## 1NC

#### Economic engagement with Latin America strengthens the hands of exploitative capital.

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Introduction In the last three decades, the Americas, with the exception of Cuba, have undergone a rapid and multifaceted process of globalization driven by transboundary alliances of elites at both the global centre and its periphery. This order of things is being presently challenged by a reconfiguration of political domestic and regional forces intent in redefining inter-American relations. In the 1980s, northern elites, in agreement with their southern counterparts, imposed structural adjustment policies on Latin American and Caribbean nations in order to "solve" their debt crises. In so doing they created a transnational regime with a legal infrastructure to solidify such structural changes. This Pax Americana tied the hands of national governments in favour of transnational capital and, thus, transformed the state into a mere collaborative regulator of the private sector. The state was weakened with the promise of "low-intensity democratization," uneven and highly inequitable growth, and widespread corruption. Moreover, the much-heralded democratic transition in Latin America has not been synonymous with the entrenchment of participatory practices nor with responsible government, let alone with the enhancement of human dignity. The "safe,""limited;' and substantially meaningless democracy brokered and supported by Washington and the famous unilateral Consensus impeded more than facilitated the emergence of a sustainable security community for the Americas, as does the persistence of neoliberal economic dogmatism and the rebirth of national security doctrines designed to fight elusive and perpetual global enemies from terrorism to criminality. De-democratization and authoritarianism throughout the hemisphere are the political corollary of these profoundly reactionary socio-economic processes and alliances. The net result is a significant deterioration of the security of most people and the generation of democratic deficits, not only south of the Rio Grande but also in North America. The New Pax Americana Following the explorations initiated in the 1980s by Robert Cox, Stephen Gill, Richard Fagen, and Terry-Lynn Karl, we propose to examine Latin America and the Caribbean in the context of a new hegemonic framework. Going beyond traditional and somewhat disembodied conceptions of realism, regime theory, and dependency, this proposed conceptualization examines complex interactions around military and economic instruments that exhibit both coercion and consensus. This approach draws on Robert Cox's analysis of historical structures in order to re-examine the changing mechanisms of hegemony developed by the region's transnational elites since the end of World War II. In his Approaches to world order (1996) Cox identifies three categories offactors-ideas, material conditions, and institutions-that interact dialectically on three levels: social forces, states, and world orders. He distinguishes two periods germane to our study of the Americas: the Pax Americana proper ( 1945-1964) and the period of"non-hegemonic condition" which starts in 1964. Retrospectively, the older version of Pax Americana at the continental scalewhat Cox called Pax Americana-originated with the 1947 Rio Treaty. This event signaled the rise to the Cold War in the continent; the political side of the Keynesian World Order. This world order was expressed regionally over a decade later in the Alliance for Progress, a project created as a response to the Cuban Revolution. It was a policy initiative based on development as the soft side of counterinsurgency. Its intellectual foundation was modernization theory and area studies, which constructed "Latin America and the Caribbean" as a contested geo-economic and strategic space. In light of the perceived and illusive communist threat in the hemisphere, hegemony was maintained through concessions and incentives to local elites in the form of development projects and foreign aid. However, this approach always rested on military force and counterinsurgency as instruments of last resort. By the mid-1960s this regional order gave way to a period that Cox called "non-hegemonic condition;' in which the elite was not hegemonic any more but merely dominant. During this period, concessions were ignoredalthough not totally eliminated- and the mechanisms of control shifted towards support for military dictatorships. This project involved the combination of the internationalization of production and finance with the implementation of Milton Friedman's monetarism, leading to the 1982 debt crisis. The factors and levels that Cox identified in his examination ofworld orders are in a state of constant flux and thus, over time, new concepts may be required to explain shifting realities. Re-thinking Cox's periodization from a non-US standpoint, we have identified a third period in inter-American relations: the "new" Pax Americana. Beginning in the 1980s, this revised US strategy attempted to solve the debt problem that had emerged in Latin America and the Caribbean through the imposition of structural adjustment conditionalities and a transnational legal framework that weakened local governments in favor of transnational capital. "Old" social concessions were eliminated while politico-ideological adjustments such as democratization, the elimination of corruption, and poverty reduction became the hegemonic instrumentalities and discourses of choice. During this period there was a geo-economic and strategic reconfiguration of space: from "Latin America and the Caribbean" to "the Americas." This reconfiguration of space included all the nations in the hemisphere, with the conspicuous absence of Cuba, under US leadership. Free trade and foreign investment accelerated the interconnectedness of the system. However, this also increased mutual vulnerability as "the weakness of the periphery increases the exposure of the centre, making the entire configuration, including the centre, more unstable" (Nef 1999, 13). Examining 'the Americas' Mirroring the abovementioned geo-economic and strategic reconfiguration of space, our study takes a critical approach to the elite's construction of the Americas. As Karl and Fagen (1986) suggested decades ago, the paradigm developed by experts to analyze Eastern Europe can be applied to the Americas. This conceptual framework posited that Eastern Europe was an integrated region where Soviet elites enjoyed relational control or metapower over its satellites. Thus, the study of individual countries and of the region as a whole began from the premise of penetrated political systems, not sovereign entities. The relatively permeable borders of the Western Hemisphere continuously experience formal and informal asymmetrical interpenetration. Northern elites, in alliance with their Latin American and Caribbean counterparts, exert relational control or metapower over other subordinate groups in the region. This process is framed within a dominant and messianic economic, ideological, and cultural matrix, which is as dogmatic and compelling as its Soviet equivalent. In this complex exchange system, capital, technology, and ideology flow south, while profits and migrants flow north. 1 Latin America and the Caribbean are integrated in a hub-and-spokes relationship with the United States. There is a growing asymmetry in the limited free trade arrangements known as NAFTA, CFTA-DR, and the presently paralyzed FTAA. Military integration under the Rio Treaty-and the letter's structural and ideological mechanisms-has been a fact of life since World War II, much longer in Central America. For contemporary US elites, what lies south of the Rio Grande continues to be simultaneously perceived as a resource-rich El Dorado and as a cultural and political threat. In this sense, almost echoing Theodore Roosevelt's characterization, the South is constructed as a source of evil in the form of narcotics, illegal aliens, and undesirable values. This American perceived threat has also emerged "indoors" in the form of a growing Hispanic population within the United States (Huntington 2004). Although the Americas are one of the richest continents on the globe, distributional inequity throughout the region, deeply rooted in powerlessness and exclusion, has not only continued to exist, but has become increasingly more pronounced. The region contains three geopolitical giants: the United States, Canada, and Brazil. Two of these are the most prosperous countries in the world: one of them is a global superpower, and the other has persistently had one of the highest scores in the United Nations Human Development Index. Latin America, in contrast, (including Brazil) continues to be "the region of the planet with the worst [distribution] indicators," according to a 2004 report by the United Nations Economic Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean. The same report estimated that by 2002, forty-four per cent of the population was below the poverty line and over nineteen per cent lived in extreme poverty (ECLAC 2004, 1, 5). This means that two out of every five Latin Americans are poor and survive under precarious circumstances. To understand this hemisphere as a whole, the notion of rich versus poor countries is misleading: wealthy individuals reside in poor countries and poor people exist in richer countries. The abysmal gap between the rich and poor within all of the countries in the Americas continues to expand. By most statistical accounts and with very few exceptions (Haiti, Honduras, Bolivia, and Nicaragua), the nations south of the Rio Grande comprise the upper layer of the Third World.2 But poverty and exclusion are not just Latin American or Third World traits. For all its wealth and power, the United States has nearly fourteen per cent of its population living in permanent poverty and its income distribution has persistently worsened over the last decades. In 2000, the top one per cent of the US population earned on average 88.5 times as much as the lowest twenty per cent (Hogan 2005, 1). Poverty and income inequality have also risen in Canada where, in 2003, almost sixteen per cent of the population was under the poverty line (CIA 2006). Above and beyond the differences that exist between the nations of the Americas, what is patently clear is a growing structural interconnectivity between the North and th e South of the Western Hemisphere. This realization points towards the need to study the Americas as the elites' social construction of space. In fact, as Boas, Marchand, and Shaw have pointed out, "regionalization can be seen as an integral part of globalization processes, i.e. the transformation of the global political economy (GPE)" (1999, 900) .

