# Consult Brazil CP

# Neg

## Consult

### Sample Counterplan Texts

As a general rule, use this template changing should to ought and putting the mandates of the plan in the middle.

TEXT: The United States federal government ought to enter into prior, binding consultation with the government of Brazil on whether … [change should to ought]…… with the possibility of minor modifications by the Brazilian government.

Checking for changes to their 1ac plan text – these are sample texts:

#### CUBA EXAMPLE:

The United States federal government ought to enter into prior, binding consultation with the government of Brazil on whether the United States ought to lift the economic embargo on Cuba with the possibility of minor modifications by the Brazilian government.

#### MEXICO EXAMPLE:

The United States federal government ought to enter into prior, binding consultation with the government of Brazil on whether the United States ought to adopt the mandates of NADBank Enhancement Act of 2011 towards Mexico with the possibility of minor modifications by the Brazilian government.

#### VENEZUELA EXAMPLE:

The United States federal government ought to enter into prior, binding consultation with the government of Brazil on whether the United States ought to offer to the Government of Venezuela to remove sanctions against Petroleos de Venezuela if the Government of Venezuela agrees to implement economic reforms designed to increase economic freedom with the possibility of minor modifications by the Brazilian government.

Key Text question: the cp text doesn’t say “US should implement outcome of consultation” at the end. Binding consultation implies this, so the cp would do the plan if brazil said yes.

### 1NC

#### CP Text:

#### Prior binding consultation key to U.S.-Brazilian relations.

**Einaudi, 11**—a Distinguished Visiting f ellow in the Center for Strategic r esearch, i nstitute for n ational Strategic Studies, at the n ational Defense University. He is also a Member of the a dvisory Council of the Brazil i nstitute at the Woodrow Wilson i nternational Center for Scholars. (Luigi, “Brazil and the United States: The Need for Strategic Engagement,” March 2011, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/SF%20266%20Einaudi.pdf //BLOV)

A prerequisite for improved mutual engagement will be changes in perspective on both sides. Mutually beneficial engagement requires the United States to welcome Brazil’s emergence as a global power. Brazil is more than a tropical China35; it is culturally and politically close to the United States and Europe. Brazil, in turn, needs to realize that the United States accepts its rise. Brazil also needs to recognize that the United States still matters greatly to Brasilia and that more can be achieved work¬ing with Washington than against it.

The United States and Brazil have vast overlapping in-terests, but a formal strategic partnership is probably out of the question for both countries. In the United States, Brazil must compete for policy attention with China, India, Rus-sia, Japan, Mexico, and several European countries. It poses no security threat to the United States. Moreover, despite Brazil’s importance in multilateral organizations, particu¬larly the UN, Brazil can be of limited practical assistance at best to the United States in its two current wars. Brazil’s interests, in turn, may be fairly said to include the need to distinguish itself from the United States. Diplomatically, this means neither country can expect automatic agreement from the other. Interests differ and it may be politically nec¬essary to highlight differences even when interests are simi-lar. But both countries should make every effort to develop a habit of “permanent consultation” in an effort to coordinate policies, work pragmatically together where interests are common, and reduce surprises even while recognizing that specific interests and policies often may differ.

A first operational step, therefore, is for both coun-tries to hold regular policy-level consultations, increase exchanges of information, and coordinate carefully on multilateral matters. This is much easier said than done. The list of global issues on which Brazil is becoming a major player includes conflict resolution, all aspects of energy, including nuclear matters, all types of trade, the environment, space, and the development of internation¬al law, including law of the seas and nonproliferation. To share information and ensure effective consultation on so many functional issues will require finding ways to lessen the geographic stovepiping natural to bureaucracy. The U.S. Department of State, for example, has historically organized itself into geographical bureaus responsible for relations with countries in particular regions, leaving functional issues to offices organized globally. This orga¬nization hampers the exchange of information and con¬sultation with countries such as Brazil, whose reach and policies go beyond their particular geographic region. One result is that multilateral affairs are still often an isolated afterthought in the U.S. Government. Are there things the United States and Brazil could do, whether bi¬laterally or in the World Trade Organization, that would offset some of the negative effects of the China trade on manufacturing in both their countries?36 Just posing the question reveals the complexity of the task.

#### INSERT IMPACT SCENARIO

## Should Consult – Countries

### Venezuela

#### The US should consult Brazil on Venezuela

Hakim 04 (Peter Hakim President Emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue) (“The Reluctant Partner” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2004), pp. 114-123, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20033833 //BLOV)

Brazil's involvement in Venezuela, on the other hand, is likely to be a more important feature of U.S.-Brazil relations. For the past year, Brazil has chaired the "friends of Venezuela," a six-country group that includes the United States and has urged the Venezuelan government and insurgents to resolve their political differences peaceably by holding a constitutionally authorized recall vote on President Chavez's term. At the same time, however, Lula has pursued direct negotiations with the Chavez administration, to foster bilateral economic ties and closer integration among South American states. Brazil has managed this precarious double act so far, but should the situation in Venezuela deteriorate, Brasilia might have difficulty pursuing both tracks at once without alienating Washington.

### Cuba

#### The US should consult Brazil on Cuba

Hakim 04 (Peter Hakim President Emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue) (“The Reluctant Partner” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2004), pp. 114-123, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20033833 //BLOV)

Cuba is another issue on which the two countries do not see eye to eye. Last year, before both the UN and the OAS, Brazil refused to criticize Cuba's brutal treatment of dissidents, let alone endorse U.S. resolutions condemning Castro's appalling human rights record. During a visit to the island last September, Lula made clear that he intended to maintain his long-standing personal friendship with Castro and declined to raise any political issues with him or meet local dissidents. Lula did seem to take account of American sensi- bilities, however, by limiting his visit to a single day and asking that anti-American displays be avoided then. Brasilia's relations with Havana may irritate Washington, but they are not likely to cause major friction, especially as Cuba's prominence in U.S. foreign policy is waning.

#### Consultation on the Cuba embargo is key to relations (and ag subsidies)

**Einaudi, 11**—a Distinguished Visiting f ellow in the Center for Strategic r esearch, i nstitute for n ational Strategic Studies, at the n ational Defense University. He is also a Member of the a dvisory Council of the Brazil i nstitute at the Woodrow Wilson i nternational Center for Scholars. (Luigi, “Brazil and the United States: The Need for Strategic Engagement,” March 2011, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/SF%20266%20Einaudi.pdf> //BLOV)

As much as both countries need it, however, im¬proved cooperation may require them to make changes for which they are not yet ready.44 Depending some¬what on their politics, many Brazilians will be dubi¬ous about cooperation with the United States as long as it continues to massively subsidize and protect key agricultural products, maintains an embargo on Cuba, is thought by important political groups to have ambi¬tions on the Amazon or troops in South America, or fails to endorse Brazil’s UN Security Council ambi-tions. Similarly, some in the United States will question working closely with a Brazil that they see as enjoying the luxuries of the irresponsible until it accepts greater responsibility on nuclear nonproliferation (including more UN monitoring of its facilities), distances itself from Iran, is more present on democracy and human rights issues (in the Middle East, Cuba, Iran, and Ven¬ezuela), is more active on these issues at the UN and OAS, and generally treats the United States better in its diplomacy than it has often done recently.

Finally, the foreign policies of both the United States and Brazil are likely to be increasingly limited by internal factors in the future. In the United States, con¬cerns over debt and weakening internal competitiveness are increasing.45 Brazil has had two successive presidents whose charisma helped them to mask domestic vulner-abilities; in doing so, they handed President Rousseff the enormous challenge of institutionalizing their success. Yet the world will not go away. Neither the United States nor Brazil is powerful enough to solve alone many of the problems directly affecting its national security. Washington and Brasilia must learn to play to each other’s strengths. Failure to work together will result in lost opportunities and damage the national interests of both countries.

#### **Literature overwhelmingly concludes that the U.S. should cultivate ties with Brazil.**

Crandall 09 (Britta H, Author for Foreign Affairs published by the council of foreign affairs, Latin American relations specialist**,** "Hemispheric giants: The unusual story of United States policy toward Brazil into the 21st century," 2009, http://udini.proquest.com/view/hemispheric-giants-the-unusual-pqid:1896841681/

Hence, explanations of U.S. policy toward Brazil based on the neglect assumption have in common the urgent appeal for the U.S. government to pay closer attention to Brazil. The sense of urgency belies Brazil's peaceful and friendly relationship with the United States, focusing instead on the perceived fleeting window of opportunity for engagement, and the hitherto missed opportunities in security, energy, and economic cooperation. William Perry expressed dismay at how "such a large and influential country in the hemisphere [had] escaped a sustained interest from the legislative branch," calling Brazil "too important to ignore."9 The literature overwhelmingly implores the United States to change its errant ways and wake up to the reality of Brazil's size, economic importance, and potential as a strategic ally. In claiming that the United States has ignored Brazil, implicit in the neglect assumption is the belief that any existent mid-level engagement is insufficient and lacks gravitas or value. The widely-held acceptance of U.S. neglect of Brazil since the 1970s contrasted by the special relationship prior to this time raises interesting and obvious questions. Why did the United States apparently abandon its alliance with Brazil? If indeed the United States has neglected Brazil since the 1970s, what caused this shift? What were the factors that prompted attention between 1882 and the mid1970s, and are those factors currently present? Finally, have new factors emerged such as those centering around energy development and agricultural trade which could prompt increased bilateral engagement? 9 William Perry, "Brazil: Too Important to Ignore," CSIS Americas Program, Policy Papers on the Americas, VTL3 (15 July 1996).

## Should Consult - Issues

### Binding Key

#### Squo Dialogue doesn’t solve- binding consultation creates a cohesive strategic project

Sweig et al 11 (Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, AND Samuel W. Bodman, and James D. Wolfensohn, Chairmen, Wolfensohn & Company, LLC) (“Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations” Council on Foreign Relations Task Force Report, July 12, 2011, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Brazil\_TFR\_66.pdf //BLOV)

According to President Obama’s recent statements, U.S. policy toward Brazil is based on engagement and “mutual interest and mutual respect,” predicated on the belief that a strong relationship with Brazil promotes both U.S. and Brazilian interests. However, U.S. and Brazilian practice has not always matched this rhetoric. In a relationship that has more often been characterized by distance than by close friendship, substantive collaboration has been shallow and prone to misunderstanding.

Drawing upon groundwork laid by the Clinton and Bush administrations, the United States is now shaping a framework for a bilateral relationship with Brazil. Brazil and the United States do work together on a number of discrete issues, such as biofuels cooperation, defense, peacekeeping, and nonproliferation, among others.2 Presidents Obama and Rousseff recently laid out an expanding agenda that includes civil aviation, space, innovation, science and technology, and education. Senior officials of the two countries occasionally maintain channels of communication on major international security issues. Still, for a variety of reasons, including competing priorities and domestic poli¬tics in each country, neither government has yet been able to weave the disparate threads of their joint ventures into the fabric of a cohesive strategic project.

### Energy

#### Energy affairs need to be consulted on- US-Brazil strategic energy dialogue

Langevin 12 (Mark S. Langevin, Ph.D. Associate Adjunct Professor of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland-University College, a Contributing Faculty at Walden University’s Graduate School of Public Policy and Administration) (“Energy and Brazil-United States Relations A Discussion Paper”, Brazil works, Sep 19, 2012, <https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B7MqlY1WLL8eZnJUNGxxZlpSQi1KcGRlYUlOeHRRZw/edit?usp=drive_web> //BLOV)

Throughout the engagement and turbulence of Brazil-U.S. relations, particular private

sector interests and national foreign policies have swirled to elevate energy affairs toward the

top of the bilateral agenda. Both Brazil and the U.S. have called for greater cooperation on

energy matters in the past several years and under different administrations. In 2007 then

Presidents Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil and George W. Bush of the U.S. celebrated the

biofuel boom by signing the Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and

Brazil to Advance Cooperation on Biofuels to foment bilateral cooperation. During the 2008

U.S. presidential campaign then candidate Barack Obama promised an “Energy Partnership of

the Americas” to deliver up regional energy security in close cooperation with Brazil (Spencer

2009). In April of 2009, the U.S. Export-Import Bank extended a $2 billion facility to enable

Brazil’s nationally controlled energy company, Petrobras, to obtain favorable financing for the

purchase of U.S. manufactured drilling equipment (United States Export-Import Bank 2011). In

May of 2011 the facility became operative and the Ex-Im Bank approved a request from JP

Morgan Chase, acting as lender, to finance over $300 million in Petrobras’ purchases of U.S.

manufactured products (Ibid.)

In March of 2011 Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff hosted U.S. President Obama to

herald the establishment of a “strategy energy dialogue.” Clearly, both Presidents Rousseff and

Obama are keen on energy as a leading issue in bilateral affairs. This should come as no surprise

since Dilma is the former Secretary of Energy for the state of Rio Grande do Sul, former Minister

of Mines and Energy, and former Chair of Petrobras’ Board of Directors. Obama has also

emphasized the vital role of renewable energy and energy security in domestic and foreign

affairs, both as candidate and as president. Today, both nations’ foreign policymakers

recognize the key role of energy as a bilateral and global issue of strategic importance; and the

establishment of the bilateral Strategy Energy Dialogue makes energy a pivotal matter for some

time to come. This discussion paper examines this fundamental bilateral issue and evaluates

the challenges and opportunities for deepening bilateral and bi-national cooperation through

the current set consultative mechanisms, including the Strategic Energy Dialogue, across the

subsectors of petroleum, ethanol, and electricity generation-transmission-distribution (GTD).

