# Cuba Embargo Negative

## \*\*\* Case

### 1NC Human Rights Frontline

#### 1. Too much too fast causes instability—going too fast risks civil war

Perez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]

Policymakers in Washington must realize that Cubans will not wake up the day after Fidel Castro dies and experience broad-based attitudinal changes. Therefore, while economic reform is sure to preface political reform, the Cuban government will have to move slowly on the former so as not to alienate the population, which would truncate the latter. At first, a successor regime may think that choosing between Castroism and economic liberalization is a Faustian choice: economic doldrums with continuity versus economic revitalization with instability. Indeed, continuing Castroism embraces the history and normative values attached to the Revolution, but would forestall any economic recovery. On the other hand, liberalizing the economy by adopting market reforms would promote economic growth, but could also alienate large segments of the population still enamored by Castro's revolutionary zeal. For example, one possible market reform would be to lay off the excess workforce that has cluttered the state-controlled enterprises and rendered them inefficient and virtually useless. Embracing deep cuts in the public employment might be efficient, but it certainly will not be popular. For decades Cubans have enjoyed job security, universal education, and universal healthcare. If market reforms are interpreted as a wholesale rejection of the normative and ideological underpinnings that have dominated Cuban discourse for the last fifty years, they will no doubt alienate influential ideologues in the Communist Party, the military, the Ministry of the Interior, and many others in the general population.

When a state takes control of the economy, it also takes responsibility for it when it performs poorly. A strong state could surely implement these reforms and survive the ensuing backlash; but to do so would require deft political maneuvering, and a careful patience to not try to change everything all at once. A poorly managed state-led economic opening can quickly become unmanageable, and create instability. Given these concerns, a slow and methodical economic transition, rather than an overnight toppling of the [\*210] state-sector, would be a far more pragmatic approach for the Cuban government.

China and Vietnam have both introduced market reforms that dwarf any that the Cuban regime has introduced so far. Given that China has been on the path of liberalization for over thirty years yet the state still controls wide swaths of the economy, one might expect Cuba's economic transformation to also move lethargically—especially at first. The stronger the parallel with Asia becomes, the more methodical Cuba's opening will be. Expectations that assume a quick economic turnaround should be correspondingly adjusted. Thus, the United States should recognize that the Cuban government has little choice but to move at a relatively glacial speed, and instead work assiduously to make the economic transition as smooth as possible. To that end, it is absolutely crucial that our policies not be used as a way to settle political grudges. For example, if America moves to regain the properties taken by the Cuban government fifty years ago as a way to "encourage" market reforms, the entire effort will be short-circuited before it takes off the ground.

Some will argue that focusing on market liberalization, while putting political reforms to the side, endangers Cuba's long-term prospects for liberty and freedom. This is a valid concern. Nevertheless, in normative terms, market reforms will vastly improve the lives of the Cuban people. The improved living conditions will give fringe groups with few resources the ability to focus their own efforts on political reform from within. Improved economic conditions, if used as a prerequisite to political reform, may also prevent a costly civil war during the inevitably painful transition.

#### 2. Embargo is good—close to causing a democratic revolution

Sadowski 12 Managing Editor of Production of the Journal of International Business and Law, Hoftra [Sadowski, Richard. "Cuban Offshore Drilling: Preparation and Prevention within the Framework of the United States’ Embargo." Sustainable Development Law & Policy 12.1 (2012): 10.]

Conclusion

Since its inception, the Cuban embargo has ebbed and flowed in severity and support. While the measure seems to be increasingly unpopular, it takes legitimate aim at a Cuban regime characterized by intolerance and oppression. Though the Castros utilize the embargo as a scapegoat upon which to blame Cuba’s failures,94 recent changes suggest the embargo is indeed close to accomplishing its goals.95 Despite this, critics, including U.S. oil producers, want the embargo dropped. Regardless of criticism, the embargo must remain in place until its goals are met. Environmental fears can be effectively countered through bilateral response and preparation agreements with Cuba. Also, economic and energy needs are more properly addressed through drilling U.S. resources. Ultimately, with the aid of legislation such as Buchanan’s bill, the United States should exercise its political and economic power to pressure foreign companies to avoid offshore drilling in Cuba. The United States can dissuade foreign investment without compromising the embargo. It appears an end to oppressive communist rule in Cuba is nearing. Now is the time for the United States to both reject offshore drilling in Cuba and demonstrate resolve in meeting the goals of the economic embargo.

#### 3. Alt causes to human rights abuses—war on terror and cyber war policies—plan can’t solve

Greenwald 12—Glenn Greenwald is an American political journalist, lawyer, columnist, blogger, and author [June 25, 2012, “Collapsing U.S. credibility,” http://www.salon.com/2012/06/25/collapsing\_u\_s\_credibility/]

Two Op-Eds in The New York Times this morning both warn of the precipitous decline of American credibility on matters of human rights and peace ushered in by the Obama presidency. Taken together, they explain much of why I’ve been writing what I’ve been writing over the last three years. The first is from Columbia Professor and cyber expert Misha Glenny, who explains the significance of the first ever deployment of cyberwarfare — by the U.S. (first under Bush and accelerated under Obama), along with Israel, against Iran:

THE decision by the United States and Israel to develop and then deploy the Stuxnet computer worm against an Iranian nuclear facility late in George W. Bush’s presidency marked a significant and dangerous turning point in the gradual militarization of the Internet. Washington has begun to cross the Rubicon. If it continues, contemporary warfare will change fundamentally as we move into hazardous and uncharted territory.

It is one thing to write viruses and lock them away safely for future use should circumstances dictate it. It is quite another to deploy them in peacetime. Stuxnet has effectively fired the starting gun in a new arms race that is very likely to lead to the spread of similar and still more powerful offensive cyberweaponry across the Internet. Unlike nuclear or chemical weapons, however, countries are developing cyberweapons outside any regulatory framework. . . .

Stuxnet was originally deployed with the specific aim of infecting the Natanz uranium enrichment facility in Iran. This required sneaking a memory stick into the plant to introduce the virus to its private and secure “offline” network. But despite Natanz’s isolation, Stuxnet somehow escaped into the cyberwild, eventually affecting hundreds of thousands of systems worldwide.

This is one of the frightening dangers of an uncontrolled arms race in cyberspace; once released, virus developers generally lose control of their inventions, which will inevitably seek out and attack the networks of innocent parties. Moreover, all countries that possess an offensive cyber capability will be tempted to use it now that the first shot has been fired. . . .

The United States has long been a commendable leader in combating the spread of malicious computer code, known as malware, that pranksters, criminals, intelligence services and terrorist organizations have been using to further their own ends. But by introducing such pernicious viruses as Stuxnet and Flame, America has severely undermined its moral and political credibility.

He also explains that the Obama administration opposes any treaties to regulate all of this in part because it “might undermine its presumed superiority in the field of cyberweaponry and robotics,” and because it claims Russia and China (but not, of course, the U.S.) would attempt to exploit such treaties to control the Internet.

In case anyone thinks he’s being melodramatic in his warnings, the original New York Times article by David Sanger that confirmed U.S. responsibility for the cyber attack included this passage: “Mr. Obama, according to participants in the many Situation Room meetings on Olympic Games, was acutely aware that with every attack he was pushing the United States into new territory, much as his predecessors had with the first use of atomic weapons in the 1940s, of intercontinental missiles in the 1950s and of drones in the past decade.” It also explained that America’s maiden use of this new form of warfare “could enable other countries, terrorists or hackers to justify their own attacks.”

The second is from former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, an actually meritorious Nobel Peace Prize winner, who describes the record of his fellow Nobel laureate, the current President, in an Op-Ed entitled “A Cruel and Unusual Record“:

Revelations that top officials are targeting people to be assassinated abroad, including American citizens, are only the most recent, disturbing proof of how far our nation’s violation of human rights has extended. This development began after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and has been sanctioned and escalated by bipartisan executive and legislative actions, without dissent from the general public. As a result, our country can no longer speak with moral authority on these critical issues. . . . .

It is disturbing that, instead of strengthening these principles, our government’s counterterrorism policies are now clearly violating at least 10 of the [Declaration on Human Rights'] 30 articles, including the prohibition against “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

Recent legislation has made legal the president’s right to detain a person indefinitely on suspicion of affiliation with terrorist organizations or “associated forces,” a broad, vague power that can be abused without meaningful oversight from the courts or Congress (the law is currently being blocked by a federal judge). This law violates the right to freedom of expression and to be presumed innocent until proved guilty, two other rights enshrined in the declaration.

In addition to American citizens’ being targeted for assassination or indefinite detention, recent laws have canceled the restraints in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to allow unprecedented violations of our rights to privacy through warrantless wiretapping and government mining of our electronic communications. . . .

Despite an arbitrary rule that any man killed by drones is declared an enemy terrorist, the death of nearby innocent women and children is accepted as inevitable. After more than 30 airstrikes on civilian homes this year in Afghanistan, President Hamid Karzai has demanded that such attacks end, but the practice continues in areas of Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen that are not in any war zone. We don’t know how many hundreds of innocent civilians have been killed in these attacks, each one approved by the highest authorities in Washington. This would have been unthinkable in previous times.

These policies clearly affect American foreign policy. Top intelligence and military officials, as well as rights defenders in targeted areas, affirm that the great escalation in drone attacks has turned aggrieved families toward terrorist organizations, aroused civilian populations against us and permitted repressive governments to cite such actions to justify their own despotic behavior. . . .

At a time when popular revolutions are sweeping the globe, the United States should be strengthening, not weakening, basic rules of law and principles of justice enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But instead of making the world safer, America’s violation of international human rights abets our enemies and alienates our friends.

One can reasonably object to Carter’s Op-Ed on the ground that it romanticizes a non-existent American past (systematic human rights abuses are hardly a new development in the post-9/11 world), but what cannot be reasonably disputed is the trend he denounces. Note that the most egregious examples he cites — assassinating U.S. citizens without due process, civilian-killing drone attacks, the indefinite detention provisions of the NDAA — had some genesis under Bush but are hallmarks of Obama policy (his other example, the rapid erosion of constraints on government domestic surveillance, took place under both, with the full support of Obama). It’s a remarkably scathing denunciation of the record of his own political party and its current leader.

#### 4. Sanctions aren’t inherently human rights violations

Marks 99 Frangois-Xavier Bagnoud Professor of Health and Human Rights, Harvard School of Public Health [Stephen P. Marks, Economic Sanctions as Human Rights Violations: Reconciling Political and Public Health Imperatives, American Journal of Public Health, October 1999, Vol. 89, No. 10]

This tension between the sound conclusions of public health surveys of countries targeted by sanctions and the uncertain attribution of responsibility for human rights violations underscores the need for more reflection on the relationship between health and human rights. There can be no doubt that the civilian populations in targeted countries are victims of human rights violations. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights authoritatively declared that "the inhabitants of a given country do not forfeit their basic economic, social and cultural rights by virtue of any determination that their leaders have violated norms relating to international peace and security."42 While it is necessarily true that violations are committed by perpetrators, the principles of accountability for the human rights violations resulting from sanctions do not clearly identify the perpetrators or the consequences they should bear. Therefore, a more fruitful avenue is reform of sanctions to avoid such violations.

### 2NC/1NR—Democracy Coming

#### Democracy coming—Raul

CNN 2—20—08 [Younger Castro hints at 'more democratic' Cuba, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/02/20/raul.castro/index.html]

"Is there going to be a transition here toward something?" Raúl Castro once commented to reporters asking about post-Fidel Cuba. "Yes, toward a better form of socialism and -- here's something you'll like -- toward a more democratic society."

What did he mean by "more democratic society"? The world may soon know.

On Tuesday, Fidel Castro announced plans to resign as president and commander-in-chief of the country's armed forces after 49 years in power. It's widely expected that Raúl Castro will be named as the country's new president when the 31-member council of ministers meets Sunday.

Always together

Fidel and Raúl Castro planned the Cuban revolution together.

The brothers were born in Biran, the sons of a Spanish immigrant -- a rich landowner -- and the housemaid he eventually married. Raúl Castro was always by his older brother's side.

Together, they plotted the 1950s uprising that became the Cuban revolution, brought Fidel Castro to power and gave birth to the first communist nation in the Western Hemisphere.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, which left Cuba on the brink of bankruptcy and starvation, it was Raúl Castro who insisted on allowing free enterprise farmers markets. He declared that "beans have as much importance as cannons, if not more."

Analysts say the world may see more of that pragmatism.

Six months ago, Raúl Castro began a "national debate" on the problems of the country, acknowledging high unemployment and other economic concerns.

Raúl Castro is "a man who's quite capable of showing flexibility when needed and quite capable of being hard-line when needed," said Harold Klepak, a professor at the Royal Military College of Canada. "So it will be what is best for Cuba. What's best, I think, in his mind for the revolution and its continuity."

### AT: Aff Spurs Democracy in Cuba

#### US actions won’t spur pro-democracy changes—blowback is likely

Weeks & Fiorey 12 a. associate professor of political science and director of Latin American Studies at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte & b. M.A. candidate [Gregory Weeks & Erin Fiorey, Policy Options for a Cuban Spring, May-June 2012, MILITARY REVIEW http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview\_20120630\_art014.pdf

U.S. Money Won’t Cause Change in Cuba What would a Cuban transition look like? Why would it start? No one predicted the Arab Spring, and for Cuba the many possible permutations are well beyond the scope of this article. Cuban opposition blogger Yoani Sánchez writes that Cubans view transition as similar to a dilapidated building in Havana: “The hurricanes don’t bring it down and the rains don’t bring it down, but one day someone tries to change the lock on the front door and the whole edifice collapses.”15 In any event, given the hermetic nature of the regime and its successful resistance to U.S. influence, it is very unlikely that the United States will have much influence over its initiation.

As the prominent Cuban dissident Oswaldo Payá argues, “One talks about the United States’ money for civil society . . . . The United States’ money won’t cause change in Cuba.”16 It is a point he has made repeatedly. If there is a Cuban Spring, then its emergence and ultimate success will hinge on its domestic wellsprings. In fact, this echoes the policy position of the administration of Barack Obama. As Secretary of State Hillary Clinton put it in 2011, “These revolutions are not ours. They are not by us, for us, or against us, but we do have a role. We have the resources, capabilities, and expertise to support those who seek peaceful, meaningful, democratic reform.”17 Even the Catholic Cardinal in Cuba, Jaime Ortega, has cautioned against “a type of U.S. subculture which invades everything.”18 He was referring not only to culture, but also to politics.

What the wariness entails is an increased risk of backlash if the United States injects itself too forcefully. The United States faced a similar dilemma in the Arab Spring Middle Eastern transitions. Widespread perception that the United States is attempting to direct events fosters distrust and provides leverage to pro-regime forces or at the very least puts leaders on the defensive who might otherwise welcome assistance from the United States. This is commonly referred to as “blowback,” and over the long term, it could greatly reduce U.S. influence.

### AT: AFF Solves Cuban Economy

#### Won’t save Cuba—internal problems

Bandow 12 senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a former special assistant to former US president Ronald Reagan. [Doug Bandow, Time to End the Cuba Embargo, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/time-end-cuba-embargo?utm\_source=feedburner&utm\_medium=feed&utm\_campaign=Feed%3A+CatoRecentOpeds+(Cato+Recent+Op-eds)]

Ending the embargo would have obvious economic benefits for both Cubans and Americans. The U.S. International Trade Commission estimates American losses alone from the embargo as much as $1.2 billion annually.

Expanding economic opportunities also might increase pressure within Cuba for further economic reform. So far the regime has taken small steps, but rejected significant change. Moreover, thrusting more Americans into Cuban society could help undermine the ruling system. Despite Fidel Castro’s decline, Cuban politics remains largely static. A few human rights activists have been released, while Raul Castro has used party purges to entrench loyal elites.

Lifting the embargo would be no panacea. Other countries invest in and trade with Cuba to no obvious political impact. And the lack of widespread economic reform makes it easier for the regime rather than the people to collect the benefits of trade, in contrast to China. Still, more U.S. contact would have an impact. Argued trade specialist Dan Griswold, “American tourists would boost the earnings of Cubans who rent rooms, drive taxis, sell art, and operate restaurants in their homes. Those dollars would then find their way to the hundreds of freely priced farmers markets, to carpenters, repairmen, tutors, food venders, and other entrepreneurs.”

The Castro dictatorship ultimately will end up in history’s dustbin. But it will continue to cause much human hardship along the way.

#### Embargo economically irrelevant—need market reforms

Vásquez & Rodríguez 12 director & assistant director of the Project on Global Economic Liberty at the Cato Institute [Ian Vásquez and L. Jacobo Rodríguez, Trade Embargo In and Castro Out, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/trade-embargo-castro-out]

The Helms-Burton Act seeks to discourage investment in Cuba by imposing sanctions on foreign companies profiting from property confiscated by the Castro regime. But fears that foreign investment there, which is much lower than official Cuban figures claim, will save the communist system from its inherent flaws are unfounded; significant capital flows to Cuba will not occur unless and until the country introduces market reforms. While the Helms-Burton Act may slow investment in Cuba, U.S. allies (in particular, Canada, Mexico, and members of the European Union) have not welcomed that coercive attempt to influence their foreign policy. Not surprisingly, the European Union is contemplating retaliatory sanctions.

### 1NC Relations Frontline

#### 1. Incompatible political views impede relations—lifting the embargo won’t solve

Hanson and Lee 13—Stephanie Hanson is associate director and coordinating editor at CFR.org. She manages the editorial production of the website and covers economic and political development in Africa and Latin America. Brianna Lee is Senior Production Editor at CFR [January 31, 2013, “U.S.-Cuba Relations,” http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113]

What is the main obstacle in U.S.-Cuban relations?

A fundamental incompatibility of political views stands in the way of improving U.S.-Cuban relations, experts say. While experts say the United States wants regime change, "the most important objective of the Cuban government is to remain in power at all costs," says Felix Martin, an assistant professor at Florida International University's Cuban Research Institute. Fidel Castro has been an inspiration for Latin American leftists such as Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and Bolivian President Evo Morales, who have challenged U.S. policy in the region.

#### 2. Alt causes to good relations with Cuba

Hanson and Lee 13—Stephanie Hanson is associate director and coordinating editor at CFR.org. She manages the editorial production of the website and covers economic and political development in Africa and Latin America. Brianna Lee is Senior Production Editor at CFR [January 31, 2013, “U.S.-Cuba Relations,” http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113]

What are the issues preventing normalization of U.S.-Cuba relations?

Experts say these issues include:

Human rights violations. In March 2003, the Cuban government arrested seventy-five dissidents and journalists, sentencing them to prison terms of up to twenty-eight years on charges of conspiring with the United States to overthrow the state. The Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation, a Havana-based nongovernmental group, reports that the government has in recent years resorted to other tactics besides prison --such as firings from state jobs and intimidation on the street-- to silence opposition figures. A 2005 UN Human Rights Commission vote condemned Cuba's human rights record, but the country was elected to the new UN Human Rights Council in 2006.

Guantanamo Bay. Cuba indicated after 9/11 that it would not object if the United States brought prisoners to Guantanamo Bay. However, experts such as Sweig say Cuban officials have since seized on the U.S. prison camp--where hundreds of terror suspects have been detained--as a "symbol of solidarity" with the rest of the world against the United States. Although Obama ordered Guantanamo to be closed by January 22, 2010, the facility remains open as of January 2013, and many analysts say it is likely to stay in operation for an extended period.

Cuban exile community. The Cuban-American community in southern Florida traditionally has heavily influenced U.S. policy with Cuba. Both political parties fear alienating a strong voting bloc in an important swing state in presidential elections.

### 2NC/1NR—Ext. Relations Dead

#### Poor relations inevitable—other priorities

Hakim 11 President Emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue [Peter Hakim, The United States and Latin America: The Neighbourhood has Changed, The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, Volume 46, Issue 4, 2011]

During the following ten years, US foreign policy attention turned sharply to the Middle East. Washington's integrationist strategy for the Americas unravelled as its weaknesses and inconsistencies became increasingly visible. For their part, Latin American governments became increasingly independent and assertive in their foreign policies, diversified in their international relations, and more inclined to challenge US leadership and initiative. The United States has not yet come fully to grips with this changing context of hemispheric relations. The G.W. Bush and Obama administrations remained, at least rhetorically, wedded to the idea of partnerships and shared responsibilities with Latin America, but these concepts seem less and less relevant to the region's evolving context.

What the past two decades of US–Latin American relations may have most clearly revealed is how difficult it is for Washington to define and execute a coherent policy in the region—with officials constrained by domestic politics, far more urgent demands on its foreign policy resources, and an increasingly independent and self-assured Latin America. The fact is that US policies toward Latin American and the Caribbean are almost invariably derivative policies. They tend not to be the result of a careful calculation of US interests and values and a clear view of what it will take to advance them. Instead, they tend to be mostly shaped by US domestic political considerations or by the demands of global issues.

#### Relations are beyond gone—the US will still maintain diplomatic isolation

Hanson and Lee 13—Stephanie Hanson is associate director and coordinating editor at CFR.org. She manages the editorial production of the website and covers economic and political development in Africa and Latin America. Brianna Lee is Senior Production Editor at CFR [January 31, 2013, “U.S.-Cuba Relations,” http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113]

What is the status of U.S.-Cuba relations?

They are virtually nonexistent. There is a U.S. mission in Havana, Cuba's capital, but it has minimal communication with the Cuban government. Since 1961, the official U.S. policy toward Cuba has been two-pronged: economic embargo and diplomatic isolation. The George W. Bush administration strongly enforced the embargo and increased travel restrictions. Americans with immediate family in Cuba could visit once every three years for a maximum of two weeks, while family remittances to Cuba were reduced from $3,000 to just $300 in 2004. However, in April 2009, President Obama eased some of these policies. He went further in 2011 to undo many of the restrictions imposed by the Bush administration, thus allowing U.S. citizens to send remittances to non-family members in Cuba and to travel to Cuba for educational or religious purposes.

Congress amended the trade embargo in 2000 to allow agricultural exports from the United States to Cuba. In 2008, U.S. companies exported roughly $710 million worth of food and agricultural products to the island nation, according to the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council. However, that number fell by about 50 percent in 2012. Total agricultural exports since 2001 reached $3.5 billion as of February 2012. Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Texas have all brokered agricultural deals with Cuba in recent years.

Tension between Cuba and the United States flared in December 2009 with Cuba's arrest of Alan Gross, a USAID subcontractor who traveled to the country to deliver communications equipment and arrange Internet access for its Jewish community. Cuban authorities alleged Gross was attempting to destabilize the Cuban regime through a USAID-sponsored "democracy promotion" program, and he was subsequently sentenced to fifteen years in prison.

Despite initial optimism over Obama's election, Cuban politicians and citizens are less hopeful of a positive relationship developing between the two countries. Raúl and Fidel Castro have both criticized the Obama administration. In a 2009 speech, Raúl Castro accused the United States of "giving new breath to open and undercover subversion against Cuba."

#### Multiple obstacles to relations

Hakim 11 President Emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue [Peter Hakim, The United States and Latin America: The Neighbourhood has Changed, The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, Volume 46, Issue 4, 2011]

The electoral triumph of Barack Obama was enthusiastically welcomed in Latin America and the Caribbean.15 The spirited reaction to Obama's election made it clear that Latin Americans wanted a good relationship with the United States, but that they also wanted the United States to pursue a different approach to the region and to foreign policy generally. Expectations for the new administration were high throughout the region.

In contrast to many of his predecessors, Obama did not present a grand vision or a broad strategy for US policy in the hemisphere. Instead, he saw his presidency as an opportunity to solve some long-standing problems, reduce discord and friction, and encourage greater cooperation. Most of all, he promised a change in style and emphasis—fundamentally a turn to multilateralism and partnership, and a closer alignment of the United States and Latin American policy agendas. This would be a time to reinvigorate US relations in the hemisphere and perhaps set the stage for a new approach to regional affairs, not to embark on major new initiatives.

Obama himself remains widely admired and extremely well liked in Latin America, but his administration has not managed to improve the quality of US–Latin American relations or develop more productive regional ties.

The new president's overcrowded agenda has left little room for Latin America. Foreign policy has generally taken a back seat to the US' economic problems, health reform and myriad other domestic challenges. Latin America has had no chance of competing successfully for Washington's limited foreign policy attention with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran's nuclear ambitions and China's expanding global muscle.

The intense and bitter partisanship of Washington has compounded the problem. Neither Democrats nor Republicans have been eager to take on the politically volatile challenge of immigration reform, which remains the highest priority issue for Mexico and most nations of Central America and the Caribbean.16 Though the US Congress finally ratified the long-stalled free trade agreements with Colombia and Panama, only one in six Democrats in the House voted for both pacts. A Republican majority in the lower house of Congress now blocks any further relaxation of Cuba policy.

Finally, an increasingly assertive and politically divided Latin America has also complicated US policymaking. Only a few countries are openly hostile to Washington, but across the region, governments have demonstrated a growing independence from the US. They have built diverse relations internationally, and increasingly resisted US approaches. These are natural trends for a region of middle income countries that is expanding economically, more confident of its ability to resolve its own problems, and developing a significant global presence. They do not necessarily represent a setback for the United States. Over time, they might well allow for more productive hemispheric partnerships. But, today they are a major source of friction in US–Latin American relations, which have been strained by disagreements over Honduras, regional efforts to restore Cuba to OAS membership, South American opposition to the US–Colombia defence pact, and Iran's ties to Brazil and other nations.