#### Neoliberal engagement in the Americas ensures structural violence, environmental collapse and insecurity. Our impact subsumes the case.

Jorge **NEF** Director of Latin American and Caribbean Studies @ South Florida **‘8** “Insecurity, Development, and Democracy” in *Capital, Power, and Inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean* eds. Harris and Nef p. 142-147

Thus, from a long-range structural perspective, social upheavals, some of them violent, have not withered away in the region, although their manifestations have changed. My analysis strongly suggests that the politics of limited democratization combined with neoliberal economics, while an improvement over the atrocious human rights abuses of the military dictatorships, imposes built-in constraints that block the realization of a truly stable and sustainable system of democratic politics in the Americas. Nor is this combination of limited democracy with neoliberalism a guarantee against expanding corruption and widespread popular alienation. In fact, the opposite seems to be the case. Moreover, if the neoliberal economic policies continue to fail to produce a better standard of living for the alienated majorities (as is currently the case throughout the Americas), and should the structural crisis deepen, these civilian regimes will likely be replaced once again by repressive civil-military regimes in the name of national security. A subtler form of national security ideology is the cultural "software" of the security establishments in most countries of the Americas and a regular staple in the training of the military, police, and paramilitary forces throughout the hemisphere. The "Communist" subversion of yesteryear is being replaced by new internal enemies: "terrorism," "anarchy," and "drug traffickers." In fact, anything that threatens the investment climate, or the core elites' interests, qualifies as a threat to national security and as a candidate for enemy status. Growing U.S. military involvement, as in Plan Colombia, is a case in point. Moreover, the post-9/11 atmosphere has had a most deleterious effect on the prospects for democracy in the Americas because it has given those in control of the U.S. government the opportunity to assume a hard-line "counterterrorist" posture that justifies authoritarian measures and the violation of civil rights. As the entire region becomes more closely integrated, a potentially dysfunctional system of mutual vulnerability is taking shape. Its impact on the life of millions throughout the Americas could be catastrophic. The preservation of the status quo points toward scenarios where unemployment, poverty, violence, criminality, health hazards, environmental threats, drug addiction, refugee flows, massive population displacements, repression, and environmental decay feed upon each other and transcend national boundaries. The regional drug-trading regime is a dramatic illustration of this interconnectedness. The ties that link the drug trade together begin with peasant producers in the economically depressed Andean region and include the crime syndicates that produce, transport, and import these addictive commodities, the corrupt officials who assist them, the local retailers who sell the drugs, and the end users, ranging from the destitute to those in high social standing. Under these circumstances, the linkages of mutual vulnerability between North and South and their multiple accelerators, including the contingent mode of labor relations, create a spiraling lose-lose situation: a negatives core game. Without profound changes in both the societies of the South and the North, the possibility of arresting or reversing the existing serious threats to human security will remain doubtful. Short of a radical reorganization of the pattern of governance throughout the Americas, including decision making, accountability, and regional cooperation, multiple and critical dysfunctions are likely to increase within these societies. In recent years, the Americas have been undergoing a rapid and multidimensional process of globalization, a term often used synonymously with modernization and Americanization (Fukuyama 1999).14 But this process has not necessarily benefited most countries, let alone their people, as Geoffrey Garrett ( 2004) has observed: Middle-income countries have not done nearly as well under globalized markets as either richer or poorer countries, and the ones that have globalized the most have fared the worst .... The ultimate irony facing globalization's missing middle may be that the more the free trade project flounders in Latin America, the greater will be the pressure on people in the region to migrate to the United States. Migration will, in turn, squeeze employment and wages for the American manufacturing middle class even more. (Garrett 2004, 96) Globalization does not involve just a series of purely random, mechanically preordained stages of development operating outside the realm of concrete actors' interests, objectives, and rules. Rather, this process unfolds within a system of intentional regulations (and deregulations) that affect the very way the "game" of globalization and its outcomes play out. Globalization in the Americas is not exempt from these eminently political regulatory policies, which the global actors can create and change. Politics still matters, and what matters in politics is who governs. Regional security cannot be equated with short-term business confidence, the magic of the marketplace, or a messianic vision of a hemispheric "Manifest Destiny," or "wars" on terrorism, or fending off the "Hispanic threat" (Huntington 2004). On the other hand, a breakdown of democratic development, prosperity, and equity, together with the increase of tensions in the more volatile regions of the hemisphere, would have a direct and most deleterious effect upon the well-being and security of the people all over the Americas. The weakness of democratic institutions and their inability to move from democratic transition and elected plutocracies to the consolidation of popular rule is a critical structural flaw in the security system of the Western Hemisphere. As a 2005 report from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) in Sweden indicates (see table 5.2), Key democratic institutions in the Americas are not performing to the entire satisfaction of citizens. Some segments of the population feel and are effectively excluded from politics and its processes, particularly women, youth and indigenous peoples. In many countries, democratic institutions remain weak, especially political parties and representative bodies. Politicians are mistrusted everywhere, yet the majority of Latin Americans say that political parties are vital to democracy. Once in office, Latin American governments often fail to forge the political alliances needed to govern and to facilitate needed reforms (otherwise known as a "crisis of governability"). (IDEA 2005) A similar observation could be made of North America (Stoker 2006, 36-37). It is becoming obvious that the Cold War's end did not automatically bring about a Fukuyama-type scenario of the "end of History," with global prosperity, peace, and democracy for all (Fukuyama 1989). The two-decade-old democratic transition in the region has not been synonymous with either the entrenchment of participatory practices or with responsible government, let alone with the enhancement of human dignity. The "safe," "limited," "low-intensity," and substantially meaningless democracy brokered and supported by Washington and encapsulated in the famous, unilateral "Washington Consensus" is fundamentally flawed. This model of democratic development, peddled by transition theorists and the neoauthoritarians at the core of the hemispheric order, impedes more than facilitates the emergence of a sustainable security community for the whole region. So does the persistence of neoliberal economic dogmatism and the rebirth of national security doctrines designed to fight elusive and perpetual global enemies. That narrowly defined concept of military security as practiced in the Americas is, in fact, a major cause of insecurity. This link underpins the insurmountable contradiction between globalization and militarization (Benftez-Manaut 2004, 59). In this context, real regime change throughout the Americas is a necessary condition for human security and the well-being of the vast majority of its peoples.

### 1NC – K Prior

#### The 1AC exemplifies neoliberal political economies of knowledge. North American institutions and forms of knowledge displace the global South by making American society the measure of everything and everyone else.

Eduardo **MENDIETA** Philosophy @ Stony Brook **‘5** RE-MAPPING LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES: POSTCOLONIALISM, SUBALTERN STUDIES,POSTOCCIDENTALISM AND GLOBALIZATION THEORY *Dispositio* 25 (52) p. 190-196

