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### Plan

#### The United States federal government should end the economic embargo on Cuba.

### Advantage One is Relations

#### Ending the embargo would expand credibility, US soft power, and improve US-Cuban relations.

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Conclusion

The two countries’ histories have long been intertwined, particularly after the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 gave rise to the American belief that it would become the hemisphere’s protector. Until the immediate aftermath of Fidel Castro’s revolution, Cuba provided a testing ground for the promotion of American ideals, social beliefs, and foreign policies.

In the context of Raúl shifting course in Cuba, the Obama administration has the opportunity to highlight the benefits of both the use of soft power and a foreign policy of engagement. As evidence mounts that the United States is ready to engage countries that enact domestic reforms, its legitimacy and influence will grow. Perhaps future political leaders, in Iran or North Korea for example, will be more willing to make concessions knowing that the United States will return in kind.

The United States should not wait for extensive democratization before further engaging Cuba, however. One legacy of the Cold War is that Communism has succeeded only where it grew out of its own, often nationalistic, revolutions. As it has with China and Vietnam, the United States should look closely at the high payoffs stemming from engagement. By improving relations, America can enhance its own influence on the island’s political structure and human rights policies.

At home, with the trade deficit and national debt rising, the economic costs of the embargo are amplified. Recent studies estimate that the US economy foregoes up to $4.84 billion a year and the Cuban economy up to $685 million a year.50 While US-Cuban economic interests align, political considerations inside America have shifted, as “commerce seems to be trumping anti-Communism and Florida ideologues.”51 Clearly, public opinion also favors a new Cuba policy, with 65 percent of Americans now ready for a shift in the country’s approach to its neighboring island.52

At this particular moment in the history of US-Cuban relations, there is tremendous promise for a breakthrough in relations. In a post-Cold War world, Cuba no longer presents a security threat to the united States, but instead provides it with economic potential. American leaders cannot forget the fact that an economic embargo, combined with diplomatic isolation, has failed to bring democracy to Cuba for over 50 years.

American policymakers should see Cuba as an opportunity to reap the political, economic, and strategic rewards of shifting its own policies toward engagement. By ending the economic embargo and normalizing diplomatic relations with the island, President Obama would indicate that he is truly willing to extend his hand once America’s traditional adversaries unclench their fists.

#### Cuba is the lynchpin to Latin American relations, goodwill, solving anti-americanism and successful soft power

Perez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]

Anti-Americanism has become the political chant de jour for leaders seeking long-term as well as short-term gains in Latin American elections. In Venezuela, the anti-American rhetoric spewed by Hugo Chavez masks his otherwise autocratic tendencies, while countries like Bolivia and Ecuador tilt further away from Washington, both rhetorically and substantively. The former expelled the U.S. Ambassador in October 2008, and the latter has refused to renew Washington's lease on an airbase traditionally used for counter-narcotics missions. The systemic neglect for eight years during the Bush Administration meant that political capital was never seriously spent dealing with issues affecting the region. Because of this, President Bush was unable to get much headway with his proposal to reform immigration, and his free trade agreement with Colombia encountered significant opposition in Congress. Recent examples of U.S. unilateralism, disregard for international law and norms, and a growing financial crisis, have all been seized by a new generation of populist Latin American leaders who stoke anti-American sentiment.

The region, however, is absolutely critical to our national interest and security. Over thirty percent of our oil comes from Latin America - more than the U.S. imports from the Middle East. Additionally, over half of the foreign-born population in the United States is Latin American, meaning that a significant portion of American society is intrinsically tied to the region. n1 These immigrants, as well as their sons and daughters, have already begun to take their place amongst America's social, cultural, and political elite.

Just south of America's borders, a deepening polarization is spreading throughout the entire region. In the last few years ideological allies in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela have written and approved new constitutions that have consolidated the power of the executive, while extending - or in Venezuela's case eliminating - presidential term limits. In Venezuela the polarization has been drawn along economic lines, whereby Chavez's base of support continues to be poor Venezuelans. In Bolivia the polarization has been drawn along racial lines: the preamble to the new Bolivian constitution, approved in January 2009, makes reference to the "disastrous colonial times," a moment in history that Bolivians of Andean-descent particularly lament. Those regions in Bolivia with the most people of European or mixed descent have consistently voted for increased provincial autonomy and against the constitutional changes proposed by President Morales. Perhaps due to its sweeping changes, the new Constitution was rejected by four of Bolivia's nine provinces. n2 Like Bolivia, Latin America is still searching for its identity.

[\*191] Traditionally the U.S. has projected its influence by using varying combinations of hard and soft power. It has been a long time since the United States last sponsored or supported military action in Latin America, and although highly context-dependent, it is very likely that Latin American citizens and their governments would view any overt display of American hard power in the region negatively. n3 One can only imagine the fodder an American military excursion into Latin America would provide for a leader like Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, or Evo Morales of Bolivia. Soft power, on the other hand, can win over people and governments without resorting to coercion, but is limited by other factors.

The key to soft power is not simply a strong military, though having one helps, but rather an enduring sense of legitimacy that can then be projected across the globe to advance particular policies. The key to this legitimacy is a good image and a reputation as a responsible actor on the global and regional stage. A good reputation and image can go a long way toward generating goodwill, which ultimately will help the U.S. when it tries to sell unpopular ideas and reforms in the region. n4

In order to effectively employ soft power in Latin America, the U.S. must repair its image by going on a diplomatic offensive and reminding, not just Latin America's leaders, but also the Latin American people, of the important relationship between the U.S. and Latin America. Many of the problems facing Latin America today cannot be addressed in the absence of U.S. leadership and cooperation. Working with other nations to address these challenges is the best way to shore up legitimacy, earn respect, and repair America's image. Although this proposal focuses heavily on Cuba, every country in Latin America is a potential friend. Washington will have to not only strengthen its existing relationships in the region, but also win over new allies, who look to us for "ideas and solutions, not lectures." n5

When analyzing ecosystems, environmental scientists seek out "keystone species." These are organisms that, despite their small size, function as lynchpins for, or barometers of, the entire system's stability. Cuba, despite its size and isolation, is a keystone nation in Latin America, having disproportionately dominated Washington's policy toward the region for decades. n6 As a result of its continuing tensions with Havana, America's reputation [\*192] in the region has suffered, as has its ability to deal with other countries. n7 For fifty years, Latin American governments that hoped to endear themselves to the U.S. had to pass the Cuba "litmus test." But now the tables have turned, and the Obama Administration, if it wants to repair America's image in the region, will have to pass a Cuba litmus test of its own. n8 In short, America must once again be admired if we are going to expect other countries to follow our example. To that end, warming relations with Cuba would have a reverberating effect throughout Latin America, and would go a long way toward creating goodwill.

#### It would provide immediate and substantial benefits to the US image globally

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From an image stand point repealing the sanctions and removing the embargo is symbolic. It shows Cuba and the world that although the United States is pro democracy, it does not wish to impose its values on other nations. The Cuba Democracy Act was an attempt to force democratic changes in Cuba.10 By repealing the act the United States, illustrates that it respects the sovereignty of nations. Considering that this Act did allow for the application of U.S. law in a foreign country11, repealing it not only sends the message about U.S. views on sovereignty but also shows that the administration is taking steps to ensure that sovereignty is actually respected.

Repealing the Helms-Burton Law will certainly stimulate foreign investment in Cuba as well. Many foreign countries were leery of investing in Cuba out of fear of being sued or losing property under the provisions established by the Helms-Burton Act.12 This return of foreign investment will further secure Cuba's place in the global marketplace. It also will help to silence skeptics who will question U.S. intentions. Since the sanctions against Cuba were unilateral U.S. actions, an unsolicited change in course will undoubtedly spark speculation. Allowing all countries to invest in Cuba again underscores the United States' position of desiring for all countries to participate in the global market place. It is difficult to imagine that the benefits of lifting the embargo will not be immediate and substantial in regards to the United States reputation in the world. Looking at the long-term benefits of removing the sanctions, the two benefits that stand out the most are trade and fuel.

#### Independently - Soft Power limits the size and frequency of conflicts around the world.

Nye 96 Professor of International Relations – Harvard University [Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 1995/1996, “Conflicts After the Cold War,” Washington Quarterly, 19:1, Winter]

Leadership by the United States, as the world's leading economy, its most powerful military force, and a leading democracy, is a key factor in limiting the frequency and destructiveness of great power, regional, and communal conflicts. The paradox of the post-cold war role of the United States is that it is the most powerful state in terms of both "hard" power resources (its economy and military forces) and "soft" ones (the appeal of its political system and culture), yet it is not so powerful that it can achieve all its international goals by acting alone. The United States lacks both the international and domestic prerequisites to resolve every conflict, and in each case its role must be proportionate to its interests at stake and the costs of pursuing them. Yet the United States can continue to enable and mobilize international coalitions to pursue shared security interests, whether or not the United States itself supplies large military forces. The U.S. role will thus not be that of a lone global policeman; rather, the United States can frequently serve as the sheriff of the posse, leading shifting coalitions of friends and allies to address shared security concerns within the legitimizing framework of international organizations. This requires sustained attention to the infrastructure and institutional mechanisms that make U.S. leadership effective and joint action possible: forward stationing and preventive deployments of U.S. and allied forces, prepositioning of U.S. and allied equipment, advance planning and joint training to ensure interoperability with allied forces, and steady improvement in the conflict resolution abilities of an interlocking set of bilateral alliances, regional security organizations and alliances, and global institutions.

#### Action now is key – removing the embargo would boost overall Latin relations and undermine the perception of US isolation globally

Perez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]

[\*193] One of the lasting legacies of America's Cuba policy is that it isolates the U.S. and represents stubbornness in the face of ineffectiveness. After the 2008 election the calls to change U.S. policy toward Cuba were echoed by both allies and non-allies, including Brazil, n9 Colombia, n10 and Mexico, as well as Venezuela n11 and Bolivia. n12 The European Union has also expressed its opposition to "the extraterritoriality extension of the United States embargo." n13 Each year the UN considers a resolution condemning America's economic embargo of Cuba, and each year the measure is overwhelmingly adopted. In 2008 the vote was 184-4, meaning the U.S. policy to isolate Cuba has had the ironic effect of isolating the United States. Additionally, the travel ban may violate multiple articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. n14 Fortunately, for three reasons, the opportunity is ripe for a fresh approach to this old problem.

First, leadership changes in both countries allow each to signal a new way forward without necessarily repudiating long-held positions. Both governments have signaled a willingness to talk, which is already a step in the right direction. Specifically, within the United States, demographic changes in the Cuban-American community have led to attitudinal changes toward U.S.-Cuban relations. Florida International University's yearly polls have shown a trend whereby an increasing number of Cuban-Americans are opposed to the current U.S. policy of economic and political isolation.

In 2008, those polls indicated that a majority of Cuban-Americans opposed the restrictions on family travel and remittances. n15 These polls also indicated that long-term demographic trends are breaking in the Democrats' favor: the divide is now between older Cuban Americans who still vote Republican, and the younger generation, increasingly more numerous, who lean Democrat. Not only did President Obama outpace Senator John Kerry's [\*194] 2004 performance by ten points, but he won the twenty-nine or younger Cuban-American vote with fifty-five percent. n16 This shift in public opinion, combined with the fact that President Obama won Florida's electoral votes during the 2008 election despite narrowly losing the Cuban vote, gives the Administration a freer hand to construct a new policy with relatively little political costs.

Moreover, migration from Cuba has picked up pace in recent years, suggesting that the aging hardliners will continue to lose clout relative to voting power. According to the Institute of Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami, over 131,000 Cubans have arrived and settled in South Florida since 2005. n17 In fact, a policy that eventually normalizes relations with Cuba would probably carry votes in Florida, and the rest of the south. n18 These domestic changes mean that the U.S. can more easily reorient its Latin American policy to encourage constructive engagement that inspires optimism and hope rather than fear and anger.

Second, reforms recently enacted in Cuba indicate that the post Fidel Castro leadership is more likely to embrace pragmatism. In recent years, and especially since Raul Castro took over the presidency from his brother Fidel, Cuba's leadership has slightly moderated its political repression. While Cuba still holds political prisoners in custody, the total number is down from 316 in July 2006, when Raul took the helm from his brother, to less than 170 today - the lowest total since Fidel Castro seized power in 1959. n19 However, these political changes have been small, and do not yet represent structural or fundamental reforms in the long term, especially since they are all easily reversible. Nevertheless, these political changes, combined with small economic liberalizations in the agricultural, technological, and tourist sectors, represent the first significant reforms under the new leadership of Raul Castro.

[\*195] Third, the Obama Administration ignores Latin America at its own peril. Latin America's importance to the United States is growing by the day, and cannot be overstated. While the issue of U.S.-Cuba relations is obviously of smaller import than many other issues currently affecting the world (i.e., the ailing economy, climate change, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction), addressing it would also involve correspondingly less effort than those issues, but could potentially lead to a disproportionately high return by making regional cooperation more likely. n20 In order to confront any of the major world issues facing the United States, Washington must find a way to cooperate with its neighbors, who generally view U.S. policy toward Cuba as the most glaring symbol of its historic inability to constructively engage the region. These three reasons combine for a perfect storm: to the extent that a healthy U.S.-Cuban relationship would mean a healthier U.S.-Latin America relationship, the former should be pursued with an unprecedented vigor, one that has been absent for the last fifty years.

#### U.S. Latin American relations are at a crossroads.

Shifter 12 President of Inter-American Dialogue [Michael Shifter, “Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” April, IAD Policy Report, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf]

Simply addressing an unfinished agenda is not enough. Both the United States and Latin America need to do more to exploit the enormous untapped opportunities of their relationship in economics, trade, and energy. They need to work together to deal with global and regional problems. And they need to project common values, including peace, democracy, human rights, expansion of equal opportunity, and social mobility. They need to breathe new life and vigor into hemispheric relations.

If the United States and Latin America do not make the effort now, the chance may slip away. The most likely scenario then would be marked by a continued drift in their relationship, further deterioration of hemisphere-wide institutions, a reduced ability and willingness to deal with a range of common problems, and a spate of missed opportunities for more robust growth and greater social equity. The United States and Latin America would go their separate ways, manage their affairs independently of one another, and forego the opportunities that could be harvested by a more productive relationship.

There are risks of simply maintaining the status quo. Urgent problems will inevitably arise that require trust and effective collaboration to resolve. And there is a chance that tensions between the United States and Latin America could become much worse, adversely affecting everyone’s interests and wellbeing. It is time to seize the moment and overhaul hemispheric relations.

#### Latin American relations are vital to the US. Needed to combat global problems like proliferation, climate change, and insure economic growth. Only engagement solves

Zedillo et al 08 Commission Co-Chair for the Brookings Institute Report on the Partnership for the Americas and former President of Mexico [Ernesto Zedillo, Thomas R. Pickering, etc, Rethinking U.S.–Latin American Relations A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World. Report of the Partnership for the Americas Commission, The Brookings Institution, November 2008, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2008/11/24%20latin%20america%20partnership/1124_latin_america_partnership.PDF>]

The Need for a Hemispheric Partnership

Historically, the United States and Latin America have rarely developed a genuine and sustained partnership to address regional—let alone global—challenges. Mutual distrust is partly to blame. Also, the LAC countries were often not ready to make stable commitments. The United States had other preoccupations and did not make hemispheric partnership a priority. Problems and solutions were seen from Washington as country-specific and were managed mostly on a country-bycountry basis through bilateral channels. Meanwhile, multilateral forums—such as the Organization of American States and the summits of hemispheric leaders—ran out of steam, became mired in confrontation, or remained underresourced.

If a hemispheric partnership remains elusive, the costs to the United States and its neighbors will be high, in terms of both growing risks and missed opportunities. Without a partnership, the risk that criminal networks pose to the region’s people and institutions will continue to grow. Peaceful nuclear technology may be adopted more widely, but without proper safeguards, the risks of nuclear proliferation will increase. Adaptation to climate change will take place through isolated, improvised measures by individual countries, rather than through more effective efforts based on mutual learning and coordination. Illegal immigration to the United States will continue unabated and unregulated, adding to an ever-larger underclass that lives and works at the margins of the law. Finally, the countries around the hemisphere, including the United States, will lose valuable opportunities to tap new markets, make new investments, and access valuable resources.

It is important to note at the outset that the term “partnership” as used in this report does not mean equal responsibility for all. The asymmetries between the United States and its neighbors are large and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Partnership here means a type of international cooperation whereby a group of countries identifies common interests, objectives, and solutions, and then each partner country undertakes responsibilities according to its own economic and political capacities to generate shared benefits.

Today, four changes in the region have made a hemispheric partnership both possible and necessary. First, the key challenges faced by the United States and the hemisphere’s other countries— such as securing sustainable energy supplies, combating and adapting to climate change, and combating organized crime and drug trafficking—have become so complex and deeply transnational that they cannot be managed or overcome by any single country. Washington needs partners in the LAC region with a shared sense of responsibility and a common stake in the future.

For example, drug trafficking and its associated criminal networks have now spread so widely across the hemisphere that they can no longer be regarded as a “U.S. problem,” a “Colombian problem,” or a “Mexican problem.” The threat posed by these networks can only be countered through coordinated efforts across producing, consuming, and transshipment countries, all of which have a shared interest in controlling the flow of arms, money, vehicles, and drugs. The process of combating and adapting to climate change also exemplifies the need for a hemispheric partnership. All carbon-emitting societies contribute to the problem to different degrees, and all will experience its consequences. The solutions—ranging from developing alternative fuels to adapting to ecological shocks—all require sustained cooperation among the hemisphere’s countries.

The second change is that the LAC countries are diversifying their international economic relations. Their range of trading and investment partners is expanding, with China in particular playing a prominent role in the region. Chinese imports from the LAC countries increased twentyfold between 1990 and 2005, while Chinese exports to the region grew even faster, from $620 million in 1990 to $37 billion in 2005. Latin America is also attracting significant foreign investment from nontraditional sources. Between just 2003 and 2005, the stock of Chinese foreign direct investment in the LAC region increased by 40 percent. China has become a key buyer of commodities, driving up prices and reversing the long-term decline in the region’s terms of trade. Meanwhile, the Caribbean countries have recently signed an Economic Partnership Agreement with the European Union, immediately opening all European markets and gradually opening Caribbean ones. With more valuable exports and less expensive manufactured imports, living standards in the LAC region have improved significantly.

At the same time, many LAC countries have moved beyond their traditional reliance on resources from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank. Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Brazil now enjoy investment-grade status from credit-rating agencies and in recent years have been able to raise capital readily in international markets. The same is true of several other countries, including Colombia, El Salvador, Panama, and Uruguay, which until the recent financial crisis enjoyed ready access to private international capital. Regionally owned institutions, such as the Andean Development Corporation and the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, have also reduced the region’s dependence on traditional sources of capital.

Some Latin American countries are investing abroad on an unprecedented scale. In 2006, for example, Brazil invested more abroad ($28 billion) than it received in foreign direct investment ($19 billion). In Chile, private pension funds and the government have become active international investors. Surpluses have allowed Venezuela to inject billions of dollars into other countries, particularly through subsidized oil exports. Many Latin American multinationals—such as Brazil’s Vale, Gerdau, and Odebrecht; and Mexico’s CEMEX, America Movil, and Grupo FEMSA—have become global corporate giants. The current crisis may no doubt affect the relative magnitude of these investments, but economic relationships in the hemisphere will continue to diversify as the world economy recovers.

The third change is that the LAC countries are diversifying their political and diplomatic relations. The most notable example is Brazil, which has opened thirty-two new embassies in the past five years. Together with Venezuela, Brazil is playing a more active political role in the region through the Union of South American Nations, which is already active at the presidential level and is expected to become a key forum for the discussion of defense issues. Mexico and Brazil are also playing prominent roles in international forums and organizations, including the finance ministers’ Group of Twenty and the trade ministers’ Group of Twenty. Brazil has announced its intention to join the Organization of the Petroleum-Exporting Countries and the Paris Club. Chile and Brazil are expected to become members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in the not-too-distant future. Mexico, Peru, and Chile are active members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. In sum, this diversification of political and economic relations reflects many LAC countries’ new confidence in their capacity to chart their own course in the world.

Their enhanced confidence and autonomy will make many LAC countries much less responsive to U.S. policies that are perceived as patronizing, intrusive, or prescriptive, and they will be more responsive to policies that engage them as partners on issues of mutual concern. Also, the LAC countries’ diversification of economic and political relations means that Washington will have to compete with governments both outside and within the region for regional influence. In particular, Brasília and Caracas are both vying for leadership in South America; and though they may have different visions for regional integration and different ways to approach other governments, they agree that Washington should play a more limited role in their part of the world.

The fourth change is that, today, the LAC countries are better positioned to act as reliable partners. Despite remaining governance challenges, the vast majority of these countries are stable democracies for which competitive elections and peaceful transitions of power are the norm, not the exception. Throughout these countries, civil society groups now participate extensively in the policymaking process, and there is much less tolerance of violence as a means of political expression.

Economic progress has also made the LAC countries more reliable partners. Leaders, including some on the left, are committed to fiscal responsibility. Most central banks are now independent bodies focused on inflation control. Exchange rates largely reflect market forces. As a result, many LAC countries can now look beyond their borders and commit to sustained partnerships and responsibilities on regional and global issues.

In sum, the countries of the LAC region have made significant strides in economic and social development and will continue to prosper even if U.S. leaders remain disengaged. Washington must decide whether it wants to actively reengage and benefit from the region’s dynamism and resources or be sidelined as other economic and political actors fill the void left by its absence.

#### Proliferation risks nuclear conflict—inexperienced nations will be more likely to use their nukes

Horowitz 9­­—Professor of Political Science at University of Pennsylvania [Michael Horowitz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons and International Conflict: Does Experience Matter?” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Volume 53 Number 2, April 2009 pg. 234-257]

Learning as states gain experience with nuclear weapons is complicated. While to some extent nuclear acquisition might provide information about resolve or capabilities, it also generates uncertainty about the way an actual conflict would go – given the new risk of nuclear escalation – and uncertainty about relative capabilities. Rapid proliferation may especially heighten uncertainty given the potential for reasonable states to disagree at times about the quality of the capabilities each possesses. 3

What follows is an attempt to describe the implications of inexperience and incomplete information on the behavior of nuclear states and their potential opponents over time. Since it is impossible to detail all possible lines of argumentation and possible responses, the following discussion is necessarily incomplete. This is a first step. The acquisition of nuclear weapons increases the confidence of adopters in their ability to impose costs in the case of a conflict and the expectations of likely costs if war occurs by potential opponents. The key questions are whether nuclear states learn over time about how to leverage nuclear weapons and the implications of that learning, along with whether or not actions by nuclear states, over time, convey information that leads to changes in the expectations of their behavior – shifts in uncertainty – on the part of potential adversaries.

Learning to Leverage?

When a new state acquires nuclear weapons, how does it influence the way the state behaves and how might that change over time? Though nuclear acquisition might be orthogonal to a particular dispute, it might be related to a particular security challenge, might signal revisionist aims with regard to an enduring dispute, or might signal the desire to reinforce the status quo.

This section focuses on how acquiring nuclear weapons influences both the new nuclear state and potential adversaries. In theory, system-wide perceptions of nuclear danger could allow new nuclear states to partially skip the early Cold War learning process concerning the risks of nuclear war and enter a proliferated world more cognizant of nuclear brinksmanship and bargaining than their predecessors. However, each new nuclear state has to resolve its own particular civil-military issues surrounding operational control and plan its national strategy in light of its new capabilities. Empirical research by Sagan, Feaver, and Blair suggests that viewing the behavior of other states does not create the necessary tacit knowledge; there is no substitute for experience when it comes to handling a nuclear arsenal, even if experience itself cannot totally prevent accidents (Blair 1993; Feaver 1992; Sagan 1993). Sagan contends that civil-military instability in many likely new proliferators and pressures generated by the requirements to handle the responsibility of dealing with nuclear weapons will **skew decision-making towards more offensive strategies** (Sagan 1995). The questions surrounding Pakistan’s nuclear command and control suggest there is no magic bullet when it comes to new nuclear powers making control and delegation decisions (Bowen and Wolvén 1999).

Sagan and others focus on inexperience on the part of new nuclear states as a key behavioral driver. Inexperienced operators, and the bureaucratic desire to “justify” the costs spent developing nuclear weapons, combined with organizational biases that may favor escalation to avoid decapitation, the “use it or lose it” mindset, may cause new nuclear states to **adopt riskier launch postures**, like launch on warning, or at least be perceived that way by other states (Blair 1993; Feaver 1992; Sagan 1995). 4

Acquiring nuclear weapons could alter state preferences and make them more likely to escalate disputes once they start, given their new capabilities.5 But their general lack of experience at leveraging their nuclear arsenal and effectively communicating nuclear threats could mean new nuclear states will be more likely to select adversaries poorly and find themselves in disputes with resolved adversaries that will reciprocate militarized challenges.

The “nuclear experience” logic also suggests that more experienced nuclear states should gain knowledge over time from nuclearized interactions that helps leaders effectively identify the situations in which their nuclear arsenal is likely to make a difference. Experienced nuclear states learn to select into cases where their comparative advantage, nuclear weapons, is more likely to be effective, increasing the probability that an adversary will not reciprocate.

Coming from a slightly different perspective, uncertainty about the consequences of proliferation on the balance of power and the behavior of new nuclear states on the part of their potential adversaries could also shape behavior in similar ways (Schelling 1966; Blainey 1988). While a stable and credible nuclear arsenal communicates clear information about the likely costs of conflict, **in the short-term** nuclear proliferation is likely to increase **uncertainty** about the trajectory of a war, **the balance of power**, and the preferences of the adopter.

#### Ignore warming critics – action is key, the science is indisputable

Pittock 10—led the Climate Impact Group in CSIRO until his retirement in 1999. He contributed to or was the lead author of all four major reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. He was awarded a Public Service Medal in 1999 and is CSIRO Honorary Fellow. (Barrie, Climate Change: The Science, Impacts, and Solutions, 2010, pg. 240)

Is the science credible?

As noted in Chapters 4 and 5, there are many uncertainties in relation to climate change. Nevertheless, the overwhelming body of evidence from relevant scientists is that there is a high probability that human-induced global warming, with associated changes in other climatic conditions, is happening. Moreover, the evidence is that warming will continue, at an accelerating pace, through the twenty-first century and beyond, unless urgent measures are taken to slow and eventually reverse the increase in greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.

These conclusions are hotly contested by a relatively small number of contrarians, discussed in Chapter 4, who for various reasons accuse so-called "˜establishment scientists' of bias and poor science. Genuine sceptics exist and are welcomed, as they keep scientists on their toes and ensure that what is accepted is well based and relevant to the real world. However, contrarians often present misleading arguments, and frequently seize upon any discussion of uncertainty as an excuse for dismissing the whole topic, rather than arguing for a balanced policy of risk management. Too often contrarians repeat old arguments that have already been thoroughly discredited.

#### Warming risks extinction

Tickell 08 (Oliver, Climate Researcher, The Gaurdian, “On a planet 4C hotter, all we can prepare for is extinction”, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/11/climatechange>)

We need to get prepared for four degrees of global warming, Bob Watson told the Guardian last week. At first sight this looks like wise counsel from the climate science adviser to Defra. But the idea that we could adapt to a 4C rise is absurd and dangerous. Global warming on this scale would be a catastrophe that would mean, in the immortal words that Chief Seattle probably never spoke, "the end of living and the beginning of survival" for humankind. Or perhaps the beginning of our extinction. The collapse of the polar ice caps would become inevitable, bringing long-term sea level rises of 70-80 metres. All the world's coastal plains would be lost, complete with ports, cities, transport and industrial infrastructure, and much of the world's most productive farmland. The world's geography would be transformed much as it was at the end of the last ice age, when sea levels rose by about 120 metres to create the Channel, the North Sea and Cardigan Bay out of dry land. Weather would become extreme and unpredictable, with more frequent and severe droughts, floods and hurricanes. The Earth's carrying capacity would be hugely reduced. Billions would undoubtedly die. Watson's call was supported by the government's former chief scientific adviser, Sir David King, who warned that "if we get to a four-degree rise it is quite possible that we would begin to see a runaway increase". This is a remarkable understatement. The climate system is already experiencing significant feedbacks, notably the summer melting of the Arctic sea ice. The more the ice melts, the more sunshine is absorbed by the sea, and the more the Arctic warms. And as the Arctic warms, the release of billions of tonnes of methane – a greenhouse gas 70 times stronger than carbon dioxide over 20 years – captured under melting permafrost is already under way. To see how far this process could go, look 55.5m years to the Palaeocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum, when a global temperature increase of 6C coincided with the release of about 5,000 gigatonnes of carbon into the atmosphere, both as CO2 and as methane from bogs and seabed sediments. Lush subtropical forests grew in polar regions, and sea levels rose to 100m higher than today. It appears that an initial warming pulse triggered other warming processes. Many scientists warn that this historical event may be analogous to the present: the warming caused by human emissions could propel us towards a similar hothouse Earth.