#### Won’t boost relations—Mexico & Brazil key & growing apart economically

Hakim 11 President Emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue [Peter Hakim, The United States and Latin America: The Neighbourhood has Changed, The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, Volume 46, Issue 4, 2011]

The current trend in US Latin American policy reflects diminishing attention to the region as a whole, a retreat from efforts to formulate a Latin American-wide policy, and a growing focus on two countries in the region, Mexico and Brazil. To be sure, the United States continues to maintain active economic and political relations with most other countries of the region. But, beyond Mexico and Brazil, sustained, high-level attention in Washington is reserved for those countries facing severe hardships or crises—Haiti, for example, with its devastating earthquake in 2010, and Central American nations confronting a growing threat to their political stability from organised crime.

Mexico is the country that presents the United States with both its toughest challenges and greatest opportunities for productive cooperation in the hemisphere. No other country affects the lives of US citizens more than Mexico. The two nations share a 2,000-mile border that is crossed legally some 250 million times per year. Mexico sends upwards of 80 percent of its exports to US markets and is the United States' third largest trading partner after Canada and China. Mexico accounts for two-thirds of US trade with Latin America and half of its energy imports from the region.17 It is also overwhelmingly the largest source of immigrants to the United States, both legal and illegal, who account for most of the US work force growth and are critical to its economy.18 Over the longer run, the central challenge for US–Mexican relations is managing the accelerating economic and demographic integration of the two vastly different nations.

But today, Mexico faces a complex of dangerous security problems that have turned the country into Washington's most troublesome foreign policy test. A four-year military campaign against the drug gangs, supported by the US government, has produced few gains. The violence has continued to escalate, wreaking havoc on public safety and the rule of law; undermining the credibility of the nation's army, police and justice systems; and, in some areas, challenging the authority of the government. No one yet has offered a credible alternative approach. The United States and Mexico have developed a solid working relationship at the operational level, but tensions between the two countries have nonetheless deepened in recent years. Mexicans increasingly view US drug consumption and loose gun laws as mostly responsible for the violence in Mexico, and are increasingly alienated by the United States’ failure to reform its broken immigration system, which mostly victimises Mexicans and Central Americans.

Brazil's rapidly escalating regional and global influence represents a pivotal change in inter-American affairs. The ability of the United States to pursue its agenda in Latin America increasingly depends on Brazil's willingness to cooperate with or at least accommodate US initiatives, and the United States has increasingly had to engage with Brazil on a variety of global issues as well. Both regionally and internationally, the US–Brazil relationship involves both conflict and cooperation.19

The two countries are at odds on many policy issues, and Brazil advocates new institutional arrangements for the region that portend a reduced US role in Latin America. Still, Washington has maintained friendly ties with Brazil and will almost surely continue them. But, as Obama's visit to Brazil in March 2011 demonstrated, neither Brazil nor the United States is yet ready to develop a broad, long-term partnership.20 They are not willing to make the concessions or accept the substantial compromises needed to build a more strategic relationship. The question is whether the two nations can find enough common ground to be able to cooperate more effectively and more consistently on specific issues of mutual concern.

Washington's declining profile and influence in regional affairs is a reflection of Latin America's stronger economies and institutions, as well as the region's diversified international relations. There is today less need for US assistance and advice than ever, and a wider selection of investment and trade partners. China, particularly, has a large and steadily growing role in the region's economies, displacing the United States as the number one trading partner for Brazil and several other countries.21 Disputes among the region's countries are now routinely addressed by the countries themselves. Latin American governments are also taking initiatives to form their own regional arrangements and institutions that sometimes reinforce, but sometimes also compete with traditional inter-American organisations like the OAS.

### 1NC Proliferation Frontline

#### No widespread prolif

Hymans 12—Jacques E. C. Hymans is Associate Professor of IR at USC [April 16, 2012, “North Korea's Lessons for (Not) Building an Atomic Bomb,” *Foreign Affairs*, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137408/jacques-e-c-hymans/north-koreas-lessons-for-not-building-an-atomic-bomb?page=show]

Washington's miscalculation is not just a product of the difficulties of seeing inside the Hermit Kingdom. It is also a result of the broader tendency to overestimate the pace of global proliferation. For decades, Very Serious People have predicted that strategic weapons are about to spread to every corner of the earth. Such warnings have routinely proved wrong -- for instance, the intelligence assessments that led to the 2003 invasion of Iraq -- but they continue to be issued. In reality, despite the diffusion of the relevant technology and the knowledge for building nuclear weapons, the world has been experiencing a great proliferation slowdown. Nuclear weapons programs around the world are taking much longer to get off the ground -- and their failure rate is much higher -- than they did during the first 25 years of the nuclear age.

As I explain in my article "Botching the Bomb" in the upcoming issue of Foreign Affairs, the key reason for the great proliferation slowdown is the absence of strong cultures of scientific professionalism in most of the recent crop of would-be nuclear states, which in turn is a consequence of their poorly built political institutions. In such dysfunctional states, the quality of technical workmanship is low, there is little coordination across different technical teams, and technical mistakes lead not to productive learning but instead to finger-pointing and recrimination. These problems are debilitating, and they cannot be fixed simply by bringing in more imported parts through illicit supply networks. In short, as a struggling proliferator, North Korea has a lot of company.

#### Deterrence breakdowns don’t cause full-scale nuclear war

Waltz 3—Kenneth, Emeritus Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley and Adjunct Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, p. 34-35

States are deterred by the prospect of suffering severe damage and by their inability to do much to limit it. Deterrence works because nuclear weapons enable one state to punish another state severely without first defeating it. "Victory," in Thomas Schelling's words, "is no longer a prerequisite for hurting the enemy." 37 Countries armed only with conventional weapons can hope that their military forces will be able to limit the damage an attacker can do. Among countries armed with strategic nuclear forces, the hope of avoiding heavy damage depends mainly on the attacker's restraint and little on one's own efforts. Those who compared expected deaths through strategic exchanges of nuclear warheads with casualties suffered by the Soviet Union in World War II overlooked the fundamental difference between conventional and nuclear worlds. 38

Deterrence rests on what countries can do to each other with strategic nuclear weapons. From this statement, one can easily leap to the wrong conclusion: that deterrent strategies, if they have to be carried through, will produce a catastrophe. That countries are able to annihilate each other means neither that deterrence depends on their threatening to do so nor that they will necessarily do so if deterrence fails. Because countries heavily armed with strategic nuclear weapons can carry war to its ultimate intensity, the control of force becomes the primary objective. If deterrence fails, leaders will have the strongest incentives to keep force under control and limit damage rather than launching genocidal attacks. If the Soviet Union had attacked Western Europe, NATO's objectives would have been to halt the attack and end the war. The United States had the ability to place thousands of warheads precisely on targets in the Soviet Union. Surely we would have struck military targets before striking industrial targets and industrial targets before striking cities. The intent to hit military targets first was sometimes confused with a war-fighting strategy, but it was not one. It would not have significantly reduced the Soviet Union's ability to hurt us. Whatever American military leaders thought, our strategy rested on the threat to punish. The threat, if it failed to deter, would have been followed not by spasms of violence but by punishment administered in ways that conveyed threats of more to come.

A war between the United States and the Soviet Union that got out of control would have been catastrophic. If they had set out to destroy each other, they would have greatly reduced the world's store of developed resources while killing millions outside of their own borders through fallout. Even while destroying themselves, states with few weapons would do less damage to others. As ever, the biggest international dangers come from the strongest states. Fearing the world's destruction, one may prefer a world of conventional great powers having a higher probability of fighting less- destructive wars to a world of nuclear great powers having a lower probability of fighting more-destructive wars. But that choice effectively disappeared with the production of atomic bombs by the United States during World War II.

### 2NC/1NR—No Prolif

#### Prolif is super slow—empirics disprove their fear mongering.

Hymans 12—Jacques E. C. Hymans is Associate Professor of IR at USC [May/June 2012, “Botching the Bomb,” *Foreign Affairs*, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137403/jacques-e-c-hymans/botching-the-bomb?page=show]

The chronic problem of nuclear proliferation is once again dominating the news. A fierce debate has developed over how to respond to the threat posed by Iran's nuclear activities, which most experts believe are aimed at producing a nuclear weapon or at least the capacity to assemble one. In this debate, one side is pushing for a near-term military attack to damage or destroy Iran's nuclear program, and the other side is hoping that strict sanctions against the Islamic Republic will soften it up for a diplomatic solution. Both sides, however, share the underlying assumption that unless outside powers intervene in a dramatic fashion, it is inevitable that Iran will achieve its supposed nuclear goals very soon.

Yet there is another possibility. The Iranians had to work for 25 years just to start accumulating uranium enriched to 20 percent, which is not even weapons grade. The slow pace of Iranian nuclear progress to date strongly suggests that Iran could still need a very long time to actually build a bomb -- or could even ultimately fail to do so. Indeed, global trends in proliferation suggest that either of those outcomes might be more likely than Iranian success in the near future. Despite regular warnings that proliferation is spinning out of control, the fact is that since the 1970s, there has been a persistent slowdown in the pace of technical progress on nuclear weapons projects and an equally dramatic decline in their ultimate success rate.

The great proliferation slowdown can be attributed in part to U.S. and international nonproliferation efforts. But it is mostly the result of the dysfunctional management tendencies of the states that have sought the bomb in recent decades. Weak institutions in those states have permitted political leaders to unintentionally undermine the performance of their nuclear scientists, engineers, and technicians. The harder politicians have pushed to achieve their nuclear ambitions, the less productive their nuclear programs have become. Meanwhile, military attacks by foreign powers have tended to unite politicians and scientists in a common cause to build the bomb. Therefore, taking radical steps to rein in Iran would be not only risky but also potentially counterproductive, and much less likely to succeed than the simplest policy of all: getting out of the way and allowing the Iranian nuclear program's worst enemies -- Iran's political leaders -- to hinder the country's nuclear progress all by themselves.

NUCLEAR DOGS THAT HAVE NOT BARKED

"Today, almost any industrialized country can produce a nuclear weapon in four to five years," a former chief of Israeli military intelligence recently wrote in The New York Times, echoing a widely held belief. Indeed, the more nuclear technology and know-how have diffused around the world, the more the timeline for building a bomb should have shrunk. But in fact, rather than speeding up over the past four decades, proliferation has gone into slow motion.

Seven countries launched dedicated nuclear weapons projects before 1970, and all seven succeeded in relatively short order. By contrast, of the ten countries that have launched dedicated nuclear weapons projects since 1970, only three have achieved a bomb. And only one of the six states that failed -- Iraq -- had made much progress toward its ultimate goal by the time it gave up trying. (The jury is still out on Iran's program.) What is more, even the successful projects of recent decades have needed a long time to achieve their ends. The average timeline to the bomb for successful projects launched before 1970 was about seven years; the average timeline to the bomb for successful projects launched after 1970 has been about 17 years.

#### Prolif is slow and stable—their ev is hysteria.

Mueller 9—John Mueller is a professor of political science and Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies at the Mershon Center at Ohio State University [October 23, 2009, “The Rise of Nuclear Alarmism,” *Foreign Policy*, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/23/the\_rise\_of\_nuclear\_alarmism?page=full]

We have also endured decades of hysteria over the potential for nuclear proliferation, even though the proliferation that has actually taken place has been both modest and substantially inconsequential. When the quintessential rogue state, communist China, obtained them in 1964, CIA Director John McCone sternly proclaimed that nuclear war was "almost inevitable." But far from engaging in the "nuclear blackmail" expected at the time by almost everyone (except Johnson, then working at the State Department), China built its weapons quietly and has never made a nuclear threat.

Still, the proliferation fixation continues to flourish. For more than a decade, U.S. policy obsessed over the possibility that Saddam Hussein's pathetic and technologically dysfunctional regime in Iraq could in time obtain nuclear weapons (it took the more advanced Pakistan 28 years), which it might then suicidally lob, or threaten to lob, at somebody. To prevent this imagined and highly unlikely calamity, a war has been waged that has probably resulted in more deaths than were suffered at Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined.

Today, alarm is focused on the even more pathetic regime in North Korea, which has now tested devices that if detonated in the middle of New York's Central Park would be unable to destroy buildings on its periphery. There is even more hysteria about Iran, which has repeatedly insisted that it has no intention of developing the weapons. If that regime changes its mind or is lying, it is likely to find that, except for stoking the national ego for a while, the bombs are substantially valueless, a very considerable waste of money and effort, and "absolute" primarily in their irrelevance.

As for the rest of the world, the nuclear age is clearly on the wane. Although it may not be entirely fair to characterize disarmament as an effort to cure a fever by destroying the thermometer, the analogy is instructive when it is reversed: When a fever subsides, the instrument designed to measure it loses its usefulness and is often soon misplaced. Thus far the former contestants in the Cold War have reduced their nuclear warheads by more than 50,000 to around 18,000. Other countries, like France, have also substantially cut their nuclear arsenals, while China and others have maintained them in far lower numbers than expected.

Total nuclear disarmament hardly seems to be in the offing -- nuclear metaphysicians still have their skill sets in order. But a continued decline seems likely, and experience suggests that formal disarmament agreements are scarcely necessary in all this -- though they may help the signatories obtain Nobel Peace Prizes. With the demise of fears of another major war, many of the fantastically impressive, if useless, arms that struck such deep anxiety into so many for so long are quietly being allowed to rust in peace.

#### Prolif will be slow.

Tepperman 9 (Jonathon, former Deputy Managing Ed. Foreig Affairs and Assistant Managing Ed. Newsweek, Newsweek, “Why Obama should Learn to Love the Bomb,” 44:154, 9-7, L/N)

The risk of an arms race--with, say, other Persian Gulf states rushing to build a bomb after Iran got one--is a bit harder to dispel. Once again, however, history is instructive. "In 64 years, the most nuclear-weapons states we've ever had is 12," says Waltz. "Now with North Korea we're at nine. That's not proliferation; that's spread at glacial pace." Nuclear weapons are so controversial and expensive that only countries that deem them absolutely critical to their survival go through the extreme trouble of acquiring them. That's why South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan voluntarily gave theirs up in the early '90s, and why other countries like Brazil and Argentina dropped nascent programs. This doesn't guarantee that one or more of Iran's neighbors--Egypt or Saudi Arabia, say--might not still go for the bomb if Iran manages to build one. But the risks of a rapid spread are low, especially given Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recent suggestion that the United States would extend a nuclear umbrella over the region, as Washington has over South Korea and Japan, if Iran does complete a bomb. If one or two Gulf states nonetheless decided to pursue their own weapon, that still might not be so disastrous, given the way that bombs tend to mellow behavior.

#### Prolif is slow. Err neg—past predictions are empirically denied

Potter 8 (William, Sam Nunn and Richard Mukhatzhanova, Lugar Prof. Nonproliferation Studies and Dir. James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies—Monterey Institute of International Studies, and Guakhar, Research Associate—James Martin Center, International Security, “Divining Nuclear Intentions: A Review Essay”, 33:1, Summer, Project Muse)

Today it is hard to find an analyst or commentator on nuclear proliferation who is not pessimistic about the future. It is nearly as difficult to find one who predicts the future without reference to metaphors such as proliferation chains, cascades, dominoes, waves, avalanches, and tipping points.42 The lead author of this essay also has been guilty of the same tendency, and initially named an ongoing research project on forecasting proliferation he directs "21st Century Nuclear Proliferation Chains and Trigger Events." As both authors proceeded with research on the project, however, and particularly after reading the books by Hymans and Solingen, we became convinced that the metaphor is inappropriate and misleading, as it implies a process of nuclear decisionmaking and a pace of nuclear weapons spread that are unlikely to transpire. The current alarm about life in a nuclear-armed crowd has many historical antecedents and can be found in classified National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) as well as in scholarly analyses. The 1957 NIE, for example, identified a list of ten leading nuclear weapons candidates, including Canada, Japan, and Sweden.43 Sweden, it predicted, was "likely to produce its first weapons in about 1961," while it was estimated that Japan would "probably seek to develop weapons production programs within the next decade."44 In one of the [End Page 159] most famous forecasts, President John Kennedy in 1963 expressed a nightmarish vision of a future world with fifteen, twenty, or twenty-five nuclear weapons powers.45 A number of the earliest scholarly projections of proliferation also tended to exaggerate the pace of nuclear weapons spread. A flurry of studies between 1958 and 1962, for example, focused on the "Nth Country Problem" and identified as many as twelve candidates capable of going nuclear in the near future.46 Canada, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland were among the states most frequently picked as near-term proliferators. The "peaceful nuclear explosion" by India in 1974 was seen by many analysts of the time as a body blow to the young NPT that would set in motion a new wave of proliferation. Although the anticipated domino effect did not transpire, the Indian test did precipitate a marked increase in scholarship on proliferation, including an innovative study developed around the concept—now in vogue—of proliferation chains. Rarely cited by today's experts, the 1976 monograph on Trends in Nuclear Proliferation, 1975–1995, by Lewis Dunn and Herman Kahn, set forth fifteen scenarios for nuclear weapons spread, each based on the assumption that one state's acquisition of nuclear weapons would prompt several other states to follow suit, which in turn would trigger a succession of additional nuclearization decisions.47 Although lacking any single theoretical underpinning and accepting of the notion that proliferation decisions are likely to be attributed to security needs, the Dunn-Kahn model rejected the exclusive focus by realists on security drivers and sought to probe [End Page 160] beneath the rhetoric to identify the possible presence of other pressures and constraints. To their credit, Dunn and Kahn got many things right and advanced the study of proliferation. Their forecasts, however, were almost without exception wildly off the mark. Why, one may inquire, were their pessimistic projections about nuclear weapons spread—and those of their past and subsequent counterparts in the intelligence community—so often divorced from reality? Although Hymans and Solingen appear not to have been familiar with the research by Dunn and Kahn on proliferation trends at the time of their books' publications, their national leadership and domestic political survival models offer considerable insight into that dimension of the proliferation puzzle.48 The Four Myths of Nuclear Proliferation Hymans is keenly aware of the deficiency of past proliferation projections, which he attributes in large part to the "tendency to use the growth of nuclear capabilities, stances toward the non-proliferation regime, and a general 'roguishness' of the state as proxies for nuclear weapons intentions" (p. 217). Such intentions, he believes, cannot be discerned without reference to leadership national identity conceptions, a focus that appears to have been absent to date in intelligence analyses devoted to forecasting proliferation.49 Hymans is equally critical of the popular notion that "the 'domino theory' of the twenty-first century may well be nuclear."50 As he points out, the new domino theory, like its discredited Cold War predecessor, assumes an over-simplified view about why and how decisions to acquire nuclear weapons are taken.51 Leaders' nuclear preferences, he maintains, "are not highly contingent on what other states decide," and, therefore, "proliferation tomorrow will probably remain as rare as proliferation today, with no single instance of proliferation causing a cascade of nuclear weapons states" (p. 225). In addition, he argues, the domino thesis embraces "an exceedingly dark picture of world trends by lumping the truly dangerous leaders together with the merely self-assertive [End Page 161] ones," and equating interest in nuclear technology with weapons intent (pp. 208–209). Dire proliferation forecasts, both past and present, Hymans believes, flow from four myths regarding nuclear decisonmaking: (1) states want the bomb as a deterrent; (2) states seek the bomb as a "ticket to international status"; (3) states go for the bomb because of the interests of domestic groups; and (4) the international regime protects the world from a flood of new nuclear weapons states (pp. 208–216). Each of these assumptions is faulty, Hymans contends, because of its fundamental neglect of the decisive role played by individual leaders in nuclear matters. As discussed earlier, Hymans argues that the need for a nuclear deterrent is entirely in the eye of the beholder—a leader with an oppositional nationalist NIC. By the same token, just because some leaders seek to achieve international prestige through acquisition of the bomb, it does not mean that other leaders "necessarily view the bomb as the right ticket to punch": witness the case of several decades of Argentine leaders, as well as the Indian Nehruvians (pp. 211–212). The case of Egypt under Anwar al-Sadat, though not discussed by Hymans, also seems to fit this category. Hymans's focus on the individual level of analysis leads him to discount bureaucratic political explanations for nuclear postures, as well. Central to his argument is the assumption that decisions to acquire nuclear weapons are taken "without the considerable vetting that political scientists typically assume precedes most important states choices" (p. 13). As such, although he is prepared to credit nuclear energy bureaucracies as playing a supporting role in the efforts by Australia, France, and India to go nuclear, he does not observe their influence to be a determining factor in root nuclear decisions by national leaders. Moreover, contrary to a central premise of Solingen's model of domestic political survival, Hymans finds little evidence in his case studies of leaders pursuing nuclear weapons to advance their political interests (p. 213). For example, he argues, the 1998 nuclear tests in India were as risky domestically for Vajpayee as they were internationally (p. 214).

### AT: Globalization makes it fast

#### Buying nuclear material doesn’t solve state backwardness

Hymans 12—Jacques E. C. Hymans is Associate Professor of IR at USC [May/June 2012, “Botching the Bomb,” *Foreign Affairs*, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137403/jacques-e-c-hymans/botching-the-bomb?page=show]

Iraq's experience notwithstanding, many proliferation analysts insist that although technologically backward states might not have been capable of nuclear weapons development in the past, they can now simply purchase all they need in the freewheeling globalized marketplace. Admittedly, illicit nuclear entrepreneurs -- such as A. Q. Khan, the rogue Pakistani scientist who sold nuclear technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea -- do pose a threat. But international nuclear technology transfers often fail because the dysfunctional states that are trying to get the bomb are hardly any better at exploiting foreign nuclear know-how than they are at developing their own.

Libya's misbegotten nuclear weapons project reflects this general pattern. Despite buying all the items in Khan's catalog, Libya was unable to "put them together and make them work," according to a 2005 U.S. government report. Indeed, when IAEA inspectors gained access to Libyan nuclear facilities after Libya's president, Muammar al-Qaddafi, abandoned the project in 2003, they found much of the imported merchandise still in its original packing crates.

### AT: Hire Experts

#### Developing states won’t recruit experts

Hymans 12—Jacques E. C. Hymans is Associate Professor of IR at USC [May/June 2012, “Botching the Bomb,” *Foreign Affairs*, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137403/jacques-e-c-hymans/botching-the-bomb?page=show]

As for some analysts' terrifying predictions of ex-Soviet nuclear scientists and technicians leaving home en masse to further the nuclear ambitions of rogue regimes, this is more the stuff of Hollywood than a genuine problem. Ex-Soviet researchers vastly prefer the professional establishments of the West over the secret lairs of brutal dictators. Moreover, developing-state rulers need to be wary of recruiting outsiders, since the few genuine nuclear experts available can be hard to distinguish from the scores of frauds and spies also on the market. Take, for instance, the case of Argentine President Juan Perón's post-World War II recruitment of Nazi scientists. This was perhaps the most successful effort to produce a reverse scientific brain drain in history. Yet Ronald Richter, the Austrian physicist whom Perón chose to head his nascent nuclear program, turned out to be part con man and part madman. Perón realized his error only after the snickering worldwide reaction to his 1951 announcement that Richter had succeeded in producing controlled fusion.

### 1NC Warming Frontline

#### Warming is irreversible—consensus of most qualified scientists

Romm 3/18/13 [Joe, PhD in Physics from MIT, Senior Fellow at American Progress, editor of Climate Progress, former acting assistant secretary of energy for energy efficiency and renewable energy in 1997, “The Dangerous Myth that Climate Change is Reversible,” http://theenergycollective.com/josephromm/199981/dangerous-myth-climate-change-reversible]

The CMO (Chief Misinformation Officer) of the climate ignorati, Joe Nocera, has a new piece, “A Real Carbon Solution.” The biggest of its many errors comes in this line: A reduction of carbon emissions from Chinese power plants would do far more to help reverse climate change than — dare I say it? — blocking the Keystone XL oil pipeline. Memo to Nocera: As a NOAA-led paper explained 4 years ago, climate change is “largely irreversible for 1000 years,” with permanent Dust Bowls in Southwest and around the globe (if we don’t slash emissions ASAP). This notion that we can reverse climate change by cutting emissions is one of the most commonly held myths — and one of the most dangerous, as explained in this 2007 MIT study, “Understanding Public Complacency About Climate Change: Adults’ mental models of climate change violate conservation of matter.” The fact is that, as RealClimate has explained, we would need “an immediate cut of around 60 to 70% globally and continued further cuts over time” merely to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of CO2—and that would still leave us with a radiative imbalance that would lead to “an additional 0.3 to 0.8ºC warming over the 21st Century.” And that assumes no major carbon cycle feedbacks kick in, which seems highly unlikely. We’d have to drop total global emissions to zero now and for the rest of the century just to lower concentrations enough to stop temperatures from rising. Again, even in this implausible scenario, we still aren’t talking about reversing climate change, just stopping it — or, more technically, stopping the temperature rise. The great ice sheets might well continue to disintegrate, albeit slowly. This doesn’t mean climate change is unstoppable — only that we are stuck with whatever climate change we cause before we get desperate and go all WWII on emissions. That’s why delay is so dangerous and immoral. I’ll discuss this further below the jump. First, though, Nocera’s piece has many other pieces of misinformation. He leaves people with the impression that coal with carbon capture and storage (CCS) is a practical, affordable means of reducing emissions from existing power plants that will be available soon. In fact, most demonstration projects around the world have been shut down, the technology Nocera focuses on would not work on the vast majority of existing coal plants, and CCS is going to be incredibly expensive compared to other low-carbon technologies — see Harvard stunner: “Realistic” first-generation CCS costs a whopping $150 per ton of CO2 (20 cents per kWh)! And that’s in the unlikely event it proves to be practical, permanent, and verifiable (see “Feasibility, Permanence and Safety Issues Remain Unresolved”). Heck, guy who debated me on The Economist‘s website conceded things are going so slowly, writing “The idea is that CCS then becomes a commercial reality and begins to make deep cuts in emissions during the 2030s.” And he’s a CCS advocate!! Of course, we simply don’t have until the 2030s to wait for deep cuts in emissions. No wonder people who misunderstand the irreversible nature of climate change, like Nocera, tend to be far more complacent about emissions reductions than those who understand climate science. The point of Nocera’s piece seems to be to mock Bill McKibben for opposing the idea of using captured carbon for enhanced oil recovery (EOR): “his answer suggests that his crusade has blinded him to the real problem.” It is Nocera who has been blinded. He explains in the piece: Using carbon emissions to recover previously ungettable oil has the potential to unlock vast untapped American reserves. Last year, ExxonMobil reportedthat enhanced oil recovery would allow it to extend the life of a single oil field in West Texas by 20 years. McKibben’s effort to stop the Keystone XL pipeline is based on the fact that we have believe the vast majority of carbon in the ground. Sure, it wouldn’t matter if you built one coal CCS plant and used that for EOR. But we need a staggering amount of CCS, as Vaclav Smil explained in “Energy at the Crossroads“: “Sequestering a mere 1/10 of today’s global CO2 emissions (less than 3 Gt CO2) would thus call for putting in place an industry that would have to force underground every year the volume of compressed gas larger than or (with higher compression) equal to the volume of crude oil extracted globally by [the] petroleum industry whose infrastructures and capacities have been put in place over a century of development. Needless to say, such a technical feat could not be accomplished within a single generation.” D’oh! What precisely would be the point of “sequestering” all that CO2 to extract previously “ungettable oil” whose emissions, when burned, would just about equal the CO2 that you supposedly sequestered? Remember, we have to get total global emissions of CO2 to near zero just to stop temperatures from continuing their inexorable march toward humanity’s self-destruction. And yes, this ain’t easy. But it is impossible if we don’t start slashing emissions soon and stop opening up vast new sources of carbon. For those who are confused on this point, I recommend reading the entire MIT study, whose lead author is John Sterman. Here is the abstract: Public attitudes about climate change reveal a contradiction. Surveys show most Americans believe climate change poses serious risks but also that reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions sufficient to stabilize atmospheric GHG concentrations or net radiative forcing can be deferred until there is greater evidence that climate change is harmful. US policymakers likewise argue it is prudent to wait and see whether climate change will cause substantial economic harm before undertaking policies to reduce emissions. Such wait-and-see policies erroneously presume climate change can be reversed quickly should harm become evident, underestimating substantial delays in the climate’s response to anthropogenic forcing. We report experiments with highly educated adults–graduate students at MIT–showing widespread misunderstanding of the fundamental stock and flow relationships, including mass balance principles, that lead to long response delays. GHG emissions are now about twice the rate of GHG removal from the atmosphere. GHG concentrations will therefore continue to rise even if emissions fall, stabilizing only when emissions equal removal. In contrast, results show most subjects believe atmospheric GHG concentrations can be stabilized while emissions into the atmosphere continuously exceed the removal of GHGs from it. These beliefs-analogous to arguing a bathtub filled faster than it drains will never overflow-support wait-and-see policies but violate conservation of matter. Low public support for mitigation policies may be based more on misconceptions of climate dynamics than high discount rates or uncertainty about the risks of harmful climate change.