### Ethanol/Biofuels

#### Brazil will say yes to ethanol and biofuels

Sweig et al 11 (Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, AND Samuel W. Bodman, and James D. Wolfensohn, Chairmen, Wolfensohn & Company, LLC) (“Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations” Council on Foreign Relations Task Force Report, July 12, 2011, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Brazil\_TFR\_66.pdf //BLOV)

Brazil’s ethanol industry is consolidating as small producers are absorbed and major energy actors such as Petrobras and Shell enter the industry. Logistical constraints, particularly in transporting etha¬nol from local producers to major markets, have slowed the pace of development in recent years. Several pipeline projects are now under development to relieve the bottlenecks. In addition, concerns about labor conditions and the potential for expanded sugarcane cultivation to push other agricultural activity into the Amazon region have raised sustainability questions.

To meet future biofuel mandates, the United States will likely have to increase its biofuel imports from Brazil. With the U.S. ethanol industry now showing support for phasing out ethanol tariffs in exchange for long-term production credits and infrastructure incentives, American policy-makers could use this as an opening within the U.S.-Brazil relationship. American budget hawks see the elimination of the tariffs (at fifty-four cents per gallon on imported ethanol) as a quick win, and industry sup¬porters are increasingly open to greater imports as it becomes clear that meeting future biofuel targets without them will be impossible.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Brazil and the United States are the dominant countries in ethanol production and consumption; their combined 89 percent share of the global ethanol market offers significant opportunities for cooperation. Many bilateral programs have focused on jointly developing related technology and establishing standards and international structures to promote a global ethanol market.

Even as Brazil and the United States work to develop biofuels pro¬duction capacity in third countries, protectionist U.S. policy toward imported sugar ethanol remains a barrier to developing a global free market for ethanol. The Task Force recommends that the Obama administration make the case in the U.S. Congress for tariff and subsidy reductions or eliminations as smart trade, clean energy, and strategic foreign policies. Understanding the contentious U.S. political environment, the Task Force encourages Congress to include an elimination of the etha¬nol tariff in any reform to the ethanol and biofuel tax credit regime. The Task Force recommends that the United States use the proposed tariff elimination to negotiate reductions in barriers for U.S. goods to Brazil. This mutual reduction of tariffs in the name of climate change mitigation could then be promoted as a model for similar agreements between other countries and serve to allay fears that climate-related criteria could be used to increase trade barriers in developing coun¬tries. In the interim, the United States can take steps to facilitate a larger integrated ethanol market by cooperating with Brazilians to align biofuels standards.

### Climate Change

#### Brazil will say yes to climate change mitigation

Sweig et al 11 (Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, AND Samuel W. Bodman, and James D. Wolfensohn, Chairmen, Wolfensohn & Company, LLC) (“Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations” Council on Foreign Relations Task Force Report, July 12, 2011, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Brazil\_TFR\_66.pdf //BLOV)

CLIMATE CHANGE

Brazil’s economic success has brought both environmental benefits and challenges. Rising living standards have made environmental protec¬tion more of a priority for both the public and the government. At the same time, however, economic growth has brought higher consump¬tion of goods and energy, as well as greater changes in land use to sup-port agricultural expansion.

Brazil’s continued economic rise will increase threats to its environ¬ment even as its economic wherewithal to address those threats grows. For example, Brazil’s growing electricity demand drives greater use of natural-gas-fired power generation and a growing automobile fleet increases gasoline and diesel demand. Development of the pre-salt oil resources risks acute environmental damage as well, as a major accident could damage Brazil’s “blue Amazon.” Deforestation of the Amazon rainforest, though generally on the decline, remains a major challenge and the primary source of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in Brazil.

Conclusions

The Rousseff administration’s efforts to mitigate GHG emissions and international efforts to strengthen global commitments to combat climate change will likely come second to Brazil’s higher priorities of economic growth and social development. Nevertheless, many areas of climate change mitigation are of mutual interest to Brazil and the United States, opening significant opportunities for cooperation.

### Energy security

#### Brazil will say yes to energy security- Strategic Energy Dialogue

Sweig et al 11 (Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, AND Samuel W. Bodman, and James D. Wolfensohn, Chairmen, Wolfensohn & Company, LLC) (“Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations” Council on Foreign Relations Task Force Report, July 12, 2011, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Brazil\_TFR\_66.pdf //BLOV)

ENERGY

Brazil’s energy matrix is among the least carbon intensive of the major economies because the majority of its electricity is provided by hydro¬power and other renewable fuels; sugar-based ethanol also provides a large share of transportation fuels.15 Brazil is also developing its sub-stantial hydrocarbon and uranium resources.

Brazil’s energy position and low level of carbon intensity will be challenging to maintain. Continued industrialization and rising stan¬dards of living have created an energy demand that outpaces Brazil’s existing infrastructure. The resulting pressure on the country’s energy infrastructure requires continuous development within all segments of the energy value chain. Perhaps the biggest challenge is for Brazil to do so while maintaining renewable energy’s share of the energy mix, cur¬rently at 50 percent.

Labor and land-use concerns, including the potential impact on bio-diversity in the Cerrado and Amazon, challenge continued growth in ethanol production.16 At the same time, electricity production is diver¬sifying away from hydropower toward greater natural-gas-fired gen¬eration, as most new large-capacity sites are located far from demand centers or in environmentally sensitive areas such as the Amazon.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The Task Force finds that energy is and will remain a critical component of Brazil’s economic and political agenda, driven by rising per capita energy consumption, development of substantial domestic energy resources, and the need to expand existing energy infrastructure. Bra-zil’s investment in this industry is a primary example of its domestic and international agendas reinforcing each other. The United States and Brazil have common interests in improving energy efficiency, reduc¬ing carbon intensity, promoting the development of biofuels, expand¬ing the use of natural gas, and managing offshore oil exploration and development.

The Task Force applauds the formation of a bilateral Strategic Energy Dialogue, announced by Obama and Rousseff, to address a broad range of energy issues, including the safe and sustainable devel¬opment of Brazil’s deepwater oil and gas resources, as well as coop¬eration on biofuels and other renewals, energy efficiency, and civilian nuclear energy. The dialogue aims to encourage energy partnerships, create jobs in both countries, make energy supplies more secure, and help address the challenge of climate change.17 The Task Force urges both countries to ensure that this initiative becomes a self-sustaining endeavor that brings together government officials, regulators, and the private sector to engage in conversation, cooperation, and collabora-tion where appropriate.

### Human rights

#### Brazil will Say yes to Human rights

Sweig et al 11 (Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, AND Samuel W. Bodman, and James D. Wolfensohn, Chairmen, Wolfensohn & Company, LLC) (“Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations” Council on Foreign Relations Task Force Report, July 12, 2011, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Brazil\_TFR\_66.pdf //BLOV)

HUMAN RIGHTS

The Task Force is encouraged by President Rousseff’s stated com¬mitment to human rights. Rousseff’s personal history has placed a spotlight on human rights, and Brazil is lending its voice to advance the many dimensions of and threats to human rights across the world. Rousseff signaled Brazil’s coming emphasis on international human rights and a departure from her predecessor when, during her first media interview after her election, she asserted that she would not have abstained on a 2010 UN human rights resolution on Iran.33 Early in the Rousseff presidency, Brazil has made overtures on human rights issues in Latin America, the Middle East, and Iran, and Rous-seff maintained the position of the special secretary for human rights as a cabinet-level position.

The Task Force also notes that Brazil has made a considerable con¬tribution to the improvement of human rights of its citizens in recent years. Brazil’s historic transition from a military-led to a democratically elected government has produced economic growth and an opening of society, and that has dramatically reduced poverty and childhood mal¬nutrition by nearly 80 percent.

Presidents Obama and Rousseff can be powerful voices calling for racial, ethnic, and gender equality in their own countries and abroad, having broken barriers as the first African-American president in the United States and the first female president in Brazil. Likewise, both President Rousseff and Secretary Clinton have identified the impor¬tance of girls’ education and the advancement of women as matters of development and security and can use their bona fides to further elevate this issue both domestically and abroad.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Brazil would strengthen its human rights credentials and influence within the UN Human Rights Council were it to apply universality to itself as assiduously as it demands it from others. For example, the number of extrajudicial executions by police is extremely high: Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo police forces combined kill more than one thou-sand people each year. Brazil has not yet passed legislation that would establish a truth commission to investigate dictatorship-era human rights abuses. The Task Force welcomes Brazil’s voice and positive influence in advancing human rights throughout the Americas and internationally and encourages Brazil and the United States to seek ways to cooperate generally with respect to human rights.

### Counter narcotics

#### Brazil will say yes to Counternarcotic assistance

Sweig et al 11 (Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, AND Samuel W. Bodman, and James D. Wolfensohn, Chairmen, Wolfensohn & Company, LLC) (“Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations” Council on Foreign Relations Task Force Report, July 12, 2011, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Brazil\_TFR\_66.pdf //BLOV)

COUNTERNARCOTICS

Counternarcotics efforts in Bolivia represent an opportunity for effec-tive third-country cooperation that maximizes Brazilian and U.S. capa-bilities and allows for all three countries to learn from one another. Just weeks after Evo Morales expelled the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) from Bolivia in 2008, Brazil and Bolivia announced a strategic alliance to combat drug production and trafficking. Brazil has a sig¬nificant national interest in Bolivia’s drug war: the shared Brazilian-Bolivian border is longer than that between the United States and Mexico, and Brazil’s police estimate that 60 percent of cocaine enter¬ing the country comes from Bolivia.50

Brazilians have acknowledged that they are unable to match the U.S. capacity to fund Bolivian police forces and equip them with expensive hardware like patrol helicopters. In August 2009, just eight months after the Brazil-Bolivia treaty went into effect, officials from Brazil’s Ministry of External Relations—or Itamaraty—began a series of dis-cussions with U.S. diplomats about Bolivia’s interest in trilateral coop-eration with the United States. According to American diplomats, the Brazilian willingness to collaborate with the United States on counter-narcotics signaled “a significant departure” from the status quo and an “about face” within Itamaraty.51

Trilateral counternarcotics efforts in Bolivia have the potential for greater effectiveness in reducing coca cultivation and drug traffick¬ing, and increase opportunities for discussion, partnership, and confi¬dence-building between Brazil and the United States. At the same time, while advancing a common agenda, the United States and Brazil can capitalize on their comparative advantages. The United States provides experience and funding but avoids leaving a heavy footprint. Brazil— without the storied and controversial U.S. counternarcotics profile in the region—takes on greater responsibility, living up to expectations that a regional powerhouse uses its resources for the good of the neigh¬borhood. Currently, negotiations are under way with the Bolivian gov¬ernment about joint monitoring efforts. Despite good intentions and a high degree of openness and cooperation between Brazil and the United States, successful trilateral collaboration requires a commitment from Bolivia in addition to the existing goodwill and bilateral consensus.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The Task Force welcomes Brazil’s involvement in counternarcotics, harm reduction, and transnational crime issues on its borders, espe¬cially in Bolivia, and encourages other such cooperation between Brazil and the United States elsewhere. The Task Force encourages Brazil’s leadership as a voice for reform of the region’s counternarcot-ics strategy.

The Task Force supports Brazil’s promotion, by former president Cardoso with former presidents Ricardo Lagos (Chile), Ernesto Zedillo (Mexico), and César Gaviria (Colombia), of harm reduction policies (which treat drug use as a public health issue and promote the reduction of drug consumption) in addition to interdiction and eradi-cation.52 The Task Force encourages the DEA and USAID and their Brazilian counterparts working in Bolivia to reinforce one another’s efforts to reassure the Bolivian government that outside counternarcot-ics support—like monitoring of coca cultivation and eradication—does not threaten Bolivian sovereignty.

### Consult key to alliances

#### Consult key to alliance and soft power

Ted **Osius**, Foreign Service Officer for Southeast Asia and the Pacific, **‘02** “The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance: Why it Matters and How to Strengthen It”, p. 75-6

The Armitage report challenges the U.S.-Japan relationship to evolve from one of "burdensharing" into "power-sharing."32 Armitage's actions since joining the government suggest his sincerity in pursu­ing this goal. In Senate testimony, he reiterated themes from the au­tumn presidential campaign: "Close and constant consultation with allies is not optional. It **is the precondition for sustaining American leadership**. . . . To the extent that our behavior reflects arrogance and heightened sense of position, our claim to leadership will be-come, **in spite of our military prowess**, the thinnest of pretenis."33 The United States can, in fact, gain from power sharing, as long as it learns to tolerate it. America and the United Kingdom fought shoulder-to-shoulder wars, share a language and cultural roots, and pursue democratic and free market values in many shared endeavors around the )e. The United States regularly takes British views into account m dealing with European matters. Although decades may pass before the U.S.-Japan relationship reaches that level of trust, Japan to world's second-largest economy and a nation that shares America's commitment to democracy and a free market. Japan needs to make its views known, especially regarding Asia, and America must in return listen respectfully and with an open mind. tough it is difficult to imagine as effective a foreign policy part-as Prime Minister Tony Blair, in Asia the United States needs an to partner empowered, at times, to play a parallel role. Consultation, according to the Brookings Institution's Ivo Daalder, implies "give-and-take, putting one view on the table, hearing the other view and seeing if what emerges from the disagreement way forward that satisfies both sides. . . . **Unilateralism has nothing to do with whether you're willing to talk to people**. It's whether you're willing to take their views into account."35 Japan can help United States deal with its challenge, as the world's only super-power, in taking other views into account. Japan can also help the United States take advantage of the opportunities in Asia to engage real consultation and to build coalitions to address today's core global issues.