#### Loss of influence in Latin American undermines our overall primacy

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The Globalization of Latin America

The United States has long been wary of foreign powers meddling in the Western Hemisphere for reasons both real and imagined. In recent years, Latin America’s increasingly diverse international relations have stoked these fears anew, as the US has witnessed the region draw closer to global rivals just as American influence is facing unprecedented challenges. The warm embrace that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad received from Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez and, more recently, Brazil’s President Lula, provides the most dramatic example of a new trend that has seen Latin America and the Caribbean seek greater independence from the United States while deepening ties with such emerging powers outside the hemisphere as China, India and Russia. To be sure, many US policy makers intellectually understand that this increasingly complex mosaic of international relations is the product of a more globalized world. Still, there is an underlying current of unease that American primacy in the Western Hemisphere is being threatened in subtle but important ways.

Of course, there has long been a precept in US foreign policy that was developed to address precisely this problem. It is called the Monroe Doctrine, after its creator President James Monroe, and it represents the iconic assertion of the United States’ right to oppose foreign powers in the Western Hemisphere. Today, the realities that were the foundation for the Monroe Doctrine have fundamentally changed, but the United States has been slow to adjust its attitudes and mindset accordingly. In order to be effective in Latin America, the Obama administration recognizes that it must adapt to an increasingly globalized era in inter-American relations. As a result, the US has attempted to forge a middle path between counterproductive efforts to isolate countries with which it has difficult relations and efforts to engage Latin America’s rising powers that show little interest in reciprocating American goodwill. In May 2009, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, speaking at a public forum in Washington, D.C., was asked how the US should manage the challenges posed by Hugo Chávez, the Venezuelan leader who has positioned himself as the chief opponent of American power in Latin America. Secretary Clinton (2009) used the opportunity to rebut the George W. Bush administration’s record in dealing with leftist leaders in the hemisphere, saying that “the prior administration tried to isolate them . . . It didn’t work.” She continued, I have to say that I don’t think in today’s world, where it’s a multipolar world, where we are competing for attention and relationships with at least the Russians, the Chinese, the Iranians, that it’s in our interest to turn our backs on countries in our own hemisphere.

Clinton also stated that the new engagement between extra hemispheric actors and certain Latin American countries is “quite disturbing” (Clinton, 2009).

Secretary Clinton is hardly the first US public official to cast China’s growing presence in Latin America as a sign that the US should deepen its own engagement in the region. During the 2008 US presidential campaign, China’s growing influence in Latin America was portrayed as a symptom of the perceived neglect of the region by the Bush administration. In his first debate with Republican candidate John McCain, Obama highlighted China’s role as a potential challenge: We’ve got challenges, for example, with China, where we are borrowing billions of dollars. They now hold a trillion dollars’ worth of our debt. And they are active . . . in regions like Latin America, and Asia, and Africa. The conspicuousness of their presence is only matched by our absence, because we’ve been focused on Iraq. (New York Times, 2009).

To its credit, the Obama administration has adopted a more nuanced approach, with regard to China in Latin America. The US posture has continued in the largely clear-headed and restrained direction that was initiated by the second Bush administration. Indeed, in the fall of 2009, Frank Mora, the top official managing Western Hemisphere affairs at the Pentagon, suggested that China could usefully help Latin America to address the issues of ungoverned territories, lack of economic opportunity, and narcotics and arms trafficking in the region (Mora, 2009). Similarly, Russia’s renewed interest in Latin America has been met with relative equanimity, despite the fact that Russian arms sales to the region have surged in recent years to overtake those of the US. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Russian arms sales to Latin America in 2009 topped US$5.4 billion, principally to Venezuela, although Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru also made major purchases (UPI, 2010). It is the deepening engagement of Iran in Latin America that has provoked the greatest alarm in the Obama administration. In Congressional testimony in January 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned, “I’m more concerned about Iranian meddling in the region than I am the Russians,” adding,

I’m concerned about the level of frankly subversive activity that the Iranians are carrying on in a number of places in Latin America ... They’re opening a lot of offices and a lot of fronts behind which they interfere in what is going on in some of these countries. (Reuters, 2009)

Indeed, while the Obama administration has accepted — even embraced — the notion of a multipolar world, it continues to indicate that one of the potential poles, Latin America, should remain off-limits to those powers of which the US disapproves. These latent tensions were thrown into even sharper relief in November 2009, when Brazilian President Lula hosted a state visit by Iranian President Ahmadinejad, despite deep disapproval in Washington (see Sweig, 2010). The emergence of Iran as a worrisome new actor in the region has heightened the need to for the US to develop effective responses to the region’s increasing globalization.

#### That influence prevents global nuclear conflicts

Kagan 07 Senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace [Robert Kagan (Senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund), “End of Dreams, Return of History,” Policy Review, August & September 2007, pg. http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html]

The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying — its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic.

It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War I and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible.

Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe’s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war.

People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that’s not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War II, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe.

The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world’s great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between **China and Taiwan** and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between **Russia and Georgia**, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between **India and Pakistan** remains possible, as does conflict between **Iran and Israel** or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States.

Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China ’s neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan.

In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene — even if it remained the world’s most powerful nation — could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe — if it adopted what some call a strategy of “offshore balancing” — this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances.

It is also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of a more passive, “offshore” role would lead to greater stability there. The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more “even-handed” policy toward Israel, which some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to come to Israel ’s aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and on the ground.

The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn’t change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. **The alternative to American predominance** in the region **is not balance and peace**. It is further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by both China and Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasn ’t changed that much. An American withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to “normal” or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again.

The alternative to American regional predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one should imagine that a reduction of American power or a retraction of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path.

### Advantage Two is Human Rights

#### Advantage Two is Human Rights

#### The embargo is destroying human rights in Cuba – denies people access to basic needs, services, and universally agreed upon rights.

Coll 07 Professor of Law and President, International Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul College of Law [Alberto R. Coll, Harming Human Rights in the Name of Promoting Them: The Case of the Cuban Embargo, UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs, Fall, 2007, 12 UCLA J. Int'l L. & For. Aff. 199]

The Cuban embargo is not a limited set of economic sanctions affecting a few carefully targeted areas of Cuba's government and society. Instead, it is a comprehensive program that prohibits virtually all American trade, investment, travel, cultural and human contact with Cuba outside of a few narrow exceptions. Moreover, throughout the embargo's 47-year history, different U.S. administrations have worked aggressively to expand the embargo's extraterritorial reach in order to pressure as many countries as possible to reduce their contacts with Cuba. The embargo's extensive extraterritorial reach and power as well as its disproportionate nature are magnified by Cuba's weakness as a small Caribbean island of 11 million people, its peculiar geographical location only 90 miles from the United States, and the U.S.'s own international economic and financial preeminence. As currently structured, the embargo has comprehensive, widespread, and indiscriminate effects on the economic, social, and family conditions of the Cuban people that cause it to violate widely recognized human rights norms as well as the basic obligation of states to ensure that sanctions imposed for the sake of promoting human rights do not have the opposite effect of harming the human rights of innocent people. n259

Apologists for the embargo point out that the embargo has only a limited impact on the Cuban economy because Cuba is free to trade with virtually every other country in the world. n260 This argument overlooks two key [\*236] issues. First, the U.S. government has not contented itself with denying the benefits of trade and investment to Cuba. Instead, throughout most of the embargo's history, U.S. administrations have exerted enormous pressures on foreign governments and companies to discourage all economic contact with Cuba. A typical example occurred in the early 1990s when Cuba, then in the midst of a severe economic depression caused by the collapse of its ally, the Soviet Union, attempted to modernize its antiquated 40-year old telephone network. Grupos Domo, a Mexican-based conglomerate with substantial economic ties to the United States, began negotiations with Cuba over what would have been a multi-billion dollar deal but eventually withdrew from negotiations as a result of enormous pressure by the U.S. government. n261 Ultimately, Cuba found a group of willing international investor partners, most of whom insisted on anonymity in order to avoid possible American retaliation. Thus, the reach of the U.S. embargo extends significantly beyond U.S.-Cuba trade relations, and negatively impacts Cuba's relations with other countries as well.

Second, since Congress passed the Cuban Democracy Act in 1992 and the subsequent Helms-Burton Act of 1996, the embargo has sharply increased its extraterritorial reach. Thousands of foreign companies that could trade with Cuba before 1992 are no longer allowed to do so by virtue of being subsidiaries of U.S. corporations. Although the European Union and other U.S. allies responded to the Helms-Burton Act by enacting "blocking statutes" and "claw-back" provisions n262, Helms-Burton has nonetheless had a [\*237] chilling effect on trade and investment with Cuba. n263 Thus, the embargo's economic impact must be measured not only in terms of the way it has isolated Cuba from U.S. markets but also by its effect on the willingness of many private international entities to do business with Cuba.

Because the embargo has such far-reaching effects on foreign trade and investment with Cuba, its effects on human rights are similarly far-reaching, encompassing such areas as public health, nutrition, education, culture, and even fundamental family rights. In general, economic sanctions affect education in the sanctioned country by decreasing access to supplies, which ultimately leads to the deterioration of infrastructure. n264 The Cuban government estimates that the embargo has cost Cuba an estimated average of $ 2.19 billion a year since 1959, a figure that may be quite conservative in light of several factors. n265 First, the embargo is unusually comprehensive and affects every area of Cuba's economic life. Second, it deprives Cuba of the benefits from economies of scale and geographical advantages associated with the U.S. market. Third, the dollar's role as the international currency of choice, the preeminent role of U.S. banks in international trade especially in the western hemisphere, and the embargo's extraterritorial reach combine to [\*238] increase substantially the costs to Cuba of trading with many other countries.

The most recent United Nations report on human rights in Cuba referred to the U.S. embargo as one of the "factors hindering the realization of human rights in Cuba," and noted that:

The restrictions imposed by the embargo help to deprive Cuba of vital access to medicines, new scientific and medical technology, food, chemical water treatment and electricity. The disastrous effects of the embargo in terms of the economic, social and cultural rights of the Cuban people have been denounced by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations Children's Fund, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the World Health Organization ... . n266

Thus, though the embargo is now promoted as a means of improving human rights, the embargo has had the opposite effect of harming human rights.

#### The embargo’s attempts to boost human rights has backfired – removing the embargo would boost human rights, force the regime to stop abusing them, and provide the impetus to improve them through internal change.

Amash 12 International Relations at UC San Diego [Brandon Amash, Evaluating the Cuban Embargo, Prospect: Journal of International Affairs at UCSD, <http://prospectjournal.org/2012/07/23/evaluating-the-cuban-embargo/>]

Cuba has a long record of violating the fundamental human rights of freedom of opinion, thought, expression, and the right to dissent; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights clearly protects these rights in Articles 19 and 21. Article 19 states that “everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” Article 21 similarly states that “everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country […]” (UDHR). The purpose of this proposal is to provide the United States with an alternative foreign policy approach toward Cuba that will improve human rights conditions and foster democracy in the country. Namely, I argue that the embargo policy should be abandoned and replaced with a policy based on modeling appropriate behavior, providing support and resources to developing democratic systems and encouraging participation in multilateral institutions. In the following pages, I will describe the historical context of the situation, critique the embargo policy and advocate for the normalization of relations with Cuba as a stronger approach to improving human rights and espousing democracy.

It is essential to carefully consider this proposal as a viable policy alternative for promoting democracy and protecting human rights in Cuba because the current embargo policy has proven to be ineffective in advancing these goals. Developing more effective approaches to similar situations of democratization and promotion of ideals has been a foreign policy goal of the United States since before the Cold War. However, despite the vast shifts in the international climate following the end of the Cold War, U.S. policy towards Cuba has not adapted. As such, this proposal highlights the need for a fresh policy toward our neighbor and bitter rival.

§ 2. Historical Context of the Problem:

The United States and Cuba have been on unstable terms since the colonization of both countries by the British and Spanish Empires, respectively. Following Cuba’s independence from Spain and the ensuing Spanish-American War, Cuban-American relations began to deteriorate: Cubans resented American intervention in their independence, afraid of leaving one empire only to be conquered by another. However, the human rights violations in question did not become a problem until after the Cuban Revolution in the 1950s, following the rise of Fidel Castro’s communist regime. After the revolution, Cuban laws imposed limits on the freedoms of expression and association, effectively undermining the basic human rights of freedom of opinion and dissent. According to Clark, De Fana and Sanchez, “given the totalitarian nature of the country, in which all communications media are in the hands of the omnipotent State-Party, it is physically impossible to express any dissenting political opinion […]” (Clark 65). Threatened by these blatantly antidemocratic policies, America had to do something.

The United States placed trade embargoes, economic sanctions, and travel bans on Cuba in an attempt to combat the communist regime and human rights violations (Carter 334). Today, diplomatic relations with Cuba remain extremely strained, although America’s embargo policy has tightened and relaxed in concert with its domestic political climate. Most recently, President Obama has reversed “tighter restrictions on Cuban American family travel and remittances,” as well as announcing “that U.S. telecommunications companies may seek licenses to do business in Cuba” (Carter 336). However, despite the ever-evolving policy and the fluid international climate, little progress has been made in improving the human rights situation in Cuba, let alone the overall promotion of democratic ideals. The embargo policy is based on the idea “that economic denial will bring about continued economic failure in Cuba, thereby creating popular dissatisfaction with the government while simultaneously weakening the government’s ability to repress this popular dissent, leading to the destabilization of the regime and, ultimately, its collapse” (Seaman 39). In the following section, I will explain how these objectives have not been realized.

§ 3. Critique of Policy Options:

Ayubi, Bissell, Korsah and Lerner suggest that “the purpose of sanctions is to bring about behavior seen as in conformity with the goals and standards of a society and to prevent behavior that is inconsistent with these goals and standards” (Ayubi 1). These goals and standards, in the Cuban context, would be democracy and a vested interest in human rights. However, the sanctions that the United States has placed on Cuba in the past half century have done little to address the systematic violations of human rights in Cuba.

§ 3.1: The American embargo is not sufficient to democratize Cuba and improve human rights. Without the help and support of multilateral institutions, economic sanctions on Cuba have been ineffective. As other states trade and interact freely with Cuba, the lack of partnership with America is only a minor hindrance to Cuba’s economy. Moreover, the sanctions are detrimental to the United States economy, as Cuba could potentially be a geostrategic economic partner. More importantly, since economic sanctions are not directly related to the goal of improved human rights, the effect of these sanctions is also unrelated; continued economic sanctions against Cuba create no incentive for the Cuban government to promote better human rights, especially when the sanctions do not have international support. Empirically, it is clear that since its inception, the policy has not succeeded in promoting democratization or improving human rights. Something more must be done in order to improve the situation.

§ 3.2: American sanctions during the Cold War strengthened Castro’s ideological position and created opportunities for involvement by the Soviet Union, thereby decreasing the likelihood of democratization and improvement in human rights. Cuba’s revolution could not have come at a worse time for America. The emergence of a communist state in the western hemisphere allowed the Soviet Union to extend its influence, and the United States’ rejection of Cuba only widened the window of opportunity for Soviet involvement. The embargo also became a scapegoat for the Castro administration, which laid blame for poor human rights conditions on the embargo policy itself (Fontaine 18 – 22). Furthermore, as Ratliff and Fontaine suggest, isolating Cuba as an enemy of democracy during the Cold War essentially made the goals of democratization in the country unachievable (Fontaine 30). While the embargo may have been strategic during the Cold War as a bulwark against communism, the long-term effects of the policy have essentially precluded the possibility for democracy in Cuba. Even after the end of the Cold War, communism persists in Cuba and human rights violations are systemic; America’s policy has not achieved its goals and has become a relic of the Cold War era. The prospects for democracy and improvement in human rights seem as bleak as ever.

§ 3.3: The current policy may drag the United States into a military conflict with Cuba. Military conflict may be inevitable in the future if the embargo’s explicit goal — creating an insurrection in Cuba to overthrow the government — is achieved, and the United States may not be ready to step in. As Ratliff and Fontaine detail, “Americans are not prepared to commit the military resources […]” (Fontaine 57), especially after unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Much like America’s current situation with isolated rogue states such as Iran and North Korea, Cuba’s isolation may also lead to war for other reasons, like the American occupation of Guantanamo Bay. These consequences are inherently counterproductive for the democratization of Cuba and the improvement of human rights.

§ 4. Policy Recommendations:

Although America’s previous policies of intervention, use of force and economic sanctions have all failed at achieving democratization in Cuba, not all options have been exhausted. One policy alternative for promoting democracy and human rights in Cuba that the United States has not attempted is the exact opposite of the approach it has taken for the past half century. Namely, the United States should lift the embargo on Cuba and reopen diplomatic relations in order to work internationally on improving human rights in Cuba. Unless Cuba, as a rogue state, is isolated internationally, rather than merely by the United States, the human rights situation in Cuba may never improve. A fresh policy of engagement towards Cuba has been delayed long enough.

§ 4.1: Reopening diplomatic relations with Cuba will decrease the chances of conflict and will promote cooperation between the two countries economically, politically and socially. Diplomatic relations and negotiations have proven to be effective in the past in similar situations, such as the renewed relations between Egypt and Israel following the Camp David Accords. As Huddleston and Pascual state, “a great lesson of democracy is that it cannot be imposed; it must come from within. […] Our policy should therefore encompass the political, economic, and diplomatic tools to enable the Cuban people to engage in and direct the politics of their country” (Huddleston 14). The mobilization of the Cuban people on the issues of democratization, which are inherently linked to the human rights violations in Cuba, is a first step to producing changes in Cuba. American engagement with the Cuban people, currently lacking under the embargo policy, will provide the impetus in Cuban society to produce regime change. Furthermore, integrating U.S.-Cuba relations on a multilateral level will ease the burden on the United States in fostering democracy and a better human rights record in the country, as other states will be more involved in the process. In contrast to a policy of isolation, normalized relations will allow America to engage Cuba in new areas, opening the door for democratization and human rights improvements from within the Cuban state itself.

§ 4.2: With diplomatic relations in place, the United States may directly promote human rights in the country through negotiations, conferences, arbitration and mediation. Providing the support, resources, and infrastructure to promote democratic systems in Cuba could produce immense improvements to the human rights situation in the nation. Normalizing diplomatic relations with the state will also allow America to truly support freedom of opinion and expression in Cuba, which it cannot currently promote under the isolationist policy. Furthermore, through diplomatic relations and friendly support, Cuba will be more willing to participate in the international system, as well as directly with the United States, as an ally. As the United States, along with the international community as a whole, helps and supports Cuba’s economic growth, Cuban society will eventually push for greater protection of human rights.

§ 4.3: Lifting economic sanctions will improve economic growth in Cuba, which correlates to democratization. Empirical evidence shows that a strong economy is correlated to democracy. According to the Modernization Theory of democratization, this correlation is a causal link: economic growth directly leads to democratization. Lifting the current economic sanctions on Cuba and working together to improve economic situations in the state will allow their economy to grow, increasing the likelihood of democracy in the state, and thus promoting greater freedom of expression, opinion and dissent.

§ 4.4: A policy of engagement will be a long-term solution to promoting democracy and improving human rights in Cuba. This proposal, unique in that it is simply one of abandoning an antiquated policy and normalizing relations to be like those with any other country, does not present any large obstacles to implementation, either in the short run or the long run. The main challenge is in continuing to support such a policy and maintaining the normal diplomatic, economic and social relations with a country that has been isolated for such a long period of time. Although effects of such a policy may be difficult to determine in the short term, promoting democracy and improving human rights in Cuba are long-term solutions. As discussed above, engagement with the Cuban government and society, along with support from the international community, will provide the spark and guidance for the Cuban people to support and promote democracy, and thus give greater attention to human rights violations.

§ 5. Conclusions:

Instead of continued economic sanctions on Cuba, the United States should reopen diplomatic relations with Cuba, work multilaterally and use soft power to promote democracy and greater attention to human rights. This policy approach will decrease the hostility between the United States and Cuba, and cause Cuba to be more willing to participate internationally with attention to human rights violations. After the end of the Cold War, United States foreign policy has found new directions, and the embargo, as a relic of a different time, must be removed should the United States wish to gain any true ground in promoting human rights in Cuba.

#### The embargo itself is a human rights violation and failure

Hernandez-Truyol 09 Mabie, Levin & Mabie Professor of Law, University of Florida, Levin College of Law [Berta E. Hernandez-Truyol, Embargo or Blockade - The Legal and Moral Dimensions of the U.S. Economic Sanctions on Cuba, 4 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 53 (2009)]

V Conclusion: The Human (Rights) and Moral Dimension

This essay has presented the history of economic sanctions against Cuba, analyzed the questionable legality of the sanctions, and detailed the effects of the sanctions. In conclusion, I want to problematize further the legality of the sanctions under international law. To be sure, the U.S. commitment to the WTO limits its ability to refuse to trade absent a legitimate, allowed concern. To use the national security claim vis-a-vis Cuba simply does not pass the laugh test; although the recent talks with Venezuela and the Russian fleet might cause a reconsideration of that position. Moreover, save for the regulations, which in any case are limited in light of the entirety of the Toricelli and Helms Burton laws, the WTO is a "later in time" statement of the law which should then govern.

The other aspect of legality involves the human rights idea. Here, the real impact on real people of the embargo borders on unconscionable. As the essay has described, the actions have taken a human toll; they affect health, hunger, education, nutrition quite directly. They also affect the right to travel and the right to family life of Cubans in the U.S. who can no longer visit their relatives with regularity nor spend time with them in either times of joy or times of need - although this has been changed dramatically by President Obama' s policy shift.

Economic sanctions are valuable tools for protecting human rights. The U.S. has used sanctions to discourage human rights violations. Examples include the U.S. ban of South African gold Krugerrands in 1985 to protest apartheid148, the blockage of Nicaraguan imports to deter terrorist acts of the Sandinista regime,149 the prohibition of foreign aid to Burma to oppose the government's use of forced labor,'50 and the 1989 denial of MFN status against China to protest the killing of pro-democracy protestors in Tiananmen Square to name a few.' 51

The U.S. is not alone in this approach. In fact, human rights violations have resulted in states jointly taking economic sanctions through the UN Security Council. Examples include NATO states' 1986 sanctions against Libya as a result of Moammar Ghadafi's support for the terrorist killing of 279 passengers aboard a U.S. airline bombed over Lockerbie and 1990 Iraq sanctions for its invasion of Kuwait.

The Cuba sanctions, however, reflect another aspect of economic sanctions: their deleterious and harmful effects on civil society, the innocent citizenry of the targeted country. By depriving citizens of the benefits of trade, of travel, of family life; by creating circumstances in which people's health, nutrition, standard of living and overall welfare are negatively affected, sanctions have effected serious denials of human rights - a moral if not legal failure.

#### Applying sanctions is an act of human rights violation – the consequences are known

Marks 99 Frangois-Xavier Bagnoud Professor of Health and Human Rights, Harvard School of Public Health [Stephen P. Marks, Economic Sanctions as Human Rights Violations: Reconciling Political and Public Health Imperatives, American Journal of Public Health, October 1999, Vol. 89, No. 10]

It is tempting to consider that because (a) the rights to an adequate standard of living, to physical and mental health, to just remuneration, to education, to family life, and to other related rights are universally recognized and (b) serious studies by public health experts substantiate the claim that these rights have been violated as a result of economic sanctions, then (c) the "senders" of sanctions regimes-that is, the governmental and intergovernmental decision makers in Congress, the White House, the UN Security Council and the OAS-are perpetrators of human rights violations. The CESR and Gibbons in her book on sanctions in Haiti come close to succumbing to that temptation, the former stressing that "the [Security] Council remains accountable to human rights principles regardless of the conduct of the Iraqi government"30 and the latter claiming that states that enforce sanctions in Haiti "inadvertently participated in violating the rights of Haitian citizens."31

The identification of senders of sanctions with perpetrators of human rights violations is not so simple, for 2 reasons. First, as a matter of law, responsibility for a violation can only be attributed to a duty holder, in most cases a state that has ratified a treaty establishing the obligation in question, and neither the Security Council nor the UN in general is a party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), or any other relevant convention. Moreover, treaties impose obligations on states to take measures within their jurisdiction- that is, within the national territory and, for a limited range of matters, for its nationals outside the territory-but not for foreigners in their own countries. Thus, the members of the Security Council have no treaty-based duty to ensure treaty rights for the citizens of Haiti, Iraq, Serbia, or other targeted countries.

One can hold states accountable, however, for actions that defeat the object and purpose of a treaty to which they are a party (or even that they have signed and not yet ratified, as is the case with the United States with respect to the ICESCR), and the aim of protecting the human rights set out in the ICESCR is part of that object and purpose. Such is the intention of the following provision of the Maastricht guidelines, adopted by a group of 30 human rights experts in January 1997:

19. The obligations of States to protect economic, social and cultural rights extend also to their participation in international organizations, where they act collectively. It is particularly important for States to use their influence to ensure that violations do not result from the programmes and policies of the organizations of which they are members.32

The language is not that of firm obligation, but it is designed to acknowledge the importance of states' using their influence to prevent violations-for example, through decisions of the Security Council or the OAS to impose sanctions. There is, moreover, a duty upon the Security Council to "act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations,"33 among which is the purpose of "promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all."34 Significantly, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which monitors the application of the ICESCR, requires the state or entity imposing sanctions to take these rights "fully into account" when designing the sanctions regime, to monitor effectively the situation in the targeted country with respect to these rights, and to take steps "to respond to any disproportionate suffering experienced by vulnerable groups within the targeted country."35 In the case of Haiti, the UN and the OAS did take human rights into account by creating the Human Rights Civilian Observation Mission (MICIVIH), which Gibbons describes as "a positive action ... that was quite different in nature from the negative action of sanctions."36 However, she also notes that its mandate excluded economic, social, and cultural rights, as a result of "pragmatic decisions" that "respect for Haitians' economic and social rights would be sacrificed for the sake of advancing their political and civil rights." This dilemma emerged in the functioning of MICIVIH's Medical Unit, an unprecedented addition to a human rights component of a peace operation, which ran into difficulty in trying to reconcile mission headquarters' efforts to restrict its role to documenting abuse of civil and political rights with the participating medical practitioners' duty to provide care when the situation called for medical assistance.37

The second problem with the senders as- perpetrators argument is both moral and legal: Senders of sanctions cannot be held responsible unless they intentionally seek to violate the rights in question or pursue policies that are so blatantly harmful to those rights that they fail to meet a minimum standard of compliance. The humanitarian exemptions that have been voted with sanctions in almost every case, and the supplemental humanitarian assistance programs funded by the "senders," as well as their public statements of concern for the plight of civilian populations, make it difficult to find willful intent on the senders' part. Gibbons' reference to states "inadvertently" participating in violations,38 and the use she and Garfield make of "unintentionally" in their article in this issue of the Journal, are indicative of the problems of accountability.

Nevertheless, the moral outrage of those who would like to hold senders of sanctions accountable as perpetrators of violations is justified, and passing blame to Saddam Hussein, Lt Gen Cedras, or Slobodan Milosevic is not enough. As a study commissioned by the UN concluded, "the amount of information available today on the devastating economic, social, and humanitarian impact of sanctions no longer permits [policymakers] to entertain the notion of 'unintended effects."'39 A member of the Security Council has declared that "it is disingenuous to talk of 'unintended side effects' when everybody knows that the sector most affected by sanctions, as presently applied, are precisely civilian populations. There is nothing surprising or unintended about it."40 His statement was in reaction to a "non-paper" (an informal document used as a flexible tool for negotiation) by the 5 permanent members of the Security Council (P-5) that insisted that sanctions regimes should "minimize unintended adverse side-effects of sanctions on the most vulnerable segments oftargeted countries."4l

#### Human Rights are an absolute good – must act to protect them in all instances

Human Rights Watch 97 [An Introduction to the Human Rights Movement, <http://www.hrweb.org/intro.html>]

Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of [hu]mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,

Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law...

These are the second and third paragraphs of the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948 without a dissenting vote. It is the first multinational declaration mentioning human rights by name, and the human rights movement has largely adopted it as a charter. I'm quoting them here because it states as well or better than anything I've read what human rights are and why they are important.

The United Nations Charter, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and UN Human Rights convenants were written and implemented in the aftermath of the Holocaust, revelations coming from the Nuremberg war crimes trials, the Bataan Death March, the atomic bomb, and other horrors smaller in magnitude but not in impact on the individuals they affected. A whole lot of people in a number of countries had a crisis of conscience and found they could no longer look the other way while tyrants jailed, tortured, and killed their neighbors.

In Germany, the Nazis first came for the communists, and I did not speak up, because I was not a Communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak up, because I was not a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I did not speak up, because I was not a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics, and I did not speak up, because I was not a Catholic. Then they came for me... and by that time, there was no one to speak up for anyone.