#### Relations won’t solve warming

Washington Times 11—a full-service, general interest daily newspaper in the nation's capital, it has a reputation for hard-hitting investigative reporting and thorough coverage of politics and policy [2/7/11, “Global warming a hard sell,” available online at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/feb/7/global-warming-a-hard-sell/]

Former Vice President Al Gore said on his website recently that the reason for the particularly harsh and snowy winter we’ve been experiencing this season was because of “man-made global warming” (“Snow job,” Comment & Analysis, Jan. 28). According to Mr. Gore, “scientists have been warning for at least two decades that global warming could make snowstorms more severe.” So just to recap, whether there’s a week-long heat wave or the exact opposite—a frigid winter—the cause is always the same: global warming. In 1992, Mr. Gore wrote his comprehensive “the sky is falling” environmental book, “Earth in the Balance,” (Rodale Books, 1992), which catapulted him to the top of Bill Clinton‘s list of potential running mates. The two would run on what was dubbed the “environmental ticket” that same year. With all his encyclopedic knowledge on the pending apocalyptic environmental calamity awaiting mankind, why did he wait so long to do something about it? For eight years, Mr. Gore was at the seat of power in the United States and this controversial environmental crisis didn’t seem to be all that much of an emergency to him then. Even if Mr. Gore were eventually proved right, there’s no political solution to global warming. Does anyone really think that China, India or any other budding industrial powerhouse is ever going to alter its economic policies because of a flimflam argument that even the godfather of the cause didn’t do anything about when he could have?

#### No risk of extinction.

Lomborg 8—Director of the Copenhagen Consensus Center and adjunct professor at the Copenhagen Business School [Bjorn, “Warming warnings get overheated,” The Guardian, August 15, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/15/carbonemissions.climatechange]

These alarmist predictions are becoming quite bizarre, and could be dismissed as sociological oddities, if it weren't for the fact that they get such big play in the media. Oliver Tickell, for instance, writes that a global warming causing a 4C temperature increase by the end of the century would be a "catastrophe" and the beginning of the "extinction" of the human race. This is simply silly. His evidence? That 4C would mean that all the ice on the planet would melt, bringing the long-term sea level rise to 70-80m, flooding everything we hold dear, seeing billions of people die. Clearly, Tickell has maxed out the campaigners' scare potential (because there is no more ice to melt, this is the scariest he could ever conjure). But he is wrong. Let us just remember that the UN climate panel, the IPCC, expects a temperature rise by the end of the century between 1.8 and 6.0C. Within this range, the IPCC predicts that, by the end of the century, sea levels will rise 18-59 centimetres—Tickell is simply exaggerating by a factor of up to 400. Tickell will undoubtedly claim that he was talking about what could happen many, many millennia from now. But this is disingenuous. First, the 4C temperature rise is predicted on a century scale—this is what we talk about and can plan for. Second, although sea-level rise will continue for many centuries to come, the models unanimously show that Greenland's ice shelf will be reduced, but Antarctic ice will increase even more (because of increased precipitation in Antarctica) for the next three centuries. What will happen beyond that clearly depends much more on emissions in future centuries. Given that CO2 stays in the atmosphere about a century, what happens with the temperature, say, six centuries from now mainly depends on emissions five centuries from now (where it seems unlikely non-carbon emitting technology such as solar panels will not have become economically competitive). Third, Tickell tells us how the 80m sea-level rise would wipe out all the world's coastal infrastructure and much of the world's farmland—"undoubtedly" causing billions to die. But to cause billions to die, it would require the surge to occur within a single human lifespan. This sort of scare tactic is insidiously wrong and misleading, mimicking a firebrand preacher who claims the earth is coming to an end and we need to repent. While it is probably true that the sun will burn up the earth in 4-5bn years' time, it does give a slightly different perspective on the need for immediate repenting. Tickell's claim that 4C will be the beginning of our extinction is again many times beyond wrong and misleading, and, of course, made with no data to back it up. Let us just take a look at the realistic impact of such a 4C temperature rise. For the Copenhagen Consensus, one of the lead economists of the IPCC, Professor Gary Yohe, did a survey of all the problems and all the benefits accruing from a temperature rise over this century of about approximately 4C. And yes, there will, of course, also be benefits: as temperatures rise, more people will die from heat, but fewer from cold; agricultural yields will decline in the tropics, but increase in the temperate zones, etc. The model evaluates the impacts on agriculture, forestry, energy, water, unmanaged ecosystems, coastal zones, heat and cold deaths and disease. The bottom line is that benefits from global warming right now outweigh the costs (the benefit is about 0.25% of global GDP). Global warming will continue to be a net benefit until about 2070, when the damages will begin to outweigh the benefits, reaching a total damage cost equivalent to about 3.5% of GDP by 2300. This is simply not the end of humanity. If anything, global warming is a net benefit now; and even in three centuries, it will not be a challenge to our civilisation. Further, the IPCC expects the average person on earth to be 1,700% richer by the end of this century.

#### Slowing now due to natural forcings—no risk of runaway warming

Klimenko 11 [VV, Research Assistant at the Department of Theoretical Astrophysics of the Ioffe Physico-Technical Institute, “Why Is Global Warming Slowing Down?,” 5-20, Doklady Earth Sciences, 2011, Vol. 440, Part 2, pp. 1419–1422]

The first decade of the present century has ended with a remarkable climatic event: for the first time over the past 65 years, the five year average global temperature over 2006–2010 turned out to be lower than the value for the previous five year interval (2001–2005). In addition, the absolute maximum temperature, which was attained as long ago as in 1998, has not been surpassed for thirteen years. Both these facts seem ingly support the arguments of the opponents of global warming theory, at least those who regard the anthro pogenic origin of warming questionable or even farfetched. Indeed, the anthropogenic emission of carbon dioxide, which is the major greenhouse atmospheric component, has risen by 60% from 5.2 giga tons to 8.5 gigatons of carbon, and its concentration has increased from 339 to 390 ppmv (parts per million by volume). How then do we explain the apparent slowdown in the rate of global warming?

Evidently, the observed global rise in temperature (Fig. 1) is a response of the climatic system to the combined action of both anthropogenic and natural impacts. Some of the latter are precisely the factors responsible for the current climatic paradox. Further, we will attempt to identify these factors and, based on their analysis, forecast the global climatic trends for the next decades.

Figure 2 presents the wavelet spectra yielded by continuously analyzing the time series of global tem perature over 1850–2011 [1]. Here, we analyze only one of three existing global temperature datasets which are continuously updated, namely the HadCRUT3 temperature series provided by the Uni versity of East Anglia (accessible at http://www.cru. uea.ac.uk/cru/data/temperature/), because this is, as of now, the only dataset covering more than a 150-year interval, which is crucial for our study. We note that it only recently became possible to analyze such long time series and, thus, identification of multidecade rhythms became a solvable task. The temperature data were preliminarily rid of the longterm anthropogenic trend associated with the accumulation of greenhouse gases and aerosols in the atmosphere; this trend was calculated from the energybalance climate model developed at the Moscow Power Engineering Institute (MPEI) [2]. The resulting temperature series, free of anthropogenic trends, will contain important infor mation on the influence of natural factors. Figure 2 shows that, throughout the entire interval of instrumental observations since the mid nineteenth century, the data contain rather stable 70 year and 20 year cyclic components. A less significant 9year cycle was present in most observations (during 1870– 1900 and 1940–2000), and a 6year cycle persisted over a considerable part of the entire time span. Closely consistent results were also obtained when analyzing the temperature series by the maximum entropy method (MEM) (Fig. 3). As the order of the auroregression (AR) method is known to significantly affect the result, in our case this parameter was chosen to be onethird the length of the studied data series: according to the long experience in application of MEM in climate research, this value is suitable for providing useful information. All the harmonic com ponents identified above are statistically significant with a confidence level of 90%.

Supposedly, the source of the dominant 70year cycle is the North Atlantic, where this harmonic is reliably identified not only in the ocean [3–5] but also on the continental margins: in Greenland [6], England [7], Finland [8], at the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago, and on the Yamal Peninsula [9]. Moreover, this periodical component is not only recognized in the instrumental data but it is also revealed in the time series of paleotemperature and pressure which date back to over hundreds and even thousands of years ago. We believe that this rhythm is associated with the quasiperiodical changes in the atmospheric and oceanic circulation known as the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) and with the related pulsations in the advection of warm waters to the basins of the Nor wegian and Barents seas. Indeed, the time series of the NAO index contain an approximately 60to 70year component [10] and show a strong positive correlation with the time series of temperature in the Northern hemisphere [11]. The positive phases of NAO indices are character ized by a more intense westerly air mass transport and a noticeable warming of the major part of the nontrop ical zone in the northern hemisphere, which is most prominent in the winter–spring season. Incidentally, the most rapid phase of the presentday warming (1975–2005) just featured such seasonal asymmetry, which is more evidence in favor of the hemispherical and global temperatures being related to NAO. Finally, it turns out that the 70year periodicity is present in the globally averaged temperature and in the temperature averaged over the northern hemisphere, whereas in the spectrum for the southern hemisphere, this harmonic component is rather weak (Fig. 3). This is an important additional argument in favor of the North Atlantic origin of the 70year cycle.

The existence of the quasibidecadal oscillations is often attributed to the influence of the Sun. However, the situation is not so simple: in our case, this cycle is almost not recognizable in the northern hemisphere, although clearly pronounced in the southern hemisphere (Fig. 3). This fact motivates one not to con strain the probable origin of this periodicity to the behavior of the Sun, but also to search for its possible correlations to the variability in the Southern Oscillation (SO) whose index has a peak at a period of 22 years [12, 13]. The latter hypothesis is supported by the fact that the temperature series over the equatorial and southern portions of the Pacific as well as those over the entire water area of the Indian Ocean contain a distinctly expressed quasibidecadal oscillation [3]. In turn, the SO, which largely controls the tempera ture regime of the southern hemisphere, is undoubt edly affected by the variations in the rate of the Earth’s rotation, which also have a significant periodical com ponent at 22 years [14].

As of now, the nature of the 9year oscillations is least clear. We suppose it to be a result of superimposi tion of oscillations associated with the lunar–solar tides that have characteristic times of 8.85 (the perigee period of the Moon) and 9.86 years (the period of barycenter of the Sun–Jupiter system), which are cer tainly able to cause significant changes to the atmo spheric circulation and, therefore, temperature. The comparison of the instrumental data series since 1850 with the results of calculations using the energy balance model with superimposed main cyclic components is presented in Fig. 1. The calculated curve in the interval 1850–2011 accounts for more than 75% of the observed variability in the data and clearly demonstrates that the natural factors may considerably enhance or, quite the opposite, reduce the ongoing warming up to its complete disappearing or even shortterm cooling, as has occurred during the last 6–8 years. We suppose warming will resume shortly in the years to come (Fig. 1). However, up to the end of the century, its rate will likely be lower than the value attained in 1975–2005 when the extremely intense positive phases of NAO and SO concurrent with the highest solar irradiation over the last 600 years [15] resulted in a rate of warming as high as in excess of 0.2°C per decade. In the next few decades, the natural forcings will restrain the process of global warming. This will be primarily associated with the decline in solar activity and the transition to the negative phase in NAO, which features a weaker westerly air mass transport. Recent measurements show that both these processes are gaining strength. Indeed, the NAO index has consistently decreased since early 1990 and is now at a 40year low (http://www.cgd. ucar.edu/cas/jhurrell/indices.html). At the same time, the minimal solar constant over the entire 33year history of satellite observations has been recorded in the current, solar cycle 24, which started in the fall of 2008 (http://www.pmodwrc.ch/pmod.php?topic=tsi/ composite/SolarConstant/).

#### Negative feedbacks solve

Singer et al. 11 [S Fred, PhD, a distinguished atmospheric physicist and first director of the U.S. Weather Satellite Service, Craig Idso, editor of the online magazine CO2 Science and author of several books and scholarly articles on the effects of carbon dioxide on plant and animal life, Robert M Carter, marine geologist and research professor at James Cook University in Queensland, Australia Climate Change Reconsidered: 2011 Interim Report]

In the 2009 NIPCC report, Idso and Singer (2009) discussed the plausibility of a multistage negative feedback process whereby warming-induced increases in the emission of dimethyl sulfide (DMS) from the world‘s oceans tend to counteract any initial impetus for warming. The basic tenet of this hypothesis is that the global radiation balance is significantly influenced by the albedo of marine stratus clouds (the greater the cloud albedo, the less the input of solar radiation to the Earth‘s surface). The albedo of these clouds, in turn, is known to be a function of cloud droplet concentration (the more and smaller the cloud droplets, the greater the cloud albedo and the reflection of solar radiation), which is dependent upon the availability of cloud condensation nuclei on which the droplets form (the more cloud condensation nuclei, the more and smaller the cloud droplets). And in completing the negative feedback loop, the cloud condensation nuclei concentration often depends upon the flux of biologically produced DMS from the world‘s oceans (the higher the sea surface temperature, the greater the sea-to-air flux of DMS).

Since the publication of the 2009 NIPCC report, additional empirical evidence has been found to support the several tenets of the DMS feedback process. Qu and Gabric (2010), for example, introduce their contribution to the subject by stating, ―dimethylsulfide (DMS) is the main volatile sulfur [species] released during the formation and decay of microbial ocean biota and ―aerosols formed from the atmospheric conversion of DMS to sulfate and methanesulfonic acid can exert a climate cooling effect directly by scattering and absorbing solar radiation and indirectly by promoting the formation of cloud condensation nuclei and increasing the albedo of clouds, thus reflecting more solar radiation back into space.

Working with climate and DMS production data from the region of the Barents Sea (70–80°N, 30– 35°E) obtained over the period 1998 to 2002, Qu and Gabric employed a genetic algorithm to calibrate chlorophyll-a measurements (obtained from SeaWiFS satellite data) for use in a regional DMS production model. Then, using GCM temperature outputs for the periods 1960–1970 (pre-industry CO2 level) and 2078–2086 (triple the pre-industry CO2 level), they calculated the warming-induced enhancement of the DMS flux from the Barents Sea region. The two researchers report, ―significantly decreasing ice coverage, increasing sea surface temperature and decreasing mixed-layer depth could lead to annual DMS flux increases of more than 100% by the time of equivalent CO2 tripling (the year 2080). In commenting on their findings, they state, ―such a large change would have a great impact on the Arctic energy budget and may offset the effects of anthropogenic warming that are amplified at polar latitudes. What is more, they write, ―many of these physical changes will also promote similar perturbations for other biogenic species (Leck et al., 2004), some of which are now thought to be equally influential to the aerosol climate of the Arctic Ocean. Thus it can be appreciated that DMS production in a warming world—especially when augmented by analogous biogenic phenomena—may provide a large moderating influence on the primary impetus for warming that is produced by mankind‘s emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases.

Kim et al. (2010) write that DMS ―represents 95% of the natural marine flux of sulfur gases to the atmosphere (Bates et al., 1992; Liss et al., 1997), and they say it ―may be oxidized to form non sea-salt sulfate aerosols, which are known to act as cloud condensation nuclei and thereby exert a cooling effect by absorbing or scattering solar radiation. They cite Charlson et al. (1987), who first described the intriguing and important chain of events. They also note ―DMS is generated by intracellular or extracellular enzymatic cleavage of DMSP [dimethylsulfoniopropionate] by DMSP-lyase, which is synthesized by algae and bacteria, following DMSP secretion from producer cells or release following autolysis or viral attack, while noting that ―grazing activity can also result in DMSP conversion to DMS if DMSP and DMSP-lyase are physically mixed following grazing, citing Stefels et al., 2007, and Wolfe and Steinke, 1996.

Working in the coastal waters of Korea from 21 November to 11 December 2008, the 14 Korean scientists utilized 2,400-liter mesocosm enclosures to simulate, in triplicate, three sets of environmental conditions—an ambient control (~400 ppm CO2 and ambient temperature), an acidification treatment (~900 ppm CO2 and ambient temperature), and a greenhouse treatment (~900 ppm CO2 and ~3°C warmer-than-ambient temperature)—and within these mesocosms they initiated phytoplankton blooms by adding equal quantities of nutrients to each mesocosm on day 0. For 20 days thereafter they measured numerous pertinent parameters within each mesocosm. This work revealed, as they describe it, that ―total accumulated DMS concentrations (integrated over the experimental period) in the acidification and greenhouse mesocosms were approximately 80% and 60% higher than the values measured in the control mesocosms, respectively, which they attribute to the fact that, in their experiment, ―autotrophic nanoflagellates (which are known to be significant DMSP producers) showed increased growth in response to elevated CO2 and ―grazing rates [of microzooplankton] were significantly higher in the treatment mesocosms than in the control mesocosms. In the concluding paragraph of their paper, they write, ―the key implication of our results is that DMS production resulting from CO2-induced grazing activity may increase under future high CO2 conditions, concluding that ―DMS production in the ocean may act to counter the effects of global warming in the future.

#### Not anthropogenic—other factors are more important and there is a diminishing curve.

Paterson 11 [Norman R., Professional Engineer and Consulting Geophysicist, PhD in Geophysics from University of Toronto, Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, “Global Warming: A Critique of the Anthropogenic Model and its Consequences,” Geoscience Canada, Vol. 38, No 1, March, Ebsco]

The term ‘global warming’ is commonly used by the media to mean ‘anthropogenic’ global warming; that is, warming caused by human activity. In this article, the writer has chosen to prefix ‘global warming’, where appropriate, by the terms ‘anthropogenic or ‘humancaused’ in order to avoid confusion. We are led today by our media, governments, schools and some scientific authorities to believe that, through his CO2 emissions, man is entirely, or almost entirely, responsible for the modest, modulated rise in global temperature of about 0.7° C that has taken place over the past 100 years. We are told, and many sincere people believe, that if we continue on this path, the planet will experience escalating temperature and dangerous sealevel rise before the end of this century. Over the past 20 years or so, this has become so much a part of our belief system, that to challenge it is to be labelled a ‘denier’ and put in the same category as a member of the Flat Earth Society. Yet, even a cursory review of the peer-reviewed scientific literature will show that the popular anthropogenic global warming dogma is being questioned by hundreds of respected scientists. Furthermore, emerging evidence points directly to other natural phenomena as probably having greater effects on global temperatures than can be attributed to human-caused CO2 emissions. The disproportionate scientific weighting attributed to the anthropogenic warming interpretation, and the general public perception of its validity, could be a serious problem for society, as the human-caused global warming belief is diverting our attention from other, more serious anthropogenic effects such as pollution and depletion of our water resources, contamination of our food and living space from chemicals, and diminishing conventional energy resources.

PROBLEMS WITH THE ANTHROPOGENIC MODEL The fact that the world has undergone cycles of warming and cooling has been known for a very long time, but the question as to man’s influence on climate did not become a hot debate until after the mid-twentieth century, when Revelle and Seuss (1957) first drew attention to the possible effect of greenhouses gases (particularly CO2 ) on the earth’s temperature. Subsequent studies pointed to the increase in atmospheric CO2 from roughly 0.025% to 0.037%, or 50%, over the past 100 years. Much was made of the apparent but crude covariance of atmospheric CO2 and global temperature, and the conclusion was drawn that [hu]man’s escalating carbon emissions are responsible for the late 20 th century temperature rise. Anxiety was rapidly raised among environmentalists, and also attracted many scientists who found ready funding for studies aimed at better understanding the problem. However, scientists soon encountered three important difficulties:

i) To this date, no satisfactory explanation is forthcoming as to how CO2 at less than 0.04% of atmospheric concentration can make a major contribution to the greenhouse effect, especially as the relationship between increasing CO2 and increasing temperature is a diminishing logarithmic one (Gerlich and Tscheuschner 2009);

ii) Geological records show unequivocally that past temperature increases have always preceded, not followed, increases in CO2; i.e. the warming could potentially cause the CO2 increase, but not the reverse. Studies (e.g. Petit et al. 1999) have shown that over the past 400 000 years of cyclical variations, temperature rose from glacial values about 800 years before CO2 concentration increased. A probable explanation is that solar warming, over a long period of time, causes the oceans to outgas CO2 , whereas cooling results in more CO2 entering solution, as discussed by Stott et al. (2007). Averaged over a still longer period of geological time, it has been shown (Shaviv and Veizer 2003) that there is no correlation between CO2 and temperature; for example, levels of CO2 were more than twice present day values at 180 Ma, at a time when temperature was several degrees cooler;

iii) Other serious mistakes in analysis were made by some scientists over the years. Perhaps the worst of these (see Montford 2010 for a thorough discussion) was the publication of the ‘Hockey Stick Curve’ (Fig. 1), a 1000-year record of past temperature which purported to show that “The 20 th century is likely the warmest century in the Northern Hemisphere, and the 1990s was the warmest decade, with 1998 as the warmest year in the last 1000 years” (Mann et al. 1999). This conclusion was adopted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its 2001 report and also by Al Gore in the movie An Inconvenient Truth. Subsequently, Mann et al.’s work has been challenged by several scientists (though to be fair, it is also supported by some). For example, McIntyre and McKitrick (2003) amended Mann’s graph, using all available data and better quality control (Fig. 1), and showed that the 20 th century is not exceptionally warm when compared with that of the 15 th century. However, the IPCC has continued to report a steady increase in global temperature in the face of clear evidence that average temperature has remained roughly level globally, positive in the northern hemisphere and negative in the southern hemisphere, since about 2002 (Archibald 2006; Fig. 2).

WHAT CAUSES WARMING? It is likely that the cyclical warming and cooling of the earth results from a number of different causes, none of which, taken alone, is dominant enough to be entirely responsible. The more important ones are solar changes (including both irradiance and magnetic field effects), atmosphere–ocean interaction (including both multidecadal climatic oscillations and unforced internal variability), and greenhouse gases. All of these factors have been discussed by IPCC, but the first two have been dismissed as negligible in comparison with the greenhouse-gas effect and man’s contribution to it through anthropogenic CO2 . It is claimed (e.g. Revelle and Suess 1957) that the particular infrared absorption bands of CO2 provide it with a special ability to absorb and reradiate the sun’s longer wavelength radiation, causing warming of the troposphere and an increase in high-altitude (cirrus) cloud, further amplifying the heating process. Detailed arguments against this conclusion can be found in Spencer et al. (2007) and Gerlich and Tscheuschner (2009). These scientists point out (among other arguments, which include the logarithmic decrease in absorptive power of CO2 at increasing concentrations), that clouds have poor ability to emit radiation and that the transfer of heat from the atmosphere to a warmer body (the earth) defies the Second Law of Ther-modynamics. They argue that the Plank and Stefan-Boltzman equations used in calculations of radiative heat transfer cannot be applied to gases in the atmosphere because of the highly complex multi-body nature of the problem. Veizer (2005) explains that, to play a significant role, CO2 requires an amplifier, in this case water vapour. He concludes that water vapour plays the dominant role in global warming and that solar effects are the driver, rather than CO2 . A comprehensive critique of the greenhouse gas theory is provided by Hutton (2009).

