# 2ac vs gitmo cp

1. permutation do both

**2. doesn’t solve relations**—lifting the embargo is essential to opening diplomatic challenges—that is our hinderael card says, “By ending the embargo Obama would indicate that he is truly willing to extend his hand once America’s traditional adversaries unclench their fists.”

**3. doesn’t solve human rights—**the counterplan doesn’t come to grips with the Cubans lack of food, electricity, and essential medicine—that’s amash

**4. doesn’t solve hegemony or credibility—**the counterplan would make America look like they are giving up on the war on terror, eviscerating any semblance of credibility that remains in Americas arsenal. Their only solvency evidence only says that it would help Cuban sovereignty NOT human rights

# 2ac vs worms

1. no internal link—their link cards do not say that ending the embargo would cause a shift away from worm production

2. no impact—their evidence is talking about the extinction of all worms ever. They do not have a card that worms are going extinct

#### 3. No internal link—cuba will not model. India will

**Rajendran et al. 08** – Professor of Zoology @Vivekananda College [P. Rajendran, E. Jayakumar, Sripathi Kandula & P. Gunasekaran “Vermiculture and Vermicomposting Biotechnology for Organic Farming and Rural Economic Development,” Eco Web, February 2008, pg. http://www.eco-web.com/edi/080211.html

Vermiculture and vermicomposting technology is easy to practice, ecologically safe, economically sound and can create more employment opportunities for the rural people to upgrade their standard of living. At present Vermiculture technology is all set to emerge as a big business of the next century. The organic manure obtained from different waste materials using this versatile technique will avoid pollution problems to a greater extent. India being agriculture based country, it could easily produce millions of tones of Vermicompost, and considerably reduce the use of chemical fertilizers.

#### 4. No internal link—Cuba remains import dependent

**Patel 13** - Research Fellow @ Institute for Food and Development Policy [R[aj Patel](http://www.slate.com/authors.raj_patel.html)|” What Cuba Can Teach Us About Food and Climate Change,” Slate, Tuesday, June 18, 2013, at 12:29 AM, pg. http://tinyurl.com/77l7b32

So has it worked? That’s up for debate. The Cuban vice minister of the economy and planning ministry reportedly said in February 2007 that [84 percent of the country’s food was imported](http://www.landaction.org/spip.php?article422" \t "_blank)—not terribly encouraging, if we are looking at Cuba to foretell our agricultural future. But a [recent paper](http://monthlyreview.org/2012/01/01/the-paradox-of-cuban-agriculture" \t "_blank) by UC-Berkeley’s [Miguel A. Altieri](http://monthlyreview.org/author/miguelaaltieri" \t "_blank" \o "Posts by Miguel A. Altieri) and the University of Matanzas’ [Fernando R. Funes-Monzote](http://monthlyreview.org/author/fernandorfunesmonzote" \t "_blank" \o "Posts by Fernando R. Funes-Monzote) suggests that while the country still imports almost all its wheat (a crop that doesn’t do well in the Caribbean), it now produces the majority of its fresh fruit and vegetables—even much of its meat. In 2007, Cubans produced more food while using one-quarter of the chemicals as they did in 1988.

#### 5. No internal link—Venezuela provides chemical fertilizer now

**Patel 13** - Research Fellow @ Institute for Food and Development Policy [R[aj Patel](http://www.slate.com/authors.raj_patel.html)|” What Cuba Can Teach Us About Food and Climate Change,” Slate, Tuesday, June 18, 2013, at 12:29 AM, pg. http://tinyurl.com/77l7b32

For many, especially government officials, choosing agro-ecology wasn’t a red-blooded Communist decision. It was a practical one. They are quite ready for an industrial-agricultural relapse if the occasion arises. Recently, they have had an unlikely enabler: Hugo Chávez. In exchange for the 31,000 Cuban doctors who are treating Venezuelans, Cuba receives 100,000 barrels of oil a day, plus a great deal of chemical fertilizer. As a result, the parts of the country untouched by agro-ecology are starting to spray and sow like it’s the 1980s again.

6. We solve the impact—lifting the embargo would open up trade between Cuba and the United States. If it’s true that Cuba has great worm tech, the plan would allow us to access the Cuban worm tech market

# 2ac vs immigration da

#### 1. Won’t pass – Obama’s scandal & GOP opposition

Bloomberg 5 – 23 – 13 [Obama Probes Create Immigration Magic as Bill Advances, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-23/obama-probes-create-immigration-magic-as-bill-advances.html]

2007 Defeat

The immigration bill stands at the same juncture a similar measure reached in June 2007, before heading for the Senate floor and collapsing after an at-times bitter floor fight, with a handful of Democrats joining Republicans to defeat it.

