# 1NC

### 1NC

#### Text: The United States Federal Government should affirm its commitment to a comprehensive, balanced and hemisphere-wide Free Trade Areas of the Americas agreement, emphasizing its support for opening all areas to negotiation, including those which had previously been taken off of the negotiating table.

#### The counterplan is necessary to jumpstart the FTAA and create a solid foundation for long-term US-Latin American relations and economic development

Luxner 9 (Larry Luxner is news editor of The Washington Diplomat, “What the World Wants From Barack Obama,”

The Washington Diplomat February 2009, <http://washdiplomat.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6304:what-the-world-wants-from-barack-obama&catid=974:february-2009&Itemid=259>)

Jaime Daremblum, director of the Center for Latin American Studies at the Washington-based Hudson Institute, says it’s important for Obama to capitalize on the unprecedented enthusiasm he’s generated throughout the region, where Bush has been deeply unpopular for years. “The incoming administration can do very positive things for Latin America,” said Daremblum, Costa Rica’s former ambassador to the United States. “The first is to support initiatives in countries that have been successful in strengthening democracy, education, transparency in elections and the rule of law. The other area is free trade — which is key for many of our countries because that’s the only way of offering real opportunities to a more educated population.” Daremblum disagrees with those who say Washington’s concept of a hemisphere-wide FTAA is dead. “Quite the contrary,” he said. “All this financial turmoil in the world has opened up the eyes of Latin America that they need export markets, and they need to increase mechanisms to access those markets. The protective little niches of Mercosur here and ALBA there are not going to work. That’s why we need to look toward an FTAA.”

#### Bi-lateral initiatives like the plan undermine the possibility of regional integration

Bayer 2 (The Center for Latin American Issues and Bayer Consulting, LLC, “Prospects for a Free Trade Area of the Americas,” 11-21-02, <http://www.gwu.edu/~clai/recent_events/Events2002/Ftaa/Ftaa_synopsis.htm>)

Much of the current discussion surrounding the FTAA focuses on whether an agreement will be reached by the current deadline, January 1, 2005. The individual interests of nations vary widely, and a number of economic and political issues are potential roadblocks for a final agreement. First, the logistics of having 34 nations agree to anything is a huge task. Mary Ryckman pointed out that, as opposed to the previous round of negotiations, the recent talks in Quito produced a consolidated draft text for an FTAA. Every nation involved seems to be committed to the process at this point, and most nations are comfortable publicizing many of their negotiating points. Some contend, however, that too many bilateral agreements and regional trading blocs, particularly those involving the U.S., will take away the economic impetus and the political will that are driving the FTAA negotiations. Ryckman argues that bilateral negotiations are actually helpful to the goals of the FTAA, because they help the negotiating parties articulate and prioritize issues. This process is especially important for the small nations with little negotiating experience. Hector Marquez from the Mexican Embassy pointed out that Mexico has aggressively pursued free trade agreements with many nations even after the passage of NAFTA. Although Mexico has secured an agreement giving it access to the world’s largest economy, it still sees measurable benefits from engaging in free trade with other nations. Marquez believes that other nations will follow Mexico’s lead.

#### FTAA is crucial to Latin American trade, growth and stops regional trading blocs and Chinese encroachment

Hornbeck 11 (J. F. Hornbeck, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, “U.S.-Latin America Trade: Recent Trends and Policy Issues,” 2-8-11, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/98-840.pdf)

The United States and Latin America have pursued trade liberalization through multilateral, regional, and bilateral negotiations, with mixed results. In part this reflects divergent priorities that have been difficult to fully reconcile. For many Latin American countries, reducing barriers to agricultural trade is top of the list for a successful agreement. This goal includes reducing market access barriers (peak tariffs and tariff rate quotas—TRQs), domestic U.S. subsidies, and nontariff barriers (administrative rules, antidumping provisions). Although there are many other issues, agriculture policy has played a big part in slowing progress in the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Development Round and halting the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).7 The United States has made clear its unwillingness to address most agricultural and antidumping issues in a regional agreement like the FTAA to preserve its bargaining leverage in the WTO against other subsidizing countries such as the European Union and Japan. Latin American counties have their own sensitive issues and a particular concern in some countries for easing its subsistence agricultural sectors slowly toward trade liberalization. In addition to market access, the United States has focused its trade negotiating goals on areas where it is most competitive such as services trade (e.g., financial, tourism, technology, professional); intellectual property rights (IPR); government procurement; and investment. Not surprisingly, these are areas where many Latin American countries are more reluctant to negotiate. Hence, there is a near reversal of priorities that has slowed the progress of comprehensive agreements at the multilateral and regional levels, reflecting inherent differences between many developed and developing countries. The result in the Western Hemisphere has been the proliferation of reciprocal bilateral and plurilateral agreements. The United States has implemented FTAs with Mexico, Central America, the Dominican Republic, Chile, and Peru, but Congress has not acted on the proposed FTAs with Panama or Colombia, despite changes agreed to even after the formal negotiations concluded. Currently, congressional reticence awaits further commitments in areas that fall outside the negotiated text of the FTAs, such as tax law in Panama and human rights improvements in Colombia, raising questions for some over the ability of the United States to consummate trade negotiations.8 The prospects are limited at best for exploring reciprocal FTAs with Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela. Brazil, as the major regional economy not in a unilateral preferential arrangement with the United States, has abandoned the FTAA model and moved ahead separately by adding associate members to Mercosur, supporting Venezuela’s accession to Mercosur as a full member, and leading in the formation of broader economic and political integration pacts in South America. Venezuela’s President Hugo Chávez has taken a decidedly more confrontational approach in establishing the Bolivarian Alternative to the Americas (ALBA), enticing Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Dominica, and Honduras to join with subsidized oil trade.9 Although these are neither deep nor comprehensive trade arrangements, they do signal a political will to consolidate regional bargaining interests in juxtaposition to the U.S.-designed FTAA. Three clear challenges emerge from this picture. First, Brazil and the United States have demonstrated a prolonged reluctance to move off their respective positions, which bodes poorly for resurrecting the FTAA.10 The addition of Venezuela and possibly other countries with less than sympathetic attitudes toward the United States as full Mercosur members could solidify this standoff. Nationalizations of key industries and other efforts to increase the role of the state in managing the economies of Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador also do not augur well for broadening support for market-based trade solutions. Second, multiple FTAs, by definition, promote an inefficient and cumbersome trading system with each FTA having its own rules of origin (to deter non-member transshipment of goods) and related customs administration and enforcement requirements that can complicate trade and investment decisions. It is not without reason, therefore, that many interest groups wish to find a way to rationalize such a convoluted system. Third, Latin America is expanding its trade to other countries in the world. China, in particular, has increased its trade and investment relationship with the region. From 2000 to 2009, total trade has grown by a factor of ten, and investment has poured into the region. In both cases, China is in search of long-term, reliable sources of basic commodities. In 2009, over 70% of Latin American exports to China were in basic ores, copper, grains, and mineral fuels. While this trade structure is currently lucrative, it does nothing to diversify Latin America’s exports into more value added goods, and leaves the fortunes of these countries to the often volatile commodities markets. Reconciling the disparate trade arrangements in the Western Hemisphere will be difficult and perhaps impossible in the absence of a complementary multilateral solution. For example, conventional wisdom argues that without advancement in agricultural issues at the WTO, action on a comprehensive FTAA (or something like it) is unlikely. Further, a less comprehensive FTAA has so far been rejected and offers a far less compelling alternative to a multilateral agreement on economic grounds. Therefore, the FTAA may not emerge in the near future, despite the logical solution that a hemispheric-wide agreement presents to improving the flow of trade (and investment) over existing arrangements.

#### Chinese challenge in Latin America devastates US hegemony

Hilton 13 (Isabel, formerly Latin America editor of The Independent newspaper, “China in Latin America: Hegemonic challenge?,” February 2013, NOREF – Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, <http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afbc054aad9.pdf>)

The United States is Latin America’s traditional hegemonic power, but China’s influence in the region is large and growing. How far does China’s presence in the U.S. backyard represent a hegemonic challenge? China is important in the region as a buyer of Latin American resources, primarily from four countries, an important investor and an exporter of manufactured goods. The impact of China’s activities varies in degree from country to country. In several countries local manufacturing has suffered from cheaper Chinese imports; several countries have benefited from Chinese demand for resources, others from large investments, and China is having an important impact on the region’s infrastructure. The risks to the region include resource curse, distorted development and environmental degradation due to a lowering of environmental and social standards. Despite its significant economic presence, China has been careful to keep a low political and diplomatic profile to avoid antagonising the U.S. and to maintain a benign environment for its economic activities. Chinese support, however, has been important for partners, such as Cuba and Venezuela, that do not enjoy good relations with the U.S. So far the two powers have sought cooperation rather than confrontation, but rising tensions with U.S. allies Japan and Vietnam could have repercussions in Latin America if China feels the U.S. is becoming too assertive in its own East Asian backyard.