## Consultation Relations Solvency

#### US-Brazil communication is key to relations and further co-operation

Sweig et al 11 (Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, AND Samuel W. Bodman, and James D. Wolfensohn, Chairmen, Wolfensohn & Company, LLC) (“Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations” Council on Foreign Relations Task Force Report, July 12, 2011, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Brazil\_TFR\_66.pdf //BLOV)

Given Brazil’s rise over the past two decades, the United States must now alter its view of the region and pursue a broader and more mature relationship with the new Brazil. It is time that the foreign policy of the United States reflects the new regional reality and adjusts to advance U.S. interests, given what has changed and the changes likely to come.

Brazil and the United States are now entering a period that has great potential to solidify a mature friendship, one that entails ever-deepening trust in order to secure mutual benefits. This kind of rela¬tionship requires the two countries to move beyond their historic oscillation between misinterpretation, public praise, and rebuke, and instead approach both cooperation and inevitable disagreement with mutual respect and tolerance.

The Task Force recommends open and regular communication between Obama and Rousseff and between senior officials of both coun¬tries. As Brazil continues to rise and the United States adapts to a mul¬tipolar order, frequent dialogue will help anticipate and diffuse tensions that will surface as each country reacts and adjusts to a new and evolving geopolitical dynamic. High-level contact will signal to each country’s bureaucracy—historically distrustful of one another—that the relation¬ship is a priority and that the success of each is in the other’s interest

#### Binding consultation increases relations

Sweig et al 11 (Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, AND Samuel W. Bodman, and James D. Wolfensohn, Chairmen, Wolfensohn & Company, LLC) (“Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations” Council on Foreign Relations Task Force Report, July 12, 2011, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Brazil\_TFR\_66.pdf //BLOV)

Conclusion

President Obama’s visit to Brazil in March 2011 heralded a new phase of the U.S.-Brazil relationship. With agreements that touched on a wide range of issues—including trade and finance, infrastructure investment, civil aviation, energy, labor, education, and social con-cerns—presidents Obama and Rousseff signaled to their respec¬tive countries that this bilateral relationship is poised to evolve into a robust and mature friendship among equals. Yet most of the concrete deliverables announced during the trip reflected only the low-hanging fruit of cooperation.

If the United States and Brazil are invested in a serious and deepen¬ing relationship, their conversation must continue. As in U.S. relations with such powers as India, China, Russia, or Germany, frank and high-level dialogue with Brazil will allow both countries to identify, acknowl¬edge, and manage issues of potential disagreement, which should not destabilize the relationship in its entirety.

Along these lines, the Task Force recommends that Obama host an interministerial meeting with Brazil, as President George W. Bush did in 2003. Principals from the U.S. and Brazilian governments need to communicate openly and specifically about the issues that remain as obstacles, including: trade, market access, and subsidies; priorities for and approaches to international security abroad; UN Security Coun-cil reform; and exercising human rights values. With frameworks now established for dialogue on many of these issues, the two countries can make genuine progress.

#### Squo consultation fails- cp solves

Sweig et al 11 (Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, AND Samuel W. Bodman, and James D. Wolfensohn, Chairmen, Wolfensohn & Company, LLC) (“Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations” Council on Foreign Relations Task Force Report, July 12, 2011, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Brazil\_TFR\_66.pdf //BLOV)

In both Brazil and the United States, interagency coordination of over¬all policy toward one another is limited. This is especially true in the United States, where initiatives regarding Brazil are undertaken by a variety of agencies with little or no synchronization or guiding strat-egy.54 The Task Force believes that existing joint efforts and potential areas for cooperation would benefit from each country developing a more cohesive and coordinated approach toward the other.

Brazil’s growing geostrategic importance merits sustained, senior-level, and comprehensive coordination of U.S. policy across agencies. The Task Force cautions that incorporating Brazil into high-level U.S. policy discussions—whether over peace and security, global finance, or climate change—are not likely to succeed if left to the regional director¬ates or bureaus at various executive branch agencies or to the regional subcommittees in the Congress.

As Brazil expands its reach across the globe and solidifies its involve¬ment on a wide array of international issues, the Task Force recom¬mends that the National Security Council institutionalize a standing interagency coordination mechanism so that a range of U.S. agencies responsible for functional issues such as finance, trade, energy, envi¬ronment, agriculture, health, homeland security, defense, and diplo-macy better coordinate what remains a highly decentralized U.S. policy toward Brazil. This would require an NSC director for Brazil, rather than a director for Brazil and the Southern Cone.

The goal is to give Brazil more and better coordinated attention across the U.S. government and to have agencies and departments beyond those that work on Western Hemisphere issues participate in formulating a more comprehensive policy. Within the State Depart¬ment, the Task Force recommends creating an Office for Brazilian Affairs separate from the Southern Cone office of the Western Hemi-sphere Affairs bureau.

#### Consultation is key to US-Brazil relations

Hakim 04 (Peter Hakim President Emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue) (“The Reluctant Partner” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2004), pp. 114-123, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20033833 //BLOV)

SO FAR, trade has been the only issue to provoke open and potentially damaging friction between the two countries. They have been able to cooperate, at least minimally, on thorny issues such as Venezuela and Colombia, and they have managed to swallow harsh rhetoric and avoid public quarrels on others, such as Cuba and the Iraq war. And although they have strikingly different backgrounds, personal styles, and political perspectives, the two presidents have apparently developed sincere respect for each other.

To sustain constructive ties, Washington must keep its expectations realistic. Some analysts and U.S. officials have advocated a far tighter relationship between the two countries, with more regular and structured collaboration. But Brazilians have traditionally preferred pragmatic and opportunistic cooperation with the United States on specific issues. Still somewhat distrustful of Washington, Brasilia is wary of creating the expectation that it will quasi-automatically support U.S. positions, compromise its ability to set an independent course for itself; or dimin¬ish the diversity of its other international relations. Brazil, in other words, has little interest in developing a privileged relationship with the United States of the type Argentina once sought. That leaves Washington with having to earn Brasilia's cooperation issue by issue, without presuming it will be granted. Still, the relationship has been remarkably stable and consistent over the years. The two countries have not been steady allies or continuing adversaries, but they have usually worked productively together. Today the United States can usually count on Brazil for an important measure of collaboration on most issues and can usually avoid its outright opposition on others.

The Bush administration should continue its good start, bolstering friendly U.S.-Brazil relations. Lula's administration welcomed the White House's two invitations and U.S. recognition of Brazil's special role in South America. Washington must remain attentive to Brasilia's interests. It would be good policy to systematically solicit Brazil's views on the full range of issues relevant to the hemisphere and take serious account of them. That will require Washington to pursue a less unilat¬eral approach, particularly in South America, and be willing to accept compromises on its policies and programs. No U.S. administration yet has been able to do this on a sustained basis, and it may be par¬ticularly difficult for the Bush White House.

#### Consultation is a starting point for sustainable US-Brazil ties.

Hakim 11 ((Peter Hakim President Emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue) (“The United States and Latin America: The Neighbourhood has Changed”, The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, 46:4, 63-78, DOI: 10.1080/03932729.2011.628094 : Published online January 5, 2012 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2011.628094> //BLOV)

Brazil’s rapidly escalating regional and global influence represents a pivotal change in inter-American affairs. The ability of the United States to pursue its agenda in Latin America increasingly depends on Brazil’s willingness to cooperate with or at least accommodate US initiatives, and the United States has increasingly had to engage with Brazil on a variety of global issues as well. Both regionally and internationally, the US–Brazil relationship involves both conflict and cooperation.19

The two countries are at odds on many policy issues, and Brazil advocates new institutional arrangements for the region that portend a reduced US role in Latin America. Still, Washington has maintained friendly ties with Brazil and will almost surely continue them. But, as Obama’s visit to Brazil in March 2011 demonstrated, neither Brazil nor the United States is yet ready to develop a broad, long-term partnership.20 They are not willing to make the concessions or accept the substantial compromises needed to build a more strategic relationship. The question is whether the two nations can find enough common ground to be able to cooperate more effectively and more consistently on specific issues of mutual concern.

#### Consultation is key to Latin American foreign policy- Brazil regional influence

Hakim 04 (Peter Hakim President Emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue) (“The Reluctant Partner” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2004), pp. 114-123, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20033833 //BLOV)

COURTING BRAZIL

ALTHOUGH MOST Latin American leaders complain that the United States has lost interest in the region since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Washington has courted the president of Brazil for the past year. Within weeks of his election to the presidency in Oc-tober 2002, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, known as Lula, was invited to meet President George W. Bush at the White House. He returned last June for a summit meeting with Bush and ten key cabinet members. At the time, he was the only head of state publicly opposed to the war in Iraq to be welcomed at i600 Pennsylvania Avenue.

The Bush administration has no more important task in the hemisphere than to cultivate a constructive working relationship with Brazil. As Latin America's largest and most influential country, Brazil will determine, to a large extent, whether the United States is able to advance its foreign policy agenda in Latin America, and on some issues it will affect U.S. success outside the region. Although Brazil may not be powerful enough to shape policy in Latin America as much as it might like, it often has enough muscle to substantially help—or obstruct—U.S. plans for the region. The main test of the relationship will not be whether Brazil and the United States can find areas of cooperation, but whether they are able to accommodate their divergent interests and goals, tolerate different practical per¬spectives and, in the end, avoid conflict.

Although security has taken over as the United States' first priority, the Bush administration's agenda for inter-American relations has not changed much in the past two years- and is not very different from those of Bill Clinton or George H.W. Bush. The United States remains focused on making Latin America a more compatible and productive partner by strengthening democratic politics and market economics in the region; forging hemisphere-wide free trade and investment arrange¬ments; and encouraging cooperative action to address common problems such as terrorism, drug trafficking, and threats to constitutional rule.

#### Poor ties with Brazil undermine U.S. Latin-American policy.

Hakim 04 (Peter Hakim President Emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue) (“The Reluctant Partner” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2004), pp. 114-123, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20033833 //BLOV)

Washington needs Brasilia's cooperation to make progress on criti-cal regional issues, such as the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FT), Venezuela's worsening political confrontation, and Colombia's criminal violence and guerrilla warfare. Brazil's voice also carries weight on broader international issues such as global trade negotiations and the struggle against AIDS. Just as surely, Brazil needs U.S. cooperation to advance its domestic and international agendas, particularly the cen¬tral challenge of economic growth, which requires dependable access to U.S. markets, capital, and technology. Brazil needs the United States to have any chance of energizing its long-stagnant economy, expanding job opportunities, and accelerating social development. An adversarial relationship would be extremely damaging to U.S. policy and interests in Latin America, more so than ever given the re¬gion's unsettled politics and uneasy relations with the United States.

#### Commitment from the U.S. stops erosion of U.S.-Brazil cooperation.

Bassoli 4 (D, Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Bassoli, “D*eveloping a Partnership with Brazil-An Emerging Power*, “3/19/04¶ <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a424216.pdf>)

By analyzing the above model, it is possible to say that the current U.S.-Brazilian relationship in almost all levels of the pyramid has suffered “erosion,” mostly in the recent years.95 International partnerships are built with the understanding that the desired goals must meet the national interests of both partners. If there are perceptions that the intended partnership will not be able to fulfill the interests of one of the partners or that one of the partners is not willing to accept the other’s interests, the partnership will never materialize. This is clearly what is happening today. Fortunately, in all the necessary elements – especially those at the base of the pyramid – the two countries still have ample common ground to explore. A partnership for the security of the Americas must be built with a socio-economic commitment of the future partners and vice-versa. Brazilians view these issues as interdependent and inseparable, one to the other

## U.S. – Brazil Relations good

### Laundry list

#### Brazil relations solve the aff- terrorism, prolif, conflict resolution, drug and arm sales,

Einaudi, 11 (Luigi Einaudi a Distinguished Visiting fellow in the Center for Strategic r esearch, institute for national Strategic Studies, at the national Defense University. He is also a Member of the advisory Council of the Brazil i nstitute at the Woodrow Wilson international Center for Scholars. ( “Brazil and the United States: The Need for Strategic Engagement,” March 2011, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/SF%20266%20Einaudi.pdf> //BLOV)

These words cannot be read simply as rhetoric rooted in the Third World trade unionism of the weak. Brazil is no longer weak. It is the only BRIC without a nuclear bomb not because it could not produce one, but because it has chosen not to, and its security doctrines are focused on protecting its borders and on deter¬rence, not on projecting global power. President Lula’s grandstanding with Turkey in Iran damaged his coun-try’s credibility, but as Brazil’s global reach matures, its multilateral skills and record of autonomy could prove important assets in efforts against the risks of nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation.

Like Canada and only a few other countries, Brazil has a tradition of good UN citizenship. This character-istic is an important asset for the United States to find in a friend nowadays. The author believes it was no acci-dent that Sérgio Vieira de Mello, the much admired UN peacemaker who lost his life in Iraq in 2003, was Brazil-ian. Brazil’s generally violence-free domestic history, the absence of conflicts with neighbors, and its longstanding commitment to UN principles and peacekeeping with-out the imposition of force are an important reservoir for conflict resolution.42

The United States and Brazil face similar problems in their immediate neighborhoods. Notable among these is trafficking in illegal drugs and arms, which contributes to citizen insecurity, migration, and unaccustomed mess¬iness along parts of their borders. These issues should all be included in a permanent consultation process, but Brazil’s approach of “South America for South Ameri¬cans” does not encourage effective cooperation with the United States on even such vital issues.

Brazil’s assertion of regional power to the exclusion of the United States is similar to China’s “active measures to promote Asian organizations that exclude the Unit¬ed States.”43 Initiatives such as UNASUR that exclude the United States, but which include actively anti-U.S. governments, invite uncertainty. The answer for Brazil is not to abandon UNASUR, let alone South American integration, but for both the United States and Brazil to ensure that they each develop and sustain bilateral ties with individual countries in accordance with the particu¬lar interests and needs of those countries. (Will anyone deny that Mexico is on some matters more important to the United States than Brazil?)