That could still be the current legislation’s fate. The potential damage from the scandal to Obama’s influence and the partisan fissures they could create may diminish momentum.

Also, some Democrats regard the bill’s provisions to bolster border security and enforcement as too punitive and object that it creates an arduous and costly process for undocumented immigrants to eventually gain citizenship.

And while most Republican leaders have embraced an immigration revision as a political imperative after the 2012 elections demonstrated their weakness with Hispanic voters, some parts of the party’s base remain opposed to what they regard as “amnesty.”

Some of the immigration bill’s top Republican supporters, who are risking their support from those party activists, have been the loudest voices criticizing Obama over the scandals.

#### 2. Obama losing capital on scandals

Morrissey 6 – 12 – 13 [Ed Morrissey, editor at Politico, [Politico: “Trust me” not really working for Obama, huh?, politico.com]

A couple of months ago, political analysts discussed Barack Obama’s increased political capital after winning re-election and increasing Democratic seats on Capitol Hill. These days, pundits like Glenn Thrush and Jennifer Epstein at Politico are openly wondering whether Obama and the avalanche of scandals have turned him into a liability. The scandals have eroded Obama’s greatest political asset — trust:

“Trust me” is President Barack Obama’s preferred mode of action in times of crisis — and his go-to comment to nervous staffers has always been some version of “Relax, I got this.”

But that message is an increasingly hard sell for Obama in his second term, following revelations that the man who once railed against the Bush administration over civil liberties abuses has himself surreptitiously quarterbacked the greatest expansion of electronic surveillance in U.S. history.

Obama’s call for trust, patience and near blanket secrecy is increasingly falling on deaf ears in his own party, spurring a backlash among Democrats who say it’s time for the “most transparent president in history” to provide the American people with a comprehensive explanation of a secret program that dragnets most phone records and much of the Internet.

It’s not just the scandals, either, but the administration’s response to them. When did Obama find out about the IRS targeting conservatives? When he picked up the newspaper — even though his chief of staff and White House counsel had briefed the West Wing on the scandal weeks earlier. He didn’t know that his close friend Eric Holder had named a Fox News reporter as a co-conspirator in espionage until that hit the newsstands, too. What did Obama do during the terrorist attack on Benghazi? He was “fully briefed,” but the White House refuses to say where he was and what specifically he did after the initial briefing. The administration managed to offer pictures of the Commander in Chief on the job during the Osama bin Laden raid, but all we get is a shrug when things went wrong in Benghazi.

#### 3. Lifting the embargo politically popular

Bandow 12 senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a former special assistant to former US president Ronald Reagan. [Doug Bandow, Time to End the Cuba Embargo, <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/time-end-cuba-embargo?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+CatoRecentOpeds+(Cato+Recent+Op-eds)>]

The embargo survives largely because of Florida’s political importance. Every presidential candidate wants to win the Sunshine State’s electoral votes, and the Cuban American community is a significant voting bloc.

But the political environment is changing. A younger, more liberal generation of Cuban Americans with no memory of life in Cuba is coming to the fore. Said Wayne Smith, a diplomat who served in Havana: “for the first time in years, maybe there is some chance for a change in policy.” And there are now many more new young Cuban Americans who support a more sensible approach to Cuba.

Support for the Republican Party also is falling. According to some exit polls Barack Obama narrowly carried the Cuban American community in November, after receiving little more than a third of the vote four years ago. He received 60 percent of the votes of Cuban Americans born in the United States.

Barack Obama increased his votes among Cuban Americans after liberalizing contacts with the island. He also would have won the presidency without Florida, demonstrating that the state may not be essential politically.

Today even the GOP is no longer reliable. For instance, though Republican vice-presidential nominee Paul Ryan has defended the embargo in recent years, that appears to reflect ambition rather than conviction. Over the years he voted at least three times to lift the embargo, explaining: “The embargo doesnt work. It is a failed policy. It was probably justified when the Soviet Union existed and posed a threat through Cuba. I think its become more of a crutch for Castro to use to repress his people. All the problems he has, he blames the American embargo.”

