# 1NC - Venezuela

#### The US is taking a strong stance in Venezuela now – Sends a signal to others

Cárdenas 4/19/13 (José R. Cárdenas, assistant administrator for Latin America at the U.S. Agency for International Development under Bush Administration, “Obama must stand firm on Venezuela” Friday, April 19, 2013 - 12:14 PM, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/taxonomy/term/4784)

After an ill-advised overture to Hugo Chávez's government last November, the Obama administration has regained its footing with a strong, principled stance on Venezuela's contested election. Based on the razor-thin margin and opposition protests of irregularities, the administration has yet to recognize as the winner Vice President Nicolas Maduro, Chávez's anointed successor, and has instead supported a review of the vote count.

In appearances before both the House and Senate in recent days, Secretary of State John Kerry re-affirmed that position "so that the people of Venezuela who participated in such a closely divided and important election can have the confidence that they have the legitimacy that is necessary in the government going forward."

He said, "I don't know whether it's going to happen. ... [But] obviously, if there are huge irregularities, we are going to have serious questions about the viability of that government."

Kerry's statements brought the predictable howls of protest from Venezuela. "It's obscene, the U.S. intervention in the internal affairs of Venezuela," Mr. Maduro said. "Take your eyes off Venezuela, John Kerry! Get out of here! Enough interventionism!"

But no one should be intimidated by such false bravado.

Maduro is in a panic. He knows he cannot handle declining socio-economic conditions in the face of a reinvigorated opposition, dissension in his own ranks, and an engaged U.S. government standing firm on principle regarding the legitimacy of his election.

Of course, the administration will face a vociferous public campaign by chavista sympathizers pressuring it to accept Sunday's disputed result. Already, the feckless Organization of American States Secretary General José Miguel Insulza has backtracked from the organization's initial strong statement on behalf of a recount and now has accepted the result.

Recognition proponents will tell us the United States faces "isolation" in the region if the administration doesn't recognize Maduro (only Panama and Paraguay have joined the call for a recount) and that its supposed intransigence plays right into Maduro's hands, allowing him to whip up nationalist sentiment.

Nonsense. Those proposing such arguments fail to recognize that governments are pursuing interests. Certain countries such as Brazil, Colombia, and even Russia and China, have benefited greatly from economic ties with Venezuela under Chávez and their short-sighted view is to try and keep that spigot open.

Most citizens throughout the region, however, tend to be more appreciative of principles, such as the security and integrity of one's vote. One can be sure that, in case of a disputed election in their own country, they would hope to count on external support for an honest accounting in their own electoral processes.

Secondly, as the election just demonstrated, Maduro is not Chávez, and his capacity to whip up anything but official violence against Venezuelans protesting in the streets is extremely doubtful (Warning: graphic photos here). In short, no one should be misled by the noisemakers.

A continued firm stand on behalf of a clean election will resonate positively throughout the region, sending a strong signal to all democrats that the United States does indeed care and that intimidation and violence have no place in any democracy. It is not likely that such sentiments will sway Maduro and his Cuban advisors to accept any sort of recount, but it will certainly place the United States on the right side of the debates and confrontations to come.

#### US flip flop now legitimizes Maduro and undermines US influence

Christy 6/13/13 (Patrick Christy, Senior Policy Analyst “U.S. Overtures to Maduro Hurt Venezuela’s Democratic Opposition” U.S. News and World Report's World Report, June 13, 2013 <http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/us-overtures-maduro-hurt-venezuela%E2%80%99s-democratic-opposition#sthash.g3CoVrbN.dpuf> )

On the margins of a multilateral summit in Guatemala last week, Secretary of State John Kerry met with Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elias Jose Jaua, marking the Obama administration's latest attempt to reset relations with the South American nation. What's worrisome is that Secretary Kerry's enthusiasm to find, in his words, a "new way forward" with Venezuela could end up legitimizing Chavez-successor Nicolas Maduro's quest for power and undermining the country's democratic opposition and state institutions.

Since the death of Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez in March, Maduro's actions have more resembled those of a Cuban strongman than a democratically-elected official. Indeed, he has taken drastic moves to preserve his power and discredit his critics in recent months.

First, the Maduro regime is refusing to allow a full audit of the fraudulent April 13th presidential elections, as opposition presidential candidate Henrique Capriles had requested. As the Associated Press notes a full audit "would have included not just comparing votes electronically registered by machines with the paper ballot receipts they emitted, but also comparing those with the poll station registries that contain voter signatures and with digitally recorded fingerprints." However, because Chavez-era appointees loyal to the current government dominate Venezuela's National Election Council and Supreme Court – the two government institutions able to challenge election results – it is unlikely either will accept the opposition's demands for a full election recount.

Second, Maduro's government is taking steps to dominate radio and television coverage of the regime. Last month, Globovision, one of Venezuela's last remaining independent news channels, was sold to a group of investors with close ties to Maduro. Under Chavez, the independent broadcasting station faced years of pressure as government authorities frequently threatened to arrest the group's owners and journalists. To no one's surprise, the company's new ownership has banned live video coverage of opposition leader Henrique Capriles and many of the station's prominent journalists have been fired or have resigned.

Third, the regime and its allies are using fear and intimidation to silence the opposition. On April 30th, pro-Maduro lawmakers physically attacked opposition legislators on the floor of Venezuela's National Assembly. Days prior, the regime arrested a former military general who was critical of Cuba's growing influence on Venezuela's armed forces. More recently, Maduro even called for the creation of "Bolivarian Militias of Workers" to "defend the sovereignty of the homeland."

In light of all this, it remains unclear why the Obama administration seeks, in Secretary Kerry's words, "an ongoing, continuing dialogue at a high level between the State Department and the [Venezuelan] Foreign Ministry" – let alone believe that such engagement will lead to any substantive change in Maduro's behavior. To be sure, Caracas's recent release of jailed American filmmaker Timothy Tracy is welcome and long overdue. However, it is clear that the bogus charges of espionage against Tracy were used as leverage in talks with the United States, a shameful move reminiscent of Fidel Castro's playbook.

While Secretary Kerry said that his meeting with his Venezuelan counterpart included discussion of human rights and democracy issues, the Obama administration's overall track record in the region gives reason for concern. President Obama failed to mention Venezuela or Chavez's abuse of power during his weeklong trip to the region in 2011. And while Obama refused at first to acknowledge the April election results, the State Department has since sent very different signals. Indeed, Secretary Kerry declined even to mention Venezuela directly during his near 30-minute address to the plenary session of the Organization of American States in Guatemala last week.

For Venezuela's opposition, the Obama administration's eagerness to revive relations with Maduro is a punch to the gut. Pro-Maduro legislators in the National Assembly have banned opposition lawmakers from committee hearings and speaking on the assembly floor. Other outspoken critics of the regime face criminal charges, and government officials repeatedly vilify and slander Capriles. What's worse, if the United States grants or is perceived to grant legitimacy to the Maduro government, that could give further cover to the regime as it systematically undermines Venezuela's remaining institutions.

The Obama administration's overtures to Maduro's government come as the region is increasingly skeptical of the Chavez successor's reign. Last month, Capriles met with Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos in Bogota. Chile's Senate unanimously passed a resolution urging a total audit of all polling stations. And in recent weeks, opposition lawmakers led by María Corina Machado, a representative from the National Assembly of Venezuela, have held meetings in capitals around the region to educate foreign leaders about Maduro's illegitimate hold on power.

Rather than accept Maduro's strongman tactics, the Obama administration should take a firm stand and make clear to Caracas that any steps to undermine the country's constitution or threaten the opposition will be detrimental to bilateral ties with the United States. The fact is that Washington holds all the cards. Venezuela's economy is in a free-fall, Maduro's popularity is plummeting, and various public scandals – especially those related to institutional corruption – could further erode public confidence in the current government.

By resetting relations with the Maduro government now, the United States risks legitimizing the Chavez protégé's ill-gotten hold on power and undercutting the Venezuelan democratic opposition efforts to sustain and expand its popular support. It's time the Obama administration rethink this hasty reset with Maduro.

#### The US must implement strong strategies against rogue states and potential proliferators to preserve US international image

Enold 09 (Scott A. Enold, Colonel, United States Air Force, “ROGUE STATES AND DETERRENCE STRATEGY” 02-04-2009, Strategy research project)

To effectively engage rogue states who have proliferated nuclear weapons or¶ weapons of mass destruction or are attempting to proliferate them, the United States¶ must develop and implement an effective policy designed to persuade, pursue and¶ punish those governments and regimes. The United States government must possess¶ extreme tactics and measures. Preemptive targeting must be available if rogue states¶ or actors utilize nuclear terror tactics as they seek political gains or to be recognized as¶ a key participant in the world balance of power. It is imperative that rogue states or¶ actors cannot employ nuclear weapons. As rogue states acquire nuclear technology,¶ the United States must develop a range of policies to apply constant pressure on these¶ states. The United States must be prepared to demonstrate resiliency to attacks should¶ they occur. The United States government must prepare its citizens to accept the fact¶ terrorist acts will occur on the continent. The citizens must understand that every effort¶ is made to protect the population. Actors exist who seek to harm citizens or provide¶ evidence of weak resolve or weak policies inside the United States. In doing so, rouge¶ states or actors seek to secure a foothold for a continued exploitation of the United¶ States. Presently, the United States National Security Strategy does not lay out a direct¶ policy demonstrating a complete and unconditional strategy to stop rogue state or actor¶ nuclear weapon employment. There must be actionable and if necessary violent steps¶ available to take against rogue states and actors. They must to be aware of and¶ understand the harsh retaliation should they chose to utilize a nuclear option.

# 1NC – Cuba

#### US won’t lift the embargo – Fear of being the international loser

Kovalik 6/30/13 (DANIEL KOVALIK, Senior Associate General Counsel of the United Steelworkers, AFL-CIO (USW), Dr. Salim Lamrani, lecturer at Paris Sorbonne Paris IV University and Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée University and French journalist, specialist on relations between Cuba and the US, “Trying to Destroy The Danger of a Good Example The Unrelenting Economic War on Cuba” JUNE 28-30, 2013 <http://www.counterpunch.org/2013/06/28/the-unrelenting-economic-war-on-cuba/> )

Imagine then, what Cuba could do if the U.S. blockade were lifted. It is clear that the rulers of the U.S. have imagined this, and with terror in their hearts.

Indeed, Lamrani quotes former Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs, Felipe Perez Roque, as quite rightly asserting:

Why does the U.S. government not lift the blockade against Cuba? I will answer: because it is afraid. It fears our example. It knows that if the blockade were lifted, Cuba’s economic and social development would be dizzying. It knows that we would demonstrate even more so than now, the possibilities of Cuban socialism, all the potential not yet fully deployed of a country without discrimination of any kind, with social justice and human rights for all citizens, and not just for the few. It is the government of a great and powerful empire, but it fears the example of this small insurgent island.

The next critical question is how can those of good will help and support the good example of Cuba in the face of the U.S. blockade. Obviously, the first answer is to organize and agitate for an end the blockade. As a young Senator, Barack Obama said that the blockade was obsolete and should end, and yet, while loosening the screws just a bit, President Obama has continued to aggressively enforce the blockade. He must be called to task on this. In addition, Congress must be lobbied to end the legal regime which keeps the embargo in place.

In addition, we must support Venezuela and its new President, Nicolas Maduro, as Venezuela has been quite critical in supporting Cuba in its international medical mission. And indeed, one of the first things President Maduro did once elected in April was to travel to Cuba to reaffirm his support for these efforts. It should be noted that Maduro’s electoral rival, Henrique Capriles – who led an attack against the Cuban Embassy in Caracas during the 2002 coup — vowed to end support for, and joint work, with Cuba.

#### Lifting the embargo signals US weakness and strengthens the Regime

Brookes 09 (Peter Brookes, Senior Fellow, National Security Affairs, “Keep the Embargo, O” April 16, 2009, The Heritage Foundation, <http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2009/04/keep-the-embargo-o>)

Sure, it's fine to allow separated families to see each other more than once every three years -- even though Cubanos aren't allowed to visit America.

And permitting gifts to Cuban relatives could ease unnecessary poverty -- even though the regime will siphon off an estimated 20 percent of the money sent there.

In the end, though, it's still Fidel Castro and his brother Raul who'll decide whether there'll be a thaw in ties with the United States -- or not.

And in usual Castro-style, Fidel himself stood defiant in response to the White House proclamation, barely recognizing the US policy shift.

Instead, and predictably, Fidel demanded an end to el bloqueo (the blockade) -- without any promises of change for the people who labor under the regime's hard-line policies.

So much for the theory that if we're nice to them, they'll be nice to us.

Many are concerned that the lack of love from Havana will lead Washington to make even more unilateral concessions to create an opening with Fidel and the gang.

Of course, the big empanada is the US economic embargo against Cuba, in place since 1962, which undoubtedly is the thing Havana most wants done away with -- without any concessions on Cuba's part, of course.

Lifting the embargo won't normalize relations, but instead legitimize -- and wave the white flag to -- Fidel's 50-year fight against the Yanquis, further lionizing the dictator and encouraging the Latin American Left.

Because the economy is nationalized, trade will pour plenty of cash into the Cuban national coffers -- allowing Havana to suppress dissent at home and bolster its communist agenda abroad.

The last thing we should do is to fill the pockets of a regime that'll use those profits to keep a jackboot on the neck of the Cuban people. The political and human-rights situation in Cuba is grim enough already.

The police state controls the lives of 11 million Cubans in what has become an island prison. The people enjoy none of the basic civil liberties -- no freedom of speech, press, assembly or association.

Security types monitor foreign journalists, restrict Internet access and foreign news and censor the domestic media. The regime holds more than 200 political dissidents in jails that rats won't live in.

We also don't need a pumped-up Cuba that could become a serious menace to US interests in Latin America, the Caribbean -- or beyond. (The likes of China, Russia and Iran might also look to partner with a revitalized Cuba.)

With an influx of resources, the Cuban regime would surely team up with the rulers of nations like Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia to advance socialism and anti-Americanism in the Western Hemisphere.

The embargo has stifled Havana's ambitions ever since the Castros lost their Soviet sponsorship in the early 1990s. Anyone noticed the lack of trouble Cuba has caused internationally since then? Contrast that with the 1980s some time.

Regrettably, 110 years after independence from Spain (courtesy of Uncle Sam), Cuba still isn't free. Instead of utopia, it has become a dystopia at the hands of the Castro brothers.

The US embargo remains a matter of principle -- and an appropriate response to Cuba's brutal repression of its people. Giving in to evil only begets more of it. Haven't we learned that yet?

Until we see progress in loosing the Cuban people from the yoke of the communist regime, we should hold firm onto the leverage the embargo provides.

#### Not appeasing Cuba is key to maintain international order through credibility – the alternative is global wars

Henriksen 99 (Thomas H. Henriksen, U.S. foreign policy, international political and defense affairs, rogue states, and insurgencies, “Using Power and Diplomacy To Deal With Rogue States” February 1, 1999 <http://www.hoover.org/publications/monographs/27159> )

Conclusion and Recommendations

At the dawn of a new millennium, the United States finds itself entering an era of neither war nor peace. Rather, it confronts an uncertain and increasingly deadly world. We face not one arms race but many, in which weapons of mass destruction have fallen--or are falling--into the most desperate hands. Rogue adversaries covet nuclear, chemical, or biological capabilities to obliterate ancient enemies or to terrorize their way into the circles of the great powers. They are also rapidly acquiring the long-range missiles to deliver awesome destruction to our allies' and our own shores. A congressionally chartered Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States under the chairmanship of Donald Rumsfeld concluded in 1998 that Iran and North Korea will be able "to inflict major destruction on the United States" within five years and Iraq within ten. How the United States handles rogue states will be of decisive importance to America's well-being and global primacy. If it is judged timorous in the use of power, it will be open to challenge as its own vulnerability becomes apparent.