Postmodern theories do not digress or divert too much from this epistemograph. The ontograph continues to be Europe, and the locus of reason or rationalization continues to be the Euro-modern institutions, but now as those that have been exhausted, or which have arrived at their logical extremes. The normative focus is the critique to the onto-teleology of the homogenizing and suicidal logos of modernity. As a critique of the rational project of modernity, and its violent univocity, postmodern theories become the celebration of and reverence for alterity, which includes what is most singular, all of that which belies the triumph of Weber's iron cage of modernity. However, this other that is supposedly placed on a pedestal is merely the other face of the self-sameness of modernity's "I conquer" that Dussel has studied and unmasked so eloquently. Politically, the consequences are that all projects of emancipation are pronounced exhausted at best or totalitarian at worst. Every project of social transformation that would be designed and projected from outside of the matrix of modernity is deemed to have failed and to have been genocidal. Here we have the same phenomenon of the impossibility for the other to speak for himself or herself. The fixture is closed. Since the west has arrived at its own exhaustion then it is impossible to conceive of the future in any different form. In this way, and once again, criticism is neutralized and silenced. Responsibility for the Other is recognized, but this is unfulfillable because the great narratives of modernity that supported the possibility of being responsible for the Other have been extinguished. Clearly we have here a subject that abrogates for itself the authority of speaking for others, and furthermore, it says that not even they are able to speak since the languages of liberation and responsibility have become anachronisms. The locus of enunciation is then the very same institutions, academic as well as of quotidian life, of the modern countries, which also announce that no other path is acceptable. For subjects located in this locus enunciationis the end of modernity has become the end of history tout court. Until now I have been discussing chronologically a series of theories, and have been offering a diagnosis, or an analysis that looks at how these theories have power-knowledge effects. Following this chronological line the next series of theories would be globalization theories. But at the same time a whole host of theories that compete with globalization have emerged. Such competition can be expressed in the following way: Where are the discourses about globalization localized with respect to the discourses of modernity and posmodernity, on the one hand, and where are they with respect to the discourses of postcolonialism and post-occidental- ism? A note of clarification about the nomenclature is in order. I want to suggest that the distinction between one group of theories or discourses is not just chronological, but is fundamentally related to the place from which and about they theorize. In so far as the discourses of globalization seem to have become the discourses of a pax Americana, that is, in so far as they are discourses about the celebration of the triumph of so-called democracy, and the defeat of the Soviet project, and therefore, of the triumph of neoliberalism, and, in so far as the discourses of globalization are understood prima- rily from the standpoint of an economic, technological and even political perspective (that is, in so far as globalization is understood as the planetarization of an economic, technological, and political system), then we have to see these discourses as principally about who the West globalizes, that is modernizes, the world. Again, if we accept the discourses of White House and Pentagon apologists, à la Huntington and Fukayama, then the discourses on globalization are the renewal of the triumphant discourses of modernity. Globalization thus becomes a modernized modernity, an actual- ized and updated modernity, and a second modernity to use Ulrich Beck's term. Globalization is the new name for modernity, but now seen from the United States, which have become the inheritors of the Western project. If Europe modernized, now the United States globalizes. The goal, the means, and the justification are the same. For this reason a radiography of globalization will make evident how this is a theorization that continues to trace and шар the same epistemograph or ontograph that modernity traced. Europe and the United States are the vortices of globalization. Evidently, positions like those of Canclini and Robertson have shown how globaliza- tion is as much the projection of the local as it is also the acculturation of the global, and for this reason it is more appropriate to talk of glocalization. Canclini, furthermore, has shown how the supposedly pre-modern or so- called traditional is an investure, or a form of fitting and appropriating trans-national, modernizing, and globalizing projects. Using the language of Hobsbawn, the pre-modern and the traditional are inventions of the mod- ern - the modern cannot be defined without inventing that which is its opposite (see also Eric Wolf, The People without History). And as Canclini shows, it is for this reason that hybridity is an already globalized strategy entering modernity, or a modern strategy to access globality. Yet, both Canclini and Roberston illustrate exactly what it is that I am circling around, namely the need to shift the epistemological locus of enunciation. For in order to accept Canclini's and Robertson's corrections requires that we see globalization as a global process in which there is not one agent, one soci- ety that globalizes, or one catalyst that inaugurates or accelerates an alleg- edly inevitable process, but a plurality of agents, both cultural and social, that transform in unexpected ways the directions and telos of globalization. The difference between globalization and modernity is that the first seems to have abandoned all strong universalistic claims and pretensions, as was fundamental to modernity. While modernity operated on the logic of an onto-teleology, globalization transfers its alibi to a naturalized history of social development. History is the realm of contingency and chaos, but it also abides by the rules of