4. No internal link—obama isn’t key. Their uniqueness argument says that Boehner is essential to sway Republicans that are on the fence

5. No internal link—IRS scandal and wiretapping scandal should have depleted obamas political capital

#### 6. Political Capital makes no sense – useless concept – unforeseen events are just as likely. The consequences of losing capital are just as likely to be positive.

HIRSH 2 – 7 – 13 chief correspondent for National Journal, previously served as the senior editor and national economics correspondent for Newsweek. Overseas Press Club award for best magazine reporting from abroad in 2001 and for Newsweek’s coverage of the war on terror, which also won a National Magazine Award [Michael Hirsh, There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital, http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207]

On Tuesday, in his State of the Union address, President Obama will do what every president does this time of year. For about 60 minutes, he will lay out a sprawling and ambitious wish list highlighted by gun control and immigration reform, climate change and debt reduction. In response, the pundits will do what they always do this time of year: They will talk about how unrealistic most of the proposals are, discussions often informed by sagacious reckonings of how much “political capital” Obama possesses to push his program through.

Most of this talk will have no bearing on what actually happens over the next four years.

Consider this: Three months ago, just before the November election, if someone had talked seriously about Obama having enough political capital to oversee passage of both immigration reform and gun-control legislation at the beginning of his second term—even after winning the election by 4 percentage points and 5 million votes (the actual final tally)—this person would have been called crazy and stripped of his pundit’s license. (It doesn’t exist, but it ought to.) In his first term, in a starkly polarized country, the president had been so frustrated by GOP resistance that he finally issued a limited executive order last August permitting immigrants who entered the country illegally as children to work without fear of deportation for at least two years. Obama didn’t dare to even bring up gun control, a Democratic “third rail” that has cost the party elections and that actually might have been even less popular on the right than the president’s health care law. And yet, for reasons that have very little to do with Obama’s personal prestige or popularity—variously put in terms of a “mandate” or “political capital”—chances are fair that both will now happen.

What changed? In the case of gun control, of course, it wasn’t the election. It was the horror of the 20 first-graders who were slaughtered in Newtown, Conn., in mid-December. The sickening reality of little girls and boys riddled with bullets from a high-capacity assault weapon seemed to precipitate a sudden tipping point in the national conscience. One thing changed after another. Wayne LaPierre of the National Rifle Association marginalized himself with poorly chosen comments soon after the massacre. The pro-gun lobby, once a phalanx of opposition, began to fissure into reasonables and crazies. Former Rep. Gabrielle Giffords, D-Ariz., who was shot in the head two years ago and is still struggling to speak and walk, started a PAC with her husband to appeal to the moderate middle of gun owners. Then she gave riveting and poignant testimony to the Senate, challenging lawmakers: “Be bold.”

As a result, momentum has appeared to build around some kind of a plan to curtail sales of the most dangerous weapons and ammunition and the way people are permitted to buy them. It’s impossible to say now whether such a bill will pass and, if it does, whether it will make anything more than cosmetic changes to gun laws. But one thing is clear: The political tectonics have shifted dramatically in very little time. Whole new possibilities exist now that didn’t a few weeks ago.

Meanwhile, the Republican members of the Senate’s so-called Gang of Eight are pushing hard for a new spirit of compromise on immigration reform, a sharp change after an election year in which the GOP standard-bearer declared he would make life so miserable for the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. that they would “self-deport.” But this turnaround has very little to do with Obama’s personal influence—his political mandate, as it were. It has almost entirely to do with just two numbers: 71 and 27. That’s 71 percent for Obama, 27 percent for Mitt Romney, the breakdown of the Hispanic vote in the 2012 presidential election. Obama drove home his advantage by giving a speech on immigration reform on Jan. 29 at a Hispanic-dominated high school in Nevada, a swing state he won by a surprising 8 percentage points in November. But the movement on immigration has mainly come out of the Republican Party’s recent introspection, and the realization by its more thoughtful members, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, that without such a shift the party may be facing demographic death in a country where the 2010 census showed, for the first time, that white births have fallen into the minority. It’s got nothing to do with Obama’s political capital or, indeed, Obama at all.

The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term. Often it is a synonym for “mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful concept,” says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of political capital. But the fact is, it’s a concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.”

