# Off Case

## BioDiversity Disad

### 1nc Link

#### Maintaining the embargo is vital to sustaining Cuban biodiversity

Canney 12 (Alexis, “The Threat of Lifting the US Embargo”, Akismet, March 1 2012, <http://pages.vassar.edu/cubantransitions/the-threat-of-lifting-the-us-embargo/>)//CB

Cuba’s political isolation and economic limitations have spelled success for its wildlife in the last 50 years. With Cuba’s limited ability to develop as other Caribbean nations have, and the continuing US embargo helping to keep Cuba in the past, Cuba’s natural resources have been preserved in a way not seen in most of the world. However, no embargo can last forever, and many believe that the US embargo will end soon. While some might look forward to celebrating the end to the hostility and the new potential to enrich the Cuban economy, others worry about the future of Cuba’s unique natural environment. Like any other country, Cuba does have a history of environmental exploitation. Only a few years after Columbus’ “discovery,” Spanish settlers arrived and began to clear the land to establish plantations. This deforestation only worsened through the following centuries. Cuba’s original forest cover had been 90%. In 1959, it stood at a meager 14%. However, one of Fidel Castro’s priorities since 1959 has been to conserve Cuba’s natural resources. Since then, reforestation has slowly taken place, and today over 26% of the country is forested.

Although Castro, and Cuba as a whole, should be recognized for its dedication to conservation, in truth, a lot of the preservation of Cuba’s land has been due to Cuba’s inability to develop it as most first world countries would have done. With the withdrawal of support from the Soviet Union in 1991, Cuba’s economy collapsed. Without access to modern technologies, Cuban turned to sustainable organic farming practices. Without capitalism driving its development, Cuba has avoided much of the environmental destruction seen in other first world countries.

Due to these political and economic factors, and also to the fact that Cuba is an island, Cuba has developed in a unique way. Cuba boasts incredible biodiversity and is home to more than 7,000 endemic species of plants and animals. One of these includes the bee hummingbird, the smallest bird in existence. Cuba’s coral reefs are of particular excitement for marine scientists. As coral reefs worldwide have been suffering the effects of global warming, pollution, boats, and fishing, Cuba’s reefs have been the least affected. Unfortunately, this paradise is threatened by many problems, despite efforts, including pollution, biodiversity loss, and deforestation. On top of this, threat of US tourism looms. If the embargo is lifted, US tourists will flood the island, promoting the construction of new resorts which will destroy beach habitats along the coasts. With the economy also flooded with US dollars, possibly pulling Cuba out of its economic downturn, will Cuba continue to refuse the tempting technologies which have devastated richer countries’ environments? With US companies eager to drill for oil off Cuba’s shores, putting pressure on the government to lift the embargo, this question becomes especially urgent.

To complicate matters further, environmentalists from both Cuba and the US are limited in the amount of work they can do by the embargo. Communication is tricky. Calls to the US in Cuba are expensive, while the internet is restricted to most Cubans. While scientists can sometimes receive academic permits to study in Cuba, the US rarely allows Cuban scientists to enter the country. Although lifting the embargo would end these problems, as well as enriching the Cuban economy, the question is, as always, would the environmental degradation be worth it? As it moves forward, is there a way that Cuba can preserve its unique environment?

### Uniq – Cuban Industrial Growth Down

#### Cuba’s industrial sector has collapsed- Soviet Union, lack of investment, and Chinese manufacturing

Ritter 11 (Archibald Ritter “Distinguished Research Professor Emeritus” in the Department of Economics and the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University in Ottawa. He holds a BA in Economics from Queen’s University, an MA in Economics from the University of Western Ontario and a Ph.D. in Economics with a minor in Latin American Studies from the University of Texas at Austin. he has worked in the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean in Santiago Chile (1973-1974), the Department of Energy Mines and Resources, Government of Canada (1979-1981) and has also lived and worked in Kenya and Tanzania.) ( Can Cuba Recover from its De-Industrialization? I. Characteristics and Causes” The Cuban Economy, September 27, 2011, <http://thecubaneconomy.com/articles/2011/09/can-cuba-recover-from-its-de-industrialization-i-characteristics-and-causes/> //BLOV)

II. Causal factors

There are a variety of reasons for the collapse of the industrial sector.

1. The initial factor was the ending of the special relationship with the Soviet Union that subsidized the Cuban economy generously for the previous 25 years or so. This resulted from the shifting of the Soviet Union to world prices in its trade relations with Cuba rather than the high prices for Cuba’s sugar exports as well as an end to the provision of credits to cover Cuba’s continuing trade deficits with the USSR. The break-up of the Soviet Union and recession in Eastern Europe also damaged Cuba’s exports. These factors reduced Cuba’s imports of all sorts, especially of imported inputs, replacement parts, and new machinery and equipment of all sorts. The resulting economic melt-down of 1989-1993 reduced investment to disastrous levels and resulted in cannibalization of some plant and equipment for replacement parts. The end result was a severe incapacitation of the manufacturing sector.

2. The technological inheritance from the Soviet era as of 1989 was also antiquated and uncompetitive, as Became painfully apparent after the opening up of the Soviet economy following Perestroika.

3. Since 1989, levels of investment have been continuously insufficient. For example, the overall level of investment in Cuba in 2008 was 10.5% of GDP in comparison with 20.6% for all of Latin America, according to UN ECLA, (2011, Table A-4.)

4. Maintenance and re-investment was also de-emphasized even before 1989. After 1989, maintenance and re-investment were a category of economic activity that could be postponed during the economic melt-down – for a little while. But over a longer period of time, lack of adequate maintenance of the capital stock has resulted in its serious deterioration or near destruction. This can be seen graphically by the casual observer with the dilapidated state of housing in Havana and indeed the frequent “derrumbes” or collapse of houses and abandoned urban areas.

5. The dual monetary and exchange rate system penalizes traditional and potential new exporters that receive one old (Moneda Nacional) peso for each US dollar earned from exports – while the relevant rate for Cuban citizens is 26 old pesos to US$1.00. This makes it difficult if not impossible for some exporters and was a key contributor to the collapse of the sugar sector.

6. The blockage of small enterprise for the last 50 years has also prevented entrepreneurial trial and error and the emergence of new manufacturing activities.

7. Finally, China has played a major role in Cuba’s de-industrialization as it has done with other countries as well. China has major advantages in its manufacturing sector that have permitted its meteoric ascent as a manufacturing power house. These include

Low cost labor;

An industrious labor force;

Past and current emphases on human development and higher education;

A relatively new industrial capital stock;

Massive economies of scale;

Massive “agglomeration economies”;

But of particular significance has been its grossly undervalued exchange rate that has permitted it to incur continuing trade and current account surpluses and amass foreign assets now amounting to around US$ 3 trillion. Indeed, in my view, China has cheated in the globalization process and captured the lion’s share of its benefits through manipulation of the exchange rate, and has contributed to the generation of major imbalances for the rest of the world, including both the United States and Cuba among other countries. .

China’s undervalued exchange rate has co-existed with Cuba’s grossly overvalued exchange rate that has been partly responsible for pricing potential Cuban exports of manufactures out of the international market. The result is that Cuba is awash with cheap Chinese products that have replaced consumer products that Cuba formerly – in the 1950s as well as the 1970s – produced for itself.

### Link - embargo

#### Cuba’s Biodiversity will be threatened- tourism and industrialization

Dean 07 (Cornelia Dean, science writer for New York Times Dean is a member of the Corporation of Brown University and was a founding member of the advisory board of the Metcalf Institute for Marine and Environmental Reporting.Dean received a bachelor’s degree in American civilization from Brown University and an M.S. degree from Boston University.) (“Conserving Cuba, After the Embargo” New York Times, December 25, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/25/science/25cuba.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>, //BLOV)

Through accidents of geography and history, Cuba is a priceless ecological resource. That is why many scientists are so worried about what will become of it after Fidel Castro and his associates leave power and, as is widely anticipated, the American government relaxes or ends its trade embargo.

Cuba, by far the region’s largest island, sits at the confluence of the Atlantic Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. Its mountains, forests, swamps, coasts and marine areas are rich in plants and animals, some seen nowhere else.

And since the imposition of the embargo in 1962, and especially with the collapse in 1991 of the Soviet Union, its major economic patron, Cuba’s economy has stagnated.

Cuba has not been free of development, including Soviet-style top-down agricultural and mining operations and, in recent years, an expansion of tourism. But it also has an abundance of landscapes that elsewhere in the region have been ripped up, paved over, poisoned or otherwise destroyed in the decades since the Cuban revolution, when development has been most intense. Once the embargo ends, the island could face a flood of investors from the United States and elsewhere, eager to exploit those landscapes.

Conservationists, environmental lawyers and other experts, from Cuba and elsewhere, met last month in Cancún, Mexico, to discuss the island’s resources and how to continue to protect them.

Cuba has done “what we should have done — identify your hot spots of biodiversity and set them aside,” said Oliver Houck, a professor of environmental law at Tulane University Law School who attended the conference.

In the late 1990s, Mr. Houck was involved in an effort, financed in part by the MacArthur Foundation, to advise Cuban officials writing new environmental laws.

But, he said in an interview, “an invasion of U.S. consumerism, a U.S.-dominated future, could roll over it like a bulldozer” when the embargo ends.

By some estimates, tourism in Cuba is increasing 10 percent annually. At a minimum, Orlando Rey Santos, the Cuban lawyer who led the law-writing effort, said in an interview at the conference, “we can guess that tourism is going to increase in a very fast way” when the embargo ends.

“It is estimated we could double tourism in one year,” said Mr. Rey, who heads environmental efforts at the Cuban ministry of science, technology and environment.

About 700 miles long and about 100 miles wide at its widest, Cuba runs from Haiti west almost to the Yucatán Peninsula of Mexico. It offers crucial habitat for birds, like Bicknell’s thrush, whose summer home is in the mountains of New England and Canada, and the North American warblers that stop in Cuba on their way south for the winter.

Zapata Swamp, on the island’s southern coast, may be notorious for its mosquitoes, but it is also known for its fish, amphibians, birds and other creatures. Among them is the Cuban crocodile, which has retreated to Cuba from a range that once ran from the Cayman Islands to the Bahamas.

Cuba has the most biologically diverse populations of freshwater fish in the region. Its relatively large underwater coastal shelves are crucial for numerous marine species, including some whose larvae can be carried by currents into waters of the United States, said Ken Lindeman, a marine biologist at Florida Institute of Technology.

Dr. Lindeman, who did not attend the conference but who has spent many years studying Cuba’s marine ecology, said in an interview that some of these creatures were important commercial and recreational species like the spiny lobster, grouper or snapper.

Like corals elsewhere, those in Cuba are suffering as global warming raises ocean temperatures and acidity levels. And like other corals in the region, they reeled when a mysterious die-off of sea urchins left them with algae overgrowth. But they have largely escaped damage from pollution, boat traffic and destructive fishing practices.

Diving in them “is like going back in time 50 years,” said David Guggenheim, a conference organizer and an ecologist and member of the advisory board of the Harte Research Institute, which helped organize the meeting along with the Center for International Policy, a private group in Washington.

In a report last year, the World Wildlife Fund said that “in dramatic contrast” to its island neighbors, Cuba’s beaches, mangroves, reefs, seagrass beds and other habitats were relatively well preserved. Their biggest threat, the report said, was “the prospect of sudden and massive growth in mass tourism when the U.S. embargo lifts.”

### Industrial Growth

#### Lifting embargo boosts major industries in Cuba

Ritter 2/15/13 – Arch Ritter holds a BA in Economics from Queen’s University, an MA in Economics from the University of Western Ontario and a Ph.D. in Economics with a minor in Latin American Studies from the University of Texas at Austin. He has worked in the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (Arch, “Castrocare in Crisis: Will Lifting the Embargo on Cuba Make Things Worse?”, The Cuban Economy, February 15 2013, <http://thecubaneconomy.com/articles/2013/02/castrocare-in-crisis-will-lifting-the-embargo-on-cuba-make-things-worse/#comment-7230>)//CB

By any measure, these achievements are laudable. But they have come at tremendous financial and social cost. The Cuban government’s 2008 budget of $46.2 billion allotted $7.2 billion (about 16 percent) to direct health-care spending. Only Cuba’s expenditures for education exceeded those for health, and Cuba’s health costs are soaring as its aging population requires increasingly expensive chronic care.

Cuba’s economic situation has been dire since 1989, when the country lost its Soviet benefactors and its economy experienced a 35 percent contraction. Today, Cuba’s major industries — tourism, nickel mining, tobacco and rum production, and health care — are fragile. Cubans blame the long-standing U.S. trade embargo for some of these strains and are wildly optimistic about the transformations that will come once the embargo is lifted.

### Tourism Module

#### Lifting the embargo increases tourism – threatens biodiversity

EDF no date - Over the years, EDF has brought a series of innovations to the work of protecting the environment. Today, our unique approach is the sum of all these innovations (“Cuba at a crossroads”, Environment Defense Fund, no date, <http://www.edf.org/oceans/cuba-crossroads>)//CB

Tourism remains central to Cuba’s economic development, and Cuba plans to build new facilities to accommodate more tourists. The number of visitors is expected to increase 10% annually in the coming years and even more should the U.S. embargo be lifted. European and Canadian visitors already flock to the island’s sandy white beaches and natural beauty, and Cuba ranks high among Caribbean nations for drawing large numbers of visitors and an influx of tourism revenues.

“Tourism has become the economic engine of Cuba,” says EDF’s Denise Choy Stetten, program manager. “This could be a boon for Cuba’s stagnant economy but would threaten vulnerable wildlife and habitat if critical safeguards are not enforced.”

Many Cubans share our conservation goals and believe that the island’s natural heritage can be the backbone of a thriving economy. Because of Cuba’s size and its rich biodiversity, the island could become an eco-tourist magnet, luring bird lovers, divers, fishermen, hikers and other nature lovers.

#### Increased tourism destroys marine biodiversity

Gray 97 - Biological Institute, University of Oslo (John, “Marine biodiversity: patterns, threats and

conservation needs”, University of Oslo, 1997, <http://www.avesmarinhas.com.br/20%20-%20marine%20biodiversity%20%20patterns,%20threats%20and.pdf>)//CB

Tourism There are greatly increasing stresses on coasts caused by tourism even in Antarctica and the Arctic. The most serious threats are those of habitat destruction. Mangroves are often removed, wetland areas filled in and estuaries reclaimed to make way for touristic complexes without there being any evaluation of the benefits of the intact systems. Once built the resort may lead to effects on adjacent habitats through sewage discharge and other threats and ultimately to the loss of habitats and their resources. Establishment of hotels on coral reefs is becoming popular and often leads to the destruction of the habitat that was the reason for the development in the first place. Coral reefs are vulnerable to trampling and in the Cayman Islands the one-day visit of a tourist ship to a coral reef led to 3000 m2 of a previously intact reef being destroyed (Smith, 1988). What is needed is a better understanding by policy makers and planners of the value and requirements for maintenance of the integrity of the natural habitat.

### Global Biodiversity IL

#### Cuba has key biodiversity-Migratory, invasive, endangered and disease vector species

Boom 12 (Brian M. Boom is the director of the Caribbean Biodiversity Program and Bassett Maguire Curator of Botany at the New York Botanical Garden.) (SCIENCE & DIPLOMACY is published by the Center for Science Diplomacy of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), the world’s largest general scientific society.) (“Biodiversity without Borders: Advancing U.S.-Cuba Cooperation through Environmental Research”, Science & Diplomacy

, Vol. 1, No. 3 September 2012, )http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/article/2012/biodiversity-without-borders. //BLOV)

Emergent, Shared Environmental Problems

Thankfully, urgent, shared environmental problems involving the United States and Cuba are not everyday occurrences. Nonetheless, every day there are numerous environmental issues of concern to both countries that are of great importance in the medium to long term. Such problems center on the need to study, monitor,and assess the status of organisms and ecosystems that functionally exist in both countries.

A complex mosaic of coral reefs, seagrass beds, and mangroves knit together the marine and coastal ecosystems. Some of the most extensive, best preserved coral reefs in the Wider Caribbean Region occur in Cuban waters, and extensive coral reefs parallel the Florida Keys in U.S. waters. Cuba has the largest extent of mangrove forests in the Caribbean, about 4,000 km2, and Florida’s southwestern coast supports mangrove forests comprising about half the extent of those in Cuba. Seagrass meadows occur in shallow waters of both countries, stabilizing sea bottom sediments that could otherwise threaten coral reefs and providing breeding, feeding, and shelter grounds for myriad marine animals, plants, and microbes.7

These ecosystems are threatened increasingly by habitat modification, the impact of tourism, overexploitation of marine fishes and other commercial seafood resources, the ramifications of climate change and rising sea levels, and pollution from land-based sources (e.g., unsustainable agricultural and forestry practices) and ocean-based sources (e.g., cruise ship waste). Increasing tourism especially threatens coral reefs. Despite some positive measures taken by the cruise industry in recent years, more cruise ships in the region still mean greater potential stresses to the marine and coastal environments. In addition to these and other shared ecosystems, many marine and terrestrial species are shared by Cuba and the United States. Examples include migratory, invasive, endangered, and disease vector species.

Migratory Species: Thousands of species of animals migrate between the two nations. Cuba provides key wintering habitats for 284 bird species that breed in the United States, such as black-and-white warblers. Many insects also migrate between the United States and Cuba, including the monarch butterfly. Fishes, such as the Atlantic bluefin tuna, swim through both Cuban and U.S. waters, while turtles, such as the hawksbill, share Cuban and U.S. marine habitats. Mammals, such as the Florida manatee, also swim between U.S. and Cuban waters.

Invasive Species: Cuba and the United States share many of these problem organisms, which are among the most significant threats to native species and to ecological and economic wellbeing. For example, Hydrilla verticillata, an aggressive waterweed native to the Old World, displaces native aquatic plants and seriously disrupts recreational uses of lakes and rivers in Cuba and the United States.8 Another example is the red lionfish, which is native to the Indian and Western Pacific Oceans but was released into the Atlantic Ocean from a home aquarium in Florida when Hurricane Andrew struck in 1992. Today, this venomous fish has spread along the U.S. Atlantic Coast as far north as New York and into the Caribbean, including Cuban waters, voraciously eating native fish and creating major disruptions to coral reef ecosystems.9

Endangered Species: Cuba and the United States share forty-nine animal species and eight plant species that are categorized as Globally Threatened by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN). Because only a small fraction of the world’s plants and animals have been assessed by the IUCN criteria, the actual number of threatened species that are shared by Cuba and the United States is certainly much larger. Even with what is known already, there exists a strong imperative for the two countries to cooperate on monitoring and protecting the threatened species for which they are joint stewards, including the West Indian walnut, the American crocodile, and the West Indian whistling duck.