selection and elimination that control the organic world. What survives is selected out. If it has survived, it is because it has been selected by nature. In fact, globalization presents itself as a second nature, as something that is inevitable. Globalization will happen, regard- less of whether we want it or not. The formulation is that we are already globalized, or rather; that whomever does not want to be globalized will be despite his or her own desires. Globalization, then, is a new philosophy of history that does not tell us that the telos that guides everything is in the future, but instead tells us that the future is already here. There is no future, because we are already in the future. Here it would be fitting to appropriate Habermas' expression and say that globalization constitutes a closure of the horizon of the future. There are no other futures, since we already live in it And this is precisely what Microsoft suggests when it asks in its commer- cials: where do you want to go today? Everything is at our disposal and within our reach. Postmodern cynicism is synthesized with the plenipoten- tiary and absolutist logic of modernity, and thus we have the discourses of globalization. Turning to our criteria, we could say then that the institutional locus is Euro-North American politics, economics and technology. It is obvious that neither Indian, African, Nicaraguan, nor even French technology can globalize. Politically, the effect once again is of the neutralization of all critique. Who would want to stand in the way of the inevitable and logical path of social development? Of course, there are resistances, but these are caricaturized as Luddites and counter-moderns, a type of anti- modern romanticisms. There is one difference with respect to both modernity and postmodernity: the discourses of globalization pretend to situate themselves beyond the borders of Europe and the United States. Here one could say that they share certain preoccupations and methodologies with the postcolonial and postoccidentalist theories. Globalization theories pretend to think the world from the perspective of the Other. However, all that they can see or think is themselves. Put differently, they go to the Other in order to see only themselves. In this form the locus of enunciation is the world, as a horizon of knowledge and concern, but what it enacts is a negation of this very locus of enunciation - for the world is not the world of cultural, social, and technological heterogeneity, but of a mere tabula rasa for the actualization of one global design. Postcolonial theories began as a methodological critique of Marxism, and they were first elaborated in regions and countries that have been Euro- pean colonies. Seen through this optic, postcolonial theories originate in a general discontent and disenchantment with a Western culture that discred- ited itself so thoroughly and irreversibly with the massacres of the First and Second World Wars, the genocides of the concentration camps and the communist gulags. Postcolonial theories attempt to rescue certain Marxist inspired methods of analysis for postcolonial societies. For this reason the Indian Subaltern group was launched initially as an internal critique to Marxism, which because of its focus on European industrial capitalism can- not understand or appreciate the logic and originality of revolutionary movements that have nothing to do with the revolutionary logic of late cap- italism as was diagnosed by Marx, Engels, and Lenin. Eventually, this methodological critique became an epistemologica! revolution, even a par- adigm revolution. The goal is no longer of transforming historical material ism and the cultural studies inaugurated by Raymond Williams and E.P. Thompson, in order to acculturate and adapt them to the historical reality of the Indian world. On the contrary, now the goal was of abandoning these methods, for their epistemological as well as onto-historical presuppositions are what hinder the possibility of understanding Indian reality in its own terms. Here we must ask what the relationship is between postcolonial theory and subaltern studies. Is one a subset of the other, or are both faces of one same coin, to use that quotidian expression? I will suggest that one way in which we can understand the relationship between postcolonial theory and subaltern studies is to think of the former as the theorization of the hori- zon of historical praxis seen from the standpoint of social agents and the institutions that frame their modes of actions, while the latter is the ques- tioning of the modalities of subjectivity and agency seen from the stand- point of lived experience and the 'psychic life of power' to use Judith Butler's wonderful book title. Postcolonial theory is to subaltern studies what historical materialism is to psychoanalytic, or, Freudian Marxism, or what Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of World History are to the Phe- nomenology of Spirit, or what Marx's Grundrisse is to his 1844 Manu- scripts', but perhaps more aptly, postcolonial theory is to subaltern studies what Edward Said's Orientalism is to Homi Bhabha's The Location of Culture. What is at stake on one side is to think from the larger canvas of his- tory, not assuming the givenness of this canvas, but precisely to question the existence and nature of that canvas as the very condition of possibility of painting something like the scene of histoiy, i.e. not just how history happens, but why is history required in order to think the very possibility of agency at a macro-level, as the agency of social ensembles. On the other side, what is at stake is to think the space of subjectivity as one that is already occupied by the socio-historical; how the subjectivity of the master and the slave are co-determined and co-determining. In this way, then, we may think of subaltern studies as an ensemble of investigations into modes of subjection, an analytics not of dasein but of subjected and revolted agency, and analytics in which one is not only and always the subaltern of another, but in which this one is also an insurrected and resisting Other. Subaltern studies thus always imply a theory of insurrected agencies, agen- cies that inaugurate and disclose new modalities and horizons of praxis, or social action. From the above we can surmise that while postcolonial