Clausewitz, the famous Prussian military theorist, emphasized that war is to be understood as the continuation of politics by other means. Our adoption of severe remedies short of declared conflict must be seen as an extension of diplomatic instruments to realize our strategic goals. Power must be employed to further diplomatic goals.

Sanctions and criminal legal proceedings make up part of our arsenal. These initial steps can build international support for more draconian measures. Offensive military operations and other measures short of war are our best defense for peace and continued security. They represent political warfare, provided, of course, that the United States has the tenacity and wherewithal to complete them once begun.

By backing away from realistic approaches we will demonstrate to our opponents that they can oppose us without cost. Our allies will take note and go their own way. This turn of events will cause still further problems down the road. If the forces of global disorder come to dominate the world scene, the human condition will be degraded, producing fertile soil for still more extreme elements to take root. The alternative to American leadership is growing international anarchy. Unless we restore power, and the credibility it represents, to U.S. diplomacy, we await the dire consequences of our feebleness.

# \*\*\*\*Neg\*\*\*\*

## Uniqueness

### Venezuela

#### US reputation is at risk – Maduro invited Snowden to spite America and protect his position

Forero and Englund 7/8/13( Juan Forero and Will Englund, Washington post reporters, “With Snowden offer, Venezuela’s Maduro is on world stage,” Washington post, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/with-snowden-offer-venezuelas-maduro-is-on-world-stage/2013/07/08/35d83f42-e812-11e2-818e-aa29e855f3ab_story_1.html> )

Newly elected and facing staggering economic problems at home despite the country’s oil wealth, Maduro appears to have made a high-pitched, openly hostile position against the Obama administration a cornerstone of his government’s foreign policy. He took his most provocative stand Friday in announcing that Venezuela would take in Snowden. On Monday, Maduro said that a letter from Snowden requesting asylum had been received and that the young American would simply have to decide when to fly to Caracas.

Maduro has accused the United States of fomenting protests against his government after his disputed April 14 election victory, which gave him the presidency his predecessor, Hugo Chávez, had held for 14 turbulent years until his death from cancer.

The Snowden saga — a young American revealing secrets the U.S. government wants to contain — provided the perfect opportunity for Maduro to take on the Obama administration, said Eduardo Semtei, a former Venezuelan government official.

“To figure internationally, to show that he is a player among big powers, he offered asylum to Snowden,” said Semtei, who had been close to Chávez’s brother, Adán, a leading ideologue in the late president’s radical movement. “This grabs headlines, and it shows that he’s a strong president, one with character, and that he’s capable of challenging the United States.”

Maduro and Venezuela came late to the Snowden saga, as tiny Ecuador, an ally also committed to opposing American initiatives, heaped praise on Snowden and expressed a willingness to help him after he had flown from Hong Kong to Moscow on June 23 to avoid American justice. When

Ecuador backed away from its initial enthusiasm over Snowden, Venezuela stepped in last week as Maduro arrived in Moscow for an energy summit.

The 50-year-old Maduro, who found his political calling as a socialist activist with close ties to Cuba, took a sharply anti-imperialist stand in embracing Snowden. He said the United States had “created an evil system, half Orwellian, that intends to control the communications of the world,” and characterized Snowden as an antiwar activist and hero who had unmasked the dastardly plans of America’s ruling elite.

Political analysts say the opportunity to take sides against Washington was simply irresistible for a government that has for years characterized itself as a moral force speaking out for the weak against “the empire,” as the United States is known in Caracas. And the fact that the secrets Snowden divulged were embarrassing to the Obama administration only gave more fuel to Venezuela, former Venezuelan diplomats and political analysts in Caracas said.

“Edward Snowden became the symbol for the anti-imperialist rhetoric, for progressivism, for international radicalism,” said Carlos Romero, an analyst and author who closely tracks Venezuela’s international diplomacy.

Venezuela helped channel the fury of Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Uruguay and Suriname after Bolivian President Evo Morales’s plane was apparently refused entry into the airspace of as many as four European countries last Tuesday because of the belief that Snowden was hiding aboard. And on Monday, Venezuela’s state media apparatus seemed to take more offense than the Brazilian government over revelations that the NSA had collected data on countless telephone and e-mail conversations in Brazil.

But former diplomats familiar with Venezuela say that there are other aspects to consider in deciphering Maduro’s support for Snowden.

Ignacio Arcaya, a diplomat who served the Chávez government in the United States in the early part of his presidency, said Maduro has had the challenge of trying to ease the concerns of radicalized sectors in his movement that have been worried about a resumption of relations with Washington now that Chávez is gone. Indeed, until recently, Maduro was spearheading an effort at rapprochement, as shown by a meeting in Guatemala on June 5 between Secretary of State John F. Kerry and his Venezuelan counterpart, Elías Jaua.

“What Maduro is doing is aimed at quieting the radical sectors of his party who think he is negotiating with the United States and think that he’s talking to private industry,” Arcaya said.

Maduro also has to consider his own unstable political position after the April 14 election, which is being contested by his challenger, Henrique Capriles, who says the vote was stolen from him. At the same time, Maduro faces millions of Venezuelans tired of the country’s sky-high inflation, rampant homicide rate and serious shortages of everything from chicken to toilet paper.

Myles R.R. Frechette, a retired American diplomat who served in Venezuela and other Latin American countries, said Maduro is using a tried-and-true strategy: loudly oppose the United States to distract from domestic problems.

“It plays very well,” said Frechette. “It’s the card to play. It’s what you’ve always got in your drawer. You open your drawer and play to your most radical elements.”

Englund reported from Moscow.

#### US Venezuelan relations at an all-time Low – No diplomatic relations remain

Villarreal 5/12/13 (Ryan Villarreal, journalist based in New York City – Specializes in Latin America, “Diplomacy War Or Political Theater? Maduro Ramps Up Anti-US Rhetoric As Venezuelan Elections Approach”, March 12 2013 1:03 PM, <http://www.ibtimes.com/diplomacy-war-or-political-theater-maduro-ramps-anti-us-rhetoric-venezuelan-elections-approach> )

The U.S. and Venezuela have both expelled diplomats from each other’s countries amid high political tensions in the South American nation following the death of President Hugo Chávez last week, ahead of new elections.

Hours before the Venezuelan government announced Chávez’s passing last Tuesday, Caracas expelled two U.S. Air Force attachés. The U.S. followed in kind, dismissing two Venezuelan diplomats on Sunday.

“Around the world, when our people are thrown out unjustly, we’re going to take reciprocal action,” Victoria Nuland, the State Department spokeswoman, said in a statement on Monday. “And we need to do that to protect our own people.”

The Venezuelan government justified its action, saying that the attachés were engaged in efforts to destabilize the country during a time of political vulnerability.

It has been suggested that Venezuela’s acting president and the socialist presidential candidate Nicolas Maduro expelled the attachés to appease supporters of his predecessor in preparation for elections scheduled for April 14. Maduro also recently accused the U.S. government of giving Chávez cancer, from which he died after a two-year battle.

“Maduro is shoring up political support within Chavismo,” said Carl Meacham, Americas Director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, the Miami Herald reported.

#### US Refusing to acknowledge Maduro as Venezuelan Leader now

Baverstock 5/17/13 (Alasdair Baverstock, Foreign Correspondent, “Venezuela's Maduro still waiting on Washington's recognition” May 17, 2013, The Christian Science Monitor, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2013/0517/Venezuela-s-Maduro-still-waiting-on-Washington-s-recognition>)

More than a month after Venezuela’s contested presidential election, President Nicolás Maduro’s narrow victory has yet to be recognized by the United States. Refusing to legitimize the new premier while a partial recount of the vote is underway, the US position has led to further political tensions in a relationship historically stressed under the leadership of former President Hugo Chávez.

A handful of countries, including Chile, Peru, and the US, have expressed concern over the democratic standards of the election, which Maduro won by a little more than 1 percent of the vote. Venezuela’s opposition party is calling for the results to be annulled, citing over 3,000 instances of election fraud, ranging from alleged multiple-voting in chavista-strongholds to polling booth intimidation.

“Obviously, if there are huge irregularities we are going to have serious questions about the viability of that government,” said Secretary of State John Kerry during a hearing of the US Foreign Affairs Committee following the announcement of President Maduro’s victory in April.

While the US has pledged not to interfere with Venezuelan politics, the refusal to recognize Maduro's presidency has left many to question what message the US is trying to send, and how – if at all – it will impact Venezuela post-Chávez.

“[The US isn’t] recognizing or failing to recognize,” says David Smilde, professor of sociology at the University of Georgia. “They’re just waiting. But here in Venezuela that’s seen as an act of belligerence.”

'Symbolic'

The US’s reluctance to accept the new leader affects little in economic terms; the heavy crude is still flowing steadily from the Venezuelan oil fields into US refineries, a trading relationship upon which Venezuela relies heavily, particularly following the recent slump in global oil prices. In fact, many believe the US’s reluctance to legitimize Maduro amounts to little more than a message to other regional observers.

“Maduro is certainly now the president of Venezuela,” says Mark Jones, professor of political science at Rice University in Texas. “The US’s refusal to recognize him is more symbolic than anything else. Ignoring Maduro’s win sends a signal to other Latin American countries that these elections didn’t meet minimum democratic standards.”

Other observers cite the socialist leader’s continued belligerence toward Washington – Maduro blames the US government’s “dark forces” for the death of Mr. Chávez and has pursued the provocative rhetoric of his predecessor – as a factor in the US’s reluctance to recognize Maduro as president.

“You can’t blame the US for not extending their hand,” says Mr. Smilde. “Maduro has been denouncing US conspiracies since the day Chávez died.”

Maduro reacted publicly to President Obama’s announcement that the US was withholding recognition of his victory by describing the US president as the “Grand chief of devils” and threatening to cut off oil exports to the country. “That’s an entirely hollow threat,” says Professor Jones, “96 percent of Venezuela’s export revenues come from oil, so Maduro is not going to do anything to upset that.”

### Cuba

#### US Cuban relations low now - Cuba wants the US to make more concessions

Taylor 6/18/13 (Guy Taylor, State Department correspondent, “U.S.-Cuba mail talks spark speculation of wider outreach” The Washington Times, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jun/18/us-cuba-mail-talks-spark-speculation-wider-outreac/> )

The announcement that U.S. and Cuban officials will hold landmark talks this week toward restarting direct mail service between the two nations prompted a mix of reactions on Monday on whether the Obama administration plans a broader outreach to the Castro regime in the president’s second term.

Veteran Cuba watchers agreed that the development is unlikely to trigger a wider normalization in relations any time soon. But the notion that the talks — slated for Thursday and Friday — could pull Washington and Havana closer than they’ve been in more than half a century prompted a harsh reaction from at least one Republican on Capitol Hill.

Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Florida Republican, said that the White House is caving to pressure from Cuban leaders desperate to end trade restrictions frozen since the 1960s.

“The regime is once again manipulating the U.S. administration in this game because it wants us to lift the embargo and make further concessions,” said Mrs. Ros-Lehtinen, a former chairwoman of the House Foreign Relations Committee and a staunch opponent of easing the stand-off that has defined bilateral relations since Cuban leader Fidel Castro agreed to house Soviet ballistic missiles in 1961.

Mr. Castro, 86, stepped down in 2008, and the top post is now held by his 82-year-old brother Raul.

The State Department said Monday that the postal talks will occur well within policy boundaries set long ago by Congress.

The talks will be led by R. Cabanas Rodriguez, the chief of mission at the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, and Lea Emerson, the U.S. Postal Service’s director of international postal affairs.

Similar negotiations in 2009 failed to produce an agreement. Separate negotiations on issues such as immigration have been on hold during recent years amid tensions simmering between the U.S. and Cuba over the trade embargo and Washington’s unwillingness to remove Cuba from its official list of state sponsors of terrorism.

Washington has also demanded that Cuba release jailed American subcontractor Alan Gross, who was arrested in December 2009 while working for a U.S. Agency for International Development-funded program. Cuban authorities gave a 15-year prison sentence to Mr. Gross and accused him of illegally delivering satellite phones to individuals in the nation’s Jewish community

## Links

### Generic

#### The plan is appeasement, which should be avoided at all costs.

Dueck 06 (Colin Dueck, associate professor in the Department of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University, Strategies for Managing Rogue States, Orbis, Volume 50, Issue 2, Spring 2006, Pages 223–241)

Appeasement

The strategy of appeasement, while seemingly discredited after 1938, has recently attracted surprising and favorable attention from scholars of international relations.2 Part of the problem surrounding the term has been a failure to agree on its meaning. Properly speaking, appeasement is not synonymous with diplomatic negotiations or diplomatic concessions, but refers only to those cases where one country attempts to alter or satiate the aggressive intentions of another through unilateral political, economic, and/or military concessions.3

It is sometimes argued that appeasement can work under certain circumstances, and that Neville Chamberlain's performance at Munich in 1938 was simply a case of appeasement badly handled.4 The drawbacks of appeasement, however, are inherent. They lie in the fact that concrete concessions are made by one side only, while the other side is trusted to shift its intentions from hostile to benign. With this strategy, there is nothing to stop the appeased state from pocketing its gains and moving on to the next aggression.5 Britain's rapprochement with the United States in the 1890s is often described as a successful case of appeasement.6 Skillful British diplomacy indeed played a part in significantly improving relations between the two over the course of that decade, but that case does not deserve the term. The United States was not particularly hostile to Great Britain in the first place, and no vital conflicts of interest existed between the two powers. The Anglo-American rapprochement was more the result than the cause of that commonality of interests.7 In sum, appeasement—strictly defined—is a strategy best avoided. Realistic bargaining or negotiations involving mutual compromise and presumably fixed intentions is another matter entirely, however, and should not be confused with appeasement.

### A2 Appeasement Solves

#### International consensus means nothing – Empirics prove, if we don’t use force we must not make concessions

Henriksen 99 (Thomas H. Henriksen, U.S. foreign policy, international political and defense affairs, rogue states, and insurgencies, “Using Power and Diplomacy To Deal With Rogue States” February 1, 1999 http://www.hoover.org/publications/monographs/27159 )

Shows of Strength and Armed Interventions to Coerce or Eliminate Rogue Governments

Rogue regimes, by their very nature, are less persuaded by appeals to the fine points of international law and customary diplomatic practices than by armed force. Coercive diplomacy is initiated after, or in response to, a hostile action, whereas deterring a foe dissuades him from undertaking an activity by threatening retaliation. But the principle is similar. Strong displays of force can contribute to persuasion as well as deterrence. Tyrants traditionally treat conciliatory actions in response to egregious behavior with contempt: Hitler interpreted Chamberlain's appeasement over Czechoslovakia at Munich as weakness, America's cruise missile retaliation for an Iraqi attempt on former President Bush's life during his 1993 visit to Kuwait did not discourage Baghdad from dispatching army units right up to the border of the oil-rich kingdom in 1994. To resist the Iraqi aggression, Washington had to deploy American troops to Kuwait.