It is firmly established that the sun is the primary heat source for the global climate system, and that the atmosphere and oceans modify and redirect the sun’s heat. According to Veizer (2005), cosmic rays from outer space cause clouds to form in the troposphere; these clouds shield the earth and provide a cooling effect. Solar radiation, on the other hand, produces a thermal energy flux which, combined with the solar magnetic field, acts as a shield against cosmic rays and thereby leads to global warming. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate both the cooling by cosmic rays (cosmic ray flux, or CRF) and warming by solar irradiation (total solar irradiance, or TSI) in the long term (500 Ma) and short term (50 years), respectively. CRF shows an excellent negative correlation with temperature, apart from a short period around 250 Ma (Fig. 3). In contrast, the reconstructed, oxygen isotope-based temperature curve illustrates a lack of correlation with CO2 except for a period around 350 Ma.

Other studies have highlighted the overriding effect of solar radiation on global heating. Soon (2005) studied solar irradiance as a possible agent for medium-term variations in Arctic temperatures over the past 135 years, and found a close correlation in both decadal (5–10 years) and multi-decadal (40–80 years) changes (Fig. 5). As to the control on this variation, the indirect effect of solar irradiance on cloud cover undoubtedly results in modulations of the sun’s direct warming of the earth. Veizer (2005) estimated that the heat reflected by cloud cover is about 78 watts/m2 , compared to an insolation effect of 342 watts/m2 , a modulation of more than 25%. This contrasts with an IPCC estimate of 1.46 watts/m2 , or about 0.5% of TSI, for the radiative effect of anthropogenic CO2 accumulated in the modern industrial era (IPCC 2001). Veizer concludes: “A change of cloud cover of a few percent can therefore have a large impact on the planetary energy balance.” In addition to solar insolation effects, the intensity of the Earth’s magnetic field (which deflects the charged particles that constitute cosmic rays) and associated sun-spot maxima are correlated with historic periods of global warming such as the Medieval Climate Optimum (Fig. 6), and typically occur mid-way between ice ages (Veizer 2005). Solar magnetic minima have accompanied global cooling, such as occurred during the Little Ice Age between 1350 and 1850 A.D. A proxy for sunspot activity prior to the start of telescope observations in 1610 can be reconstructed from the abundance of cosmogenic 10 Be in ice cores from Antarctica and Greenland (Miletsky et al. 2004).

Global temperature oscillations have been evident in both geologic and recent times, with periods varying from a few years (mostly solar and lunar driven) up to 120 million years (galactic and orbital influences) (Plimer 2009). In addition, ocean– atmosphere interactions are implicated in the control of some shorter-period climatic oscillations. For example, McLean et al. (2009) have studied the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO), a tropical Pacific ocean–atmosphere phenomenon, and compared the index of intensity (the Southern Oscillation Index, or SOI) with global tropospheric temperature anomalies (GTTA) for the 1960–2009 period (Fig. 7). McLean et al. (2009) concluded that “Change in SOI accounts for 72% of the variance in GTTA for the 29-year long record, and 68% for the 50-year record”. They found the same or stronger correlation between SOI and mean global temperature, in which SOI accounted for as much as 81% of the variance in the tropics (Fig. 8). A delay of 5 to 7 months was deduced between the SOI maximum and the associated temperature anomaly. Volcanic influences on temperature are also evident (Figs. 7, 8), probably caused by the injection of sulphur dioxide into the stratosphere, where it is converted into sulphate aerosols that reflect incoming solar radiation (McLean et al. 2009). The GTTA nearly always falls in the year or two following major eruptions.

Both solar irradiation and ocean–atmosphere oscillations have therefore been demonstrated to have effects on global temperature of at least the same order of magnitude as the CO2 greenhouse gas hypothesis, and these alternative mechanisms are supported by well-documented empirical data. Nevertheless, the CO2 hypothesis, the theoretical basis for which is being increasingly challenged, remains the popular explanation for global warming in the public domain.

THE CONTROVERSY The main factors that have led to heated scientific controversy regarding the cause of the mild late 20 th century global warming can be summarized as follows: i) A surge of media coverage and consequent public interest and anxiety, magnified by productions such as Al Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth.

ii) Fear and concern on the part of environmentalists, who were already aware of many other harmful aspects of industrial, commercial and other human activities. Environmentalists, including NGOs such as Greenpeace and the World Wildlife Fund, exploited the open disagreements that existed among scientists as to the scale of the warming and its impacts, disagreements that inevitably arose because climate science is complex and empirical data were in short supply until recently.

### 2NC/1NR—Can’t Solve Warming

#### Not even an 80% emissions cut is enough

AP 9 [Associated Press, Six Degree Temperature Rise by 2100 is Inevitable: UNEP, September 24, http://www.speedy-fit.co.uk/index2.php?option=com\_content&do\_pdf=1&id=168]

Earth's temperature is likely to jump six degrees between now and the end of the century even if every country cuts greenhouse gas emissions as proposed, according to a United Nations update. Scientists looked at emission plans from 192 nations and calculated what would happen to global warming. The projections take into account 80 percent emission cuts from the U.S. and Europe by 2050, which are not sure things. The U.S. figure is based on a bill that passed the House of Representatives but is running into resistance in the Senate, where debate has been delayed by health care reform efforts. Carbon dioxide, mostly from the burning of fossil fuels such as coal and oil, is the main cause of global warming, trapping the sun's energy in the atmosphere. The world's average temperature has already risen 1.4 degrees since the 19th century. Much of projected rise in temperature is because of developing nations, which aren't talking much about cutting their emissions, scientists said at a United Nations press conference Thursday. China alone adds nearly 2 degrees to the projections. "We are headed toward very serious changes in our planet," said Achim Steiner, head of the U.N.'s environment program, which issued the update on Thursday. The review looked at some 400 peer-reviewed papers on climate over the last three years. Even if the developed world cuts its emissions by 80 percent and the developing world cuts theirs in half by 2050, as some experts propose, the world is still facing a 3-degree increase by the end of the century, said Robert Corell, a prominent U.S. climate scientist who helped oversee the update. Corell said the most likely agreement out of the international climate negotiations in Copenhagen in December still translates into a nearly 5-degree increase in world temperature by the end of the century. European leaders and the Obama White House have set a goal to limit warming to just a couple degrees. The U.N.'s environment program unveiled the update on peer-reviewed climate change science to tell diplomats how hot the planet is getting. The last big report from the Nobel Prize-winning Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change came out more than two years ago and is based on science that is at least three to four years old, Steiner said. Global warming is speeding up, especially in the Arctic, and that means that some top-level science projections from 2007 are already out of date and overly optimistic. Corell, who headed an assessment of warming in the Arctic, said global warming "is accelerating in ways that we are not anticipating." Because Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets are melting far faster than thought, it looks like the seas will rise twice as fast as projected just three years ago, Corell said. He said seas should rise about a foot every 20 to 25 years.

#### Replacing every coal plant isn’t enough to solve—neither is the aff.

Rapier 12—Chief Technology Officer at Merica International—a Renewable Energy Company, Master’s in Chemical Engineering from Texas A&M University [March 15, 2012, Robert Rapier, Study: Eliminating Coal-Fired Power is Worth 0.2 Degrees in 100 Years, http://www.consumerenergyreport.com/2012/03/05/study-eliminating-coal-fired-power-is-worth-0-2-degrees-in-100-years/]

Who could have dreamed solving climate change would be so easy? A new paper in Environmental Research Letters called “Greenhouse gases, climate change and the transition from coal to low-carbon electricity” concludes that replacement of all of the world’s currently operating coal-fired power plants — which produce about 40% of the world’s electricity — and replacing them with renewable energy would have an impact of 0.2 degrees Celsius 100 years from now.

Cherry-Picking Conclusions According to One’s Viewpoint

However, a number of climate change websites took away a very different message than I took away from the paper. Here is Joe Romm’s view:

Bombshell: You Can’t Slow Projected Warming With Gas, You Need ‘Rapid and Massive Deployment’ of Zero-Carbon Power

I seem to recall another “bombshell” that he recently reported upon on the same theme: Natural Gas Bombshell: Switching From Coal to Gas Increases Warming for Decades, Has Minimal Benefit Even in 2100. I debunked that by showing that in that particular study, every possible alternative — including wind power, solar power, and even simply shutting down all of the coal plants — was projected to increase global warming in the short term: BOMBSHELL: Solar and Wind Power Would Speed Up, Not Reduce, Global Warming.

But Joe is back with the hyperbolic titles and exaggerations (which I get into below), and he missed the biggest story in the paper.

Coal and Sunlight-Reflecting Pollutants

The subject of Romm’s earlier “natural gas bombshell” was a paper written by Tom Wigley that concluded that shutting down coal-fired power plants would cause the global temperature to increase in the short term because of the loss of sunlight-reflecting pollutants.

In that particular paper, Dr. Wigley modeled what would happen if coal-fired power was replaced with natural gas. He did indeed project short-term warming in that scenario, yet it was a result of the air becoming cleaner and allowing sunlight through as the coal was phased out. Thus, the media really got that story wrong, which was not about a deficiency of natural gas, but rather about the peculiarity of burning coal — that the particulate emissions reflect sunlight. Those who fixated on natural gas as the culprit could have written the same story about solar power — which the study’s author confirmed for me. Hence, I made that my “Bombshell” to illustrate the point.

However, that particular study didn’t actually model the temperature impact of shutting down coal plants and replacing them with anything other than natural gas. So, I posed the following question to Dr. Wigley:

What does the graph look like in 2100 if all coal-fired plants were replaced with zero emission sources (as the idealized study)? I am just wondering what the potential actually is. Are we talking about 1 or 2 degrees lower? I just have no idea of the relative context.

We had several email exchanges over his paper, and he said that my questions were intriguing and he would look into them. I never heard back from him on that, but this new paper answers the question.

Shuttering All the World’s Coal Plants Wouldn’t Do Much

The authors of this newest study modeled the replacement of coal-fired power plants with either natural gas, coal with carbon capture and storage, hydropower, solar PV, solar thermal, wind power, or nuclear power. You can see from Joe Romm’s headline how the story is being spun, but let’s break it down in a more objective fashion.

The following graphic from the paper tells the story. Pay particular attention to the temperature scale.

The graphic indicates — as Tom Wigley’s previous paper indicated but which was only reported relative to natural gas — that in every single case, it doesn’t matter what coal-fired power plants are replaced with, the temperature is projected to increase for almost the next 40 years. This is true even in the baseline “Conservation” case, which involves merely idling the coal-fired plants and not replacing them with anything.

The paper projects that if coal-fired power plants continue to operate, the expected temperature rise relative to the baseline (i.e., relative to the expected temperature increase from other sources) in 50 years is 0.15 degrees C, and in 100 years is about 0.33 degrees C. If coal is phased out and replaced with natural gas, the relative 50 and 100 year temperature rise is projected to be 0.14 degrees C and 0.24 degrees C, respectively. So the paper shows slightly less warming when natural gas is used, which Climate Progress Tweeted as “Switch from coal to natural gas would have zero effect on global temperatures by 2100” and included a link to Joe’s “bombshell.” That is obviously an exaggeration, as the graphic clearly shows that the effect is not zero. If it was, the natural gas line would overlay the coal line.

Shocking Implications

One shocking implication from the paper was the projection that hydropower would be worse than coal for the next 60 years. The study’s authors cited methane emissions from organic matter buried under water as the reason for this apparent anomaly. But that’s not the really shocking thing about the study for me.

The most shocking conclusion was the magnitude of the numbers we are talking about. Even if you could in theory shut down all of the coal-fired power plants in the world and replace them with wind, solar, and hydropower — in 50 years the projected temperature is only one-twentieth of a degree C cooler than the base case of continuing to use coal. In 100 years, if I could replace all global coal-fired power plants with firm, renewable power — the temperature is only projected to be about 0.2 degrees cooler than under the coal base case. And the way this is being spun is that the 0.09 degree reduction from switching to natural gas is equivalent to an effect of “zero”, but the 0.2 degree reduction in hypothetically replacing everything with wind and solar power 100 years from now is significant. About the natural gas case, Romm literally said the 0.09 degree lower temperature in switching to natural gas means that “natural gas is a bridge fuel to nowhere”, but the 0.2 degree lower temperature in switching to renewables is “the world’s only plausible hope to avert catastrophic temperature rise.”

Nuclear & Natural Gas to the Rescue — But Most Environmentalists Hate Them

A big irony here is that there are only two power sources that are today capable of achieving the study’s conclusion that we must rapidly replace coal-fired power plants: Nuclear power and natural gas. If people really believe that we must urgently address this issue — and they don’t believe that the change from going to natural gas is enough — that leaves nuclear power as the only option capable of achieving a rapid replacement.

Bear in mind that this is for a global replacement of coal — most of which is used in Asia. Good luck trying to sell China and India on a 0.2 degree temperature difference in 100 years if they quickly abandon their coal-fired power plants and replace them with wind power.

Conclusion: Study is a Major Downer for Activists Battling Climate Change

To be honest, if I was devoting my life to fighting against the threat of climate change, this would be one of the most depressing papers I have ever read. If we could convince everyone in the world to shut down their coal-fired power plants — which we can’t — and replace them with renewable power — which isn’t available in quantities sufficient to replace coal-fired power — then by the end of my life there would still be no statistically significant temperature change to even be able to tell if my life’s work was successful.

But let’s be realistic, shall we? The people who are concerned about global warming have dug in their heels over natural gas, and they are generally opposed to nuclear power. Because of the sheer impossibility that we will rapidly replace coal with wind and solar power (especially since “we” is the world), then we will in all likelihood be left with the status quo. As I have said before, emissions are much higher in Asia Pacific than they are in the U.S. and Europe combined, and they are rising rapidly. Unless we can figure out a way to convince them to develop without fossil fuels — something no country has done — then global carbon emissions will continue to rise. This is why — even though I accept the science behind climate change — it isn’ t my focus. I just don’t see how the West can possibly do anything about it.

#### Can’t solve—2 degree rise inevitable

Anderson and Bows 11—\*Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, School of Mechanical, Aerospace and Civil Engineering; \*\*Sustainable Consumption Institute, School of Earth, Atmospheric and Environmental Sciences, University of Manchester (Kevin and Alice, “Beyond ‘dangerous’ climate change: emission scenarios for a new world,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society”)

This already demanding conclusion becomes even more challenging when assumptions about the rates of viable emission reductions are considered alongside an upgrading of the severity of impacts for 2◦C. Within global emission scenarios, such as those developed by Stern [6], the CCC [8] and ADAM [47], annual rates of emission reduction beyond the peak years are constrained to levels thought to be compatible with economic growth—normally 3 per cent to 4 per cent per year. However, on closer examination these analyses suggest such reduction rates are no longer sufficient to avoid dangerous climate change. For example, in discussing arguments for and against carbon markets the CCC state ‘rich developed economies need to start demonstrating that a low-carbon economy is possible and compatible with economic prosperity’ [8, p. 160]. However, given the CCC acknowledge ‘it is not now possible to ensure with high likelihood that a temperature rise of more than 2◦C is avoided’ and given the view that reductions in emissions in excess of 3–4% per year are not compatible with economic growth, the CCC are, in effect, conceding that avoiding dangerous (and even extremely dangerous) climate change is no longer compatible with economic prosperity.

In prioritizing such economic prosperity over avoiding extremely dangerous climate change, the CCC, Stern, ADAM and similar analyses suggest they are guided by what is feasible.34 However, while in terms of emission reduction rates their analyses favour the ‘challenging though still feasible’ end of orthodox assessments, the approach they adopt in relation to peaking dates is very different. All premise their principal analyses and economic assessments on the ‘infeasible’ assumption of global emissions peaking between 2010 and 2016; a profound departure from the more ‘feasible’ assumptions framing the majority of such reports. The scale of this departure is further emphasized when disaggregating global emissions into Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 nations, as the scenario pathways developed within this paper demonstrate.

Only if Annex 1 nations reduce emissions immediately35 at rates far beyond those typically countenanced and only then if non-Annex 1 emissions peak between 2020 and 2025 before reducing at unprecedented rates, do global emissions peak by 2020. Consequently, the 2010 global peak central to many integrated assessment model scenarios as well as the 2015–2016 date enshrined in the CCC, Stern and ADAM analyses, do not reflect any orthodox ‘feasibility’. By contrast, the logic of such studies suggests (extremely) dangerous climate change can only be avoided if economic growth is exchanged, at least temporarily, for a period of planned austerity within Annex 1 nations36 and a rapid transition away from fossil-fuelled development within non-Annex 1 nations.

The analysis within this paper offers a stark and unremitting assessment of the climate change challenge facing the global community. There is now little to no chance of maintaining the rise in global mean surface temperature at below 2◦C, despite repeated high-level statements to the contrary. Moreover, the impacts associated with 2◦C have been revised upwards (e.g. [20,21]), sufficiently so that 2◦C now more appropriately represents the threshold between dangerous and extremely dangerous climate change. Consequently, and with tentative signs of global emissions returning to their earlier levels of growth, 2010 represents a political tipping point. The science of climate change allied with emission pathways for Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 nations suggests a profound departure in the scale and scope of the mitigation and adaption challenge from that detailed in many other analyses, particularly those directly informing policy.

However, this paper is not intended as a message of futility, but rather a bare and perhaps brutal assessment of where our ‘rose-tinted’ and well intentioned (though ultimately ineffective) approach to climate change has brought us. Real hope and opportunity, if it is to arise at all, will do so from a raw and dispassionate assessment of the scale of the challenge faced by the global community. This paper is intended as a small contribution to such a vision and future of hope.

#### Solvency advocates overestimate reductions and underestimate necessary changes

Anderson and Bows 11—\*Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, School of Mechanical, Aerospace and Civil Engineering; \*\*Sustainable Consumption Institute, School of Earth, Atmospheric and Environmental Sciences, University of Manchester (Kevin and Alice, “Beyond ‘dangerous’ climate change: emission scenarios for a new world,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society”)

In relation to the first two issues, the Copenhagen Accord and many other high level policy statements are unequivocal in both their recognition of 2◦C as the appropriate delineator between acceptable and dangerous climate change and the need to remain at or below 2◦C. Despite such clarity, those providing policy advice frequently take a much less categorical position, although the implications of their more nuanced analyses are rarely communicated adequately to policy makers. Moreover, given that it is a ‘political’ interpretation of the severity of impacts that informs where the threshold between acceptable and dangerous climate change resides, the recent reassessment of these impacts upwards suggests current analyses of mitigation significantly underestimate what is necessary to avoid dangerous climate change [20,21]. Nevertheless, and despite the evident logic for revising the 2◦C threshold,31 there is little political appetite and limited academic support for such a revision. In stark contrast, many academics and wider policy advisers undertake their analyses of mitigation with relatively high probabilities of exceeding 2◦C and consequently risk entering a prolonged period of what can now reasonably be described as extremely dangerous climate change.32 Put bluntly, while the rhetoric of policy is to reduce emissions in line with avoiding dangerous climate change, most policy advice is to accept a high probability of extremely dangerous climate change rather than propose radical and immediate emission reductions.33

#### Plan isn’t sufficient to stabilize emissions—need 300gw annually

Siegel 9—Lee Siegel is the author of four books and a winner of the National Magazine Award. He has published over 600 articles, essays, and reviews in numerous publications, including the Atlantic Monthly, Time, The New Yorker, The Economist, The Guardian, the New York Times and The Wall Street Journal. [November 22, 2009, “Is Global Warming Unstoppable?” http://www.unews.utah.edu/old/p/112009-1.html]

"It looks unlikely that there will be any substantial near-term departure from recently observed acceleration in carbon dioxide emission rates," says the new paper by Tim Garrett, an associate professor of atmospheric sciences.

Garrett's study was panned by some economists and rejected by several journals before acceptance by Climatic Change, a journal edited by renowned Stanford University climate scientist Stephen Schneider. The study will be published online this week.

The study—which is based on the concept that physics can be used to characterize the evolution of civilization—indicates:

Energy conservation or efficiency doesn't really save energy, but instead spurs economic growth and accelerated energy consumption.

Throughout history, a simple physical "constant"—an unchanging mathematical value—links global energy use to the world's accumulated economic productivity, adjusted for inflation. So it isn't necessary to consider population growth and standard of living in predicting society's future energy consumption and resulting carbon dioxide emissions.

"Stabilization of carbon dioxide emissions at current rates will require approximately 300 gigawatts of new non-carbon-dioxide-emitting power production capacity annually—approximately one new nuclear power plant (or equivalent) per day," Garrett says. "Physically, there are no other options without killing the economy."

### 2NC/1NR—Relations Can’t Solve

#### The failure of Cancun dooms global climate initiatives for the next decade—the foundation of the carbon market mechanism has been destroyed.

Muñoz 10—Miquel Muñoz, Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future at Boston University, holds a Ph.D. from the Autonomous University of Barcelona, an M.A. in IR and Environmental Policy from Boston University, an M.S. in Environmental Management and Ecological Economics from the Autonomous University of Barcelona, has participated in over 40 international environmental negotiation meetings since 2004 as an observer for the Earth Negotiations Bulletin [“Climate Negotiations: Clouds over Cancún?,” *Triple Crisis Blog: Global Perspectives on Finance, Development and Environment*, October 27, http://triplecrisis.com/climate-negotiations-clouds-over-cancun/]

Coming back to my initial question: does it matter that no agreement will be reached in Cancún? The answer is an unqualified YES. Why? Because saving the carbon markets was the only real driver for reaching an agreement on the post-Kyoto period by 2010. A post-2012 Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in one form or another used to be taken for granted. Not anymore. Lacking hard data, anecdotal evidence suggests that private investment in new CDM projects has all but dried up. The financial crisis and behavior of financial institutions have not done much to shore up further support for (carbon) market mechanisms. The international carbon market provided by the CDM, and to a minor extent Joint Implementation, was supposed to be the anchor guiding other national and regional carbon markets towards convergence. Without it, national carbon markets will not converge, as was hoped. They will instead probably diverge into a mosaic of smaller markets, each tailored to its own national priorities and likely containing protectionist measures. The discontinuity of the CDM post 2012, however, has longer-range implications than just the carbon markets. As noted, saving the carbon markets was the real driver giving urgency to climate negotiations. Without a carbon market to save, all urgency is lost (to negotiators, that is), and we could see climate negotiations for a new comprehensive (and meaningful) agreement last longer than the Doha round already has. This would effectively lock us into another “lost decade” of sterile climate change negotiations. How long the impasse will last no one knows. But new momentum for global concerted action on climate change is unlikely until we witness mounting climate change impacts and experience a shift in the global energy matrix. That also rules out an agreement at Johannesburg’s COP 17. \* COP = Conference of Parties, the annual meeting of signatories to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; the 2010 meeting is in Cancun and the 2011 meeting is in Johannesburg.

### 2NC/1NR—No Extinction

#### Adaptation means no catastrophic impact to warming

Kenny 12 [April 9, 2012, Charles, senior fellow at the Center for Global Development, a Schwartz fellow at the New America Foundation, and author, most recently, of Getting Better: Why Global Development Is Succeeding and How We Can Improve the World Even More., “Not Too Hot to Handle,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/09/not\_too\_hot\_to\_handle?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full]

But for all international diplomats appear desperate to affirm the self-worth of pessimists and doomsayers worldwide, it is important to put climate change in a broader context. It is a vital global issue -- one that threatens to slow the worldwide march toward improved quality of life. Climate change is already responsible for more extreme weather and an accelerating rate of species extinction -- and may ultimately kill off as many as 40 percent of all living species. But it is also a problem that we know how to tackle, and one to which we have some time to respond before it is likely to completely derail progress. And that's good news, because the fact that it's manageable is the best reason to try to tackle it rather than abandon all hope like a steerage class passenger in the bowels of the Titanic.

Start with the economy. The Stern Review, led by the distinguished British economist Nicholas Stern, is the most comprehensive look to date at the economics of climate change. It suggests that, in terms of income, greenhouse gasses are a threat to global growth, but hardly an immediate or catastrophic one. Take the impact of climate change on the developing world. The most depressing forecast in terms of developing country growth in Stern's paper is the "A2 scenario" -- one of a series of economic and greenhouse gas emissions forecasts created for the U.N.'s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). It's a model that predicts slow global growth and income convergence (poor countries catching up to rich countries). But even under this model, Afghanistan's GDP per capita climbs sixfold over the next 90 years, India and China ninefold, and Ethiopia's income increases by a factor of 10. Knock off a third for the most pessimistic simulation of the economic impact of climate change suggested by the Stern report, and people in those countries are still markedly better off -- four times as rich for Afghanistan, a little more than six times as rich for Ethiopia.

It's worth emphasizing that the Stern report suggests that the costs of dramatically reducing greenhouse-gas emissions is closer to 1 (or maybe 2) percent of world GDP -- in the region of $600 billion to $1.2 trillion today. The economic case for responding to climate change by pricing carbon and investing in alternate energy sources is a slam dunk. But for all the likelihood that the world will be a poorer, denuded place than it would be if we responded rapidly to reduce greenhouse gases, the global economy is probably not going to collapse over the next century even if we are idiotic enough to delay our response to climate change by a few years. For all the flooding, the drought, and the skyrocketing bills for air conditioning, the economy would keep on expanding, according to the data that Stern uses.

And what about the impact on global health? Suggestions that malaria has already spread as a result of climate change and that malaria deaths will expand dramatically as a result of warming in the future don't fit the evidence of declining deaths and reduced malarial spread over the last century. The authors of a recent study published in the journal Nature conclude that the forecasted future effects of rising temperatures on malaria "are at least one order of magnitude smaller than the changes observed since about 1900 and about two orders of magnitude smaller than those that can be achieved by the effective scale-up of key control measures." In other words, climate change is and will likely remain a small factor in the toll of malaria deaths into the foreseeable future.