Both the United States and Brazil should actively support inter-American institutions like the OAS that bring both of them together with other countries of the hemisphere. Most Latin American and Caribbean countries want good relations with both the United States and Brazil, and multilateral activities are a key way to set and observe rules for everyone. Multilat¬eral formats also are useful to offset the asymmetries of power, which have long hampered the United States in dealing with its neighbors, and which now are be¬ginning to bedevil Brazil as it grows more rapidly than most countries around it.

### Latin American relations

#### Brazil is key to Latin-American relations

Meyer 2/27/13 (Peter J. Meyer Analyst in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service) (“CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Brazil-U.S. Relations” February 27, 2013, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33456.pdf> //BLOV)

Over the past decade, Brazil has firmly established itself as a regional power. Within South America, Brazilian foreign policy supports economic and political integration efforts in order to reinforce long-standing relationships with its neighbors. Although integration is the primary purpose of organizations like the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) and the Union of South American Nations (Unasur), they also serve as forums in which Brazil can exercise its leadership and develop consensus around its positions on regional and global issues. Brazil’s emphasis on forging new ties has led to increased engagement with countries in Central America and the Caribbean, areas where Brazil has not traditionally had much influence. Brazil engages in multilateral regional diplomacy through the Organization of American States (OAS);[48](http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/4/48864/AnuarioEstadistico2012_ing.pdf.) however, it has demonstrated a preference for resolving issues, when possible, through regional forums that do not include the United States.

#### Brazil key to Latin American economic and political stability.

Bassoli 4 (D, Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Bassoli, “D*eveloping a Partnership with Brazil-An Emerging Power*, “3/19/04¶ <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a424216.pdf>)

In the last two decades, a rising number of U.S. institutions and other experts have seen Brazil as a key partner for the United States in its pursuit of a fully integrated and prosperous community of the Western Hemisphere. In 1996, Robert Chase, Emily Hill and Paul Kennedy wrote about the pivotal role of Brazil along with other developing nations in the four corners of the world. Their conclusions on the country are quite clear: Should Brazil fail, “the Americans would feel the consequences.”29

Inattentive observers often misunderstand the size and importance of Brazil. It is the fifth largest country in the world both in size and population, with more than 170 million people and around 8.5 million square kilometers (slightly smaller than the U.S.). Brazil’s economy and populations are larger than Russia’s. While great disparities of income among social classes still exist, Brazil has a powerful entrepreneurial class, substantial industrial base, vigorous middle class, vibrant culture and a boisterous mass media.30 Its economy has been oscillating between the eighth and tenth largest in the world in the last decade. Out of its more than 170 million inhabitants, around 120 million are considered middle or emerging class (35 million families).31 This number almost equals the entire population of Japan. The persons considered rich total around 16 million – equivalent to the entire population of Chile. Such impressive figures of Brazilian assets place Brazil as one of the major markets in today’s world.32 Brazil is already among the three largest markets in the world for a variety of significant products, ranging from cell phones and microwaves to helicopters and executive jets.

### Prolif

#### **US Brazil Relations solve global proliferation**

Trinkunas & Bruneau 12(Harold & Thomas, Ph.D. at Naval Post Graduate School, Center on Contemporary conflict, “US Brazil Workshop on Global and Regional Security,” December 2012,

<http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA574567&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>)

Brazilian participants also noted the particular alignment of domestic constituencies regarding issues such as MERCOSUR and UNASUR, which they saw as demonstrating that Brazil was a consolidated democracy that had to respond to domestic political and economic interests in much the same way that the United States government did. The United States and Brazil also look very similar in their relationship with the region, one participant said. If we actually look at the interests of United States and Brazil, they are very convergent. One Brazilian participant also added that, like the United States, Brazil is happy to retreat back to unilateralism. Brazilian participants repeatedly emphasized that Brazil is uniquely qualified to play the role of international peacemaker due to their peaceful traditions, the strength of their diplomacy, and their experience in reducing tensions during international crises. Brazilians also stressed that as a consolidated free market democracy, Brazil is inherently a responsible power in the international arena. They disagreed with the characterization of Brazil as a ‘spoiler’, a position held by some U.S. observers of global nonproliferation efforts (albeit not by the U.S. participants in this dialogue). Again and again Brazilian participants emphasized their responsible and mature behavior in important international issues, including nuclear ones. The dialogue participants from outside of the region agreed that Brazil has acquired a good reputation for its skilled diplomacy. One U.S. participant predicted that Brazil would eventually join the expanded UN Security Council as a permanent member. The Brazilians considered the U.S. and Brazil to be natural partners in international nonproliferation efforts, and both sides agreed that the international nonproliferation regime was in crisis. They offered different explanations, however, for the roots of the regime crisis. A participant from within the region added that it is difficult for Brazil and the U.S. to be on the same page or even debate nuclear issues because the two countries comes from very different ends of the nuclear spectrum. Participants observed that the NPT regime is in the midst of a legitimacy crisis. One participant said that from an institutional point of view, the original design of the regime left it unable to adapt to changes that have taken place in the international system since the Cold War. Some U.S. participants expressed optimism that the NPT has been bolstered by the Obama administration’s support for the NPT. A change in both attitude and policy from the administration has fostered a new sense of hope in the NPT’s utility. This participant added that only by fully engaging other members of the NPT can the U.S. and Brazil hope to make the non-proliferation regime stronger.

#### U.S. – Brazil alliance key to Latin American democracy and growth.

Bassoli 4 (D, Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Bassoli, “D*eveloping a Partnership with Brazil-An Emerging Power*, “3/19/04¶ <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a424216.pdf>)

Democracy is the most important value for the world’s most powerful nations. This is true for Brazil as well. If democracy is believed to be the best way for mankind to live in society it should also be accepted as the best way to govern relations among countries. Accordingly, the United States through its actions should consistently demonstrate to its partners and friends that democratic behavior within the community of nations is highly desired. This by itself would send a powerful message to the entire world that those nations who live under a democracy would achieve better results for their people, regardless of the country’s size or relative power. There is a perceived increasing gap between the democratic discourse of the United States and its behavior in the international arena. Most important are the devastating consequences for the future of global peace that are not yet fully realized by U.S. policymakers. This “dual” behavior of the United States, not only when dealing with the issues of the Western Hemisphere but also with other international matters, as clearly put by Bulmer-Thomas, “is at the very least an uncomfortable state of affairs for the other states of the hemisphere: multilateralism when it is important and unilateralism in other cases.”99 Brazil, having developed its democracy throughout a “turbulent path,” is aware of the reality of the new world order and has made its decision. It is actually applying continuity to a very consistent diplomacy developed over decades and focused on the prosperity of the country as well as that of South America as a whole.100 The nation will continue to pursue both the development of South America through the enlargement of MERCOSUR and increased cooperation with different regions of the world. It will always apply its tradition of respect for the diversity of people and cultures that it has developed in its own territory throughout history. This paper has not attempted to cover the complexity of the negotiations surrounding Western Hemispheric economic integration. But the conclusion that the success of MERCOSUR should be desired and encouraged by the U.S. is a natural conclusion after what was discussed. As consistently put by the CFR report, “a realistic and sustained dialogue with Brazil is central to any successful U.S. policy in the Western Hemisphere,” but the report adds that Brazil will not “react favorably if it believes that the United States aims only to co-opt Brazil for exclusively American purposes.”101 If the United States chooses to offer to South America – through an expanded MERCOSUR – an open-ended option to develop a free system of trade, finance, security cooperation and technological and cultural interchange, a Brazilian partnership could make a major contribution to this real revolution in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere. For Brazil and its partners, MERCOSUR has created much more than economic results; it has created real conditions for a new era of cooperation in several different – and in the past forgotten – areas. This, of course, helps Brazil to meet its national objective of “establishing a ring of peace around the country” and certainly benefits other nations in the Southern Hemisphere. What is more important, this new environment is being created by the will of the people in the region, rather than being imposed by others. That is why the United States should encourage this understanding among its neighbors in South America. Democracy, economic development and peace in the region are also U.S. interests for the region. The most likely alternative is a much longer period of time necessary to overcome the socio-cultural differences needed to integrate the countries in the area and to consolidate, once and for all, the most peaceful region in the world.102

### Solves Food Shortages

#### US-Brazil Relations solve Food shortages/ Agriculture- tech and exports

Sweig et al 11 (Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, AND Samuel W. Bodman, and James D. Wolfensohn, Chairmen, Wolfensohn & Company, LLC) (“Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations” Council on Foreign Relations Task Force Report, July 12, 2011, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Brazil\_TFR\_66.pdf //BLOV)

Brazilian agricultural innovations have made agriculture more efficient and have expanded farming to parts of the country where crops could not grow roughly a decade ago, converting Brazil into an agriculture powerhouse with industrial-scale farming. The Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária, known as Embrapa) has worked since its inception in 1973 to develop new farmland and has modified varieties of seeds to grow in those environments.7 Agriculture now makes up a quarter of Brazilian GDP and accounts for 40 percent of export revenue. Accord¬ing to some estimates, pastureland covers nearly 25 percent of the coun¬try and 150 million acres of arable land remain uncultivated.

Within the framework of the BRICS countries, Brazil has become integral to the international effort to mitigate problems of food production and hunger, which has included a commitment to develop a joint strategy to ensure access to food for vulnerable populations. Coopera¬tion is strongest in Africa. Embrapa África, in conjunction with the Bra-zilian Agency for Cooperation (ABC), has personnel stationed in Ghana, Mozambique, Senegal, and Mali to coordinate food security programs, which generates goodwill for Brazil and an opportunity for cooperation with the United States. Initiatives under way from Latin America to the Middle East to Oceania point to Brazil’s global ambitions.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The Task Force finds that Brazil’s technological innovation in agricul-ture has allowed the country to capitalize on its natural resources and global economic conditions in order to carve out a place for itself on the world stage. Moreover, with more than one billion people undernourished worldwide, Brazil’s growing contribution to global food stores makes it a fundamental part of any international approach to food security.

Brazil and the United States are among the largest agricultural producers and exporters in the world. Agricultural technologies developed by U.S. companies are already being used to improve land productivity in Brazil, and barriers to further expansion (to the extent that any remain) are the subject of bilateral government dis¬cussions. The Task Force encourages the U.S. Department of Agri¬culture (USDA) to enhance capacity for cooperation on innovation and deployment of new technologies and development of standards. The USDA should provide funds for U.S. scientists to work with their counterparts in the Brazilian Embrapa. In addition, the Task Force recommends that the USDA consult with Embrapa in the develop¬ment of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) to ensure that U.S. products meet Brazilian standards.

### South-South ties

#### Brazil aids developing country- solves poverty, bio fules and AIDS

Meyer 2/27/13 (Peter J. Meyer Analyst in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service) (“CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Brazil-U.S. Relations” February 27, 2013, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33456.pdf> //BLOV)

South-South Ties

Brazilian foreign policy under the PT administrations of Presidents Lula and Rousseff has prioritized relations with nontraditional partners in the developing world, or “South-South” ties. During the Lula Administration, the country significantly expanded its diplomatic presence in the developing world, opening 37 new embassies and 25 new consulates.66 Brazil also increased its international development assistance, which totaled $362 million (0.02% of GDP) in 2009. The majority of Brazil’s aid has gone to Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa—with a special emphasis on fellow Portuguese-speaking nations. It includes humanitarian assistance and technical cooperation focused in sectors where Brazil has been particularly effective domestically, such as poverty reduction, tropical agriculture and biofuels production, and the prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS and tropical diseases.67 These diplomatic and development ties have coincided with increased commercial relations. While Brazil’s total world trade grew by 284% between 2003 and 2012, trade with the Middle East grew by 327%, trade with Africa grew by 333%; trade with India grew by 922%; and trade with China grew by 1,030%. China is now Brazil’s top trading partner, with total trade valued at $75.5 billion.68

### Middle east prolif/conflict

#### Brazil is key to mediate middle east conflict

Meyer 2/27/13 (Peter J. Meyer Analyst in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service) (“CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Brazil-U.S. Relations” February 27, 2013, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33456.pdf> //BLOV)

In addition to seeking greater influence within global governance institutions, Brazil has pushed for a greater role in resolving issues of geopolitical importance. During the Lula Administration, Brazil was somewhat critical of the U.S. role in the Middle East, arguing that the U.N. should oversee negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians and emerging powers should be more involved.77 Brazil hosted the presidents of Israel and the Palestinian National Authority, and suggested that it might be able to act as a mediator in the conflict. Brazil also recognized Palestine as an independent state within its 1967 borders, setting off a wave of similar recognitions throughout South America.78 At the September 2011 U.N. General Assembly, President Rousseff called for Palestine’s full membership in the United Nations.79

Additionally, Brazil has been involved in discussions regarding Iran’s nuclear program. In May 2010, Lula worked with his Turkish counterpart to negotiate a deal with Iran under which Iran’s enriched uranium would be reprocessed outside the country. The so-called “Tehran Declaration” was similar to a deal put forward in October 2009 by the United States, France, and Russia that had been supported by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Brazilians saw the agreement as a confidence-building measure to bring Iran back to the negotiating table; however, the Obama Administration and European nations viewed the agreement as a delaying tactic, noted that the October 2009 deal was no longer sufficient since Iran had continued to enrich uranium, and pushed ahead with sanctions.80 Brazil voted against U.N. Security Resolution 1929 (June 2010), saying the council had “lost a historic opportunity to peacefully negotiate the Iranian nuclear program,” but agreed to abide by the sanctions.81 While some analysts dismissed Brazil’s efforts as naive and unhelpful,82 others argued that the negotiation attempt demonstrated Brazil’s growing prominence and the potential for new states to play important roles in resolving issues of geopolitical importance.83