#### Collapse of hegemony causes global nuclear war

Müller 8 (Harold, Director – Peace Research Institute and Professor of International Relations – Frankfurt University, “The Future of Nuclear Weapons in an Interdependent World”, Washington Quarterly, Spring, Lexis)

A power transition creates dangerous times. **[9](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=bdd54216370e15df8fa26bde1111b584&docnum=8&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAz&_md5=f6b9321740b257920320c7efec57cfcf&focBudTerms=china%20or%20chinese%21%20or%20beijing%20w/35%20aggress%21%20or%20conflict%21%20or%20war%20or%20creeping%20occupation%20w/20%20south%20china%20sea&focBudSel=all" \l "fnote9" \t "_self)** Most challenges to a hegemon in world history, whether successful or not, have precipitated war or a series of wars. Today's interdependence will surely serve to make great powers cautious about armed conflict, but it cannot completely guarantee such a conflict will not occur. Bones of contention exist, notably between the United States and China: Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the competition for Persian Gulf and Central Asian energy resources. Although there exists a naive belief that great-power war has been eliminated as a possibility in world politics, exaggerated complacency could become extremely dangerous. Interdependence itself and advanced weaponry, nuclear weapons included, would mean that a violent contest among the big powers would be an unmitigated catastrophe. The relationships among those powers must be carefully managed if a clash is to be avoided, and nuclear weapons reductions are an essential contribution to this management.

# Net Benefit

## 2NCs

### Link 2NC

#### Plan deprives nations of “policy space” to create greater trade openness, makes the FTAA impossible

Gallagher 12 (Kevin P. Gallagher, Department of International Relations, Boston University, “Trading Away the Ladder? Trade Politics and Economic Development in the Americas,” New Political Economy, Vol. 13, No. 1, March 2008, <http://www.relooney.info/0_New_5306.pdf>)

Over the past two decades there has been a six-fold increase in the number of regional or bilateral trade agreements (RBTAs) in the world economy. Nowhere has this proliferation been more prevalent than in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), where 33 of the 39 countries belong to at least one RBTA.1 Figure 1 depicts what has been termed the ‘spaghetti bowl’ of RBTAs in the region – a tangled web of trade agreements like none other in the world. Since the early 1980s, the majority of the most important RBTAs in the region have been agreements with the USA. The USA had completed agreements with Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and Peru. Discussions for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) commenced in 1993 and included all LAC nations except for Cuba. These discussions have been put on hold and perhaps even put away forever. There is a puzzle regarding Latin America’s engagement in these numerous trade agreements with the USA. Nations in the region tend to spend the majority of their international economic diplomacy on these agreements despite the fact that the economic gains from such agreements are much smaller than they would be under world trade liberalisation. The costs of these agreements are seen as signiﬁcant, both in terms of trade diversion and the loss of ‘policy space’. Policy space is deﬁned as the extent to which trade rules provide nationstates with an optimal degree of openness that allows them to be integrated with the world economy as well as pursue domestic development policy. It has been argued that developed nations are ‘kicking away the ladder’, whereby they are not permitting developing countries the ability to deploy many of the same policies that developed countries used at earlier periods in their development history.2 This article acknowledges that developed country power is a key variable, but, like others, it asks whether developing countries are also ‘trading away the ladder’. It examines the gains from various RBTAs in the hemisphere and juxtaposes them with the costs. In addition, the article examines the extent to which interests, power and ideas, as well as collective action issues, play a role in spurring Latin American governments to favour economic integration with the USA over alternative trade and development paths.

#### Plan encourages bi-lateral trade at the cost of a hemisphere wide agreement

ITE 13 (International Trade Examiner, “Are Large Multilateral Free Trade Deals Becoming just too Difficult to Complete?,” 5-24-13, <http://internationaltradeexaminer.com/2013/05/24/are-large-multilateral-free-trade-deals-becoming-just-too-difficult-to-complete/>)

Some of the same issues that threatened other large-scale multilateral trade deals have emerged in the TPP talks. Some of those issues include agricultural subsidies and intellectual property protection. The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which was designed to establish a trading bloc composed of all countries in the Western Hemisphere excluding Cuba, collapsed in 2005. The Doha Round of the World Trade Organization CWTG) negotiations remain incomplete since the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial. Agricultural trade was a highly contentious issue for both the FTAA and Doha Round of trade talks. Perhaps, such trade deals are more difficult to complete because of a more active role of developing countries in negotiations. In other words, a few number of developed countries can no longer shape a global trade agenda with very little to no opposition. For example, Brazil and Argentina opposed an FTAA that did not include the elimination of U.S. subsidies for agriculture. In addition, the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) created another opportunity for countries such as Cuba, Venezuela and Dominica to form trade partnerships, thus weakening the possibility of an FTAA. ALBA was a response to concerns by the late Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez that the FTAA was a form of U.S. imperialism. Large developing countries such as Brazil, China, India and South Africa were successful in stalling a WTO agreement that did not adequately address their concerns over agricultural subsidies.

### Impact 2NC

#### US Hegemony solves Latin American instability

Santiba (Francisco de, PHd candidate at Professor War Studies at King’s College and Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Relations Johns Hopkins University, An End to U.S. Hegemony? The Strategic Implications of China's Growing Presence in Latin America, [Comparative Strategy](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title%7Econtent=t713769613%7Edb=all), Volume [28](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title%7Econtent=t713769613%7Edb=all%7Etab=issueslist%7Ebranches=28#v28), Issue [1](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title%7Econtent=g908609091%7Edb=all) January 2009 , pages 17 – 36)

However, the most significant sign of U.S. lack of influence in the Western Hemisphere has been the growing number of disputes among Latin American states. And maybe the most dangerous development in this trend took place on March 2008 when the Colombian air force attacked a position held by a terrorist organization, call FARC, inside Ecuadorian territory. After this action, both the governments of Ecuador and Venezuela decided to send troops to the frontiers with Colombia, accusing this country of acting as a proxy for the United States and warning about the possibility of a war. After numerous accusations between these states, a deacutetente was finally reached, but the possibility of a military conflict is still present. To this dispute we have to add, among others, the recent conflict between Argentina and Uruguay. These two nations have been discussing, in acrimonious terms, the environmental effects that the construction of two paper mills in Uruguay might have on a river that is shared by both nations.[53](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a908604855&fulltext=713240928#EN0053) A more serious conflict is the one that confronts Bolivia and Chile. The Bolivian government has demanded from Chile the exit to the Pacific Ocean that it took, together with large amounts of land, during a nineteenth-century war.[54](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a908604855&fulltext=713240928#EN0054)

#### US Re-intervention turns the case and causes global war

**Rochlin 94** (James Francis, Prof. Pol. Sci. @ Okanagan University College, “Discovering the Americas: the evolution of Canadian foreign policy towards Latin America”, p. 130-131)

While there were economic motivations for Canadian policy in Central America, security considerations were perhaps more important. Canada possessed an interest in promoting stability in the face of a potential decline of U.S. hegemony in the Americas. Perceptions of declining U.S. influence in the region – which had some credibility in 1979-1984 due to the wildly inequitable divisions of wealth in some U.S. client states in Latin America, in addition to political repression, under-development, mounting external debt, anti-American sentiment produced by decades of subjugation to U.S. strategic and economic interests, and so on – were linked to the prospect of explosive events occurring in the hemisphere. Hence, the Central American imbroglio was viewed as a fuse which could ignite a cataclysmic process throughout the region. Analysts at the time worried that in a worst-case scenario, instability created by a regional war, beginning in Central America and spreading elsewhere in Latin America, might preoccupy Washington to the extent that the United States would be unable to perform adequately its important hegemonic role in the international arena – a concern expressed by the director of research for Canada’s Standing Committee Report on Central America. It was feared that such a predicament could generate increased global instability and perhaps even a hegemonic war. This is one of the motivations which led Canada to become involved in efforts at regional conflict resolution, such as Contadora, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