theories are an epistemological and onto-historical revolution that put in question all the science that is made, written and exported by the Euro-North American pedagogical and ideological machine, subaltern studies are a socio-psychological deconstruction of the allowed theories of agency and subjectivity. For this reason, then, postcolonial theories and subaltern studies change the epistemograph and the ontograph. The world requires many chronotopo- graphs - different historical and geographical maps (Spivak and Chakra- barty). In addition, there are different ways of being historical and contemporary with the modern project - there are different ways of being modern. There are many ways in which agency and subjectivity have been and will continue to be lived beyond the shadow of the masters' sover- eignty. Here we can refer to a distinction that Dussel makes between modernity understood as a project that is supposedly accomplished only by Europe, and modernity as a global or planetary project, one which is the horizon of possibility for both Descartes and Kant (Dussel, 1996 and 1998). The normative criterion is enunciated in the negative: theories that negate reject and occlude the contribution, real or potential, of all cultures to an emergent planetary human culture, are unacceptable. Modernity is the product of the globality or mundialidad of humanity, and it would be hubristic to negate most or any contributions to such a project. The political consequences of this form of theories are evident. They are a critique of all forms of Eurocentrism, Americanism and Ethnocentrism. The subject is at the same time an object of study, and its locus of enunciation is the locus of enactment and actualization. Here the other speaks about itself from its own place: from its quotidianity. The question "can the subaltern speak?" is provisionally answered with: no, so long as the same onto-epistemological-historical categories of the Euro-North American project of modernity and globalization continue to be used (Derrida has written: theo-onto-episte- mology and I accept this neologism if we also accept how theo-ontology masks and harbors an entire philosophy of history). I am using the word post-occidentalism to refer to those theories that emerged in Latin America during the sixties (Mignolo 2000, Lander 2001). This is a paradigm of Latin American thinking that gathers and synthesizes many theoretical currents: theories of dependence, the sociology of libera- tion, the philosophy of liberation, Freire's pedagogy of the oppressed, including the works on history by Darcy Ribeiro, Samuel Ramos, Edmundo O'Gorman, and Octavio Paz. Methodologically, post-occidentalism emerges from a confrontation not only with historical materialism, but also from a synergistic synthesis and transformation of the existential ontology of Heidegger, the historicism of Gaos and Ortega y Gasset, and a symbol- ics, or cultural semantics and hermeneutics in the tradition of Ricoeur. I mention all of these precedents because I want to underscore how there is also an epistemological revolution in Latin American thought that is similar but anterior to that which took place within Indian thought, and Marxist thought in England in the late sixties and early seventies. To look at Latin American thought from the perspective of postcolonial theory allows us to appreciate the innovation and originality of Latin American thought. One, and only one, of the many critical foci of what here I will call post-occidentalism is a critique to eurocentrism and European ethnocentrism, a critique that is carried from within. The central tenet of post-occidentalism is that Europe constitutes itself through a political economy of alterization of its Others (a process that was so masterfully discussed by Edward Said). The logic of alterization creates Others, but only in order to define that which must remain unsoiled, pristine, the same: the identical. The grammar of abjection that determines the entire text of modernity in its relation to its others is not criticized from outside, but from within. What is a threat, what is vile and a possible contaminant, is within. Thus, the post-occidentalist critique begins by discovering the abject alterity within, inside. The figure is not the despised and feared Moor, or the despotic Byzantium. The figure is now of Caliban cursing Prospero. The civilizing project, justified and imposed by a sanctified teleology but disguised behind the mantle of a historical reason, shipwrecks on the shoals of indigenous and mestizo culture, the Amerindian and the American slave. From its inception, the occidental- ist project begins its failure, but it is nonetheless continued and perpetuated, as management of those others that it produces but that must be at the same time quarantine. Formulaically put, the Amerindians, the slaves of the new world, the mestizos and mulattos born with the modern project knew, in their flesh and sequestered and quarantined sociality what the postcolonial thinkers began to discover after the sixties and seventies in light of a pro- cess of decolonization begun in the aftermath of World War II. It is evident, then, that there has been a change in the locus of enunci- ation. Now, it is no longer admissible to permit a subject to speak for others, to epistemologize about them, without allowing them in turn to speak or to make claims to knowledge. Nor is it acceptable to suppose that there is another who is silent and merely known. Postoccidentalist thought is that in which the other answers and responds back in his or her polluted and vulgar tongues. This speaking subaltern confronts the master with his voice and answers back: I do not recognize myself in your caricatures of me. The goal here is to acknowledge that we are always objects of a fantasy of control, and that this control materializes if we accept to live under the fictions of the master and his discourse. In short, postoccidentalism is what Niklas Luhmann would call a second order observation, an observation of observations (Luhmann 1995). In this way, postoccidentalism contributes to a critique of the modernist disciplines that occlude their political dimensions behind the curtains of scientization. Thus postoccidentalism, in an analo- gous manner to postcolonial theories, is a critique of the political economy of knowledge.