### Counter narcotics

#### Brazil provides the bridge to Counter Narcotic assistance

Meyer 2/27/13 (Peter J. Meyer Analyst in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service) (“CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Brazil-U.S. Relations” February 27, 2013, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33456.pdf> //BLOV)

Counternarcotics

While Brazil is not a major drug-producing country, it is the second largest consumer of cocaine in the world and serves as a transit country for illicit drugs from neighboring Andean countries destined primarily for Europe. In recognition of these challenges, Brazil has taken several steps to improve its antidrug efforts. In 2004, it implemented an air bridge denial program, which authorizes lethal force for air interdiction, and in 2006, Brazil passed an anti-drug law that prohibits and penalizes the cultivation and trafficking of illicit drugs. Under its Strategic Border Plan, introduced in June 2011, the Brazilian government has deployed inter-agency resources to strengthen border security in high-risk locations, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to monitor illicit activity along its borders and in the remote Amazon region.88 As part of this effort, Brazil has signed agreements and carried out joint operations with neighboring countries.89 According to the U.S. Department of State, “Brazil’s focus on inter-agency cooperation and border security resulted in significantly improved interdiction efforts in 2011.” Through October 2011, the federal police seized 15.2 metric tons of cocaine, 87.4 metric tons of marijuana, 194,776 dosage units of ecstasy, 72,492 dosage units of LSD, and 42,000 dosage units of methamphetamine.90

The United States and Brazil cooperate on counternarcotics issues in a number of ways. U.S. counternarcotics assistance provides training for Brazilian law enforcement, assists interdiction programs at Brazil’s international airports, supports drug prevention programs, and is designed to improve Brazil’s capacity to dismantle criminal organizations. Brazil received $1 million in U.S. counternarcotics assistance in FY2010, $1 million in FY2011, and an estimated $2.9 million in FY2012. Under the Obama Administration’s request for FY2013, Brazil would receive $1.9 million in counternarcotics assistance.91

Brazil has also served as a bridge between the United States and Bolivia, which expelled the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) from its territory in 2008 as a result of alleged interference in the country’s internal affairs. Under a trilateral anti-drug cooperation agreement signed in January 2012, the United States and Brazil are providing assistance to Bolivia in the monitoring and eradication of coca crops. According to the agreement, the United States is responsible for providing monitoring equipment, Brazil is responsible for obtaining and interpreting satellite images, and Bolivia is responsible for conducting any necessary field work.92

### Terrorism

#### Brazil is key to solve terrorism- Tri border area

Meyer 2/27/13 (Peter J. Meyer Analyst in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service) (“CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Brazil-U.S. Relations” February 27, 2013, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33456.pdf> //BLOV)

Counterterrorism and the Tri-Border Area93

The Tri-Border Area (TBA) of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay has long been used for arms smuggling, money laundering, and other illicit purposes. According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism, there are no known operational cells of al Qaeda or Hezbollah-related groups in the hemisphere; however, the United States remains concerned that proceeds from legal and illegal goods flowing through the TBA could potentially be diverted to support terrorist groups.94 In December 2010, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned Hezbollah’s chief representative in South America, Bilal Mohsen Wehbe, for transferring funds collected in Brazil to Hezbollah in Lebanon. According to the Treasury Department, Wehbe and an associate raised more than $500,000 from Lebanese businessmen in the TBA following the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. Wehbe also reportedly has overseen Hezbollah’s counterintelligence activity in the TBA and has worked for the office of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i.95

The U.S. government has worked with Brazil to address concerns about the TBA and strengthen the country’s counterterrorism capabilities. The countries of the TBA and the United States created the “3+1 Group on Tri-Border Area Security” in 2002, and the group built a Joint Intelligence Center to combat trans-border criminal organizations in 2007. Within Brazil, the United States has supported efforts to implement the Container Security Initiative (CSI) at the port of Santos, and U.S. authorities are currently training Brazilian airline employees to identify fraudulent documents. The State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism for 2011 commends

the Brazilian government for its continued support of counterterrorism-related activities, including investigating potential terrorism financing, document forgery networks, and other illicit activity.96 Brazil has yet to adopt legislation, however, to make terrorism and terrorism financing autonomous offenses. Like many other Latin American nations, Brazil has been reluctant to adopt specific antiterrorism legislation as a result of the difficulty of defining terrorism in a way that does not include the actions of social movements and other groups whose actions of political dissent were condemned as terrorism by repressive military regimes in the past.97 Nevertheless, some Brazilian officials have pushed for antiterrorism legislation, asserting that the country will face new threats as a result of hosting the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics.98

### Bio Fuels

#### US-Brazil relations spread bio fuels to Latin America

Meyer 2/27/13 (Peter J. Meyer Analyst in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service) (“CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Brazil-U.S. Relations” February 27, 2013, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33456.pdf> //BLOV)

Ethanol and Other Biofuels107

Brazil stands out as an example of a country that has become a net exporter of energy, partially by increasing its use and production of ethanol. In 1975, in response to sharp increases in global oil prices, the Brazilian government began a national program to promote the production and consumption of sugarcane ethanol. Brazil now produces some 390,000 barrels per day.108 Within Brazil, pure ethanol is available at nearly every fueling station and gasoline is required to include a 20% ethanol blend. About 90% of new cars sold in Brazil each year are fitted with “flex-fuel”

engines capable of running on fuel blends ranging from pure ethanol to pure gasoline. As a result, ethanol accounts for over half of all fuel pumped in Brazil.109

On March 9, 2007, the United States and Brazil, the world’s two largest ethanol-producing countries, signed a memorandum of understanding to promote greater cooperation on ethanol and biofuels. The agreement involves (1) technology sharing between the United States and Brazil; (2) feasibility studies and technical assistance to build domestic biofuels industries in third countries; and (3) multilateral efforts to advance the global development of biofuels.110 Over the past six years, the United States and Brazil have moved forward on all three facets of the agreement. Presidents Obama and Rousseff signed onto a partnership agreement for the development of aviation biofuels in March 2011,111 and in October 2011, Boeing and Brazil’s Embraer announced plans to build a joint research center.112 Brazil and the United States have also worked together in a number of Latin American, Caribbean, and African countries. In March 2011, Presidents Obama and Rousseff agreed to commit $3 million to support the development of legal regimes and domestic biofuels production in the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, and Senegal.113 Additionally, the United States and Brazil are working with other members of the International Biofuels Forum (IBF) to make biofuels standards and codes more uniform.

Brazil and the United States have taken steps to liberalize trade in ethanol over the past year. In December 2011, the Brazilian government issued a resolution to extend its duty-free treatment of imported ethanol until December 31, 2015.114 Similarly, the U.S. Congress allowed a 54-cent-per-gallon duty on imported ethanol to expire at the end of 2011. Prior to its expiration, the duty served as a significant barrier to direct imports of Brazilian ethanol in most years. Although some Brazilian ethanol was allowed to enter the United States duty-free after being reprocessed in Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) countries, such imports could only account for up to 7% of the U.S. ethanol market. A 2.5% ad valorem tariff on ethanol imports to the United States remains in place permanently unless the Harmonized Tariff Schedule code is changed.

### Human trafficking

#### US brazil relations solve human trafficking

Meyer 2/27/13 (Peter J. Meyer Analyst in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service) (“CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Brazil-U.S. Relations” February 27, 2013, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33456.pdf> //BLOV)

Trafficking in Persons142

According to the U.S. State Department’s Trafficking in Persons Report, Brazil does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking, but is making significant

efforts to do so. As a result, it is listed as a Tier 2 country.143 Brazil is a large source country for men, women, and children trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation. Some are exploited in sex trafficking within the country while others are trafficked to neighboring countries or abroad to Europe and the United States. Brazil is also a source country for men and children subject to forced labor within the country.144 Some 25,000-40,000 Brazilian men reportedly have been recruited to labor in slave-like conditions, often at cattle ranches, logging and mining camps, and sugar-cane plantations.145

Over the past year, the Brazilian government has taken a number of actions to address the problem of human trafficking. The Brazilian Tourism Ministry began a campaign against sex tourism, asking websites to remove content related to sex tourism and distributing posters warning of criminal penalties for the sexual exploitation of minors.146 The Ministry of Labor’s mobile units rescued over 2,400 victims from slave-like labor conditions, provided $3.4 million in back-pay and damages to rescued workers, and maintained a “dirty list” of nearly 300 employers that are responsible for slave-like labor. Additionally, the Brazilian government secured convictions in nine human trafficking cases. At the same time, the State Department maintains that government-provided services for trafficking victims remained inadequate, only 10% of slave-like labor cases were criminally prosecuted, and a significant number of those rescued from slave-like labor were re-trafficked.

The State Department report offers a number of recommendations for Brazil. It calls for the Brazilian government to increase efforts to investigate and prosecute trafficking offenses, and adopt legislation to apply more stringent sentences to trafficking offenders. It also calls for the Brazilian government to increase dedicated funding to provide specialized services to trafficking victims. Moreover, the State Department report suggests that Brazil should enhance collaboration between government entities, and increase anti-trafficking training for law enforcement and judicial officials.147

### Racism

#### US-Brazil relations support affirmative action in Latin American

Meyer 2/27/13 (Peter J. Meyer Analyst in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service) (“CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Brazil-U.S. Relations” February 27, 2013, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33456.pdf> //BLOV)

Race and Discrimination

People of African descent in Brazil, also known as Afro-Brazilians, account for a majority154 of the population but have long been disproportionately affected by the country’s high level of inequality. Little concrete information was available, however, until the Brazilian government began to collect better statistics on Afro-Brazilians during the Cardoso Administration (1995-2002). These statistics—which found significant education, health, and wage disparities between Afro-Brazilians and Brazil’s general population—prompted the Brazilian government to enact antidiscrimination and affirmative action legislation.

Brazil now has the most extensive antidiscrimination and affirmative action legislation of any country in Latin America. In 2001, Brazil became the first Latin American country to endorse quotas to increase minority representation in government service. In 2003, Brazil became the first country in the world to establish a special secretariat with a ministerial rank to manage racial equity promotion policies. In 2010, Brazil enacted the Statute of Racial Equality, which offers tax incentives for enterprises that undertake racial inclusion, calls on the government to adopt affirmative action programs to reduce ethnic inequalities, and reaffirms that African and Brazilian black history should be taught in all elementary and middle schools, among other provisions. Most recently, in 2012, Brazil adopted an affirmative action law that will require federal universities to reserve half of their admissions spots for students that are Afro-Brazilian, indigenous, or graduates of public high schools (which tend to serve the poorest students). The law gradually increases the admissions spots required to be reserved from 12.5% in 2013 to 50% in 2016, with half of the spots set aside for low income students of all races with the highest grades and the other half divided in accordance with the racial makeup of each state.155 Although most Brazilians favor government efforts to combat social exclusion, race-based affirmative action initiatives have been somewhat controversial.156

In March 2008, Brazil and the United States signed an agreement known as the United States-Brazil Joint Action Plan to Eliminate Racial and Ethnic Discrimination and Promote Equality. The initiative recognizes that Brazil and the United States are multi-ethnic, multi-racial democracies, and seeks to promote equality of opportunity for the members of all racial and ethnic communities. To that end, Brazil and the United States share best practices through activities such as training programs, workshops, technical expert exchanges, scholarships, and public-private partnerships.157 Current areas of focus include expanding access to education for students of African descent, eliminating racial health disparities, mitigating environmental impacts in communities of African descent, addressing challenges in criminal justice systems, and guaranteeing equal access to economic opportunities.158 Congress called for continued U.S. support for the Joint Action Plan in the report (H.Rept. 112-331) accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-74).

### Solves Disease

#### US Brazil relations solve disease- collaborative tech and research

Sweig et al 11 (Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, AND Samuel W. Bodman, and James D. Wolfensohn, Chairmen, Wolfensohn & Company, LLC) (“Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations” Council on Foreign Relations Task Force Report, July 12, 2011, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Brazil\_TFR\_66.pdf //BLOV)

The Task Force urges action within the U.S. Congress to allow tech¬nology transfer to accompany Brazilian purchases of U.S. military equipment. These transfers would boost bilateral trade, U.S. industry, and defense cooperation and simultaneously support Brazil’s technol-ogy and innovation agenda.

Brazil’s investment in health research is providing tangible ben¬efits and important successes in developing interventions for disease, including HIV/AIDS and the so-called neglected diseases that dispro-portionally affect low- and middle-income countries (such as malaria, tuberculosis, and leprosy). The Task Force encourages the U.S. Depart¬ment of Health and Human Services and the National Institutes of Health to foster partnerships with their Brazilian counterparts to help build global health capacity and collaborate in scientific research projects that could help generate novel diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines.

### Solves Energy Security

#### US Brazil relations solve energy security- Pre-salt oil deposits

Sweig et al 11 (Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, AND Samuel W. Bodman, and James D. Wolfensohn, Chairmen, Wolfensohn & Company, LLC) (“Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations” Council on Foreign Relations Task Force Report, July 12, 2011, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Brazil\_TFR\_66.pdf //BLOV)

Brazil is one of just a few countries in the Western Hemisphere— Canada being another—that will significantly increase oil production over the next decade. Despite the difficulties of doing business in Brazil, the Brazilian oil sector is one of only a handful of attractive resource bases in the world that welcomes foreign investment. Indeed, in late 2010, Petrobras raised $70 billion in the world’s largest share offering. However, the capitalization raised some concerns of politicization as the government assumed even greater control of Petrobras and minor-ity shareholder value diminished.