Showing the flag aggressively should not be perceived as an end in itself. Or the target may call the showman's bluff. During the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, Washington demonstrated enough political resolve and military power that Moscow backed down and withdrew its missile batteries from Cuban soil. This standoff became a classic case of a superpower using force to prevent a fundamental change in the balance of power in a vital region.

The exercise of power must not be undercut by ill-advised concessions. For instance, in May 1998 the Clinton administration prompted NATO to display its air power close to Serbia's borders to persuade Milosevic to curb his forces in the province of Kosovo. But the Clinton administration then offered to lift the recently imposed investment bans on Serbia, hoping to facilitate U.S. special envoy Richard Holbrooke's peace negotiations with Belgrade. Subsequent American and NATO policy failed to make up for the misstep, and the situation worsened as special Serb police and army units committed a wave of well-publicized atrocities against Kosovo Albanians during the succeeding five months.

During the Soviet era, deterrence was a mainstay of U.S. policy toward Moscow's nuclear threat. In the post=ncold war period, deterrence may also dissuade rogue regimes from spreading biological agents or launching nuclear-armed missiles. But if rogue players persist in deadly actions, then a preemptive strike or counterassault may be in order. Iraq, as an illustration, ignored the U.N. Security Council ultimatum in November 1990 to withdraw from Kuwait during the course of the American-led military buildup in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf. Conflict became the only effective option. Hostilities broke out weeks later as coalition forces counterattacked to drive the Iraqis from Kuwait.

The 1980s witnessed more-accomplished uses of military power for diplomatic motives. In a dramatic exercise, Ronald Reagan ordered the invasion and temporary occupation of Grenada in October 1983. During the two preceding years, Washington had looked with deepening concern at the hundreds of Cuban soldiers who were working on Grenadan construction projects, especially the airport. It soon became apparent that the airport's expansion was intended for military use, not tourism as was officially announced. Reagan's hand was forced when a radical Marxist Soviet-Cuban putsch endangered several hundred American medical students studying on the small Caribbean island, alarming Barbados, Antigua, Dominica, and other tiny states of the region. The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) urged the United States to bring order to Grenada and restore democratic government.

A series of reports from Grenada heightened the Reagan administration's fears for the safety of the medical students. Those anxieties deepened when the Grenadan government imposed brutal martial law to suppress legitimate opposition and closed the airport to international landings. After an urgent public appeal from the OECS for U.S. military intervention, the ensuing air and sea invasion encountered some stiff but isolated resistance from the twenty-five hundred Cuban and Grenadan troops. But it soon rescued the students without their suffering any fatalities, repatriated the Cuban contingent, and restored American credibility worldwide. The large-scale military deployment raised American standing after the decline it had suffered with the loss of 241 U.S. Marines in a terrorist bombing in Beirut, followed by the precipitous American departure from Lebanon. The rippling effect of Reagan's projection of power in the Caribbean also had an immediate and proximate reaction. Suriname, located not far from Grenada, reversed its political course and expelled a large Cuban garrison in the wake of the U.S. assault.

President Reagan also struck at Colonel Muammar Qaddafi in retribution for a series of state-sponsored terrorist incidents occurring over several years that culminated in the bombing of a West German discotheque in which two U.S. servicemen died. Long frustrated by being unable to build a coalition among European allies that would impose effective sanctions, the United States retaliated days later with air strikes. Bombs hit Qaddafi's residence and military installations, nearly killing the Libyan dictator. After the bombardment, Libya appeared politically subdued, and some believed that it had been deterred from future terrorism. That judgment was only partially correct; during the balance of the 1980s Qaddafi used violence but sought to disguise his hand in it.13 For its part, the United States incurred world opprobrium when the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution condemning the American raid on Libya.

Fighting subversion can invite terrorist reprisals. Reagan's air strikes on Libya probably resulted in the downing of Pan American flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in December 1988, which killed 259 people aboard the jumbo jet and 11 others on the ground. Evidence pointed to two Libyan agents as having placed the bomb aboard the U.S.-bound flight. The Bush administration responded by getting U.N. sanctions against Libya and insisting that Qaddafi surrender the two suspects for trial either in the United States or in Scotland. To date, Qaddafi has refused to comply but seems open to holding the trial in an unnamed third country.

As the Libyan case demonstrates, counterterrorism--whether punishment or preemptive assaults--can breed a cycle of violence for which the American people must be prepared. A chain reaction of terrorism has already unfolded in the wake of the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on August 7, 1998. If the future reflects the past, terrorists will certainly avenge President Clinton's firing of cruise missiles at a pharmaceutical plant suspected of producing nerve gas in Sudan and at the paramilitary training camps in Afghanistan. Neither the administration's unconvincing one-shot, remote-control counterattacks nor its bank pincers on the financial assets of Osama bin Laden will win the "war on terrorism." It will take a determined and sustained campaign. A riskless, terrorist-free world is simply beyond realistic attainment, just as is a crime-free society. But a hollow reaction will invite evermore subversion and casualties.

History teaches that a massive application of power is sometimes the only method to deal with a rogue. For example, General Manuel Noriega's corrupt military dictatorship in Panama had bedeviled U.S. drug interdiction efforts for years. Grand juries in Tampa and Miami indicted Noriega for drug trafficking and racketeering in February 1988. Washington's economic sanctions failed to change Noriega's behavior. No opposition movement existed that was capable of wresting power from him, for he enjoyed the backing of the Panama Defense Forces. He put down an attempted coup in March and spurned offers of amnesty in return for going into exile.

America's initial reluctance to employ military force only steeled Noriega's determination to holdout against U.S. economic pressure. His fraudulent claim to reelection in May 1989 deepened skepticism in Bush administration circles that Noriega could be deposed by internal opponents. Panamanian military thugs had also assaulted and killed two American servicemen and attacked members of their families stationed in the Canal Zone. Believing that Noriega's presence endangered the smooth transfer of the canal to Panamanian authority, Bush opted for military intervention. In December 1989 a U.S. airborne invasion--the largest deployed since the Vietnam War--dismantled the PDF, captured Noriega, transported him to a Miami jail to await federal trial and eventual conviction, and restored democracy to Panama.

Finally, Bush led the largest military coalition since World War II to expel Iraq from Kuwait in 1990. He mobilized a 500,000-strong U.S.-led force, convinced a reluctant Congress to back a war against Baghdad, and organized a thirty-nation coalition, many of them Arab countries, to repulse Iraq. His achievement represented a post=ncold war high-watermark in U.S. leadership resolved to back American diplomacy with real power.

The Grenada, Panama, and Iraq expeditionary operations shared salient similarities despite their geographic and political differences. Each concentrated massive martial force for limited and achievable strategic objectives. Each succeeded in periods measured in months rather than years. Each saw an American president reach out for international support but fail to win universal consensus. Each witnessed a determined Washington push ahead in the face of domestic and foreign opposition. Each thus represents a milestone in the deployment of forceful measures for national purposes. Reagan and Bush relished foreign affairs. Clinton shirks them. Their records reflect their emphases.

### A2 Cooperation Solves

#### Obama must stand strong, it sends a signal – Empirics prove, Carter was a flop

Carafano 10 [( James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. Vice President, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, E. W. Richardson Fellow, and Director, “Lesson from Jimmy Carter: Weakness invites aggression” September 12, 2010, Heritage Foundation](file://C:\\Users\\Herndon\\Desktop\\College Topic\\ENDI\\Heg & Politics Wave\\Appeasement Cards\\( James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. Vice President, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, E. W. Richardson Fellow, and Director, \“Lesson from Jimmy Carter: Weakness invites aggression\” September 12, 2010, Heritage Foundationhttp:\\www.heritage.org\\research\\commentary\\2010\\09\\lesson-from-jimmy-carter-weakness-invites-aggression)

[http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2010/09/lesson-from-jimmy-carter-weakness-invites-aggression](file://C:\\Users\\Herndon\\Desktop\\College Topic\\ENDI\\Heg & Politics Wave\\Appeasement Cards\\( James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. Vice President, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, E. W. Richardson Fellow, and Director, \“Lesson from Jimmy Carter: Weakness invites aggression\” September 12, 2010, Heritage Foundationhttp:\\www.heritage.org\\research\\commentary\\2010\\09\\lesson-from-jimmy-carter-weakness-invites-aggression))

"Detente," Ronald Reagan once quipped, "isn't that what a farmer has with his turkey -- until Thanksgiving Day?'

When Reagan took over the White House he planned to make his foreign policy everything that Jimmy Carter's was not. Carter had tried accommodating America's enemies. He cut back on defense. He made humility the hallmark of American diplomacy.

Our foes responded with aggression: Iranian revolutionaries danced in the rubble of the U.S. Embassy; the Soviets sponsored armed insurgencies and invaded Afghanistan.

Later in his presidency, Carter tried to look tough. He proposed a modest increase in defense spending; pulled the United States out of the Moscow Olympics; and slapped an embargo on wheat exports to the Soviet Union. These actions hurt high jumpers and American farmers, but didn't faze our enemies. It was too little, too late.

As Reagan entered his presidency, the U.S. economy and the American spirit were low. Still, he committed to a policy of "peace through strength." And, even before he put his plan into action, our enemies began to worry.

Yuri Andropov, the chief of the KGB -- the Soviet's spy network -- feared that Reagan planned to attack. "Andropov," wrote Steven Hayward, in his "Age of Reagan"ordered the KGB to organize a special surveillance program in the United States -- code-named Operation RYAN -- to look for signs of preparations for an attack."

Reagan's assertive approach to foreign policy did not spark war. It produced peace. The Kremlin discovered Reagan was not the cowboy they feared. But they respected the more muscular United States. Russia agreed to the most effective arms control treaty in history.

The benefits spread. According to the Canadian-based Human Security project, deaths from political violence worldwide (even accounting for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq) have declined continually since the end of the Cold War ... until recently.

Reagan's opponents never understood the importance of peace through strength. When the Gipper went to negotiate economic strategy with House Speaker Tip O'Neil, he was told Congress would cut $35 billion in domestic spending only if Reagan pared the same amount from the Pentagon budget.

Reagan refused. Defense was not the problem, he told O'Neil. Defense was less than 30 percent of spending, down from nearly half the budget when John F. Kennedy had been president. (Today, Pentagon spending is less than one-fifth of the budget.) Keeping America safe, free, and prosperous, he concluded, doesn't start with making the nation unsafe.

Small wonder that people are saying the world looks like a rerun of the Carter years. The Obama Doctrine possesses many Carteresque attributes: a heavy reliance on treaties and international institutions; a more humble (and, often, apologetic) U.S. presence around the globe, and a diminishment of U.S. hard power.

And the Obama Doctrine has reaped pretty much the same results. When asked if he feared a U.S. military strike against his country's nuclear program, the Iranian president scoffed at the notion.

Meanwhile, after yielding to Russian complaints and canceling plans to build missile defenses against an Iranian attack, Obama signed an arms control treaty which, the Kremlin boasts, will further limit our missile defense. Yet Moscow still complains that the more limited system the Obama administration wants to field is too much. Once again, American concessions have only encouraged Moscow to be more aggressive.

Even in Iraq and Afghanistan, the White House's commitments are laced with qualifiers that encourage our nation's friends and enemies to doubt U.S. resolve.

Put simply, if President Obama continues to pursue a Carteresque foreign policy -- talking softly while whittling away at the stick -- he will only put American lives and the prospects of peace at greater jeopardy.

### Appeasement Happens

#### Engagement risks appeasement

HAASS & O’SULLIVAN 00 a. VP & Director of Foreign Policy Studies at Brookings, b. Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at Brookings [Richard N. Haass and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies 113, Survival, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 113–35]

While policy-makers should give greater consideration to the idea of engagement, incentives will be applicable only in a limited set of circumstances. In addition, unlike other foreign-policy tools, engagement is open to charges of appeasement from its critics. Sceptics have also argued that engagement strategies can invite problems of moral hazard, where a cash-strapped regime watching America ‘buy out’ North Korea’s nuclear programme may be inspired to embark on its own endeavour in the hopes of later ‘selling’ it to the US. Moreover, as a strategy that often depends on reciprocal actions between the US and the target country, engagement is likely to involve even higher risks and uncertainties than other foreign-policy strategies. But both the promises and the risks suggest the urgent need for a considered analysis of the strategy of engagement. Guidelines need to be formulated, drawing on instances where the US and Europe have previously used incentives rather than employed penalties alone in dealing with recalcitrant regimes. Two critical questions must be asked: when should policy-makers consider engagement; and how should engagement strategies be managed in order to maximise the chances of success?

#### Engagement creates capital within the regime to use for their own purposes – even if unintended

HAASS & O’SULLIVAN 00 a. VP & Director of Foreign Policy Studies at Brookings, b. Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at Brookings [Richard N. Haass and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies 113, Survival, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 113–35]

However, some cautionary words are in order. Almost any economic incentive enhances the foreign-exchange supply of unsavoury regimes which, even if not used directly for nefarious behaviour, can free up other reserves for such purposes. In addition, certain types of economic incentives – such as aid or the provision of material goods – have a limited ability to ensure compliance with agreements or ongoing moderated behaviour. To the extent that they involve one-off transfers, such incentives can fuel a cycle of demands as the engaged regime seeks to maximise the ‘price’ extracted for the desired changes. Therefore, policy-makers should seek to employ economic incentives, such as the adjustment of tariff rates or investment or trade credits, which are selfperpetuating in the sense that they provide enduring benefits to both sides as long as the relationship is viewed as mutually beneficial. Similarly, the provision of aid or other goods with economic value spaced out over an extended period of time – such as the regular delivery of fuel oil to North Korea throughout the late 1990s – can also provide motivation for ongoing compliance.

### Venezuela

#### Corruption in Venezuela gets them rogue state status

O’ Reilly, A. 7/10/13 (Writer/Producer at Fox News Latino) http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2013/07/10/corruption-rampant-from-us-to-venezuela-study-finds/#ixzz2YltmVbcl

But rampant corruption seems to be a more recent problem in Venezuela. Citizens seem to be concerned over the perceived corruption among the country’s public officials and civil servants – in large part to the country’s consolidation of power under former President Hugo Chávez and current leader Nicolás Maduro. “The intensity of corruption in Chávez’s Venezuela has had a strong political and social component, in addition to the purely financial,” [wrote Gustavo Coronel of the Cato Institute](http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/four-hotbeds-corruption-venezuela). “The conversion of democratic Venezuela into a rogue state has been based in systematic violations of the constitution and the laws and in the progressive elimination of administrative and institutional checks and balances.” Salas reiterated this sentiment, saying that under Maduro the same subsystem of cronyism and corruption has been able to be sustained. “It’s mostly weakness of the institution,” he said. “When the leader is a demanding force, all the other public offices don’t function the way they’re supposed to.”