Disease Vector Species: A good example of a shared disease vector is the Aedes aegypti mosquito. This species is the principal vector for the viruses that cause dengue fever, a non-curable, sometimes fatal disease in humans. In the Western Hemisphere, the disease is known to occur throughout much of Latin America and the Caribbean, including Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, but so far not in Cuba, and only rarely in the continental United States. But this situation could change. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, there is evidence that this mosquito is constantly responding and adapting to environmental changes. Cuba has one of the world’s best centers for dengue research with knowledge about how the island stays dengue free.10 Yet, Cuba and the United States are not working together on dengue, a shared and growing threat.

Both urgent natural and man-made problems, such as hurricanes and oil spills, as well as more gradual, less dramatic threats, such as habitat modification and pollution, threaten the native biodiversity shared by Cuba and the United States. These threats are exacerbated by the lack of active, ongoing bilateral scientific cooperation between Cuba and the United States in seeking solutions to such threats.

#### Cuba marine biodiversity key to global biodiversity – isolation from human influence key

Whittle et al 13 - senior attorney at Environmental Defense Fund and director of its Cuba Program; Rader - PhD, EDF's Chief Oceans Scientist; Dixon - Marketing Communications Associate for EDF's Oceans program (Dan, Doug, and Violet, “Protecting Cuba's Abundant Coral Reefs”, EDF Oceans, January 16 2013, <http://blogs.edf.org/edfish/2013/01/16/protecting-cubas-abundant-coral-reefs/>)//CB

In the waters off the Southeast coast of Cuba there's a near-pristine coral reef reserve called Jardines de la Reina, or the Gardens of the Queen. In this national park, groupers, snappers and many other reef fish flourish, along with several species of sharks. Although many of the world's best-known reefs face destruction in the face of global warming and other threats, large portions of the Gardens of the Queen remain remarkably healthy. Relative isolation from human influence helps make Cuba's coral reefs unique. Protecting these ecosystems — and species that rely on them — requires careful collaboration and cooperation among managers, scientists, fishermen and local fishing communities. Well-designed marine protected areas (MPAs), combined with innovative fisheries management, are the foundation for both sustainable commercial and recreational fisheries and a thriving eco-tourism sector. Seeing under the sea Healthy coral reefs, mangrove swamps and seagrass beds support thriving fish populations, which in turn support local fishing communities and attract ocean enthusiasts. Scuba divers come from around the world, for example, to witness the myriad of sea animals and breathtaking underwater ecosystems in the Gardens of the Queen. On these dives, they encounter numerous species of shark including Caribbean reef sharks, silky sharks, nurse sharks and occasional lemon and blacktip sharks. Depending on the season and other factors, visitors also occasionally encounter whale sharks, the largest known fish species. Swimming with Goliath Large groupers — including the true behemoths, goliath groupers — are common. They can be the size of a small car! While goliath groupers are making a comeback in some places in Florida, they are mostly juveniles, with mature individuals appearing less frequently. In the Gardens of the Queen, other groupers — black, Nassau, yellowmouth, yellowfin and tiger — are abundant at diving depths, along with a full array of snappers, many of which are fished out, or nearly so, in other Caribbean locales. Smaller species are present in great diversity and abundance as well, such as parrotfishes and other herbivores, the sanitation engineers of the reef. EDF divers recorded totals of 124 and 127 fish species in the park during short trips in 2010 and 2011, respectively, without any night diving or specialty habitat diving that would have expanded the numbers dramatically. Shared resources, important partnerships While Cuba and the United States are distant politically, only the narrow Florida Straits separate the countries and, in any case, marine species do not abide by political boundaries or physical lines in the ocean. Migratory species such as sharks and turtles swim in these waters and beyond. Therefore, it makes sense for Cuba and the United States to collaborate on marine conservation and fisheries management. Environmental Defense Fund has worked collaboratively for 12 years with scientists, managers, environmentalists and others to develop new approaches to protect marine biodiversity in Cuba and in the shared waters of the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean. Our successful partnerships are a foundation for broader dialogue and cooperation on environmental and natural resource matters. Cubans realize that the long-term value of maintaining healthy coral reefs is higher than the short-term profits that may come from tourism development, unless tourism is carefully balanced with conservation. Officials are preparing plans to expand recreational fishing, boating and diving opportunities in ways that respect the fragile coral reefs and other coastal and marine ecosystems.

#### Cuba biodiversity key to global biodiversity – regional hotspots

Cuba Headlines 12 (“Nipe-Sagua-Baracoa, an example of global biodiversity”, Cuba Headlines, March 18 2012, <http://www.cubaheadlines.com/2012/03/18/34854/nipe_sagua_baracoa_an_example_of_global_biodiversity.html>)//CB

One of the 34 regions of the planet with greater variety and more biological amenazadaque is included in the Insular Caribbean mountain system is the Nipe-Sagua-Baracoa located in eastern Cuba, also called "hot spot".

These mountains are distinguished by their water resources and wildlife are well preserved and for hosting one of the main centers of biodiversity and endemism in the region bordered by the Caribbean Sea, as the poet Nicolas Guillen in his verses, "also called Caribbean ".

These "points", also called hotspots, were identified by Conservation International (CI, acronym in English), a private, nonprofit, founded in 1987, to maintain the natural heritage of land and future generations to thrive spiritually culturally and economically.

To select these areas, IC took into account two criteria: that such points containing at least 0.5 percent of the 300 000 plant species endemic in the world, and have lost over 70 percent of its primary vegetation.

Such requirements complies easily the the Nipe-Sagua-Baracoa, also assessed as a priority of the 200 districts worldwide to be stored at the global level, according to the geographer José Luis Gerhartz, World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF-Canada).

### BioD solves Warming

#### Biodiversity key to mitigate climate change – CO2 absorption

ROBIN 12 - ROBIN is funded by the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (“Role of Biodiversity in Climate Change Mitigation in Latin America (ROBIN)”, weADAPT, August 13 2012, <http://weadapt.org/knowledge-base/ecosystem-based-adaptation/robin>)//CB

Tropical forests provide us with foods, fibres and medicines, they filter water and control its flow. They also 'soak up' carbon dioxide from the air, mitigating climate change. The REDD+ programme (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation) seeks to encourage sustainable forest management, thus maintaining ecosystem services, increasing resilience to climate change and conserving forest carbon stocks.

To optimise carbon and non-carbon ecosystem services from tropical forests in the face of global change we must improve our understanding of the relationships between biodiversity and the socio-ecological processes through which we respond and adapt to change.

ROBIN is an EU-funded project running for four years from November 2011. It will provide information for policy, together with resource use options, under scenarios of socio-economic and climate change. Objectives

Quantify the role of biodiversity in terrestrial ecosystems in South and Mesoamerica in mitigating climate change.

Quantify local and regional interactions between biodiversity, land use and climate change mitigation potential and the delivery of other key ecosystem services.

Evaluate the socio-ecological consequences of changes in biodiversity and ecosystem services under climate change.

Evaluate the effects of current climate change mitigation policies and actions on ecological and socio-economic conditions.

Analyse the impacts of alternative land-use scenarios (and other mitigation options) aimed at maximising climate mitigation potential while minimising loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services and avoiding undesirable ecological and socio-economic effects.

Provide guidance on land-use planning and other climate change mitigation options such as low carbon strategies and bio-fuel production.

ROBIN will deliver:

Improved understanding of the role of biodiversity in climate change mitigation.

Strategies and tools for climate change mitigation.

Assessments of the risks and uncertainties associated with climate change mitigation options.

Approaches - ROBIN will:

Quantify interactions between terrestrial biodiversity, land use and climate change mitigation (CCM) potential in tropical Latin America.

Develop scenarios for CCM options by evaluating their effectiveness, unintended effects on other ecosystem services and their socio-ecological consequences.

Combine new technologies (including remote sensing) for biodiversity assessments in complex multi-functional landscapes, data-based analyses, integrated modelling and participatory-driven approaches at local and regional scales.

Work at regional and landscape scales, using a gradient of field sites across Latin America.

### BioD key to the Economy

#### Biodiversity loss tanks global economy

Tulloch 11 - Allianz is a truly global company, with a very strong local presence in about 70 countries. We have people from all over the world of different nationalities, academic and professional backgrounds, experiences and perspectives – and all coming together to work for Allianz (James, “Biodiversity loss spells economic crisis”, Allianz Journal, May 5 2011, <http://knowledge.allianz.com/environment/food_water/?1486/conservation-biodiversity-loss-economic-crisis-ecosystem>)//CB

We are living through the greatest mass extinction of life in about 65 million years. We lose three species an hour to urbanization, deforestation, overfishing, climate change, and invasive species, reckons the United Nations.

It is shocking to think of a world without tigers or orangutans, but species loss is just the tip of the iceberg.

‘Biodiversity’ includes not just species but the genes that make species and the ecosystems that support them. Therefore biodiversity loss ranges from the eradication of ancient seed varieties to the destruction of coral reefs.

What’s gone unnoticed until recently is how expensive biodiversity loss can be, between 2 and 4.5 trillion dollars in 2008, according to a landmark UN report The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB).

That’s more than the 1.7 trillion dollars in economic costs that the Stern Review calculates will result from the same year’s planet-warming greenhouse gas emissions.

In other words: biodiversity loss will hit the global economy harder than climate change.

That’s because biodiversity provides us with vital ‘ecosystem services’ like fertile soil and freshwater.

Forests, for example, provide flood prevention and drought control services, as well as nutrients and freshwater for farming, fuel wood for cooking, fodder for cattle, construction materials and foods. Over a billion of the world's poorest people depend on these services, which are generally available free.

And therein lays the problem.

“The economic invisibility of nature’s flows into the economy is a significant contributor to the degradation of ecosystems and the loss of biodiversity,” writes Pavan Sukhdev, leader of the UN's Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity initiative, in the foreword to TEEB.

Markets simply don’t value nature’s bounty accordingly. The consequences can be catastrophic.

### BioD solves Disease

#### Marine biodiversity key to solve diseases

Shipman 12 - Masters Student Invertebrate Zoology & Geology Department (Carissa, “Marine Organisms as Resources for Drug Discovery”, California Academy of Sciences, August 22 2012, <http://www.calacademy.org/blogs/projectlab/?p=1351>)//CB

Marine natural products research and its application to pharmacology is a relatively new scientific discipline. The biomedical potential of marine chemicals is infinite since much of the life in the oceans has yet to be uncovered and the compounds within most known marine organisms still require investigation. The chemicals originating from marine life are valuable since their unique structures can be applied differently than those discovered from terrestrial organisms, like plants. The increased discovery of marine novel compounds indicates that research in this field is a worthwhile investment. Papers are published each year on the description, synthesis, and economic value or biomedical significance of marine natural products. Marine compounds can be utilized as probes to study cellular and biochemical processes at the molecular level and possess therapeutic value for treating certain diseases like cancer and AIDS. Sponges, algae, and bryozoans among many other marine organisms are important sources for chemicals toxic to numerous mouse, rat, and human cancer cells. For instance, the sponge Dercitus sp., found in the deep-waters of the Bahamas, harbors the compound dercitin. Dercitin was found to prolong the life of mice with leukemia tumors and is active against melanoma and small cell Lewis lung carcinoma. Dercitin may work by halting the replication of DNA within cancer cells. A second example comes from the Caribbean seaweed, Stypopodium zonale. S. zonale contains stypoldione, which disrupts the cell cycle by inhibiting the formation of the spindle. Further, Amathia convoluta, a bryozoan, possesses convolutamide A, a compound which has been successful in treating mouse leukemia and human epidermoid carcinoma cells. The diverse capabilities of marine slugs to synthesize and seize defensive compounds from their food renders them as a valuable resource for the extraction of anticancer agents. Opisthobranchs, marine slugs, feed on an assortment of marine organisms; including sponge, algae, and bryozoan, from which they acquire or synthesize secondary metabolites to prevent predation. Their extraordinary ability to incorporate and build new toxic compounds from food has lead to the reduction, internalization, or loss of a protective shell. Anticancer compounds have been discovered from many marine slugs including Hexabranchus sanguineus, Jorunna funebris, and Elysia ornata. Systematics, taxonomy, and the study of natural products are intricately woven together. The names of natural products originate from the scientific names of the organisms from which they are obtained. Studying the evolutionary relationships of marine organisms can be utilized as a tool to pinpoint new species, which may contain useful chemicals for drug discovery. This emphasizes the importance of taxonomy and systematics to other science disciplines such as biochemistry. The discovery of valuable chemicals within marine organisms highlights the importance of the ocean to human lives. Protection and conservation of vulnerable marine ecosystems, like coral reefs, is paramount since the cure for cancer, AIDS, and other diseases could be discovered from life inhabiting these underwater jungles.

#### Cuba’s marine biology is key to combat Cancer- Anti-tumor Seaweed

Nuñez et al 06 (Nuñez R., Garateix A., Laguna A., Fernández M.D., Ortiz E., Llanio M., Valdés O., Rodríguez A., Menéndez R., members of CEBIOMAR- Center of Marine Bioprodcuts

Cebimar has a collective experience of over 15 years in chemistry and pharmacology of bioactive marine as well as in the use of marine microorganisms in bioremediation) ( “CARIBBEAN MARINE BIODIVERSITY AS A SOURCE OF NEW COMPOUNDS OF BIOMEDICAL INTEREST AND OTHERS INDUSTRIAL APPLICATIONS” Pharmacologyonline 3: 111-119 (2006) , <http://oceandocs.org/bitstream/1834/3649/1/Caribbean%20Marine%20Biodiversity%20as%20a%20source%5B1%5D........pdf> //BLOV)

Antitumorals

The cancer is the second cause of death in Cuba and in many developed countries of the world, then as result of some researcher institutions of international prestige, as the National Institute of the Cancer of United States and Pharmamar of Spain, have been involved in the systematic search of substances of chemotherapy value, so much of terrestrial origin and as marine. One of the studied compounds in marine origin that it is in clinical phase III is the Ecteinoascidine 743 commercially called Yondelis 17,18 referred to a family of extracted products from a tunicate Ecteinascidia turbinate. Also, in the scientific literature there are different reports concerning to the anti-tumoral actions of seaweeds extracts 19,20,21 .

In Cuba these studies were initiated in the period 1980-1990 in the National Institute of Oncology 22,23,24,25,26 and they were continued more recently in collaboration with our Centre 27,28. Results demonstrated that of the 69 seaweed extracts evaluated, 60 were very cytotoxic in front of a brine shrimp Artemia salina a alternative toxicity test (CL50 <10 µg.mL-1), 40% belongs to extracts of green algae, 28% to extracts of red and 32% to extracts of brown algae, while the rest of the extracts (6) were moderately toxic for the referenced test 29. Also, of the extracts evaluated as toxic, 30 of them, were tested by the interchange of DNA test in from of the bioluminesce of the bacteria Photobacterium leiognathi according to the developed method by Steinberg30 modified by Miravet 31. The experiments showed that 18.6 were positive. Six of these extracts, classified as moderately toxic, were evaluated in the National Oncology Institute, in front of two signal murine tumours: leukaemia P388 and adenocarcinome 755. The results showed that two extracts significantly increased the survival of the mice implanted with the referred tumours and in comparison to 5-fluorouracil (PPF) like positive control.

Two of the above mentioned extracts were submitted to a bio-guide purification procedure. The results show a semi-purified fraction that increased the survival in 51.5 % of inoculated mice with leukaemia P388 getting better results in comparison with the positive control (5-fluorouracil (PPF), a compound traditionally used in the cancer chemotherapy). Studies of the chemical composition of the fraction showed the presence of flavonoides and flavones. While effective treatments exist for acute lymphocytic leukaemia, particularly in the case of children, and for chronic mylogenous leukaemia, more efficacious treatments for other forms of acute and chronic forms of the disease. So, seaweeds could represent a promising source in the search of this kind of compounds32.

## Politics

### Fight in Congress

#### Requires Congress – Even if Obama changes positions he can’t lift the embargo alone

Pérez-Stable 2011 (Marifeli Pérez-Stable, professor of sociology at Florida International University and non-resident senior fellow at the Inter-American Dialogue, “The United states and Cuba: intimate enemies,” 2011)

On April 13, 2009, the Obama administration announced a package of measures¶ that might have been considered slight but for the context. In 2004, the¶ Bush administration had scaled back official contacts with Havana and drastically¶ limited travel between the United States and Cuba. So the White House's press¶ release announcing the end of all restrictions on family travel and remittances,¶ authorizing U.S. telecommunications companies to do business in Cuba and¶ expanding the scope of humanitarian donations via licensed exports was significant.¶ 21 Twelve hours after the White House announced the changes, the¶ Cuban government reported them on television in measured language. 22 In¶ March, when Congress passed the spending bill with the controversial Cuba¶ provisions, Havana had been dismissive. A Cuban official had called them "a¶ minuscule gesture" and added that Cuba expected "the unjust blockade to be¶ lifted."23 But as recently as May 2008, then-Senator Obama had warned that¶ there would be no such thing were he to become president:¶ I will maintain the embargo. It provides us with the leverage to present¶ the regime with a clear choice: If you take significant steps toward democracy,¶ beginning with the freeing of all political prisoners, we will take¶ steps to begin normalizing relations. That's the way to bring about real¶ change in Cuba-through strong, smart and principled diplomacy.24¶ Nor could Obama lift the embargo without the consent of Congress. When the¶ Obama White House announced the changes, it framed them in terms reminiscent¶ of the Cuban Democracy Act ("calibrated steps") and avoided Helms-Burton's¶ confrontational tone.

#### Plan insures a fight in Congress -

Dominguez 2008 (Esteban Morales Dominguez: member of the Cuban Academy of Sciences, awarded three times by both the Cuban Academy of Sciences and the Ministry of Higher Education, and Gary Prevost: Professor of Political Science at St. John’s University and the College of St. Benedict in Minnesota, “United States- Cuban Relations A Critical History” 2008)

The United States Congress has been the center of debate for U.S. Cuba policy¶ since Helms-Burton became law in 1996, precisely because under this law only¶ Congress can make any significant policy change. The power of Congress to¶ affect U.S. policy toward Cuba derives less from its constitutional power than¶ from the prerogatives that President Clinton granted to the legislative branch¶ when, in the midst of the 1996 electoral campaign, he signed the Helms-Burton¶ law. In addition to Congress, there are other actors within the U.S. government¶ and within the political system in general that aim to secure their participation in¶ the debate. Additionally, the influence of nongovernmental organization should¶ not be underestimated. On the governmental front, the Drug Enforcement Administration,¶ the United States Information Agency, and the Defense Department¶ are among the best known actors representing perspectives that separate¶ them from the aggressive stand of extreme conservatives.