What about other diseases? Christian Zimmermann at the University of Connecticut and Douglas Gollin at Williams evaluate the likely impact of a 3-degree rise in temperatures on tropical diseases like dengue fever, which causes half a million cases of hemorrhagic fever and 22,000 deaths each year. Most of the vectors for such diseases -- mosquitoes, biting flies, and so on -- do poorly in frost. So if the weather stays warmer, these diseases are likely to spread. At the same time, there are existing tools to prevent or treat most tropical diseases, and Zimmerman and Gollin suggest "rather modest improvements in protection efficacy could compensate for the consequences of climate change." We can deal with this one.

It's the same with agriculture. Global warming will have many negative (and a few positive) impacts on food supply, but it is likely that other impacts -- both positive, including technological change, and negative, like the exhaustion of aquifers-- will have far bigger effects. The 2001 IPCC report suggested that climate change over the long term could reduce agricultural yields by as much as 30 percent. Compare that with the 90 percent increase in rice yields in Indonesia between 1970 and 2006, for example.

Again, while climate change will make extreme weather events and natural disasters like flooding and hurricanes more common, the negative effect on global quality of life will be reduced if economies continue to grow. That's because, as Matthew Kahn from Tufts University has shown, the safest place to suffer a natural disaster is in a rich country. The more money that people and governments have, the more they can both afford and enforce building codes, land use regulations, and public infrastructure like flood defenses that lower death tolls.

Let's also not forget how human psychology works. Too many environmentalists suggest that dealing with climate change will take immediate and radical retooling of the global economy. It won't. It is affordable, practical, and wouldn't take a revolution. Giving out the message that the only path to sustainability will require medieval standards of living only puts everyone else off. And once you've convinced yourself the world is on an inevitable course to disaster if some corner of the U.S. Midwest is fracked once more or India builds another three coal-fueled power plants, the only logical thing to do when the fracking or the building occurs is to sit back, put your Toms shoes on the couch, and drink micro-brewed herbal tea until civilization collapses. Climate change isn't like that -- or at the very least, isn't like that yet.

So, if you're really just looking for a reason to strap on the "end of the world is nigh" placards and go for a walk, you can find better excuses -- like, say, the threat of global thermonuclear war or a rogue asteroid. The fight to curb greenhouse gas emissions is one for the hard-nosed optimist.

#### Empirics prove our argument

INPCC 10—Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change [Past Warm Episodes did not Cause Extinction, 15 July 2010, http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2010/jul/15jul2010a7.html]

Many claims have been made about catastrophic negative effects of increasing air temperature on biodiversity; but nearly all of these claims are based on either speculation or simple correlative models. In the study of Willis et al. (2010), on the other hand, past historical periods were identified in which climate was either similar to that projected by global climate models for the next century or so, or in which the rate of temperature change was unusually rapid; and these real-world periods were examined to see if any real-world climate-related extinctions had occurred. The first period they examined was the Eocene Climatic Optimum (53-51 million years ago), during which time the atmosphere's CO2 concentration exceeded 1200 ppm and tropical temperatures were 5-10°C warmer than modern values. Yet far from causing extinctions of the tropical flora (where the data are best), the four researchers report that "all the evidence from low-latitude records indicates that, at least in the plant fossil record, this was one of the most biodiverse intervals of time in the Neotropics." They also note that "ancestors of many of our modern tropical and temperate plants evolved ...when global temperatures and CO2 were much higher than present...indicating that they have much wider ecological tolerances than are predicted based on present-day climates alone." The second period they examined consisted of two rapid-change climatic events in the Holocene -- one at 14,700 years ago and one at 11,600 years ago -- during which times temperatures increased in the mid- to high-latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere by up to 10°C over periods of less than 60 years. During these events, there is evidence from many sites for rapid plant responses to rapid warming. And the authors note that "at no site yet studied, anywhere in the world, is there evidence in the fossil record for large-scale climate-driven extinction during these intervals of rapid warming." On the other hand, they report that extinctions did occur due to the cold temperatures of the glacial epoch, when subtropical species in southern Europe were driven out of their comfort zone. The study of Willis et al. also makes use of recent historical data, as in the case of the 3°C rise in temperature at Yosemite Park over the past 100 years. In comparing surveys of mammal fauna conducted near the beginning and end of this period, they detected some changes, but no local extinctions. Thus, they determined that for all of the periods they studied, with either very warm temperatures or very rapid warming, there were no detectable extinctions.

#### Reject their try or die impact framing—they cherry-pick the worst case scenarios and assume they are likely—every scientific study concludes that the likelihood of such devastation is virtually zero

Eastin et al. 11 [Josh, Professor of Political Science at the University of Washington, Reiner Grundmann and Aseem Prakash, “The two limits debates: “Limits to Growth” and climate change,” Futures, February, Vol 43, Issue 1, pp. 16-26, ScienceDirect]

And Hjerpe and Linnér point out, ‘The IPCC ‘describes scenarios as ‘alternative images of how the future might unfold … to analyze how driving forces may influence future emission outcomes’ (…), i.e., they are not designed to provide blueprints for the future. The IPCC … emphasizes that neither probability nor desirability is attached to the various scenario families … The future evolution of society is recognized as an uncertain process of interaction between, for example, demographic development, socio-economic development, and technological change.’ [50]

There is no probability assigned to the various scenarios which opens the way for decision makers to pick the one that aligns with their preconceptions. In this sense, both LtG and IPCC have used scenarios in order to communicate the possibility of a dystopian future, not as a prediction, but as a reminder that something needs to be done urgently if we are to prevent the worst.

#### Doomsayers use faulty data and rely on consensus at the expense of sound science

Kampen 11 [Jarl, Assistant professor, Research Methodology group at Wageningen University and Research, “A methodological note on the making of causal statements in the debate on anthropogenic global warming,” June, Theoretical & Applied Climatology, 104:423-427, EBSCO]

Briefly stated, the major shortcoming of the verification criterion is that it allows only experience to decide upon the truth or falsity of scientific statements (Popper 1965: 42; see Rapp 1975). Popper's most important contribution to the debate was to state that every scientific theory should be able to list counter-examples which, if found in reality, disconfirm (“falsify”) the theory. This is the principle of falsification. In the case of anthropogenic global warming (AGW), the theory should list one or more counterexamples that could (potentially) disconfirm the theory. This listing of potential falsifiers appears to be missing in the present debate on AGW. In fact, some skeptics in the debate on AGW point out that all natural climatic disasters are used as evidence (verification) for the human impact on climate, whereas evidence that a post WWII global warming is absent in, e.g., the Greenland Ice-Core Bore Record is ignored as falsifying evidence (see, e.g., Dahl-Jensen et al. 1998; Feldman and Marks 2009). Needless to say that a methodologically sound theory would encompass all available evidence and not “cherry-pick” those pieces of evidence that confirm the theory while ignoring those that do not.

Unfortunately, when a theoretical phenomenon such as AGW becomes a global political program, it soon becomes vulnerable to methodological fallacies in the realm of social and political science. Leaving aside the quality of used data and methods, the IPCC report aimed at reaching a consensus. Consensus is recognized by some social scientific methodologists as the defining feature of social science (Swanborn 1996; Feyerabend 1987). However, if reaching consensus were really the hallmark of sound science, the scientific theories of Galileo, Copernicus, Darwin, and many others would never have seen daylight. Also, there is no guarantee that majorities will reach sensible opinions (think only of the democratic Weimar republic in the 1930s). Finally, scientists need to make a living, and they will not bite the hand that feeds them, an argument used by some advocates of AGW who claim that climate skeptics are sponsored by “Big Carbon”. Therefore, consensus must be dismissed as a defining feature of science. The IPCC recognizes the limitation of consensus by adding the phrase ‘and much evidence’ when it makes statements as in, e.g., “there is high agreement and much evidence that with current climate change mitigation policies and related sustainable development practices, global GHG emissions will continue to grow over the next few decades” (IPCC 2007: p. 7, italics added). We must therefore discuss the sources of evidence that are used to formulate the many causal statements on AGW issued in the report.

The quality of all scientific research depends of course, on the quality of the data that are being processed. Regardless of the quality of the (statistical) model used for analysis, if bad data are fed to the model, then the result of the analysis will be bad. This principle is known as garbage in–garbage out. In other words, if the data that are fed into climate models are open to dispute, then so are the projections of these models. In the scientific (i.e., peerreviewed) literature, several authors have expressed doubts about the quality of the analyzed data and the possibility to derive at valid inferences on human impact on global warming (e.g., Jaworowski 1994; Soon et al. 2004; Michaels 2008; Pielke et al. 2007). However, since the author of this article is no expert on climate science, the issue of whether or not data used in climate science are of enough quality will be left for others to decide. Instead, in this methodological note on the making of causal statements in the debate on AGW, we focus on the study designs that are used to establish the causal hypotheses. The following sections discuss briefly the consequence of a lack of experiment and the relying on correlational data for establishing causal relationships. This discussion prepares the ground for the formulation of possible falsifiers of AWG. Some concluding remarks remain in the last section.

#### Shouldn’t draw conclusions based on climate models—too much uncertainty.

Hoffman 12 [Doug L, adjunct Professor of Computer Science at Hendrix College and the University of Central Arkansas, author of the Resilient Earth, “Stop Them, Before They Model Again,” 4-17, http://www.theresilientearth.com/?q=content/stop-them-they-model-again]

In these days of faltering economies and tight government spending there still seems to be an infinite amount of funding available to promote ever larger computer based climate studies. The latest such study, “Broad range of 2050 warming from an observationally constrained large climate model ensemble,” was published online on March 25, 2012. A veritable potpourri of international climate science boffins applied yet another technique to the problem of turning sow's ear climate model results into a silk purse predictions to help bolster the IPCC's flagging fortunes. The paper's abstract explains the work and motivation:

Incomplete understanding of three aspects of the climate system—equilibrium climate sensitivity, rate of ocean heat uptake and historical aerosol forcing—and the physical processes underlying them lead to uncertainties in our assessment of the global-mean temperature evolution in the twenty-first century. Explorations of these uncertainties have so far relied on scaling approaches, large ensembles of simplified climate models1, or small ensembles of complex coupled atmosphere–ocean general circulation models which under-represent uncertainties in key climate system properties derived from independent sources. Here we present results from a multi-thousand-member perturbed-physics ensemble of transient coupled atmosphere–ocean general circulation model simulations. We find that model versions that reproduce observed surface temperature changes over the past 50 years show global-mean temperature increases of 1.4–3K by 2050, relative to 1961–1990, under a mid-range forcing scenario. This range of warming is broadly consistent with the expert assessment provided by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment Report, but extends towards larger warming than observed in ensembles-of-opportunity typically used for climate impact assessments. From our simulations, we conclude that warming by the middle of the twenty-first century that is stronger than earlier estimates is consistent with recent observed temperature changes and a mid-range ‘no mitigation’ scenario for greenhouse-gas emissions.

The new trick that these savants applied to an existing climate model is called a perturbed-physics ensemble. Reportedly, the investigators created a large collection of model results (an ensemble) by “perturbing the physics in the atmosphere, ocean and sulphur cycle components, with transient simulations driven by a set of natural forcing scenarios.” Much like tapping a bell with a hammer and observing the vibrations, they tweaked some of the model's parameters and watched what happened to the output. The claim is, that by analyzing a large number of these “perturbed” model runs, conclusions can be made regarding the error present in those models. Naturally, given that their results were “broadly consistent” with previous IPCC generated claptrap, the conclusions reached will surprise no one. Witness the figure below.

Why the researchers felt that yet another massive modeling study was needed lies in an honest assessment of the model use to prepare the previous IPCC report, AR4. Recall that the people of the world were asked to accept the output from those modeling runs as a valid prediction of where Earth's future climate was headed. Here is what these scientists are saying about those older model reports:

In the latest generation of coupled atmosphere–ocean general circulation models (AOGCMs) contributing to the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project phase 3 (CMIP-3), uncertainties in key properties controlling the twenty-first century response to sustained anthropogenic greenhouse-gas forcing were not fully sampled, partially owing to a correlation between climate sensitivity and aerosol forcing, a tendency to overestimate ocean heat uptake and compensation between short-wave and long-wave feedbacks. This complicates the interpretation of the ensemble spread as a direct uncertainty estimate, a point reflected in the fact that the ‘likely’ (>66% probability) uncertainty range on the transient response was explicitly subjectively assessed as −40% to +60% of the CMIP-3 ensemble mean for global-mean temperature in 2100, in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report (AR4).

The old models do not account for “key properties” that control climate to the point that the results are so uncertain as to be meaningless. This is unsurprising to those of us familiar with computer modeling in general and climate modeling in particular. “From this evidence it is clear that the CMIP-3 ensemble, which represents a valuable expression of plausible responses consistent with our limited ability to explore model structural uncertainties, fails to reflect the full range of uncertainties indicated by expert opinion and other methods,” the authors conclude. In other words, the older model results are crap.

Yet the AR4 report's conclusions were justified using such twaddle. As the authors state: “In the absence of uncertainty guidance or indicators at regional scales, studies have relied on the CMIP-3 ensemble spread as a proxy for response uncertainty, or statistical post-processing to correct and inflate uncertainty estimates, at the risk of violating the physical constraints provided by dynamical AOGCM simulations, especially when extrapolating beyond the range of behaviour in the raw ensemble.” Violating physical constraints is modeling speak for the program acting in a way that contradicts the laws of physical reality—an indication that the models used do not accurately represent nature.

Still, the reader is asked to accept this new analysis as proving the modeling approach's veracity. “Perturbed-physics ensembles offer a systematic approach to quantify uncertainty in models of the climate system response to external forcing, albeit within a given model structure,” the authors write. That last qualification is key, “within a given model structure.” More plainly put, if your model is wrong you cannot get good results. So they analyzed a multi-thousand-member ensemble of transient AOGCM simulations from 1920 to 2080 using HadCM3L, a version of the UK Met Office Unified Model, and found their results stayed within the constraints programmed into the model (what a surprise). Other caveats include: unexpectedly observing little relationship between climate sensitivity and aerosol forcing; difficulty in comparing the control simulation like-for-like to any period in the past, partially blamed on the “paucity of observations” at the start of the twentieth century; and under-sampling uncertainty in ocean heat uptake arising from ocean physics through perturbing only a single, coarse-resolution, ocean model structure.

The bottom line on all this statistical and modeling slight of hand is this: “Assessing goodness-of-fit, which represents a limited expression of model error, requires a measure of the expected error between model simulations and observations due to sampling uncertainty, assuming it is primarily from internally-generated climate variability.” There is absolutely no justification in making that last assumption. All they are measuring is how stable their models are with respect to the output the model would generate if unperturbed. The result has no bearing on whether the model in question accurately represents Earth's actual climate system. This is hand-waving at its most creative.

So if this new “study” is not really an improvement on previous computer driven shams why is it appearing now? Think of this report as the first salvo in the run up to the next IPCC report, due out sometime next year. But surely the IPCC has learned its lesson, you say, they must have figured out that making bogus claims of impending disaster, unsubstantiated by real science, has only lead to their own marginalization? Think again. Consider the words of the IPCC's discredited but dogged leader.

“When the IPCC’s fifth assessment comes out in 2013 or 2014, there will be a major revival of interest in action that has to be taken,” said Dr. Pachauri, speaking of the periodic assessments rendered by the group of more than 400 scientists around the world that he leads. “People are going to say, ‘My God, we are going to have to take action much faster than we had planned.’

#### Reject aff evidence—it’s based on groupthink and profit-bias

WSJ 12 [January 26, 2012, Letter signed by the follow scientists: Claude Allegre, former director of the Institute for the Study of the Earth, University of Paris; J. Scott Armstrong, cofounder of the Journal of Forecasting and the International Journal of Forecasting; Jan Breslow, head of the Laboratory of Biochemical Genetics and Metabolism, Rockefeller University; Roger Cohen, fellow, American Physical Society; Edward David, member, National Academy of Engineering and National Academy of Sciences; William Happer, professor of physics, Princeton; Michael Kelly, professor of technology, University of Cambridge, U.K.; William Kininmonth, former head of climate research at the Australian Bureau of Meteorology; Richard Lindzen, professor of atmospheric sciences, MIT; James McGrath, professor of chemistry, Virginia Technical University; Rodney Nichols, former president and CEO of the New York Academy of Sciences; Burt Rutan, aerospace engineer, designer of Voyager and SpaceShipOne; Harrison H. Schmitt, Apollo 17 astronaut and former U.S. senator; Nir Shaviv, professor of astrophysics, Hebrew University, Jerusalem; Henk Tennekes, former director, Royal Dutch Meteorological Service; Antonio Zichichi, president of the World Federation of Scientists, Geneva, “No Need to Panic About Global Warming,” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204301404577171531838421366.html]

Although the number of publicly dissenting scientists is growing, many young scientists furtively say that while they also have serious doubts about the global-warming message, they are afraid to speak up for fear of not being promoted—or worse. They have good reason to worry. In 2003, Dr. Chris de Freitas, the editor of the journal Climate Research, dared to publish a peer-reviewed article with the politically incorrect (but factually correct) conclusion that the recent warming is not unusual in the context of climate changes over the past thousand years. The international warming establishment quickly mounted a determined campaign to have Dr. de Freitas removed from his editorial job and fired from his university position. Fortunately, Dr. de Freitas was able to keep his university job.

This is not the way science is supposed to work, but we have seen it before—for example, in the frightening period when Trofim Lysenko hijacked biology in the Soviet Union. Soviet biologists who revealed that they believed in genes, which Lysenko maintained were a bourgeois fiction, were fired from their jobs. Many were sent to the gulag and some were condemned to death.

Why is there so much passion about global warming, and why has the issue become so vexing that the American Physical Society, from which Dr. Giaever resigned a few months ago, refused the seemingly reasonable request by many of its members to remove the word "incontrovertible" from its description of a scientific issue? There are several reasons, but a good place to start is the old question "cui bono?" Or the modern update, "Follow the money."

Alarmism over climate is of great benefit to many, providing government funding for academic research and a reason for government bureaucracies to grow. Alarmism also offers an excuse for governments to raise taxes, taxpayer-funded subsidies for businesses that understand how to work the political system, and a lure for big donations to charitable foundations promising to save the planet. Lysenko and his team lived very well, and they fiercely defended their dogma and the privileges it brought them.

### 2NC/1NR—Warming Slowing Now

#### It overwhelms all positive feedbacks

Idso and Idso 7 [Sherwood, Research Physicist @ US Water Conservation laboratory, and Craig, President of Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global change and PhD in Geography, “Carbon Dioxide and Global Change: Separating Scientific Fact from Personal Opinion”, 6-6, http://www.co2science.org/education/reports/hansen/HansenTestimonyCritique.pdf]

(6) Hansen says “doubling the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere causes a global climate forcing similar in magnitude to that for a 2% increase of solar irradiance.” All else being equal, this statement may not be far off the mark. However, it does not consider all of the negative biological feedbacks that the warming produced by the initial forcing might kick into motion, which could cause the long-term effective magnitude of the primary forcing to be significantly less than its initial value. Neither does it consider the cooling effects produced by increases in various biological processes that may be induced solely by the growth-enhancing effects of the increase in the air’s CO2 content, which do not even require an impetus for warming in order to be put into play. An example of the first of these ameliorative phenomena involves dimethylsulfide or DMS, which is derived from its algal precursor dimethylsulphoniopropionate. Very briefly, and rather simplistically, in response to an initial increase in temperature (caused by an increase in the air's CO2 content, for example), the climate-stabilizing mechanism begins with a warming-induced increase in the productivity of certain marine microalgae or phytoplankton, which leads to a greater production of oceanic DMS and its release to the atmosphere, which boosts the number of gas-to-particle conversions occurring there, increasing the atmosphere's population of cloud condensation nuclei and, ultimately, the albedos of marine stratus and altostratus clouds, via a narrowing of the cloud droplet spectrum and a decrease in the mean radius of the cloud droplets, both of which phenomena tend to counter the initial impetus for warming and thereby decrease the “all-else-being-equal” effect of the increase in the air’s CO2 concentration, as originally suggested by Charlson et al. (1987). Literally hundreds of peer-reviewed scientific papers have been published on this important subject over the past two decades, and recent work continues to demonstrate the great significance of this major negative feedback phenomenon. In one such study, Meskhidze and Nenes (2006) investigated the effects of ocean biological productivity on the microphysical and radiative properties of marine clouds over a large and seasonally-recurring phytoplankton bloom in the Southern Ocean in the vicinity of South Georgia Island, where the upwelling of nutrient-rich waters, as they describe it, “can support massive phytoplankton blooms, with chlorophyll-a concentrations more than an order of magnitude higher than the background.” In this ambitious endeavor, Meskhidze and Nenes used the Sea-viewing Wide Field-of-view Sensor to obtain the needed chlorophyll data and the Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer to determine the effective radii of cloud condensation nuclei. These efforts revealed, in their words, that the “cloud droplet number concentration over the bloom was twice what it was away from the bloom, and cloud effective radius was reduced by 30%.” In addition, they report that “the resulting change in the short-wave radiative flux at the top of the atmosphere was [a negative] 15 watts per square meter, comparable to the aerosol indirect effect over highly polluted regions,” and, we might add, much greater locally than the opposite (positive) radiative forcing typically attributed to the combined increases in the concentrations of all greenhouse gases emitted to the atmosphere since the inception of the Industrial Revolution.

#### AND models exaggerate sensitivity—feedbacks are overwhelmingly negative

Linzen and Choi 11 [Richardm Program in Atmospheres, Oceans, and Climate, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge and Yong-Sang, Department of Environmental Science and Engineering, Ewha Womans University, Seoul, Korea, “On the Observational Determination of Climate Sensitivity and Its Implications,” Asia-Pacific J. Atmos. Sci., 47(4), 377-390]

Abstract: We estimate climate sensitivity from observations, using the deseasonalized fluctuations in sea surface temperatures (SSTs) and the concurrent fluctuations in the top-of-atmosphere (TOA) outgoing radiation from the ERBE (1985-1999) and CERES (2000- 2008) satellite instruments. Distinct periods of warming and cooling in the SSTs were used to evaluate feedbacks. An earlier study (Lindzen and Choi, 2009) was subject to significant criticisms. The present paper is an expansion of the earlier paper where the various criticisms are taken into account. The present analysis accounts for the 72 day precession period for the ERBE satellite in a more appropriate manner than in the earlier paper. We develop a method to distinguish noise in the outgoing radiation as well as radiation changes that are forcing SST changes from those radiation changes that constitute feedbacks to changes in SST. We demonstrate that our new method does moderately well in distinguishing positive from negative feedbacks and in quantifying negative feedbacks. In contrast, we show that simple regression methods used by several existing papers generally exaggerate positive feedbacks and even show positive feedbacks when actual feedbacks are negative. We argue that feedbacks are largely concentrated in the tropics, and the tropical feedbacks can be adjusted to account for their impact on the globe as a whole. Indeed, we show that including all CERES data (not just from the tropics) leads to results similar to what are obtained for the tropics alone—though with more noise. We again find that the outgoing radiation resulting from SST fluctuations exceeds the zero feedback response thus implying negative feedback. In contrast to this, the calculated TOA outgoing radiation fluxes from 11 atmospheric models forced by the observed SST are less than the zero feedback response, consistent with the positive feedbacks that characterize these models. The results imply that the models are exaggerating climate sensitivity.

### 2NC/1NR—Not Anthropogenic

#### Global warming does not exist—empirics trump flawed CO2 models.

Happer 12 [March 27, 2012, William, professor of physics at Princeton, “Global Warming Models Are Wrong Again,” http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304636404577291352882984274.html]

During a fundraiser in Atlanta earlier this month, President Obama is reported to have said: "It gets you a little nervous about what is happening to global temperatures. When it is 75 degrees in Chicago in the beginning of March, you start thinking. On the other hand, I really have enjoyed nice weather."

What is happening to global temperatures in reality? The answer is: almost nothing for more than 10 years. Monthly values of the global temperature anomaly of the lower atmosphere, compiled at the University of Alabama from NASA satellite data, can be found at the website http://www.drroyspencer.com/latest-global-temperatures/. The latest (February 2012) monthly global temperature anomaly for the lower atmosphere was minus 0.12 degrees Celsius, slightly less than the average since the satellite record of temperatures began in 1979.

The lack of any statistically significant warming for over a decade has made it more difficult for the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and its supporters to demonize the atmospheric gas CO2 which is released when fossil fuels are burned. The burning of fossil fuels has been one reason for an increase of CO2 levels in the atmosphere to around 395 ppm (or parts per million), up from preindustrial levels of about 280 ppm.

CO2 is not a pollutant. Life on earth flourished for hundreds of millions of years at much higher CO2 levels than we see today. Increasing CO2 levels will be a net benefit because cultivated plants grow better and are more resistant to drought at higher CO2 levels, and because warming and other supposedly harmful effects of CO2 have been greatly exaggerated. Nations with affordable energy from fossil fuels are more prosperous and healthy than those without.

The direct warming due to doubling CO2 levels in the atmosphere can be calculated to cause a warming of about one degree Celsius. The IPCC computer models predict a much larger warming, three degrees Celsius or even more, because they assume changes in water vapor or clouds that supposedly amplify the direct warming from CO2. Many lines of observational evidence suggest that this "positive feedback" also has been greatly exaggerated.

There has indeed been some warming, perhaps about 0.8 degrees Celsius, since the end of the so-called Little Ice Age in the early 1800s. Some of that warming has probably come from increased amounts of CO2, but the timing of the warming—much of it before CO2 levels had increased appreciably—suggests that a substantial fraction of the warming is from natural causes that have nothing to do with mankind.