-- Martin Niemoeller, Pastor,

German Evangelical (Lutheran) Church

Many also realized that advances in technology and changes in social structures had rendered war a threat to the continued existence of the human race. Large numbers of people in many countries lived under the control of tyrants, having no recourse but war to relieve often intolerable living conditions. Unless some way was found to relieve the lot of these people, they could revolt and become the catalyst for another wide-scale and possibly nuclear war. For perhaps the first time, representatives from the majority of governments in the world came to the conclusion that basic human rights must be protected, not only for the sake of the individuals and countries involved, but to preserve the human race.

Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children. This is not a way of life at all in any true sense. Under the clouds of war, it is humanity hanging on a cross of iron.

-- Dwight D. Eisenhower

President of the United States

"I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones."

-- Albert Einstein

#### Survival of the species is only possible by respecting Human Rights

Annas et al 02 Edward R. Utley Prof. and Chair Health Law @ Boston U. School of Public Health and Prof. SocioMedical Sciences and Community Science @ Boston U. School of Medicine and Prof. Law @ Boston U. School of Law [George, Lori Andrews, (Distinguished Prof. Law @ Chicago-Kent College of Law and Dir. Institute for Science, Law, and Technology @ Illinois Institute Tech), and Rosario M. Isasa, (Health Law and Biotethics Fellow @ Health Law Dept. of Boston U. School of Public Health), American Journal of Law & Medicine, “THE GENETICS REVOLUTION: CONFLICTS, CHALLENGES AND CONUNDRA: ARTICLE: Protecting the Endangered Human: Toward an International Treaty Prohibiting Cloning and Inheritable Alterations”, 28 Am. J. L. and Med. 151, L/N]

The development of the atomic bomb not only presented to the world for the first time the prospect of total annihilation, but also, paradoxically, led to a renewed emphasis on the "nuclear family," complete with its personal bomb shelter. The conclusion of World War II (with the dropping of the only two atomic bombs ever used in war) led to the recognition that world wars were now suicidal to the entire species and to the formation of the United Nations with the primary goal of preventing such wars. n2 Prevention, of course, must be based on the recognition that all humans are fundamentally the same, rather than on an emphasis on our differences. In the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, the closest the world has ever come to nuclear war, President John F. Kennedy, in an address to the former Soviet Union, underscored the necessity for recognizing similarities for our survival:

[L]et us not be blind to our differences, but let us also direct attention to our common interests and the means by which those differences can be resolved . . . . For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal. n3

That we are all fundamentally the same, all human, all with the same dignity and rights, is at the core of the most important document to come out of World War II, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the two treaties that followed it (together known as the "International Bill of Rights"). n4 The recognition of universal human rights, based on human dignity and equality as well as the principle of nondiscrimination, is fundamental to the development of a species consciousness. As Daniel Lev of Human Rights Watch/Asia said in 1993, shortly before the Vienna Human Rights Conference:

Whatever else may separate them, human beings belong to a single biological species, the simplest and most fundamental commonality before which the significance of human differences quickly fades. . . . We are all capable, in exactly the same ways, of feeling pain, hunger, [\*153] and a hundred kinds of deprivation. Consequently, people nowhere routinely concede that those with enough power to do so ought to be able to kill, torture, imprison, and generally abuse others. . . . The idea of universal human rights shares the recognition of one common humanity, and provides a minimum solution to deal with its miseries. n5

Membership in the human species is central to the meaning and enforcement of human rights, and respect for basic human rights is essential for the survival of the human species. The development of the concept of "crimes against humanity" was a milestone for universalizing human rights in that it recognized that there were certain actions, such as slavery and genocide, that implicated the welfare of the entire species and therefore merited universal condemnation. n6 Nuclear weapons were immediately seen as a technology that required international control, as extreme genetic manipulations like cloning and inheritable genetic alterations have come to be seen today. In fact, cloning and inheritable genetic alterations can be seen as crimes against humanity of a unique sort: they are techniques that can alter the essence of humanity itself (and thus threaten to change the foundation of human rights) by taking human evolution into our own hands and directing it toward the development of a new species, sometimes termed the "posthuman." n7 It may be that species-altering techniques, like cloning and inheritable genetic modifications, could provide benefits to the human species in extraordinary circumstances. For example, asexual genetic replication could potentially save humans from extinction if all humans were rendered sterile by some catastrophic event. But no such necessity currently exists or is on the horizon.

## Solvency

### Lift: Unilateral & Total Key

#### Only unilateral total removal sends a signal to boost soft power & trade

Koenig 10 Colonel, US Army War College [Lance R. Koenig, Time for a New Cuba Policy, Strategy Research Project, Colonel Lance R. Koenig, 2010, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA518130]

There is a sound reason for unilaterally lifting the trade and travel embargoes without first seeing positive actions from the Cuban government. From Cuba expert Carlos A. Saladrigas, Co-Chairman, Cuba Study Group, “We can go back in the history -- in the 50-year history of United States-Cuba relations and clearly see that any time we begin to see a little bit of relaxation of tensions in the relationship, whenever we begin to see a little bit of openness on the part of the United States or Cuba, historically the Cuban government has done something to counteract that trend and significantly revert back to their playbook.” 40 The United States needs to take the initiative away from the Castro regime, and have them react to actions they have publicly called for (removal of the embargo), but in reality are unsure of the second and third order effects and their ability to control the outcome.

One of the first problems for the Cuban government after the removal of the embargo will be the excuse for the poor performing economy. “… the embargo and the United States policy of confrontation and isolation have been incredibly useful to the Cuban regime as an alibi for the failures of the regime to meet the fundamental needs of the people on the island, but also is a significant source of legitimacy, both internal and external.”41 This situation may present the United States with the opportunity to step in to assist with market reforms if the Cuban economy sputters and the government realizes they don’t have a scapegoat.

Conclusion

The efforts expended by the United States to keep the embargo effective, the loss of trade, and the loss of soft power in most of the world are clearly not worth it in comparison to the threat that Cuba poses today. The gains to be achieved by following any path other than the unilateral removal of the economic and travel embargoes are small in comparison to the overall costs of continuing the current failed policy. The United States is losing far too much soft power in its efforts to punish and isolate the government of Cuba. American firms could be left out of any economic gains as Cuba continues to grow its economy. As Cuba emerges from the economic difficulties of the last two decades, the United States has an opportunity to influence the future direction of our southern neighbor. The current United States policy has many passionate defenders, and their criticism of the Castro regime is justified. Nevertheless, we must recognize the ineffectiveness of our current policy and deal with the Cuban regime in a way that enhances United States interests.42

The United States cannot afford to miss out on the window of opportunity to affect a positive change in the relationship with Cuba. If Cuba is able to continue on a path of economic progress and emerge once again as a true regional power, with communism intact, the United States will be the loser in this half century struggle. Cuba is spreading its limited influence to Venezuela, Honduras, Nicaragua, and will be ready to bring in any other countries in the Americas that want to move away from the United States orbit. The United States can’t stand by and watch Cuba regain strength, intact as a communist country, but must take this opportunity to create an inflection point for Cuba that guides her onto a path that will benefit the nations of the Americas.

### Lift: Signal & Econ

#### Should lift the embargo NOW – key to US and Cuban economy. Sends a signal

Vandall 12 Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law [Frank J. Vandall, “¡CUBA SÍ!: A TRIBUTE TO PROFESSOR DAVID BEDERMAN AND A LETTER TO PRESIDENT OBAMA,” Emory Law Journal, Vol. 61:1081]

At this moment the United States is in the midst of a deep recession and several wars. I know you are searching for positive accomplishments in order to prepare for the 2012 elections. Improving the economy will require the assistance of everyone, so may I suggest a small step with substantial economic benefits: full legal recognition of Cuba. This island is our neighbor, only ninety miles from Key West.

Four critical considerations form the foundation of the argument for a full recognition of Cuba. First, economics. Because of our recession, all new trade is a good thing. From our side, we could export automobiles, motorcycles, heavy equipment, food, and electronics to Cuba.4 From Cuba, they could export rum, sugar, cigars, and music to the United States.5 Many of our citizens would love to visit Cuba and vice versa.6 Prior to the revolution, Cuba was a resort destination for many Americans. This new recognition is a win–win solution.7

Second, the three-hundred-pound gorilla at the table is the fact that Cuba is a communist government.8 But because President Nixon opened China to trade with the United States forty years ago, communism has become a nonissue.9 Today China is a huge trading partner10 and our largest creditor.11 The word communist is no longer used in a derogatory fashion. Indeed, Russia, a formerly communist nation, has adopted numerous democratic reforms, such as free elections.12 Quite simply, communism is no longer a threat to us—just the opposite. Clearly, the best way to further democracy is to trade with a country and encourage them to visit us in order to see how we live.13 The rest of the world is travelling to Cuba: Germany, Spain, Canada, and Austria, for example.14 Tourism is only a part of their trade. Recognition of Cuba would be a large step toward forging links with other nondemocratic countries.15

Third, as a community developer in Chicago, you, Mr. President, are keenly aware of the importance of encouraging everyone in the community to work together.16 Since 1962, we have been “walled-off” from Cuba.17 In the main, U.S. citizens are not permitted to visit or purchase products made in Cuba.18 Cuban visits to the United States are severely restricted, as well.19 We voice economic human rights but do nothing to change the legal foundation of our relationship with Cuba. Clearly, because of President Kennedy’s courageous stance, there are no Russian missiles in Cuba today.20 It is not an economic, political, or military threat.

Fourth, historically, a team of revolutionaries, including Che Guevara and the Castro brothers, overthrew the Cuban dictator, Fulgencio Batista.21 Fidel Castro was elected President of Cuba in 1976.22 Castro has been Cuba’s unchallenged leader since 1959, despite this later election, and one of his first accomplishments was to nationalize the private land and turn Cuba into a communist state.23 This nationalization of the land is the heart of our disagreement with Cuba today.

The state took the private land in Cuba and redistributed it to “other” Cuban citizens.24 That was over fifty years ago and is not likely to change, except perhaps through a negotiated settlement.25

A fair question is where the former owners of the Cuban land are. The answer is that many of them now live in Florida, although that is not completely accurate.26 Most of the elite former land owners are now deceased.27 It is their children who now wage “war” with Cuba and support the embargo.28 These surviving heirs fight to have their property returned. The offspring have an alternative solution at hand; they can sue for justice in the World Court.29 Of course, the surviving children of the exiles have selected a different path.

They lobby the U.S. Congress and elect Florida leaders who promise to keep up the fight and the “wall” with Cuba.30 But look at the cost to the United States. The economic embargo provides a foundation for the continuing rage of several thousand Cuban expatriates but, in the process, imprisons over 300 million American citizens.31

Mr. President, you have a unique opportunity to step up and tell the world and the children of the former land owners of Cuba that you will end the embargo now in order to grow the economies of the United States and Cuba. Tell them the “Cold War” is officially over, we are economic friends with China and Russia, and we should also be economic friends with our close neighbor, Cuba.32

President Obama, the time to end the sanctions against Cuba is now. The economic embargo has hurt us worse than it has Cuba. We are imprisoned in our own land and because of the embargo appear petty to the rest of the world.33

¡Cuba sí!

### Lift: Soft Power

#### The embargo must be removed to sustain overall US legitimacy and soft power.

Iglesias 12 Commander of the US Navy – Army War College Publication [Carlos Iglesias, United States Security Policy Implications of a Post-Fidel Cuba, 10 March 2012, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA560408>]

\*GOC = Government of Cuba

Finally, U.S. international legitimacy and influence have a great deal to gain from a more inclusive and less unilateral approach. U.S. retort to U.N. anti-embargo resolutions that bilateral relations are exempt from General Assembly scrutiny have had longstanding blowback. This rhetoric has historically undercut American’s legitimacy and wasted political capital on this central world stage. Outside of New York City and across the globe, decades-long sanctions against the island have netted few if any national objectives, all the while depleting substantial national soft power. The cost-benefit analysis to U.S. national foreign policy will remain exceedingly unfavorable, if not outright counter-productive.

Conclusion

The post-Fidel decade is stacking up to be a time of historic change for the people of Cuba. The first change in the regime’s leadership in almost a half century has already started to bring improvements to the liberty and literally starved Cuban people. In this and the near-term, the U.S. must aggressively exploit these historic opportunities with all national elements of power. The pursuit of enduring interests as they apply to its neighbor just across the Florida Straits are very much back in play.

However, the window to effect change is likely fleeting. If the GOC establishes sufficient patronage or obtains economic independence, it may become truly impervious to the American economic, moral, or international influence. In this worst of scenarios, that indifference would shift achievement of national security interests even further away at the very time when they were most attainable. Worst yet, the greatest ally of the Cuban people will have let them down from an inability to act prudently and decisively. Across the American identity, that failure will have reverberation well beyond its policy towards a small island just to the south. Sadly, the insanity will have won the day.

### Economics Key

#### Facilitating economic changes key – leads to change and pro-american attitudes in Cuba

Perez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]

(8E) Help Facilitate the Initial Success of Any Economic Apertures

As discussed above, any major reform in Cuba should first begin in the economic sector, as opposed to the political sector. The Cuban government will likely accept foreign investment and introduce elements of private ownership into its economy long before it releases its stranglehold on politics and holds free elections. Although the first stage of economic reform has already begun, this stage can end at a moment's notice. Policy performance matters, and nothing breeds success like success. Therefore, the U.S. should design a policy that helps ensure that these initial reforms are successful.

Success of reform will breed more reform and an increased demand for a different economic environment. In this way, an initial aperture's success will punch a hole in the Cuban government's ability to restrain economic [\*235] activity while maintaining credibility. While Cuba introduces these financial reforms, the U.S. should resist calls to strengthen the economic sanctions, and should instead respond to any economic opening on the island with more bilateral trade opportunities. By engaging Cuba economically, rather than isolating it politically, the U.S. could help link an entire generation of Cubans to the capitalist world.

Ultimately, closed regimes survive not because they are constantly adapting to changed circumstances, but rather because they are able to maintain a certain level of consistency, both domestically and in their foreign relations. Rapid change in either sphere can become destabilizing. To that end, facilitating closer economic ties between the U.S. and Cuba could also function as an external shock to the Cuban regime. n156 External shocks promote reform by forcing the regime to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances, which may then open the Pandora's box of transformation.

Reformists will quickly gain credibility in the government and among the people if their policies begin to solve the island's economic woes. The reformists will be more able to sell their policies at the popular level, solidifying their power bases, which will then encourage more reform. n157 The notion of popular support will become especially important in a post-Castro environment where any successor will be particularly sensitive to popular discontent along with popular legitimacy. That being said, a successor government interested in reforming the system may still resort to kangaroo trials and heavy-handedness. As these reformists gain power, the U.S. should resist efforts to punish the regime when it resorts to classically repressive tactics to consolidate its power, or when it tries to goad the U.S. into a reaction it can later use to its advantage. n158 If the U.S. were to react hostilely to these measures, it would only destabilize the situation and encourage more violence.

Once the political situation has stabilized, violence is likely to subside, and the reformists can refocus their efforts on changing the system, rather than worrying about a U.S. intervention. Although Cuba poses no existential threat to America, the fear that America poses an existential threat to [\*236] Cuba runs deep, especially among the regime's hardliners. Reactionaries attempting to truncate the onset of reforms may seek to entice the United States to overreact to their repressive tactics by either passing additional economic sanctions, or worse yet, intervening militarily. Both options, in the midst of a transition, however far along it may be, would be strategically catastrophic.

One might reasonably argue that the success of these piecemeal reforms would give the regime more breathing space to survive. This is a valid concern, but is analytically unsound. The regime has survived despite a terrible twenty-year economic depression that began after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although it sounds counter-intuitive, economic success will be the harbinger of structural collapse in Cuba.

For fifty years one system has ruled supreme; but if another system, however nascent, begins to show that it can meet the needs of the people more effectively, the prevailing system will begin to erode from the ground up. To an extent, the United States can influence this process. As the global financial crisis begins to negatively affect Cuba's state-benefactors (particularly Venezuela), as well as those private investors willing to enter a closed economy, the Cuban government will approach the point where only fundamental economic change will encourage sufficient growth. The United States can help ensure that Cuba reaches this point by encouraging more travel, rewarding economic liberalizations, and by bringing the island back into the global financial system.

#### Focus on economic changes key – more likely to succeed – now & historically

Perez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]

American policymakers should adopt another type of Copernican shift: instead of placing political reforms (i.e., free elections) at the center of our Cuba policy, the U.S. should make economic reforms the gravitational locus of our diplomatic efforts. This shift would not lose track of or diminish the importance of political change, but would simply acknowledge that such political change necessarily orbits economic change, and not the other way around. Put differently, changing our point of view does not change our objectives - it only changes the means by which we pursue our objectives.

The notion of offering a quid pro quo - easing restrictions for genuine irreversible reform - has always been impossible because of Fidel's stubborn personality. Once he is out of the picture permanently, there would be no other leader who could maintain such rigidity in the face of genuine and constructive engagement from Washington. Reform-oriented leaders will [\*207] feel less pressure to remain silent, while the government itself will feel more pressure from the populace to address the growing concerns on the island. While Fidel Castro has always exuded confidence in his leadership, in the immediate wake of his death the Cuban regime is sure to feel a tremendous amount of insecurity, which, if handled properly and respectfully, could strengthen Washington's political hand. n52 At that point, the best - indeed, the only - way to have leverage in Cuba, is for America to engage the island directly. n53

However, Washington's policy for the last fifty years has focused almost exclusively on the political situation (i.e., free and fair elections). This myopic approach has ignored the possibility of doing an end-run around Castro's political recalcitrance by simply giving the Cuban people (and government) an offer they can't refuse: economic success. As long as the political arena remains the battlefield upon which Washington and Havana wage their ideological war, there will always be stalemate. Transitions from other Cold War-era governments demonstrate that economic liberalization helped facilitate political liberalization. In Poland, the labor unions flourished before political parties were finally established after the fall of the Soviet Union; n54 in Russia, mass privatization paved the way for moderate political freedoms; n55 in Vietnam, the government started to embrace market-based reforms in the mid to late-1980s; n56 and finally, in China, an unmistakably capitalist society has emerged, although elections have still not been held. n57 Cuba will be no different. In early 2009, the Cuban government approved the largest land distribution since the revolution when it handed out 45,500 land grants to the private sector. n58

Another reason economic reforms are likely to precede political reforms is that the population seems hungrier to see an economic respite after decades of austerity. This may also be a result of their belief that the Cuban regime will try to maintain its monopolistic grip on politics for as long as [\*208] possible, even if it loosens its grip on the economy. When Raul Castro began his version of a "listening tour" around the island he also initiated a series of debates.

During one of these town hall meetings Ricardo Alarcon, the leader of the National Assembly as of April 2009, was barraged with questions that focused on the economy - specifically Cuba's dual-currency system. n59 Although such intimate private-public participation has been rare on the totalitarian island, once the window of opportunity was opened, a burst of activity flowed through. Reloading the diplomatic cannon by encouraging economic reform, rather than focusing on political reform, would represent a more dynamic approach to U.S.-Cuban relations.

### Lift All Key

#### Small changes aren’t enough – only opening up the embargo will unfreeze relations

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As a result of the administration’s hesitancy to drastically shift its Cuba policy, Abraham Lowenthal, an expert on Cuban-American relations, has concluded, “far from ushering in a new beginning, the Obama administration seemed to revert to the stance of several previous US administrations: it would wait for Cuba to change.”13 Despite sluggish progress in shifting policies and improving relations, this analysis seems to disregard President Obama’s consistent ideological rejection of an America working only with a league of Democracies.

In fact, it appears that engagement, albeit slowly, is continuing to gain traction within the administration. In particular, this has been visible since mid-2010, when Raúl began a second round of economic reforms,14 bringing many experts to claim that “a new phase in Cuban history is unfolding.”15 In September 2010, Raúl announced that the state was cutting a half-million jobs, simultaneously giving incentives to citizens to open new private businesses and instituting a new payroll tax on a sliding scale to increase the hiring of labor.16

It is telling that Raúl’s reforms alter the founding principles of the post-1959 Cuban society. Raúl himself implied an internal shift when he noted, “Socialism means equality of rights, not of income... equality is not egalitarianism.”17 At the most fundamental level, these economic reforms indicate a transformation in the relationship between Cuban society and its government. In addition, Raúl has indicated an increased willingness to make political reforms, releasing nearly all of the island’s political prisoners, including 52 in July 2010.18 though they leave much to be desired in the realm of human rights, the scope of Raúl’s newest era of reforms is unprecedented in post-Cold War Cuba.

As Cuba has moved down a path of internal transformation, beginning to unclench control over its own society, President Obama has slowly reached out. On January 14, 2011, the administration stepped toward a more active engagement by restoring higher education exchange programs, extending travel remittance allowances to all Americans, and permitting chartered flights to Havana from anyUSairport.19 though this progress indicates that relations are steadily improving, a potential breakthrough in relations and America’s Cuba policy is only possible by opening high-level diplomatic relations and eliminating the US embargo.

A Guideline for Breaking Through the Logjam

The strategic, economic, and political background that has helped shape America’s Cuba policy has shifted tremendously since the end of the Cold War. For half a century, the United States has attempted—and failed—to force democratization on the island by combining an economic embargo with either diplomatic isolation or limited engagement. In recent years, however, Raúl has increasingly charted a new course for Cuba. Despite many of these reforms being in line with American values and interests, there has not been a drastic change in US-Cuba policy. Given the continued failure of past Cuba policies to achieve the stated goals, American leaders should understand that there is much to gain from ending the embargo and opening diplomatic relations with Cuba—and surprisingly little to lose.

### Any Negativity Bad

#### ANY negativity risks backfire – used to mobilize nationalism and anti-americanism – must be open

Perez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]

(5A) Avoid Hostile Rhetoric at All Costs

Diplomatic overtures would help reformists on the island, who thrive in a benign external environment. The risk that the security apparatus will truncate any reform process because of an external threat - real or imagined - is significant. To the greatest extent possible, the U.S. should revamp its diplomatic agenda with respect to Cuba by becoming openly friendly and by [\*212] resisting expressions of hostility, even when goaded to do so by the island's leaders. Traditionally, Cuban nationalism has been co-opted by hardliners who paint a rather grim picture of the island's position relative to its giant northern neighbor. By toning down the hostile rhetoric, the U.S. would allow reformists on the island to couch their agenda in terms of a "national project" where they could then tap into Cuba's deep well of patriotism. n67 Any long-term vision contemplated by the reformists would need not only widespread appeal, but also, at a minimum, acquiescence on the part of the security and military establishments. Neither possibility is likely in the face of openly hostile rhetoric from Washington.

This does not mean that the United States cannot, and should not, regularly criticize the Cuban government when it violates human rights or oppresses its people. The State Department should still release its human rights reports detailing abuses on the island, just as it does for countries like China and Russia. Repressive governments will not become less repressive simply because the U.S. speaks nicely of them. Nevertheless, there is a difference between constructive rhetoric that rightly criticizes a totalitarian regime, and destructive rhetoric that stokes anger and inflames nationalism. This line is not always clear, but the State Department would be well advised to stay on the constructive side if it hopes to achieve any measurable result during these talks. America has a long history of negotiating with regimes it does not agree with. For instance, President Reagan held significant discussions with the Soviet Union, and pushed hard for internal reforms, despite characterizing its government as the "evil empire." n68

To be sure, everything should be on the table during these discussions, but that does not mean that the talks need to revolve solely around issues of governance or the embargo. American and Cuban officials share an interest in discussing, among other things, migration, natural disasters, environmental protection, energy exploration, and organized crime. In fact, even without discussing lifting the embargo, the agenda for these preliminary talks can still focus on economic issues. Using the existing trade flow as a springboard, n69 negotiators can discuss Cuba's credit terms, as well as the possibility of opening the U.S. market to certain Cuban exports and the Cuban market to certain American exports. In this way, the two nations can discuss ways to expand trade in a way that protects U.S. business interests.

### A2 Funds the Regime

#### Money doesn’t go to the government -

Perez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]

(3D) Acknowledge the Human-Impact of Family-Related Travel

Cuba's horrific human rights violations have been used in recent years to justify tightening the U.S. travel restrictions, n43 while the Cuban government's travel restrictions have remained generally arbitrary and abusive for the last fifty years. n44 Historically, the U.S.-imposed travel restrictions have been based, at least in part, on the quantifiable financial impact that American visits have on the Cuban economy. Foreign visitors bring much needed cash reserves that eventually make their way into the Cuban government's coffers. The CAFC singled out Cuban Americans as "one of the largest sources of funds and goods to the island." n45 While the financial impacts of these visits can be quantified, the emotional impacts that the travel restrictions have on Cuban families are incalculable. n46 The idea persists, even today, [\*205] that American visits are a cash cow for the Castro regime, and may once again be used to enact more restrictions on travel to Cuba.

However, the notion that American travel to Cuba is a source of revenue for the Cuban regime, is a rather simplistic and myopic view of people-to-people contact. Increased travel to Cuba has a non-utilitarian purpose that those with a monetized view of the issue struggle to confront: the human element of person-to-person contact, especially within the context of family. To be sure, travelers, especially American travelers, spend money when they visit Cuba, which indirectly provides the government with hard currency. n47 But this money is first put into the hands of the Cuban people, minimizing their dependence on the Cuban government. n48 Moreover, those same travelers also share ideas, thoughts, beliefs, and develop contacts. The prevailing view is that American travel provides the Cuban government with free money; on the contrary, the Cuban government pays quite a bit for those dollars when one considers the existential threat freedom of movement poses for the regime. n49

### Lifting Hurts the Regime

#### Embargo fails – needs to be lifted to hurt the regime

Bandow 12 senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a former special assistant to former US president Ronald Reagan. [Doug Bandow, Time to End the Cuba Embargo, <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/time-end-cuba-embargo?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+CatoRecentOpeds+(Cato+Recent+Op-eds)>]

The U.S. government has waged economic war against the Castro regime for half a century. The policy may have been worth a try during the Cold War, but the embargo has failed to liberate the Cuban people. It is time to end sanctions against Havana.

Decades ago the Castro brothers lead a revolt against a nasty authoritarian, Fulgencio Batista. After coming to power in 1959, they created a police state, targeted U.S. commerce, nationalized American assets, and allied with the Soviet Union. Although Cuba was but a small island nation, the Cold War magnified its perceived importance.

Washington reduced Cuban sugar import quotas in July 1960. Subsequently U.S. exports were limited, diplomatic ties were severed, travel was restricted, Cuban imports were banned, Havana’s American assets were frozen, and almost all travel to Cuba was banned. Washington also pressed its allies to impose sanctions.

These various measures had no evident effect, other than to intensify Cuba’s reliance on the Soviet Union. Yet the collapse of the latter nation had no impact on U.S. policy. In 1992, Congress banned American subsidiaries from doing business in Cuba and in 1996, it penalized foreign firms that trafficked in expropriated U.S. property. Executives from such companies even were banned from traveling to America.

On occasion Washington relaxed one aspect or another of the embargo, but in general continued to tighten restrictions, even over Cuban Americans. Enforcement is not easy, but Uncle Sam tries his best. For instance, according to the Government Accountability Office, Customs and Border Protection increased its secondary inspection of passengers arriving from Cuba to reflect an increased risk of embargo violations after the 2004 rule changes, which, among other things, eliminated the allowance for travelers to import a small amount of Cuban products for personal consumption.

“Lifting sanctions would be a victory not for Fidel Castro, but for the power of free people to spread liberty.”

Three years ago, President Barack Obama loosened regulations on Cuban Americans, as well as telecommunications between the United States and Cuba. However, the law sharply constrains the president’s discretion. Moreover, UN Ambassador Susan Rice said that the embargo will continue until Cuba is free.

It is far past time to end the embargo.

During the Cold War, Cuba offered a potential advanced military outpost for the Soviet Union. Indeed, that role led to the Cuban missile crisis. With the failure of the U.S.-supported Bay of Pigs invasion, economic pressure appeared to be Washington’s best strategy for ousting the Castro dictatorship.

However, the end of the Cold War left Cuba strategically irrelevant. It is a poor country with little ability to harm the United States. The Castro regime might still encourage unrest, but its survival has no measurable impact on any important U.S. interest.

The regime remains a humanitarian travesty, of course. Nor are Cubans the only victims: three years ago the regime jailed a State Department contractor for distributing satellite telephone equipment in Cuba. But Havana is not the only regime to violate human rights. Moreover, experience has long demonstrated that it is virtually impossible for outsiders to force democracy. Washington often has used sanctions and the Office of Foreign Assets Control currently is enforcing around 20 such programs, mostly to little effect.

The policy in Cuba obviously has failed. The regime remains in power. Indeed, it has consistently used the embargo to justify its own mismanagement, blaming poverty on America. Observed Secretary of State Hillary Clinton: “It is my personal belief that the Castros do not want to see an end to the embargo and do not want to see normalization with the United States, because they would lose all of their excuses for what hasn’t happened in Cuba in the last 50 years.” Similarly, Cuban exile Carlos Saladrigas of the Cuba Study Group argued that keeping the “embargo, maintaining this hostility, all it does is strengthen and embolden the hardliners.”