On the nongovernmental front are found extreme conservative and right-of-center¶ organizations within the Cuban community who favor continuation of the¶ embargo. Foremost among these is the conservative Cuban American National¶ Foundation (CANF). Many other nongovernmental organizations maintain an¶ interest in Cuban affairs and most a change in current U.S.-Cuba policy:

• Academic and cultural organizations interested in U.S. policy toward Cuba

• Organizations such as the Chamber of Commerce and other business groups¶ (especially farm interests)

• The media, including newspapers like the New York Times and the Washington¶ Post, which publish points of view sometimes critical of U.S. Cuba¶ policy

• Religious organizations of various denominations;

• Solidarity groups and organizations such as Pastors for Peace

• Left-leaning organizations, including Cuban American groups

• An important part of the African American, Hispanic, and labor community.

Whatever the consequences, there is a wide array of political actors within U.S.¶ society concerned with Cuban policy, spanning the whole internal political spectrum.¶ Their number has grown as the conflict has dragged on in the face of ineffective¶ policies and there has been a qualitative change regarding Cuban policy.¶ Today, it is not possible to count those interested in Cuban policy, while ten¶ years ago such a count was easy to accomplish. Also, solidarity with Cuba and¶ opposition to the blockade are no longer ignored as in the past. In the United¶ States Congress, positions against the blockade are not limited to the small¶ group of liberal legislators who for years have called attention to the contradictions¶ of Washington's Cuba policy.

### A2 Link Turns

#### Despite improvements – plan is still a huge fight

Spadoni 2010 [Paolo Spadoni 2010 assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Augusta State Failed sanctions why the US sanctions against cuba could never work page 57-58]

On the one hand, a number of anti-embargo legislative initiatives introduced¶ in Congress in 2007-2008 are being taken up again, this time¶ without the looming threat of a presidential veto.4° Current proposals¶ include the removal of all sanctions and the travel ban, a special exemption¶ for U.S. oil firms to drill for crude in Cuban waters, the expansion of¶ educational travel, and the easing of restrictions on sales of agricultural¶ products to Cuba. These efforts are aided by a Democratic-controlled¶ Congress (although many of the bills have bipartisan support), an active¶ business lobby, U.S. opinion polls showing considerable support for the¶ repeal of sanctions, and the growing pro-normalization sentiment within¶ the Cuban-American exile community. Yet, among the key challenges,¶ those advocating change in U.S. policy toward Cuba must be able to coalesce¶ the various business and citizen lobbies, maneuver the tortuous¶ process in Congress required to ease sections of the embargo, and forge¶ meaningful allegiances with the moderate elements of the Cuban-American¶ community. As in the past, questionable actions of the Cuban government¶ might also derail progress toward the betterment of U.S. relations¶ with Cuba.¶ On the other hand, Cuban-American hard-liners and their allies in¶ Congress will not go down without strenuous opposition to anti-embargo¶ bills. On March 10, 2009, Congress eliminated Bush's stiffer cash-payment rules for U.S. food sales to Cuba and eased some restrictions on travel to¶ the island for the purpose of selling agricultural products. The new provisions,¶ attached to a budget bill proposed by the Obama administration,¶ had faced strong resistance from the Democratic senators Bill Nelson of¶ Florida and Bob Menendez of New Jersey, who represent large CubanAmerican¶ communities. In a quest to secure the senators' votes and clear¶ the passage of the bill, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner was forced¶ to provide reassurance in writing that the White House would interpret¶ the changes so narrowly as to leave them unenforced.41 For those who¶ want to keep economic sanctions against Cuba alive, however, a crucial¶ challenge is to convince younger generations of Cuban Americans and¶ newly arrived Cuban immigrants that isolation is a morally correct policy¶ as well as an effective one. It might also be difficult to convince ordinary¶ Americans that an activist, confrontational, and expensive (in terms of¶ lost business) Cuban embargo is worth it at a time when the United States¶ is coping with an economic recession and has just removed the more sinister¶ North Korea from the list of states that sponsor terrorism.

### Can’t be a win

#### General apathy means no chance for a win with pro-Cuba actions

Zebich-Knos 05 (Michele Zebich-Knos , professor emeritus of political science at Kennesaw State University) (“Foreign Policy Toward Cuba: Isolation Or Engagement?” Zebich-Knos, Michele, and Heather Nora Nicol, eds. Foreign Policy Toward Cuba: Isolation Or Engagement? 2005.)

The irony of United States-Cuba relations is that it remains etched in the past and has no bearing on foreign policy changes that are so prevalent in the post-Cold War era. Remnants of Cold War behavior clearly persist in U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba. Since the external Cold War threat is no more, this author asserts that U. S. policy toward Cuba is now driven solely by domestic political dynamics This explanation is a result of the manner in which U.S. interest politics play out at state and national levels. Each U.S. administration since President Kennedy's has sought to accommodate a very vocal Cuban exile community in the United States. As time passed, many in this community eagerly acquired U.S. citizenship and transformed into a very savvy and vocal group of hyphenated Americans-Cuban Americans to be exact. To a lesser degree, policy inertia results when the political and economic costs to maintain the embargo are not debated by a broad spectrum of the U.S. electorate. Apathy toward United States-Cuba policy by the American public means that Cuba is not considered a vital issue; such apathy enables anti-Castro lobbies to wield greater clout. Only a small minority bothers to contradict Cuba lobbyists, while most Americans fall under the silent majority rubric and reflect general indifference toward the whole matter of United States-Cuba relations. Policy inertia explains in large part why laws upholding the embargo have not yet been repealed. Change toward Cuba is simply not a high priority for most Americans, but, since anti-Castro forces do place high priority on maintaining the status quo, they have managed to stave off change and, under George W. Bush's administration, have even succeeded in tightening travel and other restrictions.

### Embargo Publicly Popular

#### Sanctions against Cuba are popular among the public

Spadoni 2010 [Paolo Spadoni 2010 assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Augusta State Failed sanctions why the US sanctions against cuba could never work page 51]

Overall, it is hard to deny the fact that U.S. policy toward Cuba in the¶ post-cold war era has had much to do with domestic politics and little to¶ do with promoting democracy in Cuba. Some scholars pointed out that¶ other driving factors should be taken into consideration. These include¶ congressional activism, special interests of the executive and bureaucratic¶ elites, and external pressures (Brenner et al. 2002) as well as ideological¶ issues linked to U.S. hegemonic plans (Morales Dominguez and Prevost¶ 2008, 146). Yet, except in 2008, all major U.S. moves to intensify or relax¶ sanctions against the Castro government occurred in presidential election¶ years, when partisan bidding for Cuban-American votes (and money) in¶ the politically pivotal state of Florida takes center stage.

#### Plan unpopular – Politicians wont risk losing Florida voters or losing leverage over Cuba

Seaman 2010 (David Seaman, Research Assistant and Lecturer at the University of Osnabrück – Department of social sciences, “U.S. Democracy Promotion- The Case of Cuba” - 2010)

It can also not be overlooked that the continuation of the failed U.S.¶ policy is unquestionably maintained by the considerable domestic rewards it¶ reaps. In fact, the importance of the state of Florida in U.S. presidential¶ elections may be the primary obstacle to reforming the U.S. policy (Staten¶ 2003, 135). While the resolute U.S. policy may achieve the goals of signaling¶ disapproval and pleasing certain domestic constituencies, its inherent¶ feature that allows for determinant U.S. influence in shaping any 'transition¶ government' or 'democratically elected government' that may come to¶ power in Cuba may well serve as the main explanation of the policy's continuance.¶ During a press conference on U.S . Cuba policy in 2002, Deputy¶ Assistant Secretary Fisk (2002) pointed out the importance of this aspect of¶ the policy:

The question before us ... is not whether to lift the restrictions on trade and tourism but¶ when and how. Does it make any sense to hand a political victory and capital windfall to¶ a hostile dictator in his final days who is the single biggest obstacle to genuine economic¶ and political change? Or, does it make more sense to retain the leverage that we can use¶ with a transition government to ensure deep and broad political and economic reform?

This leverage is the criterion laid out in Libertad, which promises a strong¶ influential role for the United States in dictating the policy choices of any¶ "democratically elected government" in Cuba that seeks to free itself from¶ the U.S. embargo and normalize relations with Washington.

#### No political support for the plan – No support from Cuban public or legislators

Pérez-Stable 2011 (Marifeli Pérez-Stable, professor of sociology at Florida International University and non-resident senior fellow at the Inter-American Dialogue, “The United states and Cuba: intimate enemies,” 2011)

In contrast to the situation in the early 2000s, Cuban-American public¶ opinion is now more diverse. A prospective national coalition for changing¶ Cuba policy could, therefore, include sectors of Cuban Miami. Still, these¶ trends are not fully established. Unforeseen events-for example, a Tiananmen-like¶ confrontation with demonstrators or a radical economic transformation in¶ Cuba-could stall, revert or accelerate them. In Congress, Cuban-American¶ legislators largely oppose the Obama administration's overture toward Havana.¶ Public opinion and the Cuban-American political establishment are then seemingly¶ at odds, in part because traditional exiles still constitute a majority of¶ Cuban-American voters. If these public-opinion trends continue and if post-¶ 1990 arrivals become citizens, register and vote, the Democratic Party stands to¶ benefit, although newer Cuban Americans may not vote solely on the issue Cuba policy of¶ and enough may be swayed to back Republican incumbents for¶ their record on local issues. At any rate, unless organized and funded to make¶ their case before Congress, Cuban Americans in favor of change will remain no¶ more than interesting trends in public opinion.

#### U.S.-Cuba relations unchanging – opposition to lifting of embargo

Starr 13 - Dr. Pamela K. Starr is Director of the US-Mexico Network @ USC, an associate professor (NTT) in Public Diplomacy and the School of International Relations (Pamela, “As Cuba Changes, U.S. Policy Does Not”, Pacific Council on International Policy, May 2013, <https://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id=539>)//CB

Why the United States Resists Change

On the U.S. side, our conversation with Rep. Joe Garcia reinforced what many academic analysts of Cuban-American public opinion and politics have concluded: that Cuban-American attitudes and Florida politics more broadly are changing. Younger generations of Cuban-Americans and later waves of Cuban migrants, whose departures were motivated more by economic opportunity than politics, have dampened support among Cuban-Americans for a policy of economic isolation toward Cuba. A majority of Cuban-Americans favor policies that allow them to travel to Cuba and send money and goods to relatives on the island without restrictions. Still, the majority of Cuban Americans continue to support what Cubans on the island identify as evidence of continued U.S. hostility toward Cuba: the embargo.

Rep. Garcia explained this seemingly contradictory Cuban-American attitude toward U.S. economic engagement with Cuba. He argued that while the new generation of Cuban-Americans see U.S. policy toward Cuba from the perspective of someone born and raised in the United States, their elders still see it from the perspective of a Cuban driven out of his home. Furthermore, while new migrants see U.S. policy toward Cuba from the perspective of an economic migrant who came north to help their families in Cuba, their predecessors came for political reasons, often bringing their entire family with them and thus obviating any personal concern about living conditions on the island. But there is one thing that unites most all Cuban-Americans: their opposition to the Castro regime in Cuba. The attitude of Cuban-Americans towards the embargo makes sense in light of the fact that it has become the symbol of that opposition. Despite its evident failure as a tool of U.S. foreign policy, the embargo, in Rep. Garcia’s words, “defines us.” Thus, changing Cuban-American attitudes about the embargo will take time.

## Condition CP

### Trade Conditions CP

#### Market Access acts as a bargaining Chip for free trade

Lawrence 7 (Robert, Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, “Trade Policy: The Exception to American Exceptionalism?,” 2007, http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/rlawrence/Lawrence%20on%20Trade.pdf

If trade protection is harmful, why not liberalize unilaterally? Because the United States has the ability to influence the behavior of its trading partners. While the United States benefits from removing its tariffs, its benefits are even greater if other countries reciprocate.¶ A second explanation for the rarity of unilateral liberalization by the United States relates to domestic politics. Trade liberalization creates winners and losers, and in particular the losers are producers who compete with imports. To be sure, U.S. consumers would gain from cheaper prices if the United States liberalized unilaterally, but consumers are poorly organized, and thus the politics of unilateral liberalization are difficult in a system that is particularly responsive to producer interests. But reciprocal liberalization brings export interests to the table, which makes obtaining such agreements much easier.¶ Cooperative Liberalization¶ Cooperative liberalization can take place in both multilateral or bilateral (and pluri- lateral) settings. Multilateral trade liberalization depoliticizes trade relations. It places the focus on economic gains and losses rather than the virtues or vices of a particular trading partner. Reducing tariffs equally for all trading partners ensures that sales go to the trading partner whose products are cheapest or most attractive rather than the one who happens to have cut the best trade deal. Just as monetary exchange is superior to barter because it does not require a double coincidence of wants, so multilateral bargaining can facilitate cross trading. Bargaining multilaterally also gives opportunities for forming coalitions, something which is particularly beneficial to small countries but at times is very useful for all participants. The inclusive nature of multilateral agreements can achieve bargains that are particularly difficult to strike when countries can free ride on bilateral deals, because such deals may confer benefits without making other countries pay. For example, the United States refuses to cut its agricultural subsidies in bilateral deals, because it wants to use these cuts to obtain benefits from all WTO members.¶ Bilateral trade agreements do have virtues. They can be more precisely tailored to meet the particular needs of each side. For the United States they have the virtue that generally the negotiations heighten power asymmetries. But they also have disadvantages because they could divert trade from more efficient producers to those receiving preferences, and because they result in complicated overlapping regimes of trade rules.¶ The ability to use both approaches simultaneously to achieve freer trade may also yield strategic benefits. In particular, footdraggers have the ability to stall large negotiations whereas it may be possible to put them under greater pressure by cutting bilateral deals with their competitors.¶ In short, the United States has a basic interest in cooperative, reciprocal trade liberalization because it not only yields economic gains but also helps to mobilize domestic political support for free trade. By contrast, unilaterally using market power to extract gains through protection can give rise to counterproductive foreign responses, while unilateral liberalization neglects the potential additional gains that can be obtained by using the reduction in domestic trade barriers as a bargaining chip to reduce foreign barriers. The United States is a large economy, and its relationship with many trading partners is asymmetrical. Foreigners are generally more dependent on their trade with the United States than it is on trade with them. Accordingly the United States can use market access as a powerful bargaining chip in either multilateral or bilateral settings, and the ability to combine these approaches could enhance its bargaining advantage.

# Advantage Answers

## Democracy

### Coming Now

#### Democracy coming, lifting pressure on Castro kills it

**Marco 5-22**, 13 (Daniel García Marco is a US correspondent for DPA) (interviewing Guillermo Farinas, Doctor of Psycology, independent writer in Cuba) (“Cuban Dissident Guillermo Fariñas Interviewed in Miami” <http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=93477>)

HAVANA TIMES — After the more than 20 hunger strikes that have seriously undermined his health, Cuban dissident Guillermo Fariñas is still determined to oppose Raul Castro’s government through peaceful means and wishes to send “a message of love” to his “oppressors”, DPA reported. “We always remember to send our oppressors a message of love. As a peaceful protester, one must take the moral high-ground and avoid calls for revenge,” 51-year-old Fariñas stated during an interview with DPA in Miami, the capital of Cuban exiles. Fariñas is the latest renowned Cuban dissident to have traveled outside of Cuba, availing himself of the migratory reforms that came into effect this January. The dissident will go on a tour not too dissimilar from that made by blogger Yoani Sanchez, to claim a Sakharov Award in Brussels, granted him in acknowledgement of his defense of human rights and civil liberties. Fariñas, known for the hunger strikes with which he has sought to bring pressures on the Cuban government to secure the release of political prisoners, has no faith in Raul Castro and believes his reforms are mere “cosmetic” changes. DPA: Do you think things are truly changing in Cuba, that something new is coming? Fariñas: Something new is coming, but nothing is truly changing. Democracy is what’s coming. They’re going to try and install a democracy in the style of Byelorussia, the Ukraine, or Russia, where those who were in power in the days of totalitarianism can maintain their totalitarian hold on society under the banner of democracy. We have to bring pressure to bear on the government, as Cubans, as exiles, as defenders of democracy, no matter what part of the world we’re in, so that that doesn’t happen, so that the people are the ones who decide their fate. DPA: Do you feel that Cuba’s migratory reform, the fact all of you are traveling outside Cuba and denouncing the actions of its government, is having effects contrary to what they wanted?

Fariñas: No, they knew they couldn’t impose conditions on us, they know us well. They’re trying to clean up their act. They knew this was going to happen. They want to coax the European Union and North America into making more substantial investments in Cuba and granting them credit that will pull them out of bankruptcy.

### Embargo Lifting Fails

#### Lifting the embargo empowers the regime- Soviet Union proves

Jorge 2000 (Dr. Antonio Jorge is Professor of Political Economy at Florida International University,

holding appointments in the Departments of International Relations, Economics, Political

Science, and Sociology/Anthropology. He is also a Senior Research Fellow of the Institute for

Cuban and Cuban American Studies at the University of Miami.) (, "The U.S. Embargo and the Failure of the Cuban Economy" (2000). Institute for Cuban & Cuban-American Studies Occasional Papers. Paper 28.

<http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/iccaspapers/28> //BLOV)

It follows, from all of the above, that a lifting of the embargo at this time would only serve the purpose of facilitating to Castro desperately needed resources, mainly in the form of credit lines extended by international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank, and also by private banking and other financial institutions. This financial influx would serve to strengthen his 40-year stranglehold on the Cuban people. Furthermore, to those who believe that greater contacts between the United States and Cuba would further the cause of democratization, it should be pointed out that such hopes definitely have not been validated by the experience of Marxist societies from the inception of the New Economic Policy in the Soviet Union, which followed the stage of War Communism, up to the last efforts at reforming socialism in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. In these countries, trade, foreign investment, and loans led hermetic lives of their own, oblivious to and unaffected by the rest of society. There is no historical precedent for drawing hope from the Cuban experience. As a matter of fact, it could be realistically argued that the opposite has happened. As the Cuban regime succeeds in solidifying itself, as a result of the legitimacy conferred upon it by other nations and by an augmented flow of resources, its repressive proclivities have increased in parallel fashion. Trade and investment with totalitarian states have not weakened or eroded those states; rather, the contrary has always been the case. Castro’s regime is certainly no exception to the rule and, in fact, categorically confirms it. Only pressure has led Castro temporarily to implement some timid reforms that he subsequently has either partly rescinded or revoked altogether. Cuba has established for all to see a system of apartheid — which is openly and vigorously enforced — between foreigners and Cuban nationals.

### Can’t Predict

Removing the embargo won’t change the regime – political transition must start itself

Weeks and Fiorey 2012 (Gregory Weeks, Ph.D., and Erin Fiorey MA, “Policy Options for a Cuban Spring,” http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview\_20120630\_art014.pdf)

U.S. Money Won’t Cause Change ¶ in Cuba

What would a Cuban transition look like? Why ¶ would it start? No one predicted the Arab Spring, ¶ and for Cuba the many possible permutations ¶ are well beyond the scope of this article. Cuban ¶ opposition blogger Yoani Sánchez writes that ¶ Cubans view transition as similar to a dilapidated ¶ building in Havana: “The hurricanes don’t bring ¶ it down and the rains don’t bring it down, but one ¶ day someone tries to change the lock on the front ¶ door and the whole ediﬁce collapses.”15 In any ¶ event, given the hermetic nature of the regime ¶ and its successful resistance to U.S. inﬂuence, it is¶ very unlikely that the United States will have much ¶ inﬂuence over its initiation.