### 1NC ALT – Decolonization (Role of Intellectual)

#### Our alternative – Decolonize engagement. We should question the politics of space and knowledge that make engagement an economic tool of manipulation.

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Cultural Studies, in our project, is constructed and understood as more than a field of ‘study’. It is broadly understand as a formation, a field of possibility and expression. And it is constructed as a space of encounter between disciplines and intellectual, political and ethical projects that seek to combat what Alberto Moreiras called the impoverishment of thought driven by divisions (disciplinary, epistemological, geographic, etc.) and the socio-political-cultural fragmentation that increasingly makes social change and intervention appear to be divided forces (Moreiras 2001). As such, Cultural Studies is conceived as a place of plural-, inter-, transand in-disciplinary (or undisciplined) critical thinking that takes as major concern the intimate relationships between culture, knowledge, politics and economics mentioned earlier, and that sees the problems of the region as both local and global. It is a space from which to search for ways of thinking, knowing, comprehending, feeling and acting that permit us to intervene and influence: a field that makes possible convergence and articulation, particularly between efforts, practices, knowledge and projects that focus on more global justice, on differences (epistemic, ontological, existential, of gender, ethnicity, class, race, nation, among others) constructed as inequalities within the framework of neo-liberal capitalism. It is a place that seeks answers, encourages intervention and engenders projects and proposals. It is in this frame of understanding and practice in our Ph.D. programme in Latin-American Cultural Studies at the Universidad Andina Simo´n Bolı´var, that this broad description-definition continues to take on more concrete characteristics. Here I can identify three that stand out: the inter-cultural, the inter-epistemic and the de-colonial. The inter-cultural has been and still is a central axis in the struggles and processes of social change in the Andean region. Its critical meaning was first affirmed near the end of the 1980s in the Ecuadorian indigenous movement’s political project. Here inter-culturality was positioned as an ideological principal grounded in the urgent need for a radical transformation of social structures, institutions and relationships, not only for indigenous peoples but also for society as a whole. Since then, inter-culturality has marked a social, political, ethical project and process that is also epistemological;6 a project and a process that seek to re-found the bases of the nation and national culture, understood as homogenous and mono-cultural. Such call for re-founding does not to simply add diversity to what is already established, but rather to rethink, rebuild and inter-culturalize the nation and national culture, and with in the terrains of knowledge, politics and life-based visions. It is this understanding of the inter-cultural that is of interest. Concretely, we are interested in the spaces of agency, creation, innovation and encounter between and among different subjects, knowledges, practices and visions. Referring to our project of Cultural Studies as (inter)Cultural Studies, enables and encourages us to think from this region, from the struggles, practices and processes that question Eurocentric, colonial and imperial legacies, and work to transform and create radically different conditions for thinking, encountering, being and coexisting or co-living. In a similar fashion, the inter-epistemic focuses on the need to question, interrupt and transgress the Euro-USA-centric epistemological frameworks that dominate Latin-American universities and even some Cultural Studies programmes. To think with knowledges produced in Latin America and the Caribbean (as well as in other ‘Souths’, including those located in the North) and by intellectuals who come not only from academia, but also from other projects, communities and social movements are, for us, a necessary and essential step, both in de-colonization and in creating other conditions of knowledge and understanding. Our project, thus, concerns itself with the work of inverting the geopolitics of knowledge, with placing attention on the historically subjugated and negated plurality of knowledge, logics and rationalities, and with the political-intellectual effort to create relationships, articulations and convergences between them. The de-colonial element is intimately related to the two preceding points. Here our interest is, on one hand, to make evident the thoughts, practices and experiences that both in the past and in the present have endeavoured to challenge the colonial matrix of power and domination, and to exist in spite of it, in its exterior and interior. By colonial matrix, we refer to the hierarchical system of racial civilizational classification that has operated and operates at different levels of life, including social identities (the superiority of white, heterosexual males), ontological-existential contexts (the dehumanization of indigenous and black peoples), epistemic contexts (the positioning of Euro-centrism as the only perspective of knowledge, thereby disregarding other epistemic rationalities), and cosmological (the control and/or negation of the ancestral-spiritual-territorial-existential bases that govern the life-systems of ancestral peoples, most especially those of African Diaspora and of Abya Yala) (see Quijano 1999). At the centre or the heart of this matrix is capitalism as the only possible model of civilization; the imposed social classification, the idea of ‘humanity’, the perspective of knowledge and the prototype life-system that goes with it defines itself through this capitalistic civilizational lens. As Quijano argues, by defending the interests of social domination and the exploitation of work under the hegemony of capital, ‘the ‘‘racialization’’ and the ‘‘capitalization’’ of social relationships of these models of power, and the ‘‘eurocentralization’’ of its control, are in the very roots of our present problems of identity,’ in Latin America as countries, ‘nations’ and States (Quijano 2006). It is precisely because of this that we consider the de-colonial to be a fundamental perspective. Within our project, the de-colonial does not seek to establish a new paradigm or line of thought but a critically-conscious understanding of the past and present that opens up and suggests questions, perspectives and paths to explore. As such, and on the other hand, we are interested in stimulating methodologies and pedagogies that, in the words of Jacqui Alexander (2005), cross the fictitious boundaries of exclusion and marginalization to contribute to the configuration of new ways of being and knowing rooted not in alterity itself, but in the principles of relation, complement and commitment. It is also to encourage other ways of reading, investigating and researching, of seeing, knowing, feeling, hearing and being, that challenge the singular reasoning of western modernity, make tense our own disciplinary frameworks of ‘study’ and interpretation, and persuade a questioning from and with radically distinct rationalities, knowledge, practices and civilizational-life-systems. It is through these three pillars of the inter-cultural, the inter-epistemic and the de-colonial that we attempt to understand the processes, experiences and struggles that are occurring in Latin America and elsewhere. But it is also here that we endeavour to contribute to and learn from the complex relationships between culture-politics-economics, knowledge and power in the world today; to unlearn to relearn from and with perspectives otherwise. Practices, experiences and challenges In this last section, my interest is to share some of the particularities of our doctorate programme/project, now in its third cycle; its achievements and advancements; and the challenges that it faces in an academic context, increasingly characterized regionally and internationally, by disciplinarity, depolitization, de-subjectivation, apathy, competitive individualism and nonintervention. Without a doubt, one of the unique characteristics of the programme/ project is its students: all mid-career professionals mainly from the Andean region and from such diverse fields as the social sciences, humanities, the