The pre-salt deposits hold great promise, but many daunting chal¬lenges remain. The reservoir’s geophysical characteristics and its position below miles of salt and water make it technically difficult to develop. Its location more than three hundred kilometers offshore—a distance too great to supply via helicopter without an interim staging platform—and its relatively high share of carbon dioxide and associated natural gas greatly increase the logistical complexity of producing the oil. Brazil’s revised oil law designates Petrobras as the operator in any development and imposes strict local content requirements. This will put an unprecedented strain on the ability of both Petrobras and the country in general to supply the required capital, raw materials, equip¬ment, and management and manpower capabilities.

Concern about the risks of too many simultaneous projects and deteriorating investment climates has led Petrobras to scale back its activities in South America, focusing on domestic investments and new projects in West Africa, the U.S. Gulf, and Australia, where Petrobras’s deepwater capabilities provide synergies and a competi¬tive advantage.

Finally, Brazil’s politicians continue to debate how best to divide and spend the government revenues that are anticipated to come from pre-salt development. Notably, 50 percent of pre-salt oil revenues will sup¬port state-run socioeconomic programs. In the past, the states that held the physical resource received the lion’s share of oil revenues. The new pre-salt regime proposes more even sharing among all Brazilian states, benefiting the interior and poorer states in the northeast at the expense of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. The final details remain to be worked out within the enabling legislation and regulations that will build on the basic legal framework enacted in 2010.

Conclusions and Recommendations

As Brazil develops its pre-salt oil and thereby diversifies global energy suppliers, the Task Force considers greater oil exports from Brazil to be in the United States’ strategic interest. As the United States seeks to diversify its energy supply, increased imports from Brazil could help reduce its dependency on exports from less stable countries. Though the United States will not have a significant influence on the trajectory of pre-salt development, the Ex-Im Bank, the Overseas Private Invest¬ment Corporation, and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency can provide financing to U.S. companies to facilitate their participation.

The Task Force recognizes that Brazil’s pre-salt oil will have a dra-matic effect on Brazil as the country reinvents itself as an energy power and develops a regulatory and distribution framework that corresponds to Brazilian priorities.

Given the 2010 deepwater oil accident and spill in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico, the Task Force is mindful of the risks of deep-sea drilling. Developing this resource poses significant technical, logistical, environ¬mental, and political challenges, and the timing and pace of production growth is uncertain. The Task Force encourages the U.S. government to convey the lessons learned from the BP Macondo well disaster and wel¬comes the government-sponsored workshop series that was formed in early 2011 by the United States and Brazil to share best practices on safe development of offshore resources. The United States can build on this existing bilateral mechanism to launch a multilateral effort that includes relevant private sector and government participants from other deep-water producers such as Norway, Australia, Nigeria, Angola, and other emerging producers in Africa.

### Solves Amazon Deforestation

#### Co-operation is key to solve amazon deforestation- models and data gathering

Sweig et al 11 (Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, AND Samuel W. Bodman, and James D. Wolfensohn, Chairmen, Wolfensohn & Company, LLC) (“Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations” Council on Foreign Relations Task Force Report, July 12, 2011, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Brazil\_TFR\_66.pdf //BLOV)

The Task Force recognizes that the importance and complexity of the Amazon suggest it should be managed comprehensively, coordinat¬ing all relevant parties to help preserve it from climate change, defor¬estation, and fire. As a steward of the largest share of the Amazon and as the largest economy in the region, Brazil has a natural role in lead¬ing cooperation across cultures, political jurisdictions, research disci¬plines, and industries. The Task Force recommends the United States, where possible, use its voice in international financial institutions and other multilateral settings to help mobilize resources that can support Brazil’s coordination.

There is ample scope for the United States and Brazil to work together to improve climate modeling and data gathering capabilities, particularly in the Amazon region. Current climate forecasting models inadequately model the potential consequences of climate change on the Amazon rainforest and other Brazilian ecosystems. Brazil has established a number of international research groups and programs to improve global understanding of the Amazon, its role in regulating the global climate, and its vulnerability to climate change.

The Task Force encourages greater U.S. support for and collabo¬ration with Brazil’s programs that monitor deforestation and climate change, which advance understanding of Brazil’s complex ecosystems and improve the utility of global climate models in general. These programs include: the Large-scale Biosphere-Atmosphere Experi¬ment in Amazonia, a program focused on understanding the role of the Amazon in global environmental change; the National Institute for Space Research’s (INPE) various real-time space- and land-based deforestation monitoring systems; regional and global climate models being jointly developed by Brazil and South Africa; and the Predic-tion and Research Moored Array in the Tropical Atlantic, which stud¬ies ocean-atmosphere interactions. These bilateral efforts would help further Brazil’s space-related science and technology ambitions while addressing deforestation and climate change and the relationship between them. The U.S.-Brazil biofuels memorandum of understand¬ing (MOU) is a good example of both countries jointly promoting the adoption of climate-friendly technologies in third countries, though execution could be strengthened. The Task Force encourages the devel¬opment of similar efforts to reduce deforestation, such as the Bolsa Flo-resta conservation program, in third-party countries.

#### Solves deforestation

Meyer 2/27/13 (Peter J. Meyer Analyst in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service) (“CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Brazil-U.S. Relations” February 27, 2013, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33456.pdf> //BLOV)

Amazon Conservation

The Amazon basin spans the borders of eight countries and is the most biodiverse tract of tropical rainforest in the world. It holds 20% of the Earth’s fresh water and 10% of all known species. The Amazon also holds 10% of the world’s carbon stores and absorbs nearly 2 billion tons of carbon dioxide each year, making it a sink for global carbon emissions and an important asset in the mitigation of climate change. Approximately 60% of the Amazon falls within Brazilian borders, making Brazil home to 40% of the world’s remaining tropical forests.159 The Brazilian Amazon was largely undeveloped until the 1960s, when the military government began subsidizing the settlement and development of the region as a matter of national security. The human population grew from 6 million in 1960 to 25 million in 2010, and approximately 20% of the Brazilian Amazon has now been deforested as a result of settlements, roads, logging, farming and other activities.160

Recognizing that continued destruction of the Amazon is damaging to Brazil’s global image and could threaten energy generation and agricultural production in the future,161 the Brazilian government has implemented a series of policies designed to slow deforestation. For example, the Lula and Rousseff Administrations have significantly expanded the country’s nature reserves, bringing Brazil’s total area of protected land to nearly 300,000 square miles.162 Likewise, the Brazilian government adopted a plan to reduce the rate of Amazon deforestation by half—based on the 1996-2005 average—to 2,300 square miles per year by 2017 and reduce Amazon deforestation by 80% by 2020. To meet these targets, the Brazilian government is increasing surveillance, replanting over 21,000 square miles of forest, and financing sustainable development projects in areas where the local economy depends on logging.163 Brazil appears to be on track to achieve its goals, as annual deforestation has fallen from about 10,700 square miles in 2004 to about 2,500 square miles in 2011.164 There is considerable debate as to whether these decreases are the result of government policies or changing economic circumstances, such as lower commodity prices. One recent study, which examined deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon between 2005 and 2009, found that about half of the reduction in deforestation was attributable to the Brazilian government’s conservation policies.165

Some environmentalists are concerned that government policy changes may halt or even reverse Brazil’s recent progress in reducing deforestation. In December 2011, President Rousseff signed a law transferring responsibility for environmental oversight of non-federal lands from Brazil’s federal environmental agency to local officials. While the federal government maintains that local officials are better placed to manage such resources, critics argue that local authorities lack the necessary finances and are more susceptible to intimidation and corruption.166 Many environmentalists are also concerned about changes to Brazil’s forest code—a law that requires rural landowners to set aside 20%- 80% of their land for natural vegetation. The Brazilian Congress approved a major overhaul of the code in April 2012. Although President Rousseff vetoed some of the most controversial provisions, the final version relaxes conservation requirements for environmentally sensitive areas like river banks, reduces reforestation requirements for land that has already been deforested, and decreases the total amount of forest that must be preserved.167 Supporters of the reform assert that it is necessary in order to bring farmers into compliance with the law, and argue that the updated forest code remains among the strictest regulations of privately-owned property in the world.168

U.S. environment programs in Brazil are designed to support tropical forest conservation through the promotion of proper land-use and encouragement of environmentally friendly income generation activities for the rural poor. In FY2006, USAID initiated the Amazon Basin Conservation Initiative, which supports community groups, governments, and other organizations working throughout the Amazon Basin to conserve the forest’s biodiversity. USAID provided Brazil with $14 million for environmental programs in FY2010, $11.5 million in FY2011, and an estimated $10 million in FY2012.169 The Obama Administration did not request any aid for environmental programs in Brazil in FY2013; however, Congress has specifically directed USAID to fund such programs in previous appropriations measures and could do so once again.

In August 2010, the United States and Brazil signed a debt-for-nature agreement under the Tropical Forest Conservation Act of 2008 (P.L. 105-214). According to the agreement, the United States will reduce Brazil’s debt payments by $21 million over five years. In exchange, the Brazilian government will commit those funds to activities to conserve protected areas, improve

natural resource management, and develop sustainable livelihoods in endangered areas outside of the Amazon such as the Atlantic Rainforest, Caatinga, and Cerrado ecosystems.170

### Oil

#### Brazil solves US energy security and spill response

Meyer 2/27/13 (Peter J. Meyer Analyst in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service) (“CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Brazil-U.S. Relations” February 27, 2013, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33456.pdf> //BLOV)

Oil

In recent years, Brazil has discovered substantial new off-shore oil fields that have the potential to turn the country into one of the top five oil and gas producers in the world,115 and an important source of energy for the United States. The new discoveries are so-called “pre-salt” reserves,

located beneath layers of rock and salt more than18,000 feet below the ocean surface. Analysts have estimated that the total recoverable reserves of pre-salt oil and natural gas may exceed 50 billion barrels of oil equivalent.116

In December 2010, the Brazilian Congress approved a new regulatory framework for developing the approximately 70% of pre-salt reserves that have not already been auctioned off.117 The new framework is designed to increase the role of the Brazilian government and use the resources to fuel long-term economic and social development. Among other provisions, the framework establishes state-owned Petróleo Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras) as the sole operator for all new offshore projects; replaces the existing concessionary model with a production sharing regime; guarantees Petrobras a minimum 30% stake in all new joint ventures; creates a new public company—Petrosal—to manage the development of the offshore reserves; and creates a new social fund overseen by the Brazilian Congress to direct offshore revenues toward four key areas: education, infrastructure, science and technology, and poverty reduction.118 The development of these reserves has been delayed, however, as there is currently considerable debate within the Brazilian Congress regarding the distribution of oil royalties and Petrobras is unable to auction the rights to the fields until a new royalties framework is in place.119

Exploiting the new fields will likely be difficult and costly. Some foreign investors have questioned whether Petrobras will be able to access sufficient finance to develop the pre-salt reserves given the enlarged role of the Brazilian government under the new regulatory framework and increased concerns about offshore oil drilling as a result of the 2010 BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.120 Other analysts maintain that the Brazilian reserves are becoming ever-more attractive as a result of the rising price of oil and Brazil’s political stability at a time of conflict in other oil producing nations.121 Petrobras intends to invest $141.8 billion in exploration and production between 2012 and 2016, $67.1 billion of which will go toward developing the pre-salt reserves.122

Brazil and the United States are working together under the Strategic Energy Dialogue to foster the safe and efficient development of oil reserves in both countries. Through technical workshops and other activities, government regulators and private industry have exchanged best practices on issues such as spill response, well integrity, subsea containment, the use of dispersants, and national contingency plans. Brazil and the United States have also cooperated on financing. In April 2009, the Export-Import Bank of the United States offered to consider up to $2 billion in financing for Petrobras to purchase U.S. goods and services. The Bank has approved $300 million

in financing so far, and has told Petrobras that it would consider increasing its offer above $2 billion if requested.123

## A2 alt cause

#### Consultation creates strong relations- alt causes can be addressed in the future

Hakim 10 (Peter Hakim President Emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue) (“US-Brazil Relations: Expect More Conflict” Infolatam, October 21, 2010, <http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2490> //BLOV)

Even as the US-Brazil relationship has become increasing strained in recent years, the two countries have never considered themselves adversaries—and both governments, with few exceptions, have sought downplay disputes and have been willing to tolerate considerable disagreement. For the US and a newly powerful Brazil to build and sustain a constructive relationship into the future, however, will likely demand far greater effort and attention by both governments than has been the case to date Both sides need to better understand the interests, priorities, and positions of the other on important regional and global issues—and to be routinely informed of proposed decision and actions of the other. More systematic consultation might have avoided (or at least reduced the intensity of) both the dispute over the Brazil-Turkey-Iran negotiations and the friction over the US-Colombia security agreement.  The US and Brazil should also be able to identify more opportunities for cooperation on many of the issues discussed above, in which both countries have a major stake.