### A2 No Impact: 2NC

#### Prefer our evidence- unipolarity is the only check on conflicts

**Wohlforth 9 (**William Wohlforth, professor of government at Dartmouth College, 2009 “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” *World Politics*, Volume 61, Number 1, January 2009, pp. 28-57)

The evidence suggests that narrow and asymmetrical capabilities gaps foster status competition even among states relatively confident of their basic territorial security for the reasons identified in social identity theory and theories of status competition. Broad patterns of evidence are consistent with this expectation, suggesting that unipolarity shapes strategies of identity maintenance in ways that dampen status conflict. The implication is that unipolarity helps explain low levels of military competition and conflict among major powers after 1991 and that a return to bipolarity or multipolarity would increase the likelihood of such conflict. This has been a preliminary exercise. The evidence for the hypotheses explored here is hardly conclusive, but it is sufficiently suggestive to warrant further refinement and testing, all the more so given [End Page 56] the importance of the question at stake. If status matters in the way the theory discussed here suggests, then the widespread view that the rise of a peer competitor and the shift back to a bipolar or multipolar structure present readily surmountable policy challenges is suspect. Most scholars agree with Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke’s argument: “[S]hould a satisfied state undergo a power transition and catch up with dominant power, there is little or no expectation of war.” 81 Given that today’s rising powers have every material reason to like the status quo, many observers are optimistic that the rise of peer competitors can be readily managed by fashioning an order that accommodates their material interests. Yet it is far harder to manage competition for status than for most material things. While diplomatic efforts to manage status competition seem easy under unipolarity, theory and evidence suggest that it could present much greater challenges as the system moves back to bipolarity or multipolarity. When status is seen as a positional good, efforts to craft negotiated bargains about status contests face long odds. And this positionality problem is particularly acute concerning the very issue unipolarity solves: primacy. The route back to bipolarity or multipolarity is thus fraught with danger. With two or more plausible claimants to primacy, positional competition and the potential for major power war could once again form the backdrop of world politics. [End Page 57]

#### Specifically true in deterring China in Latin America

Hilton 13 (Isabel, formerly Latin America editor of The Independent newspaper, “China in Latin America: Hegemonic challenge?,” February 2013, NOREF – Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, <http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afbc054aad9.pdf>)

China’s presence in Latin America is unlikely to diminish and will continue to affect its regional partners for the foreseeable future. Although this undoubtedly entails a loss of U.S. influence in the region, both China and the U.S. have so far sought cooperation rather than confrontation. In the context of the Obama administration’s “pivot” to Asia, however, and the latent, long-term strategic competition between China and the United States, there is potential for increasing competition for influence in the future. An escalation of tensions between China and U.S. allies in the South China or East China Sea could prompt China to raise retaliatory tensions in the U.S. backyard. At that point, the traditional Latin American allies of the U.S. could face some uncomfortable choices.

### A2 Layne: 2NC

#### Layne is just wrong – his analysis and conclusions about heg are based on a flawed understanding of historical events

**Snyder 6 (**Jack, Professor of International Relations at Columbia University's Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, “The Crusade of Illusions,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2006)

His account, however, is far too one-sided to convince, and Layne is wrong on many key issues. In his historical overview, he ignores the fact that the U.S. decision to withdraw from active participation in balancing power in Eurasia in the 1930s was a disaster, and that the U.S. victory in the Cold War came cheap compared to other historic contests for hegemony. Moreover, Stalin would never have accepted a deal to set up a truly independent Germany, because he rightly feared a rerun of World War II. And NATO was created because the Europeans pushed for it; if anyone was ambivalent about it, it was the U.S. Congress, which was reluctant to fund ongoing troop deployments abroad. More generally, Layne is right to worry that U.S. dominance may provoke resistance. But he overlooks the critical fact that during the Cold War, most states balanced against the weaker but more threatening Soviet Union, rather than against the stronger but more attractive United States. The result of such skewed historical judgments is that Layne unfairly dismisses the possibility that a consensual international order based on prudent, liberal American leadership could emerge.

### Turns Relations: 2NC

#### Trade is key to overall relations

Hornbeck 11 (J. F. Hornbeck, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, “U.S.-Latin America Trade: Recent Trends and Policy Issues,” 2-8-11, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/98-840.pdf)

It is uncertain if any of these alternatives will lead to a new chapter in trade relations between the United States and Latin America. For one, they may be difficult to implement and monitor, but nonetheless could provide marginal benefits in light of the apparent hiatus in moving toward a broad and comprehensive hemispheric trade agreement. In the meantime, trade remains foundational to good U.S.-Latin America relations, an important consideration in the contemplation of future U.S. trade policy.

### Turns Human Rights: 2NC

#### Undermining Cuba-China alliance is key to global human rights

Hawkins 12 (Awr, “China, Cuba Block U.N Human Rights Council From Condemning Syria,” 7-14-12,

<http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Peace/2012/07/13/U-N-Human-Rights-Council-Fails-to-Address-Human-Rights-Violations>)

The U.N. has long been viewed as a questionable authority in the world because it issues edicts and condemnations in a whimsical, often baseless fashion. In particular, the U.N. often condemns those it shouldn't because of ideological differences while turning a blind eye to true violators of the law because of ideological agreements. Case in point: the U.N. Human Rights Council just ended its yearly meeting and patted itself on the back for a job well done, although their meetings witnessed a delegate from Cuba standing again and again to defend human rights violations in Syria and other countries. Think about it: not only did the Human Rights Council fail to address the human rights violations of the Cuban government, where Communism comes first, period. But they also allowed Cuba to stand in solidarity with China, "opposing the condemnation of Syria's atrocities." What are they going to do next, allow Iran to oversee an international gun control treaty that will usurp the 2nd Amendment? To make matters worse, according to the Miami Herald, Cuba put a number of proposals before the Human Rights Council that basically provided cover for "Sudan, Belarus, China, Sri Lanka, Iran, and North Korea." In other words, Cuba spent their time during the annual council meeting making sure human rights weren't addressed.

## Politics

### Avoids Politics: 2NC

#### The Counterplan creates positive momentum at the highest levels of government

USTR 2 (Office of the United States Trade Representative, “Zoellick Tells Congress It's Crucial We Move Forward on FTAA,” October 2002, <http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/archives/2002/october/zoellick-tells-congress-its-crucial-we-mo>)

WASHINGTON - United States Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick yesterday formally notified Congressional leaders of U.S. objectives and goals for the ongoing negotiations in the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), saying it was "crucial that we move forward on hemispheric trade negotiations." Zoellick's letter fulfills the requirements of the recently enacted Trade Act of 2002 and highlights the strong intent of the United States to continue its leadership role in the hemispheric trade negotiations. "The FTAA negotiations offer the United States an opportunity to lead the Americas toward stable and continuing economic growth, improved living standards, and higher paying jobs in all FTAA countries. By reducing and then eliminating hemispheric trade barriers, the FTAA will provide substantial and growing foreign markets for U.S. goods and services," wrote Zoellick. "The FTAA agreement will also strengthen the rule-of-law, solidify economic reform throughout the hemisphere, and reinforce the democratic principles that unite FTAA countries." On October 1, Zoellick provided Congress with the formal notification for the Administration's intent to enter into free trade negotiations with Morocco and five nations of Central America. In addition, Zoellick also notified Congress of the U.S. goals and objectives for completing the final stages of ongoing free trade negotiations with Singapore and Chile. Zoellick's letter was sent to the Speaker of the House, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, and Congressional trade leaders.

#### Public supports the counterplan

WPO 5 (World Public Opinion, “International Trade,” 2005 <http://americans-world.org/digest/global_issues/intertrade/nafta.cfm>)

Recent polling suggests that there is no clear positive or negative public attitude on NAFTA. Americans are divided as to whether it has been good or bad. Yet, a plurality wants to see changes to NAFTA, and a majority expresses dissatisfaction. These reservations appear to arise from concerns that, while business is benefiting, NAFTA can have negative impacts on American workers' jobs and wages and on the environment. Attitudes are also very divided about CAFTA, with the public showing similar concerns. Support for CAFTA would be robust, however, if key public concerns were addressed. It appears that there is slim majority support for expanding free trade to include other American countries, such as the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). However, this is based on minimal polling and very general questions.