Cuban human rights activists also generally oppose sanctions. A decade ago I (legally) visited Havana, where I met Elizardo Sanchez Santa Cruz, who suffered in communist prisons for eight years. He told me that the “sanctions policy gives the government a good alibi to justify the failure of the totalitarian model in Cuba.”

Indeed, it is only by posing as an opponent of Yanqui Imperialism that Fidel Castro has achieved an international reputation. If he had been ignored by Washington, he never would have been anything other than an obscure authoritarian windbag.

Unfortunately, embargo supporters never let reality get in the way of their arguments. In 1994, John Sweeney of the Heritage Foundation declared that “the embargo remains the only effective instrument available to the U.S. government in trying to force the economic and democratic concessions it has been demanding of Castro for over three decades. Maintaining the embargo will help end the Castro regime more quickly.” The latter’s collapse, he wrote, is more likely in the near term than ever before.

Almost two decades later, Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, chairwoman of the House Foreign Relations Committee, retains faith in the embargo: “The sanctions on the regime must remain in place and, in fact, should be strengthened, and not be altered.” One of the best definitions of insanity is continuing to do the same thing while expecting to achieve different results.

### Now Key

#### Now is key to stop the Cuban insanity

Iglesias 12 Commander of the US Navy – Army War College Publication [Carlos Iglesias, United States Security Policy Implications of a Post-Fidel Cuba, 10 March 2012, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA560408>]

\*GOC = Government of Cuba

The maxim that “insanity is doing the same thing, over and over again, but expecting different results,” is commonly attributed to Albert Einstein. Due to his death four year before Fidel Castro’s 26th of July insurrection came to power, it was impossible for that quote to have had anything to do with Revolutionary Cuba. Nonetheless, the adage’s applicability to U.S.-Cuban policy since seems almost serendipitous… or maybe it’s just the sign of a timeless insight. Either way, U.S. policy over the last half century towards Cuba has maintained a constancy of national interest objective that have been resolutely pursued by static, tried-and-failed isolation policies.

An easy culprit for America’s sadly stale approach in the pursuit of Cuba’s policy objective is a blinding political fixation on the villain and Maximum Leader, Fidel Castro. Across eleven U.S. administrations, Fidel Castro has challenged and bested U.S. efforts to remove him, his regime and his Revolution from the island.2 A laughable bit of U.S. foreign policy following President Bush’s 2002 declaration of the “Axis of Evil” came when U.S. Under Secretary of State John Bolton included Cuba in a “Beyond Axis of Evil.”3 Domestically, the powerful hard-line lobby of Cuban-American exiles that has resembled a blood feud against the Castro brothers has also added to the policy intransigence.

For the first time in nearly five decades, Castro’s step down from power has opened opportunities previously unavailable. Though the despotic rule has been masterfully handed off to his younger brother, Raúl Castro, things have changed and new doors will continue to open for U.S. policies into the near-term. For one, Raúl is certainly no Fidel. Where the elder was a brilliant demagogue and shrewd politician, the younger’s leadership talents come from managerial skills and loyal followings. On the other hand, one similarity that the bothers have in common is their advanced ages. With both Castros in their 80’s, the inevitable next power shift looms undeniably.

For the first time in several generations, changes in the U.S., the island, and even internationally have opened unprecedented opportunities and windows for advancing U.S. security policy objectives towards Cuba. This confluence of events is unique and worthy of analysis. That is the purpose of this Project. The document will provide a general background on U.S.-Cuban relations, address some of those nascent prospects, discuss the resultant security policy implications and make recommendations. All of this is in the sincerest hope of helping to finally stopping American’s “Cuba insanity.”

### Communications Embargo Aff

#### 1ac Solvency - - - - Repealing the Communications Embargo solves – allows the dissemination of view points and engagement with the Cuban people

Perez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]

(8D) Repeal the "Communications Embargo"

Removing the targeted sanctions on communications equipment would facilitate the transfer of ideas, information, and communication between the Cuban people and the rest of the world. The Obama Administration has taken a step in this direction by easing restrictions that prevented American companies from providing telecommunications services between Cuba and the United States. With these changes, U.S. companies can now install fiber optic cables, as well as provide satellite radio and television. These changes have not, however, gone far enough.

To be sure, removing sanctions on communications equipment would make communication and information dissemination easier for the Cuban government, but the embargo itself does not prevent this. As long as the European and Canadian markets are available, the regime will have access to the Internet and to computer systems. Restrictions like these impact the people, particularly the dissident movement, far more than the government. Put differently, the American restrictions on communications equipment amounts to a minor inconvenience for the regime, but a rather impossible hurdle for those struggling to create a civil society in Cuba.

The author has had numerous discussions with Cuban dissidents like Oswaldo Paya and Oscar Espinosa Chepe, both in person and electronically. The Cuban government clearly has an interest in keeping dissidents like [\*234] Paya and Chepe as isolated as possible. By cracking down on the communications equipment available on the island, the U.S. creates a bottleneck of information flow, whereby the Cuban government alone has access, helping the regime maintain a totalitarian stranglehold on the island and keep its dissident problem in check. Even if Cuba were to remain on the State Sponsors of Terrorism List, the Administration can still remove the ban on communications equipment pursuant to the Export Administration Act and the Foreign Assistance Act. n155 The recent reforms introduced by the Obama Administration begin to address the flow of information to the island, but much more should be done.

By entirely eliminating the communications plank of the economic sanctions, the U.S. will have removed a serious barrier to constructive academic and cultural exchanges. Many of these exchanges involve ordinary Cubans who would otherwise be left rudderless without communications equipment to link with their American counterparts. By encouraging nonpolitical contact between Cuban academics, cultural elites, and even athletes, the U.S. could circumvent the totalitarian strictures set up by the Cuban regime to isolate its own people.

American and global NGOs would also finally find their hands untied to establish a network of contacts in order to help nurture a fledgling civil society. This recommendation amounts to a negative suggestion: the less U.S. government involvement, the better. By stepping back and simply allowing private-to-private contacts flourish across the border, the U.S. government would be striking at the very heart of Cuba's totalitarian maintenance: its relative isolation.

## Latin-American Relations Adv

### Relations Brink

#### Relations good but not purposeful – need more

Shifter 12 President of Inter-American Dialogue [Michael Shifter, “Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” April, IAD Policy Report, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf]

All these changes taken together are transforming the nations of the hemisphere—and their relations with one another.

What is at stake is the future of inter-American relations, which today are generally cordial but lack vigor and purpose. Efforts at hemispheric integration have been disappointing. Effective cooperation in the Americas— even on widely shared problems like energy security, organized crime and the drug trade, and international economic volatility—remains limited and sporadic.

It is the good news of Latin America’s progress that has most altered hemispheric relations. In the past decade, the region has posted its best economic performance in a generation and managed largely to sidestep the world financial crisis in 2008–2009. The ranks of the middle classes have swelled. The region’s political structures have also opened up, giving way to growing participation by women, indigenous and Afro-descendant populations, and other once-excluded groups. All Latin Americans across a broadening spectrum have greater access to education and health services, consumer goods, and foreign travel. They now have real and rapidly expanding stakes in their societies.

These advances have also led to new social stirrings which, along with demands and expectations, are notably on the rise. There are more and more pressures for further change and improvements.

Impressive economic, political, and social progress at home has, in turn, given Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and many other countries greater access to worldwide opportunities. Indeed, the region’s most salient transformation may be its increasingly global connections and widening international relationships.

Brazil’s dramatic rise on the world stage most visibly exemplifies the shift. But other countries, too, are participating actively in global affairs and developing extensive networks of commercial and political ties. China is an increasingly prominent economic actor, but India and other Asian countries are intensifying their ties to the region as well.

The United States has also changed markedly, in ways that many find worrisome. The 2008 financial crisis revealed serious misalignments in and poor management of the US economy—which, four years later, is still struggling to recover. Inequality has significantly widened in the United States, while much-needed improvements in education and infrastructure are ignored. The most ominous change in the United States has taken place in the political realm. Politics have become less collaborative. It is increasingly difficult to find common ground on which to build solutions to the critical problems on the policy agenda. Compromise, the hallmark of democratic governance, has become an ebbing art, replaced by gridlock and inaction on challenges that would advance US national interests and well-being.

In part as a result of these shifts, US-Latin American relations have grown more distant. The quality and intensity of ties have diminished. Most countries of the region view the United States as less and less relevant to their needs—and with declining capacity to propose and carry out strategies to deal with the issues that most concern them.

In the main, hemispheric relations are amicable. Open conflict is rare and, happily, the sharp antagonisms that marred relations in the past have subsided. But the US-Latin America relationship would profit from more vitality and direction. Shared interests are not pursued as vigorously as they should be, and opportunities for more fruitful engagement are being missed. Well developed ideas for reversing these disappointing trends are scarce.

### Improves Relations

#### Improves relations – politically easier

Perez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]

Conclusion

For fifty years the Castro regime has ruled Cuba with an iron fist. In response, for nearly fifty years, the United States has tried to isolate Cuba, politically and economically. This policy has failed to achieve any discernible policy end, and has actually helped isolate the United States from the rest of the world. Moreover, America's hostile relationship with Cuba has become a symbolic rallying cry for an emerging class of Latin American leaders determined to convert anti-American sentiments into electoral victories. As a result, America's image has suffered, as has its ability to influence a region so intricately tied to its economic and national security interests. This report provides a starting point for dialogue with the Cuban government, which could eventually be used as a stepping-stone towards the normalization of relations. Additionally, this report attempts to accomplish another end: the fostering of a dialogue amongst policymakers in America who are ready and willing to listen to new ideas and a fresh approach.

Implementing these recommendations will not be easy, but they certainly are not as insurmountable as some will claim. President Obama was the first Democrat to win Florida's Hispanic vote, and nearly tied Senator [\*237] John McCain in the Cuban-dominated Miami-Dade County. n159 While in 2004 President Bush won 55% of the Hispanic vote, President Obama bettered that number by winning over 57%, compared to only 42% for Senator McCain. This emerging political climate has given the President enough room to maneuver around those who hope to continue the failures of the status quo.

Freedom has always been an important part of America's narrative, but too many leaders in Cuba see America's promotion of human rights and democracy as a war on sovereignty. The new central premise of America's Cuba policy must focus on economic reform, including an American commitment to helping Cuba develop on its own terms. This approach would support our interest in one day seeing a free and open society flourish in Cuba.

### Spills over

#### Embargo obstructs US-Latin relations

Shifter 12 President of Inter-American Dialogue [Michael Shifter, “Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” April, IAD Policy Report, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf]

Cuba, too, poses a significant challenge for relations between the United States and Latin America. The 50-year-old US embargo against Cuba is rightly criticized throughout the hemisphere as a failed and punitive instrument. It has long been a strain on US-Latin American relations. Although the United States has recently moved in the right direction and taken steps to relax restrictions on travel to Cuba, Washington needs to do far more to dismantle its severe, outdated constraints on normalized relations with Cuba. Cuba is one of the residual issues that most obstructs more effective US-Latin American engagement.

At the same time, Cuba’s authoritarian regime should be of utmost concern to all countries in the Americas. At present, it is the only country without free, multi-party elections, and its government fully controls the press. Latin American and Caribbean nations could be instrumental in supporting Cuba’s eventual transition to democratic rule. An end to the US policy of isolating Cuba, without setting aside US concern about human rights violations, would be an important first step.

#### Cuba is the most important symbolic issue for Latin America

Shifter 08 Oxford Analytica Staff, Latin American Dialogue [Michael Shifter, LATIN AMERICA/US: Obama may mark attitude shift, Oxford Analytica, November 21, 2008, <http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=1686>]

Cuba. No issue on the Latin America agenda is as symbolically important as Cuba and none has been as much a prisoner of US domestic politics. On this issue in particular, many Latin Americans expect Obama to make a break with the past. Florida's election results show the political costs are not as high as they once were, making it more likely that he will at least fulfill his campaign pledge to remove remittance and travel restrictions for Cuban-Americans. Obama is unlikely to lift the embargo in the short term, but rather to seek to use that possibility to nudge Havana toward opening up its political system. Obama backed off his initial campaign promise to meet leaders such as President Raul Castro without preconditions, although he would probably pursue lower-level channels of communication and identify areas of cooperation with Havana -- in short, gradual relaxation, a cautious but determined approach.

#### Cuba is the most important nation globally – symbolic and historical ties

Naim 09 Senior Associate in the International Economics Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace [Moises Naim, The Havana Obsession, Why all eyes are on a bankrupt island, <http://www.newsweek.com/2009/06/12/the-havana-obsession.html>]

Bill Clinton and George W. Bush recently had a face-to-face debate in Canada to discuss current affairs. The only Latin American nation mentioned in their conversation? Cuba. In April the heads of state of the Americas met in Trinidad. The central theme? Cuba—the only country not invited to the summit. Last week the Organization of American States (OAS) had a summit in Honduras. What thorny problem dominated the discussions of the -foreign-affairs ministers, including Hillary Clinton, who had to divert her attention from the North Korean nuclear test and the crises in the Middle East, Afghanistan and Pakistan to travel to the summit of the OAS? Cuba, of course. A few months ago, the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank, convened a meeting to discuss the situation in Cuba. The room was overflowing. A few days later it held a far-less-attended meeting. The subject? Brazil.

The obsession with Cuba is not exclusively American. It is as intense in Europe. It would be natural to conclude, there-fore, that no other Latin American country matters more to the rest of the hemisphere, or indeed to the rest of the world, than Cuba. Unless, of course, one looks at a map—or at some statistics. Brazil occupies almost half of South America's land mass and is the fifth largest country in the world. Its territory is nearly 80 times larger than that of Cuba. More people live in just one Brazilian city, São Paolo, than in all of Cuba. Brazil's economy is the ninth largest in the world and one of the most dynamic—it is also 31 times larger than that of Cuba. Trade between Brazil and the rest of the world is 25 times that of Cuba. There are 10 times as many Brazilians in the military as there are Cubans in the island's armed forces. In global negotiations on the environment, trade, nuclear proliferation, financial regulation, energy and poverty alleviation, Brazil is a major player.

Why the Cuba obsession, then? Why is more attention given to this bankrupt Caribbean island than to a continental giant and global player like Brazil?

The usual explanation is that Cuba has a unique symbolic allure. It is the small country that confronted the U.S. empire and has survived despite the attempts by all U.S. presidents since to subdue its communist government. It is the island with iconic leaders like Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, and the Latin American country that in the language of revolutionaries everywhere embodies the struggle of socialist humanism against the materialism of capitalist societies.

Cuba is also the small nation that in the past sent its troops to die in faraway lands in Latin America and even Africa fighting for the poor (and to further the interests of the Kremlin, but that's another story). And it is also the country whose progress in health care and education for the majority became the stuff of legend. It is the small country that the United States has unsuccessfully tried to isolate for decades through a variety of means—including an absurd and useless embargo that hurts the United States more than Cuba. The embargo is the perfect example used by anti-Americans everywhere to expose the hypocrisy of a superpower that punishes a small island while cozying to dictators elsewhere.

But Cuba is not just the David that stands against Goliath. Unfortunately, it is also a country where people are willing to risk their lives and take to the sea in rickety rafts to escape from material deprivation, brutal repression and political suffocation. It is a country whose economy cannot survive without the handouts from its allies and where food shortages and hunger are common. It is also the country where, for more than half a century, power has been in the hands of the same family.

#### Cuba spillsover to the region

Perez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]

There is no doubt that America's diminished image in Latin America means that it will face additional difficulty when trying to accomplish its regional goals. n21 To address the issues confronting the United States vis-a-vis Latin America (i.e., drugs, the environment, trade, labor and human rights), Washington must restore its heavily damaged image and regain its place as the region's trendsetter and leader. Resolving America's "Cuba problem" is a low-cost/high-reward strategy that would inject new energy and credibility into America's image. The Eight Recommendations found in this proposal are suggestions that the Obama Administration should consider as it moves to reengage Latin America. Part of America's greatness is its ability to inspire practical solutions in people. Any new U.S.-Cuban policy should embrace not only America's uncanny ability to reinvent itself, but also the pragmatism that has made America so great to begin with.

#### Spillsover to effect all Latin American relations

Perez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]

Over the last decade, America's image and influence in Latin America have been declining as a result of poorly executed policies and general neglect. Given the region's importance to American economic and national security interests, the United States must begin pursuing policies that foster trust and cooperation with Latin America, rather than fear and enmity. Reaching out to the Cuban government would have positive and reverberating effects.

#### Cuba key to overall Latin relations

Zedillo et al 08 Commission Co-Chair for the Brookings Institute Report on the Partnership for the Americas and former President of Mexico [Ernesto Zedillo, Thomas R. Pickering, etc, Rethinking U.S.–Latin American Relations A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World. Report of the Partnership for the Americas Commission, The Brookings Institution, November 2008, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2008/11/24%20latin%20america%20partnership/1124_latin_america_partnership.PDF>]

U.S.-Cuban relations have disproportionately dominated U.S. policy toward the LAC region for years. Tensions generated by U.S. policies toward Cuba have affected the United States’ image in the region and have hindered Washington’s ability to work constructively with other countries. For this reason, addressing U.S. policy toward Cuba has implications that go beyond the bilateral relationship and affect U.S. relations with the rest of the LAC region more generally. Political change in Washington, combined with recent demographic and ideological shifts in the Cuban American community and recent leadership changes in Cuba itself, offer a valuable opportunity to change course.

Though the reforms enacted recently in Cuba have thus far been mostly cosmetic, they could create openings for grassroots political and economic activity. The removal of restrictions on access to tourist facilities and on the purchase of mobile telephones and computers may have an important psychological impact and increase contact with the outside world. Also, the Cuban government has recently lifted all wage caps, started to allow performance bonuses for certain salaried professions, liberalized the sale of farming equipment, and begun to lease idle state lands to increase agricultural output. These reforms may improve labor incentives, purchasing power, and productivity.

Economic developments in Cuba will affect U.S.-Cuban relations.

Today, the United States is Cuba’s fourth-largest trading partner; in 2007, it sold the island $582 million worth of goods (including shipping costs). Cuba is currently exploring its prospects for energy production in both sugarcane-based ethanol and offshore oil. Spanish, Canadian, Norwegian, Brazilian, Indian, and other international oil companies have secured contracts to explore drilling possibilities off the Cuban coast. If the ethanol and oil industries become fully operational in five to seven years, revenues of $3 billion to $5 billion annually could significantly strengthen the Cuban economy and reduce the government’s vulnerability to external political pressure. With stable inflows of hard currency from oil sales, the Cuban government would have more funds to use at its discretion, further eroding the effects of the U.S. embargo on trade with Cuba.

Demographic and ideological shifts in the Cuban American community in the United States add to the prospects for reorienting U.S.-Cuban relations. The Cuban American population is getting younger demographically, and its priorities regarding Cuba have shifted from a traditional hard line to a focus on the day-to-day existence of those living on the island. According to 2007 polls by Florida International University, Cuban Americans are increasingly opposed to current U.S. policy, particularly restrictions on family travel, caps on remittances, and limitations on the sale of medical and other vital supplies to Cuba; 64 percent of those polled support a return to the more liberal policies of 2003. The Cuban American community has historically played a central role in U.S. domestic politics, with strong influence in the state of Florida. This shift in public opinion may ease the path toward reorientation for policymakers in Washington.

The view of this Commission is that U.S. policy should be reframed to enable legitimate Cuban voices to shape a representative, accountable, and sustainable transition to democracy. The Cuban people should be empowered to drive sustainable change from within by facilitating the free flow of information and expanding diplomatic networks to support human rights and democratic governance.

#### Cuba key to overall cooperation on multiple issues.

Shifter 12 President of Inter-American Dialogue [Michael Shifter, “Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” April, IAD Policy Report, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf]

Relations between the United States and Latin America are at a curious juncture. In the past decade, most Latin American countries have made enormous progress in managing their economies and reducing inequality and, especially, poverty, within a democratic framework. These critical changes have brought greater autonomy, expanded global links, and growing self-confidence. It is now the United States that is in a sour mood, struggling with a still weak economic recovery, diminished international stature and influence, and fractured politics at home. These recent changes have profoundly affected Inter-American relations. While relations are today cordial and largely free of the antagonisms of the past, they also seem without vigor and purpose. Effective cooperation in the Americas, whether to deal with urgent problems or to take advantage of new opportunities, has been disappointing.

The Inter-American Dialogue’s report is a call to all nations of the hemisphere to take stock, to rebuild cooperation, and to reshape relations in a new direction. All governments in the hemisphere should be more attentive to emerging opportunities for fruitful collaboration on global and regional issues ranging across economic integration, energy security, protection of democracy, and climate change. The United States must regain its credibility in the region by dealing seriously with an unfinished agenda of problems—including immigration, drugs, and Cuba—that stands in the way of a real partnership. To do so, it needs the help of Latin America and the Caribbean.

If the current state of affairs continues, the strain between the United States and Latin America could worsen, adversely affecting the interests and wellbeing of all in the hemisphere. There is a great deal at stake. This report offers a realistic assessment of the relationship within a changing regional and global context and sets out an agenda of old and new business that need urgent attention. A collaborative effort should begin immediately at the sixth Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia.

#### Cuba undermines relations with the whole hemisphere

Shifter 12 President of Inter-American Dialogue [Michael Shifter, “Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” April, IAD Policy Report, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf]

Some enduring problems stand squarely in the way of partnership and effective cooperation. The inability of Washington to reform its broken immigration system is a constant source of friction between the United States and nearly every other country in the Americas. Yet US officials rarely refer to immigration as a foreign policy issue. Domestic policy debates on this issue disregard the United States’ hemispheric agenda as well as the interests of other nations.

Another chronic irritant is US drug policy, which most Latin Americans now believe makes their drug and crime problems worse. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, while visiting Mexico, acknowledged that US anti-drug programs have not worked. Yet, despite growing calls and pressure from the region, the United States has shown little interest in exploring alternative approaches.

Similarly, Washington’s more than half-century embargo on Cuba, as well as other elements of United States’ Cuba policy, is strongly opposed by all other countries in the hemisphere. Indeed, the US position on these troublesome issues—immigration, drug policy, and Cuba—has set Washington against the consensus view of the hemisphere’s other 34 governments. These issues stand as obstacles to further cooperation in the Americas. The United States and the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean need to resolve them in order to build more productive partnerships.

#### Cuba critical to Latin America – US image tied to it

Gandásegui 11 professor at the University of Panama and a research fellow at the Arosemena Latin American Studies Center [Marco A. Gandásegui, Jr, President Obama, the Crisis, and Latin America, Latin American Perspectives 2011 38: 109]

Obama’s greatest challenge in Latin America concerns Cuba. After 50 years of embargo, everyone in the United States wants a solution to the problem, but no U.S. government has had the political ability to find the right way. Obama promised to solve this impasse and restore the U.S. image, but during his presidential campaign he spoke only once about his Cuban plans. In May 2008, at Miami’s Cuban American National Foundation, he said that it was high time Cuba and the United States listened to each other and learned from each other’s experience. He promised to open up travel and allow the sending of remittances without restrictions, but in two years he has only eliminated some of the radical measures introduced by Bush, bringing things back to where they were during the Clinton administration. In 2004 he said that the Cuban embargo had to end because it had failed to oust Castro, but in May 2008 he said that he would maintain an embargo that could serve as a weapon in negotiations. What, then, are his intentions?

The Basque journalists José Miguel Arrugaeta and Joseba Macías (2008) have suggested that, unlike his predecessors, Obama seemed to have no definite links to the more reactionary sectors of the U.S.-based Cuban counterrevolutionary movement and did not owe them his comfortable win in Florida. The recalcitrant sectors of this opposition and their domestic allies have been generously financed, supported, and even organized for decades by several U.S. administrations, but during the last electoral campaign most placed their bets on the losing candidate. Obama did not get the message.

The Cuban Manuel Yepe (2008) has described the optimism generated by Obama’s election: the embargo might end, and the five Cuban fighters who have been unfairly incarcerated in the United States might finally be released. “Cubans . . . hope that the election of a president who has promised changes and who, in himself, represents change, will lead to a new period in relations between Havana and Washington.” But these possibilities do not fit the logic of U.S. foreign policy. Obama could have gained some points during the 2010 earthquake in Haiti (Castor, 2010), but he let the United States address the tragedy as an issue of “national security.” Instead of sending aid, the White House’s first order was to send several regiments to occupy the island and aircraft carriers to areas with U.S tourists in case the latter had to be evacuated.

Most observers agree that, for Obama, Latin America continues to be terra incognita. The United States has already lost its trade presence in the Southern Cone, and whatever changes Obama’s presence may have introduced into the White House, Latin America remains forgotten (Montecino, 2008).

### Combats Chavez Message

#### Helping Cuba undermines Chavez’s anti-US message

Perez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]

Above all else, Venezuela's most expensive petro-project is its subsidization of the Cuban economy, which over the last decade has helped keep Cuba's government solvent, while bringing the two countries closer together. Venezuela is Cuba's largest benefactor, sending billions of dollars worth of aid, including much-needed oil from Venezuela's state-owned energy sector. n109 It was no surprise then that Raul Castro's first official visit was to Venezuela. n110

The relationship accomplishes at least three things. First, it gives Hugo Chavez the ideological credibility he desperately needs to respond to those who criticize him for being heavy on rhetoric and light on action. Second, a strong relationship with Venezuela props up Cuba's failing economy, and by default, its regime. In recent years Cuba has become increasingly reliant on Venezuelan aid, which it ostensibly pays for by sending Cuban doctors to Venezuela to shore up President Chavez's crumbling healthcare system. n111 Third, the relationship is structured in a way that it can only deepen. As Chavez edges closer to radical socialism, he becomes more dependent on the Cuban government's ideological support, while the Cubans become more dependent on Venezuelan largesse. n112 When Raul Castro visited Caracas in December 2008, he discussed additional cooperative ventures in agriculture, athletics, education, energy, medicine, as well as other governmental programs. n113

Nevertheless, the Cubans would prefer to avoid another dependent relationship upon an unstable power, since the memories of the 1990s, when the collapse of the Soviet Union left a deep crater in the Cuban economy, are still fresh in many leaders' minds. For that reason, Cuba has been wary of Venezuela's erratic behavior, its dependence on high oil prices, its stagflationary outlook, and above all its negative debt rating, which restricts its ability [\*223] to access funds. n114 Given Venezuela's vulnerability to the recent crash in oil prices, Cuba has been courting other trading partners, including Brazil and China. Any reassessment of Cuban-Venezuelan cooperation by Havana presents an enormous opportunity for the United States.

The parallels between President Chavez's reliance on demonizing the U.S. in order to advance his domestic and foreign policy, and the Cuban regime's reliance on the embargo to scapegoat the U.S. for all its failures, should not be overlooked. Fixing America's reputation in the region would undercut Chavez's own image by removing a large part of his regime's raison d'etre, and would help prevent his taking up the mantle left by Fidel Castro's departure. American rapprochement with Cuba would be a nightmare scenario for Caracas, and a win-win for Washington: if Chavez opposes it, his credibility is undermined; if he endorses it, his critique of America is undermined.

#### US is competing with Chavez’s message in Latin America – must engage

Perez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]

In order to effectively engage Cuba and the rest of Latin America, the United States must accept that it is directly competing with Venezuela for the hearts and minds of the Latin American people. The U.S. should explicitly use any rapprochement with Cuba as a means to engage (and defeat) Venezuela in a regional battle of ideas that, to this point, it has been losing.

Although President Bush was deeply unpopular in Latin America, perhaps the most polarizing figure throughout the continent is Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. Chavez's message strikes a chord among millions of Latin Americans who have taken a liking to his role as both Fidel Castro's pinch-hitter, and the most reliable source of anti-American rhetoric. Although the last thing the U.S. would want is for another loud and erratic leftist to gain a permanent foothold in Latin American politics, Chavez's ascension to Castro's ideological throne makes that scenario likely, though not inevitable. The U.S. would have to directly compete with Chavez's message, which according to William Ratliff, a Latin America expert at the Hoover Institution, can be broken down into three parts. n88 First, Chavez argues that poverty is ubiquitous in Latin America because of an economic quagmire afflicting the entire region. Second, he blames the United States for this quagmire. Finally, he presents socialism - and himself - as an alternative to U.S. influence and the solution to all of Latin America's woes. n89

Chavez's message to Latin Americans resonates for the same reason Fidel's message to Cubans has been so effective: it is much easier for governments and political leaders to scapegoat the "Colossus to the North" than to address their own domestic failures. However, this message is not new, it is simply a repackaging of the economically intrusive policies pursued during the 1960s and 1970s to horrific effect. Some governments in the region, such as Brazil and Chile, have eschewed these worn-out policies in favor of [\*219] reform, while others have bought into Chavez's anachronistic ideas, such as Bolivia and Ecuador.