The real problem is that the idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong. “Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind of political capital—some sense of an electoral mandate to do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason, political capital is a concept that misleads far more than it enlightens. It is distortionary. It conveys the idea that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusive concept of political power, and it discounts the way unforeseen events can suddenly change everything. Instead, it suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest, just as someone might have real investment capital—that a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history.

Naturally, any president has practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress and a cohesive coalition behind him? Obama has neither at present. And unless a surge in the economy—at the moment, still stuck—or some other great victory gives him more momentum, it is inevitable that the closer Obama gets to the 2014 election, the less he will be able to get done. Going into the midterms, Republicans will increasingly avoid any concessions that make him (and the Democrats) stronger.

7. No impact—the current immigration bill doesn't solve the impact card. Their evidence assumes a much more comprehensive bill.

#### 8. Impossible to predict the economic benefits

**Khimm, 13** (Suzy, “How much will immigration reform cost?,” February 1st, 2013, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/02/01/how-much-will-immigration-reform-cost/>)

There’s a lot of evidence pointing to the economic benefits of adding more legal immigrants to the economy. What’s less clear is how much a comprehensive immigration overhaul would affect the federal budget.¶ While more legal immigrants could cost taxpayers more in health care, education, and other social services, they would also contribute more tax revenues. Ultimately, there will be a lot of political pressure to produce a reform that costs as little as possible, possibly even reducing the deficit in the long term.¶ In 2007, the Congressional Budget Office concluded that the Senate’s proposed bipartisan immigration reform would increase the deficit by about $18 billion over 10 years, but would have “a relatively small net effect” on the deficit over 20 years.¶ Here’s how that number breaks down: Direct federal spending on immigrants would cost $23 billion over 10 years, mostly because of Medicaid and refundable tax credits. At the same time, the overhaul would generate $48 billion in new revenue, mostly through increased Social Security taxes.¶ So under the 2007 overhaul, newly legal immigrants would have generated far more revenue than they take in from the government. It’s partly because most undocumented immigrants are working age and wouldn’t immediately incur major Social Security and Medicare costs. It’s also because the 2007 bill required immigrants to pay back taxes and forced them to wait for years before receiving federal benefits.¶ However, the process of implementing reform itself — setting up a legalization process, new enforcement measures, and so forth — carries its own price tag, of $43 billion over 10 years. So ultimately, CBO estimated that the total cost of the 2007 immigration overhaul was $18 billion.¶ How would the math work out now? Since neither Congress nor the White House has actually put out a bill, it’s not clear. But there are a few things that we do know: Obamacare expanded federal health insurance, and an estimated 7 million undocumented immigrants might theoretically qualify for coverage under its provisions, as my colleague Sarah Kliff explains.¶ That could add to the cost of immigration reform, depending on how many ultimately became legal citizens and how long they would have to wait to receive benefits. (Both the White House and the Senate gang agree that undocumented immigrants with provisional legal status wouldn’t qualify for benefits.) At the same time, it could also introduce a large number of younger, healthier people into insurance pools, which could potentially reduce overall insurance costs, says Michael Fix, senior vice-president of the Migration Policy Institute. ”The jury is still really out.”¶ It’s also unclear what the cost of implementation will be: As I’ve reported earlier, we’ve already hit most of the 2007 targets for border security, at the cost of hundreds of millions of dollars. And the Senate Gang of Eight’s plan is vague about what “securing our border” will really mean this time around. Most of the security reforms involve more use of technology, rather than personnel, but the government already has a track record of investing into tech-driven boondoggles in the name of border security.¶ So the price tag of immigration reform will really depend on legislative debate that Congress has begun to wade into. There will be a lot of pressure on Congress to produce a bill that’s either revenue-neutral or will actually reduce the deficit, both by restricting any federal spending on immigrants and limiting the upfront appropriations on implementation.

#### 9. No impact—no evidence that not passing immigration reform would plunge the economy into economic collapse. There is no evidence that the economy is collapsing now.