arts, philosophy, communication, education and law. The connection that the majority of the students have with social and cultural movements and/or processes, along with their dedication to teaching or similar work, helps to contribute to dynamic debate and discussion not always seen in academia and post-graduate programmes. Similarly, the faculty of the programme stand out for being internationally renowned intellectuals, and, the majority, for their commitment to struggles of social transformation, critical thinking and the project of the doctorate itself. The curriculum offering is based on courses and seminars that seek to foment thinking from Latin American and with its intellectuals in all of their diversity comprehend, confront and affect the problems and realities of the region, which are not only local but global. The pedagogicalmethodological perspective aforementioned works to stimulate processes of collective thought and allow the participants to think from related formations, experiences and research topics and to think with the differences disciplinary, geographical, epistemic and subjective thereby fracturing individualism by dialoguing, transgressing and inter-crossing boundaries. Trans-disciplinarity, as such, is a fundamental position and process in our project. The fact that the graduate students come from an array of different backgrounds provides a plurality in which the methodologicalpedagogical practice becomes the challenge of collectively thinking, crossing disciplinary backgrounds and creating new positions and perspectives, conceived and formed in a trans-disciplinary way. The majority of courses, seminars and professors, also assume that this is a necessary challenge in today’s world when no single discipline and no single intellectual is capable alone of analyzing, comprehending or transforming social reality. Nevertheless, trans-disciplinary gains continue to be a point of criticism and contention, especially given the present trend to re-discipline the LatinAmerican university. As Edgardo Lander has argued (2000a), this tendency reflects the neo-liberalization of higher education, as well as the increasing conservatism of intellectuals, including those that previously identified as or to continue to identify themselves as progressives and/or leftists. To establish oneself in a discipline or presume truth through a discipline, a common practice today, is to reinstall the geopolitics of knowing. This, in turn, strengthens Euro-USA-centrism as ‘the place’ of theory and knowledge. As such, the subject of dispute is not simply the trans-disciplinary aspect of Cultural Studies but also its ‘indisciplinary’ nature, that is, the effort central to our project to include points of view that come from Latin America and thinkers who are not always connected to academia (see Walsh et al. 2002). Our interest is not, as some claim, to facilitate the agendas or cultural agency of subaltern groups or social movements, promote activism or simply include other knowledge forms, but instead to build a different political-intellectual project a political-intellectual project otherwise. Such project gives centrality to the need to learn to think from, together and with LatinAmerican reality and its actors, thereby stimulating convergences, articulations and inter-culturalizations that aim at creating an academia that is committed to life itself. Such a perspective does not eliminate or deny knowledge conceived in Europe or North America usually named as ‘universal’ or its proponents and thinkers. Instead, it incorporates such knowledge as part of a broader canon and worldview that seeks pluriversality, recognizing the importance of places and loci of enunciation. For our project, all of this serves to highlight the doubly complicated situation that is still in flux. On one hand, there is the negative association with trans-disciplinarity and the academic suppositions that accompany it, particularly in the area of research; this requires that our theses be doubly rigorous. And, on the other hand, there is the geopolitical limitation not only of disciplines but also of academic disciplining. To argue, as we do, that knowledge and thought are also produced outside of universities and, in dialogue with Hall, that political movements also produce and provoke theoretic moments and movements, is to question and challenge the academic logic and the authority of a universal and singular reasoning and science. We will, through such questioning and challenges, always be marginalized, placed on the fringe, under a microscope, criticized and disputed. Because of this, the challenges that we have encountered have been many. On one hand, there are those challenges that many face in the Latin-American academic context: the real difficulties of financing, infrastructure and research support. On the other hand, are the challenges that come with the traditional academic disciplinary structure, its de-politization and de-subjectification. Here the challenge is to transgress the established norms of neutrality, distance and objectivity. It is also to confront the standards that give little relevance to historically subjugated groups, practices and knowledges, and to the interlinking of race, ethnicity, gender and sexuality with the structures and models of power and knowledge. It is to make evident past and present struggles that give real meaning to the arguments of heterogeneity, decoloniality and inter-culturality. Here the criticism and dispute comes from many sides: from those who describe these efforts as too politicized (and, as such, supposedly less ‘academic’), uni-paradigmatic (supposedly limited to only one ‘line of thought’), fundamentalist (supposedly exclusionary of those subjects not marked by the colonial wound) and as obsessed with conflict (and therefore far from the tradition of ‘culture’, its letters and object of study). These challenges together with the tensions, criticisms and disputes that they mark often times make the path more difficult. Still, and at the same time, they allow us to clarify the distinctive and unique aspects of our project and its motivations to continue with its course of construction, insurgence and struggle. Our concern here is not so much with the institutionalizing of Cultural Studies. Better yet, and in a much broader fashion, we are concerned with epistemic inter-culturalization, with the de-colonialization and pluriversalization of the ‘university’, and with a thinking from the South(s). To place these concerns, as argued here, within a perspective and a politics of naming: ‘(inter)Cultural Studies in de-colonial code,’ is to open, not close, paths. Conclusion In concluding the reflections I have presented here, it is useful to return to a fundamental point touched by Stuart Hall: ‘intervention’. In particular and with Hall, I refer to the will to intervene in and transform the world, an intervention that does not simply relate to social and political contexts and fields, but also to epistemology and theory. That is to an intervention and transformation in and a de-colonization of the frameworks and logics of our thinking, knowing and comprehending. To commit oneself in mind, body and spirit as Frantz Fanon argued. To consider Cultural Studies today a project of political vocation and intervention is to position and at the same time build our work on the borders of and the boundaries between university and society. It is to seriously reflect on whom we read and with whom we want and/or need to dialogue and think, to understand the very limits or our knowledge. And precisely because of this, it is to act on our own situation, establishing contacts and exchanges of different kinds in a pedagogicalmethodological zeal to think from and think with, in what I have elsewhere called a critical inter-culturality and de-colonial pedagogy (Walsh 2009). In universities and societies that are increasingly characterized by nonintervention, auto-complacency, individualism and apathy, intervention represents, suggests and promotes a position and practice of involvement, action and complicity. To take on such a position and practice and to make it an integral part of our political-intellectual project is to find not only ethical meaning in work on culture and power, but also to give this work some heart. That is to say, to focus on the ever-greater need and urgency of life. To call these Cultural Studies or critical (inter)Cultural Studies is only one of our options, and part of the politics of