Washington must accept the fact that it is competing directly with Chavez for the hearts and minds of the Latin American people, but so far it is losing the race. For too long the contest has been a one-man show featuring a relatively young leader who is able to give fiery speeches from his bully pulpit. Fortunately, despite its relative absence from the region during the last eight years, the U.S. still has a horse than can run circles around Venezuela, since the American market presents a much bigger carrot than Caracas could ever offer. For instance, Latin American exports to the U.S. has grown by more than 69% since 1996. n90

Unfortunately, the stark economic comparisons that clearly show America's advantage over Venezuela have allowed Washington's policymakers to sit on their laurels while Chavez distorts the numbers to scapegoat the United States for Latin America's difficulties. Washington's recent neglect of the region should be replaced with an aggressive and humble courtship of the Latin American people. America's economic advantage over Caracas should be leveraged as a means to directly engage the region's leaders while challenging Chavez's message. We can no longer sit back and wait for the region to engage us while ignoring the obvious problem posed by Chavez's distortions.

### Soft Power IL

#### Key to international soft power – anti-Cuba stance is regularly criticized

Iglesias 12 Commander of the US Navy – Army War College Publication [Carlos Iglesias, United States Security Policy Implications of a Post-Fidel Cuba, 10 March 2012, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA560408>]

\*GOC = Government of Cuba

Unlike the policy implications above, the major hurdle to this interest does not come from any continuation of the GOC, but from the rest of the world. International opposition to the perceived fairness and effectiveness of the economic sanctions has long posed an obstacle for U.S. policy. In the global scale, the problem is epitomized by the twenty consecutive years of near unanimous UN General Assembly resolution votes against the embargo. 96 More regionally, Spain and other European Union partners have strongly pushed to loosen sanctions. The arguments are straightforward and pragmatic, “since sanctions in place have not worked, it makes more sense to do things that would work, and (the next obvious one is to) change things.”97 Even more locally, Cuba has managed to generally retain positive feelings among the people of Latin American in spite of the country’s domestic realities.98 The rise of Raúl and any subsequent successions further complicated the problem of mustering international consensus. Several countries in the hemisphere see any new Cuban leadership as fresh opportunities to engage in common interests. The two largest Latin American countries, Brazil and Mexico, have both ascribed to this approach and have indicated their interests in forging new ties since Fidel’s stepped down.99

On the other hand, this international dissention does hold some prospect for leveraging U.S. soft power. An indirect approach would be to coordinate U.S. proxy actions with partner countries interested in Cuba. This has the double benefit of leveraging U.S. soft power without compromising legislated restrictions or provoking hard-line Cuban-American ire. In this approach, burgeoning relations with Brazil and Mexico would be strong candidates. Devoid of the “bullhorn diplomacy” that have marginalized U.S.-Cuban policy efficacy for decades, the U.S. could better engage the island through hemispherical interlocutors. At a minimum, U.S. interests would be advanced through the proxy insights of what is occurring on the island in addition to the potential displacement of anti-American influences (e.g. Chávez).100

Another potential gain for U.S. interests would be to upgrade its diplomatic presence on the island. For decades, the countries have reciprocated diplomacy marginalization with low-level “interest sections” in each other capitals. The fallback reasoning for the U.S. has always been that it did not want to appear to reward the GOC’s legitimacy with an embassy. This is myopic and inconsistent. The national strategy clearly promotes engagement in order to “learn about the intentions and nature of closed regimes, and to plainly demonstrate to the public within those nations that their governments are to blame for their isolations.101 Additionally, the diplomatic level is inconsistent with the longstanding U.S. accreditation of ambassadors to both friendly and hostile governments.102 An embassy in Cuba could support critical awareness and engagements. In the event of an opportunity or crisis, this presence could be the difference between knowing where, when, and with whom to act or just watching from across the Florida Straits.

### Everyone Hates It

#### Everyone hates the embargo - everyone

Coll 07 Professor of Law and President, International Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul College of Law [Alberto R. Coll, Harming Human Rights in the Name of Promoting Them: The Case of the Cuban Embargo, UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs, Fall, 2007, 12 UCLA J. Int'l L. & For. Aff. 199]

The overwhelming majority of United Nations members, including all of the United States' major allies, oppose the U.S. embargo against Cuba. As noted earlier in this article, the OAS, the only regional organization in the hemisphere with the legitimate authority to impose sanctions, ended its sanctions against Cuba in 1975, and called upon its members - including the United States - to follow suit. In addition to lacking United Nations and OAS endorsement and being opposed by 183 states in the international community, the embargo has no support from the international human rights community - not even from a single international NGO working on human rights or humanitarian issues. The world's two most prominent international human rights NGOs, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, are sharply critical of the Cuban government's human rights policies. Both strongly oppose the embargo as harmful to human rights in Cuba and as counterproductive to the long-term objective of promoting democracy and human rights on the island. n424 The Roman Catholic Church, which under Pope John Paul II gained wide credibility for its stance on behalf of human rights across the globe, has also been highly critical of indiscriminate sanctions in general and of the Cuban embargo specifically. n425 The embargo's purely unilateral character is highlighted by the fact that, with the exception of the governments of the United States, Israel, Palau and the Marshall Islands, there is not a single credible international actor, governmental or otherwise, [\*264] that supports the embargo or has not expressed clear opposition to it. Finally, even within the United States, the embargo's supporters consist of a narrow minority located in a small geographic corner of the United States as well as the successive U.S. administrations and members of Congress that are eager to court their votes and financial backing. A 2006 Gallup poll indicated that two-thirds of the American people, while disapproving of the Castro government, would like to reestablish U.S. diplomatic relations with Cuba. n426 Similarly, a 2007 Zogby poll found that a majority of Americans were in favor of improving relations with Cuba and were against the embargo and its restrictions. n427

Thus, the nearly universal disapproval for the Cuban embargo constitutes a fatal flaw in its legitimacy. The established consensus is that comprehensive human rights embargoes require international support in order to be legitimate and free from the taint of partiality and self-interest. This is also a crucial difference between the Cuban embargo and the earlier sanctions imposed against South Africa in the 1980s. Unlike the Cuban embargo, the South African sanctions were limited, supported by many states within the international community across a wide range of different cultures and economic and political systems, backed by a substantial number of international actors from the NGO and corporate sectors, and endorsed by leading members of the South African opposition, such as Bishop Desmond Tutu. n428

### Laundry List Impact

#### Relations key to multiple issues – growth, democracy, prolif, and warming.

Shifter 12 President of Inter-American Dialogue [Michael Shifter, “Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” April, IAD Policy Report, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf]

There are compelling reasons for the United States and Latin America to pursue more robust ties.

Every country in the Americas would benefit from strengthened and expanded economic relations, with improved access to each other’s markets, investment capital, and energy resources. Even with its current economic problems, the United States’ $16-trillion economy is a vital market and source of capital (including remittances) and technology for Latin America, and it could contribute more to the region’s economic performance.

For its part, Latin America’s rising economies will inevitably become more and more crucial to the United States’ economic future. The United States and many nations of Latin America and the Caribbean would also gain a great deal by more cooperation on such global matters as climate change, nuclear non-proliferation, and democracy and human rights. With a rapidly expanding US Hispanic population of more than 50 million, the cultural and demographic integration of the United States and Latin America is proceeding at an accelerating pace, setting a firmer basis for hemispheric partnership.

Despite the multiple opportunities and potential benefits, relations between the United States and Latin America remain disappointing. If new opportunities are not seized, relations will likely continue to drift apart. The longer the current situation persists, the harder it will be to reverse course and rebuild vigorous cooperation. Hemispheric affairs require urgent attention—both from the United States and from Latin America and the Caribbean.

#### US-Latin relations are key to combat nuclear proliferation, climate change, and insure economic growth – Cuba is a key starting point

BROOKINGS 08 Brookings’s Partnership for the Americas Commission [Re-Thinking U.S.-Latin American Relations: A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2008/11/24-latin-america-partnership>]

Developments in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) have a very significant impact on the daily lives of those who live in the United States. Yet because of a lack of trust, an inability to undertake stable commitments by some countries, and different U.S. priorities, the United States and Latin America have rarely developed a genuine and sustained partnership to address regional —let alone global—challenges.

If a hemispheric partnership remains elusive, the costs to the United States and its neighbors will be high, in terms of both growing risks and missed opportunities. Without a partnership, the risk that criminal networks pose to the region’s people and institutions will continue to grow. Peaceful nuclear technology may be adopted more widely, but without proper regional safeguards, the risks of nuclear proliferation will increase. Adaptation to climate change will take place through isolated, improvised measures by individual countries, rather than through more effective efforts based on mutual learning and coordination. Illegal immigration to the United States will continue unabated and unregulated, adding to an ever-larger underclass that lives and works at the margins of the law. Finally, the countries around the hemisphere, including the United States, will lose valuable opportunities to tap new markets, make new investments, and access valuable resources.

Today, several changes in the region have made a hemispheric partnership both possible and necessary. The key challenges faced by the United States and the hemisphere’s other countries —such as securing sustainable energy supplies, combating and adapting to climate change, and combating organized crime and drug trafficking—have become so complex and deeply transnational that they cannot be managed or overcome by any single country. At the same time, the LAC countries are diversifying their international economic and political relations, making them less reliant on the United States. Finally, the LAC countries are better positioned than before to act as reliable partners.

This report does not advance a single, grand scheme for reinventing hemispheric relations. Instead, the report is based on two simple propositions: The countries of the hemisphere share common interests; and the United States should engage its hemispheric neighbors on issues where shared interests, objectives, and solutions are easiest to identify and can serve as the basis for an effective partnership. In this spirit, the report offers a series of modest, pragmatic recommendations that, if implemented, could help the countries of the region manage key transnational challenges and realize the region’s potential.

The report identifies four areas that hold most promise for a hemispheric partnership: (1) developing sustainable energy sources and combating climate change, (2) managing migration effectively, (3) expanding opportunities for all through economic integration, and (4) protecting the hemisphere from drug trafficking and organized crime. The next section of this report explores the growing need for a U.S.-LAC partnership. The subsequent four sections offer an analysis of each promising area for the potential partnership and provide concrete recommendations for U.S. policymakers—which are previewed below. The last section addresses U.S. relations with Cuba. Though this issue is of a smaller order of magnitude than the other four areas, it is addressed here because Cuba has long been a subject of intense interest in U.S. foreign policy and a stumbling block for U.S. relations with other countries in the hemisphere.

### Growth Impact

#### Latin America relations key to US economic growth

Zedillo et al 08 Commission Co-Chair for the Brookings Institute Report on the Partnership for the Americas and former President of Mexico [Ernesto Zedillo, Thomas R. Pickering, etc, Rethinking U.S.–Latin American Relations A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World. Report of the Partnership for the Americas Commission, The Brookings Institution, November 2008, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2008/11/24%20latin%20america%20partnership/1124_latin_america_partnership.PDF>]

As the crisis unfolds, Latin America remains important to the United States in at least two respects. If the LAC region grows at rates of more than 3 percent a year—as the International Monetary Fund currently projects—even in a weak global economy, its countries will play a valuable role as buyers of U.S. goods and services, helping the U.S. economy export its way out of the crisis. Conversely, if the region’s economy deteriorates further, the problems associated with poverty, crime, inequality, and migration may worsen and could potentially spill across borders. For the United States, coping with the hemispheric impact of the financial crisis will be a major policy challenge with economic as well as political and security implications.

### Environment Impact

#### US Latin relations key to energy policies – combat warming & Amazon deforestation

Zedillo et al 08 Commission Co-Chair for the Brookings Institute Report on the Partnership for the Americas and former President of Mexico [Ernesto Zedillo, Thomas R. Pickering, etc, Rethinking U.S.–Latin American Relations A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World. Report of the Partnership for the Americas Commission, The Brookings Institution, November 2008, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2008/11/24%20latin%20america%20partnership/1124_latin_america_partnership.PDF>]

To expand the hemisphere’s energy capacity, massive infrastructure investments will be required. Major investments in oil production (especially deep offshore), refining, and distribution will be needed to achieve the region’s potential. Developing the Tupi project in Brazil alone will cost $70–240 billion. Liquefied natural gas will become an important source of energy, but not before major investments are made in infrastructure to support liquefaction, regasification, transport, and security. U.S. and Canadian electricity networks, which are already highly integrated, can be further integrated with Mexico’s. Mexico also plans to connect its grid to those of Guatemala and Belize, eventually creating an integrated power market in Central America. Power integration in South America will demand even larger investments in generation, transmission, and distribution. Finally, reliance on nuclear power may grow because it is carbon free and does not require fossil fuel imports.

However, efforts to expand energy capacity and integrate hemispheric energy markets face a variety of obstacles. Energy nationalism has led to disruptive disputes over pricing and ownership. Tensions and mistrust in South America have hindered regional cooperation and investment, particularly on natural gas. The security of the energy infrastructure, especially pipelines, remains a concern in Mexico and parts of South America. Gas, oil, and electricity subsidies distort patterns of production and consumption, and they are triggering protectionist behavior elsewhere. Technology on renewables remains underdeveloped, and research in this area can be better centralized and disseminated. Overcoming these obstacles will require high levels of cooperation among hemispheric partners.

In addition to developing carbon-neutral sources of energy, the Western Hemisphere has other roles to play in combating climate change. The LAC region currently accounts for about 5 percent of annual global carbon emissions, and emissions per capita are still relatively low compared with other regions. However, minimizing the LAC region’s future carbon footprint will require new policies. Also, deforestation globally accounts for 20 percent of greenhouse gas emissions. The Amazon River Basin contains one of the world’s three most important rainforests, whose protection can therefore very significantly contribute to combating climate change. Brazil is pioneering the use of information technology to lessen deforestation in the Amazon.

### Soft Power Good – Global Problems

#### Soft Power solves global problems

Reiffel 05 Visiting Fellow at the Global Economy and Development Center of the Brookings Institution [Lex Reiffel, The Brookings Institution, Reaching Out: Americans Serving Overseas, 12-27-2005, [www.brookings.edu/views/papers/20051207rieffel.pdf](http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/20051207rieffel.pdf)]

I. Introduction: Overseas Service as a Soft Instrument of Power The United States is struggling to define a new role for itself in the post-Cold War world that protects its vital self interests without making the rest of the world uncomfortable. In retrospect, the decade of the 1990s was a cakewalk. Together with its Cold War allies Americans focused on helping the transition countries in Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union build functioning democratic political systems and growing market economies. The USA met this immense challenge successfully, by and large, and it gained friends in the process. By contrast, the first five years of the new millennium have been mostly downhill for the USA. The terrorist attacks on 9/11/01 changed the national mood in a matter of hours from gloating to a level of fear unknown since the Depression of the 1930s. They also pushed sympathy for the USA among people in the rest of the world to new heights. However, the feeling of global solidarity quickly dissipated after the military intervention in Iraq by a narrow US-led coalition. A major poll measuring the attitudes of foreigners toward the USA found a sharp shift in opinion in the negative direction between 2002 and 2003, which has only partially recovered since then.1 The devastation of New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina at the end of August 2005 was another blow to American self-confidence as well as to its image in the rest of the world. It cracked the veneer of the society reflected in the American movies and TV programs that flood the world. It exposed weaknesses in government institutions that had been promoted for decades as models for other countries. Internal pressure to turn America’s back on the rest of the world is likely to intensify as the country focuses attention on domestic problems such as the growing number of Americans without health insurance, educational performance that is declining relative to other countries, deteriorating infrastructure, and increased dependence on foreign supplies of oil and gas. A more isolationist sentiment would reduce the ability of the USA to use its overwhelming military power to promote peaceful change in the developing countries that hold two-thirds of the world’s population and pose the gravest threats to global stability. Isolationism might heighten the sense of security in the short run, but it would put the USA at the mercy of external forces in the long run. Accordingly, one of the great challenges for the USA today is to build a broad coalition of like-minded nations and a set of international institutions capable of maintaining order and addressing global problems such as nuclear proliferation, epidemics like HIV/AIDS and avian flu, failed states like Somalia and Myanmar, and environmental degradation. The costs of acting alone or in small coalitions are now more clearly seen to be unsustainable. The limitations of “hard” instruments of foreign policy have been amply demonstrated in Iraq. Military power can dislodge a tyrant with great efficiency but cannot build stable and prosperous nations. Appropriately, the appointment of Karen Hughes as Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs suggests that the Bush Administration is gearing up to rely more on “soft” instruments.2

### Soft Power key to Heg

#### Soft Power key to sustaining US leadership – assumes the 21st century

NYE 02 former Assistant Secretary of Defense and Dean of Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government (Joseph, “The Paradox of American Power”)

PEERING INTO THE FUTURE The September 2001 wake-up call means that Americans are unlikely to slip back into the complacency that marked the first decade after the Cold War. If we respond effectively, it is highly unlikely that terrorists could destroy American power, but the campaign against terrorism will require a long and sustained effort. At the same time, the United States is unlikely to face a challenge to its preeminence unless it acts so arrogantly that it helps other states to overcome their built- in limitations. The one entity with the capacity to challenge the United States in the near future is the European Union if it were to become a tight federation with major military capabilities and if the relations across the Atlantic were allowed to sour. Such an outcome is possible but would require major changes in Europe and considerable ineptitude in American policy to bring it about. Nonetheless, even short of such a challenge, the diminished fungibility of military power in a global information age means that Europe is already well placed to balance the United States on the economic and transnational chessboards. Even short of a military balance of power, other countries may be driven to work together to take actions to complicate American objectives. Or, as the French critic Dominique Moisi puts it, “The global age has not changed the fact that nothing in the world can be done without the United States. And the multiplicity of new actors means that there is very little the United States can achieve alone.”73 The United States can learn useful lessons about a strategy of providing public goods from the history of Pax Britannica. An Australian analyst may be right in her view that if the United States plays its cards well and acts not as a soloist but as the leader of a concert of nations, “the Pax Americana, in terms of its duration, might. . . become more like the Pax Romana than the Pax Britannica:’74 If so, our soft power will play a major role. As Henry Kissinger has argued, the test of history for the United States will be whether we can turn our current predominant power into international consensus and our own principles into widely accepted international norms. That was the greatness achieved by Rome and Britain in their times.75

#### United States leadership is solely dependent on Soft power

FRASER 03 doctorate in political science from [Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Institut_d%27Etudes_Politiques_de_Paris), former Editor-in-Chief of [National Post](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Post) (Matthew, , p. 18, “Weapons of Mass Distraction: Soft Power and American Empire”).

Let's begin with soft power. The term has been championed by Joseph S. Nye, a Harvard professor who served as Assistant Secretary of Defense under President Bill Clinton. Nye has defined soft power as "the ability to achieve desired outcomes in international affairs through attraction rather than coercion." Nye argues, more specifically, that America's global influence cannot depend solely on its economic strength, military muscle, and coercive capacities. Yes, hard power is needed as an implied threat, and should be used when necessary—as was demonstrated in Afghanistan and Iraq. But American leadership in the world must depend on the assertion of soft power—namely, the global appeal of American lifestyles, culture, forms of distraction, norms, and values. In short, American leadership is more effective when it is morally based. Soft power has the advantage of being much less violent than brute force. It can claim, moreover, the not inconsequential virtue of being much less costly. Why keep the peace with ground troops, aircraft carriers, and inter-continental missiles when Big Macs, Coca-Cola, and Hollywood blockbusters can help achieve the same long-term goals? Soft power also includes artistic expression and institutional arrangements—such as travelling exhibitions and scholarly exchange programs—that help export American models. When foreign students undertake studies in the United States, they return to their home countries immersed in American values, attitudes, and modes of thinking.

### China Module

#### US-Latin America relations are key to stop Chinese expansion in the region

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The U.S. Government is waking up to China's growing presence in Latin America. For the last several years as U.S. policymakers' attention and resources, largely diverted from Latin America, have been focused on the Middle East, China has pursued a policy of economic engagment with the region. Sino-Latin American trade has sky-rocketed, and Chinese investment in the region is picking up. In this monograph, Ms. Janie Hulse, a Latin American specialist based in Buenos Aires, Argentina, argues that increased Chinese investment in regional telecommunications and space industries has implications for U.S. national security. She believes that globalization, advances in information technology and China's growing capacity and interest in information warfare make the United States particularly vulnerable. Ms. Hulse details China's expansion into the U.S. withdrawal from these intelligence-related industries in Argentina and highlights associated risks for the United States. The author calls for the U.S. government to react to this current trend by increasing its engagement in regional strategic industries and bettering relations with its southern neighbors.

#### Regional influence is key to prevent a Chinese ASATs attack

Hulse 7 (Janie Hulse, Master’s degree in Politics of Development of Latin America from the London School of Economics, is an independent contractor based in Buenos Aires, Argentina, who provides communica-tions and research services to private and public sector organizations “CHINA’S EXPANSION INTO AND U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM ARGENTINA’S TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND SPACE INDUSTRIES AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY,” Strategic Studies Institute, September, <http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=806> )

Chinese presence in Western Hemisphere space creates particular vulnerabilities for the United States. Latin America?s geographical proximity makes for convenient satellite observance of the United States. Access to space tracking facilities in the region also could give China the ability to attack U.S. satellites. Moreover, Chinese space cooperation with Latin American governments that have historically collaborated with the United States provides the Chinese an opportunity to study U.S. space technologies and practices up close. As is the case with the telecommunications industry, there is increasing competition in the international space markets. If the United States fails to maintain its preeminence in these markets, it will lose the ability to secure this extremely strategic industry. While China is not currently building a significant military presence in Latin America, the human and commercial infrastructure that it is building in the region increasingly gives China a powerful lever for disrupting and distracting the United States in the Western Hemisphere, should Sino-U.S. relations turn sour. The United States should work to counter China?s growing influence to mitigate future threats. To do so requires improving U.S. relations with Latin American countries and making U.S. companies more competitive in the region?especially in strategic markets where U.S. security is at stake. The most effective way for the United States to improve its standing and influence in Argentina and the Latin American region as a whole is to help these countries succeed economically through increased aid, trade, and investments. Aid should be expanded in a creative, cost-effective manner and should include middle-income countries in South America, which traditionally do not qualify for U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) assistance. Free trade should continue to be promoted, but in a more generous way. The U.S. Government should promote investment by bolstering the U.S. Commercial Service and assisting U.S. companies in gaining a foothold in the strategic telecommunications and space industries. It also behooves the U.S. Government to increase assistance to and cooperation with Latin American militaries to maintain friendships throughout the region. It is not too late for the United States to take remedial action to increase its presence in Latin America?s telecommunications and space sectors. Commercial and aid efforts should be complemented by a heavy dose of improved public diplomacy? especially in countries similar to Argentina where U.S. popularity is low and where China has made substantial inroads.

**The impact is US-Sino nuclear war**

**Forden, PhD and Research Associate @ MIT, 8** (Geoffrey, PhD and Research Associate at MIT, “How China Loses the Coming Space War (Pt. 2),” 1/10, <http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/01/inside-the-ch-1/>, EMM)

The United States has five satellites in geostationary orbit that detect missile launches using the heat released from their exhaust plumes. These satellites are primarily used to alert US nuclear forces to massive nuclear attacks on the homeland. However, in recent years, they have played an increasing role in conventional conflicts, such as both Gulf Wars, by cueing tactical missile defenses like the Patriot missile defense systems that gained fame in their engagements with Saddam’s SCUD missiles. Because of this new use, China might find it useful to attack them with ASATs. Since there are only five of them, China could destroy the entire constellation but at the cost of diverting some of the few available deep-space ASATs from other targets. Of course, China would not have to attack all five but could limit its attack to the three that simultaneously view the Taiwan Straits area. If China did decide to destroy these early warning satellites, it would greatly reduce the area covered by US missile defenses in Taiwan against SCUD and longer range missiles. This is because the area covered by a theater missile defense system is highly dependent on the warning time it has; the greater the warning time, the more effective the missile defense system’s radar is. Thus a Patriot battery, which might ordinarily cover the capital of Taiwan, could be reduced to just defending the military base it was stationed at. Some analysts believe that China would gain a tremendous propaganda coup by having a single missile make it through US defenses and thus might consider this use of its deep-space ASATs highly worthwhile even if it could not increase the probability of destroying military targets. On the other hand, China would run a tremendous risk of the US believing it was under a more general nuclear attack if China did destroy these early warning satellites. Throughout the history of the Cold War, the US has had a policy of only launching a “retaliatory” nuclear strike if an incoming attack is detected by both early warning satellites and radars. Without the space leg of the early warning system, the odds of the US misinterpreting some missile launch that it detected with radar as a nuclear attack would be greatly increased even if the US did not view the satellite destruction as a sufficiently threatening attack all by themselves. Such a misinterpretation is not without precedent. In 1995, Russia’s early warning radars viewed a NASA sounding rocket launch off the coast of Norway and flagged it as a possible Trident missile launch. Many analysts believe that Russia was able to not respond only because it had a constellation of functioning early warning satellites. Any Chinese attacks on US early warning satellites would risk both intentional and mistaken escalation of the conflict into a nuclear war without a clear military goal.

**Escalates to extinction**

**Cheong, Senior Writer @ the Strait Times, 2k** (Ching, Senior Writer at the Strait Times, “No one gains in a war over Taiwan,” June 25th, Lexis)

THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China, 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilization.

### Prolif Bad

#### And arguments for slow proliferation are wrong—it will snowball and put everyone on hair trigger—that makes all their impacts worse

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At a minimum, such developments will be a departure from whatever stability existed during the Cold War. After World War II, there was a clear subordination of nations to one or another of the two superpowers’ strong alliance systems — the U.S.-led free world and the Russian-Chinese led Communist Bloc. The net effect was relative peace with only small, nonindustrial wars. This alliance tension and system, however, no longer exist. Instead, we now have one superpower, the United States, that is capable of overthrowing small nations unilaterally with conventional arms alone, associated with a relatively weak alliance system ( nato) that includes two European nuclear powers (France and the uk). nato is increasingly integrating its nuclear targeting policies. The U.S. also has retained its security allies in Asia (Japan, Australia, and South Korea) but has seen the emergence of an increasing number of nuclear or nuclear-weapon-armed or -ready states. So far, the U.S. has tried to cope with independent nuclear powers by making them “strategic partners” (e.g., India and Russia), nato nuclear allies (France and the uk), “non-nato allies” (e.g., Israel and Pakistan), and strategic stakeholders (China); or by fudging if a nation actually has attained full nuclear status (e.g., Iran or North Korea, which, we insist, will either not get nuclear weapons or will give them up). In this world, every nuclear power center (our European nuclear nato allies), the U.S., Russia, China, Israel, India, and Pakistan could have significant diplomatic security relations or ties with one another but none of these ties is viewed by Washington (and, one hopes, by no one else) as being as important as the ties between Washington and each of these nuclear-armed entities (see Figure 3). There are limits, however, to what this approach can accomplish. Such a weak alliance system, with its expanding set of loose affiliations, risks becoming analogous to the international system that failed to contain offensive actions prior to World War I. Unlike 1914, there is no power today that can rival the projection of U.S. conventional forces anywhere on the globe. But in a world with an increasing number of nuclear-armed or nuclear-ready states, this may not matter as much as we think. In such a world, the actions of just one or two states or groups that might threaten to disrupt or overthrow a nuclear weapons state could check U.S. influence or ignite a war Washington could have difficulty containing. No amount of military science or tactics could assure that the U.S. could disarm or neutralize such threatening or unstable nuclear states.22 Nor could diplomats or our intelligence services be relied upon to keep up to date on what each of these governments would be likely to do in such a crisis (see graphic below): Combine these proliferation trends with the others noted above and one could easily create the perfect nuclear storm: Small differences between nuclear competitors that would put all actors on edge; an overhang of nuclear materials that could be called upon to break out or significantly ramp up existing nuclear deployments; and a variety of potential new nuclear actors developing weapons options in the wings. In such a setting, the military and nuclear rivalries between states could easily be much more intense than before. Certainly each nuclear state’s military would place an even higher premium than before on being able to weaponize its military and civilian surpluses quickly, to deploy forces that are survivable, and to have forces that can get to their targets and destroy them with high levels of probability. The advanced military states will also be even more inclined to develop and deploy enhanced air and missile defenses and long-range, precision guidance munitions, and to develop a variety of preventative and preemptive war options. Certainly, in such a world, relations between states could become far less stable. Relatively small developments — e.g., Russian support for sympathetic near-abroad provinces; Pakistani-inspired terrorist strikes in India, such as those experienced recently in Mumbai; new Indian flanking activities in Iran near Pakistan; Chinese weapons developments or moves regarding Taiwan; state-sponsored assassination attempts of key figures in the Middle East or South West Asia, etc. — could easily prompt nuclear weapons deployments with “strategic” consequences (arms races, strategic miscues, and even nuclear war). As Herman Kahn once noted, in such a world “every quarrel or difference of opinion may lead to violence of a kind quite different from what is possible today.”23 In short, we may soon see a future that neither the proponents of nuclear abolition, nor their critics, would ever want.