#### Overwhelming public support for the counterplan

WPO 5 (World Public Opinion, “International Trade,” 2005 <http://americans-world.org/digest/global_issues/intertrade/nafta.cfm>)

Support for FTAA Although very little polling has been done on the issue, it appears that there is majority support for expanding free trade to more American countries and thus there would likely be support for what has been proposed as a Free Trade Area of the Americas (or FTAA). Most recently, CCFR asked about this issue in July 2004: “As you may know, the US and most countries of North, Central and South America have been discussing the possibility of having a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, similar to what the US now has with Mexico and Canada in NAFTA. Would you favor or oppose having such a new agreement?” A majority of 59% supported the idea, while 30% opposed it. This is higher than the results PIPA found when it asked the same question in January of 2004. At that time, 52% favored the idea and 40% opposed it.[22]

# Solvency

## 2NC

### 2NC Solvency

#### FTAA negotiations offer an unprecedented amount of transparency and access – overcomes opposition

Dannenmaier 9 (Eric Dannenmaier, Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Indiana University--Indianapolis. M.St., Oxford University; LLM, Columbia University; J.D., Boston University. Charles B. Bretzfelder International Law Fellow, Columbia University, 2006-07, “Lawmaking On The Road To International Summits,” Fall 2009, 59 DePaul L. Rev. 1)

As international trade agreements have been constructed in recent years, calls for greater transparency and public access to the trade process have increased, including access to negotiations on the texts of agreements and to dispute resolution processes. This has been exemplified at the global level by a growing discourse on NGO participation in the processes of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and growing claims for access. n257 These claims have, in some respects, begun to yield results in opening the WTO to non-state actors, although [\*50] the results have been quite modest and generally limited to the right to "attend" Ministerial Conferences, n258 to participate in certain technical or informational forums, and to submit amicus briefs to dispute resolution panels. n259 No real institutional effort has been made to open the WTO negotiating process to actors, although some delegations have occasionally posted negotiating positions or specific proposals on their web sites. n260 This measure of transparency at least informs public positions and allows non-state actors to think strategically about where allies and obstacles may lie. Similar claims for access greeted negotiations for the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Unlike the WTO, which has grown as an autonomous economic integration body, the FTAA proposal had its origins in the inter-American summit process, having been conceived at the Miami Summit, n261 and advanced and promoted in subsequent summits. FTAA negotiations stalled following the Eighth Annual Ministerial Conference in Miami in 2003, and for a number of reasons, the FTAA proposal has not been revived. n262 [\*51] While regional trade negotiations may or may not be revived, the degree of transparency and public access to the negotiation process was clearly on the rise prior to suspension. As described below, this access was informed by summit commitments and efforts to implement those commitments. At the Santiago Summit in 1998, heads of state explicitly called for greater transparency and participation in FTAA negotiations: The FTAA negotiating process will be transparent ... in order to create the opportunities for the full participation by all countries. We encourage all segments of civil society to participate in and contribute to the process in a constructive manner, through our respective mechanisms of dialogue and consultation and by presenting their views through the mechanism created in the FTAA negotiating process. n263 While this commitment is aimed in part at the participation of smaller states whose capacity to engage in complex and protracted trade negotiations is limited, it also contemplates a degree of openness to non-state actors. The mechanism referred to is the Committee of Government Representatives on the Participation of Civil Society (SOC), which was created as part of a broader scheme to receive input from civil society on a range of issues, and which convened for the first time several months after the Santiago Summit. n264 Heads of state renewed their commitment to a transparent process at the Quebec Summit in 2001 by pledging to ensure the transparency of the negotiating process, including through publication of the preliminary draft FTAA Agreement in the four official languages as soon as possible and the dissemination of additional information on the progress of negotiations. n265 The negotiating text of the FTAA was released three months later, and two subsequent revisions were released in the days preceding the annual meetings of trade ministers that punctuate the negotiating process. n266 [\*52] The Quebec Summit Plan of Action also includes a pledge by states to foster through their respective national dialogue mechanisms and through appropriate FTAA mechanisms, a process of increasing and sustained communication with civil society to ensure that it has a clear perception of the development of the FTAA negotiating process [and to] invite civil society to continue to contribute to the FTAA process. n267 While this language appears partly aimed at marketing the FTAA to civil society--communications are intended to "ensure" clear perceptions rather than to invite meaningful input--it also includes a call for non-state actors to contribute to the process. These contributions have largely been managed by the SOC, although the negotiating process at trade ministerial meetings has also been opened to some extent. The SOC created a public input mechanism that invited NGOs to make "submissions" on any area of concern that was raised by the proposed FTAA. n268 This mechanism has been criticized for being a somewhat one-way "post office box" approach to public input that creates no real basis for dialogue. n269 Nevertheless, since its inception, it has evolved to some extent, and the SOC now collates and summarizes submissions for trade delegations, so that at least this one-way flow of information is a bit more accessible. Between 2003 and 2004, the SOC also hosted a series of three "issue meetings" on agriculture, services, and intellectual property rights. n270 While these themes reflected the concerns of governments more than those of the NGO community--NGO concerns relate more to environmental, labor, and other social issues--the meetings at least provided an opportunity for direct interaction between non-state actors and responsible government officials, including negotiators and representatives of technical ministries. The SOC was also charged with designing a proposal for a [\*53] "civil society consultative committee within the institutional framework of the FTAA," as called for in the Eighth Ministerial Meeting in Miami in 2003, n271 but efforts to develop the proposal have not proceeded since the FTAA negotiation process was suspended. The last two FTAA Ministerial Meetings, in Quito in 2002 and in Miami in 2003, also provided opportunities for direct interaction between trade negotiators and interested civil society participants. In both cases, the issues that NGOs brought to the table were related to the broader social concerns raised by the FTAA proposal. In Quito, trade ministers held a brief direct meeting with non-state actors who had participated in three separate non-governmental forums. The first, on indigenous and labor concerns, was hosted by a loose coalition called the Hemispheric Social Alliance. n272 The second, on environmental sustainability, was hosted by two Ecuadorian NGOs and their counterparts from the region. n273 The third, on trade policy more generally, was hosted by a Latin American coalition of parliamentarians. n274 In Miami, a coalition of NGOs from the region organized a forum called the Americas Trade and Sustainable Development Forum (ATSDF) and, at the invitation of the Office of the United States Trade Representative, hosted a three-day workshop inside the "security perimeter" that was established to contain street protests. n275 The ATSDF included parallel workshops on nine areas: trade and agriculture; trade, democracy, and human rights; trade and environment; trade and smaller economies; trade, participation, and access; trade and sustainable livelihoods; trade, corruption, and transparency; trade, knowledge, and intellectual property rights; and trade and investment. n276 More than three hundred NGO participants from over twenty countries attended, and representatives from trade ministries of at least eight countries were present for at least part of the proceedings. n277 [\*54] While each of these mechanisms is imperfect, and although considerable obstacles still prevent the opening of any future regional trade negotiations to meaningful participation by non-state actors, a framework is evolving that offers a greater degree of access than can be found in comparable negotiations related to other trade accords.

#### Counterplan jumpstarts negotiations with Brazil and other countries, solves agreement and integration

Schott 5 (Jeffrey J., Senior Fellow at the Institute for International Economics, “Does the FTAA have a Future?,” <http://www.piie.com/publications/papers/schott1105.pdf>)