## Say yes

### To US Requests

#### Brazil will say yes- Lula and Rousseff’s agenda

Meyer 2/27/13 (Peter J. Meyer Analyst in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service) (“CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Brazil-U.S. Relations” February 27, 2013, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33456.pdf> //BLOV)

Foreign Policy

Brazil’s foreign policy is a byproduct of the country’s unique position as a regional power in Latin America, a leader among developing countries in economic cooperation and collective security efforts, and an emerging center of global influence. Brazilian foreign policy has traditionally been based on the principles of multilateralism, peaceful dispute settlement, and nonintervention in the affairs of other countries.45 Adherence to these principles has enabled Brazil to maintain peaceful relations with all 10 of its neighbors46 and to play a larger role in global affairs than its economic and geopolitical power would otherwise allow. Building on its traditional principles, Brazilian foreign policy under the PT administrations of Presidents Lula and Rousseff has emphasized three areas of action: (1) reinforcing relations with traditional partners such as its South American neighbors, the United States, and Europe; (2) diversifying relations by forging stronger economic and political ties with other nations of the developing world; and (3) supporting multilateralism by pushing for the democratization of global governance.47

#### Rousseff will co-operate with US

Sweig et al 11 (Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, AND Samuel W. Bodman, and James D. Wolfensohn, Chairmen, Wolfensohn & Company, LLC) (“Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations” Council on Foreign Relations Task Force Report, July 12, 2011, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Brazil\_TFR\_66.pdf //BLOV)

BRAZIL TODAY

The world watches with great interest as Rousseff attempts to build on the legacy of the enormously popular former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) while charting her own course. Rousseff held two cabinet positions and served as Lula’s chief of staff before being chosen as the ruling party’s candidate. The daughter of a Bulgarian immigrant and a school teacher, Rousseff was jailed and tortured for her underground activism; she is an economist who had previously never run for election. Ambitious, results-driven, and pragmatic, Rousseff now stands as one of the most powerful and influential women in the world.

Former presidents Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Lula presided over sixteen years of democratic consolidation and sound economic policy. Brazil was well positioned to survive the global economic reces¬sion of 2008—having stabilized its currency, tackled rampant inflation, strengthened its banking system, and built up dollar reserves—and it emerged in 2009 relatively unscathed.

In a break from its past, Brazil’s 2010 presidential election and recent political transition did not shake its strong stock market, bonds, or currency, signaling international confidence in its stability. Flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) into Brazil remain high: among non– Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, Brazil is second only to China as a destination for foreign investment. Though inflationary pressures remain a serious challenge, the Brazilian economy is expected to grow by more than 4 percent this year, after a particularly strong 2010 (7.5 percent growth).

The country Rousseff inherited in 2011 is substantially different from the one Lula inherited in 2003, as is the international environment. In the early stages of her presidency, Rousseff has stressed the need for Brazil’s domestic agenda to drive and be served by the country’s international engagement. In that vein, Brazil’s foreign policy priorities under her leadership are likely to emphasize integrating with South America, establishing deeper ties and investment in Africa, managing a complex relationship with China, improving relations with the United States, and strengthening Brazil’s influence in the restructuring of mul-tilateral institutions.

## Politics – Net Benefit

#### Cooperation on Cuba policy avoids the link to Politics – wont provoke hard-line disagreement

Iglesias 12 (Carlos, United States Navy Commander, “United States Security Policy Implications of a Post-Fidel Cuba,” 2012, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA560408

Unlike the policy implications above, the major hurdle to this interest does not come from any continuation of the GOC, but from the rest of the world. International opposition to the perceived fairness and effectiveness of the economic sanctions has long posed an obstacle for U.S. policy. In the global scale, the problem is epitomized by the twenty consecutive years of near unanimous UN General Assembly resolution votes against the embargo. 96 More regionally, Spain and other European Union partners have strongly pushed to loosen sanctions. The arguments are straightforward and pragmatic, “since sanctions in place have not worked, it makes more sense to do things that would work, and (the next obvious one is to) change things.”97 Even more locally, Cuba has managed to generally retain positive feelings among the people of Latin American in spite of the country’s domestic realities.98 The rise of Raúl and any subsequent successions further complicated the problem of mustering international consensus. Several countries in the hemisphere see any new Cuban leadership as fresh opportunities to engage in common interests. The two largest Latin American countries, Brazil and Mexico, have both ascribed to this approach and have indicated their interests in forging new ties since Fidel’s stepped down.99

On the other hand, this international dissention does hold some prospect for leveraging U.S. soft power. An indirect approach would be to coordinate U.S. proxy actions with partner countries interested in Cuba. This has the double benefit of leveraging U.S. soft power without compromising legislated restrictions or provoking hard-line Cuban-American ire. In this approach, burgeoning relations with Brazil and Mexico would be strong candidates. Devoid of the “bullhorn diplomacy” that have marginalized U.S.-Cuban policy efficacy for decades, the U.S. could better engage the island through hemispherical interlocutors. At a minimum, U.S. interests would be advanced through the proxy insights of what is occurring on the island in addition to the potential displacement of anti-American influences (e.g. Chávez). 100

# AFF

### Consult Theory 2AC

[you need to shorten this for your 2ac]

Consultation is a voting issue.

Makes the debate unwinnable for the aff. They can defend the ENTIRE plan forcing us to start our offense in the 2AC. It’s worse than a PIC because our ONLY offense is impact turning the net benefit which is a rigged game for the neg or bad timeframe args which have NO impact at all.

It’s wildly unpredictable. There’s over 200 countries and myriad international groups. Makes research impossible destroying meaningful policy comparison. Low judge standards and lack of aff research means “genuine key” ev isn’t a check.

Counter-Interp: They get counterplans that include the possibility of doing all the textual mandates of the plan. Guarantees aff ground and provides lots of neg flex.

### Brazil Says no

#### Brazil will say no- They resist US regional Dominance

Hakim 04 (Peter Hakim President Emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue) (“The Reluctant Partner” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2004), pp. 114-123, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20033833 //BLOV)

Brasilia's ambivalence about its regional and international roles complicates Washington's task. Brazilian politicians have long argued that Brazil is among the world's great powers, alongside the United States, Russia, China, and India. As a result, Brazil has insisted on playing a lead part in shaping regional politics, resisting U.S. attempts to dominate them. At the same time, it subscribes to a traditional understanding of state sovereignty and frowns on intervention in a state's domestic affairs even in the name of human rights and de-mocratization. (Lula said on his trip to Cuba, "I don't comment on the internal policies of other .countries.") That view has led Brazil almost viscerally to oppose the United States' activist agenda in the hemisphere and elsewhere. Although the United States cannot change Brazil's position, it can moderate it in specific circumstances.

Brazil will say No. Acting against U.S. interests increases international perceptions that Brazil has leverage.

PBS 12 (Meeting with Obama, and Rousseff to discuss US Brazil Relations, “U.S., Brazil 'Disagree More Than They Agree,' Analyst Says,” April 2012, <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world/jan-june12/brazil_04-09.html>)

MARGARET WARNER: A country once best known by Americans for postcard-perfect beaches and a passion for the game of soccer, Brazil has emerged as a powerhouse competitor in the global economy, achieving the number six world GDP ranking this year. Along with Russia, India and China, it's part of the so- called BRIC club of rapidly developing economies. Now this country of 200 million, Latin America's largest, is demanding to be taken more seriously on the world political stage as well. And, today, President Dilma Rousseff was given a cordial welcome by President Obama at the White House. PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA: I'm -- feel very fortunate to have such a capable and far-sighted partner as President Rousseff. DILMA ROUSSEFF, President of Brazil (through translator): The U.S.-Brazil bilateral relations are, for Brazil, a very important relationship, not only from a bilateral but also from a multilateral perspective. "Americans and Brazilians love to talk about a strategic relationship. Yet, the U.S. rarely consults with Brazil on the important, global issues." - Peter Hakim, Inter-American Dialogue MARGARET WARNER: But though the hemisphere's two biggest democracies should be natural allies, they often don't see eye to eye. PETER HAKIM, president emeritus, Inter-American Dialogue: It would certainly be hard to say the U.S. and Brazil are adversaries or in conflict, but the fact is, they disagree more than they agree. MARGARET WARNER: Peter Hakim is senior fellow and president emeritus at Inter-American Dialogue in Washington. PETER HAKIM: Americans and Brazilians love to talk about a strategic relationship. Yet, the U.S. rarely consults with Brazil on the important global issues. MARGARET WARNER: That shouldn't be surprising, given Brazil's history of being a thorn in the U.S. side. In 2010, then President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva tried to broker a deal with Turkey on Iran's nuclear program and derail Secretary of State Clinton's push for U.N. sanctions against Tehran. Brazil has staked out positions contrary to Washington's on Cuba, climate change, and the 2009 coup in Honduras as well. PETER HAKIM: Brazil is in many respects still learning what it means to be a global power. And the way it's been successful, ironically, is not by joining with the United States, which would have been one route, but rather in opposition to the United States, that it sort of has gained its international prestige precisely by showing its independence of the United States. MARGARET WARNER: When Dilma Rousseff won Brazil's 2010 presidential election campaign, Washington had high hopes she would be easier to work with than her one-time boss and mentor Lula. The former Marxist-guerrilla-turned-technocrat has been less assertive and flamboyant on the global stage. Noted Eurasia group analyst Joao Augusto de Castro Neves. JOAO AUGUSTO DE CASTRO NEVES, analyst, Eurasia Group: President Dilma's foreign policy is a little bit less rhetorical or ideological than President Lula's, her predecessor, was. I think that in the sense that more risk-averse diplomacy, that more conservative in some sense diplomacy is good for not only relations with Brazil and the United States, but actually for Brazil's goals abroad.

### Doesn’t Solve Relations

#### Failure to consult on military support for Columbia outweighs positive ties on other areas.

Hakim 10 (Peter Hakim President Emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue) (“US-Brazil Relations: Expect More Conflict” Infolatam, October 21, 2010, <http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2490> //BLOV)

Regional Leaders

It is almost inevitable that Brazil and the US will, for some years to come, be bumping up against one another in this hemisphere and worldwide. They both have a central stake in global politics and a deep concern about the world’s common problems. Their policies and agendas, however, will reflect their divergent, interests, priorities, and approaches to international affairs. If they cannot find significant common ground or, at a minimum, work to keep their disagreements in check, tension between them is likely to increase. Indeed, on most issues, the US-Brazil relationship will involve both conflict and cooperation—as do US ties with other global actors like China, Russia, and Japan as well as many European nations.

In the past year or so, the US and Brazil have squabbled over several hemispheric issues—as Brazil has taken on a more assertive role in Latin America. Brazil surprised and irritated the US and neighboring Colombia when it joined nearly every other South American nation in opposing a newly announced military arrangement allowing US expanded access to Colombian military bases. By subsequently mending fences with Colombia and announcing its own, albeit more modest, military accord with Washington, Brazil demonstrated a welcome flexibility and accommodation. It also made clear, however, that US military initiatives in South America henceforth require prior consultation and agreement from Brazil—which is hardly an unreasonable demand. Indeed, this should be routine by now for Washington.

#### Consultation can’t resolve underlying issues between U.S. and Brazil.

Burnett 13 (Alistair, editor of The World Tonight, a BBC News program, Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, “Brazil and the US – Not on Same Page,” YaleGlobal, 4/12/13, <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/brazil-and-us-%E2%80%93-not-same-page>)

RIO DE JANEIRO: Relations between the two giant democracies of the Americas, Brazil and the US, should be easy. After all, the two countries have much in common. Both are complex societies, with territory stretching across their respective continents and a history of European colonists taking land from indigenous Americans. Granting differences between British and Portuguese colonial traditions, both were built by immigrants, most who came willingly and others like slaves, indentured servants or prisoners who didn’t. Both are well-established democratic federal republics.

Yet, when it comes to foreign policy and trade relations there are constant tensions. These could be addressed soon, with reports that President Dilma Rousseff will make a formal state visit to the United States, the first of a Brazilian leader in two decades.

To the irritation of Washington, Brazil has failed to extend support on issues such as the 2011 intervention in Libya, where Brasilia thought the Western powers were jumping the gun and abused the UN mandate to pursue regime change. For its part, Brazil has been irked by US failure to support its long-held ambition for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

Washington, traditionally the main foreign-arms supplier to the Brazilian armed forces, won’t overlook Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev’s February visit to Brazil to sign an agreement on selling air-defense equipment with President Rousseff.

But the highest profile disagreement between the two has been over the Brazilian attempt, along with Turkey, to break the deadlock between Iran and the West over Tehran’s nuclear program. Former Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva went to Iran with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in May 2010 to sign a confidence-building deal with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to send some Iranian-enriched uranium for reprocessing abroad, so it could not be diverted to any weapons program.

Brazil has tried, along with Turkey, to break the deadlock between Iran and the US over Tehran’s nuclear program.

The US immediately rejected the deal. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton accused Brazil and Turkey of making the world “a more dangerous place.” Then Foreign Minister Celso Amorim insisted the US had been kept abreast of the negotiations; when asked at an international security conference later in the year why the US had later rejected the deal, he said “some people just can’t take ‘Yes’ for an answer.” He suggests the Americans were happy to go along with the initiative because they thought it would fail; when it succeeded, they turned on Brasilia. The agreement was essentially the same as a proposed deal that Iran and the UN Security Council’s permanent five powers, plus Germany, almost signed eight months before in Geneva – another reason Brazil was taken aback by the US condemnation.

US diplomats and analysts take the view that Brazil is often unhelpful, by which they seem to mean it doesn’t always support US policy. For their part, the Brazilians say the US doesn’t want to accept that the world has changed and Washington can’t accept that it must deal with emerging economies on an equal footing.

The countries have also had their share of trade disputes over products from orange juice to cotton, whereas the US has tried to limit access to its markets for Brazilian produce. Since the 2008 crash, Brazil has accused the US of currency manipulation by using quantitative easing to devalue the dollar.

#### Alt cause - Iran nuclear program

Hakim 10 (Peter Hakim President Emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue) (“US-Brazil Relations: Expect More Conflict” Infolatam, October 21, 2010, <http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2490> //BLOV)

Iran and the Nuclear Issue

Brazil’s close, supportive ties with Iran have most exasperated Washington and unsettled the US-Brazilian relations in recent years. And there is considerable justification in the US position. Brazil has long defended Iran’s nuclear program—claiming, despite mounting and broadly accepted evidence to the contrary, that it is directed only toward civilian purposes. It has overlooked Iran’s repression at home, its continuing support of terrorist groups abroad, and its unrelenting threats toward Israel. Washington was particularly galled when, this past May, Brazil joined with Turkey to negotiate an agreement with Iran to halt a US-led drive for new UN sanctions against Tehran for its persistent violations of UN resolutions regarding its nuclear development activities.