#### And multiple factors ensure miscalculation is likely—their deterrence checks evidence is outdated and false

Evans and Kawaguchi 9—President of the International Crisis Group & Former Foreign Minister of Japan [December 15, 2009, Gareth Evans (Co-chair of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament and Professorial fellow in the School of Social and Political Sciences @ University of Melbourne) & Yoriko Kawaguchi (Co-chair of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament), “Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers,” International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Report, pg. 31-32, http://www.icnnd.org/Reference/reports/ent/part-ii-3.html]

3.1 Ensuring that no new states join the ranks of those already nucleararmed must continue to be one of the world’s top international security priorities. Every new nuclear-armed state will add significantly to the inherent risks – of accident or miscalculation as well as deliberate use – involved in any possession of these weapons, and potentially encourage more states to acquire nuclear weapons to avoid being left behind. Any scramble for nuclear capabilities is bound to generate severe instability in bilateral, regional and international relations. The carefully worked checks and balances of interstate relations will come under severe stress. There will be enhanced fears of nuclear blackmail, and of irresponsible and unpredictable leadership behaviour.

3.2 In conditions of inadequate command and control systems, absence of confidence building measures and multiple agencies in the nuclear weapons chain of authority, **the possibility of an accidental or maverick usage of nuclear weapons will remain high**. Unpredictable elements of risk and reward will impact on decision making processes. The dangers are compounded if the new and aspiring nuclear weapons states have, as is likely to be the case, ongoing inter-state disputes with ideological, territorial, historical – and for all those reasons, strongly emotive – dimensions.

3.3 The transitional period is likely to be most dangerous of all, with the arrival of nuclear weapons tending to be accompanied by sabre rattling and competitive nuclear chauvinism. For example, as between Pakistan and india a degree of stability might have now evolved, but 1998–2002 was a period of disturbingly fragile interstate relations. **Command and control and risk management of nuclear weapons takes time to evolve**. Military and political leadership in new nuclear-armed states need time to learn and implement credible safety and security systems. The risks of nuclear accidents and the possibility of nuclear action through inadequate crisis control mechanisms are very high in such circumstances. If this is coupled with political instability in such states, the risks escalate again. Where such countries are beset with internal stresses and fundamentalist groups with trans-national agendas, the risk of nuclear weapons or fissile material coming into possession of non-state actors cannot be ignored.

3.4 The action–reaction cycle of nations on high alerts, of military deployments, threats and counter threats of military action, have all been witnessed in the Korean peninsula with unpredictable behavioural patterns driving interstate relations. The impact of a proliferation breakout in the Middle East would be much wider in scope and make stability management extraordinarily difficult. Whatever the chances of “stable deterrence” prevailing in a Cold War or india–Pakistan setting, the prospects are significantly less in a regional setting with multiple nuclear power centres divided by multiple and cross-cutting sources of conflict.

## Human Rights Advantage

### Embargo Hurts HR

#### Embargo undermines human rights – keeps goods from the Cuban people

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CONCLUSION

The Cuban embargo's sole purpose, as articulated officially by the U.S. government, is to promote human rights and democracy on the island. However, because the embargo is comprehensive and indiscriminate, the [\*273] embargo adversely affects the human rights of vast numbers of innocent Cubans, especially in the areas of economic, social, and cultural rights. The embargo has also failed since its inception more than four decades ago to contribute to the promotion of human rights on the island, and it continues to retard any possible political opening by fostering a siege mentality among Cuban leadership. Moreover, the embargo disregards the clear wishes of the people of Cuba for closer economic, family and cultural ties to the United States, thereby contradicting its own ostensibly democratic rationale and further detracting from the limited possibilities currently available to Cubans to create a more open society.

Moreover, the embargo can be justified legally only by grounding it in the classic state sovereignty paradigm according to which states can refuse to trade with any others regardless of the consequences to the target state's population. This paradigm is completely at odds with the cosmopolitan paradigm which gives states a legitimate interest in the domestic human rights conditions of other states. This latter paradigm is the basis under which the United States has justified its "human rights" embargo against Cuba since 1992. Thus, both philosophically and as a policy instrument, the embargo is incoherent in its very rationale.

As an indiscriminate, comprehensive, unilateral peacetime measure taken by the world's most powerful nation against a small developing country, the embargo also has come under the strict legal scrutiny of the international community. Because the embargo is a human rights embargo as opposed to a national security embargo, it is subject to a higher degree of scrutiny in terms of its impact on the human rights of the affected population. For the past ten years, overwhelming majorities at the GA, including all of the United States' closest European, Asian and Latin American allies, have voted against the embargo. Since 2000, the votes in favor of the United States have been reduced to four out of 187: the United States itself, Israel, and two Pacific island mini-states that are heavily dependent on U.S. foreign aid. Even Israel, which ironically maintains full commercial relations with Cuba and allows its citizens to travel and invest there, has explained its vote not as a vote in favor of the embargo but as a vote against condemning the actions of its senior ally. The depth and breadth of the global consensus against the embargo point to serious international doubts regarding its legal permissibility and its appropriateness as an instrument for the promotion of human rights. Thus far, however, Washington shows no signs of paying any heed to this international consensus, just as it ignores what Cubans on the island think of the chief policy instrument though which the United States seeks to bring democracy and human rights to their country.

### Sanctions Bad

#### Sanctions are human rights violations

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While the use of sanctions is permitted under the principles of international law (UN Charter, Art. 39 & 41, as well as notion of state sovereignty), 1 they often produce consequences that run counter to the obligations of governments to protect human rights. Hence, sanctions constitute violations of human rights to the extent they deny the above-mentioned fundamental basic rights and violated norms of jus cogens. Even the United Nations, often the focal point for a sanctioning effort, now acknowledges that the damage imposed by sanctions can rise to the level of human rights abuses (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 8, 1997). Similarly, the United Nations authorized a number of studies detailing humanitarian impact of sanctions and their devastating effect on human rights (Garfield 1999; Minear 1997). While some disagree that sanctions constitute human rights violations directly (e.g., Marks 1999), there is nonetheless near universal consensus on the main point: economic sanctions, even when used for humanitarian purposes, (often unintentionally) impose significant hardship on innocent populations.

### Humanitarian Crisis

#### Embargo responsible for a humanitarian crisis

Hernandez-Truyol 09 Mabie, Levin & Mabie Professor of Law, University of Florida, Levin College of Law [Berta E. Hernandez-Truyol, Embargo or Blockade - The Legal and Moral Dimensions of the U.S. Economic Sanctions on Cuba, 4 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 53 (2009)]

IV A Critique - The Effects of the Embargo from a Social Justice Perspective"0

It is common knowledge that trade sanctions hurt workers and industries, not the officials who authored the policies that are the target of the sanctions. The countries most likely to face sanctions are those run by undemocratic governments least likely to let the pain of their population sway them. These observations hold true in the case of the U.S. embargo on Cuba.

While in nearly fifty years of the embargo the purported goal of achieving democracy in Cuba has not been met, the embargo has had deleterious effects on Cuba and the Cuban people. First, a look at some factual data in light of trade relation confirms the reality and extent of the harms suffered. In 1958, the United States accounted for 67% of Cuba's exports and 70% of its imports,11 placing it seventh on both export and import markets of the United States.112 In 1999, by contrast, official U.S. exports to Cuba totaled a paltry $4.7 million, which was comprised mainly of donations of medical aid, pharmaceuticals, and other forms of charitable aid. 13 In the year 2000, Cuba ranked 184th of 189 importers of U.S. agricultural products. 114 The relaxation of sanctions against food and medicines beginning in 2000 found Cuba rising to 138th in 2001 and to 26th in 2004 for U.S. export markets." 5 By 2006, Cuba's ranking had fallen slightly to become the 33rd largest market for U.S. agricultural exports (exports totaling $328 million).16 The U.S. International Trade Commission estimates an ongoing annual loss to all U.S. exporters of approximately $1.2 billion for their inability to trade with Cuba.117

The Cuban government estimates that the total direct economic impact caused by the embargo is $86 billion, which includes loss of export earnings, additional costs for import, and a suppression of the growth of the Cuban economy.' 18 However, various economic researchers and the U.S. State Department discount the effect of the embargo and suggest that the Cuban problem is one of lack of hard foreign currency which renders Cuba unable to purchase goods it needs in the open market.' 19

That there has been an economic impact of the embargo is evident to anyone who visits Cuba. For example, there is a minuscule number of modern automobiles on the roads of Cuba. Most are American vehicles from the late 1950s-prior to the embargo (and the revolution). To be sure, because the law prohibits ships from entering U.S. ports for six months after making deliveries to Cuba, the policy effectively denies Cuba access to the U.S. automobile market. 120

However, the impacts of economic sanctions are greater than lack of access to goods. In the case of Cuba, some argue that the U.S. embargo has had a deleterious impact on nutrition and health with a lack of availability of medicine and equipment, as well as decreased water quality.121 Indeed, the American Association for World Health (AAWH), in a 1997 report, concluded that the U.S. embargo of Cuba has dramatically harmed the health and nutrition of large numbers of ordinary Cuban citizens.... [I]t is our expert medical opinion that the U.S. embargo has caused a significant rise in suffering-and even deaths-in Cuba .... A humanitarian catastrophe has been averted only because the Cuban government has maintained a high level of budgetary support for a health care system designed to deliver primary and preventive health care to all of its citizens. 122

Thus, AAWH concludes that the embargo, limiting availability of food, medicine, and medical supplies, has a deleterious effect on Cuban society. Significantly, religious leaders, including the late Pope John Paul II, opposed the embargo and called for its end.23 The gravamen of the objection is the humanitarian and economic hardships that the embargo causes.

### Right to Medicine

#### Embargo denies medicine access to Cuban people

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In a widely publicized 1997 report, the American Association for World Health ("AAWH") found that the embargo's arduous licensing provisions actively discouraged medical trade and commerce. n289 AAWH further reported that in some cases U.S. officials provided American firms with misleading or confusing information. n290 In addition, it reported that several licenses for legitimate medications and medical equipment were denied as "detrimental to U.S. foreign policy interests." n291 The AAWH concluded that, as a result of inaccurate or confusing information from U.S. officials, [\*242] one-half of the firms they surveyed incorrectly believed that the embargo prevented all sales of medications and medical supplies to Cuba. n292

An arduous and confusing process that discourages even legal sales of medication and medical supplies from U.S. companies or subsidiaries harms Cubans' human rights to health and medical care. The licensing procedures often effectively ensure that vital health products are only available to Cubans through intermediaries at prohibitive prices that are much higher than in the American market. n293 The resulting impact of medication shortages in Cuba is well documented. n294 For example, between 1992 and 1993, medication shortages in Cuba accounted for a 48% increase in deaths from tuberculosis; a 67% increase in deaths due to infectious and parasitic diseases; and a 77% increase in deaths from influenza and pneumonia. n295

More recently, the Cuban government has issued reports in the United Nations General Assembly documenting the ways in which the U.S. embargo makes the process of obtaining medications and medical equipment unnecessarily difficult and costly. n296 Two examples include Cuba's unsuccessful attempts to purchase an anti-viral medication called Tenofovir (Viread) from the U.S. firm Gilead and Depo-Provera, a contraceptive drug, from another U.S. firm, Pfizer. Because it would have required an export license from the U.S. government, Gilead was unable to sell Tenofovir, and Cuba was forced to purchase the medication through third-parties at a significantly higher price. The Cuban government cited this as an example of the embargo's negative impact on Cuba's efforts to modernize its HIV/AIDS treatments. n297 In the Depo-Provera example, Cuba reported that, despite Cuba's attempts to purchase the drug as part of a national program associated with the United Nations Population Fund, Pfizer claimed it could not sell the product to Cuba without obtaining a number of licenses, a process which would take several months. n298 Cuba's report to the United Nations [\*243] also chronicled obstacles the country faced in obtaining medical equipment from U.S. companies and subsidiaries.

Moreover, Cuba reports that the embargo's restrictions go beyond the purchase of medical equipment and medications but also includes replacement components for equipment it already possesses. n299 The country reported being denied the possibility of purchasing replacement pieces containing U.S.-made components for equipment used in its Oncology and Radiobiology Institute. n300 In another example, Cuba reported that the U.S. Treasury refused to authorize Atlantic Philanthropic, a United States NGO, from donating a molecular biology laboratory to Cuba's Nephrology Institute. This technology would have facilitated successful kidney transplants for a larger percentage of Cuban patients. n301 Additional reported examples include film for x-ray machines used to detect breast cancer, Spanish-language medical books from a U.S. conglomerate subsidiary, and U.S.-made components for respirators. n302

A policy of maintaining an arduous and at times insurmountable licensing procedure for trading health-related products with Cuba harms the health of Cuban citizens. Moreover, the waste of valuable time and the deprivation of necessary medicine and equipment do not make sense morally or politically. In a 1995 speech addressing the use of economic sanctions as a political tool, former United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali explained: "Sanctions, as is generally recognized, are a blunt instrument. They raise the ethical question of whether suffering inflicted on vulnerable groups in the target country is a legitimate means of exerting pressure on political leaders whose behaviour is unlikely to be affected by the plight of their subjects." n303

### Right to Family

#### Violates the Right to Family

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D. Right to Family

The right to family, and the obligation of governments to respect the family and refrain from interfering with family life and family relations, is a fundamental human right recognized in numerous international human rights documents and treaties to which the United States is a party. Although these documents focus on the obligations of states toward their own citizens, they also refer to states' obligation to promote the enjoyment of these rights by all. Thus, one of the embargo's chief legal and moral flaws is that, although it purports to promote the human rights of Cubans on the island, it actually harms their rights - as well as the rights of Cuban-Americans in the United States - to family life.

The Bush administration's 2004 amendment to the CACRs were particularly damaging. To review, the amendment tightened travel restrictions by: (1) restricting travel to once every three years; (2) limiting the length of travel to 14 days; (3) requiring special licenses to visit Cuba; (4) eliminating any additional visas; (5) reducing the amount of money travelers could spend during their trip to Cuba; (6) restricting remittance amounts; (7) limiting remittance amounts that travelers could bring with them to Cuba; n325 and (8) redefining "immediate family" to include only "spouse, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent, or sibling of that person or that person's spouse, as well as any spouse, widow or widower of the foregoing." n326 This last definition effectively prohibits aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews and cousins from traveling to Cuba to visit their families, n327 causing numerous Cubans living in the [\*248] United States to suffer immeasurable emotional turmoil. The emotional toll that the embargo imposes is thus extensive and disproportionate to any conceivable policy goal the regulations might serve, such as denying resources to the Castro regime. n328

The human suffering imposed by these restrictions becomes apparent by examining individual stories about their impact. Prior to the implementation of the amended travel restrictions, Marisela Romero, a 53-year old Cuban-American, traveled to Cuba several times a year to visit her 87-year old father who suffers from Alzheimer's disease. n329 The amended travel restrictions now make it impossible for her to visit more than once every three years. The Office of Foreign Asset Control denied her request for permission to travel more often by stating that "it would be inappropriate for you to make application with the Office of Foreign Assets Control for a specific license to visit a member of your immediate family until the required three-year period has passed." n330

Romero's father was the only living member of her "immediate family" in Cuba, and he was "incapable of cashing checks or even signing them over to someone else" due to his illness. n331 Thus, the restrictions not only limited Romero's ability to visit her ailing father but also limited her ability to support him by sending remittances. Moreover, the psychological impact of the travel restrictions was severe for both of them. The father's doctor informed Romero that her father "had become deeply depressed - most likely because of her extended absence - and stopped eating." n332 He subsequently died before Romero was able to visit him.

The restrictions also weigh heavily upon those left behind in Cuba to care for ill relatives. Prior to the implementation of the amended travel restrictions, Andres Andrade, a 50-year old Cuban-American, traveled to Cuba regularly to help his sister care for their aging parents. n333 Because of the amended travel restrictions, Andres' sister was left largely on her own. Andres' mother, who was battling cancer, had to be hospitalized in late 2004 [\*249] due to a severe pulmonary complication. n334 Travel restrictions prevented Andres from traveling to Cuba to be at his mother's side and left his sister alone to care for their mother. His sister "spent four straight days without any sleep, sitting on a chair next to her." n335 Andres' sister believed that their mother "was holding onto life because she hoped that he would come ... . That day before she died, the screaming was horrible. She wept and cried out his name." n336 The death of Andres' mother took a terrible toll on Andres' father's health. According to Andres' sister:

"Every day he tells me that he is waiting for Andres to come because he has a gift for him that my mom gave him and that only he can tell him... He says that he wants to go join my mom, that he wants to die but that before he goes he wants to see Andres and give him the gift that my mother left him... I pray to God that my dad makes it until 2007 [when Andres can visit Cuba]... But he is already 82-years old, and he is very sick... Sometimes, when I despair, I sit on the patio alone and cry." n337

These accounts evince the deep emotional distress caused by the CACR travel restrictions. Milay Torres, a teenage girl, moved to the United States with her father in 2000. n338 Milay returned to Cuba to visit her family three years later, and she planned to return again in 2004. With the implementation of the stricter travel rules, however, she would have to wait until 2006. n339 Upon learning this, Milay "became "very depressed, turned rebellious, and stopped going to school.'" n340 Milay's mother began to suffer severe anxiety as a result of her daughter's absence. She explained:

After she left Cuba, I began suffering more anxiety attacks. After I found out [about the travel restrictions] my anxiety worsened. I am seeing psychologists and psychiatrists, and when I get these attacks, I go to the hospital and they inject me with some sedatives and send me home... When I see the things that are happening there with the travel restrictions ... my condition worsens because I am waiting for her to come, but she doesn't come... Sometimes I tell people that I would give up my life to be able to see my daughter for just five [\*250] minutes. n341

Thus, the psychological effects of the CACR restrictions on the multitude of affected families are profound.

Carlos Lazo, a U.S. army Sergeant serving in Iraq, returned to Miami during a leave from service in June of 2004 n342 and purchased an airline ticket to visit his two teenage sons in Cuba. n343 However, "even though his trip would have started before the new travel restrictions took effect, the Bush Administration directed charter aircraft to stop accepting new passengers, to fly to Cuba empty, and to return only with travelers from Cuba." n344 As Mr. Lazo commented, "the administration that trusted me in battle in Iraq does not trust me to visit my children in Cuba." n345 Moreover, Mr. Lazo's inability to visit his sons left him with deep feelings of inadequacy: "I can't help out my sons ... . I can't give them human warmth. I can't fulfill my obligation as a father. I can't send money to my uncles because they are no longer part of my family." n346

The following statement by another Cuban-American summarizes the deep heartache caused by the travel restrictions to people on both sides of the Florida straits:

Against my will and for decades I have been deprived of attending important happenings in Cuba such as the death and funeral of my father, grandfather, uncles, aunts, cousins, and high school buddies; weddings, births, and baptisms of nephew, niece, grandnephews, grandnieces and cousins. There were the long illnesses of my father, grandfather, uncle, niece, cousin and grandnephew ... . Thanks to Washington's restrictions it got very difficult, onerous and lengthy to obtain and deliver vital medications, thus prolonging the suffering and distress of patients and relatives on both sides of the straits. Telling of the cruelty, hurt, and violation of my human rights (and that of my family) caused by the travel ban could go on and on; its hypocrisy and double standard (go not to Cuba, but OK with China, Vietnam, Russia, Saudi Arabia, etc.) are incredible and not worthy of any nation that truly values family and God. n347

[\*251] By enforcing an arbitrary definition of "immediate family," and by dictating when Cuban-Americans may visit their sick and dying family members, the embargo's travel restrictions create extreme psychological and emotional distress to those affected by them and violate the basic human right to family. n348

### HR good

#### Human rights framework transforms political calculations – makes poverty, violence, disease, and nuclear conflict unthinkable

Seita 97 Professor of law at Albany Law School of Union University [Alex Seita, “Globalization and the Convergence of Values”, 30 Cornell Int'l L.J. 429, L/N]

Because globalization promotes common values across nations and can make foreign problems, conditions, issues, and debates as vivid and captivating as national, state, and local ones, it contributes to a sense of world community. n99 It develops a feeling of empathy for the conditions of people abroad, enlarging the group of human beings that an individual will identify with. Globalization thus helps to bring alive persons in foreign lands, making them fellow human beings who simply live in different parts of the world rather than abstract statistics of deaths, poverty, and suffering. The convergence of basic political and economic values is thus fundamentally important because it helps to establish a common bond among people in different countries, facilitating understanding and encouraging cooperation. All other things being equal, the commonality among countries - whether in the form of basic values, culture, or language - enhances their attractiveness to each other. n100 In addition, convergence increases [\*461] the possibility that a transformation of attitude will take place for those who participate in transnational activities. People will begin to regard foreigners in distant lands with the same concern that they have for their fellow citizens. n101 They will endeavor to help these foreigners obtain basic political rights even though the status of political rights in other countries will have no tangible beneficial impact at home. n102 Convergence does not mean that there is a single model of a market economy, a single type of democracy, or a single platform of human rights. They exist in different forms, and nations may have different combinations of these forms. n103 [\*462]

A. The Perspective of One Human Race

The convergence of fundamental values through globalization has profound consequences because it increases the chance that a new perspective will develop, one which views membership in the human race as the most significant societal relationship, except for nationality. n104 A person owes his or her strongest collective loyalties to the various societies with which he or she most intensely identifies. Today, this societal identification can be based on numerous factors, including nationality, race, religion, and ethnic group. n105 While it is unlikely that nationality will be surpassed as the most significant societal relationship, globalization and the convergence of values may eventually convince people in different countries that the second most important social group is the human race, and not a person's racial, religious, or ethnic group. n106 One of the first steps in the formation of a society is the recognition by prospective members that they have common interests and bonds. An essential commonality is that they share some fundamental values. A second is that they identify themselves as members belonging to the same community on the basis of a number of common ties, including shared fundamental values. A third commonality is the universality of rights - the active application of the "golden rule" - by which members expect that all must be entitled to the same rights as well as charged with the same responsibilities to ensure that these rights are protected. Globalization promotes these three types of commonalities. Globalization establishes common ground by facilitating the almost universal acceptance of market economies, the widespread emergence of democratic governments, and the extensive approval of human rights. The most visible example is economic. With the end of the Cold War, the free market economy has clearly triumphed over the command economy in the battle of the [\*463] economic paradigms. Because some variant of a market economy has taken root in virtually all countries, there has been a convergence of sorts in economic systems. n107

Further, because it often requires exposure to and pervasive interaction with foreigners - many of whom share the same fundamental values - globalization can enlarge the group that one normally identifies with. Globalization makes many of its participants empathize with the conditions and problems of people who in earlier years would have been ignored as unknown residents of remote locations. This empathy often leads to sympathy and support when these people suffer unfairly. Finally, the combination of shared values and identification produce the third commonality, universality of rights. n108 Citizens of one country will often expect, and work actively to achieve, the same basic values in other countries. They will treat nationals of other nations as they would wish to be treated. The effects of shared values, identification, and universality of rights in globalization could have a pivotal long-term effect - the possibility that a majority of human beings will begin to believe that they are truly part of a single global society - the human race. This is not to say that people disbelieve the idea that the human race encompasses all human beings. Of course, they realize that there is only one human species. Rather, the human race does not usually rank high on the hierarchy of societies for most people. Smaller societies, especially those based on nationality, race, religion, or ethnicity, command more loyalty. n109 The idea of the human race, the broadest and all-inclusive category of the human species, is abstract and has little, if any, impact on the lives of human beings. To believe in the singular importance of the human race requires an attitudinal shift in which a person views the human race seriously. [\*464] This may occur because the convergence of values does not only mean that the people of different countries will share the same basic values. It may also lead to the greater promotion of these values for the people of other countries. Historically and certainly today, America and the other industrial democracies have attempted to foster democracy and human rights in other countries. n110 While some part of this effort has been attributable to "self interest," it has also been due to the empathy that the industrialized democracies have had for other countries. n111

The magnitude of these efforts in the future, as in the past, will depend not solely upon the available financial and human resources of the industrialized democracies. It will also depend upon their national will - a factor undoubtedly influenced by the intensity with which the people of the industrialized democracies identify with people in foreign lands. The perspective that the human race matters more than its component divisions would accelerate cooperative efforts among nations to attack global problems that adversely affect human rights and the quality of human life. n112 Obviously, there is no shortage of such problems. Great suffering still occurs in so many parts of the world, not just from internal armed conflicts, n113 but also from conditions of poverty. n114 There are severe health problems in much of the world which can be mitigated with relatively little cost. n115 There are the lives lost to the AIDS epidemic, and [\*465] the deaths and disabilities caused by land mines. n116 Russia, a nuclear superpower that could end life on this planet, has severe social, economic, and political problems. n117 Making the human race important would not just promote liberal democratic values but would also reduce human suffering and perhaps eliminate completely the risk of nuclear war.

#### Prioritizing Human Rights key to sustainable environmental decisions

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For example, insufficient and unsustainable development, e.g., inadequate access to or availability of drinking water coupled with groundwater contamination, unrestrained urban development, poor pollution control, management and regulation can all lead to environmental and health problems and thus an infringement of environmental rights: based upon the above justification for environmental rights, environmental rights cannot be denied, as they can be linked to other, fundamental human rights. Further, individual human rights cannot be seen in total isolation from one another. There are inextricable links between the right to life, the right to health and the right to environment and other rights, such as the right to enjoyment of property free from pollution, which form the ratio legis at the nexus of international human rights law and international environmental law n54 - that, of survival, existence and continuation of human life, which is inextricably linked to sustainable development.

#### Human Rights create frameworks that improve the world

Shattuck 94 Former Assistant Secretary of State (John, Federal News Service, AT THE WOMEN'S NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC CLUB, September 12)

On the disintegration side, we are witnessing ugly and violent racial, ethnic and religious class conflict in Haiti, in Bosnia, in Central Asia, in Africa, most horribly in Rwanda -- all places where I have traveled in recent months and witnessed unspeakable suffering and abuses of the most fundamental rights. The new global community has yet to develop an adequate response to these horrors. We must intensify our search for new ways of holding individuals and governments accountable for gross human rights violations, for new ways of anticipating and preventing conflicts before they spiral into uncontrollable violence and reprisal, for new ways of mobilizing the international community to address an avalanche of humanitarian crises. These are daunting tasks. Why then has the Clinton administration made protecting human rights and promoting democracy such a major theme in our foreign policy? The answer I think lies not only in our values, which could be reason enough, but in the strategic benefits to the United States of a policy that emphasizes our values. We know from historical experience that democracies are more likely than other forms of government to respect human rights, to settle conflicts peacefully, to observe international and honor agreements, to go to war with each other with great reluctance, to respect rights of ethnical, racial and religious minorities living within their borders, and to provide the social and political basis for free market economics. In South Africa, in the Middle East, and now remarkably perhaps even in Northern Ireland, the resolution of conflict and the broadening of political participation is releasing great economic and social energies that can provide better lives for all the people of these long-suffering regions. By contrast, the costs to the world of repressive governments are painfully clear. In the 20th century, the number of people killed by their own governments under authoritarian regimes is four times the number killed in all of this century's wars combined. Repression pushes refugees across the borders and triggers wars. Unaccountable governments are heedless of environmental destruction, as witnessed by Chernobyl and the ecological nightmares of Eastern Europe.

#### A commitment to human rights leadership in US foreign policy is key to prevent extinction

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The indivisible human rights framework survived the Cold War despite U.S. machinations to truncate it in the international arena. The framework is there to shatter the myth of the superiority [\*72] of the U.S. version of rights, to rebuild popular expectations, and to help develop a culture and jurisprudence of indivisible human rights. Indeed, in the face of systemic inequality and crushing poverty, violence by official and private actors, globalization of the market economy, and military and environmental depredation, the human rights framework is gaining new force and new dimensions. It is being broadened today by the movements of people in different parts of the world, particularly in the Southern Hemisphere and significantly of women, who understand the protection of human rights as a matter of individual and collective human survival and betterment. Also emerging is a notion of third-generation rights, encompassing collective rights that cannot be solved on a state-by-state basis and that call for new mechanisms of accountability, particularly affecting Northern countries. The emerging rights include human-centered sustainable development, environmental protection, peace, and security. n38 Given the poverty and inequality in the United States as well as our role in the world, it is imperative that we bring the human rights framework to bear on both domestic and foreign policy.