#### 10. Economic decline doesn’t cause war

Tir 10 Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and is an Associate Professor in the Department of International Affairs at the University of Georgia [Jaroslav Tir, “Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict”, The Journal of Politics, 2010, Volume 72: 413-425)]

Empirical support for the economic growth rate is much weaker. The finding that poor economic performance is associated with a higher likelihood of territorial conflict initiation is significant only in Models 3–4.14 The weak results are not altogether surprising given the findings from prior literature. In accordance with the insignificant relationships of Models 1–2 and 5–6, Ostrom and Job (1986), for example, note that the likelihood that a U.S. President will use force is uncertain, as the bad economy might create incentives both to divert the public’s attention with a foreign adventure and to focus on solving the economic problem, thus reducing the inclination to act abroad. Similarly, Fordham (1998a, 1998b), DeRouen (1995), and Gowa (1998) find no relation between a poor economy and U.S. use of force. Furthermore, Leeds and Davis (1997) conclude that the conflict-initiating behavior of 18 industrialized democracies is unrelated to economic conditions as do Pickering and Kisangani (2005) and Russett and Oneal (2001) in global studies. In contrast and more in line with my findings of a significant relationship (in Models 3–4), Hess and Orphanides (1995), for example, argue that economic recessions are linked with forceful action by an incumbent U.S. president. Furthermore, Fordham’s (2002) revision of Gowa’s (1998) analysis shows some effect of a bad economy and DeRouen and Peake (2002) report that U.S. use of force diverts the public’s attention from a poor economy. Among cross-national studies, Oneal and Russett (1997) report that slow growth increases the incidence of militarized disputes, as does Russett (1990)—but only for the United States; slow growth does not affect the behavior of other countries. Kisangani and Pickering (2007) report some significant associations, but they are sensitive to model specification, while Tir and Jasinski (2008) find a clearer link between economic underperformance and increased attacks on domestic ethnic minorities. While none of these works has focused on territorial diversions, my own inconsistent findings for economic growth fit well with the mixed results reported in the literature.15 Hypothesis 1 thus receives strong support via the unpopularity variable but only weak support via the economic growth variable. These results suggest that embattled leaders are much more likely to respond with territorial diversions to direct signs of their unpopularity (e.g., strikes, protests, riots) than to general background conditions such as economic malaise. Presumably, protesters can be distracted via territorial diversions while fixing the economy would take a more concerted and prolonged policy effort. Bad economic conditions seem to motivate only the most serious, fatal territorial confrontations. This implies that leaders may be reserving the most high-profile and risky diversions for the times when they are the most desperate, that is when their power is threatened both by signs of discontent with their rule and by more systemic problems plaguing the country (i.e., an underperforming economy).

# 2ac vs Cuban democracy disad

#### 1. Case outweighs—none of their impacts reach TOTAL planetary extinction

**2. Plan solves**—lifting the embargo will usher in democracy—that’s amash

#### 3. Cuban democracy is not emerging --- it’s a sham.

Associated Press, 10/20/2012. “Cuba's electoral process: Grassroots democracy or a sham? Lacks hoopla seen in many countries,” http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/10/20/cuba-electoral-process-grassroots-democracy-or-sham/.

HAVANA –  There are no flashy television ads or campaign signs spiked into front yards. And candidates definitely don't tour the island shaking hands and kissing babies.

Elections in Cuba lack the hoopla they have in other countries, but authorities here say they give people a voice in government and rebut charges that the country is undemocratic. Critics call them a sham since voters can't throw out the Communist Party long led by Fidel and Raul Castro.

A long, complicated and truly unique electoral process is under way on this communist-run island, with more than 8 million Cubans going to the polls this weekend for municipal elections. The process culminates in February, when national assembly legislators vote on who will occupy the presidency, a post held by Raul Castro since 2008.

The latest electoral exercise began in September when Cubans met in common spaces, parks and buildings for neighborhood assemblies to choose the candidates in municipal elections. Those assemblies nominated 32,000 candidates, and each electoral district must have between two and eight names on the ballot.

Sheets of paper with terse biographies and photos of the candidates were then taped up to strategically placed walls and windows in each neighborhood for residents to read. That's just about the only campaigning that's allowed.

On Sunday, Cubans will cast ballots to choose among these candidates for municipal assemblies that administer local governments and relay complaints on issues such as potholes and housing, social and sports programs.

After the local elections, commissions elected by workers, farmers, youth, student and women's groups then choose candidates for the national legislature, which eventually elects Cuba's next president.

Near-complete voter participation is expected. In 2007-2008, voter turnout was 96.8 percent.

The government says perennial high turnouts are a clear sign of support for the revolution. Dissidents say people vote for fear that not doing so could get them in trouble.

Polling places also turn into social gatherings for neighbors. Young students escort the elderly and the disabled to vote, and Cubans are reminded by state television, unions and women's groups that casting a ballot is a patriotic duty.