Frustrated by the lack of computer-predicted warming over the past decade, some IPCC supporters have been claiming that "extreme weather" has become more common because of more CO2. But there is no hard evidence this is true. After an unusually cold winter in 2011 (December 2010-February 2011) the winter of 2012 was unusually warm in the continental United States. But the winter of 2012 was bitter in Europe, Asia and Alaska.

Weather conditions similar to 2012 occurred in the winter of 1942, when the U.S. Midwest was unusually warm, and when the Wehrmacht encountered the formidable forces of "General Frost" in a Russian winter not unlike the one Russians just had.

Large fluctuations from warm to cold winters have been the rule for the U.S., as one can see from records kept by the National Ocean and Atmospheric Administration, NOAA. For example, the winters of 1932 and 1934 were as warm as or warmer than the 2011-2012 one and the winter of 1936 was much colder.

Nightly television pictures of the tragic destruction from tornadoes over the past months might make one wonder if the frequency of tornadoes is increasing, perhaps due to the increasing levels of CO2 in the atmosphere. But as one can read at Andrew Revkin's New York Times blog, dotearth, "There is no evidence of any trend in the number of potent tornadoes (category F2 and up) over the past 50 years in the United States, even as global temperatures have risen markedly."

Like winter temperatures, the numbers, severity and geographical locations of tornadoes fluctuate from year-to-year in ways that are correlated with the complicated fluid flow patterns of the oceans and atmosphere, the location of the jet stream, El Niño or La Niña conditions of the tropical Pacific Oceans, etc.

As long as the laws of nature exist, we will have tornadoes. But we can save many more lives by addressing the threat of tornadoes directly—for example, with improved and more widely dispersed weather radars, and with better means for warning the people of endangered areas—than by credulous support of schemes to reduce "carbon footprints," or by funding even more computer centers to predict global warming.

It is easy to be confused about climate, because we are constantly being warned about the horrible things that will happen or are already happening as a result of mankind's use of fossil fuels. But these ominous predictions are based on computer models. It is important to distinguish between what the climate is actually doing and what computer models predict. The observed response of the climate to more CO2 is not in good agreement with model predictions.

We need high-quality climate science because of the importance of climate to mankind. But we should also remember the description of how science works by the late, great physicist, Richard Feynman:

"In general we look for a new law by the following process. First we guess it. Then we compute the consequences of the guess to see what would be implied if this law that we guessed is right. Then we compare the result of the computation to nature, with experiment or experience; compare it directly with observation, to see if it works. If it disagrees with experiment it is wrong."

The most important component of climate science is careful, long-term observations of climate-related phenomena, from space, from land, and in the oceans. If observations do not support code predictions—like more extreme weather, or rapidly rising global temperatures—Feynman has told us what conclusions to draw about the theory.

#### Newest satellite data confirms

Taylor 11 (James, senior fellow for environment policy at The Heartland Institute and managing editor of Environment & Climate News, “New NASA Data Blow Gaping Hole In Global Warming Alarmism”, 7/27, http://news.yahoo.com/nasa-data-blow-gaping-hold-global-warming-alarmism-192334971.html)

NASA satellite data from the years 2000 through 2011 show the Earth's atmosphere is allowing far more heat to be released into space than alarmist computer models have predicted, reports a new study in the peer-reviewed science journal Remote Sensing. The study indicates far less future global warming will occur than United Nations computer models have predicted, and supports prior studies indicating increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide trap far less heat than alarmists have claimed.

Study co-author Dr. Roy Spencer, a principal research scientist at the University of Alabama in Huntsville and U.S. Science Team Leader for the Advanced Microwave Scanning Radiometer flying on NASA's Aqua satellite, reports that real-world data from NASA's Terra satellite contradict multiple assumptions fed into alarmist computer models.

"The satellite observations suggest there is much more energy lost to space during and after warming than the climate models show," Spencer said in a July 26 University of Alabama press release. "There is a huge discrepancy between the data and the forecasts that is especially big over the oceans."

In addition to finding that far less heat is being trapped than alarmist computer models have predicted, the NASA satellite data show the atmosphere begins shedding heat into space long before United Nations computer models predicted.

The new findings are extremely important and should dramatically alter the global warming debate.

Scientists on all sides of the global warming debate are in general agreement about how much heat is being directly trapped by human emissi5ons of carbon dioxide (the answer is "not much"). However, the single most important issue in the global warming debate is whether carbon dioxide emissions will indirectly trap far more heat by causing large increases in atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds. Alarmist computer models assume human carbon dioxide emissions indirectly cause substantial increases in atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds (each of which are very effective at trapping heat), but real-world data have long shown that carbon dioxide emissions are not causing as much atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds as the alarmist computer models have predicted.

The new NASA Terra satellite data are consistent with long-term NOAA and NASA data indicating atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds are not increasing in the manner predicted by alarmist computer models. The Terra satellite data also support data collected by NASA's ERBS satellite showing far more longwave radiation (and thus, heat) escaped into space between 1985 and 1999 than alarmist computer models had predicted. Together, the NASA ERBS and Terra satellite data show that for 25 years and counting, carbon dioxide emissions have directly and indirectly trapped far less heat than alarmist computer models have predicted.

#### --Polar shift and solar cause it—accounts for CO2

Rivera and Khan 12 [Paul, Hymetocean Peers Co and Tariq, Professor of Environmental Studies at the University of Karachi, “Discovery of the Major Mechanism of Global Warming and Climate Change,” 6-30, Pakistan Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences, Vol. 8 No. 1, Lexis]

A statistical test that would show the relative contributions of increased obliquity, total solar irradiance and GHG concentrations on the global temperature rise was performed on the data sets using multiple regression in MS Excel. The data set on earthquake count was smoothed by taking the 7-year moving average. All the other data on temperature anomaly and GHG concentrations were not smoothed since they already represent yearly averaged values from monthly observations.

The multiple regression analysis of the observed data revealed a rather strong positive contribution of polar shift and associated enhanced obliquity on the observed increase of global temperature and CO2 concentration [26]. Similar to Fang et al., the regression analysis showed that the annual increment of CO2 concentration is not significantly correlated with global temperature. However, the regression analysis showed that CO2 and global temperature were largely dictated by obliquity and TSI changes. This shows the possibility that the global warming problem is not dictated by increasing CO2 concentrations but rather by the enhanced obliquity and changes in solar irradiance. Multiplying the CO2 anomaly with the global temperature anomaly and subjecting the product to a 30-year running average revealed a very significant correlation with TSI and obliquity changes as shown in Figure 8 (left).

Similar regression analysis of the ratio of CO2 and global temperature versus TSI and North Pole Shift showed a significant correlation with r2 = 0.99 (Figure 8, right).

The impact of obliquity change on the global temperature and CO2 concentrations were also analyzed individually using the observed polar shift data from NGDC since 1880. The regression analysis in Figure 9 revealed that the rising global temperature and CO2 concentrations are largely dictated by the changes in obliquity and TSI. Both analyses yielded very high correlation (r2 = 0.97—0.99) and low standard errors. These showed the big impact of the obliquity change on the global warming problem, and possibly on the rise of greenhouse gases. The correct timing in the changes of both the global temperature and GHG rise together with the obliquity change and TSI variation was not coincidental. It should be noted that TSI started to decrease after attaining its peak in 1990, but the North Pole shift (and planetary obliquity) was abruptly enhanced after that period possibly due to increased number of major earthquakes, resulting to an acceleratedwarming since then.

The regression analyses also yielded very low standard errors. This proves that variations in the TSI and North Pole shift (or obliquity change) are the major cause of the observed global temperature including CO2 rise. The individual analysis clearly showed that the observed rise of CO2 concentrations is due mainly to the tilting motion of the north pole (Figure 9, right). Since CO2 respiration fluxes also increase due to increasing temperature and solar heating, the result proves that both global warming and the rise in greenhouse gases are directly related to the enhanced planetary tilting and TSI changes.

The individual regression analyses conducted for global temperature versus CO2 concentration (and vice versa) did not show better results with lower r2 values and higher standard errors. The regression analysis for global temperature versus CO2 was compared with the analysis made for global temperature versus the annual increment of CO2 in Figure 10. The regression result for global temperature versus CO2 (Figure 10, left) showed a seemingly good correlation with r2 = 0.81 and low standard error of 0.11. However, the regression analysis for global temperature versus the annual increment of CO2 (Figure 10, right) showed poor statistics with very low correlation (r2 = 0.52) and high standard error (SE = 0.17). The results imply that the overall increase in the global temperature cannot be due largely to CO2 increases since the correlation is very low.

As concluded by Fang et al. [26], the temperature change has not always been consistent with the change of CO2 concentration, since for several periods the global temperatures decreased or were stable while the atmospheric CO2 concentration continuously increased.

A direct computation of the contributions of CO2, North Pole shift (or obliquity change), and TSI to global warming was done using multiple regression against the observed global temperature variation since 1880. The analysis made use of the annual increment of CO2, decadal change of the North Pole Shift, and TSI anomaly. The result showed that since the start of the new millenium, the relative contribution of the North Pole shift or planetary tilt outweighed the combined effects of both TSI and CO2 changes (Figure 11, left). The tilt of the North Pole contributed about 63.5% while TSI change contributed 36.4% to the observed temperature rise. The annual increment of CO2 showed insignificant contribution to global warming with about 0.1% contribution to the observed global temperature rise.

This result falsifies the anthropogenic global warming theory as clearly shown by the big impact of both the North Pole tilt and TSI changes as compared to the insignificant contribution of annual CO2 change (Figure 11, right). The effect of polar shift outweighed the combined contribution of TSI and CO2 changes after 1995 when global temperatures exceeded existing records.

#### --PDO

Ferrara 12—Director of Entitlement and Budget Policy @ Heartland Institute [Peter Ferrara, “Sorry Global Warming Alarmists, The Earth Is Cooling, Forbes, 5/31/2012 @ 3:26PM, pg. http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterferrara/2012/05/31/sorry-global-warming-alarmists-the-earth-is-cooling/2/]

Check out the 20th century temperature record, and you will find that its up and down pattern does not follow the industrial revolution’s upward march of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2), which is the supposed central culprit for man caused global warming (and has been much, much higher in the past). It follows instead the up and down pattern of naturally caused climate cycles.

For example, temperatures dropped steadily from the late 1940s to the late 1970s. The popular press was even talking about a coming ice age. Ice ages have cyclically occurred roughly every 10,000 years, with a new one actually due around now.

In the late 1970s, the natural cycles turned warm and temperatures rose until the late 1990s, a trend that political and economic interests have tried to milk mercilessly to their advantage. The incorruptible satellite measured global atmospheric temperatures show less warming during this period than the heavily manipulated land surface temperatures.

Central to these natural cycles is the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO). Every 25 to 30 years the oceans undergo a natural cycle where the colder water below churns to replace the warmer water at the surface, and that affects global temperatures by the fractions of a degree we have seen. The PDO was cold from the late 1940s to the late 1970s, and it was warm from the late 1970s to the late 1990s, similar to the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation (AMO).

In 2000, the UN’s IPCC predicted that global temperatures would rise by 1 degree Celsius by 2010. Was that based on climate science, or political science to scare the public into accepting costly anti-industrial regulations and taxes?

Don Easterbrook, Professor Emeritus of Geology at Western Washington University, knew the answer. He publicly predicted in 2000 that global temperatures would decline by 2010. He made that prediction because he knew the PDO had turned cold in 1999, something the political scientists at the UN’s IPCC did not know or did not think significant.

Well, the results are in, and the winner is….Don Easterbrook. Easterbrook also spoke at the Heartland conference, with a presentation entitled “Are Forecasts of a 20-Year Cooling Trend Credible?” Watch that online and you will see how scientists are supposed to talk: cool, rational, logical analysis of the data, and full explanation of it. All I ever see from the global warming alarmists, by contrast, is political public relations, personal attacks, ad hominem arguments, and name calling, combined with admissions that they can’t defend their views in public debate.

Easterbrook shows that by 2010 the 2000 prediction of the IPCC was wrong by well over a degree, and the gap was widening. That’s a big miss for a forecast just 10 years away, when the same folks expect us to take seriously their predictions for 100 years in the future. Howard Hayden, Professor of Physics Emeritus at the University of Connecticut showed in his presentation at the conference that based on the historical record a doubling of CO2 could be expected to produce a 2 degree C temperature increase. Such a doubling would take most of this century, and the temperature impact of increased concentrations of CO2 declines logarithmically. You can see Hayden’s presentation online as well.

Because PDO cycles last 25 to 30 years, Easterbrook expects the cooling trend to continue for another 2 decades or so. Easterbrook, in fact, documents 40 such alternating periods of warming and cooling over the past 500 years, with similar data going back 15,000 years. He further expects the flipping of the ADO to add to the current downward trend.

#### --solar forcing

#### AND empirically caused warming 2800 years ago

Martin-Puertas et al. 12 [Celia, Helmholtz Centre Potsdam, GFZ German Research Centre for Geosciences, Katja Matthes, Achim Brauer, Raimund Muscheler, Felicitas Hansen, Christof Petrick, Ala Aldahan, Göran Possnert & Bas van Geel, “Regional atmospheric circulation shifts induced by a grand solar minimum,” Nature Geoscience, 5-6, http://www.nature.com/ngeo/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/ngeo1460.html#auth-2]

Large changes in solar ultraviolet radiation can indirectly affect climate1 by inducing atmospheric changes. Specifically, it has been suggested that centennial-scale climate variability during the Holocene epoch was controlled by the Sun2, 3. However, the amplitude of solar forcing is small when compared with the climatic effects and, without reliable data sets, it is unclear which feedback mechanisms could have amplified the forcing. Here we analyse annually laminated sediments of Lake Meerfelder Maar, Germany, to derive variations in wind strength and the rate of 10Be accumulation, a proxy for solar activity, from 3,300 to 2,000 years before present. We find a sharp increase in windiness and cosmogenic 10Be deposition 2,759 ± 39 varve years before present and a reduction in both entities 199 ± 9 annual layers later. We infer that the atmospheric circulation reacted abruptly and in phase with the solar minimum. A shift in atmospheric circulation in response to changes in solar activity is broadly consistent with atmospheric circulation patterns in long-term climate model simulations, and in reanalysis data that assimilate observations from recent solar minima into a climate model. We conclude that changes in atmospheric circulation amplified the solar signal and caused abrupt climate change about 2,800 years ago, coincident with a grand solar minimum.

#### Colder now with more CO2—their measurements are off

Idso and Idso 11 [Craig D., founder and chairman of the board of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, B.S. in Geography from Arizona State University, his M.S. in Agronomy from the University of Nebraska—Lincoln, and his Ph.D. in Geography from Arizona State University, former Director of Environmental Science at Peabody Energy, faculty researcher in the Office of Climatology at Arizona State University; and Sherwood, President of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, former Research Physicist with the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Agricultural Research Service, Adjunct Professor in the Departments of Geology, Geography, and Botany and Microbiology at ASU, M.S from UMinnesota, receipt of the Arthur S. Flemming Award, "Carbon Dioxide and Earth’s Future," 1-31-11, http://www.co2science.org/education/reports/prudentpath/prudentpath.pdf]

1. Unprecedented Warming of the Planet The claim: With respect to air temperature, the climate-alarmist contention is multifaceted. It is claimed that over the past several decades: (a) earth’s temperature has risen to a level that is unprecedented over the past millennium or more, (b) the world has been warming at a rate that is equally unprecedented, and (c) both of these dubious achievements have been made possible by the similarly unprecedented magnitude of anthropogenic CO2 emissions, due to humanity’s ever-increasing burning of fossil fuels such as coal, gas and oil. With respect to the level of warmth the earth has recently attained, it is important to see how it compares with prior temperatures experienced by the planet, in order to determine the degree of "unprecedentedness" of its current warmth. Taking a rather lengthy view of the subject, Petit et al. (1999) found that peak temperatures experienced during the current interglacial, or Holocene, have been the coldest of the last five interglacials, with the four interglacials that preceded the Holocene being, on average, more than 2°C warmer (see figure at right). And in a more recent analysis of the subject, Sime et al. (2009) suggested that the “maximum interglacial temperatures over the past 340,000 years were between 6.0°C and 10.0°C above present-day values.” If anything, therefore, these findings suggest that temperatures of the Holocene, or current interglacial, were indeed unusual, but not unusually warm. Quite to the contrary, they have been unusually cool. But could the higher temperatures of the past four interglacials have been caused by higher CO2 concentrations due to some non-human influence? Absolutely not, for atmospheric CO2 concentrations during all four prior interglacials never rose above approximately 290 ppm; whereas the air’s CO2 concentration today stands at nearly 390 ppm. Combining these two observations, we have a situation where, compared with the mean conditions of the preceding four interglacials, there is currently 100 ppm more CO2 in the air than there was then, and it is currently more than 2°C colder than it was then, which adds up to one huge discrepancy for the world’s climate alarmists and their claim that high atmospheric CO2 concentrations lead to high temperatures. The situation is unprecedented, all right, but not in the way the public is being led to believe. Zooming in a little closer to the present, we compare earth's modern temperatures with those of the past 1000 years, where the IPCC bases its claim for recent heretofore-unreached high temperatures on the infamous “hockey stick” temperature history of Mann et al. (1998, 1999). There is a problem with this history, however, in that reconstructed temperatures derived from a variety of proxy data (which make up the bulk of the temperature history) are replaced near its end with the historical record of directly-measured temperatures, resulting in an “apples vs. oranges” type of comparison, where the latter cannot be validly compared with the former, because the two types of data are not derived in the same way and are, therefore, not perfectly compatible with each other.

### 1NC Soft Power Frontline

#### Soft power doesn’t solve—increases resentment for the “uncivilized”

Gray 11—Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, England [Colin S., April, “HARD POWER AND SOFT POWER: THE UTILITY OF MILITARY FORCE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY,” Published by Strategic Studies Institute]

An inherent and unavoidable problem with a country’s soft power is that it is near certain to be misassessed by the politicians who attempt to govern soft power’s societal owners and carriers. Few thoroughly encultured Americans are likely to undervalue “the American way” in many of its aspects as a potent source of friendly self-co-option abroad. Often, this self-flattering appreciation will be well justified in reality. But as an already existing instrument of American policy, the soft power of ideas and practical example is fraught with the perils of self-delusion. If one adheres to an ideology that is a heady mixture of Christian ethics (“one nation, under God . . .”), democratic principles, and free market orthodoxy, and if one is an American, which is to say if one is a citizen of a somewhat hegemonic world power that undeniably has enjoyed a notably successful historical passage to date, then it is natural to confuse the national ideology with a universal creed. Such confusion is only partial, but nonetheless it is sufficiently damaging as to be a danger to national strategy. Since it is fallacious to assume that American values truly are universal, the domain of high relevance and scope for American soft power to be influential is distinctly limited. If one places major policy weight on the putative value for policy of American soft power, one needs to be acutely alert to the dangers of an under-recognized ethnocentrism born of cultural ignorance. This ignorance breeds an arrogant disdain for evidence of foreigners’ lack of interest in being coopted to join American civilization. The result of such arrogance predictably is political and even military strategic counterreaction. It is a case of good intentions gone bad when they are pursued with indifference toward the local cultural context. Some people have difficulty grasping the unpalatable fact that much of the world is not receptive to any American soft power that attempts to woo it to the side of American interests. Not all rivalries are resolvable by ideas, formulas, or “deals” that seem fair and equitable to us. There are conflicts wherein the struggle is the message, to misquote Marshal MacLuhan, with value in the eyes of local belligerents. Not all local conflicts around the world are amenable to the calming effect of American soft power. True militarists of left and right, secular and religious, find intrinsic value in struggle and warfare, as A. J. Coates has explained all too clearly. The self-fulfilment and self-satisfaction that war generates derive in part from the religious or ideological significance attributed to it and from the resultant sense of participating in some grand design. It may be, however, that the experience of war comes to be prized for its own sake and not just for the great ends that it serves or promotes. For many, the excitement unique to war makes pacific pursuits seem insipid by comparison. This understanding and experience of moral, psychological, and emotional self-fulfillment increase our tolerance for war and threaten its moral regulation. It transforms war from an instrumental into an expressive activity.49 It is foolish to believe that every conflict contains the seeds of its own resolution, merely awaiting suitable watering through co-option by soft power. To be fair, similarly unreasonable faith in the disciplinary value of (American) military force is also to be deplored.

#### No impact to soft power—believers exaggerate benefits—hard power is comparatively more important

Gray 11—Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, England [Colin S., April, “HARD POWER AND SOFT POWER: THE UTILITY OF MILITARY FORCE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY,” Published by Strategic Studies Institute]

Soft power is potentially a dangerous idea not because it is unsound, which it is not, but rather for the faulty inference that careless or unwary observers draw from it. Such inferences are a challenge to theorists because they are unable to control the ways in which their ideas will be interpreted and applied in practice by those unwary observers. Concepts can be tricky. They seem to make sense of what otherwise is intellectually undergoverned space, and thus potentially come to control pliable minds. Given that men behave as their minds suggest and command, it is easy to understand why Clausewitz identified the enemy’s will as the target for influence.37 Beliefs about soft power in turn have potentially negative implications for attitudes toward the hard power of military force and economic muscle. Thus, soft power does not lend itself to careful regulation, adjustment, and calibration. What does this mean? To begin with a vital contrast: whereas military force and economic pressure (negative or positive) can be applied by choice as to quantity and quality, soft power cannot. (Of course, the enemy/rival too has a vote on the outcome, regardless of the texture of the power applied.) But hard power allows us to decide how we will play in shaping and modulating the relevant narrative, even though the course of history must be an interactive one once the engagement is joined. In principle, we can turn the tap on or off at our discretion. The reality is apt to be somewhat different because, as noted above, the enemy, contingency, and friction will intervene. But still a noteworthy measure of initiative derives from the threat and use of military force and economic power. But soft power is very different indeed as an instrument of policy. In fact, I am tempted to challenge the proposition that soft power can even be regarded as one (or more) among the grand strategic instruments of policy. The seeming validity and attractiveness of soft power lead to easy exaggeration of its potency. Soft power is admitted by all to defy metric analysis, but this is not a fatal weakness. Indeed, the instruments of hard power that do lend themselves readily to metric assessment can also be unjustifiably seductive. But the metrics of tactical calculation need not be strategically revealing. It is important to win battles, but victory in war is a considerably different matter than the simple accumulation of tactical successes. Thus, the burden of proof remains on soft power: (1) What is this concept of soft power? (2) Where does it come from and who or what controls it? and (3) Prudently assessed and anticipated, what is the quantity and quality of its potential influence? Let us now consider answers to these questions. 7. Soft power lends itself too easily to mischaracterization as the (generally unavailable) alternative to military and economic power. The first of the three questions posed above all but invites a misleading answer. Nye plausibly offers the co-option of people rather than their coercion as the defining principle of soft power.38 The source of possible misunderstanding is the fact that merely by conjuring an alternative species of power, an obvious but unjustified sense of equivalence between the binary elements is produced. Moreover, such an elementary shortlist implies a fitness for comparison, an impression that the two options are like-for-like in their consequences, though not in their methods. By conceptually corralling a country’s potentially attractive co-optive assets under the umbrella of soft power, one is near certain to devalue the significance of an enabling context. Power of all kinds depends upon context for its value, but especially so for the soft variety. For power to be influential, those who are to be influenced have a decisive vote. But the effects of contemporary warfare do not allow recipients the luxury of a vote. They are coerced. On the other hand, the willingness to be coopted by American soft power varies hugely among recipients. In fact, there are many contexts wherein the total of American soft power would add up in the negative, not the positive. When soft power capabilities are strong in their values and cultural trappings, there is always the danger that they will incite resentment, hostility, and a potent “blowback.” In those cases, American soft power would indeed be strong, but in a counterproductive direction. These conclusions imply no criticism of American soft power per se. The problem would lie in the belief that soft power is a reliable instrument of policy that could complement or in some instances replace military force. 8. Soft power is perilously reliant on the calculations and feelings of frequently undermotivated foreigners. The second question above asked about the provenance and ownership of soft power. Nye correctly notes that “soft power does not belong to the government in the same degree that hard power does.” He proceeds sensibly to contrast the armed forces along with plainly national economic assets with the “soft power resources [that] are separate from American government and only partly responsive to its purposes.” 39 Nye cites as a prominent example of this disjunction in responsiveness the fact that “[i]n the Vietnam era . . . American government policy and popular culture worked at cross-purposes.”40 Although soft power can be employed purposefully as an instrument of national policy, such power is notably unpredictable in its potential influence, producing net benefit or harm. Bluntly stated, America is what it is, and there are many in the world who do not like what it is. The U.S. Government will have the ability to project American values in the hope, if not quite confident expectation, that “the American way” will be found attractive in alien parts of the world. Our hopes would seem to be achievement of the following: (1) love and respect of American ideals and artifacts (civilization); (2) love and respect of America; and (3) willingness to cooperate with American policy today and tomorrow. Admittedly, this agenda is reductionist, but the cause and desired effects are accurate enough. Culture is as culture does and speaks and produces. The soft power of values culturally expressed that others might find attractive is always at risk to negation by the evidence of national deeds that appear to contradict our cultural persona.

#### US decline will not spark wars.

MacDonald & Parent 11—Professor of Political Science at Williams College & Professor of Political Science at University of Miami [Paul K. MacDonald & Joseph M. Parent, “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), pp. 7–44]

Our findings are directly relevant to what appears to be an impending great power transition between China and the United States. Estimates of economic performance vary, but most observers expect Chinese GDP to surpass U.S. GDP sometime in the next decade or two. 91 This prospect has generated considerable concern. Many scholars foresee major conflict during a Sino-U.S. ordinal transition. Echoing Gilpin and Copeland, John Mearsheimer sees the crux of the issue as irreconcilable goals: China wants to be America’s superior and the United States wants no peer competitors. In his words, “[N]o amount of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia.” 92

Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline, the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. In the next few years, the United States is ripe to overhaul its military, shift burdens to its allies, and work to decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. Some might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credibility. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one’s reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers.

Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations.

We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. In particular, periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the AngloAmerican transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition. 93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism. 94

Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a “moderate” decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two. 95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness. 96 Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation. In short, the United States should be able to reduce its foreign policy commitments in East Asia in the coming decades without inviting Chinese expansionism. Indeed, there is evidence that a policy of retrenchment could reap potential benefits. The drawdown and repositioning of U.S. troops in South Korea, for example, rather than fostering instability, has resulted in an improvement in the occasionally strained relationship between Washington and Seoul. 97 U.S. moderation on Taiwan, rather than encouraging hard-liners in Beijing, resulted in an improvement in cross-strait relations and reassured U.S. allies that Washington would not inadvertently drag them into a Sino-U.S. conflict. 98 Moreover, Washington’s support for the development of multilateral security institutions, rather than harming bilateral alliances, could work to enhance U.S. prestige while embedding China within a more transparent regional order. 99 A policy of gradual retrenchment need not undermine the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments or unleash destabilizing regional security dilemmas. Indeed, even if Beijing harbored revisionist intent, it is unclear that China will have the force projection capabilities necessary to take and hold additional territory. 100 By incrementally shifting burdens to regional allies and multilateral institutions, the United States can strengthen the credibility of its core commitments while accommodating the interests of a rising China. Not least among the benefits of retrenchment is that it helps alleviate an unsustainable financial position. Immense forward deployments will only exacerbate U.S. grand strategic problems and risk unnecessary clashes. 101

#### The only comprehensive study proves no transition impact.

MacDonald & Parent 11—Professor of Political Science at Williams College & Professor of Political Science at University of Miami [Paul K. MacDonald & Joseph M. Parent, “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), pp. 7–44]

In this article, we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists. To date there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. This article fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments.

First, we challenge the retrenchment pessimists’ claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench. In fact, when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers, peaceful retrenchment is the most common response, even over short time spans. Based on the empirical record, we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61–83 percent. When international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies or adversaries, draw down their military obligations, and impose adjustments on domestic populations.

Second, we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. Following the dictates of neorealist theory, great powers retrench for the same reason they expand: the rigors of great power politics compel them to do so.12 Retrenchment is by no means easy, but necessity is the mother of invention, and declining great powers face powerful incentives to contract their interests in a prompt and proportionate manner. Knowing only a state’s rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined.

Third, we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform, seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones, and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. Further, our analysis suggests that great powers facing acute decline are less likely to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes. Faced with diminishing resources, great powers moderate their foreign policy ambitions and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of critics, retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation. Great powers are able to rebalance their commitments through compromise, rather than conflict. In these ways, states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. Far from being a hazardous policy, retrenchment can be successful. States that retrench often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline, 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. In contrast, none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position. Pg. 9-10

#### Latent power sustains hegemony

Wohlforth 7— Olin Fellow in International Security Studies at Yale University [William, “Unipolar Stability: The Rules of Power Analysis, A Tilted Balance,” Vol. 29 (1), Spring]

US military forces are stretched thin, its budget and trade deficits are high, and the country continues to finance its profligate ways by borrowing from abroad—notably from the Chinese government. These developments have prompted many analysts to warn that the United States suffers from “imperial overstretch.” And if US power is overstretched now, the argument goes, unipolarity can hardly be sustainable for long. The problem with this argument is that it fails to distinguish between actual and latent power. One must be careful to take into account both the level of resources that can be mobilized and the degree to which a government actually tries to mobilize them. And how much a government asks of its public is partly a function of the severity of the challenges that it faces. Indeed, one can never know for sure what a state is capable of until it has been seriously challenged. Yale historian Paul Kennedy coined the term “imperial overstretch” to describe the situation in which a state’s actual and latent capabilities cannot possibly match its foreign policy commitments. This situation should be contrasted with what might be termed “self-inflicted overstretch”—a situation in which a state lacks the sufficient resources to meet its current foreign policy commitments in the short term, but has untapped latent power and readily available policy choices that it can use to draw on this power. This is arguably the situation that the United States is in today. But the US government has not attempted to extract more resources from its population to meet its foreign policy commitments. Instead, it has moved strongly in the opposite direction by slashing personal and corporate tax rates. Although it is fighting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and claims to be fighting a global “war” on terrorism, the United States is not acting like a country under intense international pressure. Aside from the volunteer servicemen and women and their families, US citizens have not been asked to make sacrifices for the sake of national prosperity and security. The country could clearly devote a greater proportion of its economy to military spending: today it spends only about 4 percent of its GDP on the military, as compared to 7 to 14 percent during the peak years of the Cold War. It could also spend its military budget more efficiently, shifting resources from expensive weapons systems to boots on the ground. Even more radically, it could reinstitute military conscription, shifting resources from pay and benefits to training and equipping more soldiers. On the economic front, it could raise taxes in a number of ways, notably on fossil fuels, to put its fiscal house back in order. No one knows for sure what would happen if a US president undertook such drastic measures, but there is nothing in economics, political science, or history to suggest that such policies would be any less likely to succeed than China is to continue to grow rapidly for decades. Most of those who study US politics would argue that the likelihood and potential success of such power-generating policies depends on public support, which is a function of the public’s perception of a threat. And as unnerving as terrorism is, there is nothing like the threat of another hostile power rising up in opposition to the United States for mobilizing public support. With latent power in the picture, it becomes clear that unipolarity might have more built-in self-reinforcing mechanisms than many analysts realize. It is often noted that the rise of a peer competitor to the United States might be thwarted by the counterbalancing actions of neighboring powers. For example, China’s rise might push India and Japan closer to the United States—indeed, this has already happened to some extent. There is also the strong possibility that a peer rival that comes to be seen as a threat would create strong incentives for the United States to end its self-inflicted overstretch and tap potentially large wellsprings of latent power.

### 2NC/1NR—No Hegemony Impact

#### Heg doesn’t solve war

Fettweis 10—Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College [Christopher J. Fettweis, “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” *Survival*, Volume 52, Issue 2 April 2010 , pages 59—82//informaworld]

One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The limited evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe in the stabilising power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the relative level of American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defence spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defence in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.29 To internationalists, defence hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible 'peace dividend' endangered both national and global security. 'No serious analyst of American military capabilities', argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, 'doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace'.30 And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilising presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities. Most of all, the United States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up. Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are unrelated.

#### No risk of conflict—discards paranoid threat predictions.

Bandow 11—Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, former special assistant to Ronald Reagan, author of *Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire* (Xulon) [January 31, 2011, “Solving the Debt Crisis: A Military Budget for a Republic,” http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=12746]

More than two decades after the Cold War dramatically ended, the U.S. maintains a Cold War military. America has a couple score allies, dozens of security commitments, hundreds of overseas bases, and hundreds of thousands of troops overseas. Yet international hegemonic communism has disappeared, the Soviet Union has collapsed, Maoist China has been transformed, and pro-communist Third World dictatorships have been discarded in history's dustbin. The European Union has a larger economy and population than America does. Japan spent decades with the world's second largest economy. South Korea has 40 times the GDP and twice the population of North Korea. As Colin Powell exclaimed in 1991, "I'm running out of demons. I'm running out of enemies. I'm down to Castro and Kim Il-sung." Yet America accounts for roughly half of the globe's military outlays. In real terms the U.S. government spends more on the military today than at any time during the Cold War, Korean War, or Vietnam War. It is difficult for even a paranoid to concoct a traditional threat to the American homeland. Terrorism is no replacement for the threat of nuclear holocaust. Commentator Philip Klein worries about "gutting" the military and argued that military cuts at the end of the Cold War "came back to haunt us when Sept. 11 happened." Yet the reductions, which still left America by far the world's most dominant power, neither allowed the attacks nor prevented Washington from responding with two wars. And responding with two wars turned out to be a catastrophic mistake. Evil terrorism is a threat, but existential threat it is not. Moreover, the best response is not invasions and occupations — as the U.S. has learned at high cost in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Rather, the most effective tools are improved intelligence, Special Forces, international cooperation, and restrained intervention. Attempts at nation-building are perhaps even more misguided than subsidizing wealthy industrialized states. America's record isn't pretty. The U.S. wasn't able to anoint its preferred Somali warlord as leader of that fractured nation. Washington's allies in the still unofficial and unstable nation of Kosovo committed grievous crimes against Serb, Roma, and other minorities. Haiti remains a failed state after constant U.S. intervention. The invasion of Iraq unleashed mass violence, destroyed the indigenous Christian community, and empowered Iran; despite elections, a liberal society remains unlikely. After nine years most Afghans dislike and distrust the corrupt government created by the U.S. and sustained only by allied arms. The last resort of those who want America to do everything everywhere is to claim that the world will collapse into various circles of fiery hell without a ubiquitous and vast U.S. military presence. Yet there is no reason to believe that scores of wars are waiting to break out. And America's prosperous and populous allies are capable of promoting peace and stability in their own regions. Indeed, U.S. security guarantees are profoundly dangerous. Intended to deter by making American involvement automatic, they ensure American participation if deterrence fails. Moreover, Washington's defense promises discourage friendly states from defending themselves while encouraging them to take more provocative positions against their potential adversaries. Yet analysts keep coming up with bizarre new duties for the U.S. government. John Guardiano, for one, thinks it is America's responsibility to prepare "to occupy and rebuild North Korea when it implodes." Actually, that should be South Korea's job.

#### Interdependence ensures peace

Ikenberry 11—PhD, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs [May/June issue of Foreign Affairs, G. John, “The Future of the Liberal World Order,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67730/g-john-ikenberry/the-future-of-the-liberal-world-order?page=show]

The liberal international order is not just a collection of liberal democratic states but an international mutual-aid society -- a sort of global political club that provides members with tools for economic and political advancement. Participants in the order gain trading opportunities, dispute-resolution mechanisms, frameworks for collective action, regulatory agreements, allied security guarantees, and resources in times of crisis. And just as there are a variety of reasons why rising states will embrace the liberal international order, there are powerful obstacles to opponents who would seek to overturn it. To begin with, rising states have deep interests in an open and rule-based system. Openness gives them access to other societies -- for trade, investment, and knowledge sharing. Without the unrestricted investment from the United States and Europe of the past several decades, for instance, China and the other rising states would be on a much slower developmental path. As these countries grow, they will encounter protectionist and discriminatory reactions from slower-growing countries threatened with the loss of jobs and markets. As a result, the rising states will find the rules and institutions that uphold nondiscrimination and equal access to be critical. The World Trade Organization -- the most formal and developed institution of the liberal international order -- enshrines these rules and norms, and rising states have been eager to join the WTO and gain the rights and protections it affords. China is already deeply enmeshed in the global trading system, with a remarkable 40 percent of its GNP composed of exports -- 25 percent of which go to the United States. China could be drawn further into the liberal order through its desire to have the yuan become an international currency rivaling the U.S. dollar. Aside from conferring prestige, this feat could also stabilize China's exchange rate and grant Chinese leaders autonomy in setting macroeconomic policy. But if China wants to make the yuan a global currency, it will need to loosen its currency controls and strengthen its domestic financial rules and institutions. As Barry Eichengreen and other economic historians have noted, the U.S. dollar assumed its international role after World War II not only because the U.S. economy was large but also because the United States had highly developed financial markets and domestic institutions -- economic and political -- that were stable, open, and grounded in the rule of law. China will feel pressures to establish these same institutional preconditions if it wants the benefits of a global currency. Internationalist-oriented elites in Brazil, China, India, and elsewhere are growing in influence within their societies, creating an expanding global constituency for an open and rule-based international order. These elites were not party to the grand bargains that lay behind the founding of the liberal order in the early postwar decades, and they are seeking to renegotiate their countries' positions within the system. But they are nonetheless embracing the rules and institutions of the old order. They want the protections and rights that come from the international order's Westphalian defense of sovereignty. They care about great-power authority. They want the protections and rights relating to trade and investment. And they want to use the rules and institutions of liberal internationalism as platforms to project their influence and acquire legitimacy at home and abroad. The UN Security Council, the G-20, the governing bodies of the Bretton Woods institutions -- these are all stages on which rising non-Western states can acquire great-power authority and exercise global leadership.

#### Growing relative power will only strengthen the liberal order

Ikenberry 11—PhD, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs [May/June issue of Foreign Affairs, G. John, “The Future of the Liberal World Order,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67730/g-john-ikenberry/the-future-of-the-liberal-world-order?page=show]

Pronouncements of American decline miss the real transformation under way today. What is occurring is not American decline but a dynamic process in which other states are catching up and growing more connected. In an open and rule-based international order, this is what happens. If the architects of the postwar liberal order were alive to see today's system, they would think that their vision had succeeded beyond their wildest dreams. Markets and democracy have spread. Societies outside the West are trading and growing. The United States has more alliance partners today than it did during the Cold War. Rival hegemonic states with revisionist and illiberal agendas have been pushed off the global stage. It is difficult to read these world-historical developments as a story of American decline and liberal unraveling. In a way, however, the liberal international order has sown the seeds of its own discontent, since, paradoxically, the challenges facing it now -- the rise of non-Western states and new transnational threats -- are artifacts of its success. But the solutions to these problems -- integrating rising powers and tackling problems cooperatively -- will lead the order's old guardians and new stakeholders to an agenda of renewal. The coming divide in world politics will not be between the United States (and the West) and the non-Western rising states. Rather, the struggle will be between those who want to renew and expand today's system of multilateral governance arrangements and those who want to move to a less cooperative order built on spheres of influence. These fault lines do not map onto geography, nor do they split the West and the non-West. There are passionate champions of the UN, the WTO, and a rule-based international order in Asia, and there are isolationist, protectionist, and anti-internationalist factions in the West. The liberal international order has succeeded over the decades because its rules and institutions have not just enshrined open trade and free markets but also provided tools for governments to manage economic and security interdependence. The agenda for the renewal of the liberal international order should be driven by this same imperative: to reinforce the capacities of national governments to govern and achieve their economic and security goals. As the hegemonic organization of the liberal international order slowly gives way, more states will have authority and status. But this will still be a world that the United States wants to inhabit. A wider array of states will share the burdens of global economic and political governance, and with its worldwide system of alliances, the United States will remain at the center of the global system. Rising states do not just grow more powerful on the global stage; they grow more powerful within their regions, and this creates its own set of worries and insecurities -- which is why states will continue to look to Washington for security and partnership. In this new age of international order, the United States will not be able to rule. But it can still lead.

#### Regional actors check war.

Carpenter 11—senior fellow of foreign policy studies at The Cato Institute [July 25, 2011, Ted Galen Carpenter, “Washington's Foreign-Policy Hypochondria,” http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/washingtons-foreign-policy-hypochondria-5652]

To do so, however, requires abandoning the mindset that any significant change in the foreign-policy status quo would signal isolationism and lead in short order to global chaos. Unless one assumes that there are no other capable powers in the world whose interests overlap with those of the United States—or, alternatively, that those nations would be catatonic and not seek to maintain stability in their own regions despite an obvious security interest in doing so—the thesis of global chaos absent perpetual U.S. hegemony is utter nonsense. America’s allies and clients free ride on Washington’s security exertions because it is convenient for them to do so, not because they have no alternative. The member states of the European Union, for example, are certainly capable of handling any likely security problems that might emerge in their neighborhood. It is preposterous to assert that the EU, an entity that has both a larger population and a larger economy than the United States, cannot deal with new troubles in the Balkans—the most likely arena for instability. Adopting a more prudent, more sustainable U.S. grand strategy requires a number of changes. Perhaps most important, Washington must overcome what amounts to foreign-policy hypochondria. The United States worries about international developments that normal, rational great powers would ignore. What goes on in Haiti, Burma, Belarus or Libya need not and should not be a matter of significant concern to the United States. Instead, Washington has become the Aunt Myrtle of the international community—a busybody who insists on meddling in everyone else’s affairs, often for trivial reasons, citing far-fetched security justifications for doing so.

### 2NC/1NR—No Soft Power Impact

#### Soft power is useless—no impact to boosting U.S. credibility

Miller 10 [2/3/2010, Aaron David, public-policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Foreign Policy, “The End of Diplomacy?” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/03/the\_end\_of\_diplomacy?page=full]

Back in the day, there was a time when American diplomacy did big and important things. No more, it seems. The world's gotten complicated, America is a good deal weaker, and the U.S. administration is handicapping itself with a dysfunctional bureaucratic setup that makes it harder to focus and find its footing. Effective American diplomacy may well be going the way of the dodo, and the sad fact is there may be little Barack Obama can do about it. Lamenting the absence of great men years before his own shining moment, Winston Churchill wrote that in England, once upon a time, "there were wonderful giants of old." There's always a danger in idealizing what once was or seemed to be in order to make a point about the present. Still, looking back over the last 60 years, you really do have to wonder whether America's best diplomacy and foreign policy are behind it. America never ran the world (an illusion the left, right, and much of the third and fourth worlds believe; but there were moments (1945-1950, the early 1970s, 1988-1991) when the United States marshaled its military, political, and economic power toward impressive ends. There were, or course, disasters and plenty of dysfunction during these years, including the Vietnam War and out-of-control CIA operations. But there were also brilliant achievements: the Marshall Plan, NATO, effective Arab-Israeli diplomacy, détente with the Russians, opening to China, a competent American role in the acceleration and management of the end of the Cold War, and the first Gulf War. For most of the last 16 years, however -- under Bill Clinton and George W. Bush -- America has been in a diplomatic dry patch. In the face of terrorism, nuclear proliferation, wars of choice, and nasty regional conflicts, conventional diplomacy has either not been tried or not been very successful. The image of the shuttling secretary of state pre-empting crises or exploiting them to broker agreements, doggedly pursuing Middle East peace, achieving dramatic breakthroughs with spectacular secret diplomacy seems a world away. The Obama administration wants to do this kind of stuff. And it has done pretty well in managing the big relationships with Russia and Europe, though it has had its share of problems with China. But frankly, these are the easy ones. It's not from the big that the president's problems come; it's from the small. In garden spots like Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Somalia, the problems are four parts military, five parts nation-building, and maybe one part diplomacy. And America is unlikely to prevail in any meaningful sense of the word where corrupt, extractive regimes are unable to control their own territory and cut deals with anti-American elements and place their security and political concerns first. Even in areas where diplomacy might seem to work on paper -- Kashmir, Arab-Israeli peacemaking -- the United States is hampered by conflicts driven by deep ethnic and religious hostility and by internal politics in which its own allies (Israel, Pakistan, and India) can't be of much help. And in one of the cruelest ironies of all, the U.S. president who has gone further to engage Iran than any of his predecessors is watching any hope for diplomacy being ground up by a regime under siege in Tehran. What's more, the power of the small is being matched by the weakening of the big. You don't have to be a declinist (I'm not) to see how far the image of American power has fallen. Forget the economic meltdown, which has much of the world wondering about what kind of great power the United States really is. America's currently fighting two wars where the standard for victory is not whether it can win but when it can leave. Whether it's an inability to get tough sanctions from the international community against Iran, bring Tehran to heel, make North Korea play ball, get the Arabs and the Israelis to cooperate, or push the Pakistanis to hit the Taliban and al Qaeda in a sustained way, the world has gotten used to saying no to America without cost or consequence. And that's very bad for a great power. Finally, there's the issue of how the country organizes itself. A new bureaucratic flowchart won't replace skill and luck, better marshal American power, or create genuine opportunities for success abroad. But if you don't have the right structure, it makes success all that much harder. And the United States has departed from the one model that has proven successful: the strong foreign-policy president empowering the strong secretary of state who rides herd over subcabinet-level envoys in real time and in close coordination with the president on strategy. Instead, the Obama administration has created an empire of envoys with power concentrated in the White House but without real purpose or strategy. The nation's top diplomat (the secretary of state) seems to be everywhere and nowhere in terms of owning issues and finding a way to take on some of the nastiest challenges, which is what secretaries of state are supposed to do. It's still early, and maybe the Obama administration will get lucky. Perhaps the Iranian regime will collapse or the Arabs and Israelis will do something good by themselves. But the next several years are more likely to be tough ones for American diplomacy. And the image that comes to mind isn't a terribly kind one: America as a kind of modern-day Gulliver tied up by tiny tribes abroad and hobbled by its inability to organize its own house at home.

#### Soft power fails—no influence and it’s inherently unsustainable

Kennedy 8—professor of history and director of international security studies at Yale University [Paul, “Soft power is on the up. But it can always be outmuscled,” http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/nov/18/usa-obama-economy-military]

About a decade and a half ago certain scholars began to call attention to the importance of "soft power" in world affairs, which they defined as the capacity to win friends abroad and persuade other nations to agree to policies that you want. It was very different by nature from "hard power"—that is, military strength and economic muscle—but it was nonetheless real. Thus the crumbling USSR under Brezhnev was weakened by being culturally and ideologically unattractive to other peoples, except perhaps to the crumbling regimes of Cuba and North Korea. By contrast, a US boasting lots of soft power—the English language, Hollywood, the Wall Street way of doing business, democracy, the Bretton Woods institutions—gained from this additional measure of power and influence. Yet there has always been one feature to "soft power" that has made it less substantive than military capacity or economic resilience: you can lose it or gain it—or even regain it—very swiftly indeed. The Bush administration has been a spectacular example of how the US could rapidly destroy its attractiveness once it appeared bent on unilateralist, heavyhanded, neoconservative actions, and didn't seem to care about world opinion. Little wonder, then, that outside the US there was such jubilation when Barack Obama was decisively voted in. Phew! The nightmare is over. And soft power will prevail again. Before the world begins to think Obama can walk on water, we ought perhaps to reflect on what the recovery of US attractiveness and soft power cannot do. Here, alas, we have to return to the horrid world of "hard" power: economic reality and geopolitical reality. Soft power cannot pay for foreign oil and gas, imported cars, electronic goods, kitchenware and children's toys. Soft power cannot staunch General Motors' global disintegration, just as it could not stop the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Soft power seems to have very little influence over the wildly fluctuating exchange value of the dollar: when the trade deficit worsens, so does the greenback; and when hedge funds pull back monies from Brazil and Canada the dollar rises, like a cork on the tide, at least for a while. If Asia's appetite for Boeing's planes falls away, no amount of Obama charm will stop that. More important still, if Asia decides it is too risky to continue buying American treasury bonds—and Ben Bernanke and Henry Paulson are planning to put an awful lot more of them out on the market during the coming months—then White House glamour will count for little. There is more. American soft power cannot handle the longer term secular shifts in the world's economic balances, any more than could the replacement of a rather disturbing Disraeli with a somewhat nicer Gladstone stop the diminution of Victorian Britain's relative global influence. The international financial system is no longer as it was at Bretton Woods, when only one country could recreate the world's trading and currency systems. There is a larger lesson from the recent desperate efforts by central bankers—in Britain, Germany, the European Bank, Japan, Switzerland—to shore up a few crucial banks, country by country. The lesson is that the US followed, reluctantly. It did not lead. The same trend is evident at the IMF, yet another American institution slipping away from its founder's half-century dominance. How the world turns. We have come back to a multipolar system, whether US neocons or liberal imperialists like it or not. The same is true on the military-strategic playing fields. How exactly, one wonders, would revamped US soft power be applied to counter the assertiveness of an increasingly nationalistic Russia, smarting at its imperial collapse and intent on balancing the influence of the world hegemon? We may not like Vladimir Putin but, judging from domestic opinion polls, he is even more popular among Russians than Obama is among Americans. What can Hollywood and democratic peace theory do to missiles installed in Kaliningrad? What can the president-elect's undoubted charms do in the face of China and India's remarkable maritime expansion, with their silent submarines, long-range rocketry and satellite capacity? The probable answer is not much. No wonder they are keeping the lights on late in the night in the China Maritime Studies Centre at the Naval War College in Rhode Island. To those folks, soft power doesn't count for much. To them, it is the old story of covenants without swords. The sweeping election of Obama has generated extraordinary goodwill; who, apart from the most purblind, has not been excited? But such positivity must be tempered by the realisation that he comes into office during one of the most difficult and troubled periods in modern history; that he is to run a country far less dominant, relatively, than at the time of Wilson, Truman and Kennedy; and that, while his international attractiveness is strong, great nations cannot survive on soft power alone.