## Europe Adv

### Engage helps allies

#### Should engage Cuba – improves image, helps European allies

HAASS & O’SULLIVAN 00 a. VP & Director of Foreign Policy Studies at Brookings, b. Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at Brookings [Richard N. Haass and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies 113, Survival, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 113–35]

Cuba

Although the peaceful transition of Cuba towards a democratic, market oriented country remains the ultimate goal of the US, the context in which this aim can be pursued has altered significantly. When stringent US sanctions were placed on Cuba in 1962, Cuba posed a threat to the US as an outpost of communism in the Western hemisphere and an ardent exporter of revolution to its neighbours. However, almost 40 years later and in the wake of the Cold War, Cuba’s importance has dwindled and its ability to promote radical politics among its democratising neighbours has evaporated almost entirely. Not only has much of the rationale for isolating Cuba collapsed, but US policy towards the country – in particular the imposition of ‘secondary sanctions’ – has created tensions with America’s European allies that outweigh Cuba’s importance. Finally, America’s sanctions-dominated policy towards Cuba demands reevaluation because it is warping the message that the United States sends to potentially moderating ‘rogue’ regimes elsewhere. Cuba remains on the ‘terrorism list’ (a grouping of countries designated by the US as state sponsors of terrorism), even in the absence of a Cuban-sponsored terrorist act for many years. This discrepancy signals to others on the terrorism list that their renouncement of terrorism will not necessarily free them from the designation or from the many sanctions associated with it. Despite the many good reasons to reassess US policy towards Cuba today, formidable obstacles have thus far prevented the sort of policy overhaul needed. Most importantly, sections of the Cuban-American community have vehemently opposed any policy changes which would confer legitimacy on Castro or possibly prolong his rule. Nevertheless, recent generational changes have opened possibilities for moderates to gain prominence in this community. In addition, the growing number of American farmers and businessmen expressing interest in doing business in Cuba indicates the existence of at least one influential domestic US constituency favouring engagement. Rather than maintaining the status quo, the US should simultaneously pursue two forms of engagement with Cuba. First, it should actively seek out Castro’s willingness to engage in a conditional relationship and to chart a course towards more satisfactory relations. It should attempt to strike a dialogue with Castro in which reasonable benefits are offered to him in return for reasonable changes. Rather than accentuating the desire for a regime change or immediate democratic elections, US policy-makers should make lesser goals the focus of their policy, as the more ambitious the demands, the less likely Castro is to enter into a process of engagement. For instance, the release of political prisoners and the legitimisation of political parties might be offered in exchange for lifting of selected elements of the embargo. Regardless of Castro’s reaction to such an approach, benefits would accrue to the United States. If Castro accepted this dialogue, US policy would be promoting meaningful political liberalisation on the island; if Castro rejected these attempts, America would still ease tensions with its European allies by demonstrating that it was willing to take a more flexible line towards Cuba. Second, while pursuing what conditional engagement is possible under Castro, unconditional engagement can be undertaken and expanded. The recent easing of certain restrictions in the hopes of building ties between the United States and Cuba at the civic level is laudable. Additional air links and liberalised travel restrictions can help temper the negative image of America held by many younger Cubans, and to cultivate outward-looking segments of Cuban society. Both groups will be influential in determining future levels of cooperation between the United States and Cuba once Castro is gone. The United States should also expand unconditional engagement of the economic variety; such a low-risk strategy can gradually promote internal changes as Cubans benefit from new economic opportunities. The Clinton administration has already authorised increased levels of allowable remittances and expanded trade with non-government entities. However, these changes do not go far enough. There should be no ceiling on the amount of remittance that Cuban families can receive from relatives living in the US. Moreover, even if Castro resists conditional engagement that could be linked to the gradual easing of restraints, US policy-makers should consider ways in which investment codes could replace elements of the embargo. The possibility of employing investment codes that allow for American trade with, and investment in, Cuban entities meeting specific conditions concerning ownership structure and labour rights should be explored.14 Given the paucity of privately owned businesses in Cuba today, the instant effects of such codes in boosting trade and investment would probably be minimal. However, the employment of investment codes – in place of more blanket restrictions – would offer immediate psychological support, as well as tangible incentives for growth, to Cuba’s struggling private sector.

### Europe Hates

#### Hurts relations with allies – EU counter sanctions

Vásquez & Rodríguez 12 director & assistant director of the Project on Global Economic Liberty at the Cato Institute [Ian Vásquez and L. Jacobo Rodríguez, Trade Embargo In and Castro Out, <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/trade-embargo-castro-out>]

The World Trade Organization meeting in Singapore will be the scene of some intense discussions about whether the Helms-Burton Act—which tightens the U.S. embargo on Cuba—violates international trading rules. U.S. officials should use the opportunity to reconsider the impact of Washington’s overall policy toward Cuba.

The Helms-Burton Act seeks to discourage investment in Cuba by imposing sanctions on foreign companies profiting from property confiscated by the Castro regime. But fears that foreign investment there, which is much lower than official Cuban figures claim, will save the communist system from its inherent flaws are unfounded; significant capital flows to Cuba will not occur unless and until the country introduces market reforms. While the Helms-Burton Act may slow investment in Cuba, U.S. allies (in particular, Canada, Mexico, and members of the European Union) have not welcomed that coercive attempt to influence their foreign policy. Not surprisingly, the European Union is contemplating retaliatory sanctions.

That confrontation risks poisoning U.S. relations with otherwise friendly countries that are far more important than Cuba to the economic well-being and security of the United States. The stalemate also diverts attention, both inside and outside Cuba, from the island’s internal crisis.

## Democracy

### SQ bad for Demo

#### Status quo undermines democracy

Griswold 02 associate director of the Cato Institute’s Center for Trade Policy Studies [Daniel T. Griswold, No: The Embargo Harms Cubans and Gives Castro an Excuse for the Policy Failures of His Regime, <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/no-embargo-harms-cubans-gives-castro-excuse-policy-failures-regime>]

If the goal of U.S. policy toward Cuba is to help its people achieve freedom and a better life, the economic embargo has failed completely. Its economic effect is to make the people of Cuba worse-off by depriving them of lower-cost food and other goods that could be bought from the United States. It means less independence for Cuban workers and entrepreneurs, who could be earning dollars from American tourists and fueling private-sector growth. Meanwhile, Castro and his ruling elite enjoy a comfortable, insulated lifestyle by extracting any meager surplus produced by their captive subjects.

Cuban families are not the only victims of the embargo. Many of the dollars Cubans could earn from U.S. tourists would come back to the United States to buy American products, especially farm goods. The American Farm Bureau estimates that Cuba could “eventually become a $1 billion agricultural-export market for products of U.S. farmers and ranchers.” The embargo stifles another $250 million in potential annual exports of fertilizer, herbicides, pesticides and tractors. According to a study last year by the U.S. International Trade Commission, the embargo costs American firms between $684 million and $1.2 billion per year.

As a foreign-policy tool, the embargo actually enhances Castro’s standing by giving him a handy excuse for the manifest failures of his oppressive communist system. He can rail for hours about the suffering the embargo inflicts on Cubans, even though the damage done by his domestic policies is far worse. If the embargo were lifted, the Cuban people would be a bit less deprived and Castro would have no one else to blame for the shortages and stagnation that will persist without real market reforms.

### Key to Spread

#### Engaging Cuba key to spread Democracy – now is key. Need to change the embargo

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During his inaugural address, US president Barack Obama stated, in an attempt to ease tensions with some of America’s more traditional adversaries, “we will extend a hand, if you are willing to unclench your fist.”1 Indeed, when countries have indicated a readiness to make domestic reforms, the Obama administration has shown an increased willingness to engage them.

Cuba, in particular, offers policymakers an ideal case study of how the administration has reacted to internal reforms. It also demonstrates how the administration, in an attempt to bolster its position as the world’s leader, has relied primarily upon soft power to develop its ties with other countries.

In light of Raúl Castro2 charting a new course for Cuba, recent US policy initiatives have been aimed at a limited engagement and an easing of tensions with Cuban leadership. While these efforts constitute a vital first step in the transformation of US-Cuban relations, it is in America’s best interest to more firmly “extend a hand.” In fact, Cuba provides President Obama an opportunity to highlight the potential benefits of America’s foreign policy of engagement.

In 2002, Cuban American scholar Louis Pérez Jr. noted that the US embargo policy has been “derived from assumptions that long ago ceased to have relevance to the post-Cold War environment, designed as a response to threats that are no longer present, against adversaries that no longer exist.”3 to be sure, American policymakers have been unable to sufficiently adjust Cuba policy to the realities of post-Cold War relations with the island.

The economic embargo, which has been in place for half a century, coupled with either diplomatic isolation or limited engagement, has failed to force democratization on the island. If anything, it has taught that democracy cannot be imposed or coerced, but must grow from within. In this light, ending the embargo and engaging Cuba will allow the united States to better influence a process of political reform on the island. Conversely, as America stalls, other countries are playing a larger role in what traditionally has been considered America’s backyard.

Fortunately for American policymakers, recent and drastic shifts in the realities of US-Cuban relations show that there is much to gain, and surprisingly little to lose, from transforming US-Cuba policy. Though for too long domestic politics has trumped international security goals, pragmatic leaders will soon grasp the full extent of these new realities.

At a time when the United States runs a large trade deficit and holds a rising national debt, President Obama’s foreign policy of engagement could provide essential political, economic, and strategic gains for America. In order to capitalize on these opportunities, the administration should end the embargo and open diplomatic relations with Cuba.

### Lift Boosts Civil Society Reforms

#### Plan boosts democracy in Cuba – economic change within sparks civil society reforms

Vásquez & Rodríguez 12 director & assistant director of the Project on Global Economic Liberty at the Cato Institute [Ian Vásquez and L. Jacobo Rodríguez, Trade Embargo In and Castro Out, <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/trade-embargo-castro-out>]

Perhaps the biggest shortcoming of U.S. policy toward Cuba is its false assumption that democratic capitalism can somehow be forcibly exported from Washington to Havana. That assumption is explicitly stated in the Helms-Burton law, whose first purpose is “to assist the Cuban people in regaining their freedom and prosperity, as well as in joining the community of democratic countries that are flourishing in the Western Hemisphere.”

But the revolution in democratic capitalism that has swept the Western Hemisphere has had little to do with Washington’s efforts to export democracy. Rather, it has had to do with Latin America’s hard-earned realization that the free-enterprise system is the only system capable of providing self-sustaining growth and increasing prosperity.

Even though Cuba—unlike other communist countries, such as China or Vietnam, with which the United States actively trades— has not undertaken meaningful market reforms, an open U.S. trade policy is more likely to subvert its system than is an embargo. Proponents of the Cuban embargo vastly underestimate the extent to which increased foreign trade and investment can undermine Cuban communism even if that business is conducted with state entities.

Cuban officials appear to be well aware of the danger. For example, Cuba’s opening of its tourism industry to foreign investment has been accompanied by measures that restrict ordinary Cubans from visiting foreign hotels and tourist facilities. As a result, Cubans have come to resent their government for what has become known as “tourism apartheid.” In recent years, Cuban officials have also issued increasing warnings against corruption, indicating the regime’s fear that unofficial business dealings, especially with foreigners, may weaken allegiance to the government and even create vested interests that favor more extensive market openings.

Further undercutting the regime’s authority is the widespread dollar economy that has emerged as a consequence of the foreign presence and remittances from abroad (those from the United States now banned by the Helms-Burton bill). The dollarization of the Cuban economy—which the Cuban government has been forced to legalize as a result of its inability to control it—has essentially eliminated the regime’s authority to dictate the country’s monetary policy.

Replacing the all-encompassing state with one that allows greater space for voluntary interaction requires strengthening elements of civil society, that is, groups not dependent on the state. That development is more likely to come about in an environment of increased interaction with outside groups than in an environment of isolation and state control.

Supporters of the embargo casually assume that Castro wants an end to the embargo because he believes that step would solve his economic problems. Despite his rhetoric, Castro more likely fears the lifting of the U.S. sanctions. It is difficult to believe, for example, that he did not calculate a strong U.S. response when he ordered the attack on two planes flown by Cuban-Americans in early 1996. But as long as Castro can point to the United States as an external enemy, he will be successful in barring dissent, justifying control over the economy, and stirring up nationalist and anti-U.S. sentiments in Cuba. It is time for Washington to stop playing into Castro’s hands and instead pull the rug out from under him by ending the embargo.

## Cuban Econ Advantage

### Improves Economic Ties

#### Removing the embargo boosts economic ties – allows long term reforms

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Economic Implications

In 2008, the UN general Assembly, voting 185 to 3, rejected the US economic embargo on Cuba; it has done so every year since 1992.31 the United States is isolated in its approach to Cuba policy. As the island rapidly expands its economic and diplomatic ties with other countries, America increasingly sacrifices the potential economic benefits of trading with Cuba. Worse yet, its economic policies with regard to Cuba appear impractical in light of its policies toward other Communist governments.

By signing bilateral trade agreements with China and Vietnam, in 1999 and 2001 respectively, the United States has indicated a willingness to actively build economic ties with countries that, while Communist, have enacted economic reforms and largely reintegrated themselves into the international community. In the wake of Raúl’s reform agenda, the island has diplomatic relations with over 160 nations and has significantly increased foreign investment.32 As such, it is generally speculated that Raúl Castro favors continued adoption of Chinese political and economic models, which would allow Cuba to maintain elements of its socialist system.33

The economic benefits stemming from even limited trade with Cuba are unmistakable. After Bill Clinton signed into law the Trade Sanctions Reform Act (TSRA) in early 2000, exports to Cuba jumped from $4 million in 2001 to $392 million in 2004, and $710 million in 2008.34 Despite importing only food and medical products, Cuba has ranked as high as twenty-fifth among importers of American products.35 these economic benefits have further diversified the political debate, amplifying the influence of Midwestern congressmen, many of whose constituencies profit significantly from the sale of corn, poultry, wheat, and soybeans to Cuba.36

Business groups, politicians, and economists are also illuminating the benefits of ending the embargo. Kenneth Lippner, a university of Miami economist, estimates that the embargo costs the Florida economy between $750 million and $1 billion per year.37 far short of ending the Cuban embargo, the Department of transportation found that simply ending unrestricted travel to Cuba for all Americans would generate up to $1.6 billion annually, and somewhere between 17,000 and 23,000 jobs.38 With such economic and political gains to be made, it is no surprise that the legislatures of California, Texas, and many others have already passed resolutions for improving and opening economic relations with Cuba.

Early in the nineteenth century, Cuba and the United States became inseparable as trade relations and the slave trade grew; big American businesses continued to prosper in the country until Fidel Castro’s 1959 revolution. Despite having blocked itself off from trade with Cuba ever since, geographic proximity, as well as Cuba’s need for cheap agricultural goods, provide a strong basis for future trade. At the moment, Cuba is already buying more food from the United States than any other country, and Raúl has indicated that it would purchase much more with eased restrictions.39

Ending the embargo would also help Cubans, lowering the cost of consumer goods and raising the standards of living, while simultaneously challenging Raúl’s assertions of American imperialism. In realizing that the embargo is too insignificant to have a fatal impact on the Cuban government, and that the usage of sanctions and practice of isolation are no way to be seen as a credible advocate of democratic reform, American policymakers should realize that the economic embargo only diminishes the United States’ ability to influence change in Cuba. Furthermore, over time, increased economic ties can provide the leverage needed to push for political reforms.

As a result, with regard to economic and political return, there is little reason to keep the economic embargo in place. Its repeal should be easy to sell to the American people given popular domestic support, recent Cuban internal reforms, and the precedent set with Vietnam and China. It would also provide the United States with a more united front when confronting key Cuban issues by not drawing the ire of the UN for its policies toward the island. Most importantly, repealing the embargo could guide the two countries toward improved relations by employing economic policies that are mutually beneficial.

### Plan helps Cuban Businesses

#### Lifting the embargo will help Cuban businesses and investors - opportunities

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Long Term: Greater Liberalization in Cuba and the End of the Embargo

Major liberalizing changes on the island and a movement toward the elimination of all US trade, investment, and financial restrictions with respect to Cuba should gather pace once Fidel Castro passes away and Raúl is replaced by a new generation of younger leaders. This new scenario will dramatically increase pressure on Canada's market share in Cuba because of US competition and, at the same time, stimulate competition among Canadian firms.

Canadian investors should suffer less than traders from a complete lifting of the US embargo (Ritter, 2010a). After all, they have been active in Cuba for years and gained very good direct market knowledge. Considering the latest trends, and whether or not it was ever truly important, Havana's appreciation for Canada's long-time investment presence on the island does not seem to carry as much weight as it used to. And there is little reason to assume that it will matter at some point in the future. Institutionalized knowledge along with quality and efficiency will be key factors to success. In a postembargo Cuba that relies heavily on free-market mechanisms and practices, there should be opportunities for Canadian companies to expand their investment activities, establish new enterprises, and work on joint projects with firms from Canada and other countries. Canadian hotel groups, no longer worried about their exposure to the US market, could participate more vigorously in the Cuban tourism industry. Canadian banks should benefit for the same reason. The Bank of Nova Scotia, which had major deposits in Cuba before the revolution along with the Royal Bank, backed away from providing loans to Canadians wishing to invest in Cuba during the 1990s largely out of fear of running afoul the Helms-Burton law and jeopardizing its investments in the United States (Kirk & McKenna, 1997, p. 16; McKenna & Kirk, 1998). Even in the telecommunications sector, where the United States would naturally become the primary supplier of services to Cuba, there could be room for Canadian firms to participate with other investors and service companies.

### Dollar Access Denied

#### Embargo keeps Cuba from operating with the dollar – impedes investment

Gordon 12 Professor of Philosophy at Fairfield University, and Senior Fellow at the Global Justice Program, MacMillan Center for Area and International Studies, Yale [Joy Gordon, The U.S. Embargo against Cuba and the Diplomatic Challenges to Extraterritoriality, VOL. 36:1 WINTER 2012, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs]

IMPACTS OF THE EXTRATERRITORIAL MEASURES

International banking

The U.S. embargo measures interfere in Cuba's access to international banks in several ways, even when they are not U.S. financial institutions. The United States prohibits Cuba from engaging in any transactions in U.S. dollars, and likewise prohibits any bank—including foreign banks— from facilitating commercial transactions by Cuba in U.S. dollars. In recent years, particularly under the Bush administration, the United States has enforced the banking provisions aggressively. The United States fined the Swiss bank UBS $100 million for engaging in U.S. dollar transactions with Cuba, and also imposed smaller fines on Italian and Spanish banks. In 2006, the United States blacklisted the Dutch bank, UNG, which had done business in Cuba for over a decade; the following year UNG terminated its banking operations in Cuba." In 2009, the Treasury Department imposed a fine of $5.75 million on the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group, Ltd., for financial transactions involving Cuba and Sudan, and also fined Credit Suisse Bank almost half a billion dollars for financial transactions involving Cuba and other countries subject to U.S. embargoes.'^

By 2007, in spite of their own national legislation prohibiting compliance with the U.S. embargo, a number of major Canadian and European banks stopped doing business with Cuba including Barclays, the Bank of Nova Scotia, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Royal Bank of Canada, and HSBC'' These measures impede Cuba's commerce in a number of ways. For many transactions, there are additional costs in using currencies other than the dollar. Because so many major international banks no longer provide banking services to Cuba out of fear of U.S. retaliation, Cuba has had to turn to other banks, which charge higher rates for their services. For 1998, a State Department official maintained that, because of U.S. measu res, interest rates for financing Cuban development projects reached 22 percent.'\* In 2009, Cuba estimated that the losses related to financing costs attributable to the embargo came to $164 million."

### International Institution Access

#### Embargo keeps Cuba from working with International Financial Institutions like the IMF and World Bank

Gordon 12 Professor of Philosophy at Fairfield University, and Senior Fellow at the Global Justice Program, MacMillan Center for Area and International Studies, Yale [Joy Gordon, The U.S. Embargo against Cuba and the Diplomatic Challenges to Extraterritoriality, VOL. 36:1 WINTER 2012, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs]

Global effects

In some regards, because of the extraordinary power held by the United States in many domains, the U.S. unilateral embargo functions as a global embargo. The Helms-Burton Act effectively blocks Cuba's access to global financial institutions—including the International Monetary the World Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Inter-American Development Bank—by requiring the U.S. representatives on their boards to vote against granting Cuba member- ship or access to loans or development funds. Because voting is weighted, it is nearly impossible for any of these orga-nizations to admit Cuba or provide loans or development aid. In the IMF, the United States holds almost 17 percent of the votes; only three other countries—France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—hold more than 4 percent of the votes. By contrast, over 90 countries hold 0.1 percent of the vote or less.^'^ The World Bank has roughly the same structure.^^ In the unlikely event that the U.S. vote is not sufficient to deny Cuba access to financing from the organization, the Helms-Burton Act would then impose punitive measures: if the institution were to somehow extend loans or aid to Cuba, the United States will reduce its contribution to that institution by the same amount."

Cuba's lack of access to major global financial institutions has been particularly damaging in the context of Cuba's economic crisis, "increasing the difficulties of negotiating debt settlements and credit with public and commercial creditors, including Paris Club creditors."^' The UN coordinator of aid activities in Cuba notes that, while it is difficult to quantify the effect of this exclusion, "Cuba is one of the few countries in the world facing a deep restructuring of its economy without assistance from international financial institutions."'"

There are also other ways in which the U.S. embargo effectively excludes Cuba from global financial networks. For example, international monetary transfers between banks take place through a network called the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) system Without access to this system, it is not possible to wire money or deposit a check sent from another country. The SWIFT system has released new software which will be the only means of accessing the system starting in March 2012. The SWIFT network has informed Cuba that it will not provide Cuba with this software, "because it contains United States technologies and components subject to the restrictions of the economic embargo.""

### Cuba Failed State

#### Solves risk of a Cuban failed state

Perez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]

Aside from the strategic importance of this issue, addressing these concerns might also prevent more serious problems in the future. Although the chances of a post-Castro Cuba becoming a failed state are slim, the threat is nevertheless real. If the state were to collapse, the island could plunge into civil war, face a humanitarian crisis, become a major drug trafficking center, experience a massive migration to Florida, or endure a combination of each. However, a new and comprehensive policy toward Cuba can help prevent these nightmare scenarios from materializing.

### Disease & Biomed Research

#### Boosts disease & biomedical research

Iglesias 12 Commander of the US Navy – Army War College Publication [Carlos Iglesias, United States Security Policy Implications of a Post-Fidel Cuba, 10 March 2012, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA560408>]

\*GOC = Government of Cuba

Another major market where U.S.-Cuban cooperation promises mutual benefits are biomedical and pharmaceutical industries. With similar rates of major diseases (e.g. cancer and diabetes) the common benefits would be more than just economic. Long proud of its “first world” medical research and training, the GOC has touted an advanced medical capacity. While Cuban Democracy Act restrictions on medicines have impeded cooperation historically, there have been some recent instances of innovation partnering. A notable example was the U.S. Treasury’s 2004 permission for CancerVax, a California biotechnology company, to conduct clinical trials and license a group of experimental cancer drugs that originated in Cuba. 85

### Oil Drilling – Embargo Key

#### Lifting the embargo necessary for cooperative oil drilling

REUTERS 08 [Cuban oil production could be a catalyst for a change in relations with U.S., <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/12/business/worldbusiness/12iht-cubaoil.4.13670441.html>]

Sometime next year, Cuba plans to begin drilling a major oil field off its northern coast that might do what little else has done - bring change to U.S-Cuba relations.

In a rare confluence of circumstances - including a new leader in Havana and a new one coming to the United States, as well as record-high crude oil prices - a new petroleum source could grease the wheels for the two longtime foes to reunite out of mutual need, experts say.

Getting there would require a sea change in U.S. policy, namely altering the U.S. trade embargo imposed against Cuba in 1962 to try to topple Fidel Castro's Communist government.

If the embargo remains as is, a nearby source of oil will be off limits to the United States, and the American oil industry will miss out on billions of dollars of business.

Opponents of the embargo rule out any change until President George W. Bush, who has toughened the embargo, leaves office next year.

## Trade Advantage

### Embargo Violates Free Trade

#### Embargo violates free trade globally

Hernandez-Truyol 09 Mabie, Levin & Mabie Professor of Law, University of Florida, Levin College of Law [Berta E. Hernandez-Truyol, Embargo or Blockade - The Legal and Moral Dimensions of the U.S. Economic Sanctions on Cuba, 4 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 53 (2009)]

In the middle of this debate squarely sits the elephant in the room: the almost fifty-year old U.S. economic policy towards Cuba - the embargo that is the topic of this essay. Indeed, not even on the naming of the economic policy can the camps agree. To those antagonistic to the revolution the policy is an embargo - an economic sanction constituting a legitimate government action that legally restricts the flow of goods, services and capital to the island in order to try to influence the Castro regime into changing its undemocratic ways. Such lawful restrictions simply signal justifiable disapproval of another country's policy with the goal of changing the state's behavior that is perceived as a threat to the sanction-imposing state's national security or economic well-being. To those supportive of the regime, however, the U.S. action is a "blockade," an illegitimate use of power to try to make the state march to a different tune - one not of its own sovereign imagination or desire.

From an internationalist's perspective, two sticky points of the U.S. policy stand out. One is its express extraterritorial reach aimed at regulating the conduct of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies which, under international legal principles, are nationals of the state of incorporation and not U.S. nationals. The other is the tension of the sanctions with the idea of free trade central to the World Trade Organization (WTO), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and also embraced by the North American Free Trade Agreement governing U.S.-Canada-Mexico trade. Opponents claim that the extraterritorial reach of and the barriers to trade created by the embargo violate international law. Moreover, it has a disastrous impact on the people of Cuba including establishing a roadblock to feeding the hungry or treating the sick.6 On the other hand, proponents of the policy argue that it is a perfectly legitimate exercise of sovereignty by the world's only surviving superpower with the valid and laudable objective of strangulating an already failed economy and bringing democracy (and thus freedom) to the people of Cuba.7

### WTO Norms

#### Sanctions violate WTO norms

Hernandez-Truyol 09 Mabie, Levin & Mabie Professor of Law, University of Florida, Levin College of Law [Berta E. Hernandez-Truyol, Embargo or Blockade - The Legal and Moral Dimensions of the U.S. Economic Sanctions on Cuba, 4 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 53 (2009)]

2. WTO Legality of U.S. Sanctions against Cuba104

Title IV's effects on the ability of European corporations doing business in Cuba-most of them subsidiaries of U.S. firms- thereafter to trade with the United States, led the European Commission to challenge Helms-Burton as violative of the non- discrimination provisions of the GATT's Four Pillars.'05 The United States announced that its actions were justified under GATT Article XXI as national security measures and that, because that Article left national security measures to the sole discretion of each Member, a WTO dispute settlement panel would have nothing to decide.106 Article XXI(b)(iii) provides that "nothing in this Agreement shall be construed ... to prevent [a WTO Member] from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests .. taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations (emphasis added)." Legal experts disagree whether this standard is self-judging. On the one hand, some claim that the drafters could not have intended to leave to the complete discretion of Members any action taken under Article XXI. In support of this interpretation they refer to the term "emergency in international relations" which ostensibly describes an extreme and unusual occurrence that is plainly subject to evaluation by dispute panels.107 In the case of the U.S. embargo on Cuba, unless the U.S. declares war against Cuba, the U.S. has to establish an emergency in international relations. Under this theory, the emergency must be interpreted as having a close relationship to war. Another reason to suggest that no emergency in international relations exists with respect to the embargo is the consistent vote by the U.N. General Assembly against the U.S. embargo of Cuba. From such a perspective, Cuba's shooting down of an aircraft flown by Cuban exiles in 1996 can not be translated either to a declaration of or an act of war. 10 Rather, as a matter of law-although clearly not as a matter of politics-that occurrence is a relatively minor incident that cannot be considered an international wrong by Cuba. To be sure, the other side - in the EU-U.S. dispute the position taken by the U.S. - contends that, because Article XXI is on its face self-judging, there can be no interpretive role for a dispute panel and assumption of jurisdiction over such a measure thus serves no purpose.109 There has been no resolution of the debate on these theories of the appropriate interpretation of GATT Article XXI. The United States and Europe settled the dispute that would have provided the answer by the U.S. agreeing that the President would waive application of Title IV, as the U.S. Congress had authorized him to do. It is noteworthy that one of President Bush's Commission's recommendations was to put an end to such waiver.

## China Advantage

### Chinese Influence Growing

#### China influence growing in Latin America vis-à-vis US disengagement

Perez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]

Re-engaging Cuba should be used as a means to balance against China's growing influence in Latin America, particularly in Cuba.

(7A) China's Economic Interest in Latin America

The absence of a strong American presence over the last eight years has also given China the opportunity to step in as a major player, both economically and politically, in regions all around the world, but particularly in Latin America. The Chinese government has invested a tremendous amount of soft power in Latin America, where it is now the continent's third largest trading partner, with an annual trade growth of 30% since 2001. n115 American disinterest in Latin America has convinced many countries to adopt a "Pacific view," whereby China steps in to fill the gap left by America's absence. n116

After signing a free trade agreement with Chile, China quickly displaced the United States as that country's largest export market. China also [\*224] recently displaced the U.S. as Brazil's biggest trading partner. n117 In 2000, trade between China and Latin America hovered around $ 13 billion, but in 2007, that number had increased to $ 102 billion, and by 2008 total trade was valued at $ 140 billion. n118 Even despite the current financial crisis, trade between China and Latin America is likely to grow during the next five years.