The entire process is devoid of party slogans, ads or logos, since only one party is legal in Cuba: the Communist Party, and its job is to "guide" society and its politics rather than impose candidates, said Ruben Perez, secretary of the National Electoral Commission.

"Voting is free, not obligatory and secret," he said. "Our system is totally transparent and we defend it like this. We think that it is very democratic.

"It is a different concept: no delegate represents any political interest, only society itself."

While the Communist Party's power and influence are enormous, candidates don't have to be party members.

But those who don't usually come from allied groups such as the Federation of Cuban Women and the neighborhood-watch Committees for the Defense of the Revolution.

The nomination assemblies also see heated debate and criticisms about local problems such as slow police response, poor water supply and garbage pickup or unauthorized vending stands that block sidewalks.

But it is rare, almost unheard of, for a candidate to be nominated against the party's wishes, and there's no real electoral threat to the country's rulers. There are no direct elections for the presidency or for Communist Party leadership posts, which critics say hold real power in the country.

Members of the island's tiny dissident community have not been nominated when they tried in the past, and many boycott a system they consider illegitimate.

"To be truly democratic, besides being free (the elections) should be competitive and the people able to choose among alternative programs and in the case here there is only one program, that of the government," said Elizardo Sanchez, a dissident who runs the non-governmental Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation.

Sanchez said that while multiparty systems have deficiencies, the island's one-party electoral process "doesn't reflect the pluralism of Cuban society."

Cuban authorities say they have no plans to change the system.

"Our adversaries and even some of our sympathizers ... demand of us, as if we were a country living under normal conditions and not under siege, that we reinstall a multiparty model," Raul Castro said at a Communist Party conference in January. But legalizing parties other than the Communist Party would be to "sacrifice the strategic arm of the unity of all Cubans that has made our dreams of independence and social justice a reality."

#### 4. Non unique: their evidence is citing a blogger that holds no political weight. The only warrant for impending democracy is due to increasing internet activity, but that does not mean a democracy is ACTUALLY coming.

**5. No link:** the plan will not *change* the motives of the organic democratic groups. They are invested in the cause to bring a more democratic society to Cuba regardless of the plan. The government would not crack down on the bloggers post plan.

#### 6. Link Turn --- lifting embargo would empower democratic groups.

[Doug Bandow](http://www.cato.org/people/doug-bandow), 12/11/2012. Senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a former special assistant to former US president Ronald Reagan. “Time to End the Cuba Embargo,” National Interest, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/time-end-cuba-embargo.

Ending the embargo would have obvious economic benefits for both Cubans and Americans. The U.S. International Trade Commission estimates American losses alone from the embargo as much as $1.2 billion annually.

Expanding economic opportunities also might increase pressure within Cuba for further economic reform. So far the regime has taken small steps, but rejected significant change. Moreover, thrusting more Americans into Cuban society could help undermine the ruling system. Despite Fidel Castro’s decline, Cuban politics remains largely static. A few human rights activists have been released, while Raul Castro has used party purges to entrench loyal elites.

Lifting the embargo would be no panacea. Other countries invest in and trade with Cuba to no obvious political impact. And the lack of widespread economic reform makes it easier for the regime rather than the people to collect the benefits of trade, in contrast to China. Still, more U.S. contact would have an impact. Argued trade specialist Dan Griswold, “American tourists would boost the earnings of Cubans who rent rooms, drive taxis, sell art, and operate restaurants in their homes. Those dollars would then find their way to the hundreds of freely priced farmers markets, to carpenters, repairmen, tutors, food venders, and other entrepreneurs.”

The Castro dictatorship ultimately will end up in history’s dustbin. But it will continue to cause much human hardship along the way.

The Heritage Foundation’s John Sweeney complained nearly two decades ago that “the United States must not abandon the Cuban people by relaxing or lifting the trade embargo against the communist regime.” But the dead hand of half a century of failed policy is the worst breach of faith with the Cuban people.

Lifting sanctions would be a victory not for Fidel Castro, but for the power of free people to spread liberty. As Griswold argued, “commercial engagement is the best way to encourage more open societies abroad.” Of course, there are no guarantees. But lifting the embargo would have a greater likelihood of success than continuing a policy which has failed. Some day the Cuban people will be free. Allowing more contact with Americans likely would make that day come sooner.

**7. No internal link:** they do NOT have a card that says other countries would model the Cuban cooperative project. The spansh cooperative should have been a model.