Bluntly put, the FTAA negotiations have been stuck in the mud since the Miami ministerial meeting of November 2003. At that time, soon after the failed World Trade Organization (WTO) meeting in Cancun in September 2003 that had led to a breakdown in the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, trade officials were under intense pressure "not to fail." Moreover, trade ministers didn't want their leaders to have to address the ensuing mess when they convened in Monterrey, Mexico, two months later for a special Summit on Development. So the political imperative was to cut a deal in Miami and go home quickly. Accordingly, the co-chairs of the FTAA process—the United States and Brazil—produced a procedural compromise that allowed them to shake hands and promise to resume negotiating in early 2004. Despite infrequent bilateral meetings of ministers and chief negotiators, the US-Brazil rapprochement never advanced beyond a handshake to an abrazo. The outcome of the Miami ministerial prevented the collapse of the trade negotiations but made it more difficult to achieve an agreement that balanced the interests of the participating countries. What went wrong? At the Miami meeting, ministers "affirmed their commitment to a comprehensive and balanced FTAA" [paragraph 5), which includes "provisions in each of the [FTAA] negotiating areas" (paragraph 10). However, countries were permitted to take specific issues or products off the table, and some "countries may assume different levels of commitments" (paragraph 7). If other countries want to do more, say on investment, they could enter into "plurilateral" agreements that only obligate those countries that sign the specific pact. In other words, the Miami compromise accommodated two levels of negotiation: a core FTAA in which countries could exclude sensitive issues and supplementary accords by a subset of FTAA participants that covered "FTAA-plus" commitments. The plurilateral option was introduced to accommodate the incremental development of an FTAA through a series of iterative negotiations. In so doing, however.it seemed to walk away from the comprehensive trade accord that hemispheric leaders promised at the Summit of the Americas in 1994 and had reiterated at their subsequent reunion in Santiago (1998) and Quebec City (2001). Some countries took the Miami mandate as license to try to remove entire areas from the talks—leading some observers to derisively label the potential outcome "FTAA-lite." The Brazilians certainly thought that they had pared down the negotiating agenda to core issues that need not include subjects sensitive to them—particularly, investment and intellectual property rights (IPRs)—but such a result is not viable since the United States could not agree to liberalize its own border harriers to trade in the absence of reciprocal benefits for US traders and investors. If action on key trade and investment issues is deferred, will US or Brazilian officials be able to garner political support to reform long-standing barriers protecting farmers, manufacturers, and service providers? In essence, the Miami declaration presaged a "hollow core" agreement in which individual countries could avoid committing to reforms in politically sensitive areas (hence "FTAA-lite"). Thus, if Brazil and others did not want to negotiate on investment and IPRs they could opt out of a hemispheric accord in those areas while the United States and others could adopt a more comprehensive accord among a subset of FTAA participants (probably the same countries that already have signed FTAs with the United States). The value of this plurilateral approach is unclear, since there is little "additionally" if the plurilateral pacts only involve existing US FTA partners. At best, plurilateral pacts would seek to harmonize the terms of existing FTAs. However, such harmonization would require inter alia augmenting Canadian obligations in NAFTA and unraveling politically sensitive compromises on FTA origin rules for textiles, clothing, and agricultural products. Such a result is highly unlikely. While it is conceivable that a more limited outcome could balance US and LAC interests, the trade benefits resulting from such a modest undertaking would not seem sufficient to justify the political cost/risk of going back to Congress for another vote on these pacts. For Congress to approve changes in existing US trade barriers of interest to Brazil and other Latin American countries, US negotiators need to receive concrete commitments that open access to those markets for US exporters and investors. In short, the FTAA has to be a big deal, or the deal won't fly. In sum, the Miami declaration complicated the task of crafting a balanced package of concessions that negotiators can sell to their respective legislatures. It took pressure off the Brazilian negotiators by giving them an excuse for their minimalist position on so-called WTO-plus issues—i.e., those that go beyond the scope of existing WTO rights and obligations. For Brazil, the Miami decision seemed to condone an FTAA that simply removed traditional border barriers and did not require commitments on new issues like investment and competition policy. At the same time, it allowed US officials to defend inaction on US farm barriers because of lack of reciprocity from their Brazilian counterparts. In short, the talks have devolved into a caricature of the "Alphonse and Gaston" routine, with neither side willing (and possibly not politically able) to advance first.

### A2 Brazil Says No: 2NC

#### Counterplan resolves Brazil’s concerns and gets them on board

Schott 5 (Jeffrey J., Senior Fellow at the Institute for International Economics, “Does the FTAA have a Future?,” <http://www.piie.com/publications/papers/schott1105.pdf>)

The basic problem is twofold: whether Brazil will open its market to foreign competition in goods and services and whether the United States will reciprocate by increasing market access, for Brazilian agriculture and competitive manufactures. In both cases, prospective liberalization is contentious and subject to a fractious domestic debate. In both cases, electoral and legislative considerations probably will constrain negotiations through much of 2006, if not longer. In Brazil, recent political scandals have weakened President Lula da Silva and cast doubts about his reelection. Under these circumstances, the PT regime seems unlikely to risk further dissension within its own ranks by considering controversial policy reforms. Until the October 2006 election, Brazilian negotiators may thus resist negotiating over reforms of important regulatory barriers (including those tor the services industries), strengthening protection of IPRs, and opening of some public procurement tenders to bidding by foreign suppliers. Such reforms are supported by some parts of the Brazilian business community but staunchly opposed by protectionist interests A FTAA deal could provide large inducements to undertake such reforms, but only if the United States commits in turn to provide concrete new trading opportunities in the US market tor Brazilian farmers and industrialists—especially by slashing subsidies and committing to liberalization in politically sensitive areas such as cotton, sugar, tobacco, and citrus. In his speech to the United Nations in September 2005, President George W. Bush pledged that "the United States is ready to eliminate all tariffs, subsidies and other barriers to free flow of goods and services as other nations do the same" [emphasis added]. Loosely translated, this means that he will ask Congress to authorize trade and subsidy reforms commensurate with liberalization undertaken by the European Union and other major trading nations in the Doha Round. The success of this negotiating gambit will turn, however, on what Congress legislates in the new US farm bill that will be dratted in 2006.

## Latin America

### Laundry List: Human Rights, Democracy

#### Negotiating the FTAA results in broader cooperation – solves human rights, democracy, etc.

Dannenmaier 9 (Eric Dannenmaier, Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Indiana University--Indianapolis. M.St., Oxford University; LLM, Columbia University; J.D., Boston University. Charles B. Bretzfelder International Law Fellow, Columbia University, 2006-07, “Lawmaking On The Road To International Summits,” Fall 2009, 59 DePaul L. Rev. 1)

The summits are institutionally tied to the OAS, and this connection has become stronger over time. The OAS serves as the summit secretariat and has seen its own agenda increasingly shaped by summit commitments. Yet summit agenda setting and implementation are still technically independent of the OAS. The process of negotiating and shaping summit agendas is managed by the Summit Implementation and Review Group (SIRG), which is chaired by the upcoming summit's designated host country and steered by past summit host countries. n95 An institutional tripartite committee, which includes the OAS, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), helps to oversee summit implementation. n96 The inter-American summits have typically featured one to three days of presidential plenary sessions and side meetings among heads of state and their delegations. Official documents have traditionally been signed by participating heads of state. n97 These include "declarations," which are essentially a broad statement of principles, and "plans of action," which are more detailed lists of commitments that state leaders will pursue in order to advance the principles on which they have agreed. n98 The action plans are often general and vague, but [\*20] in some cases they include more concrete commitments to work toward social goals. n99 The declarations and action plans are negotiated through the SIRG in a relatively transparent process that offers both formal and informal opportunities for non-state actors to offer advice, including advice about specific language, and to comment on elements of the documents. Non-state actors also work informally with the tripartite committee institutions, especially the technical units of the OAS, to conduct research and develop reports and recommendations that inform the preparation of summit documents. n100 The subject matter of inter-American summits has varied widely to cover a range of security, economic, and social interests in the region. A commitment to negotiate a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) emerged at the First Summit in Miami, n101 and greater economic integration remained a subject of many subsequent summit commitments until an impasse over the creation of a new regional free trade zone emerged in Quebec, which has hardened in subsequent summits. n102 In addition to serving as a platform for the discussion of [\*21] competing trade agendas, summits have addressed concerns over education, labor rights, gender discrimination, human rights, the environment, democracy, transparency, health, and urban development, among others.

## Ethanol

### Solves Ethanol

#### Caribbean countries will demand a repeal of ethanol subsidies

Luxner 9 (Larry Luxner is news editor of The Washington Diplomat, “What the World Wants From Barack Obama,”

The Washington Diplomat February 2009, <http://washdiplomat.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6304:what-the-world-wants-from-barack-obama&catid=974:february-2009&Itemid=259>)

Caribbean From the Cayman Islands to Curaçao, people throughout the Caribbean are unabashedly excited about the prospect of an African American man in the White House — and nowhere in the region are regular folks more pro-Obama than the Dominican Republic. That’s according to Flavio Espinal, who was scheduled to step down as Dominican ambassador on Jan. 31. But the warm feelings don’t necessarily mean it’ll be smooth sailing for U.S.-Caribbean relations. “On the economic front, we expect that the United States will not start a protectionist era and that the approach to deepening free trade and engagement will continue,” Espinal told The Diplomat, echoing the sentiment of many Latin American envoys. “In that context, for us it’s very important that the new administration deal with the issue of farm subsidies.” Specifically, Espinal said the United States must eliminate subsidies on ethanol “so that different countries in our region can benefit from the market in this new form of energy.”