China's interest in Latin America is also based on its increasingly assertive global political agenda. In 2007, Costa Rica dropped its diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, a move heavily courted by Chinese officials. In 2008, President Hu rewarded Costa Rica's new policy by visiting San Jose and signing a free trade agreement in 2010. n119

China also timed the release of a new policy paper on Sino-Latin American relations to coincide with President Hu's most recent trip to the region. It charts China's growing relationship with Latin America and promises increased cooperation in scientific and technological research, cross-cultural educational exchanges, as well as political and economic exchanges. n120 As China's role in Latin America increases, American clout correspondingly decreases in terms of relative power. To be sure, the U.S. will remain the major powerbroker in the Americas for decades to come, but will increasingly have to make room for a new player. Given this diminishing economic position, Washington will have to rely more heavily on diplomatic initiatives that shore up credibility rather than simply economic incentives and disincentives, such as bilateral trade agreements.

### Cuba = Chinese Staging Ground

#### Chinese presence on Cuba used to prepare cyber and info war against the US. Building up bases now

Perez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]

China's presence in Cuba is rather significant: after Venezuela, China is Cuba's second-largest trading partner with $ 2.3 billion worth of goods exchanged. n121 In fact, China purchases over 400,000 tons of Cuban sugar, as well as half its annual output of nickel, which is Cuba's top export. n122 In 2008, on a visit to Cuba, Chinese President Hu Jintao agreed to not only defer for ten years some of Cuba's debt payments, but also to invest $ 80 million in the island's health industry. n123 Moreover, as long as Taiwan is a [\*225] thorny issue for U.S.-Sino relations, China will have a stake in Cuba. China is neurotic about the functional American presence in Taiwan and has made its intentions for the island known to everyone; the only thing standing between Beijing's re-appropriation of Taipei is Washington. An increased Chinese presence in Cuba might be a strategic move by Beijing to later leverage their presence on the island for a change in America's Taiwan policy.

In the unlikely event of hostile engagement with the United States, China has an incentive to develop technological capabilities in Cuba, which can be used in tandem with cyber and communications warfare against Washington. Development of such capabilities may already be happening. China has a huge presence at Lourdes, a former Soviet espionage base just outside of Havana, where in 2004 Hu Jintao visited and confirmed that most of the technology housed there, including almost all of the computers, came from China. n124 Another former Soviet base in Bejucal may now also house both Cuban and Chinese intelligence analysts. n125 But China's leadership is pragmatic, not ideological, which begs the question: what is China getting in return for all this assistance? If China is cooperating with Cuban intelligence to spy on the United States, a greater American presence on the island would be needed to fully understand the scope of this rather disturbing operation.

## Politics

### Plan Popular – shift

#### Plan is politically popular – shifting demographics and voting concerns. Plan is a political win

Hinderdael 11 M.A. candidate at SAIS Bologna Center, concentrating in American Foreign Policy and Energy, Resources, and Environment [Klaas Hinderdael, Breaking the Logjam: Obama's Cuba Policy and a Guideline for Improved Leadership, by <http://bcjournal.org/volume-14/breaking-the-logjam.html?printerFriendly=true>]

Political Implications

In the wake of a markedly diminished strategic threat from the Cuban island after the end of the Cold War, domestic political goals trumped other goals in terms of setting Cuba policy, particularly during election years. Nonetheless, legislative momentum for engaging Cuba has picked up decidedly, even as some presidents have lagged behind. This momentum has coincided with a slow shift in public opinion and demographics that make ending the embargo and engaging Cuba popular amongst both the majority of American voters, as well as the majority of the Cuban-American constituency.

Two events in the late 1990s have often been pointed to as significant turning points in the political views and weight of Cuban-American voters. First, many traveled to Cuba for the 1998 papal visit, and embraced Pope John Paul II’s call for “Cuba to open to the world, and the world to open to Cuba.”40 then, two years later, the Elián González episode of 2000 allowed for a shift dubbed by Daniel Erikson the “Elián meets the China syndrome.”41 With the majority of Americans calling for Elián to be reunited with his father in Cuba, a position that anti-Castro Cuban-Americans opposed vehemently, the Cuban-American community, by taking such a hard-line stance, lost some of its legitimacy in the American political system. Furthermore, a harsh Cuba policy stood in stark contrast to a simultaneous broadening of America’s economic and diplomatic ties with China.

Polls over the last decade have revealed the dramatic shift in the views of Cuban-Americans. They indicate that, while in 1997, only 22 percent of Miami-Dade County Cuban-Americans favored ending the embargo, by 2004, that percentage had risen to 34 percent, and by December 2008 to 55 percent (in 2008, 65 percent also supported ending restrictions on travel and remittances).42 these statistics indicate that Obama’s positions in the run-up to the 2008 presidential election may not have been such a bad political strategy after all. Furthermore, we should expect to see politicians increasingly catering to these beliefs as they continue to gain political expediency.

Perhaps more significantly, Americans on both sides of the political spectrum support significant changes in Cuba policy, from relaxing travel and remittance restrictions to opening up diplomatic relations. They also believe that the island provides little threat to the United States, and that engagement is the most likely policy to lead Cuba towards democratic reform. An April 2009 World Public opinion poll drew the following conclusions from republican (r) and Democrat (D) pollsters:43

In terms of the US embargo policy, just days before the World Public opinion poll was released, separate Gallup and ABC polls showed that approximately 55 percent of Americans believe the embargo should be ended, with 35 percent believing it should be continued, and the rest unsure.44 Due to such strong public support for a shift in Cuba policy, the risks of making a drastic shift in the country’s Cuba policies are decreasing rapidly. Leaders willing to promote such a transformation stand to reap significant political gains.

A steady demographical shift in the Cuban-American population also makes such a stance politically pragmatic. As experts have noted, first generation Cuban-Americans, traditionally more linked to Cuba policy hardliners, “are retreating from the political stage, if for no reason other than age.”45 In contrast, later-generation immigrants are no longer single-issue voters, made particularly evident during the 2008 election, as the majority of Cuban-American voters agreed with Obama’s Cuba policy, but still voted for Senator John McCain.

In fact, Florida International University (FIU) polls show that on a variety of issues, including ending restrictions on remittances and travel, ending the embargo, and reestablishing diplomatic relations, there is a 15 to 20 percent hike in support for these policies among those who immigrated between 1980 and 1998, as opposed to earlier immigrants. There is an additional increase of 5 percent for those who came to America after 1998.46 Clearly, as these demographics continue to provide rising support for engagement and ending the embargo, politicians should and will attempt to shift Cuba policy accordingly.

Nonetheless, while the above views do provide increasing political clout, one cannot discard the historical significance of election year Florida politics. During his campaign, President Bush repeatedly condemned the June 2000 seizure of Elián González and made it clear that “he intended to confront [Fidel] Castro.”47 Harsh anti-Castro rhetoric ultimately helped Bush win the election, as he won 80 percent of the Cuban-American vote and the state of Florida by only 537 votes.48

In the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election, it is inevitable that candidates continue to fear alienating a strong voting bloc in a key swing state. Similarly, republican campaign finance money going into Democratic coffers bolsters the status quo and prevents policy modifications.49 Florida can still determine an election, but candidates should note the weakening correlation between the voting patterns of Cuban-Americans and the Cuba policies touted by politicians, as well as the demographical changes that have taken place since 2000.

Ultimately, public support amongst Americans as a whole, as well as Cuban-Americans in particular, shows that pragmatism is winning, and that the majority prefers engagement over isolation. More recently, Raúl’s reforms are also providing domestic momentum for a transformation of US-Cuba policy. Forward-looking American leaders will see these shifts and take advantage of the political gains that they provide by ending the embargo and normalizing relations with Cuba.

#### Cuba policy shift means plan is popular

Iglesias 12 Commander of the US Navy – Army War College Publication [Carlos Iglesias, United States Security Policy Implications of a Post-Fidel Cuba, 10 March 2012, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA560408>]

\*GOC = Government of Cuba

Domestically, the traditional third rail of Cuban-America politics has also just recently been de-energized. Historically the exile community has been a bulwark against any Cuba policy that loosened universal values attainment. However, a major poll of registered Cuban-American voters in 2008 reflected a reshuffling of priorities. The Florida International University poll showed for that first time since polling began, the majority of respondents favored normalization of diplomatic relations with the island.103 Even many in the older and more hard-line generations have broken with “first wave conservatives.”104 This shift of collective opinions points to a new perspective that attainment of those values has to come from within the country and the U.S.’s role is best played through “engagement with Cuba in order to help the Cuban people create the conditions for democratic change from within.”105

#### Politically popular now – most authoritative analysis

Brookings 10 – Book Review [Learning to Salsa New Steps in U.S.-Cuba Relations, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/books/2010/learningtosalsa>]

As longtime U.S. diplomats Vicki Huddleston and Carlos Pascual make painfully clear in their introduction, the United States is long overdue in rethinking its policy toward Cuba. This is a propitious time for such an undertaking—the combination of change within Cuba and in the Cuban American community creates the most significant opening for a reassessment of U.S. policy since Fidel Castro took control in 1959. To that end, Huddleston and Pascual convened opinion leaders in the Cuban American community, leading scholars, and international diplomats from diverse backgrounds and political orientations to seek common ground on U.S. policy toward Cuba. This pithy yet authoritative analysis is the result.

In the quest for ideas that would support the emergence of a peaceful, prosperous, and democratic Cuba—one in which the Cuban people shape their political and economic future—the authors conducted a series of simulations to identify the critical factors that the U.S. government should consider as it reformulates its Cuba policies. The advisers' wide-ranging expertise was applied to a series of hypothetical scenarios in which participants tested how different U.S. policy responses would affect a political transition in Cuba.

By modeling and analyzing the decisionmaking processes of the various strategic actors and stakeholders, the simulations identified factors that might influence the success or failure of specific policy options. They then projected how key actors such as the Cuban hierarchy, civil society, and the international and Cuban American communities might act and react to internal and external events that would logically be expected to occur in the near future.

The lessons drawn from these simulations led to the unanimous conclusion that the United States should adopt a proactive policy of critical and constructive engagement toward Cuba.

Today the United States has little leverage to promote change in Cuba. Indeed, Cuba enjoys normal relations with virtually every country in the world, and American attempts to isolate the Cuban government have served only to elevate its symbolic predicament as an "underdog" in the international arena. A new policy of engagement toward Cuba is long overdue.

—From the Introduction

#### Engaging Cuba more popular – shifting congress attitudes

Hinderdael 11 M.A. candidate at SAIS Bologna Center, concentrating in American Foreign Policy and Energy, Resources, and Environment [Klaas Hinderdael, Breaking the Logjam: Obama's Cuba Policy and a Guideline for Improved Leadership, by <http://bcjournal.org/volume-14/breaking-the-logjam.html?printerFriendly=true>]

President Obama won the state of Florida and made substantial inroads with Cuban Americans, gaining 16 more points than gore in 2000 and 10 more than Kerry in 2004.6 upon assuming office in 2009, he immediately fulfilled a key campaign pledge by signing an executive order to close the prison at the Guantanamo naval base. Shortly thereafter, on April 13, 2009, at the Summit of the Americas, he implemented a second campaign promise by lifting travel and remittance restrictions for CubanAmericans.7

Legislative momentum for engagement of Cuba, which had been stymied for years by President George W. Bush’s veto threats, picked up as well. On March 30, 2009, Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), the top-ranking republican on the Senate foreign relations Committee, called for the creation of a special envoy for Cuba in order to “recognize the ineffectiveness of our current policy and deal with the Cuban regime in a way that enhancesUSinterests.”8

Perhaps the most significant shift in Cuba policy under the Obama administration has been the abandonment of a single and primary aim to remove the Castro’s from power. By dissolving the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba (CAFR), created by Bush in 2003 with a mandate to “identify ways to hasten the arrival of that day when Castro’s regime is no more,”9 President Obama has moved quickly to ease tensions with its neighboring island.

### Plan Popular – GOP

#### Lifting the embargo politically popular

Bandow 12 senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a former special assistant to former US president Ronald Reagan. [Doug Bandow, Time to End the Cuba Embargo, <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/time-end-cuba-embargo?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+CatoRecentOpeds+(Cato+Recent+Op-eds)>]

The embargo survives largely because of Florida’s political importance. Every presidential candidate wants to win the Sunshine State’s electoral votes, and the Cuban American community is a significant voting bloc.

But the political environment is changing. A younger, more liberal generation of Cuban Americans with no memory of life in Cuba is coming to the fore. Said Wayne Smith, a diplomat who served in Havana: “for the first time in years, maybe there is some chance for a change in policy.” And there are now many more new young Cuban Americans who support a more sensible approach to Cuba.

Support for the Republican Party also is falling. According to some exit polls Barack Obama narrowly carried the Cuban American community in November, after receiving little more than a third of the vote four years ago. He received 60 percent of the votes of Cuban Americans born in the United States.

Barack Obama increased his votes among Cuban Americans after liberalizing contacts with the island. He also would have won the presidency without Florida, demonstrating that the state may not be essential politically.

Today even the GOP is no longer reliable. For instance, though Republican vice-presidential nominee Paul Ryan has defended the embargo in recent years, that appears to reflect ambition rather than conviction. Over the years he voted at least three times to lift the embargo, explaining: “The embargo doesnt work. It is a failed policy. It was probably justified when the Soviet Union existed and posed a threat through Cuba. I think its become more of a crutch for Castro to use to repress his people. All the problems he has, he blames the American embargo.”

### Plan Popular – Oil

#### Oil drilling makes the plan more popular

REUTERS 08 [Cuban oil production could be a catalyst for a change in relations with U.S., <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/12/business/worldbusiness/12iht-cubaoil.4.13670441.html>]

The embargo has withstood repeated legislative attempts to loosen its terms, including unsuccessful bills in the U.S. Congress in 2006 to exempt oil companies.

But Kirby Jones, a consultant on Cuban business and founder of the U.S.-Cuba Trade Association in Washington, and who is against the embargo, said a big Cuba oil find would change the political equation.

"This is the first time that maintaining the embargo actually costs the United States something," he said. "And we need oil. We need it from wherever we can get it, and in this case it's 50 miles off our coast."

An odd fact is that Cuba will be drilling 50 miles from the Florida Keys, or more than twice as close as U.S. companies can get because of regulations protecting Florida's coast.

Representative Jeff Flake, an Arizona Republican who has introduced bills in Congress to lift the embargo for oil companies, said the environmental argument might be crucial because there was much concern in Florida about potential oil spills.

"If there are going to be oil rigs off of Florida, I think most Americans would be more comfortable if they were U.S. oil rigs, rather than Chinese for example," Flake said.

### Cuban-Americans Divided

#### Cuban community divided

Hernandez-Truyol 09 Mabie, Levin & Mabie Professor of Law, University of Florida, Levin College of Law [Berta E. Hernandez-Truyol, Embargo or Blockade - The Legal and Moral Dimensions of the U.S. Economic Sanctions on Cuba, 4 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 53 (2009)]

Two other observations are noteworthy about the embargo. One is that the Cuban community in the U.S., a politically powerful and usually united force, is deeply divided on the embargo issue, especially with respect to the most recent regulations enlarging the limitations on remittances and family travel to Cuba. Second is that while the Cuban community generally has been embraced in the U.S. as a model minority - although that has more to do with the Cold War politics that praise capitalism and denounce communism than with any impetus of non-discrimination - many in the Midwest who want to trade their agricultural products have joined the international community's (including many states with a long history of alignment with the U.S.) condemnation of the U.S. action as an invalid exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction and thus an impermissible infringement of states' sovereignty.

## Counterplans

### A2 PICS

#### Plan is a conditional quid-pro-quo – can be reversed and re-applied – that’s normal means. Their understanding is a flawed one.

Perez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]

Policymakers in America often emphasize that any change on America's end must be met with irreversible change on Cuba's end, based on the idea that the United States might be offering irreversible carrots for nothing. The underlying premise of that notion is simply wrong: there is no reason to believe that once the United States changes parts of its Cuba policy, it cannot reverse those changes in response to negative behavior in Havana. Concessions the United States makes on many of these issues can be reversed: targeted sanctions can be reapplied after they have been removed; [\*218] travel bans can be reinstituted after they have been lifted; diplomatic relations can be re-severed after they have been re-established.

If the United States normalizes relations with the Cuban government, only to witness the Cuban government imprison or execute hundreds of dissidents, there is no reason why our government could not respond strongly, and even consider reverting back to hostile relations. Establishing relations between Washington and Havana is not an end in itself, nor is it a right that has been taken away from Havana. Instead, normalized relations should properly be seen as a privilege that Cuba has to earn before it is once again offered by the United States. But even if it is offered to Cuba, by no means are any overtures on Washington's end irreversible.

### Towards = Conditional

#### Engagement TOWARDS is always conditional

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Many different types of engagement strategies exist, depending on who is engaged, the kind of incentives employed and the sorts of objectives pursued. Engagement may be conditional when it entails a negotiated series of exchanges, such as where the US extends positive inducements for changes undertaken by the target country. Or engagement may be unconditional if it offers modifications in US policy towards a country without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act will follow. Generally, conditional engagement is geared towards a government; unconditional engagement works with a country’s civil society or private sector in the hope of promoting forces that will eventually facilitate cooperation.

### Quid Pro Quos Natural

#### Economic liberalization creates quid-pro-quos

Perez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]

(4B) Washington's Policies Should Encourage Economic Liberalization

The importance of this argument cannot be overstated. The fact that economic reforms will precede political reforms means at least two things. First, given this ordering, any quid pro quo from Washington should provide due credit to any economic liberalization that the island may implement, however piecemeal. For example, when the Cuban government privatizes parcels of agricultural land, or when it allows its tourist industry to engage in the dollar economy, or when it allows its taxi drivers to charge their own rates, these reforms should be seen as the economic equivalent of allowing small-scale political pluralism. When economic reforms are implemented, they should be praised - not belittled - and followed by positive reinforcement by Washington.

Second, since these economic changes will be prerequisites for any significant political reforms on the island, Washington should focus its short-term diplomatic efforts on an open Cuban market, rather than an open Cuban polity. This might mean easing or restructuring, though not necessarily fully eliminating, restrictions on trade, travel, and remittances, in order to encourage more private economic activity. In these ways, the U.S. can help awaken Cuba's nascent economic society, providing the necessary impetus for political reform.

### Embargo = Weak Leverage

#### Embargo offers little leverage – China & Venezuela fill in

Hinderdael 11 M.A. candidate at SAIS Bologna Center, concentrating in American Foreign Policy and Energy, Resources, and Environment [Klaas Hinderdael, Breaking the Logjam: Obama's Cuba Policy and a Guideline for Improved Leadership, by <http://bcjournal.org/volume-14/breaking-the-logjam.html?printerFriendly=true>]

Strategic Implications

The fall of the Soviet union in 1991 had severe economic repercussions for Cuba, causing its economy to contract by 34 percent between 1990 and 1993 alone.20 It also meant that, almost overnight, the strategic threat the island presented to the united States had drastically diminished. With Fidel Castro subsequently abandoning a policy of internationalism by announcing that he would no longer support armed struggle in the third world, Cuba became even less of a strategic threat.21 As a result, with regard to America’s Cuba policy, domestic politics has trumped international security concerns for over 20 years. Raúl’s recent economic reforms, in an attempt to spur job creation, have allowed an increase of foreign investment in what has traditionally been seen as America’s backyard. Countries quickly exploited such opportunities—with Venezuela and Cuba signing the Integral Cooperation Accord in 2000, according to which Cuba sends thousands of doctors and teachers to Venezuela in return for 90,000 barrels of oil daily.22 China has also strengthened its ties with Cuba since President Hu Jintao’s 2004 visit, and it will soon overtake Canada to become the island’s largest trade partner, purchasing 18 percent of its exports.23

In light of such inroads by friends and foes alike, several concerns might arise for American policymakers. First, the leverage that America’s embargo holds is severely diminished. Second, China, with nearly half of its 2004 foreign direct investment going to Latin America, might slowly impede upon American hegemony in the Western hemisphere.24 third, increased ties with Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela may cause Cuba and Venezuela to attempt to “drive a wedge between the U[nited] S[tates] and its Caribbean partners” in regional relations.25 In other words, the economic embargo in place could potentially lead to geopolitical instability and have enormous repercussions for American security.

## Disad Answers

### Canada Wants the Aff

#### Canada wants US to lift the embargo

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In April 2009, on the eve of his departure for the Summit of the Americas, Prime Minister Harper expressed his support for Obama's decision to lift restrictions on Cuban-American travel and remittances to Cuba. While pointing out that, as a conservative, he was by no means an admirer of the Castro regime and communism and regretted the lack of democratic changes on the island, Harper unequivocally stated: “That said, I think there's a lot of evidence to say that the historic American approach to Cuba has not worked.” Pragmatic commercial interests, though, proved to be once again of most importance as he added: “Cuba has great potential. The No. 1 reason for the Cuban regime to reform is for the benefit of its own people and for Cuba to recognize its economic potential. The fact that we've planted some flags there, made some connections there would help if substantive change came to the island.”13 Proving the premier's point, shares of Sherritt International rose 24.5 percent on Obama's move.14

### Plan helps Canada

#### Weakening the embargo helps Canadian exports

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Medium Term: Partial Liberalization in Cuba and Partial Lifting of the Embargo

Overall, the partial lifting of the US embargo on Cuba might prove more positive than negative for Canadian business. The easing of restrictions on the US food trade with Cuba and, to a lesser extent, the removal of the travel ban could intensify pressure on some Canadian agricultural producers. A study of July 2007 by the US International Trade Commission, or USITC, estimated that permitting direct wire transfers between US and Cuban banks to execute food sales, relaxing payment rules, and allowing all Americans to travel to the island would increase the US share of Cuban food imports from one third to between one half and two thirds. Two years later, an update of that study found that US agricultural exports to Cuba would have been between $216 million and $478 million higher in 2008 without the aforementioned restrictions. Wheat and rice would benefit the most among the 16 commodity groups examined (Coleman, 2009; USITC, 2007). Yet, except for frozen chicken, Canada's main food exports to Cuba have already withstood considerable US competition. Even more important, the USITC demonstrated that the end of the travel ban alone would have a relatively small impact on current US trade, which consists mostly of bulk commodities, while boosting the Cuban demand for higher value-added food products.

If successful, current US initiatives to permit Cuban oil to be sold in the United States would open up a new important market for Canadian investors in Cuba and remove certain legal issues related to the embargo. In effect, when Sherritt disclosed plans in 2007 to begin exporting a portion of its Cuban heavy crude as a consequence of anticipated production growth and limited domestic demand,20 the issue of whether the end of the line client for these supplies would violate the embargo rapidly emerged as a source of concern. A major discovery of light crude oil in Cuba's Gulf of Mexico waters, however, would raise the likelihood of US firms being allowed to bid for exploration rights in these offshore areas and participate directly in the Cuban oil trade.

The potential lifting of the travel ban for all U.S. citizens deserves a special mention. Some US studies estimated that between 550,000 and 1.1 million Americans would visit Cuba in the short-run if travel restrictions were abolished and more than 3 million would go there annually once the market has fully adjusted (Robyn, Reitzes, & Church, 2002; Sanders & Long, 2002; USITC, 2007). With the infusion of cash from American visitors and no competition from US investors yet, the time between the end of the travel ban and the complete lifting of the embargo will establish a rather unique scenario in Cuba with good opportunities for Canadian firms on the whole. Established players, in particular, could move quickly to take advantage of changing conditions. Obviously, a flood of US tourists will probably lead to a reduction in the number of Canadian and European visitors (Romeu, 2008), some of whom like to go to Cuba because there are very few Americans. Nevertheless, travel agents and airlines from Canada and other countries could easily move people to other destinations once the Americans come in. Besides the need for more food imports, the Castro government will face tremendous pressure to improve tourism facilities and, in general, all kinds of infrastructures to make sure that Cuban consumers would not suffer from extra demand diverted to hotels and tourism enclaves. This will require some additional foreign investment. According to Cuban officials, the island would have to roughly double its hotel room capacity and build more than 40,000 new units to accommodate 3 million US tourists. But it took Cuba almost 20 years to build that capacity.21

Although the presence of Canadian equity investors in new hotels could remain limited due to their exposure to the US market and potential problems with the Helms-Burton law, the participation of Canadian firms in many tourism-related areas and other sectors could expand significantly. Curiously, there are no Canadian hotel management contracts on the island at the moment despite the fact that Canada is Cuba's main source of international tourists. Moreover, Cuba has never been self-sufficient on food due to its heavy reliance on sugar, and it is doubtful that it could substitute most food imports. Thus, the island will likely continue to import large amounts of agricultural products, especially if the travel ban is removed and at least an extra 1 million US visitors must be fed with quality food. Given the good reputation of its products, Canada should be able to reap substantial benefits.

Mainly prompted by economic considerations going beyond a simple predilection for Canadian suppliers, the most noticeable feature of Canada-Cuba commercial relations is that trade tends to follow investment. Indeed, a sizable share of Canadian exports to the island target sectors that have attracted major Canadian investments, above all basic industries where Sheritt has large operations. Between 2001 and 2010, Canada sold to Cuba equipment and machinery for oil, gas, and mining worth more than $270 million. An expansion of joint venture deals with Cuban companies would therefore be beneficial for Canadian business, but this is unlikely to occur in the medium term since the Castro government continues to prefer investment projects involving Venezuelan and, to a lower extent, Chinese and a few other partners.

In general, the more holes in the US embargo against Cuba the more competition there is for Canada, but also more opportunities. Canadian investors, especially those with a foothold in the Cuban economy, will be well positioned to reap benefits from the removal of the travel ban and the need to upgrade infrastructures on the island. The dramatic growth of American tourists in Cuba should increase business for Canadian food exporters even if less stringent rules on US food sales to Havana are implemented. Exempting oil from embargo provisions will foster US participation in Cuban fields, yet it will open the US market to all companies involved. As noted before, a bigger challenge for Canada is to find ways to gain from Cuba's economic strategies that tend to favor investment and trade relations with Venezuela and China. Just to cite one example, the expansion of medical cooperation programs between Cuba and Venezuela after 2004 significantly boosted Canadian exports of medical devices to the island. Canada's sales of optical instruments to Cuba increased from $4.7 million in 2004 to $17.2 million in 2008. Canadian firms also sold to Cuba surgical and dental furniture worth $3.4 million in 2006.

#### Embargo lifting won’t hurt Canadian companies – dominate in other Latin American economies now

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Far from arguing that Canadian traders will not be affected by growing US competition in Cuba, the actual impact of the lifting of the embargo on their commercial dealings with the island might not be as harmful as it seems at first glance (Wylie, 2010). In terms of revenues, Canada's largest export products to all countries of the world are oil and petroleum preparations, motor vehicles and related parts, natural gas, lumber, trucks, gold, newsprint, and agricultural goods. Canadian firms are already involved in most of this in Cuba. In addition, as highlighted in Table 4, a closer look at Canada's regional trade patterns reveals that the country's principal products exported to Latin America are quite similar to those sold to Cuba. Excluding Mexico, 7 of the top 15 Canadian export products to Latin America in 2008 were also top export goods to Cuba, which means that Canadians could have a natural advantage in certain sector categories. This pattern continued largely unchanged in 2009–2010 even if Havana curbed its purchases from abroad. As Canadian companies were generally able to withstand US trade competition in Latin America, there is a good chance that, after a process of adjustment, they would have the same competitive advantages in a postembargo Cuba. And if there are Canadian firms serving Latin American markets successfully, it makes sense that they would want to expand into Cuba or work with Canadians and others already on the ground once all US sanctions are removed.

### Spadoni Pro-Dict

#### Study is comprehensive and actual – not theoretical

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This is not a theoretical study. The examination of the Canadian case presented below raises issues that are of relevance to practitioners, in particular executives of Canadian companies who are looking for ways to take advantage of a gradual elimination of the US embargo. It might also be useful to policymakers in Canada, foreign firms from various countries that are doing or considering doing business with Cuba, and US companies interested in partnering with these firms when the embargo is lifted. Finally, although it is not our intention with this article, the latter can be used by other authors as a basis for comparison to test if and how our methodology and analysis are applicable to countries other than Canada and how a “model” for predicting behavior after the end of the embargo could arise. As for the methodology, we relied on both secondary data and in-depth interviews. Rather than testing a general hypothesis, we used an open-format questionnaire to conduct over 30 interviews with corporate executives, government officials, and financial intermediaries in Havana, Miami, Toronto, and Ottawa, asking respondents, among other things, to evaluate their business experience in Cuba and the significance of recent economic changes in that country, identify critical challenges and areas for improvement, and assess the competitive pressure in a post-embargo scenario. We selected companies based on their prominence in trade with and investment in Cuba and recommendations from knowledgeable government sources. Because of assurances of confidentiality and potential problems with US sanctions laws and regulations, we cannot reveal any of our sources.