<It says, “No country bears as much promise in this respect than Cuba.” However, this does NOT indicate that other countries would be willing to completely abandon their economic model because Cuba adopts different economic policies. Their evidence does NOT mention the world model whatsoever.>

**8. No impact**: their turnbull impact evidence cites multiple other initiatives that would need to be adopted globally to spur economic democracies worldwide, such as income security for ALL people.

#### 9. Degrowth will fail and environmental management is possible under the current system.

[Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800910004209), 3/15/2011. Institute for Environmental Science and Technology, and Department of Economics and Economic History, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Bellaterra (Cerdanyola), Spain. Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, and Institute for Environmental Studies, VU University Amsterdam, The Netherlands. “Environment versus growth — A criticism of “degrowth” and a plea for “a-growth”,” Ecological Economics 70.5.

Degrowth proponents generally seem to think that we cannot expect too much from public policies aimed at controlling environmental problems, for two reasons: because policies are ineffective, and because their political acceptance is very low ([Schneider et al., 2010](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800910004209#bb0125)). The first is not convincing: to illustrate, we know from empirical research that people are sensitive to prices which means that price regulation of energy or CO2 definitely would alter consumption (and production) patterns and in turn reduce pollutive emissions (e.g.,[Espey et al., 1997](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800910004209#bb0050), [Espey, 1998](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800910004209#bb0040) and [Espey and Espey, 2004](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800910004209#bb0045)).

The second reason, relating to political acceptance, has two dimensions, namely a national and international one. Environmental agreements between countries at the international level are a prerequisite for the implementation of effective national policies, at least for global, transboundary environmental problems like climate change, acid rain and biodiversity loss. This is so because of two reasons: the necessity to create a level playing field (so as minimize economic costs or damage); and efficient regulation having to take into account the often uneven (internationally) spatial distribution of sensitive ecosystems (e.g., in the context of acid rain) and cost-effective options for abatement. Without a response to global climate change in the form of an effective international agreement we will be unable to stabilize GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a reasonably safe level. Governments or citizens on their own are very limited. Unilateral extreme action will be either ineffective (if lax) or economically harmful (if stringent) as it deteriorates the international competitive position of a country.

Should we be pessimistic about the process of international environmental agreement making, notably in the area of climate policy? Yes and no. Yes, because climate change seems to outpace institutional change in terms of effective agreement formation. No, because we have made quite some progress in the last two decades on scientific research, information diffusion, citizen and political awareness, and creation of international networks (IPCC, UN frameworks). Some pessimists will point at the failure of the Kyoto Protocol in terms of both effectiveness and efficiency of reducing GHGs, but at the same time Kyoto can be judged as a large step for [hu]mankind and a stepping stone for a more effective subsequent agreement. Institutional changes like international agreements, certainly for such a tough problem like climate policy, take time and require a social and international learning process. Whether we like it or not, democratic support for climate policy needs to develop slowly, which requires information transfer from science to society, education, media involvement and a great deal of public and private debate about climate change. All in all, it is too early to say that agreements and policy do not work and that we need to turn to some degrowth strategy instead (whether focusing on GDP, consumption, work-time or radical degrowth). Anyway, the political acceptability of the latter is likely to be much lower than of environmental agreements and national policies. Worse, I fear that employing the term “degrowth” really comes down to preaching to the choir, rather than enlarging the group of citizens who are genuinely concerned about the environment and critical about pleas for unconditional economic growth (i.e. the growth paradigm).

One argument of degrowth supporters against the social–political acceptability of stringent environmental regulation is that both rich and poor individuals will oppose policies that are seen to threaten their income ([Schneider et al., 2010](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800910004209#bb0125)). Apart from wondering whether this is entirely true, it raises the question whether a direct (GDP, consumption, work-time or radical) degrowth strategy could really count on more democratic support than well-formulated environmental policies? I doubt it, since a degrowth strategy will make the income losses for everyone only more visible and explicit. Drawing attention to income effects may not be a clever, effective strategy to obtain political support for one's ideas. Instead, convincing society about public policies and strategies on the basis of expected impacts on real welfare or happiness rather than on income would make more sense. Not only does real welfare represent a more adequate (social) evaluation criteria, but also it will convey a less pessimistic message. For example, even if a stringent climate policy may negatively affect (average) income growth this does not necessarily translate into a reduction of real welfare ([van den Bergh, 2010b](http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800910004209#bb0150)).