As the prominent Cuban dissident Oswaldo Payá ¶ argues, “One talks about the United States’ money ¶ for civil society . . . . The United States’ money ¶ won’t cause change in Cuba.”16 It is a point he has ¶ made repeatedly. If there is a Cuban Spring, then ¶ its emergence and ultimate success will hinge on its ¶ domestic wellsprings. In fact, this echoes the policy ¶ position of the administration of Barack Obama. As ¶ Secretary of State Hillary Clinton put it in 2011, ¶ “These revolutions are not ours. They are not by ¶ us, for us, or against us, but we do have a role. ¶ We have the resources, capabilities, and expertise ¶ to support those who seek peaceful, meaningful, ¶ democratic reform.”17 Even the Catholic Cardinal in ¶ Cuba, Jaime Ortega, has cautioned against “a type ¶ of U.S. subculture which invades everything.”18 He ¶ was referring not only to culture, but also to politics.

What the wariness entails is an increased risk ¶ of backlash if the United States injects itself too ¶ forcefully. The United States faced a similar ¶ dilemma in the Arab Spring Middle Eastern ¶ transitions. Widespread perception that the United ¶ States is attempting to direct events fosters distrust ¶ and provides leverage to pro-regime forces or at the ¶ very least puts leaders on the defensive who might ¶ otherwise welcome assistance from the United ¶ States. This is commonly referred to as “blowback,” ¶ and over the long term, it could greatly reduce U.S. ¶ inﬂuence.

However, once the political transition is underway ¶ the United States will have to respond, especially ¶ given Cuba’s geographic immediacy and the domestic ¶ political ties of the Cuban American community. It ¶ must do so in a constructive way, to avoid remaining ¶ in the habit of “rejecting most tools of diplomatic ¶ engagement” as a 2009 Senate staff report put it.19¶ The report also accurately noted that any transitional ¶ government or opposition movement attempting to ¶ become a government will not be a tabula rasa. Even ¶ if they are more positive toward the United States ¶ than the Castros are, the movement’s leaders will also ¶ be steeped in the history of U.S.-Cuban relations; that ¶ is, steeped in U.S. efforts to exert political control. ¶ In 2009 congressional testimony, former Southern ¶ Command commander General Barry McCaffrey ¶ noted, “There is no question we lack inﬂuence.”20¶ Establishing inﬂuence is no easy task, and we cannot ¶ accomplish it quickly

#### Democracy isn’t the first step– It is a byproduct of economic engagement

Dickerson 2010 (Sergio M. Dickerson, Lieutenant Colonial US Army, “United States Security Strategy Towards Cuba” 14 January 2010, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518053.pdf>)

¶ Another important pitfall is to exploit democracy as a precondition for diplomacy ¶ and economic engagement in Cuba. If democracy is virtuous, then why must we exploit 13¶ it? It casts a negative shadow on a positive change in government. There is a common¶ perception that U.S. policy with regards to security and stability can only exist under the ¶ precondition of a “Democratic Cuba”. It has prevented any real progress in U.S. – Cuba ¶ relations because of well-placed fears that we mean to subvert the Cuban government. ¶ A popular Cuban American lobby group, The Cuban American National Foundation¶ summarizes traditional U.S. beliefs towards Cuba. They suggest, “U.S. – Cuba policy ¶ should focus on (1) advancing U.S. interests and security in the region and (2) ¶ empowering Cuban people in their quest for democracy and prosperity…that these are ¶ “intertwined and one cannot be individually accomplished without the other.”28 The ¶ recommendation then focuses largely on steps to pursue a democratic Cuba.¶

To separate security and stability from democratic pursuits in Cuba could benefit ¶ both causes. Focusing on better diplomatic relations could further democracy as a ¶ byproduct of increased exposure to open markets, businesses and globalization. China ¶ is a good example. The U.S. has diffused tensions with China by exposing them to ¶ open markets. Although they continue to embrace communism, their version of ¶ communism has been somewhat diluted as they modified their business practices, trade ¶ and other aspects to compete in the global marketplace. If you take into account that ¶ Cuba’s Growth National Product (GDP) decreased by 4% since 2006 while their debt ¶ grew by 16% to almost $20B in 2008, Cuba certainly has incentive to do the same.¶ 29 By ¶ imposing democracy we jeopardize diplomatic avenues to our principal security and ¶ stability pursuits. To assuage the Cuban America position on this issue may be simpler ¶ today than 10 years ago. Today’s younger Cuban-American generation is more ¶ amenable to closer relations with Cuba. The anger carried by their immigrant forefathers¶ after 50 years may be passing and perhaps the time is right to leverage this new Cuban ¶ American generation to open dialogue with Cuba without the democratic preconditions ¶ tied to negotiations.

#### There will be no democratic Cuba – It’s just a capitalist dream

Winter 2013 (Mick Winter, author, Cuba for the Misinformed: Facts from the Forbidden Island, 2013, Book)

¶ Only in the fevered minds of aging—and vanishing—Cuban exiles in Florida,¶ and in the fantasies of nostalgic Cold Warriors, does the hope exist that¶ somehow Cuba after Castro (any Castro) will be transformed into a capitalist¶ paradise, as the long-enslaved Cubans throw off their chains, rise up against¶ Fidel and his brother Raúl, and once again make Cuba safe for American-¶ style democracy. That is, safe for corporations, the financial industry,¶ McDonald’s, mining and oil companies, hotel chains, fast-food outlets, and¶ advertising. An added advantage for the US government would be the¶ elimination of the extensive social safety net currently enjoyed by Cuba’s¶ people, which, in the US government’s eyes, serves as an undesirable example¶ to the American people.

Successive American governments have preferred to believe that one man—¶ the Evil Bearded One—has single-handedly enslaved the suffering Cuban¶ people, and that once he and his brother have faded into history, all will be¶ well again.

Cuba is a social experiment, a Caribbean Petri dish, a fifty-year pilot project¶ for the planet, one in which the scientists inhabit the same dish that contains¶ the organisms they study. Not everyone is happy with the experiment.¶ Certainly not everyone in the dish is pleased to be there. The country to¶ Cuba’s north, generally considered to be the richest and most powerful¶ empire in the history of the planet, appears terrified by its tiny neighbor.

The United States has devoted much energy trying to kill or devalue Fidel¶ Castro, the lead scientist for the Cuban experiment. Why this is so is¶ puzzling. Why would a country of more than 300 million people, armed to¶ the teeth with multiple units of every weapon imaginable, fear a poor,¶ tropical country of 11 million people?

### Embargo Not key

#### Neg card\* Embargo not key to democratic movements – polls prove

**NPR 09** (National Public Radio, interview of Ambassador Casson regarding Cuba and the US, “Weighing The Embargo Against Cuba”, <http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=102997034)(JN)>

I disagree with that totally. I think that there's a tremendous civil society growing in Cuba. Now there's bloggers, there's clandestine newspapers that are springing up in spite of all the economic difficulties on the island. The young people are totally disenchanted with the revolution. International Republican Institute just did a poll and asked people what they thought the biggest problem was. Only six percent said the embargo. Think we have to work with civil society, and I agree with Brookings Institute that the population will find voice to express, when the time comes, when Fidel and his brother are not on the scene, to create the kind of society that they want for Cuba.

### Engagement Fails

#### Economic engagement fails – no democracy or empirical evidence

Suchlicki 7 - Jaime Suchlicki is Emilio Bacardi Moreau Distinguished Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies (Jaime, “Don't Lift the Cuba Travel Ban”, Front Page Mag, April 11 2007, <http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=26082)//CB>

American tourists will not bring democracy to Cuba. Over the past decades hundreds of thousands of Canadian, European and Latin American tourists have visited the island. Cuba is not more democratic today. If anything, Cuba is more totalitarian, with the state and its control apparatus having been strengthened as a result of the influx of tourist dollars. The assumption that tourism or trade will lead to economic and political change is not borne out by empirical studies. In Eastern Europe, communism collapsed a decade after tourism peaked. No study of Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union claims that tourism, trade or investments had anything to do with the end of communism. A disastrous economic system, competition with the West, successive leadership changes with no legitimacy, anti-Soviet feeling in Eastern Europe and the failed Soviet war in Afghanistan were among the reasons for change. There is no evidence to support the notion that engagement with a totalitarian state will bring about its demise. Only academic ideologues and those interested in economic gains cling to this notion. Their calls for ending the embargo have little to do with democracy in Cuba or the welfare of the Cuban people. The repeated statement that the embargo is the cause of Cuba’s economic problems is hollow. The reasons for the economic misery of the Cubans are a failed political and economic system. Like the communist systems of Eastern Europe, Cuba’s system does not function, stifles initiative and productivity and destroys human freedom and dignity.

#### US unilateral approach towards Cuba will fail – Cuba has to take the first step

**Lopez 3/25/13** (Vanessa Lopez, Research Associate at the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies, University of Miami. She is currently pursuing a **Law Degree at Emory University**, “The Failure of U.S. Attempts at Unilateral Rapprochement with Cuba”, <http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/FOCUS_Web/Issue187.htm>) (JN)

History demonstrates that unilateral U.S. efforts have had, and are having, no impact on Cuba's leadership. On the contrary, the Cuban government has interpreted U.S. openings towards Cuba as signs of weakness, which have resulted in Cuba's hostility towards the U.S. and in some instances, in reckless actions such as Mariel and the Balsero Crisis.

Improved relations between the U.S. and Cuba is a laudable goal, but to be successful, Cuba must be a willing participant. Cuba has an unambiguous pattern of harming U.S. interests when the U.S. has engaged in attempts of unilateral rapprochement. If the U.S. would like to protect its interests, it should demand that Cuba take the first step in any future efforts to improve relations between the two countries and offer irreversible concessions.

### No Spillover

#### Democracy wont spillover - research proves

**Leeson & Dean 09** (Peter T. Leeson  Professor of Economics and BB&T Professor for the Study of Capitalism at George Mason University; Andrea M. Dean is a Kendrick Fellow at West Virginia University) (American Journal of Political Science. Vol. 53, No. 3 (Jul., 2009), pp. 533-551) (http://www.jstor.org/stable/25548136)

This article empirically investigated the democratic domino theory using spatial econometrics to estimate a panel covering more than 130 countries over the last one and-a-half centuries. Our results suggest that a democratic domino effect does in fact exist. However, they also find that this effect is more modest than the emphasis on domino reasoning in global foreign affairs would suggest. Countries "catch" only about 11% of their average geographic neighbors' changes in democracy. The idea that enhancing democracy in a few strategic nations could substantially alter the extent of democracy in the rest of the region, for instance, does not appear to be correct. Our results point to several conclusions. First, foreign policy should not pretend that democratic increases in one country will lead, in the words of President Bush, to a "democratic revolution" in the larger region it is situated in. The democratic domino effect is modest, and even in the presence of only a few geographic neighbors, provided these neighbors are not also independently increasing in their democracy, minimally affects changes in democracy in neighboring countries. In the presence of many geographic neighbors the vast majority of the spread of any increase (or decrease) in democracy in one country to its neighbors is overwhelmed by the independent democracy changes in these countries' neighbors. In particular, the "lightness" with which democratic dominoes fall suggests that even if foreign military intervention aimed at promoting democracy in undemocratic countries succeeds in democratizing these nations, intervention is likely to have only a small effect on democracy in their broader regions.

## Economy

### Cuba Econ Growing

#### Cuban economy growing now – less restrictions and cooperatives

Sabo 12 (Eric, “Castro Sees Acceptable Cuban Economic Growth of 3.7% Next Year”, Bloomberg, December 14 2012, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-14/castro-sees-acceptable-cuban-economic-growth-of-3-7-next-year.html>)//CB

Cuban President Raul Castro said that economic growth will be at an “acceptable” 3.7 percent next year as the communist government eases control over businesses and employment.

The Caribbean nation’s economy expanded a less than forecast 3.1 percent in 2012 even as tourist arrival jumped a record 4.9 percent, Castro told the National Assembly yesterday. The government had previously forecast growth of 3.4 percent for this year, he said.

The growth forecast for next year “is acceptable in a scenario of a continuing global economic crisis and persecution of Cuban bank transactions” due to the U.S. embargo, Castro said, according to a transcript of the speech posted on the government-run website Granma.

Since his brother Fidel started handing over power in 2006, Castro has taken measures to open the island’s economy, including loosening of property laws and controls prohibiting private enterprise such as taxi and mobile phone companies. Cooperatives with as many as five employees began managing their own operations this month, a policy meant to loosen restrictions on basic services and increase productivity.

Almost 400,000 Cubans are now self-employed, a number that should grow as the government allows more private enterprise, Castro said.

#### Cuban economy growing – driven by remittances

Morales and Scarpaci 6/11/13 - Emilio Morales is the former Director of Marketing for CIMEX, S.A., the largest Cuban company in the retail and wholesale business. Joseph L. Scarpaci holds a Doctorate from the University of Florida in urban-economic geography and Latin American Studies, with a concentration in Health Services Administration. (Emilio and Joseph, “Remittances Drive the Cuban Economy”, The Havana Consulting Group, June 11 2013, <http://thehavanaconsultinggroups.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=345%3Aremittances-drive-the-cuban-economy&catid=48%3Aremittances&lang=en>)//CB

The former Cuban leader probably never imagined that the forced opening up to dollars was going to become the most efficient driver in the economy over the last 20 years. Not a single Cuban economist foresaw that outcome. Today, remittances reach 62% of Cuban households, sustain about 90% of the retail market, and provide tens of thousands of jobs.

Money sent from overseas far exceeds the value of the once powerful sugar industry which, in 1993, began a huge decline from which it has not recovered. Remittances in 2013 surpass net profits from tourism, nickel, and medical products manufactured by the Cuban biotech industry.

### Cuba not key to global econ

#### Cuba economy not key to global economy – limited economic transitions

Pumar 12 - chair of the sociology department (Enrique, “What The Future Holds For Cuba's Economy”, NPR, August 9 2012, <http://www.npr.org/2012/08/09/158501276/what-the-future-holds-for-cubas-economy>)//CB

How important are these jobs in the tourism sector, and what is the effect? What has the U.S. embargo done to economic output in Cuba? I know you're not an economist, but we're talking in layman terms here, anyway.

PUMAR: OK. The tourism is very important for the Cuban economy. The sugar industry is so practically gone for all intents and purposes. So tourism and remittances are the main source of cash in Cuba. However, the influx of tourism is not without a social and political cost. As more people get to know foreigners, they, obviously, get more hungry for reforms, and they have - they get more hungry to travel abroad and, you know, they get more interested in change. So it's very, very - it's a very risky business.

Now, with regard to the embargo, the - Cuba is one of those countries that doesn't have relation with the United States, of course, but we shouldn't forget that it has relations with many other countries. And there are some limited economic transactions, cash transactions between the United States and Cuba. The problem is that the Cuban government doesn't have enough cash to conduct many of these transactions. So the embargo is a limiting factor. It also - it has also served as an escape for the leadership because the leadership blames everything on the embargo.

#### No impact to Cuban economic decline – sustainability policies from embargo

King 12 - Department of Political Science and Environmental Studies (M. Dawn, “Cuban Sustainability: The Effects of Economic Isolation on Agriculture and Energy”, Western Political Science Association, March 21-24 2012, <http://wpsa.research.pdx.edu/meet/2012/kingmdawn.pdf>)//CB

Over the past fifty years, increased access to electricity and intensified agricultural production lifted millions out of extreme poverty. However, the world is consuming fossil fuels at a record pace to satiate global demands in the transportation, agriculture, and energy sectors while the effects of global warming, caused by this fossil fuel use, are already threatening human security by shifting agricultural zones and causing extreme weather patterns (USDA 2012). The same practices meant to solve the world’s resource and poverty problems, are now creating them. As energy prices soar, scholars often discuss the economic and environmental repercussions of hitting “peak oil” as something that may happen in the future. This study looks at Cuba, a country that faced “peak oil,” and argues that the world can learn valuable sustainability lessons from the Cuban experience. Cuba’s relative economic isolation in a globalizing world forced the country to adopt agricultural sustainability practices and invest in domestic energy sources (both renewable and non-renewable) when USSR petroleum imports were severely restricted, yet this same economic isolation impeded the Cuban government from achieving a sustainable energy system. Effective sustainability policies must strike a balance between purposive, centralized actions to reduce dependence on fossil-fuels coupled with decentralized capital investments that allow for new research, development, and infrastructure. Cuba is currently trying to find this balance.

### No risk of Cuban decline

#### No economic decline in Cuba – environmental sustainability

Vassar no date (“History of Sustainability in Cuba”, WordPress, no date, <http://pages.vassar.edu/sustainability/video/history-of-sustainability-in-cuba/>)//CB

The United States has maintained an economic blockade of Cuba, and thus severely restricted Cuban trade, since the Cuban revolutionary forces successfully ousted Dictator Fulgencio Batista in 1959 and turned the country away from capitalism. This blockade, while economically devastating for Cuba, has had both a negative and positive impact on Cuba’s environmental sustainability. As a result of the blockade Cuba’s economy was heavily dependent on trade with the Soviet Union and the Soviet led Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) until they began to collapse in 1989. Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuba followed its model of centralized industrialization and was following the same unsustainable path as both capitalist countries and the bloc led by the Soviet Union. For example, during this time period Cuba had the most industrialized agricultural sector in Latin America, characterized by all-encompassing mechanization and monocropping. However, industrialization was dependent on the trade which began to disappear in 1989. Cuba lost crucial access to items such as oil, heavy machinery, machine parts, and pesticides and faced an economic and agricultural crisis.

However, out of this turbulence, the country re-oriented its economy and agriculture and became a world leader in ecological or organic and urban agriculture. Agricultural production rebounded and Cuba posted the best growth rate of any Latin American country in the latter half of the 1990s and into the 2000s. Much of the production rebound was due to the adoption of a range of agrarian decentralization policies beginning in the 1990s that encouraged individual and cooperative forms of production. Inefficient State companies were replaced with thousands of new small urban and suburban farms and millions of hectares of unused State lands were given to workers for small-scale farming. In this new model, decisions concerning resource use and food production strategies were transferred to the local level, while the State supported farmers by distributing needed inputs and services.

### Embargo Good for Cuban Econ

#### Embargo key to Cuba’s economy – resource efficiency and human development

Wackernagel 7 - Global Footprint Network Director (Mathis, “Ecological Footprints”, Living on Earth, November 9 2007, <http://www.loe.org/shows/segments.html?programID=07-P13-00045&segmentID=2#links>)//CB

WACKERNAGEL: Among all the 90 countries we looked at, we only found one country that meets both minimum criteria, which doesn’t mean that they are necessarily sustainable but they are providing long lives and high education and minimum income without using more than what is available globally worldwide per person. And this country is called Cuba.