#### Engagement with Venezuela undermines US influence

Christy. P 3/15/13 (Patrick Christy is a senior policy analyst at the Foreign Policy Initiative.) “Obama must stand up for Democracy in Post-Chavez Venezuela” <http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/03/15/after-chavez-us-must-encourage-democratic-venezuela>

For over a decade, Chavez led ideologically-driven efforts to erode U.S. standing in Latin America and around the globe. The populist leader expanded Venezuela's ties with rogue states such as Cuba and Iran, aided and protected terrorist organizations such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and actively undermined the rule of law in Venezuela and throughout the Americas. In the Western Hemisphere alone, Chavez used record petrol prices to prop up anti-American socialist leaders, most notably in Bolivia, Cuba and Nicaragua. Chavez leaves behind a broken economy, a deeply divided nation and a dysfunctional government, all of which will take years—if not decades—to overcome. Venezuela is plagued with double-digit inflation, mounting budget deficits and rising levels of violence. While the OPEC nation maintains one of the world's largest geological oil reserves, crude exports—which [account](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/09/world/americas/venezuelas-role-as-oil-power-diminished.html) for roughly 45 percent of federal budget revenues—have declined by nearly half since 1999. The United States imports roughly one million barrels from Venezuela per day. Chavez's protégé Nicolas Maduro, the former vice president who's now acting as Venezuela's interim president, is running to succeed the late strongman, but it's not preordained that he'll win. It remains to be seen the extent to which he can properly unite prior to the election the many competing populist factions that benefited under Chavez for so many years. What is clear is that he will drape himself in the political ideology of chavismo in the run up to April 14 elections, and use—and quite possibly abuse—government institutions and petrodollars in attempt to woo the country's voters. What's perverse is how the Obama administration's move to "reset" relations with Maduro is doing more to legitimize him as the rightful heir to Venezuela's presidency than to resuscitate relations between the two governments. The move showed itself to be even more naive after Maduro accused the United States of plotting to poison Chavez shortly after the strongman's death. Washington must realize that a strategy of engagement alone will not ensure a renewed and improved partnership with Caracas. Failure to realize this will not only undermine whatever influence America has in the months ahead, but also send a troubling signal to Venezuela's increasingly united political opposition. The Obama administration should instead pursue a more principled policy towards a post-Chavez Venezuela. In particular, it should:

### Cuba

#### Lifting travel bans on Cuba helps the regime and sends a signal of weakness to others

Suchlicki 07 (Jaime Suchlicki is Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami, “Don't Lift the Cuba Travel Ban” Front Page Magazine, Wednesday, April 11, 2007, http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=26082)

There are a number of reasons the Cuba travel ban should not be lifted at this time:

* American tourists will not bring democracy to Cuba. Over the past decades hundreds of thousands of Canadian, European and Latin American tourists have visited the island. Cuba is not more democratic today. If anything, Cuba is more totalitarian, with the state and its control apparatus having been strengthened as a result of the influx of tourist dollars.
* The assumption that tourism or trade will lead to economic and political change is not borne out by empirical studies. In Eastern Europe, communism collapsed a decade after tourism peaked. No study of Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union claims that tourism, trade or investments had anything to do with the end of communism. A disastrous economic system, competition with the West, successive leadership changes with no legitimacy, anti-Soviet feeling in Eastern Europe and the failed Soviet war in Afghanistan were among the reasons for change.
* There is no evidence to support the notion that engagement with a totalitarian state will bring about its demise. Only academic ideologues and those interested in economic gains cling to this notion. Their calls for ending the embargo have little to do with democracy in Cuba or the welfare of the Cuban people.
* The repeated statement that the embargo is the cause of Cuba’s economic problems is hollow. The reasons for the economic misery of the Cubans are a failed political and economic system. Like the communist systems of Eastern Europe, Cuba’s system does not function, stifles initiative and productivity and destroys human freedom and dignity.
* As occurred in the mid-1990s, an infusion of American tourist dollars will provide the regime with a further disincentive to adopt deeper economic reforms. Cuba’s limited economic reforms were enacted in the early 1990s, when the island’s economic contraction was at its worst. Once the economy began to stabilize by 1996 as a result of foreign tourism and investments, and exile remittances, the earlier reforms were halted or rescinded by Castro.
* The assumption that the Cuban leadership would allow U.S. tourists or businesses to subvert the revolution and influence internal developments is at best naïve.
* Money from American tourists would flow into businesses owned by the Castro government thus strengthening state enterprises. The tourist industry is controlled by the military and General Raul Castro, Fidel’s brother.
* American tourists will have limited contact with Cubans. Most Cuban resorts are built in isolated areas, are off limits to the average Cuban, and are controlled by Cuba’s efficient security apparatus. Most Americans don’t speak Spanish, will have limited contact with ordinary Cubans, and are not interested in visiting the island to subvert its regime. Law 88 enacted in 1999 prohibits Cubans from receiving publications from tourists.
* While providing the Castro government with much needed dollars, the economic impact of tourism on the Cuban population would be limited. Dollars will trickle down to the Cuban poor in only small quantities, while state and foreign enterprises will benefit most.
* Tourist dollars would be spent on products, i.e., rum, tobacco, etc., produced by state enterprises, and tourists would stay in hotels owned partially or wholly by the Cuban government. The principal airline shuffling tourists around the island, Gaviota, is owned and operated by the Cuban military. Carlos Lage, the czar of the Cuban economy, reiterated that the economic objective of the Cuban government is “to strengthen state enterprises.”
* Once American tourists begin to visit Cuba, Castro would restrict travel by Cuban-Americans. For the Castro regime, Cuban-Americans represent a far more subversive group because of their ability to speak to friends and relatives on the island, and to influence their views on the Castro regime and on the United States. Indeed, the return of Cuban exiles in 1979-80 precipitated the mass exodus of Cubans from Mariel in 1980.
* Lifting the travel ban without any major concession from Cuba would send the wrong message “to the enemies of the United States”: that a foreign leader can seize U.S. properties without compensation; allow the use of his territory for the introduction of nuclear missiles aimed at the United Sates; espouse terrorism and anti-U.S. causes throughout the world; and eventually the United States will “forget and forgive,” and reward him with tourism, investments and economic aid.
* Since the Ford/Carter era, U.S. policy toward Latin America has emphasized democracy, human rights and constitutional government. Under President Reagan the U.S. intervened in Grenada, under President Bush, Sr. the U.S. intervened in Panama and under President Clinton the U.S. landed marines in Haiti, all to restore democracy to those countries. The U.S. has prevented military coups in the region and supported the will of the people in free elections. While the U.S. policy has not been uniformly applied throughout the world, it is U.S. policy in the region. Cuba is part of Latin America. A normalization of relations with a military dictatorship in Cuba will send the wrong message to the rest of the continent.
* Supporting regimes and dictators that violate human rights and abuse their population is an ill-advised policy that rewards and encourages further abuses.
* A large influx of American tourists into Cuba would have a dislocating effect on the economies of smaller Caribbean islands such as Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, the Bahamas, Puerto Rico, and even Florida, highly dependent on tourism for their well being. Careful planning must take place, lest we create significant hardships and social problems in these countries.
* Since tourism would become a two-way affair, with Cubans visiting the United States in great numbers, it is likely that many would stay in the United States as illegal immigrants, complicating another thorny issue in American domestic politics.
* If the travel ban is lifted unilaterally now by the U.S., what will the U.S. government have to negotiate with a future regime in Cuba and to encourage changes in the island? Lifting the ban could be an important bargaining chip with a future regime willing to provide irreversible concessions in the area of political and economic freedoms.
* The travel ban and the embargo should be lifted as a result of negotiations between the U.S. and a Cuban government willing to provide meaningful political and economic concessions or when there is a democratic government in place in the island.

## Impacts

### Credibility

#### The US must implement strong strategies against rogue states and potential proliferators to preserve US international image

Enold 09 (Scott A. Enold, Colonel, United States Air Force, “ROGUE STATES AND DETERRENCE STRATEGY” 02-04-2009, Strategy research project)

To effectively engage rogue states who have proliferated nuclear weapons or¶ weapons of mass destruction or are attempting to proliferate them, the United States¶ must develop and implement an effective policy designed to persuade, pursue and¶ punish those governments and regimes. The United States government must possess¶ extreme tactics and measures. Preemptive targeting must be available if rogue states¶ or actors utilize nuclear terror tactics as they seek political gains or to be recognized as¶ a key participant in the world balance of power. It is imperative that rogue states or¶ actors cannot employ nuclear weapons. As rogue states acquire nuclear technology,¶ the United States must develop a range of policies to apply constant pressure on these¶ states. The United States must be prepared to demonstrate resiliency to attacks should¶ they occur. The United States government must prepare its citizens to accept the fact¶ terrorist acts will occur on the continent. The citizens must understand that every effort¶ is made to protect the population. Actors exist who seek to harm citizens or provide¶ evidence of weak resolve or weak policies inside the United States. In doing so, rouge¶ states or actors seek to secure a foothold for a continued exploitation of the United¶ States. Presently, the United States National Security Strategy does not lay out a direct¶ policy demonstrating a complete and unconditional strategy to stop rogue state or actor¶ nuclear weapon employment. There must be actionable and if necessary violent steps¶ available to take against rogue states and actors. They must to be aware of and¶ understand the harsh retaliation should they chose to utilize a nuclear option.

### China

#### Maintaining a good image and success in international issues avoids US Sino Conflict

Dobbins 12 (James Dobbins, American diplomat who served as United States Ambassador to the European Union and as Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. Member of the American Academy of Diplomacy “War with China” August 1 2012 ) CA

While the risk of conflict with China cannot be ignored, neither should¶ it be exaggerated. Any number of other conflicts are more likely, some in¶ places we cannot even vaguely foresee at present. These more likely conflicts¶ will be with opponents quite different from China and will call for capabilities¶ quite dissimilar from those required to deal with a real peer competitor.¶ Individually, these contingencies will be less consequential than a conflict¶ with China, but collectively they will shape the international environment¶ in which both countries interact, and will fundamentally influence Chinese¶ perceptions of American power and determination. Coping successfully¶ with these smaller challenges may be one of the best ways to ensure that the¶ United States and China never have to fight the larger conflict.

#### China is planning on an attack – It’s a question of when

Nyquist 11 (Jeff Nyquist, former Russia analyst for the DOD, Zhang Zhaozhong, professor at the Chinese National Defense University, “Warning from a Chinese Professor”, 12/5/2011, <http://www.financialsense.com/contributors/jr-nquist/2011/12/05/warning-from-a-chinese-professor> ) CA

China’s Major Gen. Zhang Zhaozhong has reportedly said that China must be prepared to fight World War III if Iran is attacked by the United States. According to Zhang’s logic, China’s security is tied to Iran’s security. Zhang further suggested that China may need to fight such a war for domestic political reasons; namely, that as China’s economy cools so will the population’s enthusiasm for the ruling Communist Party. In bad economic times, a global war would redirect popular discontent against a foreign enemy. Zhang Zhaozhong is a professor at the Chinese National Defense University, and published a book in 1999 titled Who is the Next Target? Of course, the target is America. In writing this, Zhang was not merely expressing a personal opinion. The Chinese regime is Communist, and this actually signifies something – though this **signification is masked behind a façade of peaceful cooperatio**n and economic partnership. Communists are violently committed to the overthrow of global capitalism. Therefore, capitalism in China has been built by the Communist Party for Communist ends. Those who do not know this have forgotten their political ABCs. Of course, China’s best media commentators would say General Zhang is exaggerating, and does not represent the official Chinese position. If what he said was wrong or outrageous, then why hasn’t he been fired from his post by the government? But is Zhang’s comment serious? Could China wage a global war with the United States in support of Iran? Obviously, China could not do this alone. Russia would have to join with the Chinese, because China does not have a sufficient nuclear arsenal; that is, unless a Georgetown University research project, directed by a former Pentagon official, is correct in its estimation that China could have as many as 3,000 nuclear warheads in underground tunnels. This contention has, of course, been challenged. The FAS Strategic Security Blog says “China Does Not Have 3,000 Nuclear Weapons,” and gives the argument that China has only produced an estimated two tons of plutonium for weapons, which is only enough to make 450-650 warheads. One might ask, however, whether we actually know how much nuclear material the Chinese actually possess? The 363-page Georgetown study was partly based on a 400-page manual issued by China’s strategic rocket corps (Second Artillery), and takes into account the vast extent of China’s military tunnel system. Why would such a system exist, if not as housing for nuclear weapons? China has been secretive about aspects of its military buildup. Recently, the Chinese managed to build a new class of submarine so that Western defense analysts didn’t know it existed until units had already been built and launched. This degree of secrecy, and the success of this secrecy, tells us something. **China’s policy vis-à-vis the United States is not friendship. China’s policy is to use** capitalism against the capitalists, to use **peace as** a means to war. China’s economic advance has a strategic dimension. China’s unfair trading practices are strategically designed. China’s policies in Africa and the Middle East have secured new allies and military positions from which China can close off key waterways. Chinese military aid invariably goes to America’s enemies around the globe, and trade with America provides money for these and other strategic operations. On 2 December the Associated Press published a story titled, “Minister: China Wants to Invest in US Roads, Rails,” by Joes McDonald. Using its dollar assets, China wants to invest in U.S. and British infrastructure. Is such investment innocent? Or is it part of a long range plan? Arguably, such an investment could not be innocent. In fact, China’s clandestine services and the People’s Liberation Army have long been infiltrating Canada in an attempt to build a strategic highway into America’s flank. A secret study conducted by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canadian Intelligence Service (CIS) in June 1997 revealed the existence of a “multifaceted threat to Canada’s national security based on concrete facts drawn from the databanks” of law enforcement and intelligence services. Former Canadian officials with knowledge of the report have publicly warned that Canada is being inwardly corrupted by Chinese business (and criminal) syndicates. In fact, those who tried to stop the Chinese penetration of Canada failed when the Sidewinder Report was buried and ignored. According to the Sidewinder Report, “By using [business] alliances, the Chinese government is trying to gain influence on Canadian politics by maximizing their presence over some of the country’s economic levers.” As the report further explained, Chinese money is used to gain a strategic foothold within the country’s economy: “To that end, they proceed initially to buy and/or legally set up a company in Canada that, once under their control, buys other companies and so on.” The resulting domino effect “acts like a well-spun web or network at strategic points.” The Chinese military buildup, combined with Chinese economic penetration of Canada and the U.S., is not part of an innocent game. It is part of a strategic game, with the ultimate intention of eliminating the United Statesas a world economic and military power. The result of such elimination would entail unspeakable atrocity, terror and mass death. Only if one pays close attention to the growing effectiveness of anti-American agitation-propaganda can the individual obtain some idea of the proposed and Communist-inspired “sequence of events.” Major Gen. Zhang is not alone in talking of nuclear world war. Last month Russian Admiral Victor Kravchenko told Izvestia that an attack on Russian warships protecting Syria “would be regarded as a declaration of war with all the consequences.” Iran and Syria are allied with Russia and China. The future of the Middle East is, in some respect, tied to Russian and Chinese plans. As Russia actively assists with building a nuclear weapons infrastructure for Iran, the expectation is not actually a direct nuclear war between America and Russia (or America and China). Everything is being done so that a future nuclear war will occur between the crazy Iranian Islamists and the “American imperialists.” In following this plan, Moscow is adopting a strategic model invented by Josef Stalin. It was Stalin who enabled Hitler to attack Poland in 1939, triggering a war between Germany and the West. Today Moscow enables Iran to attack Israel , triggering a war that Russia will be in a position to benefit from. After all, if Iran closes the Strait of Hormuz, the Russians will make enormous profits from oil exports. China’s Major Gen. Zhang Zhaozhong is a voice among many. He is part of a chorus with Russian, Syrian, Iranian, Cuban, North Korean and Venezuelan voices. It is hard to say whether the anti-Western coalition is bluffing. These countries do not share the liberal Western concern for human life. Democracy and freedom are not values they embrace. What seems to be embraced, most of all, is a nuclear strike potential that can be used to level the playing field.