Neither Brazil nor the US managed this incident particularly well. A letter from Barack Obama to Lula da Silva initially appeared to encourage the Brazil-Turkey-Iran talks—although Washington subsequently made clear its strong opposition to the talks, and its unwillingness to back down from its demand for harsher sanctions. At the same, however, the US—if it had not been so narrowly focused on preserving a big power consensus for the sanctions—might well have recognized that there was potentially some value in the deal negotiated by Brazil and Turkey and not simply rejected it out of hand.

Iran will surely be a cause of continuing friction in the US-Brazilian relation, primarily because of Brazil’s defense of Iran’s uranium enrichment efforts—while the US is persuaded these are directed toward building a nuclear bomb. Brazil will almost certainly continue to oppose sanctions against Iran (although it has pledged to respect those that have been imposed by the UN). The US and Brazil together might usefully explore the question of what evidence would be sufficient to conclude either that Tehran is pursuing a weapons capability or that its intentions are peaceful. Narrowing the gap between the two countries on this issue would help to ease tensions.

#### Alt cause- Brazil prolif

Hakim 10 (Peter Hakim President Emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue) (“US-Brazil Relations: Expect More Conflict” Infolatam, October 21, 2010, <http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2490> //BLOV)

Over time, Brazil’s own nuclear program may emerge as an even more contentious issue than Iran for US-Brazilian relations. To be sure, Brazil has signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and is bound to forego nuclear weaponry by its own constitution, by an agreement with Argentina, and by the Latin American-wide Tlateloco treaty. The US today has little concern that Brazil is preparing to develop an atomic weapon. But Brazil has embarked on a uranium enrichment program, and will almost certainly acquire the capacity to build such a weapon. Today, Brazil and the US are at odds over Brazil’s refusal to sign the NPT’s additional protocol, which requires far more intrusive inspections of enrichment facilities than the original treaty.

Washington sees Brazil’s rejection of the NPT’s additional protocol as vitiating an already weakened non-proliferation regime. Brazil, on the other hand, claims it is entirely within its rights, and asserts that it is the US and Russia who are most in violation of the NPT provision because of their failure to vigorously pursue its nuclear disarmament provisions. US-Brazilian frictions over the issues involved may increase as Brazil and several other countries come closer to a weapons capacity.

Ironically, nuclear development could be an area for cooperation between the US and Brazil. Certainly US scientific and technical resources could importantly bolster Brazil’s efforts to develop its nuclear energy industry. The recent US agreement with India (a country that has already has a nuclear arsenal) may serve as model for US technology transfer to Brazil. What the US would surely want from Brazil in exchange, however, is sustained support for enhanced nonproliferation policies.

#### No solvency- Institution changes are pre-req for sustained co-ordination

Sweig et al 11 (Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, AND Samuel W. Bodman, and James D. Wolfensohn, Chairmen, Wolfensohn & Company, LLC) (“Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations” Council on Foreign Relations Task Force Report, July 12, 2011, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Brazil\_TFR\_66.pdf //BLOV)

Brazil’s growing geostrategic importance merits sustained, senior-level, and comprehensive coordination of U.S. policy across agencies. The Task Force recommends that the National Security Council (NSC) institutionalize a standing interagency coordination mechanism so that a range of U.S. agencies responsible for functional issues—includ-ing finance, trade, labor, energy, environment, agriculture, health, homeland security, defense, and diplomacy—better coordinates what remains a highly decentralized U.S. policy toward Brazil.

This reorganization would require an NSC director for Brazil alone, rather than a director for Brazil and the Southern Cone. In addition, the Task Force recommends that the State Department create a sepa¬rate Office for Brazilian Affairs outside the Office for Southern Cone Affairs. The goal is for a U.S. policy approach that treats Brazil as a global actor, with policies formulated not just by regional experts with narrow portfolios.

### Cooperation Inev.

#### U.S.-Brazil cooperation will occur based on self-interest – consultative framework isn’t necessary.

Sweig et al 11 (Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, AND Samuel W. Bodman, and James D. Wolfensohn, Chairmen, Wolfensohn & Company, LLC) (“Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations” Council on Foreign Relations Task Force Report, July 12, 2011, <http://www.cfr.org/brazil/global-brazil-us-brazil-relations/p25407> //BLOV)

Recognizing Brazil's global role, the report recommends that the Obama administration now fully endorse the country's bid for a seat as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). It argues that "a formal endorsement from the United States for Brazil would go far to overcome lingering suspicion within the Brazilian government that the U.S. commitment to a mature relationship between equals is largely rhetorical."

Domestically, Brazil's "inclusive growth has translated into a significant reduction of inequality, an expansion of the middle class, and a vibrant economy, all framed within a democratic context." Consequently, Brazil has been able to use its economic bona fides to leverage a stronger position in the international, commercial, and diplomatic arenas.

The report stresses the importance of regular communication between the presidents of both countries. "Cooperation between the United States and Brazil holds too much promise for miscommunication or inevitable disagreements to stand in the way of potential gains." A mature, working relationship means that "the United States and Brazil can help each other advance mutual interests even without wholesale policy agreements between the two," notes the report.

### Brazil Says No – Mexico

#### Brazil perceives U.S.-Mexico ties as zero-sum. They will say no.

Malamud 11(A., research fellow at the Institute of Social Sciences (ICS) of the University of Lisbon, “A leader without followers? The growing divergence between the regional and global performance of Brazilian foreign policy,” Latin American Politics and Society, 1-24, 2011, <http://americo.usal.es/iberoame/sites/default/files/malamud_brasil_leader_without_followers.pdf>)

Two countries in Latin America that are in a structural position¶ to dispute Brazilian claims to leadership: Argentina and Mexico. Both¶ have sizable economies, large territorial landmass and population, rich¶ natural resource endowments, and a record of intermittent international¶ activism. Moreover, both relentlessly pursue the diplomatic goal of¶ impeding any single country from “representing” the whole region.¶ Their leading role in the Uniting for Consensus group and their participation with Brazil in the G-20 (the only Latin American countries in the¶ forum) testify to their international standing as well as their determination not to be left behind by their bigger neighbor. ¶ One of Brazil’s responses to this competition has been to exclude¶ Mexico from its redefined region. In his inauguration speech, Foreign¶ Minister Amorim listed Mexico after South America, the United States,¶ and the European Union, together with other so-called “large developing countries,” such as China, Russia, India, and South Africa. It would¶ appear, then, that to the Itamaraty, Mexico can no longer be considered¶ a regional rival: it belongs to another region.

#### Brazil says no for Mexican Engagement – Infringement of a Sphere of influence

Malamud 11(A., research fellow at the Institute of Social Sciences (ICS) of the University of Lisbon, “A leader without followers? The growing divergence between the regional and global performance of Brazilian foreign policy,” Latin American Politics and Society, 1-24, 2011, <http://americo.usal.es/iberoame/sites/default/files/malamud_brasil_leader_without_followers.pdf>)

The absence of hard power instruments to pursue foreign policy goals¶ despite Brazil’s relatively rich endowments is aptly characterized by¶ Sean Burges (2006) as “without sticks or carrots.” Deprived of the structural resources of leadership, Brazil has had no choice but to resort to¶ instrumental (or ideational) ones—hence the characterization of the¶ country as a “soft power” promoting “consensual hegemony” (Burges¶ 2008). But this is only part of the story. If it is true that the quest for¶ regional influence has been conducted with velvet gloves, Brazil has¶ deployed tougher—though not military—means to achieve global influence—replicating, albeit inverted, the regional-global duplicity highlighted by Pinheiro (2000, 327). Brazil’s market size, export capacity,¶ and investment weight have proved effective as bargaining chips in¶ international negotiations.¶ As Hakim notes, compared to Mexico, the foreign policy of which¶ is heavily influenced by and oriented toward a single country, ¶ The Brazilian approach to foreign relations is very different. Its¶ diplomats, politicians, and commentators write and speak about¶ Brazil as a continental power. Pointing to its size and population,¶ they argue that Brazil should be counted among the world’s giant¶ countries, alongside the United States, Russia, China, and India.¶ Indeed, prior to his appointment as foreign minister a year ago,¶ Celso Lafer argued that the interests of Brazil and these other “monster countries” . . . go beyond specific issues and outcomes. They¶ have a major stake—and therefore should have a major say—in¶ how global affairs are managed. (Hakim 2002, 157)¶ MALAMUD: BRAZIL’S FOREIGN POLICY 5¶ Because the country is smaller and less powerful than the other¶ “monster countries,” Brazil’s ruling elites have believed it necessary to¶ gain the support of the region in order to bolster their global claims¶ (Almeida 2007; Hurrell et al. 2000; Lima 2008). This approach is consistent with the conventional argument that “it is the neighboring countries¶ which have to sign up to the lead of emerging powers . . . in order to¶ give them the power base necessary for regional as well as global¶ power projection and international coalition building” (Schirm 2007, 6).¶ Therefore, in the 1970s, Brazil started a slow but steady warming of relations with neighbors it had long neglected. The agreements with¶ Paraguay and Argentina to build the Itaipú and Corpus power plants,¶ the signing of economic agreements with Argentina that led to the establishment of MERCOSUR, and Brazil’s prodemocracy activism during the¶ 1990s paved the way for farther-reaching goals. In 2000, these ambitions¶ crystalized into a new regional concept: South America. By substituting¶ this for Latin America, Brazil tacitly recognized that it was unable to¶ exert a significant influence on the whole continent and was thereby¶ ready to focus on a smaller area, in accordance with two objectives: first,¶ Mexico—the other Latin American giant and potential rival—was left¶ out; and second, the countries included in the newly defined region¶ were less dependent on the United States than those excluded, which¶ gave Brazil broader room to maneuver. ¶ To assess Brazil’s performance as a regional and global player, there¶ are three areas that merit inspection: the operation of Brazilian-led¶ region-building projects; the degree of regional support for Brazilian¶ goals within international organizations; and the existence and¶ prospects of rival contenders for regional leadership.

### Heg Disad

#### We should cooperate with others but actually giving them a veto crushes leadership and causes war.

**Goble ’93** (Paul, Senior Associate – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Christian Science Monitor, “AWOL Abroad: Clinton’s Foreign Policy”, 7-2, L/N)

The end of the cold war is an appropriate time to redefine our national interests. The world has changed profoundly. The US may be the only superpower, but change increasingly undermines the alliance structures that were built in a world that no longer exists. During the cold war, we defined our national interests almost exclusively in negative terms. We said what we were against, rather than what we were for. We defined the defense of our interests primarily in terms of military power. Now, we must define our interests more positively and broadly to include economic, political, and moral dimensions - and recast our means of promoting them. President Clinton's desire for multilateralism flows from a noble impulse. **But it truncates and trivializes a needed debate over what our interests** now are and how to defend them. His approach implies that the United Nations and other **multilateral bodies provide ready-made and higher standards to which we must submit**. Witness his unfortunate remarks about backing down in Bosnia because of opposition in the Security Council. Such an approach gives other countries a veto over our actions. Most seriously, Clinton's faith in multilateralism **brings uncertainty among traditional friends about our willingness to act. It unwittingly encourages them to act independently and even oppose us**. Ironically, **multilateralism will cause others to act more unilaterally. It may lead real and potential foes to conclude our actions abroad will increasingly be at a lowest-common-denominator level of international agreement**. This is not to say we should always go it alone, or that the UN is not on occasion a useful tool. But we should make sure it does not become an excuse for non-action or a trap where our interests get lost. Clinton's faith in multilateralism both reflects and reinforces his second conviction - that the end of the cold war reduces our responsibilities in the world and that we can now turn inward. Historically, the US has alternated between periods of isolationism and periods of intense intervention in the world. With the end of the cold war, neither position is adequate; we are too intertwined with the world to withdraw, and there are too many other powers for us to act as the world's policeman. (So far, we have been acting more like a fireman responding to disasters than a policeman trying to prevent them.) We must, then, learn to balance interests and resources, defining what is most important to us and using our enormous strength to pursue it. Yet instead, the White House has worsened the situation - not out of evil intentions but out of a failure to set priorities and bring rhetoric in line with reality. This is a serious failure in a superpower. Too often the White House has promised more than it could deliver - raising, then dashing expectations, and undermining the perception and reality of US power abroad. A basic shift is taking place in the way decisions are made about American interests and how to generate public support for foreign commitments. Given our isolationist tendency and the nature of our democratic system, any president faces enormous challenges in generating support in the absence of a direct attack on the US. But where earlier presidents urged Americans to broaden their scope, Clinton seems to have accepted status quo. This ''democratic'' approach slows our response to crises until they grow too big. Clinton's third conviction, opposition to the use of force, may be the most harmful. Announcing an unwillingness to use force leaves diplomacy toothless. During the cold war the US military could be rightly counted on to say why force should not be used. But a political leadership that simply accepts this view weakens its hand. This seems to have happened to the White House. Both our allies and opponents are recalculating their strategies. We may soon find ourselves forced to fight stronger opponents in less favorable circumstances. It is often objected that Serb President Milosevic and his ilk are not Hitler and that opposing him doesn't tell Moscow that we oppose a Russian thrust at, say, the Baltic states. But failure to oppose ''ethnic cleansing'' in the former Yugoslavia has already influenced other governments that are more aggressive and less amenable to US influence. The last time these three beliefs shaped the foreign policy of a great power was in pre-World War II Britain. If you did not like the results of that policy, you won't like the probable remake now. Fortunately, there is time to change direction; unfortunately, there may be less time than we may think.