GELLERMAN: Cuba? That’s a surprise.

WACKERNAGEL: To be totally honest, Cuba would probably like to have a larger footprint; it would like to have access to more resources. They were forced to be much more resource efficient than they probably would like to be because of the trade embargo they’re under and so their footprint has shrunk a little bit since, in particular the Soviet Union collapsed back in the early 90s. However, they have still been able to maintain high human development in terms of still increasing longevity and maintaining very high access to educational success.

GELLERMAN: I was in Cuba soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union and things were terrible there. I mean, people were really suffering. There was no gas for cars. People were pulling cars down the street with horses. I went back a few years ago and things had dramatically improved. One of the things that I found was that they were doing sustainable agriculture. They weren’t using inputs like pesticides and chemicals because they couldn’t afford them. And other things had improved but they had suffered mightily.

#### Cuba is growing – It has high international cooperation and great economic prospects

Dominguez 2008 (Esteban Morales Dominguez: member of the Cuban Academy of Sciences, awarded three times by both the Cuban Academy of Sciences and the Ministry of Higher Education, and Gary Prevost: Professor of Political Science at St. John’s University and the College of St. Benedict in Minnesota, “United States- Cuban Relations A Critical History” 2008)

Havana has been steadily recovering its international links. Today, the¶ country has more than 360 joint ventures with foreign capital, 170 of which¶ were created after the signing of the Helms-Burton law. Marketing and investment¶ agreements have been signed with forty countries. In the last five years¶ new economic relations, especially with Venezuela and China, have raised higher¶ the prospects for the recovery of the Cuban economy in the coming years to a¶ point of prosperity that Cuba enjoyed in the mid-1980s. It has been elected or¶ appointed to twenty governing bodies of the United Nations, and currently has¶ 118 diplomatic, consular, or interest offices abroad, ninety-eight of them are¶ embassies, the highest number in the history of Cuba. 14 Furthermore, Cuba has¶ commercial relations with 1700 companies from 150 nations, hosts seventy-nine¶ nine embassies representing countries from all continents, and has accredited¶ 138 foreign correspondents from 104 media organizations and thirty-one countries,¶ compared with ninety-three correspondents from sixty-two media organizations¶ a decade ago. Faced with this reality, it is not proper to speak of Cuba's¶ isolation, it is more accurate to speak of the growing international opposition to¶ U.S. policy, particularly the blockade against Cuba.

### Regime Alt Cause

#### Cuba economy is the alt cause to foreign investors

Spadoni 2010 [Paolo Spadoni 2010 assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Augusta State Failed sanctions why the US sanctions against cuba could never work page 72-73]

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In summary, the flow of foreign direct investment into Cuba is greatly¶ inhibited by the island's rigorous evaluation procedures, its increasing¶ selectiveness toward FDI projects, and its heavily regulated business environment.¶ Although Cuban authorities have continued to encourage¶ foreign companies to discuss the formation of joint ventures (and important¶ agreements were recently signed with Venezuelan firms and a few¶ other ones), many potential investors either withdraw during the process¶ of negotiations because the terms offered by the Cuban partner are not¶ sufficiently attractive or opt for lower levels of cooperation (EIU 2004).¶ Overall, it can be expected that some major investors will continue to¶ expand their operations in Cuba and receive substantial concessions from¶ the Castro government given the latter's preference for well-established¶ businesses and partners and for projects involving large amounts of foreign¶ capital. It is also evident that Cuba wants to stimulate foreign investment¶ without transgressing the limits beyond which the control of the¶ fundamental wealth of the nation might be jeopardized (Perez Villanueva¶ 2004, 194). However, apart from projects with Venezuela, a significant¶ long-term upward trend in the flow of FDI from European, Canadian,¶ and other firms will occur only if Cuba promotes a gradual decentralization¶ of its state-dominated economy by introducing profound internal¶ reforms and taking steps to relax existing regulations on the activities of¶ joint ventures and state enterprises.

### Remittances Solve

#### Cuban economy high now – cash remittances prove

Chavez 13 (Juan, “Remittances from Cubans abroad drive the island’s economy”, The Miami Herald, June 12 2013, <http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/06/12/3448098/remittances-from-cubans-abroad.html>)//CB

Cash remittances to Cuba in 2012 surpassed all revenue coming from the main components of the Cuban economy while becoming the largest element of support to the retail market, according to a study by a Miami-based analysis group. The study, titled “Remittances to Cuba: the Most Powerful Engine of the Cuban Economy,” was done by The Havana Consulting Group. It concludes that in 2012, remittances reached $2.605 billion. The number represents an increase of more than 13 percent compared to the previous year of nearly $2.3 billion. “Today remittances to the island reach 62 percent of Cuban homes, support close to 90 percent of the retail market and allow employment of tens of thousands of people,” the study says. The remarkable upward trend has also been a common denominator in goods (electrical appliances, clothes and consumer items, among others) that Cubans abroad ship to relatives or friends in Cuba. This category amounted to $2.5 billion in 2012, according to the study. Both categories (money and goods) together surpassed $5.105 billion.¶ “The remittances have left behind the powerful sugar industry ($391 million) — which by 1993 had entered its biggest crisis and it is still in decline — they surpass tourism ($2.613 billion) in volume and performance, provide more revenue than nickel exports ($1.413 billion) and the pharmaceuticals produced by the Cuban biotechnological industry ($500 million),” the study says. “And this without subtracting costs in each category, which would make the difference significantly larger.” The injection of remittances has been a powerful pillar for the country’s economy, which has been practically stagnant and with high levels of unemployment. But it’s role has now been strengthened because of the deteriorating economy, according to experts familiar with the issue.

## Human Rights

### Lifting Fails

#### Lifting embargo empowers Castro, causes HR violations

**López 12** (Juan J. Lopez, Ph.D. Director of Research @ Research Office (College of Arts & Sciences) at Florida International University) Implication of the US Economic embargo for a Political Transition in Cuba. Endowment for Cuban American Studies of the Cuban American National Foundation, 1998. (<http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume7/pdfs/Lopez.pdf>) (HT)

An alternative to maintaining the embargo is to lift it. It is an illusion to believe that ending the embargo will lead to greater respect for human rights in Cuba or encourage a negotiated political transition under the Castro regime. The failure of normal international relations between Cuba and countries in Latin America and Western Europe to achieve political liberalization or respect for human rights supports this conclusion. The foremost goal of the ruling elite is to perpetuate itself in power. The strategy of the dictatorship apparently is to obtain enough foreign exchange from its international transactions to muddle through while refusing to allow political liberalization. The Castro government is not willing to pay the price of respect for human rights for better international economic relations. Lifting the embargo would not mean that the Castro government would allow significant market-oriented economic reforms nor that there would be a dramatic improvement in economic performance. The Cuban government has refused to move beyond quite limited market reforms while engaging in economic relations with countries other than the United States. Yet lifting the embargo would help the Castro regime to survive. Besides handling a political victory to the Cuban government, the end of the embargo would increase the financial resources available to the regime with which to ease the pressures it confronts arising from Cuba’s economic situation. The end of the embargo would make a political transition less likely. The likelihood that Fidel would die of natural causes while in office would be greater. The current regime could last for an additional decade. Under the best outcome in this scenario, after Fidel dies a different type of regime could emerge in which a negotiated transition becomes possible. But the emergence of such a regime is not assured after the death of Fidel. It is possible that his younger brother, Raúl, the second in command in Cuba, could be able to maintain the current regime. In any event, anyone willing to bet on helping the Castro regime survive for the sake of a possible negotiated transition at some point in the distant future must not lose sight of the fact that people in Cuba have been living in hell for a long time.

### Backlash

#### Lifting the embargo destroys human rights – Collapse of the health system and workforce

Garrett 2012 (LAURIE GARRETT is Senior Fellow for Global Health at the Council on Foreign Relations,“Castrocare in Crisis Will Lifting the Embargo Make Things Worse?” August 2010 http://terpconnect.umd.edu/~kmcm/Articles/Castrocare%20in%20Crisis.pdf)

According to Steven Ullmann of the University of Miami's Cuba Transition Project, if Washington lifts its embargo,¶ Cuba can expect a mass exodus of health-care workers and then the creation of a domestic health system with two¶ tiers, one private and one public. The system's lower, public tier would be at risk of complete collapse. Ullmann¶ therefore suggests "fostering this [public] system through partnerships and enhanced compensation of personnel." He¶ also argues that officials in both governments should "limit out-migration of scientific brainpower from the country."¶ Properly handled, the transition could leave Cuba with a mixed health-care economy -- part public, part locally owned¶ and private, and part outsourced and private -- that could compensate Cuban physicians, nurses, and other health-care¶ workers enough to keep them in the country and working at least part time in the public sector.

The only U.S. policy currently in place, however, encourages Cuban physicians to immigrate to the United States. In¶ 2006, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security created a special parole program under which health-care workers¶ who defect from Cuba are granted legal residence in the United States while they prepare for U.S. medical licensing¶ examinations. An estimated 2,000 physicians have taken advantage of the program. Although few have managed to gain¶ accreditation as U.S. doctors, largely due to their poor English-language skills and the stark differences between¶ Cuban and U.S. medical training, many now work as nurses in Florida hospitals.

The Castro government, meanwhile, is in a seemingly untenable position. The two greatest¶ achievements of the Cuban Revolution -- 100 percent literacy and quality universal health care -- depend on huge¶ streams of government spending. If Washington does eventually start to normalize relations, plugging just a few holes¶ in the embargo wall would require vast additional spending by the Cuban government. The government would have to¶ pay higher salaries to teachers, doctors, nurses, and technicians; strengthen the country's deteriorating infrastructure;¶ and improve working conditions for common workers. To bolster its health-care infrastructure and create incentives¶ for Cuban doctors to stay in the system, Cuba will have to find external support from donors, such as the United¶ Nations and the U.S. Agency for International Development. But few¶ sources will support Havana with funding as long as the regime restricts the travel of its citizens.

In the long run, Cuba will need to develop a taxable economic base to generate government revenues -- which would¶ mean inviting foreign investment and generating serious employment opportunities. The onus is on the Castro¶ government to demonstrate how the regime could adapt to the easing or lifting of the U.S. embargo. Certainly, Cuban¶ leaders already know that their health triumphs would be at risk.

### Embargo Good for HR

#### Economic sanctions boost human rights – not the cause of violations

Baek 8 - J.S.D. candidate, Cornell Law School (Buhm Suk, “Economic Sanctions Against Human Rights Violations”, Cornell Law Library, April 14 2008, <http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1039&context=lps_clacp)//CB>

Undeniably, these economic sanctions have had some negative effects on the targeted states. In numerous reports and articles, scholars and human rights advocates have constantly argued that economic sanctions hurt large numbers of innocent civilians in the targeted states not only by limiting the availability of food and medicine, but also by disrupting the whole economy, depriving civilians of essential income, and reducing the national capacity for water treatment, electrical systems and other infrastructure critical for health and life. The cases discussed, however, demonstrate that the sanctions forced the targeted states to accept international treaty obligations including human rights norms and modestly change their human rights policies. In most of the cases, the targeted state entered into a comprehensive agreement including the protection of human rights with the international community in order to have the sanctions ultimately lifted. What is more, economic sanctions cannot be the sole cause of civilian suffering in the targeted states. The targeted states should bear the heavy burden of responsibility for this suffering. It is undeniable that economic sanctions have inherent flaws. However, they should not be abolished because of these flaws and negative effects. The problem is not in the sanctions themselves, but in their effect. Therefore, the criticism on economic sanctions should focus on finding a way to decrease their negative effects, rather than arguing against the use of economic sanctions without providing a better alternative. In addition, in order to reduce the negative impact of broad economic sanctions on civilian populations in the targeted states, the Security Council, the U.S. and the E.U. have actively discussed a way of mitigating any negative humanitarian impact.

### Single Acts Fails

Single decisions in favor of Human Rights don’t change things – just part of a larger double-standard

#### HR double standards hurt soft power and future rights endeavors

Mertus 04 (Julie Mertus, Professor School of International Service @ American University) “Bait and Switch Human Rights and US Foreign Policy” 2004. P1-3 (<http://www.doc88.com/p-672121731835.html>) (HT)

The United States is in fact still leading the world on human rights, but in the wrong direction, promoting short-term instrumentalism over long-term ethical principles, double standards instead of fair dealing, and a fearful view of human nature over a more open one. An increasingly sophisticated array of nongovernmental organizations (NUOs) and other leaders in civil society continue to demand that human rights ideas be more fully incorporated into U.S. foreign policy. To some extent. these advocates have succeeded in framing public policy choices in human rights terms, but too often competing interests eclipse human rights considerations. Human rights talk has not been accompanied by human rights behaviors. This is not the book I set out to write. When I began this project in the fall of 2000, I intended to test the thesis that human rights norms had a significant impact on both the White House and the Pentagon because they had become "deeply embedded," or, if you prefer, "institutionalized." I thought I would find that human rights norms had, in Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink's words, "become so widely accepted that they [had been] internalized by actors and achieved a 'taken-for-granted' quality that [made] compliance...almost automatic." 3 I was particularly interested in analyzing how human rights norms shape the identity, interests, expectations, and behaviors of Americans who make, implement, and influence decisions concerning military intervention and other forms of American involvement across state borders. I had high hopes of finding human rights deeply embedded in - U.S. foreign policy. I discovered that human rights norms had shaped identities, but that human rights were not a taken-for-granted factor in shaping behavior. In particular, I discovered that the American public would tolerate and even participate in behavior running contrary to human rights tenets. The events following September 1l assured me of my failed thesis, but the interviews I conducted in and around Washington, D.C., long before then had already tipped me off that something is seriously awry with the way the United States "does" human rights. Policy makers may talk about human rights now more than ever, but the talk does not lead to consistent human rights abiding behaviors and decisions. The manner in which human rights have been understood and applied threatens to strip human rights ideas of their central content. While many of the government policy makers and military officers I interviewed for this book genuinely identified with being "on the side of human rights," their vision of human rights accommodated double standards: one for the United States, and another for the rest of the world. In other words, human rights are something the United States encourages for other countries, whereas the same international standards do not apply in the same manner in the United States. In the course of my research, I discovered that when I said "human rights" and when many of the governmental actors I was studying said "human rights," we were referring to two different things. I was referring to an understanding of human rights that, as explained below, incorporates three fundamental principles] the equality principle, the human dignity principle, and the moral worth principle. In contrast, the people and institutions that I was studying were most likely referring to a short list of American values, to be projected and applied to others in line with American national interests. By explicitly or implicitly understanding human rights as something done "out there" and to "other people," and in failing to apply human rights norms to the United States on equal terms, they were undercutting the core nature of human rights. Although the rhetoric on human rights has changed from presidential administration to administration, manifestations of American exceptionalism appear in every presidency. Harold Hongju Koh, assistant secretary of state for democracy, human rights, and labor during part of the Clinton administration 0998-2004 .stresses that some forms of American exceptionalism present little danger to the future of human rights, 4 For example, that the United States has a distinctive rights culture and often uses distinctive legal terminology is not troubling. Indeed, the distinctiveness of the United States may benefit human rights claimants. However, the use of a double standard may be devastating both for U.S. human rights foreign policy and for the future of human rights. Koh points to at least four problems with a double-standard approach to human rights: (1) the undercutting of U.S. ability to pursue an affirmative human rights agenda; (2) the cooptation of the United States into condoning or defending other countries' human rights abuses; (3) the weakening of the United States' claim to lead globally through moral authority; and (4) the undermining of the legitimacy of human rights norms.

#### Human rights is bait and switch – used for policy coercion

Mertus 04 (Julie Mertus, Professor School of International Service @ American University) “Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy” Foreign Policy in Focus” (Mar 4, 2004 issue) (<http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Human+rights+and+U.S.+foreign+policy.-a0118341370>) (HT)

In the aftermath of the failure to find Iraqi [weapons of mass destruction](http://www.thefreedictionary.com/weapons+of+mass+destruction), human rights have become the most prominent justification for the [Iraq War](http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Iraq+War) in statements by President George W. Bush and other administration officials. This represents the latest of what has become a routine pattern for numerous U.S. administrations: invoking human rights to justify a range of foreign policy decisions and military ventures. But this human rights talk has not been supported by a human rights walk. Policymakers consistently apply a double standard to human rights norms: one that the rest of the world must observe but which the U.S. can safely ignore. \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* Talk of human rights has become the political equivalent of a "[bait and switch](http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Bait+and+switch) tactic." Like the car salesman promoting an amazing but bogus deal in order to get people into his showroom and to boost his reputation as a preferred dealer, politicians champion human rights in order to induce desired behaviors in others and to nurture a positive self-image. Then, as soon as the desired behavior occurs, they offer a substitute sentiment unreflective of a genuine concern for rights. Instead of promoting just solutions to contemporary foreign policy dilemmas, rights talk is becoming just another way to dupe otherwise-unwilling allies into supporting U.S. interests. What's going wrong with rights? There is nothing wrong with human rights per se, but they are often opportunistically seized upon as the best available choice for framing arguments and making policy choices. Other options, which may not be intrinsically bad, look less appealing when compared to the pretty veneer of human rights. What is wrong is that human rights remains only an option and has not achieved the status of an imperative. Furthermore, in interplay with other policies, human rights are vulnerable to misuse by powerful states plying the cause for their own benefit. To extend the car dealer analogy, the car is a desired commodity promised by the dealer in an attractive package, but when the customer arrives, he or she finds that the option actually offered is not the same as the advertised special. The car dealer misleads people through his power of influence, stemming from the desired product he has to offer and from the magnified voice that his wealth affords him (i.e., his ability to advertise). Like the car dealer, the U.S. can use its wealth and influence to mislead other states about its commitment to a human rights framework, appearing to support universal human rights standards while actually applying double standards. Recognizing the ethical problems with "bait and switch" car dealers, [consumer protection laws](http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/consumer+protection+laws) seek to set advertising requirements that diminish the possibility for such behavior. Perhaps even more influential is the limit to the amount of nonsense and [trickery](http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/trickery) that the American consumer is willing to tolerate. What is needed with respect to human rights is a similar safety mechanism--a "consumer protection provision" regarding human rights and limits to what is socially acceptable--to eliminate or at least highly restrict the possibility that they will be trumped by lesser, competing norms. The misuse of human rights gets to the heart of international relations theories about how norms spread and gain influence. For a long time, the most popular theory of norm diffusion has been the [socialization](http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Socialization) and persuasion approach championed by such [international relations](http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/International+relations) thinkers as Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink. [According to](http://www.thefreedictionary.com/according+to) this school of thought, dialogue, communication, and argumentation are essential mechanisms for the socialization of norms. (1) Arguing for the inherent goodness of human rights may shame states into action in individual instances, and, as human rights norms are internalized, this process may provoke a shift in identity, interests, and expectations. The best advocates are those that make the most convincing or [skillful](http://www.thefreedictionary.com/skillful) argument in favor of one norm over another. One could point to significant evidence that human rights arguments are indeed powerful tools for framing policy issues and can influence behavior. After all, in recent years, regardless of administration, both the White House and Pentagon have repeatedly invoked human rights concerns as justifications for their actions. But in those cases where human rights advocates are successful, have they really persuaded anyone in a broad or transformative sense, or have they only managed to convince someone to apply their approach to a specific, isolated case? The socialization theory of norm diffusion has serious [shortcomings](http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Shortcomings). If we could get into President Bush's head when he speaks about human rights, what would we find? Given the instrumental and selective manner in which the Bush administration employs human rights, can we really point to a shift in the identity, interests, or expectations of anyone in the White House? Can we ever really tell if someone's sentiments have shifted? More importantly, does a sentiment shift matter if behavior does not change? Why is it that U.S. foreign policy, regardless of administration, continues to address in a selective and self-serving manner the violation of human rights by other countries while refusing to apply the same international standards to its own behavior? How do human rights influence U.S. foreign policy? To understand this problem, we need to consider a new theoretical model of norm diffusion. One current theory does not require explicit evidence of a philosophical shift but rather just enough "rhetorical coercion" to compel the endorsement of a normative stance. Under this model of norm diffusion, proposed by international relations upstarts [Patrick Jackson](http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Patrick+Jackson) and Ronald Krebs, claimants deploy arguments less in the naive hope of persuasion than in the realistic expectation that they can, through skillful framing, back their opponents into a "rhetorical corner." (2) The goal then is not to persuade but to coerce by limiting policy options.