#### US Sino nuclear war would be devastating and China would win

McDaniel 2007 (Aby McDaniel, “United States vs China - Consequences of a Nuclear War” The Internationalist http://www.abytheliberal.com/world-politics/united-states-vs-china-consequences-of-a-nuclear-war) CA

A nuclear war between China and United States will likely be a US first strike on China. Due to its smaller arsenal and limited number of ICBMs, China would not risk a first strike on the US mainland. Hence, we will assume a US first strike and what follows. In the advent of a US first strike on China, the targets are more likely to be Chinese ICBM silos, as the US would first attempt to eliminate chances of retaliation as much as possible. A US attack on China’s ICBM silos would kill at least 1.5 million to 20 million civilians depending on the type and the number of warheads used. Assuming that most of its land based silos have been destroyed, China’s choice of retaliatory strike would be its submarine based SLBMs. Assuming that 12 JL-2 SLBMs with MIRV warheads are launched from two Jin class submarines, at least 20 of the largest American cities could be targeted. This would result in extermination of 25 million to 100 million civilians, which would be more devastating on the US than the first strike would be on China.

If we take more realistic standards, a nuclear war between China and USA would result in much higher casualties for both sides, due to real world lack of considerations. One would most likely obliterate the other or worse, both countries would be destroyed before a truce or victory call could be reached. It is more likely that Americans would suffer the most because of their lower population and lack of creature comforts (that they are habituated to). The Chinese on the other hand, would have more suvivours because of their much larger population, which is also much more adapted to adversity and wars than the American people.

#### Heg can’t solve – The US is a waning power, China is growing

Kaplan 10 (Robert D. Kaplan, senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and a correspondent for the Atlantic, “Where's the American empire when we need it?” Friday, December 3, 2010, The Washington Post, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/03/AR2010120303448.html> ) CA

North Korea already plows onward with its nuclear weapons program, even as it lobs artillery shells on a South Korean island, demonstrating the limits of both U.S. and Chinese power in a semi-anarchic world. During the Cold War, North Korea was kept in its box by the Soviet Union while the U.S. Navy dominated the Pacific as though it were an American lake. Now China's economic dominance of the region, coupled with our distracting land wars in the Middle East, is transforming the western Pacific from a benign and stable environment to a more uncertain and complex one.

China's navy is decades behind America's, but that should offer little consolation. The United States, having just experienced asymmetric warfare on land, should now expect asymmetric challenges at sea. With its improving mine-warfare capability, seabed sonar networks and cyber-warfare in the service of anti-ship ballistic missiles, not to mention its diesel-electric and nuclear submarines, China will make U.S. Navy operations more dangerous over the coming years.

As for Taiwan, China has 1,500 short-range ballistic missiles pointed at the island, even as hundreds of commercial flights each week link Taiwan with the mainland in peaceful commerce. When China effectively incorporates Taiwan in the years to come, that will signal the arrival of a truly multipolar and less predictable military environment in East Asia.

In the Middle East we see the real collapse of the Cold War imperial order. The neat Israeli-Arab dichotomy that mirrored the American-Soviet one has been replaced by a less stable power arrangement, with a zone of Iranian influence stretching from Lebanon to western Afghanistan, pitted against both Israel and the Sunni Arab world, and with a newly Islamic, and no longer pro-Western, Turkey rising as a balancing power.

Yes, empires impose order, but that order is not necessarily benevolent, as Iran's budding imperial domain shows. U.S. threats against Iran lack credibility precisely because of our imperial fatigue resulting from Iraq and Afghanistan. Out of self-interest we will probably not involve ourselves in another war in the Middle East - even as that very self-interest could consign the region to a nuclear standoff.

One standard narrative is that as we recede, China will step up as part of a benign post-American world. But this presupposes that all imperial powers are the same, even when history clearly demonstrates that they are not. Nor does one empire sequentially fill the gap left by another.

While the Soviet Union and the United States were both missionary powers motivated by ideals - communism and liberal democracy - through which they might order the world, China has no such grand conception. It is driven abroad by the hunger for natural resources (hydrocarbons, minerals and metals) that it requires to raise hundreds of millions of its citizens into the middle class.

This could abet the development of a trading system between the Indian Ocean, Africa and Central Asia that might maintain peace with minimal American involvement. But who is to fill the moral void? Does China really care if Tehran develops nuclear weapons, so long as it has access to Iran's natural gas? And Beijing may not be entirely comfortable with the North Korean regime, which keeps its population in a state of freeze-frame semi-starvation, but China props it up nevertheless.

It can be argued that with power comes moral responsibility, but it will probably be decades before China has the kind of navy and air force that would lead it to become an authentic partner in an international security system. For the moment, Beijing gets a free ride off the protection of the world's sea lanes that the U.S. Navy helps provide, and watches us struggle to stabilize Afghanistan and Pakistan so that China can one day extract their natural resources.

If the Cold War was an epoch of relative stability, guaranteed by a tacit understanding among empires, we now have one waning empire, that of the United States, trying to bring order amid a world of rising and sometimes hostile powers.

Looming over all of this is the densely crowded global map. Across Eurasia, rural populations have given way to megacities prone to incitement by mass media and to destruction by environmental catastrophe. Lumbering, hard-to-deploy armies are being replaced with overlapping ballistic missile ranges that demonstrate the delivery capabilities of weapons of mass destruction. New technologies make everything affect everything else at a faster and more lethal rate than ever before. The free flow of information, as the WikiLeaks scandal makes clear, and the miniaturization of weaponry, as the terrorist bombings in Pakistani cities make clear, work against the rise and sustenance of imperial orders.

The American empire has always been more structural than spiritual. Its network of alliances certainly resembles those of empires past, and the challenges facing its troops abroad are comparable to those of imperial forces of yore, though the American public, especially after the debacles in Iraq and Afghanistan, is in no mood for any more of the land-centric adventures that have been the stuff of imperialism since antiquity.

Americans rightly lack an imperial mentality. But lessening our engagement with the world would have devastating consequences for humanity. The disruptions we witness today are but a taste of what is to come should our country flinch from its international responsibilities.

### Human Rights turn

#### Consistency turns Human Rights – only when there is consistency can there be human rights solvency

Rotberg 07 (Robert I. Rotberg, professor in governance and foreign affairs, “Worst of the Worst: Dealing with Repressive and Rogue Nations” Chapter one: “Repressive, Aggressive, and Rogue Nation-States: How Odious, How Dangerous?” 2007, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/press/books/2007/worstoftheworst/worstoftheworst_chapter> )

Likewise, because it is only among the highly repressive states that the real¶ rogues—the aggressive and dangerous rogues—will be found, policy actions¶ can and should be crafted to encourage those outlaw states to adhere more¶ strictly to global basic values. Incentives can be provided by the big powers¶ and international order to elicit behavioral reforms. If not, the international¶ system and the United Nations will have a transparent foundation on which¶ to base a campaign of sanctions, possibly leading to forceful initiatives under¶ chapter VII of the UN Charter.55

The proliferation of nuclear arms, chemical or biological capabilities, and¶ light weapons is dangerous and destabilizing, as is regime support of transborder terrorism. Of equal concern as a threat to stability and normative¶ behavior is internal repression. In order to achieve a more peaceful, prosperous world, it behooves the UN and big powers to act consistently against the¶ repressors. Only by their so doing will widespread deprivations of human¶ rights and the immiseration of whole peoples over long periods of time be¶ reduced. State-sponsored oppression is just as dangerous in terms of lives lost¶ and opportunities forfeited as state-sponsored terrorism. Explicitly measuring and labeling highly repressive states, and showing how they attack their¶ own citizens, is the ﬁrst step toward reform and the improved well-being of¶ millions of the poorest and most abused peoples of the world.

## Cuba

### A2 Appeasement Solves

#### Appeasement in Cuba will fail – empirics prove

Cárdenas 12 (José R. Cárdenas, assistant administrator for Latin America at the U.S. Agency for International Development under Bush Administration, “How Not to Appease a dictatorship” Friday, Monday December 31, 2012, <http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/12/31/how_not_to_appease_a_dictatorship> )

Do we really need another lesson on the folly of attempting to appease dictators?

Apparently, Foreign Affairs thinks so -- albeit inadvertently. They recently posted a piece, "Our Man in Havana," about the heroic efforts of some Obama administration officials to give the Castro regime everything it wanted for the release of jailed development worker Alan Gross. Specifically, this meant gutting the official U.S. democracy program for Cuba that Gross was operating under. In the end, however, they just could not overcome the intransigence of -- not the Castro regime -- but the "Cuban-American Lobby" in Congress.

Indeed, not only did they not wind up with the long-suffering Gross's freedom, but, to boot, former Assistant Secretary of State Arturo Valenzuela was forced to sit through a humiliating meeting with Cuban officials ranting about all the dictatorship's grievances against the United States. As the article puts it, "The Cubans were far less flexible than the Americans expected." (One doesn't know whether to laugh or cry.)

The central figure in this drama of high diplomacy is one Fulton Armstrong, a controversial former CIA analyst who began a second career as a staffer for Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry (D-MA). (Today, he is affiliated with American University.) Armstrong was such an unabashed promoter of U.S.-Cuba normalization in the inter-agency process that he was shipped off to Europe during the Bush 43 administration, although not before playing a role in trying to scuttle John Bolton's nomination to serve as U.S. representative to the United Nations.

Apparently, Armstrong was enlisted by the administration to serve as a go-between with the Castro regime, no doubt due to the fact that he was a "friendly face" in the eyes of the Cubans. His mission: convince the Castro regime that the Obama administration agrees with them that USAID's Cuba democracy programs "are stupid" and that, in the words of Armstrong, "we're cleaning them up. Just give us time, because politically we can't kill them."

The article also includes other Armstrong-sourced inanities meant to further discredit the USAID program: that he was told by a "State Department official" that Gross's mission was "classified" and by another that Gross "likely worked for the Central Intelligence Agency." Apparently, Armstrong needs new sources, because such assertions are nonsense and known to be by anyone remotely associated with the program (as I was during my time with the Bush administration.)

The ever-resourceful, man-on-a-mission Armstrong even enlisted his former boss, Senator Kerry, in the appeasement effort, arranging for him to meet with Cuban officials in New York. The article reports, "there was no quid pro quo, but the meeting seemed to reassure the Cubans that the democracy programs would change, and the Cubans expressed confidence that Gross would receive a humanitarian release shortly after his trial." (That was in March 2011.)

Enter the villain: Senator Bob Menendez (D-NJ), a member of the nefarious "Cuban American Lobby." He supposedly called Denis McDonough, Obama's deputy national security adviser, to say basically hands off the Cuba program. According to a former government official, "McDonough was boxed in." Now, there's a tough call: side either with a lawless dictatorship or with an influential U.S. senator from your own party

In the end, the effort to appease the Castro regime ended predictably: no freedom for Alan Gross and only utter contempt from Castro regime lackeys. Indeed, is there any mystery why Gross continues to languish in a Cuban jail cell when, according to Armstrong, unnamed administration officials signal to the Cubans that they think the democracy program is "stupid" as well? Moreover, offering to gut a democracy program because a dictatorship opposes it sends a terrible message to authoritarian regimes around the globe.

As I have written several times before, the best approach to securing Alan Gross's freedom is not giving in to the demands of an illegitimate regime, but by denying it things it wants and needs, such as U.S. tourists spending hard currency under currently licensed travel programs. Let's hope this Fulton Armstrong-led fiasco puts an end to any more appeasement attempts and the issue is placed in the hands of those with a more sober understanding of the nature of the Castro regime

### A2 Cuba Wants the Embargo

#### Cuba wants the embargo removed, It’s desperate

Franks 12 (Jeff Franks, Reuters “Cuba says ending U.S. embargo would help both countries”, Reuters, Thu Sep 20, 2012 3:52pm http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/20/us-cuba-usa-embargo-idUSBRE88J15G20120920)

The embargo, fully in place since 1962, has done $108 billion in damage to the Cuba economy, but also has violated the constitutional rights of Americans and made a market of 11 million people off limits to U.S. companies, Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez told reporters.

"The blockade is, without doubt, the principal cause of the economic problems of our country and the essential obstacle for (our) development," he said, using Cuba's term for the embargo.

"The blockade provokes suffering, shortages, difficulties that reach each Cuban family, each Cuban child," Rodriguez said.

He spoke at a press conference that Cuba stages each year ahead of what has become an annual vote in the United Nations on a resolution condemning the embargo. The vote is expected to take place next month.

Last year, 186 countries voted for the resolution, while only the United States and Israel supported the embargo, Rodriguez said.

Lifting the embargo would improve the image of the United States around the world, he said, adding that it would also end what he called a "massive, flagrant and systematic violation of human rights."

That violation includes restrictions on U.S. travel to the island that require most Americans to get U.S. government permission to visit and a ban on most U.S. companies doing business in Cuba, he said.

"The prohibition of travel for Americans is an atrocity from the constitutional point of view," Rodriguez said.

Cuba has its own limits on travel that make it difficult for most of its citizens to leave the country for any destination.

Rodriguez said the elimination of the embargo would provide a much-needed tonic for the sluggish U.S. economy.

"In a moment of economic crisis, lifting the blockade would contribute to the United States a totally new market of 11 million people. It would generate employment and end the situation in which American companies cannot compete in Cuba," he said.

Obama, who said early in his presidency that he wanted to recast long-hostile U.S.-Cuba relations, has been a disappointment to the Cuban government, which expected him to do more to dismantle the embargo.

He has lifted some restrictions on travel and all on the sending of remittances to the island, but Rodriguez said he has broadened the embargo and its enforcement in other areas.

Fines against U.S. and foreign companies and individuals who have violated the embargo have climbed from $89 million in 2011 to $622 million so far this year, he said.

U.S.-Cuba relations thawed briefly under Obama, but progress came to a halt when Cuba arrested U.S. contractor Alan Gross in Havana in December 2009.

Gross was subsequently sentenced to 15 years in prison for setting up Internet networks in Cuba under a controversial U.S. program that Cuba views as subversive.

Rodriguez dodged questions about how U.S. policy toward Cuba might change if Obama is re-elected in November or if Republican candidate Mitt Romney wins the presidency, but said whoever is in office will have a chance to make history.

"Any American president would have the opportunity to make a historic change," he said. "He would go into history as the man who rectified a policy that has failed."

### A2 States Trade Now

#### It isn’t unrestricted State trade – Human rights abuses prevent it

Fender 09 (Jessica Fender, Denver Post Writer “Colorado eyes trade with Cuba” 07/27/2009, The Denver Post, <http://www.denverpost.com/comicsold/ci_12920052> )

"The state is preparing for the likely adoption of new federal legislation that would allow companies to more actively promote trade exports," said Evan Dreyer, spokesman for Gov. Bill Ritter. "We do what the Colorado marketplace demands. We serve them ... within the framework established by the federal government."

The Ritter administration's position is a reversal of the posture held by his predecessor, Owens.

"I too felt the pressure from some in the ag community to do this, but I wouldn't allow state tax dollars to subsidize this kind of mission," Owens said. "(The Castros are) directly responsible for personally murdering thousands of people. This will help that regime stay in power."

Mauricio Claver-Carone of the U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC, an anti-Castro group, says Cuba is using the agriculture sales in an effort to influence U.S. policy toward the nation by buying from states and seeking their help lobbying Congress.

Claver-Carone said U.S. companies can do business only with a quasi-governmental import agency run by the Castro family.

"We will be for (opening trade with Cuba) the day when U.S. farmers and the people in Colorado can do business with the Cuban people — when Cubans can open up a business or a fruit stand," Claver-Carone said. "This doesn't help the Cuban people."