## Cuba

### CP Solves Cuban Embargo

#### Brazil will request the US repeal the Cuban Embargo – Solves the aff

Erikson 10 (Daniel P. Erikson, Senior Associate for US policy and Director of Caribbean programs,

Inter-American Dialogue, The Centre for International Governance Innovation, “The Obama Administration and Latin America: Towards a New Partnership?,” Working Paper No. 46 April 2010)

While virtually all the presidents of Latin America and the Caribbean hailed Obama’s election, specific responses reflected the idiosyncrasies of each country — perhaps nowhere more so than Brazil, where six candidates in municipal elections legally changed their names to either Barack or Obama in an attempt to capitalize on the local popularity of the American candidate. Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (quoted in Foley, 2009), a leftist who had burnished his credentials as a pragmatist by cozying up to the Bush administration, placed Obama’s election in a regional context, saying, “In the same way that Brazil elected a metalworker, Bolivia an Indian, Venezuela a Chávez, and Paraguay a bishop, I believe it will be an extraordinary thing if in the biggest economy in the world a black is elected president.” Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim chimed in that, “We aren’t going to deny that the Brazilian government had a good, pragmatic relationship with the Bush government, but now the relationship can be refined, and we hope to establish a relationship of partners with the new US government” (quoted in Erikson, 2008). Lula later proposed two policy changes for Obama to implement: an end to US agricultural subsidies and the repeal of the US embargo of Cuba. Mexican President Felipe Calderon spoke with Obama about the challenge of fighting organized crime and drug trafficking, an issue also emphasized by Colombian president Álvaro Uribe along with urging passage of the controversial Colombia Free Trade Agreement then awaiting a vote in the US Congress.

## Venezuela

### CP Solves Petro-Diplomacy

#### FTAA negotiations undermine Venezuela’ Petro-Diplomacy

Perez 10 (David A. Perez, J.D. 2010, Yale Law School, “America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department,” Spring 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187)

(6A) Venezuela's Petro-Diplomacy Is Vulnerable; the U.S. Should Take Advantage President Chavez has consistently used his petro-dollars to project his influence abroad and support his ideological allies n91 --especially Cuba. n92 In recent years, Venezuela has committed itself to funding or subsidizing over $ 30 billion in massive infrastructure programs and foreign aid allotments. n93 President Chavez has used his Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), a trade agreement ostensibly designed to rival the U.S.-led Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), to parlay the distribution of Venezuelan funds around the region into political support. ALBA now counts Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent [\*220] and the Grenadines and Venezuela as members, while Grenada, Haiti, Paraguay, and Uruguay are observer countries. n94 Despite Chavez's hyperactive hubris, the financial crisis will undoubtedly reveal Venezuela's pragmatism, since his foreign policy is almost entirely dependent on the government's ability to squeeze the oil industry for as much money as possible. By the end of 2008, oil accounted for nearly 80% of Venezuela's export revenues, 50% of its government budget, and 33% of its GDP. n95 Skyrocketing oil prices reached a zenith in the summer of 2008, giving Caracas a steady stream of cash to project its power across Central America, South America, and the Caribbean; but prices have since plummeted. As of September 13, 2009, the price for a barrel of oil dropped to around $ 70, which is far less than the inflated prices to which Caracas had grown accustomed. n96 Petroleos de Venezuela, the state oil company, has been a critical part of Chavez's political agenda, helping to not only build roads and shipyards, but to also distribute food and supplies. n97 Although Petroleos once produced as much as 3.4 million barrels a day in 1998, the Council on Foreign Relations, OPEC, the U.S. government, and the International Energy Agency all agree that Venezuela's oil production had fallen to about 2.4 million barrels a day by 2008. n98 Additionally, while Venezuela is producing 33% less oil than it did in 1998, it is nearly 33% more dependent on oil for its export revenue. n99 Recognizing that the domestic oil industry is losing its steam and needs fundamental and structural reforms, in January 2009, the Venezuelan government began courting North American and European oil companies to invest in the country's oil infrastructure, despite the freshness of the wounds left over from the most recent round of oil field nationalizations in 2007. n100 President Chavez's ability to credibly dole out promises of extravagantly expensive development projects around the region was based in large part on oil prices remaining high indefinitely. n101 The high prices of oil insulated Venezuela from experiencing the full impacts of its drop in oil production; but now that oil prices have fallen, Venezuela will have no choice but [\*221] to scale back its oil-based spending. For example, the construction of a refinery in Nicaragua has already been postponed indefinitely. n102 Inflationary concerns will also cabin Venezuela's petro-diplomacy. According to Venezuelan economist Jose Guerra, Venezuela has entered a period of stagflation, a condition where the economy is in recession while inflation rates remain high. n103 In 2009 Venezuela's economy is expected to contract by up to 2.5%, while inflation - already the highest rate in Latin America, and second only to Zimbabwe in the world - is projected to increase beyond 35%, n104 even higher than the eleven-year high of 30.9% set during 2008. n105 The questions swirling around the Venezuelan currency and the government's liquidity raise serious doubts about Venezuela's ability to finance its ambitious domestic projects, as well as its splashy projects abroad, such as ALBA and the Bank of the South. Additionally, Venezuela is increasingly dependent on the United States. Nearly 15% of America's oil imports come from Venezuela, a quantity not impossible to replace. n106 This amounts to nearly 60% of Venezuela's oil output. n107 Despite his firebrand rhetoric, it is clear that Chavez needs the American market more than the American market needs Chavez. He obviously understands this asymmetry, which is why he is trying to diversify his clientele by seeking alternative markets such as China and Iran. n108 Until he finds alternative buyers, however, Chavez's ability to use oil as an "economic weapon" against the U.S. will be severely limited, especially now that the Venezuelan economy is contracting. America should punctuate Venezuela's inability to follow through on its own promises by stepping back into its role as the region's only credible financier. But first, Washington must rehabilitate its image. For eight years President Bush stoked anti-Americanism by erecting diplomatic barriers in Latin America, directly depositing significant capital into Hugo Chavez's political bank account. It is now time to stop those payments by encouraging cooperation with the entire region; there's no better place to start than by warming relations with Cuba.

# Perm

### A2 Perm: 2NC

#### Permutation gives up a key source of leverage – Cuba would pocket the concession

Perez 10 (David A. Perez, J.D. 2010, Yale Law School, “America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department,” Spring 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187)

Use the Embargo as a Bargaining Chip After conducting some initial discussions, both countries can then move on to the embargo. No one argues that the embargo is an effective foreign policy, because it has clearly failed to bring about real reform on the island; the only argument for maintaining the embargo is that it can be used as a bargaining chip for more dialogue - not that in its current state it can lead to a better situation. Put differently, the embargo is only valuable to the extent that its removal can be part of a quid pro quo strategy - not that its maintenance will lead to fundamental reform on the island. n82 This reveals a bifurcated myopia that affects both sides of the debate. On the one hand those who support the embargo as a negotiating chip often gloss over the fact that its continuation will not lead to regime change. On the other hand, those who focus on the embargo's inability to topple the regime and instead support lifting the embargo unconditionally, generally give too little weight to the embargo's value during diplomatic negotiations. The Helms-Burton legislation lays out the rather onerous conditions that must be met on Cuba's end before the U.S. can begin restoring diplomatic relations. n83 The significance of Helms-Burton's restraints cannot be overstated: while a particular president's rhetoric or a particular resolution's wording might chill diplomatic relations between two countries, Helms-Burton's arduous provisions freeze relations. The onus to thaw that freeze is properly placed upon Washington, rather than Havana. It is therefore incumbent upon the United States to change its own laws before any rapprochement with Cuba can begin. Invariably the debate surrounding America's embargo revolves around its solvency: has it worked? The question should instead be reworded to ask: will current U.S. policy work from here on out to achieve certain definable interests? The United States sold the island over $ 700 million in goods in 2008, accounting for 40% of the island's agricultural imports. n84 That number seems to indicate that Cuba's trading relationship with the U.S. is not of [\*217] trivial importance to the island's leadership. However, the strength of this relationship may steadily diminish relative to other trading partners in the next few years. For example, over the next five to seven years Cuba will have an increased energy productivity stemming from its coastal drilling operations that will bring it closer to Spain, Canada, Norway, Brazil, and India. n85 With these relatively stable flows of capital, Cuba will increasingly become insulated from U.S. economic pressure. The moment to decisively influence Cuba's government through economic pressure may have never existed, but if it did, it has surely passed. The notion that the U.S. can intricately craft Cuba's governmental and domestic policies by applying a combination of economic and political pressure must be rejected either as categorically false, or as an anachronism of the early 1990s. During her confirmation hearings, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said "that it is not time to lift the embargo on Cuba, especially since it provides an important source of leverage for further change on the island." n86 Secretary Clinton is correct: the embargo definitely provides a valuable bargaining chip during negotiations, and should not be lifted unconditionally. But given this evidence, the Obama Administration should be suspect of claims that the embargo gives the U.S. decisive leverage over Cuba.