### Impossible

#### Security concerns prevent realization of HR

**Lebovic & Voeten 06** (James H. Lebovic Professor of Political Science and International Affairs @ Columbian College of Arts and Sciences, Ph.D., University of Southern California, 1981)(Erik Voeten is the Peter F. Krogh assistant professor of geopolitics and global justice at the School of Foreign Service and the department of Government) LEBOVIC, J. H. and VOETEN, E. (2006), “The Politics of Shame: The Condemnation of Country Human Rights Practices in the UNCHR.” International Studies Quarterly, 50: 861–888. (<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00429.x/full>) (HT)

Human rights are at best a peripheral or indirect concern in realist treatments of international politics. For contemporary neorealists, security is a state's singularly important policy objective. Given the logic of the “security dilemma” by which no state is permanently secure and all states can procure security only at another's expense, states must marshal their resources to increase their capabilities and offset gains by competitors ([Waltz 1979](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00429.x/full#b51)). States cannot afford the cost of pursuing objectives that will little effect, or might deleteriously effect, the capability balance. Neither can they afford the distractions of unnecessary conflict, as would most likely result from interfering in the domestic affairs of another state. This stark realist contention offers a relatively visible and convenient target for testing: human rights records should not explain why countries voted as they did in the UNCHR or which countries were targeted or punished by the commission, regardless of time period. In this realist view, the narrow pursuit of security objectives is a timeless feature of international competition.

#### Their human rights advantage is all talk, politics corrupt

**Lebovic & Voeten 06** (James H. Lebovic Professor of Political Science and International Affairs @ Columbian College of Arts and Sciences, Ph.D., University of Southern California, 1981)(Erik Voeten is the Peter F. Krogh assistant professor of geopolitics and global justice at the School of Foreign Service and the department of Government) LEBOVIC, J. H. and VOETEN, E. (2006), “The Politics of Shame: The Condemnation of Country Human Rights Practices in the UNCHR.” International Studies Quarterly, 50: 861–888. (<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00429.x/full>) (HT)

An alternative argument, with complementary implications, can be derived from the assertions of some realists that the struggle for power and security in international politics is in part a contest for legitimacy through which national leaders can strengthen or weaken their domestic and international positions ([Walt 1987](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00429.x/full#b50):39). In their view, positive or negative decisions by political institutions such as the UNCHR are important because they can deny or build political support for a government's policies. These realists stress that the process of legitimation is not guided fundamentally by law, morality, or conscience. Instead, as [Claude (1966](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00429.x/full#b12):371) writes, “collective legitimation has developed, for better or worse, as essentially a political function, sought for political reasons, exercised by political organs through the operation of a political process, and productive of political results.”

The contest for legitimacy within institutions such as the UNCHR amounts to what [Krasner (1999)](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00429.x/full#b23) labels an “organized hypocrisy” in which states selectively observe global norms and subordinate them to the principles of power politics. Governments may talk the talk when it comes to human rights, but their intent is to inflict political damage on foreign adversaries, not to induce them to treat their citizens according to some universally accepted standard. This thesis receives considerable support from [Donnelly's (1988)](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00429.x/full#b13) finding that the UNCHR was strongly biased and regularly applied double standards in its evaluation of states (although Donnelly notes that bias declined significantly in the 1980s). It also fits the popular assertion that the UNCHR was in the business of “selling morality” ([Loconte 2004](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00429.x/full#b28)).

If organized hypocrisy best characterizes the behavior of the UNCHR, we expect that governments used the UNCHR for strategic reasons: they attacked rivals and assisted allies—whatever their actual rights records—so as to serve broader, political strategies. Given that the United States held countries accountable publicly for their rights practices, and that these countries reciprocated by holding the United States and its allies accountable for their rights practices, we expect that US alignment (right-wing governance and UN alignment, more generally) will feature heavily in shaming efforts, then, as countries target and punish these countries whatever their actual levels of abuse. Of note is that the UN was frequently criticized during the Cold War for singling out pro-Western and right-wing governments while ignoring the excesses committed by left-leaning regimes (e.g., [Franck 1985; Donnelly 1988](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00429.x/full#b15)) and that conflict in the UN continues to be dominated by clashes between the United States and its ideological adversaries ([Voeten 2000](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00429.x/full#b49)).

Given the underlying logic, countries are not above using their rights records to political advantage against countries with poor records. In turn, rights abusers will do their part to sully those good records with charges of abuse to undercut the “moral advantage” of the accusers. In fact, traded accusations of abuse are part of a larger ideational contest if the literature on hegemonic stability is correct that strong states seek to pursue their policies within a facilitative ideological context.

#### HR cant be achieved through political action, double standards inevitable

**Lebovic & Voeten 06** (James H. Lebovic Professor of Political Science and International Affairs @ Columbian College of Arts and Sciences, Ph.D., University of Southern California, 1981)(Erik Voeten is the Peter F. Krogh assistant professor of geopolitics and global justice at the School of Foreign Service and the department of Government) LEBOVIC, J. H. and VOETEN, E. (2006), “The Politics of Shame: The Condemnation of Country Human Rights Practices in the UNCHR.” International Studies Quarterly, 50: 861–888. (<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00429.x/full>) (HT)

An expected consequence is that the actions and nonactions of the UNCHR prompted incessant calls for reforms. In an April 2005 speech to the Commission, UN Secretary General [Kofi Annan (2005)](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2006.00429.x/full#b2) argued the following:

[T]he Commission's ability to perform its tasks has been overtaken by new needs, and undermined by the politicization of its sessions and the selectivity of its work. We have reached a point at which the Commission's declining credibility has cast a shadow on the reputation of the United Nations system as a whole, and where piecemeal reforms will not be enough.

The Annan speech is a breathtaking indictment that draws implicitly from many of the theories that are familiar to international politics scholars. On the one hand, Annan embraces the realist contention that international organizations (IOs), like the UNCHR, have selectively enforced rules to support friends and punish adversaries.

Not all states are necessarily held to a common benchmark. The reputation argument can be taken to suggest that members of the UNCHR targeted states for bad reputations acquired in other areas of interest and, conversely, gave the benefit of the doubt to states with a generally good record of cooperation. To similar effect, the conformity argument can be interpreted to mean that states reserve severe sanctions for those who lie outside the community, that is, those that do not embrace the liberal norms and principles that define membership within the community. Indeed, the violation of any specific norm by nonmembers might only serve to reinforce their standing as “outsiders” and the dangers they pose to the community. If so, reputations and community standing could well be determined through active participation in the global community more than formal IO membership. For example, states that aid in the production of global public goods through participation in UN peacekeeping missions may be given some leeway in their domestic practices. Whatever its source, a state's general reputation or social standing as “good citizens” may be a basis of UNCHR action. This gives us the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2:The more a state participates in the global community, the less likely it is to be targeted and/or punished by the UNCHR.

### Not Absolute

#### Human Rights are not absolute – reasonable restrictions

Cooray 96 - For 38 years he studied and worked in Universities in Sri Lanka, England and Australia. He obtained a first class honours degree from the University of Ceylon in 1961. He chose the University of Cambridge where he obtained a degree of doctor of Philosophy in 1968. He later obtained a second doctors degree from the University of Colombo (Doctor Mark, “22.5 Human Rights Are Not Absolute”, 1996, <http://www.ourcivilisation.com/cooray/btof/chap225.htm>)//CB

Restrictions On Rights

In countries which have bills of rights there is a basic statement of freedoms subject to permitted abridgment of such freedoms. Freedoms are restricted in the public interest on grounds of national security, to preserve public order, to protect public health, to maintain moral standards, to secure due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others or to meet the just requirements of the general welfare of a democratic society. The United States Supreme Court has over the years qualified the rights in the constitution. Any statement of rights is not absolute and must of necessity be subject to limitations on the above lines. The right of free speech and expression does not extend to sedition, slander, defamation and obscenity. The principle of equality before the law cannot deny a legislature the power to classify persons for legislative purposes and to legislate affecting them, provided that the classification is not arbitrary and is based on a real and substantial distinction bearing a reasonable and just relation to the objects sought to be achieved. Thus the legislature could enact legislation regulating the activities of money lenders. This would amount to a singling out of money lenders and would be prima facie in conflict with the principle of equality before the law. But provided the classification is reasonable and there is a legitimate object to be achieved the legislation would nonetheless be valid. The above are instances of legitimate restrictions of rights. They are intended to illustrate that no right available to an individual or group is or can be absolute. This seems obvious but is often not appreciated.

The Clash Of Rights

The reality that human rights are not absolute, and are subject to reasonable restrictions, does not mean that the rights can be arbitrarily curtailed according to legislative or bureaucratic discretion. The manner in which restrictions are to be determined and imposed and the criteria which apply to the formulation of restrictions are crucial. If human rights are to be meaningful they cannot be subject to crude majoritarian dictates. What distinguishes a human right from any other right is that a human right is available to and enforceable by a minority, however small, even against the wishes of a majority. If human rights were to become subject to ordinary parliamentary control they would be no different from any other statutory right which parliament is free to confer and withdraw at its pleasure. The restriction of human rights is therefore a crucial and delicate question. They cannot be based on ideological perceptions of parliamentarians, bureaucrats or the Human Rights Commission but must be grounded on objectively ascertained and comprehended criteria.

#### Human Rights are not absolute – certain situations justify infringement

Gewirth 81 - was an American philosopher, a professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago, and author of Reason and Morality, (1978), Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Applications (1982), The Community of Rights (1996), Self-Fulfillment (1998), and numerous other writings in moral philosophy and political philosophy (Alan, “Are There Any Absolute Rights?”, The Philosophical Quarterly, January 1981, Vol. 31, No. 122, pp. 1-16, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/view/2218674>)//CB

It is a widely held opinion that there are no absolute rights. Consider what would be generally regarded as the most plausible candidate: the right to life. This right entails at least the negative duty to refrain from killing any human being. But it is contended that this duty may be overridden, that a person may be justifiably killed if this is the only way to prevent him from killing some other, innocent person, or if he is engaged in combat in the army of an unjust aggressor nation with which one's own country is at war. It is also maintained that even an innocent person may justifiably be killed if failure to do so will lead to the deaths of other such persons. Thus an innocent person's right to life is held to be overridden when a fat man stuck in the mouth of a cave prevents the exit of speleologists who will otherwise drown, or when a child or some other guiltless person is strapped onto the front of an aggressor's tank, or when an explorer's choice to kill one among a group of harmless natives about to be executed is the necessary and sufficient condition of the others' being spared, or when the driver of a runaway trolley can avoid killing five persons on one track only by killing one person on another track.' And topping all such tragic examples is the catastrophic situation where a nuclear war or some other unmitigated disaster can be avoided only by infringing some innocent person's right to life. Despite such cases, I shall argue that certain rights can be shown to be absolute. But first the concept of an absolute right must be clarified.

#### Only the rich get human rights

Kurz 03 (Robert Kurz is a prominent German critical theorist, cofounder of the journal *EXIT!*, founder of *Wertkritik* movement; citing Noam Chomsky, professor of linguistics @ MIT) “Paradoxes of human rights” March 2003 (<http://libcom.org/library/paradoxes-human-rights-robert-kurz>) (HT)

Promise as Threat

Once that systematic gap is opened between the pure existence of human beings and the “right to submit”, individuals are not, by nature, “men” in that sense, they can only become human beings thus defined, and subjects of rights, through a selective “process of recognition”. The selection process can be “objective” (in accordance with the laws of valorization and the market situation) or it can be effected “subjectively” (in accordance with ideological or political definitions of “friend” and “enemy”).

In accordance with this process, individuals’ real existence can be condemned, just as a commodity which is not recognized by the market is considered “superfluous”. And, when necessary, missiles, or, as the “last resort”, atomic bombs, will definitively terminate the “process of recognition”, towards the end of reducing those individuals no longer capable of being recognized to the category of physical matter.

For this reason, the promise of human rights has always been a threat: if you cannot fulfill the tacit conditions which define the modern “human being”, then you must go without recognition. For most people, however, these tacit conditions are currently no longer attainable, even should they force themselves into self-renunciation, which consists of respectfully submitting to the abstract form of money and the law. The termination of their existence, as an effect of “collateral damage” of the world market or of the interventions of the world policeman, is foreseeable.

This bitter assertion is not intended to bear witness against the motives of the many individuals and organizations that defend victims in the name of human rights and often demonstrate courage in the face of the ruling powers. But these efforts will be like the labors of Sisyphus if they do not manage to overcome the paradoxical and negative form of world society, which possesses the power of definition concerning who is, generally, a “human being”, and, consequently, defines human rights.

### War Turns HR

#### Conflict destroys Human Rights – they get abandoned – means our impact turns theirs.

**Watkin 04** (Kenneth Watkin, Colonel and Deputy Judge Advocate General/Operations, Canadian Forces, visiting fellow in the Human Rights Program, Harvard Law School) (“CONTROLLING THE USE OF FORCE: A ROLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS”, American Journal of International Law January, 2004) (<http://www.asil.org/ajil/watkin.pdf>) (HT)

The level of state control and intervention raises significant issues of privacy and the potential for abuse. The Reign of Terror launched by the generator of the levée en masse, the French National Assembly, introduced the term “terror” into the modern lexicon.87 It is no coincidence that efforts to control the power of the state and its impact on individual citizens spawned human rights norms. Human rights are generally “concerned with the organization of State power vis-à-vis the individual” and, as such, “found their natural expression in domestic constitutional law.”88 This focus on the individual in respect of power wielded by the state is fundamental to international human rights law. Within states the application of human rights norms reflects the challenges associated with maintaining order. Some human rights may be derogated from during “emergencies” to facilitate the maintenance of public order. While the exercise of such powers is controversial and by law strictly controlled, their existence demonstrates that internal threats to the security of the state can reach the level of interfering with governance.89 (For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 64, Art. 4, the European Convention for Human Rights, supra note 65, Art. 15, and the American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, Art. 27, 1144 UNTS 123, all provide for the suspension of certain rights in times of crisis like wars and emergencies) That derogations are not permitted with regard to the right to life is a strong statement of the fundamental importance of that right. At the same time, anyone interpreting the right to life must be prepared to deal with situations, such as emergencies, where a significant degree of violence is being threatened or used. As important as civilian police forces are to the maintenance of internal order, the policing of a state is not always a function of civil police alone. Some states employ security forces of a paramilitary nature or legally empower military forces to perform internal policing duties.90 In some cases modern terrorism has stimulated the substantial militarization of police forces. Thus, different states may use either police or military forces to perform the same function (i.e., rescuing hostages). This blurring of lines between police and military forces further highlights the possible heights to which violence can rise in internal conflict.

## Relations/Soft Power

### Cuba Doesn’t Want to be friends

#### Cuba does not want U.S. relations – low on their foreign policy agenda

Starr 13 - Dr. Pamela K. Starr is Director of the US-Mexico Network @ USC, an associate professor (NTT) in Public Diplomacy and the School of International Relations (Pamela, “As Cuba Changes, U.S. Policy Does Not”, Pacific Council on International Policy, May 2013, <https://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id=539>)//CB

This reading of the Cuban attitude toward the United States was reinforced by a recitation of the history of Cuban responses to U.S. attempts to reduce bilateral hostility provided by the Chief of the U.S. Mission in Cuba, John Caulfield. We were reminded that President Ford’s efforts to reduce tensions were greeted by Cuba’s decision to send troops to Angola. Carter’s efforts to normalize relations were greeted by the Mariel boatlift. Clinton’s were met by the shooting down of a Brothers to the Rescue plane. Finally, most recently, Obama efforts were greeted by the arrest and imprisonment of a USAID contractor on charges of espionage. Although Caulfield did not explicitly connect the dots, his meaning was clear: Alan Gross was likely arrested either to prevent any reduction in tensions between the two countries or because improving ties with the United States is simply not that important to Cuba. Whatever the reason for Alan Gross’ arrest, it is clear that Cuba is not preoccupied with encouraging the United States to end the embargo. Time and again we were told that economic reform is Cuba’s number one priority—the United States is not. The two countries do cooperate—on hurricane tracking, drug trafficking, migration, and preparing for potential gulf oil spills—but extending and improving bilateral cooperation is not high on the Cuban foreign policy agenda. Instead, Cuban foreign policy continues to emphasize efforts to maintain Cuban sovereignty and identity, which Ambassador Alzugaray noted have historically been most directly threatened by the United States. It is now charged with supporting the economic reform process by promoting foreign direct investment and the diversification of Cuban economic ties. In this context, the only potential role for the United States in the coming years that was mentioned by our Cuban hosts is the growing role of Cuban-American investment in Cuba.

### Policy Changes don’t fix

#### Latin America doesn’t like U.S. politics – bitter resistance and dissatisfaction

Kinzer 6/25/13 - Stephen Kinzer is a former New York Times reporter and the author of Overthrow: America's Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq (2006) and Reset Middle East: Old Friends and New Alliances: Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey, Iran (2011) (Stephen, “Latin America is ready to defy the US over Snowden and other issues”, The Guardian, June 25 2013, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/jun/25/edward-snowden-ecuador-defy-united-states>)//CB

During the 1990s the United States sought to impose the "Washington Consensus" on Latin American governments. It embodied what Latin Americans call "neo-liberal" principles: budget cuts, privatization, deregulation of business, and incentives for foreign companies. This campaign sparked bitter resistance and ultimately collapsed.