### A2 Obama Appeasing Now

#### Obama has done limited appeasement now – but it’s only backfired to embolden the dictatorship – proves the need to back-off

Diaz-Balart, B. (Mario Diaz-Balart is a United States Congressman representing the 25th district of Florida.) Press- Release “Obama's Policies toward Cuba and Venezuela: Ignorance is NOT Bliss” <http://mariodiazbalart.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/obamas-policies-toward-cuba-and-venezuela-ignorance-is-not-bliss>

President Obama clearly wants to continue his failed policy of providing unilateral concessions to the Castro dictatorship, and expects that the murderous regime will in turn ‘recognize that their system is no longer working.’ Yet during his three and a half years in office, the regime has responded by holding hostage American humanitarian aid worker Alan Gross, murdering four political prisoners of conscience, and increasing its brutal oppression against the Cuban people. That President Obama continues to reach out a hand to the Cuban dictatorship, and ignores the brave pro-democracy movement in Cuba, is an outrage. It is deeply disturbing that in the face of the regime’s demonstrated depravity, President Obama continues to expect that his acts of appeasement will somehow convince the regime to ‘recognize that their system is no longer working.’ Miraculously, the President fails to notice that it is precisely his policies which have increased the channeling of U.S. dollars to the Cuban dictatorship and have only emboldened it further. Clearly President Obama’s policies are ‘working’ just fine for the Castro brothers. ¶ “As to Venezuela, President Obama said that Chavez ‘has not had a serious national security impact’ on the United States. His willful ignorance on this matter is shocking from a U.S. president. The President must have forgotten that his own State Department expelled the Venezuelan consul general in Miami for plotting against U.S. security interests, and that Chavez fiercely supports the State Sponsors of Terrorism Iran, Syria, and Cuba, and the terrorist organizations, the FARC and Hezbollah, with his vast petroleum resources, safe harbor, and access to credit.¶ “It is dangerous that President Obama is utterly blind to the brutal nature of the Castro dictatorship, and to the grave threats posed by Hugo Chavez’s committed support for terrorist states and organizations. The Castro dictatorship and Chavez actively work against U.S. interests and in coordination with other U.S. foes. In our dangerous world, it is appalling that the United States has a President who completely fails to appreciate serious threats within our own hemisphere.”

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## Non UQ

### General

#### Non-Unique- US has no credibility now Robbins. J 2/13/13 (James S. Robbins is a senior fellow in national security affairs at the American Foreign Policy Council) “Rogue nations shrug off Obama's threats” http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/02/12/james-robbins-state-of-the-union/1914225/

In his State of the Union Address, President Obama pledged that "America will continue to lead the effort to prevent the spread of the world's most dangerous weapons." Strong words. But then again, he says that every year, and the rogue states don't seem to take notice. Obama keeps talking, and the proliferaters keep proliferating. On Tuesday, North Korea conducted its [third nuclear test](http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/02/11/earthquake-north-korea-nuclear-test/1911587/), prompting Obama to threaten that the United States would "lead the world in taking firm action in response to these threats." But the White House has issued no specific threats, and has no action plan. Pyongyang knows it can act with impunity because Obama's threats are not credible. In the 2010 State of the Union address, Obama warned North Korea that it "faces increased isolation, and stronger sanctions." In 2011, he said that we "insist that North Korea keeps its commitment to abandon nuclear weapons." And in 2012, he chose not to mention Pyongyang's nuclear program at all. Obama also lectured Iran, demanding that "they meet their obligations," and pledged the U.S. will "do what is necessary to prevent (Tehran) from getting a nuclear weapon." But we heard this before, too, in 2012, 2011 and 2010, when Obama threatened Iran "will face growing consequences. That is a promise." Yet Iran's nuclear weapons program has continued apace. And solid evidence exists that Iran and North Korea are collaborating on nuclear weapons development. Iran might even be inspired by North Korea's example. Pyongyang has proved that even a country as poor and dysfunctional as North Korea can not only develop and test nuclear weapons, but also can do so without significant consequences. Iran is wealthier than North Korea, more technologically advanced and governed by a committed, revolutionary government. If North Korea can defy Obama's empty threats, Iran can, too. Despite his annual bluster, Obama has failed to formulate an effective, credible strategy to deal with the growing danger of rogue state nuclear programs. An Iranian nuclear weapon is only a matter of time.

### Venezuela

#### Non unique – The US already sent the wrong signal

Cárdenas 6/14/13 (José R. Cárdenas, assistant administrator for Latin America at the U.S. Agency for International Development under Bush Administration, “How Not to Treat the Neighborhood Bully” Friday, June 14, 2013 - 3:00 PM, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/taxonomy/term/4784)

Trying to track the course of U.S. policy toward Venezuela is enough to give one whiplash. Where a few weeks ago Barack Obama's administration appeared to take a principled stand behind opposition protests asserting that this April's presidential election to elect Hugo Chávez's successor was stolen, today it seems to have tossed the opposition overboard as it seeks to normalize relations with the disputed government of Nicolás Maduro.

Even as opposition leader Henrique Capriles has been traveling to regional capitals seeking support for his campaign for a clean election, someone at the State Department evidently thought it was perfect timing for a smiling, handshaking photo op between Secretary of State John Kerry and Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elías Jaua at last week's Organization of American States meeting in Guatemala.

Certainly it would be understandable if a U.S.-Venezuelan rapprochement was the product of some identifiable change in that government's behavior -- some nod to the legitimacy of the opposition's complaints, maybe a commitment to stop berating the United States and friendly countries, or perhaps even a public pledge to finally cooperate on counternarcotics policy. Yet none of this has occurred.

Instead, this is what we have seen from the Maduro government in the last few months:

* Accused the United States of giving Chávez his cancer
* Repeatedly accused the United States of fomenting instability in Venezuela, including alleging that former U.S. officials had entered the country to poison him
* Expelled two U.S. military attachés from the U.S. Embassy, accusing them of destabilizing the country
* Insulted Obama as "the big boss of the devils"
* Arrested a U.S. filmmaker (subsequently released) on spurious charges of espionage
* Accused the United States of trying to assassinate Capriles and make it look like it was the government
* Accused former Colombian President Álvaro Uribe of trying to assassinate Maduro
* Accused the opposition of purchasing 18 U.S. warplanes to be based in Colombia
* Accused Salvadoran mercenaries of trying to kill Maduro
* Denounced the Peruvian foreign minister for suggesting that Latin American countries could help mediate political tensions in Venezuela (the minister was forced to resign)
* Accused CNN of fomenting a coup against his government
* More closely aligned Venezuela with the Castros' Cuba than anything ever seen under Chávez

Not exactly what you would call a charm offensive.

Indeed, the only thing we have seen from the Maduro government since its tainted victory is an accelerated offensive to replace the Castro regime as the bully in the Latin American neighborhood, using threats both explicit and implicit to intimidate anyone daring to criticize its anti-democratic actions.

#### Non-Unique- Full relations coming in the SQ/ Venezuela in bad shape - needs US engagement

**Cordoba and Vyas 6/5/13(JOSÉ DE CÓRDOBA in Mexico City and KEJAL VYAS in Caracas are both correspondents at the Wall Street Journal)** <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324798904578527182521405120.html>

The officials said Venezuela requested the meeting. In recent months, both countries have sought to restore full diplomatic ties, including the return of ambassadors that were removed after a 2010 dispute following years of tense relations. But those efforts were sidelined last year amid former President Hugo Chávez's deteriorating health, his death in March and elections in April. "This clears the underbrush," said a U.S. official.¶ "We have faith and confidence that this meeting marks the beginning of a relationship of respect and good relations," Mr. Jaua said. He added he would seek to ensure that the U.S. avoids "meddling in internal affairs" in Venezuela.¶ Mr. Kerry thanked Mr. Jaua for Mr. Tracy's release and said the two countries agreed to find "a new way forward."¶ A U.S. official added the U.S. wouldn't stop pressing Venezuela to ensure democracy and individual freedoms.¶ Calixto Ortega, Venezuela's newly named chargé d'affaires in Washington, who attended the Guatemala meeting, said in a telephone interview that the two countries agreed on a plan to normalize ties and resume cooperation on antiterrorism, antinarcotics operations and energy. He said he would be in "permanent contact" with Roberta Jacobson, the U.S.'s top diplomat for Latin America.¶ Mr. Ortega didn't specify why the filmmaker was released.¶ "If someone wants to interpret that as an action that will have an impact on improving relations with the U.S., they are free to do so," he said. "It's a gesture from Venezuela but it's not an event that will influence greatly to advance our goal to improve relations."¶ Analysts cautioned that improving relations could prove difficult. "Venezuela is in such terrible shape that it needs the U.S., but at the same time the government has to keep up its anti-U.S. rhetoric" to please some segments of his supporters, said Michael Shifter, president of the Washington-based Inter-American Dialogue think tank. "The big question is whether [President Nicolás] Maduro is politically strong enough to carry it off."¶ U.S. officials said former U.S. Rep. William Delahunt of Massachusetts and Mr. Ortega played key roles in Mr. Tracy's liberation. "I think this might signal the beginning of a new chapter in American-Venezuelan relations," Mr. Delahunt said.

### Cuba

#### Non UQ – We have appeased already – Legalized agricultural trade and eased restrictions

Hanson and Lee 13 (Stephanie Hanson is associate director and coordinating editor at CFR.org. She manages the editorial production of the website and covers economic and political development in Africa and Latin America. Brianna Lee is Senior Production Editor at CFR, January 31, 2013, “U.S.-Cuba Relations,” <http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113>)

What is the status of U.S.-Cuba relations?

They are virtually nonexistent. There is a U.S. mission in Havana, Cuba's capital, but it has minimal communication with the Cuban government. Since 1961, the official U.S. policy toward Cuba has been two-pronged: economic embargo and diplomatic isolation. The George W. Bush administration strongly enforced the embargo and increased travel restrictions. Americans with immediate family in Cuba could visit once every three years for a maximum of two weeks, while family remittances to Cuba were reduced from $3,000 to just $300 in 2004. However, in April 2009, President Obama eased some of these policies. He went further in 2011 to undo many of the restrictions imposed by the Bush administration, thus allowing U.S. citizens to send remittances to non-family members in Cuba and to travel to Cuba for educational or religious purposes.

Congress amended the trade embargo in 2000 to allow agricultural exports from the United States to Cuba. In 2008, U.S. companies exported roughly $710 million worth of food and agricultural products to the island nation, according to the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council. However, that number fell by about 50 percent in 2012. Total agricultural exports since 2001 reached $3.5 billion as of February 2012. Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Texas have all brokered agricultural deals with Cuba in recent years.

Despite initial optimism over Obama's election, Cuban politicians and citizens are less hopeful of a positive relationship developing between the two countries.

Tension between Cuba and the United States flared in December 2009 with Cuba's arrest of Alan Gross, a USAID subcontractor who traveled to the country to deliver communications equipment and arrange Internet access for its Jewish community. Cuban authorities alleged Gross was attempting to destabilize the Cuban regime through a USAID-sponsored "democracy promotion" program, and he was subsequently sentenced to fifteen years in prison.

Despite initial optimism over Obama's election, Cuban politicians and citizens are less hopeful of a positive relationship developing between the two countries. Raúl and Fidel Castro have both criticized the Obama administration. In a 2009 speech, Raúl Castro accused the United States of "giving new breath to open and undercover subversion against Cuba."

#### Non UQ - US is looking into new cooperation efforts with Cuba already

Taylor 7/4/13 (Guy Taylor, State Department correspondent, “Private talks hint at change in U.S.-Cuba relationship” The Washington Times, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/4/private-talks-hint-at-change-in-us-cuba-relationsh/> )

The State Department has quietly been holding talks with a small but diverse cadre of Cuban natives in Washington — including democracy activists offering insider views of the communist island’s politics — that analysts say could send shock waves through the long-standing debate about what a future U.S. policy toward Cuba should look like.

Obama administration officials are mum on the closed-door meetings, including one held at Foggy Bottom last week with renowned Cuban hunger-striker Guillermo Farinas, who came bearing a somewhat paradoxical message: Most pro-democracy activists now operating in Cuba, which has been a Communist dictatorship and a U.S. enemy for more than a half-century, oppose lifting the long-standing U.S. embargo on trade with their nation.

Such realities may not surprise close Cuba watchers, who say U.S. officials have known for years that ending the embargo might unleash a flow of badly needed foreign cash to the government of President Raul Castro — enhancing its ability to crush the island’s fragile pro-democracy movement.

But activists like Mr. Farinas are now being allowed to inject their views directly into the heart of Washington’s foreign policy establishment, ironically because he and other dissidents have been allowed to take advantage of January’s historic lifting by the Castro government of a decades-old ban on travel abroad.

“The activists are feeling with their blood and bones the repression of the Cuban security apparatus,” said Mauricio Claver-Carone, executive director of the U.S.-Cuba Democracy PAC in Washington.

U.S. policymakers “now get to actually see it and feel it firsthand from the protagonists themselves,” he said. “That’s extraordinary and it’s very helpful.”

The impact such visits are having on the Obama administration, however, is a subject of debate.

Mr. Farinas’ visit occurred in the shadow of headlines from a landmark meeting last month between U.S. and Cuban officials, who talked about possibly re-establishing direct mail service between the two nations. The two nations plan to meet July 17 to talk about regulating migration.

Together, the negotiations have some in Washington wondering whether the Obama administration is looking to break the stalemate that has defined U.S. relations with Havana since Cuban leader Fidel Castro agreed to house Soviet ballistic missiles in 1961.

Mr. Castro, 86, stepped down in 2008, and the top post is now held by his 82-year-old brother, who has allowed such incremental reforms as the easing of the ban on his citizens’ travel. Raul Castro has said that he will step down when his five-year term ends in 2018.

#### Non UQ – States have been trading with Cuba

Fender 09 (Jessica Fender, Denver Post Writer “Colorado eyes trade with Cuba” 07/27/2009, The Denver Post, <http://www.denverpost.com/comicsold/ci_12920052> )

Colorado officials are seeking to establish trade between the state's farmers and Cuba, a practice forbidden by the previous governor but in step with a growing group of U.S. states far from the political pressure of anti-Castro groups.

Advocates say the Cuban demand for American foodstuffs is growing too rapidly — from $260 million annually to $711 million in six years — for Colorado farmers to ignore a potential customer just 90 miles from the Florida coast.

Critics, including Republican former Gov. Bill Owens, call Cuban ex-President Fidel Castro "a cold- blooded murderer" whose regime is using business ties with states to pressure the U.S. government for the two things it most wants: credit and tourists.

Tim Larsen, the state Agriculture Department's senior international marketing specialist, is leading Colorado's exploration of the Cuban market with the support of many farm and business interests across the state.

"We're complying with U.S. regulations in a growth market," Larsen said. "The mood is changing about Cuba. Do we position ourselves to take advantage of it now, or do we wait?"

Colorado companies already sell some products to Cuba — about $1 million worth in 2008 — all of them exempt from the long-standing U.S. trade embargo.

Now, a request for proposals Colorado recently posted seeks to up that figure considerably, asking for help with the complicated process of traveling to Cuba, setting up meetings and deciding the quantities and packaging of goods, among other tasks.

The proposed contract is broken into three phases and can be severed at any point.

It's not known by anyone how much the endeavor could cost — or earn — the state. But politically, there is no clear cost here for trading with Castro and his brother, Cuban President Raul Castro.