# \*\*\*Aff Answers

## 2AC

### 2AC: Brazil Says No

#### Brazil will tank the agreement

Erikson 10 (Daniel P. Erikson, Senior Associate for US policy and Director of Caribbean programs,

Inter-American Dialogue, The Centre for International Governance Innovation, “The Obama Administration and Latin America: Towards a New Partnership?,” Working Paper No. 46 April 2010)

Brazil, with the world’s fifth largest population and tenth largest economy, is similarly interested in a realignment of global power that recognizes its political and economic heft. Unlike Venezuela, however, it has been careful to ensure that its pursuit of this goal does not veer into open conflict with the US. Indeed, Brazilian President Lula enjoyed one of the warmest relationships with President Bush of any Latin American leader, and the personal rapport between Obama and Lula has been even warmer (see Marinis, 2010). Still, Brazilian opposition to the FTAA helped fuel its demise in 2005, and the country has clashed with the US in world trade talks as a leader of the G77 group of developing countries that includes China, India and South Africa. Brazil’s aggressive bid to win a permanent seat on the UN Security Council has led Lula on a global tour to garner support for the country’s global aspirations. Brazilian diplomacy has focused on positioning Brazil as a leader in world affairs ready to hold the US at arm’s length when necessary (see Simpson, 2010).

### 2AC: Argentina Says No

#### **Argentina will block the agreement**

Daremblum 11 (Jaime Daremblum, Senior Fellow and Director of Hudson's Center for Latin American Studies, Ambassador of Costa Rica to the United States, professor at the University of Costa Rica, “Has Argentina Joined the Chávez Bloc?,” March 2011 <http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/ArgentinaFinal.pdf>)

Néstor Kirchner took office at a precarious moment in Argentine history. The country was still recovering from a disastrous financial crisis and currency devaluation that had occurred in 2001 and 2002. Like other Argentine leftists, Kirchner blamed the economic implosion on “neoliberal,” free-market policies implemented during the 1990s. But this argument was totally unpersuasive. As journalist Michael Reid explained in his book Forgotten Continent, “What killed Argentina’s economy in 2001 was not ‘neoliberalism’ or the free-market reforms, but a fiscal policy incompatible with the exchange-rate regime, and a lack of policy flexibility.” Indeed, “Contrary to many claims, Argentina’s policy mix was in direct contravention of the Washington Consensus.” Moreover, the reforms that helped pull the country out of crisis were actually “neoliberal” initiatives championed by Roberto Lavagna, who served as Argentine economy minister from 2002 until 2005. The New York Times correctly described Lavagna as “the main architect” of the Argentine recovery. Nevertheless, Kirchner promoted a false storyline about the crisis, and he fired Lavagna in 2005. For Kirchner and his supporters, the Argentine default was attributable to U.S.style policies, and the solution was massive government spending and heavy-handed intervention in the economy. Kirchner borrowed heavily from the Chávez playbook, with its emphasis on populism, class warfare, and fierce denunciations of private enterprise. He nationalized the postal service, the largest water utility, telecommunications, and railways, among other things. Kirchner also took a somewhat authoritarian approach to Argentina’s legal institutions and independent media. Meanwhile, he pursued warmer relations with Caracas and remained cool toward Washington. The 2005 Summit of the Americas left no doubt about his hostility toward free-market economics and the United States, or about his willingness to indulge the antics of his Venezuelan counterpart. Held in the Argentine resort city of Mar del Plata, the summit became a carnival of violent anti-U.S. demonstrations and Chávez-led rallies. The Venezuelan radical addressed tens of thousands of supporters at a soccer stadium close to the summit. He brazenly declared that the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) would be buried in Mar del Plata. (“Each one of us brought a shovel, a gravedigger’s shovel,” Chávez said.) Celebrity protesters included the former Argentine soccer star Diego Maradona. As the Washington Post reported, “Hundreds of protesters had traveled through the night from Buenos Aires in a mass pilgrimage led by Maradona. Carrying signs comparing Bush to Adolf Hitler, the protesters chanted in unison as they filed into the stadium: ‘Bush, the fascist! Bush the terrorist!’” During the formal summit negotiations, Kirchner strongly opposed the FTAA and helped scuttle its adoption. His role in torpedoing the free-trade plan drew criticism from Mexican president Vicente Fox, a robust FTAA advocate. Kirchner responded to this criticism by suggesting that Fox was a U.S. lackey. Chávez also called him “a puppet of the empire.” Later that month, the Argentine and Venezuelan presidents held “unity” 3 talks and signed multiple energy pacts, with Kirchner agreeing to support Venezuela’s entry into Mercosur, the South American trade bloc. Kirchner and Chávez also discussed future energy projects and the creation of a Latin American investment fund.

### 2AC: FTAA Doesn’t Solve

#### Counterplan results in coercive negotiating and fails to help Latin American economies

Carranza 4 (Dr. Mario E. Carranza, Associate Professor of Political Science, Texas A & M University-Kingsville; Ph.D., University of Chicago; a specialist in regional integration in the Western hemisphere and nuclear proliferation in South Asia, “Latin American Perspective: MERCOSUR, The Free Trade Area Of The Americas, And The Future Of U.S. Hegemony In Latin America,” Fordham International Law Journal, February 2004, 27 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1029)

[\*1038] The novelty of hegemonic stability theory is the claim that smaller States gain even more than the international hegemon when the latter provides the public good of leadership for the emergence of a stable international regime of free trade. n27 This claim is clearly unwarranted in the U.S./Latin American context. Several studies have shown that if a NAFTA-style Free Trade Area of the Americas comes into existence, the United States will obtain greater benefits than its Latin American counterparts will. "It is highly doubtful that Latin American countries stand to gain much from entering into an arrangement which gives their rich counterparts -- the USA and Canada -- a much greater preferential market access than the latter are able to offer in return... . Discriminatory liberalization with the United States under these circumstances is unlikely to confer major gains and will, very likely, lower welfare." n28 If Mexico's experience with NAFTA is of any guide, the Latin American countries are not likely to benefit from the FTAA, unless the United States truly opens its large market to Latin American agricultural and industrial exports. In 1995, the Salinas miracle collapsed together with the Mexican peso crisis. As a result, employment in manufacturing fell, the poorly paid informal sector of the economy grew, and assets became more concentrated. Average wages for most of Mexico's industrial workers dropped 10% since the early 1990s... . Relative social spending has declined since the late 1980s. The North American Development Bank has yet to have a major impact on cleaning up the U.S.-Mexican border... . Many Mexicans have not yet supped at the table of free trade prosperity. n29 According to two World Bank experts, "overall, full Free Trade Agreement preferences would raise Latin American exports only 8 or 9[%] ... U.S. trade gains, particularly for highly protected transport and machinery products, are likely to be considerably greater than those for Latin America are in the U.S. market." n30 [\*1039] Opposition to the FTAA in Latin America is widespread, because it is perceived as a narrow, free-market oriented agreement, "a brainchild of big business, whose interests it would serve from start to finish." n31 On the other hand, the United States presents itself as a benevolent hegemon, attempting to debunk the myths of the FTAA as an instrument of U.S. predatory hegemony. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative has produced a series of fact sheets on the FTAA trying to prove that (a) NAFTA has been a huge success for the United States and its NAFTA partners, n32 (b) far from spreading poverty, "free trade and open markets are among the most powerful tools available to fight poverty," n33 and (c) the FTAA would not provide excessive privileges to U.S. corporations, such as the right to sue governments to overturn laws. n34 Despite the U.S. rhetoric on the benefits of free trade in the Americas, after the Cancun debacle in September 2003 the United States has deployed a coercive, rather than benevolent, diplomacy. According to hegemonic stability theory, n355 "when power is distributed asymmetrically but hegemony is exercised in ways that do not benefit all states, subordinate states will chafe under the (coercive) leadership." n36 After Cancun, the United States used its structural power, attempting to destroy the Group of twenty-two developing nations that stood their ground in the WTO negotiations. Economic threats and reprisals were delivered against the Latin American nations that had stood with Brazil at Cancun: The impoverished island nations of the Caribbean were told they could forget about their newly negotiated US trade agreement. They folded. Central American countries were threatened with loss of the modest trade preferences... already granted to their products. Costa Rica...was hammered [\*1040] - privatize your energy and telecommunications sectors or be left in the cold - and gave in. Peru and Colombia both resigned from Lula's group... . Within a few weeks, Lula's G-22 coalition had shrunk to the G-12. n37