In spite of these military, political, and economic assaults – or perhaps because of them – much of Latin America has become profoundly dissatisfied with the made-in-USA model. Some of the continent's most popular leaders rose to power by denouncing the "Washington Consensus" and pledging to pull their countries out of the United States orbit.

Because President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela was the most flamboyant of these defiant leaders, some outsiders may have expected that following his death, the region would return to its traditional state of submission. In fact, not just a handful of leaders but huge populations in Latin America have decided that they wish for more independence from Washington.

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### US foreign policy Unpopular

#### U.S. foreign policy unpopular – seen as imperialistic

Zakaria 9 - Zakaria was the managing editor of Foreign Affairs, the widely circulated journal of international politics and economics. He is the author of several books, including "The Future of Freedom," which was a New York Times bestseller (Fareed, “Why Washington Worries”, The Daily Beast, March 13 2009, <http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/03/13/why-washington-worries.html>)//CB

These are initial, small steps but all in the right direction— deserving of praise, one might think. But no, the Washington establishment is mostly fretting, dismayed in one way or another by most of these moves. The conservative backlash has been almost comical in its fury. Two weeks into Obama's term, Charles Krauthammer lumped together a bunch of Russian declarations and actions—many of them long in the making—and decided that they were all "brazen provocations" that Obama had failed to counter. Obama's "supine diplomacy," Krauthammer thundered, was setting off a chain of catastrophes across the globe. The Pakistani government, for example, had obviously sensed weakness in Washington and "capitulated to the Taliban" in the Swat Valley. Somehow Krauthammer missed the many deals that Pakistan struck over the last three years—during Bush's reign—with the Taliban, deals that were more hastily put together, on worse terms, with poorer results.

Many normally intelligent commentators have joined in the worrying. Leslie Gelb, the author of a smart and lively new book, "Power Rules," says that Hillary's comments about China's human-rights record were correct, but shouldn't have been said publicly. Peter Bergen of CNN says that "doing deals with the Taliban today could further destabilize Afghanistan." "It's change for change's sake," Gelb writes ruefully. Ah, if we just kept in place all those Bush-era policies that were working so well.

Consider the gambit with Russia. The Washington establishment is united in the view that Iran's nuclear program poses the greatest challenge for the new administration. Many were skeptical that Obama would take the problem seriously. But he has done so, maintaining the push for more effective sanctions, seeing if there is anything to be gained by talking to the Iranians, and starting conversations with the Russians. The only outside power that has any significant leverage over Tehran is Russia, which is building Iran's nuclear reactor and supplying it with uranium. Exploring whether Moscow might press the Iranians would be useful, right?

Wrong. The Washington Post reacted by worrying that Obama might be capitulating to Russian power. His sin was to point out in a letter to the Russian president that were Moscow to help in blunting the threat of missile attacks from Tehran, the United States would not feel as pressed to position missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic—since those defenses were meant to protect against Iranian missiles. This is elementary logic. It also strikes me as a very good trade since right now the technology for an effective missile shield against Iran is, in the words of one expert cited by the Financial Times's Gideon Rachman: "a system that won't work, against a threat that doesn't exist, paid for with money that we don't have."

The problem with American foreign policy goes beyond George Bush. It includes a Washington establishment that has gotten comfortable with the exercise of American hegemony and treats compromise as treason and negotiations as appeasement. Other countries can have no legitimate interests of their own—Russian demands are by definition unacceptable. The only way to deal with countries is by issuing a series of maximalist demands. This is not foreign policy; it's imperial policy. And it isn't likely to work in today's world.

### Alt Causes to Anti-Americanism

#### Alt causes to solving anti- Americanism- neoliberalism, politics, immigration, Iraq, US regional dominance

Lance 2007 (Justin Lance Instructor in the Department of Political Science at the Ohio State UniversityB.A. from Bethany College and a M.A. from the Ohio State Universityonducted field research in Brazil with funding from the Tinker Foundation and has received a FLAS grant to study Yoruba.) (“Populism and Anti-Americanism in Modern Latin America” Origins vol. 1, issue 1 - October 2007 <http://origins.osu.edu/article/populism-and-anti-americanism-modern-latin-america> //BLOV)

Proximate Sources of Anti-Americanism and Populism Today

While military interventions, economic exploitation, and covert U.S. political and economic support for brutal military regimes provide the historical foundations for anti-Americanism and populism, a confluence of more recent events explains why the resurgence has happened now. We can point to five which have fueled the rise of anti-American populism:

1) The failure of neoliberal economic reform to benefit large sectors of these societies and worsening economic inequality

2) Weak, corrupt political institutions

3) U.S. immigration policy, especially toward Mexico and Central America

4) U.S.-led intervention of Iraq in 2003

5) The continuing hegemonic position of the United States in relation to the region culturally, economically, and politically

These conditions have led a larger number of people, particularly poor voters who feel disenfranchised by the current political system, to begin supporting politicians such as Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, and Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico. These politicians often used populist political strategies when campaigning, and routinely critiqued U.S. supported economic policies, immigration policy, and U.S. unilateralism when campaigning.

The first condition has been a proximate cause for both anti-Americanism and populist politicians who promise economic redistribution of wealth. Neoliberalism has often been perceived as one of the causes for increasing economic inequality in the region. Latin America generally has one of the most lopsided wealth distributions in the world. The richest 10% of the population earns 47% of the income in the region, while the poorest 10% accounts for just 2-4% of the income, making Latin America vastly more unequal than the developed nations, eastern Europe, most of Asia, and even parts of Africa.3

Politicians have been able to capitalize on this economic divide by promising to rapidly redistribute wealth to the poor. This has thus been a primary source of anti-Americanism because the U.S. strongly supported these neoliberal economic reforms that many feel has failed to remedy long-term economic problems.

The second condition is related to the ability of populists to win political office. Weak and ineffective political institutions, in particular political parties, give populist politicians the chance to effectively win office in Latin America. While populists exist elsewhere (in the U.S. Ross Perot and Ralph Nader could be considered populist politicians), the possibility for winning office is greatly diminished by the political institutions of these countries. The U.S. system, in particular, has a number of laws that prevent new parties from winning elections.

In Latin America, however, corrupt parties and weak political structures that make populist parties and politicians viable candidates, gives populists the opportunity not only to compete in elections, but also the ability to win them. Many of the poor feel slighted by the traditional ruling elites, who are often accused of corruption and nepotism.

Populists, distancing themselves from the traditional ruling elite, have been able to capture a large number of poor voters who feel disenfranchised by the other political parties. What concerns most scholars and policymakers is the anti-system approach taken by many populists.

The third, fourth and fifth conditions also help to account for a rise in anti-Americanism in the region. The third condition is a prominent reason for anti-Americanism in Mexico and Central America, which have higher emigration rates to the U.S. in comparison to countries in South America. The increasing salience of immigration policy in the U.S. – as well as the perception that immigrants from Latin America are illegal and treated as second class citizens (or non-citizens altogether) in the U.S. – has led many citizens in countries with high emigration rates to be concerned (and critical) about U.S. immigration policies.

The fourth condition has led to decreasing support for U.S. foreign policy, especially in South American countries. As Table 1 demonstrates, recent survey research suggests that perceptions of the United States have declined since the start of the Iraq War. These attitudes can be attributed to increasing concern about the U.S. policy to "go it alone" in Iraq and its unwillingness to consult allies during times of turmoil. Latin Americans also perceive (and, often rightly so) that their region has declined in importance to U.S. foreign policy in the post-9/11 world. Traditionally the most important region for the United States abroad, Latin America has seen a steady decline in importance in a world in which terrorism takes center-stage.

It should be noted, however, that anti-American hostility is directed largely at the U.S. government – not toward U.S. citizens more generally. As Tables 2 and 3 show, many hold an unfavorable opinion of President Bush at both the elite and mass level. But many Latin Americans across the region also hold a similarly unfavorable opinion of Hugo Chávez, the most anti-American populist in region.

Importantly, survey research on the final condition disaggregates opinions on anti-Americanism between elites and the masses. In fact, many citizens draw a distinction between the U.S. government and American culture. As Table 4 shows, many in the region admire aspects of American culture but are still concerned about their spread. Interestingly, the country most supportive of U.S. culture is also the country with the most anti-American populist in power (Venezuela). Other countries, such as Argentina, are considerably more skeptical of U.S. cultural influence.

### LAC don’t want to Cooperate

#### Latin America doesn’t want U.S. – looking to Russia to avoid U.S. blackmail

Prensa Latina 6/30/13 - A team of editors, writers, reporters, photographers, as well as correspondents and stringers worldwide contribute to PL news services, supported by highly qualified technicians and engineers who make possible that PL messages on the most diverse issues reach the world (“Bolivia Seeks Russian Technology and Cooperation”, Prensa Latina, June 30 2013, <http://www.plenglish.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1563361&Itemid=1>)//CB

La Paz, June 30 (Prensa Latina) Bolivian President Evo Morales will meet his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, on Monday, with the intention to getting technology and cooperation for his country and Latin America, highlights today the national press.

Morales, who will attend the Gas Exporting Countries Forum in Russia, stated before leaving to Nicaragua to attend a Petrocaribe meeting that the Russian leader proposed him a bilateral encounter to converse of different topics.

Morales will make use of the occasion to request Russia to prioritize the region as for technology and cooperation, with the expressed objective to avoiding any blackmail from the United States.

"I wish Russia returns to Latin America with its technology to thwart any blackmail or imposition by the US government. Our great desire is that Russia is present in Latin America and the Caribbean with all its cooperation, investment, especially with its technology," he said.

### Advantage CP – Science Panels

#### Solvency advocate- may be better because bottom says it lays foundation for relations

Boom 12 (Brian M. Boom is the director of the Caribbean Biodiversity Program and Bassett Maguire Curator of Botany at the New York Botanical Garden.) (SCIENCE & DIPLOMACY is published by the Center for Science Diplomacy of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), the world’s largest general scientific society.) (“Biodiversity without Borders: Advancing U.S.-Cuba Cooperation through Environmental Research”, Science & Diplomacy

, Vol. 1, No. 3 September 2012, )http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/article/2012/biodiversity-without-borders. //BLOV)

Enhancements to Environmental Cooperation

Nature knows no boundaries, and given the number and scale of environmental problems shared by Cuba and the United States, combined with the multitude of impediments to finding joint solutions to these problems, the best way to enhance environmental cooperation between the two countries would be through the establishment of a bilateral agreement on this theme.

The ecological stakes are too high for Cuba and the United States to rely on anything short of a government-to-government accord to formalize, catalyze, and facilitate cooperation on environmental problems of mutual concern. Various models for such an agreement exist: the United States has joint statements on environmental cooperation with Spain and Italy, an agreement on air quality with Canada, and a memorandum of understanding on environmental protection with India, among others.

Such a bilateral agreement could logically take advantage of the collective experiences of the U.S.-based environmental NGO community in conducting collaborative initiatives with Cuban counterparts over many years and, in some cases, decades. The focus of such a bilateral agreement should be on helping to facilitate the activities by NGOs that are currently underway and encouraging new initiatives by NGOs in consultation with and the approval of Cuban authorities. The elements of such an agreement should take into account the difficulties mentioned above and the following considerations:

• Project Approvals: Before cooperative projects can begin, one or more Cuban agencies need to approve. It would be ideal to have this process more clearly defined and streamlined to minimize delays in getting approvals.

• Visas: Research visas for representatives of NGOs conducting approved projects should be expedited and ideally approved for multiple entries into Cuba, perhaps renewable annually for the duration of the project.

• Permits: Permits for all the components of projects (e.g., to collect specimens, to enter and collect or monitor in protected areas, to import research equipment, to export biological specimens, etc.) should be expedited for approved projects.

• Licenses: The processes for obtaining the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s OFAC specific licenses and the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security licenses should be streamlined and more transparent.

Cuba’s Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (MINREX) might logically take the lead on such a bilateral agreement. Any of several U.S. government entities could logically take the lead, such as the Department of State, NOAA, the Fish and Wildlife Service, or the Environmental Protection Agency. At the same time, efforts should continue unabated to promote the revision of U.S. government policies that currently impede greater bilateral environmental cooperation between the two countries.

Cuba and the United States have the potential to work around their differences to respond to the threats to their shared biodiversity. And no matter what the trajectory of future official relations between the two countries, initial mutually beneficial steps concerning the environment can provide an important opportunity to address real shared problems while also building links and trust between the two societies that can provide some bedrock for future relations. SD

#### Demanding Scientific joint exercies

Boom 12 (Brian M. Boom is the director of the Caribbean Biodiversity Program and Bassett Maguire Curator of Botany at the New York Botanical Garden.) (SCIENCE & DIPLOMACY is published by the Center for Science Diplomacy of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), the world’s largest general scientific society.) (“Biodiversity without Borders: Advancing U.S.-Cuba Cooperation through Environmental Research”, Science & Diplomacy, , Vol. 1, No. 3 September 2012, )http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/article/2012/biodiversity-without-borders. //BLOV)

Current Situation of Environmental Cooperation

Both Cuban and U.S. environmental scientists are aware of the shared urgent and emerging environmental challenges outlined in the previous sections. However, many scientists on both sides of the Florida Straits remain frustrated that more cannot be done to identify, study, and solve these challenges in a collaborative fashion. On the other hand, there is increasingly a palpable sense among environmental scientists in both Cuba and the United States that the opportunities for bilateral collaboration are poised to expand. This was underscored by an April 2009 panel discussion on U.S.-Cuba relations concerning marine and coastal resources conservation hosted by the Brookings Institution and the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF). Among many notable elements of that event was the participation of U.S. government representatives (NOAA and the Department of State), which was a real breakthrough in expanding this discussion in the United States beyond the NGO community.

A few months before the Brookings/EDF gathering, the American Council of Learned Societies/Social Science Research Council Working Group on Cuba and the Christopher Reynolds Foundation sponsored a two-day workshop. “Workshop on the Future of Environmental Collaboration between the United States and Cuba,” held in November 2008 in New York City, helped identify and define the issues that led to the Brookings/EDF event and to a number of others. This workshop was attended by thirty-two representatives of environmental NGOs and private philanthropic foundations. One of the outputs was a letter, dated December 11, 2008, which was signed by twelve CEOs of environmental NGOs, addressed to then President-elect Barack Obama urging him to “take action to increase scientific exchange and collaboration between the United States and Cuba.” The letter specifically suggested

• issuing U.S. visas to Cuban scientists and conservation professionals;

• directing the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to grant licenses to U.S. scientists and conservation professionals planning to collaborate with their Cuban colleagues;

• giving OFAC licenses to U.S. entities to enable Cuban scientists and conservation professionals to travel to third countries when U.S. funds are used;

• directing federal agencies, such as NOAA, to encourage more collaboration between U.S. and Cuban scientists and academic and conservation professionals; and

• amending OFAC regulations that govern educational exchanges between the United States and Cuba to allow more flexibility.

#### Environmental agreement solve biodiversity- diplomatic approach

Boom 12 (Brian M. Boom is the director of the Caribbean Biodiversity Program and Bassett Maguire Curator of Botany at the New York Botanical Garden.) (SCIENCE & DIPLOMACY is published by the Center for Science Diplomacy of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), the world’s largest general scientific society.) (“Biodiversity without Borders: Advancing U.S.-Cuba Cooperation through Environmental Research”, Science & Diplomacy

, Vol. 1, No. 3 September 2012, )http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/article/2012/biodiversity-without-borders. //BLOV)

THE ever-increasing challenges to the biodiversity shared by Cuba and the United States provide the opportunity and the need for the two nations to take an enhanced collaborative, bilateral approach to addressing shared issues. Cuba lies a mere ninety miles south of the U.S. state of Florida, and the two countries’ territorial waters meet in the Gulf of Mexico and the Straits of Florida. Cuba and the United States thus share much biodiversity—ranging from varied populations of organisms to diverse aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems. Native species migrate, exotic species invade, disease-causing species disperse, and rare species go extinct in the face of growing habitat modification. The living components of this shared environment are dynamically impacted, sometimes unpredictably so, by natural or man-made environmental disasters. Nature does not respect political boundaries nor do such potential disasters as oil spills, toxic releases, hurricanes, and tropical storms. Such events provide the sine qua non for greater bilateral cooperation.

Governments around the world routinely collaborate on shared environmental concerns bilaterally or multilaterally, depending on the situation being addressed. Environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) from local to international levels often work in partnership with governments to solve environmental problems that extend beyond national boundaries. Such public/private arrangements workwell in most circumstances, and there are many effective mechanisms in place to deal with challenges ranging from endangered species and ecosystems to oil and toxic waste spills.

However, a lack of formal diplomatic relations can limit desirable cooperation on shared environmental issues. The U.S. embargo on trade with Cuba— which was instituted in 1961 by the Kennedy administration in response to Cuba’s nationalization of U.S. businesses’ properties in Cuba during the Cuban Revolution—and subsequent regulations have thwarted the efforts of Cuban and U.S. scientists to collaborate on environmental or other professional and academic matters.1 There is essentially no intergovernmental environmental interaction between the United States and Cuba. The shared biodiversity of these countries, and in some cases that of other nations in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico regions, suffers as a result.

Fortunately, some NGOs in the United States have had success over the years in working collaboratively with their Cuban counterparts on shared environmental issues. The experiences of such NGOs can inform a way forward in structuring an enhanced mechanism for bilateral cooperation. Also fortunately, on January 14, 2011, the Obama administration announced new rules that ease some restrictions on U.S. citizens’ travel and remittances to Cuba, which will collaterally encourage more bilateral environmental collaboration as well. While these steps have created some space, given the political realities, a targeted environmental agreement is required to facilitate further mutually beneficial study, monitoring, and protection of shared biodiversity.

## Telecomm

### Solvency Take Out

#### Regime will prevent telecommunications access – see it as the US’s ‘Trojan Horse’

**Henken ’10** (Ted Henken, Doctorate in Latin American Studies from Tulane University. He is an Associate Professor and Chair of the Black and Hispanic Studies Department at Baruch College, City University of New York. Henken also holds a joint appointment in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology.“THE INTERNET AND EMERGENT BLOGOSPHERE IN CUBA:

DOWNLOADING DEMOCRACY, BOOTING UP DEVELOPMENT,

OR PLANTING THE VIRUS OF DISSIDENCE AND

DESTABILIZATION?”,<http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume20/pdfs/henken.pdf>) (JN)

Meanwhile, governments around the world have become wary of the security risks posed by increased and nearly universal connectivity with financial, military, and other secrets potentially exposed to malicious hackers often working at the service of their

foreign adversaries. For them, the same web that could be embraced to boot up development, should also be feared as a potential “Trojan horse” where its enemies, real or perceived, can unleash the “virus” of dissidence and destabilization.