While anti-Castro Cuban expatriates have considerable clout in places such as Florida, Colorado has just 3,701 Cubans, according to the most recent census.

Since 2000, when Congress exempted agricultural and medical products from the embargo, at least 21 states have led trade missions to the island nation with varying degrees of success.

Only two of those states — New York and California — have sizable populations of Cuban expats. And both of their trade efforts have been exploratory rather than productive, according to State International Development Organizations, a not-for-profit group that advises state governments on trade.

Florida — home to 68 percent of the nation's Cuban population, according to the Pew Hispanic Center — has made no effort to trade with Cuba.

States without significant Cuban populations have tried harder. Nebraska's Great Northern Bean market was tanking in 2006 before an agreement with Cuba led to more than $20 million in sales by 2008, according to Stan Garbacz, that state's agricultural trade representative.

"There's nothing steady about anything down there. It's a constant activity, but I've built up a relationship," he said. "It's really been wonderful."

Nebraska has 859 Cuban residents.

Pro-trade business groups say they realize the Cuban government — which prefers trade envoys that include elected officials — isn't buying American goods purely out of need or altruism.

"It doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out they're going to take pictures and say, 'Here's the senator from New Mexico. Here's the Nebraskan governor. Why won't the federal government talk to us?' " said Jim Reis, president of the World Trade Center Denver. "But this is a great opportunity to help Colorado sell a little more of what we produce and broaden the market for (Cubans)."

Earlier this year, President Barack Obama opened up increased travel to Cuba for family members of those on the island. He has also proposed other ways to ease the long-standing embargo.

And legislation pending in Congress would further open Cuba to American tourists and ease sales practices for U.S. businesses.

## No Link

### Venezuela

### Cuba

## Impact Defense

### A2 China

#### There will be no US-Sino Conflict- predicting models are flawed

Johnson 2011(Alastair Iain Johnston, Professor of China in World Affairs at Department of Government, Harvard University, “Stability and Instability in Sino–US Relations: A Response to Yan Xuetong’s Superficial Friendship Theory” 2011) CA

Predicting or post-dicting when a Sino–US security dilemma started is, of course, an important test of a security dilemma argument. Put simply, if the timing test fails, the explanation is severely undermined. But developing empirical indicators for pinpointing when security dilemmas begin is not easy to do. I take solace in the fact that thus far theorists have not shown how to observe the beginning of a full blown security dilemma. Presumably one would look for the point where the dominant actors in the security policy process in Self conclude that Other's security policies constitute a major threat to Self's key interests. The interesting question is whether security dilemmas can exist between sub-national actors across different states, e.g. between militaries, before coming to dominate interstate relations at the national level. If this is the case, then one might posit that a sub-national security dilemma appeared between the US and Chinese militaries starting in the mid-1990s after the Taiwan crisis and has been, in more recent years, spreading across other sub-national actors. Whether currently the dominant leaders in Zhongnanhai and the White House have internalized the belief structures common to a security dilemma is unclear. But what I am suggesting here is that the environment in which they operate and make decisions is taking on the features of a security dilemma.

Yan’s argument, and the sketch of a security dilemma argument above, has focused on the different explanations for instability in the US–China relationship. But to avoid selecting on the dependent variable, we need to acknowledge the stabilizing elements in the relations (elements that I think Yan discounts), despite an emerging security dilemma. There are at least four of them.

First, I think there is evidence that the very top levels on both sides actually have a better understanding of each other’s interests and red lines than is implied by the public debates.56 There is evidence of an ability to self-reflect, and to correct behaviours that appear to contribute to security dilemma dynamics.57 Indeed, much of the evidence of security dilemma dynamics comes from outside the core decision-making units on both sides, and is mostly found in some government-connected analytical communities, in the media, and in think-tank communities. When leaderships are weak or distracted by other issues, the narratives and conventional wisdoms of these communities might contribute to security dilemma dynamics in the policy process itself. The exception might be the mindsets behind military programmes and policies aimed at countering the other side. Here, even strong civilian leaderships probably struggle to monitor the practices of their militaries, and to ensure that these are consistent with political policy. All of this means, however, that a critical indicator of an intensifying security dilemma will be the degree to which leaders can control, and insulate themselves from, hardliner pressures, or can mobilize counter-hard-line voices and interests.

Second, it may well be that deterrence (including nuclear) works. Both leaderships appear to realize the military, economic, and political costs of major conflict. Thus, an indicator of an intensifying security dilemma will be the degree to which key actors on both sides begin to discount these costs.

Third, ideological competition between the two sides is relatively low compared with US–Soviet rivalry. Ideological differences are important, since these underscore perceptions of identity difference on both sides. But these ideological differences affect how each society views the other, and do not feature centrally in competition to win supporters abroad. Thus, another indicator of an intensifying security dilemma might be just how much traction the US liberal critique of the so-called China model gets, and to what degree the notion of a China model begins to guide Chinese economic, military, and political practices in the developing world.

Finally, economic integration appears to be mutually beneficial for sizeable constituencies on both sides. China’s economic rise has benefited from US policy (e.g. markets, investment, entrance into the WTO). The US benefits overall from China’s cheap manufactures and its buying of American debt. Thus, yet another indicator of an intensifying security dilemma will be the degree to which advocates of de-integration and restricted economic interaction are able to make their cases politically.58

The discussion above about an emerging US–China security dilemma explanation is clearly based on anecdotal evidence, and awaits a more systematic testing of its three main hypotheses against a clearer and more rigorously derived set of hypotheses from Yan’s superficial friendship model. Probing the plausibility of an argument is a legitimate reason for preliminary scholarly research, but I would encourage Yan to develop further the theoretical micro-foundations and empirical implications of his model beyond his current assessments of instability in the US–China relationship.

#### No risk – China is stuck with us, they need our economy

Belong and Cohen 09 (BRAD DELONG, economist at the University of California and STEPHEN COHEN, professor of regional planning at the University of California, Berkeley and co-director of the Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy , “The End of Influence” DECEMBER 23, 2009, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/12/23/the_end_of_influence>? ) CA

Neither side can walk away; we're locked. The debt binds China especially and other governments that have the money. Selling the debt would send the dollar way down and thereby destroy the value of their dollar holdings and severely damage their economies' massive export-based sectors. Worse yet, sell it for what? Their "reserves" are so huge that there is nothing else they can hold them in, not at that scale. From a Chinese viewpoint, it's exasperating.

The U.S.-China economic imbalance has forced the two powers into a very intimate and not very desired embrace, something Lawrence Summers once called a financial balance of terror. This is all to the good: The two powers must learn to work as partners, and not just in economic matters -- global warming and global order also need positive Sino-American cooperation, and they are much more important long-term issues. Sino-American partnership, in managing the complex mess of their imbalanced economic codependency, can constitute a good beginning for managing the utterly unhinged problems of world balance and order. We have no acceptable choice but to get good at it, and that will take some doing on both sides.

As money alters power relations, the United States is not simply becoming dependent -- but it is no longer independent, either. That is a major change. And China is no longer helpless and cowed in face of the superpower hegemon; it has got a grip on it. Indeed, while the world peeks in, the two countries are realizing that they have thrown themselves into an intimate economic embrace with, to say the least, very mixed feelings.

## A2 General

### Appeasement Solves

#### Critics of appeasement are illogical – Appeasement works as an assertion of power

Dimuccio 98 (Ralph B. A. Dimuccio “The Study of Appeasement in International Relations: Polemics, Paradigms, and Problems”, Journal of Peace Research, Mar 1, 1998 <http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/35/2/245.full.pdf>)

Conclusion

Many observers have accepted uncritically¶ the idea that appeasement only encourages¶ further aggression on the part of recalcitrant¶ actors. This apparent consensus represents¶ merely the most recent evidence that many¶ commonly held ideas about foreign policy¶ continue to be strongly conditioned by¶ Munich, the ‘object lesson of our age’¶ (Lammers, 1966: 2). Yet, the ostensible realist consensus remains both predictable and¶ puzzling. It is predictable in the sense that¶ the stark realist imagery lends itself well to¶ hyperbole. Whereas realism as a general¶ theory of world politics has been all but discredited in a world of transnational issues,¶ expanding actors, interdependence and multipolariry, many retain the rhetoric for its¶ political usefulness.

It is puzzling because for many scholars of¶ 20th century world affairs, the realist interpretation¶ of appeasement has gone the¶ way of realism itself. Since the early 1960s,¶ revisionist efforts in history along with a¶ blossoming of neoliberal standpoints and ¶ Behavioral methods in international relations¶ have yielded substantially more sophisticated¶ and markedly less normatively tinged findings. ¶ Anti-appeasers rely on an outmoded¶ model.

A second source of puzzlement relates to¶ recent cases in which the issue of appeasement¶ has come to the fore. Appeasement is¶ seen not only as counterproductive but immoral.¶ It encourages further recalcitrance on¶ the part of aggressor states but also rewards¶ them for their rogue behavior and often involves ¶ a ‘sell-out’ of oppressed groups. Many¶ of those who moralize on this issue have on¶ other occasions chided their more dovish¶ colleagues’ lack of sensitivity to traditional¶ concerns for power in world politics. We¶ seem to have a role reversal on the issue of¶ appeasement.

As a clear example, the Clinton¶ Administration’s nuclear energy agreement¶ with North Korea of October 1994, which¶ arguably started the notable ‘opening’ of¶ North Korea that has taken place over the¶ last two and a half years,’ has been the focus¶ of unrelenting criticism by those who claim¶ to know the ‘true lessons of history’. But the¶ most surprising flaw of the hawkish position¶ on the North Korean issue is its lack of realism. Claiming to know and understand the¶ ‘real’ nature of power politics, the decriers of¶ ‘engagement’ are instead swayed by their¶ own conceptions of morality. Seeking to¶ bring North Korea into the international¶ community by offering concessions and¶ ignoring past transgressions may not be the¶ most ‘moral’ thing to do, but the USA has¶ legitimate interest in stability on the Korean¶ peninsula and it does not have the material¶ resources or the domestic political support¶ to issue credible threats of force towards¶ North Korea and every rogue state in the¶ world simultaneously. The anti-appeasement ¶ rhetoric does not provide a clear¶ solution to this conundrum.

Power is the ability to get others to do¶ things they otherwise would not do. One¶ way to accomplish this is to use or threaten¶ the use of force. When the situation dictates¶ that this method is inadvisable, the next best¶ method may be appeasement. H Whether engagement,¶ deterrence, or some combination¶ is the option of choice, a sure method to¶ bring foreign policy failure is to employ un¶ critically standard operating procedures and¶ historical analogies (Hybel, 1990; Jervis,¶ 1976; Neusradt & May, 1986). In the case¶ of the nuclear energy agreement, the Clinton¶ Administration perceived a mutuality of¶ interest between the United States and¶ North Korea, calculating that well-placed¶ concessions could have a powerful control¶ ling effect on a country that needs the world¶ and that has something to give by following¶ the rules of international society. Whether¶ such policies will succeed in the long run is a¶ question well beyond the scope of this¶ review. However, of the three approaches¶ reviewed above, only the orthodox model¶ appears at first glance to be largely incapable¶ of capturing the logic of recent decisions to¶ employ appeasement as a strategy of conflict¶ avoidance. Rigorous empirical research will¶ be needed to show whether the utility or¶ exchange approaches can offer determinate¶ explanations of these and other cases. The¶ findings of such studies may well lay the¶ foundation for a new view of appeasement¶ and inevitably relieve the term of its inexorable linkage to the caricature that the¶ ‘Munich Analogy’ has become.

#### WW2 doesn’t mean appeasement is bad – Hitler was an exception in history

Record 05 (Jeffrey Record, professor in the Department of Strategy and International Security at the U.S. Air Force’s Air War College in Montgomery, Alabama, “APPEASEMENT RECONSIDERED: INVESTIGATING THE MYTHOLOGY OF THE 1930s” August 2005, The Strategic Studies Institute

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub622.pdf>)

Invocations of the Munich Analogy to Justify Use ¶ of Force Should Be Closely Examined.

Such invocations have more often than not been misleading ¶ because security threats to the United States genuinely Hitlerian ¶ in scope and nature have not been replicated since 1945. Though ¶ the Munich analogy’s power as a tool of opinion mobilization is ¶ undeniable, no enemy since Hitler has, in fact, possessed Nazi ¶ Germany’s combination of military might and willingness—indeed, ¶ eagerness—to employ it for unlimited conquest. This does not mean ¶ the United States should withhold resort to force against lesser ¶ threats. Nor does it mean that Hitlerian threats are a phenomenon ¶ of the past; an al-Qaeda armed with deliverable nuclear weapons ¶ or usable biological weapons would pose a direct and much more ¶ lethal threat to the United States than Nazi Germany ever did.

The problem with seeing Hitler in Stalin, Mao Zedong, Ho Chi ¶ Minh, and Saddam Hussein is that it reinforces the presidential ¶ tendency since 1945 to overstate threats for the purpose of rallying ¶ public and congressional opinion, and overstated threats in turn ¶ encourage resort to force in circumstances where deterrence, ¶ containment, even negotiation (from strength) might better serve ¶ long-term U.S. security interests. Threats that are, in fact, limited ¶ tend to be portrayed in Manichaean terms, thus skewing the policy ¶ choice toward military action, a policy choice hardly constrained by ¶ possession of global conventional military primacy and an inadequate ¶ understanding of the limits of that primacy

If the 1930s reveal the danger of underestimating a security threat, ¶ the post-World War II decades contain examples of the danger of ¶ overestimating a security threat.

### Credibility Fails

#### Theories of Credibility are flawed – Credibility is not necessary or useful

Fettweis 08 (Christopher Fettweis, assistant professor of political science at Tulane University, “Credibility and the War on Terror”, Political Science Quarterly, Winter 2007/2008,)

Credibility in Practice

The evidence seems to fall heavily on one side of the divide between scholars and practitioners over the importance of credibility. This division is not merely of academic interest. The credibility imperative has distinct and profound effects upon policymaking, all of which are apparent during the current war on terror. In order to assess more accurately the true value of a healthy reputation for resolve, policymakers ought to be aware of the following general rules about how the credibility imperative shapes national debate. Three such effects are presented below, more as arguments rather than testable hypotheses, owing to the nature of the subject. Although the supporting evidence is by necessity somewhat anecdotal, the arguments themselves should not be very controversial.

First, the credibility imperative is almost always employed to bolster the most hawkish position in a foreign policy debate. Cries of appeasement (and of the need to maintain credibility) arise almost every time the use of force is debated in the United States. Critics warned that U.S. credibility would be irreparably harmed if Washington failed to get involved in Vietnam, and then if it did not stay until the war was won; if it did not use air strikes against the Soviet missiles in Cuba; if it did not respond to Bosnian Serb provocations with sufficient force; if it failed to attack the leaders of the military coup in Haiti in 1994; and, of course, if it does not "stay the course" today in Iraq. At other times, hawks have employed the credibility imperative to urge two presidents to use military force to prevent nuclear proliferation in North Korea and to punish the recalcitrant Saddam Hussein.55 The reputation of the United States is always endangered by inaction, not by action, no matter how peripheral the proposed war might be to tangible national interests. The reputation for good policy judgment never seems to be as important as the reputation for belligerence.