#### Military force is key—soft power is insufficient to prevent conflict

Greenwald 10—policy adviser and online editor at the Foreign Policy Initiative [July/August, Abe, “The Soft-Power Fallacy,” http://www.commentarymagazine.com/viewarticle.cfm/the-soft-power-fallacy-15466?page=all]

Like Francis Fukuyama’s essay “The End of History,” soft-power theory was a creative and appealing attempt to make sense of America’s global purpose. Unlike Fukuyama’s theory, however, which the new global order seemed to support for nearly a decade, Nye’s was basically refuted by world events in its very first year. In the summer of 1990, a massive contingent of Saddam Hussein’s forces invaded Kuwait and effectively annexed it as a province of Iraq. Although months earlier Nye had asserted that “geography, population, and raw materials are becoming somewhat less important,” the fact is that Saddam invaded Kuwait because of its geographic proximity, insubstantial military, and plentiful oil reserves. Despite Nye’s claim that “the definition of power is losing its emphasis on military force,” months of concerted international pressure, including the passage of a UN resolution, failed to persuade Saddam to withdraw. In the end, only overwhelming American military power succeeded in liberating Kuwait. The American show of force also succeeded in establishing the U.S. as the single, unrivaled post–Cold War superpower. Following the First Gulf War, the 1990s saw brutal acts of aggression in the Balkans: the Bosnian War in 1992 and the Kosovo conflicts beginning in 1998. These raged on despite international negotiations and were quelled only after America took the lead in military actions. It is also worth noting that attempts to internationalize these efforts made them more costly in time, effectiveness, and manpower than if the U.S. had acted unilaterally. Additionally, the 1990s left little mystery as to how cataclysmic events unfold when the U.S. declines to apply traditional tools of power overseas. In April 1994, Hutu rebels began the indiscriminate killing of Tutsis in Rwanda. As the violence escalated, the United Nations’s peacekeeping forces stood down so as not to violate a UN mandate prohibiting intervention in a country’s internal politics. Washington followed suit, refusing even to consider deploying forces to East-Central Africa. By the time the killing was done, in July of the same year, Hutus had slaughtered between half a million and 1 million Tutsis. And in the 1990s, Japan’s economy went into its long stall, making the Japanese model of a scaled down military seem rather less relevant. All this is to say that during the presidency of Bill Clinton, Nye’s “intangible forms of power” proved to hold little sway in matters of statecraft, while modes of traditional power remained as critical as ever in coercing other nations and affirming America’s role as chief protector of the global order. If the Clinton years posed a challenge for the efficacy of soft power, the post-9/11 age has exposed Nye’s explication of the theory as something akin to academic eccentricity. In his book, Nye mentioned “current issues of transnational interdependence” requiring “collective action and international cooperation.” Among these were “ecological changes (acid rain and global warming), health epidemics such as AIDS, illicit trade in drugs, and terrorism.” Surely a paradigm that places terrorism last on a list of national threats starting with acid rain is due for revision.

#### The government cannot control soft power—it is the perception of the entire society that matters.

Gray 11—Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, England [Colin S., April, “HARD POWER AND SOFT POWER: THE UTILITY OF MILITARY FORCE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY,” Published by Strategic Studies Institute]

Moreover, no contemporary U.S. government owns all of America’s soft power—a considerable understatement. Nor do contemporary Americans and their institutions own all of their country’s soft power. America today is the product of America’s many yesterdays, and the worldwide target audiences for American soft power respond to the whole of the America that they have perceived, including facts, legends, and myths.41 Obviously, what they understand about America may well be substantially untrue, certainly it will be incomplete. At a minimum, foreigners must react to an American soft power that is filtered by their local cultural interpretation. America is a futureoriented country, ever remaking itself and believing that, with the grace of God, history moves forward progressively toward an ever-better tomorrow. This optimistic American futurism both contrasts with foreigners’ cultural pessimism—their golden ages may lie in the past, not the future—which prevails in much of the world and is liable to mislead Americans as to the reception our soft power story will have.42 Many people indeed, probably most people, in the world beyond the United States have a fairly settled view of America, American purposes, and Americans. This locally held view derives from their whole experience of exposure to things American as well as from the features of their own “cultural thoughtways” and history that shape their interpretation of American-authored words and deeds, past and present.43

### AT: Credibility Impact

#### International credibility doesn’t matter for hegemony

MacDonald and Parent 11—Former Research Fellow, International Security Program [Spring 2011, Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent, Belfer Center at Harvard, “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment” *International Security*, volume 35, issue 4, pages 7-44, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/ISEC\_a\_00034-MacDonald\_proof2.pdf]

These arguments have a number of limitations. First, opponents of retrenchment exaggerate the importance of credibility in the defense of commitments. Just because a state has signaled a willingness to retreat from one commitment does not mean it will retreat from others. Studies of reputation, for example, have demonstrated a tenuous link between past behavior and current reputation. 22 The capacity to defend a commitment is as important as credibility in determining the strength of a commitment. Quantitative studies have likewise found a mixed link between previous concessions and deterrence failure. 23 The balance of power between the challenger and the defender, in contrast, is often decisive. For instance, after a series of crises over Berlin and Cuba, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan observed to his cabinet, “The fact that the Soviet Government had agreed to withdraw their missiles and their aircraft from Cuba was not evidence of weakness but of realism. . . . But Berlin was an entirely different question; not only was it of vital importance to the Soviet Government but the Russians had overwhelming conventional superiority in the area.” 24 This finding supports the basic insight of retrenchment: by concentrating scarce resources, a policy of retrenchment exchanges a diffuse reputation for toughness for a concentrated capability at key points of challenge. Second, pessimists overstate the extent to which a policy of retrenchment can damage a great power’s capabilities or prestige. Gilpin, in particular, assumes that a great power’s commitments are on equal footing and interdependent. In practice, however, great powers make commitments of varying degrees that are functionally independent of one another. Concession in one area need not be seen as influencing a commitment in another area. 25 Far from being perceived as interdependent, great power commitments are often seen as being rivalrous, so that abandoning commitments in one area may actually bolster the strength of a commitment in another area. During the Korean War, for instance, President Harry Truman’s administration explicitly backed away from total victory on the peninsula to strengthen deterrence in Europe. 26 Retreat in an area of lesser importance freed up resources and signaled a strong commitment to an area of greater significance. Third, critics do not just oversell the hazards of retrenchment; they downplay the dangers of preventive war. 27 Both Gilpin and Copeland praise the ability of preventive war to arrest great power decline by defusing the threat posed to a hegemonic power by an isolated challenger. Such reasoning disregards the warning of Otto von Bismarck and others that preventive war is “suicide from fear of death.” 28 In practice, great powers operate in a much more constrained and complex security environment in which they face multiple threats on several fronts. Powers pursuing preventive war are shouldering grave risks: preventive war may require resources that are unavailable or allies that are difficult to recruit, and defeat in preventive war opens floodgates to exploitation on multiple fronts. Even a successful war, if sufficiently costly, can weaken a great power to the point of vulnerability. 29 For most great powers, the potential loss of security in the future as a result of relative decline rarely justifies inviting the hazards of war in the present.

### AT: Lashout

#### Domestic lobbying and the public prevent lash-out.

MacDonald and Parent 11—Former Research Fellow, International Security Program [Spring 2011, Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent, Belfer Center at Harvard, “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment” *International Security*, volume 35, issue 4, pages 7-44, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/ISEC\_a\_00034-MacDonald\_proof2.pdf]

Although useful in many contexts, domestic constraint arguments suffer from several problems. First, domestic political theories assume that interest groups predominantly push for more expansive overseas commitments. Yet domestic interest groups possess much more complicated and nuanced preferences than is commonly assumed. For example, many domestic interest groups oppose overseas commitments, favoring expenditure on domestic programs rather than adventures abroad.

Second, groups favoring assertive foreign policies do not speak with one voice or assign equal priority to all interests. Different interest groups will place different weight on particular regions, economic sectors, or types of international challenges. 34 The heterogeneity of domestic interests is critical because it opens up space for politicians to outmaneuver domestic groups and force trade-offs on unwilling lobbies.

Third, domestic political theories are unclear about when domestic interests are able to hijack the policymaking process. Some studies emphasize problems with democratic states, which provide interest groups easier access to the policymaking process. In his classic study, however, Stephen Krasner finds that “again and again there are serious discrepancies between the aims of central decision-makers and those of private corporations” in which “the state has generally prevailed.” 35 Others argue that it is not regime type that is crucial, but the institutional structure of a country. Spruyt emphasizes the importance of institutional veto points, which are present in both democratic and autocratic systems. 36 Although the inclusion of veto points allows a more nuanced understanding of domestic constraints, it suffers from the same problem of specifying which veto points are most significant and when they will prove decisive.

Fourth, domestic political theories tend to downplay or ignore the ability of international context to inform domestic politics. Yet policymakers do not operate in a vacuum; elites react to changes in the international system. 37 Policymakers at the helm of rising powers can afford to indulge the interests of domestic lobbies with minimal consequences. Elites in rising powers have few incentives to resolve trade-offs among competing interests or veto new and unnecessary foreign adventures. In contrast, there are significant pressures on policymakers in declining great powers to put aside their parochial interests. They sit atop wasting assets, and a local defeat may easily turn into a general rout. It is precisely in periods of acute relative decline that one should expect partisan rancor and sectoral rivalry to recede.

### AT: Kagan

#### Kagan is wrong about everything—he ignores reality.

Bacevich 8—Andrew J. Bacevich, Professor of History and International Relations at Boston University (July/August, 2008, “Present at the Re-Creation,” *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 87, Issue 4, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Premier)

Despite his newfound realism, Kagan balks at considering the possibility that the United States and Americans ought to change. He makes no effort to assess whether the Bush administration's recent revival of an expansionist conception of statecraft serves U.S. interests today. Has the doctrine of preventive war enhanced the well-being of the American people? Has the pursuit of President Bush's "freedom agenda" improved the United States' standing in the world? Or have the policies devised in the wake of 9/11 squandered the United States' power and multiplied its problems?

Although there is abundant empirical evidence bearing directly on these questions, Kagan evinces almost no interest in such data. He has little time for contemplating the costs of Bush's aggressive policies in the Middle East, even though, according to some estimates, the price of the Iraq war alone may reach into the trillions of dollars. Key indicators of basic economic health—such as the size of the national debt, the strength of the dollar, the extent of the trade deficit, and the country's ever-increasing dependence on imported oil—do not figure in his analysis, even though they all have worsened under President Bush.

For Kagan, the United States remains indispensable. It "is still the keystone to the arch," he writes. "Remove it, and the arch collapses." Here, Kagan the recent convert to realism gives way to Kagan the unrepentant neoconservative, who refuses to acknowledge that the United States' traditional foreign policy of expansionism has long been counterproductive. From the end of the Revolutionary War through the 1950s, expansionism did enhance U.S. power and wealth, and it did make freedom possible for ever larger numbers of Americans. But that correlation came undone in the 1960s. Recent efforts at expansion—such as President Bush's ill-fated attempt to pacify the Muslim world—have served only to dissipate U.S. power while weakening the U.S. economy and creating pretexts for the government to curtail individual freedoms at home. Expansionism no longer offers a way out—and this fact, as much as and perhaps more so than the rise of China or the resurgence of Russia, defines the world that must be reckoned with today. But Kagan, eager to move on, bury the Iraq war, and whitewash the entire post-9/11 era, which he and other neo-conservatives have so profoundly misunderstood, cannot or will not acknowledge this new reality.

## \*\*\* Disadvantages

### 2NC/1NR Politics Link—Cuba Embargo

#### Politics link turns the case—lifting sanctions is a drop in the bucket for relations and the political controversy would nullify benefits to relations

Hanson and Lee 13—Stephanie Hanson is associate director and coordinating editor at CFR.org. She manages the editorial production of the website and covers economic and political development in Africa and Latin America. Brianna Lee is Senior Production Editor at CFR [January 31, 2013, “U.S.-Cuba Relations,” http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113]

What is the likelihood that the United States and Cuba will resume diplomatic relations?

Given the range of issues dividing the two countries, experts say a long process would precede resumption of diplomatic relations. Daniel P. Erikson of the Inter-American Dialogue says that though "you could have the resumption of bilateral talks on issues related to counternarcotics or immigration, or a period of détente, you are probably not going to see the full restoration of diplomatic relations" in the near term.

Many recent policy reports have recommended that the United States take some unilateral steps to roll back sanctions on Cuba. The removal of sanctions, however, would be just one step in the process of normalizing relations. Such a process is sure to be controversial, as indicated by the heated congressional debate spurred in March 2009 by attempts to ease travel and trade restrictions in a large appropriations bill. "Whatever we call it--normalization, détente, rapproachement--it is clear that the policy process risks falling victim to the politics of the issue," says Sweig.

## \*\*\* Counterplans

### 1NC CP—Gitmo

#### The United States federal government should close its naval base on Guantanamo Bay and relocate terrorist suspects to federal prisons in the United States.

#### Closing GITMO sends a signal of U.S. commitment to Latin American relations—solves the case

Perez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]

(5B) Offer to Discuss the Status of Guantanamo Bay

The United States could also offer to renegotiate its open-ended lease of its naval base at Guantanamo Bay, which sits on a parcel of land that is formally still part of Cuba. The U.S. secured a permanent lease on the land in 1903 after the Americans expelled the Spanish from the island in the Spanish-American war of 1898. n70 Over the years the U.S. has consistently stoked Cuban nationalism, while the Cuban regime has been particularly adept at exploiting nationalistic fears and translating them into domestic support. Offering to renegotiate the status of Guantanamo Bay would be a clear demonstration that the U.S. is committed to respecting Cuban nationalism and sovereignty.

Closing Guantanamo Bay would have reverberating effects, not just in Cuba and Latin America, but also throughout the world. Guantanamo Bay has come to "represent the image of an intolerant, abusive, unjust America." n71 Its "very existence undermines America's ability to carry forth a message of principled optimism and hope." n72 Closing the base will not be easy, but if the United States were to put the option of ceding the land back to Cuba on the table, it could buy time and more effectively turn the page on a base that long ago became a major political liability. n73

### 2NC/1NR CP—Gitmo

#### Leaving Gitmo solves the aff

Hinderdael 11 M.A. candidate at SAIS Bologna Center, concentrating in American Foreign Policy and Energy, Resources, and Environment [Klaas Hinderdael, Breaking the Logjam: Obama's Cuba Policy and a Guideline for Improved Leadership, by http://bcjournal.org/volume-14/breaking-the-logjam.html?printerFriendly=true]

The United States does hold a strategic card that could transform relations with Cuba, while improving its own credibility and goodwill across the globe. Over a century ago, the forced inclusion of the Platt Amendment in the 1901 Cuban Constitution allowed the United States to occupy the Guantanamo naval base on the island. It has stood as a symbol of American imperialism and an infringement on Cuba’s sovereignty ever since. Used by Fidel Castro over 50 years ago to legitimize and radicalize the revolution, the naval base is still used by Raúl today to show that there remains a “symbol of solidarity with the rest of the world against the U[nited] S[tates].”27

Ending the occupation of Guantanamo, not simply closing the detainment center, would send a signal to Cubans, while showcasing a new and more engaging foreign policy to the world. It would also severely undercut one of the main sources of Cuban anti-Americanism, simultaneously increasing American legitimacy and weakening the viability of harsh Cuban rhetoric.

### 1NC CP—Travel Ban

#### The United States federal government should remove all restrictions on family-related travel, ease restrictions on education and research-based travel licenses, actively encourage students to visit and study in Cuba, and ease restrictions to allow for one trip every three years for all other Americans.

#### Loosening the travel ban but maintaining the embargo solves and is more politically popular

Perez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]

(3E) Separate the Travel Ban from the Embargo

The embargo and the travel ban have sometimes been grouped together as the same policy, but should instead be dealt with separately. Although most Cuban-Americans endorse the embargo, almost all are opposed to the restrictions on family travel. n50 Separating the travel ban from the embargo would give the U.S. more flexibility as it considers the long-term viability of our current Cuba policy. By adopting this Copernican shift, policymakers could then envision a policy that promotes human rights by loosening the travel restrictions, but maintaining significant elements of the embargo.

That being said, not all travel by U.S. citizens is helpful to our interests. Any loosening of the travel ban should first focus on those restrictions that undermine family unity and academic exchanges. For example, the U.S. has no immediate interest in seeing its high school and college students travel to Cuba for spring break trips, and therefore should not prioritize travel licenses for purely tourist reasons. However, the U.S. does have an interest in sending researchers, study abroad students, graduate professionals, and other academics to the island. Although complete normalization is the ultimate end of any responsible Cuba policy, in the short run the travel ban should be maintained, but loosened considerably, to accommodate more family visits as well as far more academic and cultural exchanges.

Loosening the travel ban is not without precedent; family travel has ebbed and flowed in response to different administrations. For example, [\*206] President Carter lifted the ban entirely in 1977, President Reagan tightened restrictions to only allow certain family travel to the island, President Clinton vacillated between suspending family travel and encouraging it, and President Bush tightened the ban to its strictest level in decades in 2004. n51 Additionally, a policy that loosens the travel ban would have the support of a majority of Cuban-Americans in Florida. By loosening its travel restrictions, the U.S. can once again starkly contrast its policy with the Cuban regime by comparing their respective travel bans. This would translate into an important coup de image for an administration in desperate need of repairing its perception in Latin America.

(3F) Specific Travel Recommendations

(1) Remove all restrictions on family-related travel.

(2) Ease restrictions on education and research-based travel licenses, and actively encourage students to visit and study in Cuba.

(3) Ease restrictions to allow for one trip every three years for all other Americans.

### 2NC/1NR CP—Travel Ban

#### Lifting the travel ban solves—allows public diplomacy

Perez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]

Recommendation 3: Repeal the CAFC to Encourage More Travel

The Obama Administration should continue rescinding the measures implemented in response to the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba reports, especially the travel restrictions and the "Transition Coordinator." Additionally, while conducting its unofficial talks with the Cuban government, the Obama Administration should refocus America's public diplomacy efforts by actively encouraging more travel to Cuba.

(3A) The CAFC Reports Should Be Rescinded in Full

The President, in assembling his Cuba Study Group, must not make the same mistakes that the Bush Administration made in 2004 and 2006. When President Bush first assembled his Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba (CAFC) in 2004, he failed to ensure that pragmatists would have the final say in any recommendations. Instead, the hard-line takeover of the CAFC led to the publication of some rather unhelpful policy recommendations, which the Bush Administration later adopted in full. Some particularly damaging CAFC changes included:

(1) Restricting Family Travel. The CAFC prohibited Cuban Americans from visiting family on the island more than once every three years, while the pre-2004 law allowed yearly visits. The CAFC's explicit failure to include any provisions for emergencies made this restriction particularly painful for many families. For example, if a Cuban American visited his mother in Havana in 2007, and she died in 2008, he would not have been able to go to her funeral because the travel restriction had no exceptions. n31 In addition, the CAFC's report [\*200] also redefined family to exclude aunts, uncles, cousins, nieces, and nephews.

(2) Decreasing Remittances. The CAFC limited remittances to only $ 300 per quarter, one-tenth of the quarterly limit before 2004. n32 This restriction was particularly onerous for Cuban-Americans desperately trying to help their families in Cuba cope with the economic crisis.

(3) Restricting Educational Travel. The CAFC also rescinded many of the educational licenses that were once used by American colleges and universities to send their students to Cuba as part of academic study programs. n33

(4) Minimizing Cultural Exchanges. Halting educational programs was not the only barrier preventing people-to-people contact. The CAFC's report eliminated nearly every cultural exchange that, in the past, had been conducted by sports teams, museums, artists, musicians, writers, and other associations.

(5) Minimizing Religious Exchanges. Although the CAFC did not change statutory language regulating religious exchange, it reinterpreted that language to frustrate the efforts of religious organizations seeking travel exemptions. Prior to 2004, religious travel licenses had been granted routinely in order to allow American congregations to visit with likeminded persons of faith in Cuba.

(6) Transition Coordinator. The CAFC created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. The Bush Administration then named Caleb McCarry as the first Transition Coordinator to oversee U.S. planning for a Cuba-led transition to democracy and a market economy. The creation of an American-based Transition Coordinator ignited a firestorm throughout Cuba, and even amongst the generally pro-American dissident community. n34 The Cuban government successfully used this issue against the opposition.

Although the Obama Administration has since rolled back many of the changes implemented after the CAFC reports were published in 2004 and [\*201] 2006, including the restrictions on family travel and remittances, n35 the administration has yet to ease the restrictions on religious, academic, and cultural travel to Cuba. Additionally, the administration has not eliminated the Transition Coordinator. While there are some useful sections of each CAFC report, the entire project has been tainted by the hostile and aggressive nature in which it was administered with respect to Cuba. Unfortunately, the positive qualities of the reports cannot restore their credibility. As a result, the CAFC reports should be rescinded in full.

(3B) Increased Travel as a Tool of Public Diplomacy -

A Copernican Shift

When Copernicus first claimed that the Sun, rather than the Earth, was the center of the solar system, he did not suddenly lose sight of our planet. Policymaking circles in the U.S. could use a Copernican shift of their own when analyzing the travel ban debate. Given the Cuban government's totalitarianism, its legitimacy and credibility should be questioned at all times, but simply preventing Americans from visiting the island does not chip away at Cuba's totalitarian pillars. We should reframe the issue by searching for other ways to delegitimize the regime. One possible solution is to facilitate the flow of visitors to and from the island, which would give the Cuban people access to the outside world, and provide them with the very unpropagandized information that the Cuban government would otherwise deny them. This Copernican shift—that is, placing travel within the orbit of change—would not lose sight of our end goal (an open Cuba), but would simply shift the emphasis away from breaking the Cuban regime with isolation. It instead would use travel to do an end-run around Cuba's self-imposed information blockade. Once travel to Cuba is properly seen as a way to pierce the Cuban government's totalitarian veil, and is no longer seen as a hindrance to reform on the island, a more pragmatic travel policy can then be crafted.

As mentioned above, the Obama Administration recently removed many of the restrictions on travel and remittances imposed during the Bush presidency, n36 however it should not stop there. Our initial backchannel and unofficial discussions with the Cuban Government should go hand-in-hand with an increased American presence on the island. To that end, the U.S. should encourage more travel to Cuba by easing the travel ban as much as [\*202] possible. The President has the authority to ease travel restrictions on "family visits, people-to-people educational activities, academic educational activities (including for secondary schools), and participation in amateur or semi-professional sports competitions." n37 By doing so, America can dip into its deep reserve of citizen-diplomats before it reestablishes state-to-state diplomatic relations with Havana.

Effective public diplomacy establishes contacts directly with the people, not the government, of a foreign country, providing foreign populations with a deeper understanding of American values. n38 The U.S. had great success with public diplomacy during the Cold War, where the tactic was used as a means to improve Americans' understanding of populations living under closed regimes. Every U.S. citizen can serve as a public diplomat when traveling abroad, helping to influence groups of individuals and institutions, and to shape public opinion in other countries. Although the Interests Section in Havana has career diplomats who work on "public diplomacy" in another sense—that is, establishing nongovernmental contacts for the State Department—this notion of public diplomacy emphasizes nongovernmental contact on both sides.

Effectively engaging Cuba will require a much higher degree of cultural and historical understanding by Americans in both the public and private sectors. Public diplomacy is not very useful if it is confined to government-sponsored propaganda (which is seen as inauthentic) or official activity conducted within an embassy's walls (which is inaccessible to the general population). In Cuba, however, the United States has no official embassy, just a leanly-staffed Interests Section. Moreover, America's diplomatic efforts in Cuba are further handcuffed by the mutually restrictive measures the U.S. and Cuba each impose on one another's diplomats. n39 Encouraging more diplomacy by citizens is a relatively costless endeavor that is not only genuine, but also avoids the trappings of officialdom.

A major impediment to public diplomacy efforts, however, will be the travel ban, in place in one form or another, since January 16, 1961, when the State Department declared that travel to Cuba would be contrary to the foreign policy and national interest of the United States. Since 1967, the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control has enforced the travel ban under the auspices of a currency regulation. n40

#### Easing the travel ban will spark political change in Cuba—influences perspective

Perez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]

(8C) Ease the Travel Ban to Increase the Flow of Information to the Cuban People

A steady flow of information would help highlight the cracks in Cuba's system of government. For example, public outrage over Cuba's economic decline has been muted because the public has a limited perception of their relative poverty since global interaction is so restricted. Highlighting relative economic disparities increases the potential for popular discontent. n151

The best way the U.S. can facilitate the flow of information into the island is by encouraging more travel to Cuba. Easing the travel ban could go a long way toward puncturing the Cuban regime's stranglehold on public perception of the outside world. Since the U.S. remains the only country that bans its citizens from visiting the island, citizens from other countries have been visiting the island for decades, especially since the fall of the Soviet Union.

These visits, for business, family, and tourism, have helped expose millions of Cubans to life outside the island. Nevertheless, most tourist visits have had a limited effect since tourists tend not to have personal contacts on the island, and are thus relegated to isolated resorts, and minimal interaction with the public. Moreover, those who visit the island for business purposes usually meet with government bureaucrats in charge of a particular project or investment. Although these relationships are important, there is a qualitative difference between visits for the purposes of tourism, and visits for academic, business, and familial purposes.

American academics and students bring powerful ideas, as well as alternative thoughts and paradigms about life outside Cuba. Even the most prestigious Cuban academics are regularly denied exit visas, and thus are unable to travel to international conferences, or develop academic contacts outside the island. The U.S. can get around this restriction by encouraging more academic travel to the island.

Cuban doctors, economists, intellectuals, lawyers, scientists, professors, and especially students, will populate the vanguard of any future reform movement. Promoting contact between their American counterparts will expose these individuals to the requisite ideas that they can later use to articulate their demands for change. Indeed, today's young students represent America's greatest public diplomacy assets since they tend to view themselves as global citizens, and favor "wiser internationalism." n152

Increased family visits will also help puncture the regime's legitimacy. The vast majority of Cuban exiles live in the United States, and most have family that remained on the island. When they visit they tend to stay with their families, rather than in isolated resorts. As a result, the conversations and interactions they have are more personal, more intimate, and ultimately more consequential.

[\*233] The stories visitors bring with them from the U.S. and the rest of the world hold more credibility than the radio signals sent in from southern Florida. n153 This is a form of communication that the regime cannot control since the messages brought by family members are not easily spun in the government's favor. In this way, "increased people-to-people flows thus add to the pressures for change in Cuba." n154 Even when weighed against the drawbacks of increased travel to Cuba, namely increasing the amount of hard currency available to the government, the benefits of a policy that eases the travel ban still justify its implementation.

Totalitarian regimes thrive by not only concentrating power in the central government, but also by removing the people's ability to exercise influence or engage in real learning independent of government interference. A larger flow of information would be impossible to manage, empowering each person with access to it. A steady stream of information would help dissidents, proto civil society groups, and other organizations work around the Cuban government's restrictions. Moreover, this information invasion would not only make Cuban society more permeable, but would also make the regime more malleable.