The case of Cuba clearly illustrates each of these potentialities. For example, the Cuban government has recently expanded cell phone access (wireless accounts surged from just 200,000 in 2008 to more than 800,000 by early 2010) and drastically reduced

prices (activation fees have been cut from $150 to $25) even if the regime is aware that its critics see such phones as a potentially destabilizing medium that could provide Cuban citizens with access to unfiltered information. “We’re going to keep working to provide the benefits of telecommunications to a greater number of Cubans,” declared Cuban telecom

official Máximo Lafuente recently. “There’s no doubt that cell phones are an important foundation

to the country’s development.” However, when the U.S. exempted American wireless companies from sections of the embargo in mid-2009, the move was justified as a different kind of “development.” Increased communications with Cuba is “our best tool for helping to foster the beginnings of grassroots democracy on the island,” argued an Obama administration official at the time (Miroff 2010).

Nelson Valdés, a scholar sympathetic to the revolution who has published extensively on Cuban Internet connectivity and who assisted Cuba in its initial

attempts to develop its own Intranet in the 1990s, has argued that as long as the U.S. government continues to see the Internet in Cuba as its “Trojan horse,” the Cuban government will understandably prioritize security and control over connectivity and access—especially if that access comes via the U.S.

#### Internet restrictions by the Cuban government are a defensive maneuver to counter the embargo

**Miroff ’12** (Nick Miroff, staff writer at The Washington Post, an NPR contributor and a senior correspondent for GlobalPost, “How the US keeps Cubans Offline”, <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/cuba/120627/us-embargo-google-analytics-cuban-internet-access>) (JN)

Some US products, such as the iPad, [don’t even include Cuba](http://alongthemalecon.blogspot.com/2012/06/ipads-country-of-origin-list-skips-cuba.html) as one of the countries for first-time users to register.

If the software sanctions are meant to punish the Cuban government and its one-party socialist state, it’s not clear that they achieve anything more than making cyber orphans of ordinary Cubans.

If anything, the US restrictions seem to play into arguments made by Cuban government hardliners who seem eager to bypass the internet and create a closed, Orwellian copy, free from outside contamination.

In recent years, the Cuban government has launched its own version of Wikipedia, called[EcuRed](http://www.ecured.cu/index.php/EcuRed:Enciclopedia_cubana), sanitized of any politically incorrect content.

There’s also a Cuban copy of Facebook, Redsocial, whose social network doesn’t extend beyond the island, keeping users cut off from the rest of the world. (“Red” is the Spanish word for network.)

Both form part of the expanding Cuban “intranet,” a parallel self-contained universe that island residents can log onto through computer centers called “Youth Clubs” that work like internet cafes, without the internet or the cafe.

It’s partly a defensive maneuver, driven by US attempts to make the internet the new battlefield in the 50-year-old fight against the Castro government. And the more US democracy-promotion programs seem aimed at sparking a “Cuban Spring” on the island, the more Cuban officialdom seems to view the internet with trepidation.

### Terror List Prevents

#### Terrorism Risk Insurance Act prevents telecommunications – elephant in the room

**Martinez 10** (Tony Martinez, “United States Cuba Relations - U.S. Cuba Telecom? - The Elephant in the Room Still”, <http://www.uscubapolitics.com/2010/01/united-states-cuba-relations-us-cuba.html>) (JN)

While this is a positive step and intends to improve the environment hypothetically to do business, it is still actually toxic for U.S. businesses. The notice misses the elephant in the room– As long as Cuba cannot get paid normally and without fear of seizure of its assets or payments owed to it in the U.S., they will not do any telecom business with us. The only way to make that happen is to take Cuba off the terror list so the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act no longer hinders business dealings and shuts down the Cuba lawsuit cottage industry. This is blocking more normal business and fair prices. Right now, millions in telecom and internet revenue are being lost and Americans and Cubans who want to have normal conversations and internet access with each other are being hindered.

## Trade

### Waived Helms-Burton

#### Helms-Burton waiver key to national interests and Cuban economy

Pecquet 13 (Julian, “Obama waives Helms-Burton sanctions against Cuba”, The Hill, January 16 2013, <http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/americas/277573-obama-waives-helms-burton-law-sanctions-against-cuba>)//CB

President Obama on Wednesday waived a portion of the 1996 Helms-Burton embargo law that would allow lawsuits against Cuban businesses, following in the footsteps of Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush. The law allows U.S. courts to take up lawsuits against businesses that operate on property the communist government appropriated after coming to power in 1959. Like his predecessors, Obama waived that provision for another six months, citing “national interests.” “I hereby determine and report to the Congress that suspension, for 6 months beyond February 1, 2013, of the right to bring an action under title III of the Act is necessary to the national interests of the United States and will expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba,” Obama wrote to lawmakers. Obama has been opening the door for better relations with Cuba, relaxing limits on travel and remittances in his first term.

### Helms-Burton - Hasn’t Stopped Trade

#### Helms-Burton is halted-Cuba gets investment from foreign companies

Spadoni 2010 [Paolo Spadoni 2010 assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Augusta State Failed sanctions why the US sanctions against cuba could never work page 126-127]

Conclusion¶

There is little doubt that Helms-Burton has complicated the business operations¶ of foreign investors in Cuba and produced some negative effects¶ on the Cuban economy. First, possible links with expropriated properties¶ and the extreme vagueness of the concept of "trafficking" forced foreign¶ companies to keep a low profile, resort to expensive legal assistance,¶ disguise or reorganize their activities, and eventually renounce further¶ expansion. Second, the higher risk introduced by the Helms-Burton law¶ raised the cost of external financing for Cuba and convinced quite a few¶ potential investors, mostly during 1996-98, to withhold their projects or¶ look elsewhere for less problematic business environments. Third, it is¶ conceivable that certain foreign firms with operations in the United States¶ stayed out of Cuba because of the U.S. policy toward the island that was¶ reinforced by Helms-Burton. 54¶ However, the overall foreign investment process clearly has not been¶ halted. Several foreign companies are engaging in profitable activities in¶ Cuba, expanding their operations, and taking advantage of the lack of U.S.¶ competition. In addition, U.S. pressures were largely ineffective against¶ foreign firms with little or no U.S. exposure. Finally, those companies that¶ verified that their projects do not involve confiscated properties moved¶ forward with their investments (McKenna and Kirk 1998, 9). The flow of¶ foreign direct investment into Cuba remains low if compared to other¶ Latin American countries, but this seems to be more a consequence of¶ l{avana's limited commitment to FDI rather than of Helms-Burton.¶ In summary, Helms-Burton has met with some success but missed its¶ main targets. The law was moderately effective in dissuading a number¶ of foreign companies from entering the Cuban market but largely failed¶ to force existing investors to pull out of Cuba. It also failed to hinder¶ Cuba's economic recovery in the post-cold war era and detain the flow¶ of foreign capital delivered to the island. Besides foreign investment, substantial¶ amounts of hard currency reaching Cuba from the United States,¶ especially in the form of remittances, played a major role in reactivating¶ the island's economy after the deep crisis of the early 1990s. The next¶ chapter provides an analysis of U.S. financial flows in the Cuban economy¶ in the context of tightened U.S. economic sanctions against the Castro¶ government.

### Doesn’t Violate the WTO

#### Embargo doesn’t violate WTO – can be adapted under their framework

Baek 8 - J.S.D. candidate, Cornell Law School (Buhm Suk, “Economic Sanctions Against Human Rights Violations”, Cornell Law Library, April 14 2008, <http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1039&context=lps_clacp>)//CB

The evolving of international human rights law for last 60 years has been in two parallel directions. First, international human rights norms which are recognized as Jus Cogens provide the legality for the international community’s intervention in offending states. Second, the Erga Omnes status of international human rights norms shows that every state has an interest in having these human rights norms observed by other states. All of these norms authorize economic sanctions not only by the international community including the U.N., but also by each individual state. Overall, while some economic sanctions may conflict with the main goal of the WTO, i.e. free trade, economic sanctions against human rights violations do not undermine the WTO system itself. Rather, they can be adapted to the WTO’s free trade framework under international law.

### Bilateral Trade Bad

#### Bilateral trade u/m global trade – giving preferential treatement to one keeps the group from working together

Watson et al. 13 (K. William and Sallie James, analysts at the Cato Institute’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center, “Regulatory Protectionism A Hidden Threat to Free Trade for Trade Policy Studies,” 4/9/13, http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa723.pdf)

The WTO allows members signing preferential trade agreements or forming customs unions to deviate from normal nondiscrimination rules, but those deviations appear to apply only to preferential tariff rates and not to TBT or SPS measures. In practical terms, this means that WTO members signing free trade agreements or customs unions can agree to provisions that are broader and/ or stricter than WTO rules on TBT or SPS measures, but they cannot allow for weaker standards, or less onerous enforcement, for preferred trade partners. After all, to do so would be to imply that the level of risk that the country is willing to accept is not based on absolute scientific standards, but rather is an elastic concept that could be traded off for other economic considerations. The current, so-called Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations is dead in all but name. More exclusive trade deals have been flourishing in its absence, raising concerns about destabilizing “trade blocs” and trade diversion to less efficient producers. Although WTO rules prevent members from granting preferential TBT or SPS terms in trade agreements, most of them cover standards at least rhetorically: the WTO’s 2011 trade report showed that approximately 60 percent of preferential trade agreements contained provisions on TBT/SPS measures.30 As countries look increasingly to bilateral and regional avenues for trade liberalization, free traders need to be vigilant about further damage to disciplines on standards and technical barriers to trade. A couple of recent controversies provide instructive examples of how bilateral agreements can undermine multilateral disciplines. Korean Autos. There was an interesting twist to the renegotiation of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS), which needed to get the support of President Obama before he agreed to submit it to Congress for ratification. Many of the tariff-related modifications were ugly, especially the decision to delay, in both markets, tariff cuts on cars. As a perhaps surprising result of the accord, American pork producers now have to wait two years longer for duty-free access to the Korean market. But standards were caught up in the horse-trading, too. Somewhat undermining his claim to want to increase environmental standards in trade agreements, President Obama convinced the Koreans to exempt American car makers that sold less than 4,500 vehicles in Korea in 2009 (the year before the renegotiation) from Korean fuel efficiency and carbon dioxide emission regulations, which are stricter than those in the United States and which U.S. automakers have trouble meeting. Korea will also exempt up to 25,000 American-made cars per carmaker from Korean safety inspections. Strict deference to standards also was relaxed when the United States agreed to let Korea maintain its ban on U.S. beef from cattle older than 30 months. Surrendering that market access was controversial and constituted a rare loss for a powerful domestic lobby group. Especially since the World Organization for Animal Health had ruled U.S. sanitary measures sufficient to meet Korea’s standards even for older cattle.31 Some of these dubious transactions could promote trade, of course. But by compromising on its supposedly inviolable auto emissions standards for the Americans, Korea is tacitly admitting that those standards are unnecessary. Presumably, every other WTO member now has the enforceable right to sell its “substandard” cars to Korea under the same terms as the U.S. deal. In any event, it arouses suspicion about the true motivation for the Korean auto emissions standards if they are relatively easily negotiated away. Disease-free recognition in the Brazilian cotton deal. Following a series of WTO rulings, Brazil won the right to suspend certain trade obligations to the United States in retaliation for American cotton subsidies, which were deemed to be harming Brazilian trading interests and those of other, poorer cotton-exporting nations. Had the retaliatory sanctions gone into effect, U.S. exports worth hundreds of millions of dollars would have been subject to higher tariffs in Brazil, and U.S. intellectual property rights holders would have lost many millions of dollars worth of royalties. Instead of amending its cotton support policy to comply with the rulings, the United States convinced Brazilian farmers to accept almost $150 million per year in “technical assistance,” paid for by U.S. taxpayers, to stave off the retaliation. The deal allowed the United States to continue subsidizing politically connected cotton farmers without incurring the ire of other domestic interests that would have suffered under Brazilian sanctions. Many free traders were rightly outraged by that part of the deal, but another, less publicized part of the settlement has damaging implications for the world trading system, too. The United States additionally agreed to recognize the southern Brazilian state of Santa Catarina as free of foot-and-mouth disease, thereby permitting easier access to the U.S. market for exports from that region. But recognizing areas as “disease free” is an obligation under the SPS Agreement, not a favor to certain trade partners or, even worse, a bribe to offer as part of a legal settlement. The United States, in other words, should have already recognized the disease-free status of Santa Catarina beef farmers if the scientific evidence warranted it, and if it was requested by Brazil. By not doing so until it needed to call in a favor, the United States has undermined the spirit, and possibly the letter, of the SPS Agreement. The Trans-Pacific Partnership Tobacco Proposal. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a potential preferential trade agreement among the United States and 10 other Pacific Rim states. During negotiations for the TPP, the U.S. Trade Representative drafted a proposal to provide a special exemption for tobacco-related regulation. The catalyst for the proposal was the WTO ruling against the U.S. ban on clove cigarettes and the growing resentment for international trade rules within the anti-tobacco lobby. Substantively, the proposal was meant to prevent any actions by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) under the 2009 tobacco law from being challenged as a violation of the TPP. While the specific text of the proposal has not yet been published, the U.S. Trade Representative has stated that it “would clarify that TPP governments may adopt regulations that impose origin-neutral, science-based restrictions on specific tobacco products or classes in order to safeguard public health.”32 Under the TBT Agreement, a regulation must also be no less trade-restrictive than necessary and may be deemed, as the clove cigarette ban was, to be discriminatory when disparate impact on imports does not stem from a legitimate regulatory distinction.33 The tobacco proposal would bypass the WTO requirement that regulations be applied in an “even-handed” manner.34 Critics of the proposal have further pointed out that it demonstrates unwarranted dissatisfaction with the framework of general exceptions in the GATT and the safeguards already in place in the TBT and SPS agreements. In order to avoid bringing its laws in line with those disciplines, the United States was trying to use its significant bargaining power to impose ad hoc exemptions for pet policies. There does not seem to be any reason that tobacco-control regulation deserves special attention, other than that the United States is concerned about it. By opening the door to calls from other states for similar exemptions, this proposal can only harm the effectiveness and primacy of broader WTO rules.

### A2 Europe

#### The embargo doesn’t harm EU interests - no effect on European countries

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For all practical purposes, the threat of a direct conflict over lawsuits involving European investments in Cuba had passed. "It's assumed on both sides, or at least on the European side, that the U.S. will continue to renew the Title III waiver," observed a State Department European Affairs official in late 2002. "Now if, for whatever reason, the U.S. was not to renew the waiver again then, of course, the WTO case would come back. But for the moment I don't think anyone in the administration would be advocating that we stop renewing it." 166 EU officials concurred with this assessment: "Our assumption is that a regular waiver is part of the understanding. So we're assuming that things are ok and the U.S. is aware that if things, for whatever reason, turn out not to be ok then there's the WTO and other things [that we would do] and that would just sour everything." 167

Much the same fate befell Title IV of Helms-Burton. Bush continued to stall implementation on national security grounds, but removing it from the statute books-an objective Washington agreed to pursue in May 1998-had fallen into what one senior State Department Western Hemisphere official described as "a state of diplomatic purgatory."168 While the EU remained in no doubt that "if there were to be a Title IV action then it wouldn't take too long for everything to spiral out of control again," the likelihood of such a scenario occurring seemed more and more remote. "Obviously the Europeans are interested in a more permanent arrangement but I think they recognize that under this present administration that's all they are going to get," a Department Europeanist confided, "and given the fact that the United States has not upset the cart by vigorously pursuing any action against European companies, then people are happy just to let things stay as they are. "169

## Russia Advantage

### Cuba not key

#### Russia will cooperate – Cuba is too small an issue for overall relations

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One consistent element in Moscow's policy towards Cuba is its continued support for the lifting of the U.S. economic embargo and the normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations. Russian foreign policy experts interpret Washington's determination to maintain the sanctions in place, which they repeatedly assert is "contrary to the interests of the United States itself and of U.S. business," as primarily the result of internal politics.117 Russian officials insisted throughout the 1990s that Cuba no longer represented any security threat to the United States; after the Russian withdrawal from Lourdes, the claim became even more credible.118 Moscow has probably been seeking to reassure the Bush administration that Cuba-sometimes included in the "axis of evil," sometimes not-does not pose a threat either in terms of terrorism or weapons of mass destruction. After former U.S. president Jimmy Carter had been taken on a tour of Cuba's biological research laboratories in 2002, the Russian foreign minister issued a statement to the effect that "the goodwill of the Cuban government [in giving Carter] free access to biological facilities, should eliminate all U.S. concerns about any possible biological weapons programs pursued by Cuba. " 119 The Russians took the opportunity to endorse Carter's view that it was time to normalize U.S.-Cuban relations and to lift the embargo.

The two nations can find common cause in resisting Pax Americana, although since Cuba's term on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) ended, its views carry far less weight. In any case, the united position is tactical rather than strategic, for the Cubans have little to lose by digging their heels in, while the Russians have a number of pressing reasons to make an accommodation with U.S. wishes when it comes to the crunch. If the two countries took a radically opposed stance on the U.S. war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, Putin's reluctance to support the Bush administration's commitment to regime change in Iraq brought Moscow and Havana closer together again. Autumn 2002 saw a series of joint statements opposing the use of force against Iraq and calling for the strengthening of the United Nations as a force for peace. Russia and Cuba declared themselves to be particularly "alarmed by strategies and doctrines that appeared recently trying to justify unilateral military actions in circumvention of the UN Security Council."120 In a distant echo of Cold War collaboration, an account of a recent vote at the International Atomic Energy Agency to refer North Korea to the UNSC for being in breach of the international body's nuclear safeguards noted that "Russia and Cuba abstained. " 121 Russian-Cuban discussions of such matters tend to take place at the level of first deputy foreign minister or below; in other words, both countries grant moderate, but not great, significance to their exchanges.

For the foreseeable future, the Russian government is committed to integration with the West-even Moscow's adamant opposition to the U.S.-led imposition of "regime change" in Iraq in March-April 2003 was followed by a concerted effort (on both sides) to pave over the damage done to bilateral relations. The Russians may occasionally "play the Cuba card," just to remind Washington that their support cannot be taken for granted, but all concerned know that this is largely an empty gesture given that Russia no longer has any strategic interest in the island. Moscow would prefer the United States to normalize relations with Cuba; Washington would like Moscow to exert its remaining leverage to pressure Castro to implement political reforms-but the two governments are likely to agree to differ on this issue, accepting that even if either of them were willing to budge, then Castro certainly is not. For their part, the Cubans have no reason to trust the Russians. Their predicament of increasing economic and political isolation means that they have little choice but to take allies as they find them, but their expectations are unlikely to extend much beyond preserving an exchange of moderate quantities of oil for sugar. Mojitos may have become fashionable in Moscow recently, and the city has recently acquired its very own Club Che, but the vast Russian Soviet-era embassy on Havana Bay is likely to remain under occupied indefinitely. 122