The credibility imperative not only urges the use of military force, but it encourages hawkish behavior at the negotiating table as well, supporting rigidity and decrying all compromise as demonstrations of weakness. Only victory can legitimate diplomacy; compromised settlements only encourage further challenges, and are synonymous with appeasement. Madeleine Albright reported a typical example in her memoirs, explaining that during Bosnia negotiations "the ordinarily hawkish Jamie Rubin urged me to compromise on a particular measure. I glared and said, 'Jamie, do you think we're in Munich?'"56 After Jimmy Carter's now-famous mission helped find common ground between Pyongyang and Washington in 1994, McCain worried that the deal "will have changed the balance of power in Europe and the Middle East. That it will have changed for the worse is obvious."57 Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer labeled the compromise on the same peninsula in 2003 "an abject cave-in," which would prove to be a "threat to American credibility everywhere."58

This is not meant to suggest, of course, that individual cases of belligerence or intervention were not warranted; however, it is important to recognize that, for better or for worse, the credibility imperative is the rhetorical instrument of the hawk. The actors employing the imperative are not always the same, but their prescription never waivers. Many of the doves of the 1980s had become hawks by the 1990s, warning of the potential loss of credibility if strong action were not taken in Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, and Haiti. For example, the New York Times cited "United States diplomats" warning President Clinton that a failure to act in Bosnia in 1993 would "badly damage U.S. credibility abroad."59 Anthony Lake told the Council on Foreign Relations that among the reasons to act in Haiti was the need to defend American credibility in world affairs.60 In general, the more a policymaker or strategist saw the credibility of the United States in peril, the more willing he or she was to use force to prevent its erosion.

The second observation on the use of the credibility imperative in policy debate is perhaps related to the first: the imperative often produces astonishing hyperbole, even in otherwise sober analysts. If the United States were to lose credibility, the floodgates would open to a variety of catastrophes, setting off dominoes that would eventually not only threaten vital interests and make war necessary, but perhaps even lead to the end of the Republic itself. The credibility imperative warns that momentum toward disaster can begin with the smallest demonstration of irresolution, thus sustaining the vision of an interdependent system in which there are no inconsequential events. In the words of Dale Copeland, "It is easier to stop a snowball before it begins to roll downhill than to intervene only after it has started to gain momentum."61 Therefore, even the smallest of slips can lead to large-scale disaster.

Thus, although Quemoy and Matsu might have seemed like irrelevant, uninhabitable rocky atolls, if they fell to the Chinese without action from the United States, the resulting loss of credibility for the United States would enable the communists "to begin their objective of driving us out of the western Pacific, right back to Hawaii and even to the United States," according to John Foster Dulles.62 Ten years later, Dean Rusk wrote that if U.S. commitments became discredited because of a defeat in Vietnam, "the communist world would draw conclusions that would lead to our ruin and almost certainly to a catastrophic war."63 Ronald Reagan told Congress that if the United States failed in Central America, "our credibility would collapse, our alliances would crumble, and the safety of our homeland would be put at jeopardy."64 The examples are legion-indeed, the tendency toward hyperbole seems almost irresistible. In a world where threats are interdependent, the loss of credibility in one area threatens U.S. goals everywhere. The fall of Vietnam, thought Nixon, "would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace-in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere."65 Credibility is apparently the glue holding together the international system of dominoes.

Audiences often seem distressingly willing to accept such statements at face value. Rarely are policymakers or analysts asked to justify these visions, or pressed to examine the logic connecting the present decisions to such catastrophic future consequences. Could interdependence alone set off such enormous strings of disasters? Why should anyone believe that the loss of credibility would result in an unprecedented string of disasters? For those under the spell of the credibility imperative, the logic behind these statements seemed less relevant than establishing the potential, however slim, for catastrophe. Since foreign policy is a worst-case-scenario business, the sagacious policymaker hedges against disaster, no matter how absurdly remote the risk may seem. Who would oppose the defense of Quemoy and Matsu, if that defense might prevent a "catastrophic war"? Similarly, it was difficult to argue that aid to the Contras was not in the national interest once it became linked to the survival of NATO and the safety of "our homeland." Once policymakers accept the imperative to remain credible, logic and reason can become casualties of fear.

The third and final observation is that there is a loose inverse relationship between the rhetorical employment of the credibility imperative and the presence of vital, more tangible national interests. Franklin D. Roosevelt did not make reference to the reputation of the United States when he asked Congress for a declaration of war against Japan in 1941. Similarly, Winston Churchill's stirring speeches rallying his countrymen at their darkest hour did not mention the importance of maintaining the credibility of the realm. When a clear national interest is at stake, policymakers have no need to defend (or sell) their actions with reference to the national reputation or credibility. Simply put, the more tangible the national interest, the smaller the role that intangible factors will play in either decisions or justifications for policy. The United States was willing to use force to ensure that Korea, Lebanon, Vietnam, Grenada, El Salvador, and Nicaragua stayed in the camp of free nations despite the fact that none had any measurable impact upon the global balance of power. "El Salvador doesn't really matter," one of Ronald Reagan's foreign policy advisers admitted in 1981, but "we have to establish credibility because we are in very serious trouble."66

When credibility is the primary justification for action, the interest is usually not vital to the United States. Since Washington had no strategic interests at stake in the Balkans in the 1990s, for example, it was forced to invent some. Rather than sell the policy based solely on what it was-predominantly a humanitarian intervention-the Clinton administration repeatedly linked the fate of the Muslims of southeastern Europe to the credibility of the United States and NATO. By doing so, according to Owen Harries, the administration "managed to create a serious national interest in Bosnia where none before existed: an interest, that is, in the preservation of this country's prestige and credibility."67 The credibility imperative rose to prominence precisely because no tangible U.S. interest in Bosnia existed.

In sum, when the credibility imperative drives policy, states fearful of hyperbolic future consequences are likely to follow hawkish recommendations in order to send messages that other states are unlikely to receive. Policymakers are thus wise to beware of the credibility imperative when devising policy, questioning the assumptions that it contains and remaining skeptical of the catastrophes of which it warns. They must recognize that the imperative is typically employed when no tangible national interest exists, used as a rhetorical smoke screen to win over otherwise-peaceful masses. Most importantly, it should perhaps give them pause that scholars can supply virtually no evidence supporting the conventional wisdom about its importance.

It might seem blasphemous, or at least dangerously naïve, to suggest that the blood and treasure spilled over the past six decades to preserve the credibility of the United States has been in vain. However, history offers little evidence to support one of the most deeply held beliefs of the makers of U.S. foreign policy. States cannot control their reputations or their credibility, since target adversaries and allies will ultimately form their own perceptions, often learning incorrect lessons. Even the best efforts to bolster the credibility of the United States ultimately serve little purpose.

## A2 Venezuela

### Venezuela wants it

#### Turn – Maduro likes the hate, it gives him power in his party and country, cooperating with him would not help him

Baverstock 5/17/13 (Alasdair Baverstock, Foreign Correspondent, “Venezuela's Maduro still waiting on Washington's recognition” May 17, 2013, The Christian Science Monitor, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2013/0517/Venezuela-s-Maduro-still-waiting-on-Washington-s-recognition>)

Meanwhile, other countries in the region were quick to congratulate Maduro on his victory. In fact, the new leader spent last week on a whistle-stop tour of friendly regional governments including Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil in an attempt to secure his leadership status.

“Things haven’t been going well for Maduro since the election,” says Smilde. “his recent touring of the continent has been a very obvious attempt to demonstrate his legitimacy.”

Following the hotly contested election, which many Venezuelans believe was stolen by a socialist government fearing the loss of power, country-wide protests erupted. Riot police fought protesters with tear gas and nightly "cacerolazo" sound protests filled the capital with a cacophony of noise. Although officially victorious, Maduro’s slim win compared to the eleven percent by which Chávez defeated the same opponent last October left the new premier with little mandate to govern.

“A lot of Venezuelans seem to think that a close election is not a valid election, so this leaves room for Maduro’s critics to question it,” says Mark Weisbrot of the Center for Economic and Policy research, an independent think-tank in Washington. Mr. Weisbrot says he thinks the US is trying to take advantage of this situation.

Far from putting a dent in Maduro’s credibility, other observers believe that continued tensions between Venezuela and the US serve as a positive for a president whose supporters have come to expect belligerence towards “las imperialistas.”

“In many ways John Kerry is doing Maduro a favor by not recognizing him,” says Jones. “The US’s refusal to cooperate plays into the socialists’ broader narrative that the US is conspiring to defeat Venezuela’s revolution.”

### Maduro likes the US

#### Maduro wants respectful US relations

Ellsworth. B 5/20/13 (Brian Ellsworth is the Senior Correspondent, Brazil at Reuters) “Venezuela says taking steps to restore U.S. diplomatic ties” <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/20/us-venezuela-usa-idUSBRE94J01R20130520>

Disputes between Caracas and Washington were common during the 14-year-rule of late socialist leader Hugo Chavez, leaving both nations without ambassadors in each other's capitals.¶ Foreign Minister Elias Jaua suggested in a televised interview that the move to name government ally Calixto Ortega as charge d'affaires in Washington could be a prelude to restoring ambassadors.¶ "This is a message for U.S. politicians so they understand Venezuela's desire to normalize relations ... via the designation of the highest diplomatic authorities," he said. "Why? Because the United States remains our top trade partner."¶ Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro has in recent months said he wants better ties with Washington as long as the relationship is respectful. But he has also accused the United States of seeking to destabilize the country.¶ Last month, he slammed the United States for "vulgar" meddling after the State Department said it had not decided if it would recognize his presidency and supported opposition calls for a vote recount after the April 14 election.¶ He won that vote, triggered by Chavez's death, by 1.5 percentage points. The opposition refused to accept the results and is challenging the election in the country's top court.¶ In 2008, Chavez expelled U.S. Ambassador Patrick Duddy from Caracas in a dispute over what the late president called Washington's involvement in violent protests in Bolivia.¶ In 2010, he blocked Washington's nomination of diplomat Larry Palmer as ambassador in protest of Palmer's comments that there were "clear ties" between members of Chavez's government and leftist Colombian rebels.¶ The State Department responded by revoking the visa of Venezuela's ambassador.¶

## A2 Cuba

### Appeasement good

#### Engagement with Cuba is good appeasement- it removes the Cuban ability to deflect blame and is the only chance of solving Cuban American Relations

Lopez-Levy 11 (Arturo Lopez-Levy, lecturer and doctoral candidate at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies of the University of Denver “Appease Cuba? What Would Winston Churchill Say?” Jan 10, 2011, <http://thehavananote.com/node/845>)

Unfortunately, Mrs. Perez’s analogies are not marginal among the right wing exiles who defend the Helms-Burton Act, the legislation that guides current U.S. policy towards Cuba.

Of course, this is delusional. The Cuban communist political system and command economy might have prevented economic development of the Cuban people and repressed its civil and political liberties but there is little evidence about genocidal or expansionist tendencies in Raul Castro’s government. The U.S. inclusion of Cuba in the terrorist list of the State department is seen as the world paradigm of political manipulation of a core theme of American foreign policy for domestic political reasons.

So, where does a policy of engagement - or as critics would call it, “appeasement” - fit in? In fact, appeasement shouldn’t be a bad word for U.S. policy towards Cuba since the island is a minor power with limited capacity to cause damage to U.S. national interests.

As Winston Churchill, the main opponent of appeasing Hitler, wrote in 1950: “The world appeasement is not popular but appeasement has its place in all policy. Make sure you put it in the right place. Appease the weak. Defy the strong”. Cuban nationalism and its sense of victimhood have never been a stronger conviction of the Cuban people. But the Cuban state’s power position versus foreign powers is the weakest since 1959. Under the weight of the Special Period, the period of crisis that began in 1989 and amount to forty percent of post revolutionary history, the Castros’ regime is economically exhausted. This is why Raul Castro is attempting a serious reform.

Now is most likely the optimal time for the United States to address appeasable Cuban nationalism and engage Cuban post-revolutionary society. To paraphrase Henry Kissinger, the question should be whether Cuban power holders see virtue in a permanent conflict with the United States, or there is space for accommodation of Cuba’s national interests in a U.S. led world order. Only through engagement can Obama test whether Cuba’s new leaders are rooted in a Cold War opposition to the United States, or are just defending their interests, values and privileges against U.S. impositions.

# RANDOM CARD

## Nuclear Terrorism Impact Defense

#### Countries aren’t irrational, they won’t give Terrorists Nukes

Lieber and Press 2013 (Keir A. Lieber, Associate Professor in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and the Department of Government at Georgetown University, and Daryl G. Press, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, “Why States Won’t Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists”, International Security Volume 38, Number 1, Summer 2013. <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v038/38.1.lieber.html>)

President Obama has identified nuclear terrorism as “the single biggest threat to U.S. security,” describing it as “something that could change the security landscape of this country and around the world for years to come.”54 The prospect of an adversary state covertly giving a nuclear weapon or nuclear materials to a terrorist organization has been the animating force in U.S. grand strategy for more than a decade. The scenario was used to justify the invasion of Iraq and toppling of the Iraqi regime in 2003; and in 2012 and 2013, proponents of a preventive military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities frequently argued that such attacks are necessary to eliminate the possibility of Iran trying a [End Page 103] nuclear attack by proxy against Israel or the United States. We demonstrate here that such fears are overblown. The rationale for state sponsorship of nuclear terrorism lacks sound deductive logic and is empirically unsupported by the most relevant available evidence.

The United States and its allies should be able to deter nuclear-armed states from passing their weapons to terrorists, because a terrorist nuclear strike would not remain anonymous for long and would soon be traced back to the originating state. This conclusion is based on two empirical findings. First, among the relevant past cases of conventional terrorist attacks—those targeting the homelands of powerful states and causing significant casualties—almost all were successfully attributed to the perpetrating terrorist organization. Second, linking the attributed terrorist organization to a state sponsor would not be difficult. Few foreign terrorist organizations have state sponsors; those that do typically have only one; and only one suspected state sponsor of terrorism (Pakistan) has nuclear weapons or sufficient stockpiles of nuclear materials.

Furthermore, potential sponsors of nuclear terror face a wicked dilemma: to maintain distance by passing the weapon to a terrorist group they do not know well or trust, or to maintain control by giving it to a group they have cooperated with repeatedly. The former strategy is mind-bogglingly dangerous; the latter option makes attribution from terror group to sponsor simple.

Our findings have two important policy implications. First, the fear of nuclear attack by proxy by itself does not justify costly military steps to prevent nuclear proliferation. Nuclear proliferation may pose a variety of other risks, and the appropriate level of U.S. efforts to stop proliferation should depend on the cumulative effect of these risks, but the dangers of a nuclear handoff to terrorists have been overstated. For example, Iranian leaders would have to be crazy or suicidal to think that they could give a nuclear weapon to one of their terrorist collaborators and face no repercussions. If leaders were that irrational, the bigger problem would be direct nuclear attack without concern for the retaliatory consequences, not the alleged problem of a nuclear handoff.

A second implication is that instead of publicly stressing the dangers of nuclear attack by proxy and lamenting the limits of U.S. nuclear forensic capabilities (and thus potentially misleading enemies to overestimate the feasibility of an anonymous attack against America), the United States should be advertising its impressive record of attributing highly lethal terrorist attacks. Understating one’s own capabilities is a reasonable strategy for luring an enemy into making an unwise attack, but it is a disastrous policy if the goal is deterrence. The most effective way to deter countries from passing weapons to terrorists is to demonstrate the ease of nuclear attribution and the devastating consequences of such attribution to the sponsoring state. [End Page 104]