### 2AC: Links to Politics

#### The Counterplan makes the ag lobby really angry

Stencel 8 (John Stencel, Past President of Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, “Sutton Colloquium Article: Free Trade Versus Fair Trade,” Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, Summer / Fall 2008 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 36 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 349)

Farmers Union has always been a proponent of fair trade. As trade agreements have been negotiated, and as federal farm policy has shifted to the "free market" approach, Farmers Union has remained steadfast in its call for fairness, accountability, and benchmarks for success in trade negotiations. Farmers Union policy implies they support free trade, as long as it is fair trade. n3 National Farmers Union supports a fair trade system that protects the economic well-being, health and environmental concerns, working conditions and labor rights of our country's producers as well as producers in all other countries. n4 In the race to become the world's least-cost producer, individual farmers and ranchers are left to fend for themselves in global markets, while the processors and consumers enjoy the benefits of cheap commodities. [\*350] After the breakdown of the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations in 2003, n5 the United States' trade negotiators have instead tried to complete free trade agreements with many other countries and regions in bilateral and multilateral agreements, namely the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement, n6 the Australia Free Trade Agreement, n7 and the Free Trade Area of the Americas. n8 While each of these may seem to be minor in overall scope, collectively they could do great damage to our country's agricultural economy. Many times in recent years, Farmers Union has been a lone voice in the agriculture community, the only purveyor of reason and perspective when it came to agricultural trade. Yet, the influence of the free trade ideology continued to grow and pervade our public policy decisions.

### 2AC: Trade Now Solves Impact

#### US-Latin America Trade Vibrant Now – solves the net benefit

Llobet 10 (Gabriela Llobet, law degree from the University of Costa Rica, a Master of Law in international trade from Georgetown University and a Master of Law in Environmental Law from George Washington University,

Harvard Latino Law and Policy Conference: “Building Bridges: Connecting the US and Latin America: April 23-25, 2009: The 2009 Summit of the Americas and What it Means for Latin America,”

So why do I think that trade is important to be dealt with in the region? Because we do have a significant portion of trade amongst our countries. Twenty percent of total U.S. exports in 2008 went to Latin America. Latin [\*130] American and the Caribbean is the third trade partner behind Asia and the E.U to the U.S. and fifty-eight percent of total Latin American and the Caribbean exports just last year went to the U.S. Obviously, also the trade of goods has been growing ever since 2000. We think this tendency will continue so if we do have this amount of trade, this significant amount of trade, why don't we have a regional basis or a regional set of rules to address this trade? Interestingly enough is to see the type of exports and the type of products that come from Latin America and the Caribbean to the U.S. or that are also imported into Latin America from the U.S. I think here just to highlight that yes, a lot, as was mentioned yesterday by Insulza, a lot of the trade goes into mineral fuel oils of some of the countries. See Peru, Bolivia, Colombia and Ecuador, obviously Venezuela as well. Ninety-five percent of its exports to the U.S. are fuel oil or comes into that category. See some of the other products that are coming from Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile - copper, Panama - fish. And interestingly enough this is something just to think further on how trade capacity building and trade promotion, trade diversification strategies within the region can help countries start exporting other things apart from raw materials which is what we are seeing right now, which is happening right now and seeing how we can help countries diversify their exports and move into other areas as what seems to be the case of Costa Rica, definitely if you see the percentages, and Mexico as well. As regards in investment, FDI from foreign direct investment from the U.S. in Latin America has grown one percent every year since 2004. So yes, there is an important U.S. investor presence in the Latin American region. Global FDI has reached very significant numbers and foreign direct investment coming from the U.S. to the region has represented more than half percent of the total FDI that has been received in the region. So again, I think that this data shows that we have very close ties both in trade and investment and that a set of rules to address this and to protect investors on the one hand and to continue to promote this tendency and protect this tendency is needed and is something that can be of ideal to the countries. As regards the type of flows of investment flows that we have Brazil and Chile have the largest foreign direct investment growth rates in the last for years of the whole Latin American region. Brazil received 35 Billion dollars in total foreign direct investment. Twenty-four percent of that comes from the U.S. In the case of Chile, we are talking about 15 Billion U.S. dollars. Fifteen percent of that comes from the U.S. and the significant increases in both countries were related to natural resource manufacturing. That's what accounts currently for a large proportion of FDI. And just because I'm of Costa Rica with of course much less numbers, we definitely have much less numbers as regards FDI but fifty percent of that comes from the U.S. and that has been the tendency over the years. Not related to natural resource manufacturing but mostly related to multi-national or U.S. based companies that are seeking to produce in an efficient way in Costa Rica in the area of high-tech manufacturing. Thirty-seven percent of that fifty percent [\*131] is related to that [high-tech manufacturing]. ICT, which is information or communication technology services: nine percent. Or real estate infrastructure: thirty-four percent.

### 2AC: No Impact

#### Heg doesn’t prevent conflict

Crawford 3 (Timothy W., Professor of Political Science – Boston College, Pivotal Deterrence: Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 209-210)

*Forward Engagement, Global Leadership, and U.S. Pivotal Deterrence*

As the preponderant power in a globalized and interdependent world, the United States—so we are told—must embrace "forward engagement" and "global leadership." Depending on one's preferred partisan formula, it must either "address problems early before they become crises," or "shape circumstances before crises emerge."9 In these slogans there is a strong whiff of an enduring nostrum. As an early twentieth century writer put it, "the secret of foreign policy" is that "a nation cannot be merely pas­sive ... a nation should in every line take the most vigorous initiative."10 Or, as President George W. Bush put it in September 2002, "In the world that we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of ac­tion."11 Those who trumpet such an activist posture tend only to see peaceful consequences resulting from forward engagement. For them "American power is now the linchpin of stability in every region, from Europe to Asia to the Persian Gulf to Latin America."12 They rarely concede that the strong prospect of U.S. involvement in regional conflicts may not always cause sta­bility but instead cause instability. But the incentives (if not the underlying motives) that lead some to aggress will often be shaped by optimism about outside involvement.13 We should not assume that the forces of globaliza­tion that justify U.S. activism and incline the international community toward intervention do not also play into the strategies of regional adver­saries. It is naive to think that they, with survival at stake, do not gird for war keenly aware of the opportunities as well as dangers posed by inter­vention by the United States or other outside actors. There is thus no reason to assume that forward U.S. engagement will re­inforce regional stability and promote peaceful change. Because the United States may significantly influence the outcome of many conflicts, that po­tential must be seen for what it is; something that, by looming so large, may encourage as well discourage revisionism. If the massive risks of running afoul of U.S. power are a deterrent "shaping" the intentions of some re­gional antagonists, the potential windfall of securing U.S. support will shape the intentions of others. Because the benefits of enlisting U.S. support in a war may be enormous, even the slim chance of doing so may goad a party to act provocatively, become inflexible in negotiations, or otherwise do things that make war likely. In sum, forward U.S. engagement may fuel disintegrative as well as integrative tendencies in world politics and "jiggle loose" as many deadly conflicts as it knits back together.

#### Hegemony isn’t true – data’s on our side

Fettweis, 11 (Christopher J., Department of Political Science, Tulane University, “Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy”, 9/26, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, Ebsco)

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. **Evidently the rest of the world can** operate quite effectively **without the presence of a global policeman**. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

#### Historically true

Layne 97 (Christopher, Visiting Professor – Naval Postgraduate School, From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing)

Two critical objections could be lodged against an offshore balancing grand strategy: an offshore balancing strategy would increase—not lower—the risk of U.S. involvement in a major war, and the strategy of preponderance should not be abandoned because its benefits exceed its costs. Advocates of preponderance believe it is ifiusory to think that the United States can disengage from international commitments, because it inevitably would be drawn into major wars even if initially it tried to remain aloof. The example of Europe is frequently invoked: whenever a major European war breaks out, it is said, the United States invariably is compelled to intervene. Preponderance’s advocates also claim that U.S. security commitments in Europe and East Asia are a form of insurance: it is cheaper and safer for the United States to retain its security commitments and thereby deter wars from happening than to stand on the sidelines only to be compelled to intervene later under what presumably would be more dangerous conditions. Yet this argument is unsupported by the historical record, and it is not evident that the strategy of preponderance will in fact minimize the risk of U.S. involvement in future wars.