naming.

### 1NC – ALT - Solidarity

#### We should endorse solidarity against neoliberalism. Economic engagement encourages Latin American countries to compete in a rigged game.

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Uruguayan novelist and journalist Eduardo Galeano once wrote that the part of the world known today as Latin America had been precocious: it specialised in losing, 'ever since those remote times when Renaissance Europeans ventured across the ocean and buried their teeth in the throats of lndian civilisations. Centuries passed, and Latin America perfected its role. '1 A spokesman for those same Indian civilisations came from Latin America to London in 2009, donning the mantle of the prophet, to tell the west that this time things would be different. Far from fitting their stereotype as inhabitants of a region of banana republics and idealistic utopias, the peoples of South America have risen up and now stand together. They have been able to resist some of the most extreme consequences of the globalist and unfettered market policies that have wreaked havoc elsewhere in the developed world, particularly after the 2008 global financial crisis. They are now calling on the rest of the world, especially the young people of Europe, Asia, Africa and America who may choose to use their newfound consciousness of the relational nature of global space, for help and recognition, to stand together and overcome the paradox whose damaging effects we all suffer today. Of Business and Freedom 'The more freedom is extended to business, the more prisons have to be built for those who suffer from that business.'2 This argument, popularised in Latin America during the 1950s and 1960s, resonates with the observations made in seventeenth-century England about the link between the enclosure movement, the death penalty and imprisonment by Diggers and Levellers, and by commoner revolutionaries in New Granada, present-day Colombia, a century later. The 'prisons' referred to included forced displacement, impressment to serve in merchant and military vessels at sea, private and public debt, and indentured and waged labour as much as straightforward deprivation of liberty in dungeons and other places of incarceration. British Diggers and Spanish American commoners were conscious of the connections between the occurrence of such phenomena at home and the enslavement of poor and indigenous peoples on both sides of the Atlantic and in Africa and Asia. They also acknowledged the role that the use of force, militarism and the limitation of liberty played in the wider context of global economic relations. A form of solidarity was born between them, based upon an emergent consciousness of the need to protect their common heritage in order to be able to create future environments for all. Contemporary native activists like Davi Kopenawa and others appeal to the associative approach and the consciousness that animated the efforts of levelling and commoner movements on both sides of the Atlantic when they say 'we need your help'. They aim not to move our sympathy and provoke charity, but to retrieve in us the deep-seated and almost forgotten memory of mutuality that long united English-speaking peoples and communities in the struggle in South America and the Caribbean. Such declarations should not be understood as appeals for assistance; rather, they contain an age-old call to action that can be heard across the globe.3 For years, policies favoured by the centres of power in Europe and Washington, and in the international financial institutions where their influence prevails, such as the W odd Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) - including deregulation of financial and capital markets, privatisation of state-owned enterprises and pensions, private and public debt to sustain demand, debt conditionality, deregulation of labour markets, and trade liberalisation - compelled countries to remove obstacles to foreign investment, make labour contracts flexible and deregulate financial systems, sell everything, including most natural resources, without any consideration for indigenous rights, development concerns or environmental impact, and throw all of their efforts into raising exports to be exchanged in a playing field where players are unequal and competition unfair. All the while, these policies facilitated indebtedness, both private and public. Internal mismanagement by elites catering for their short-term interests, to the detriment of the long-term interests of the peoples they were supposed to represent, did not help. The rationale behind such policies was that unless these countries fitted themselves with such policies as if they were a 'golden straitjacket', nations dependent on the exploitation of raw materials would never be able to join the Lexus and Samsung world. Fitting themselves with the straitjacket was thus the only path for developing countries to follow in order to succeed in the new global economy. However, the fact is that had the Japanese, Korean, Indian, Chinese or Brazilian governments followed the free-trade economists, IMF and Washington officials and their self-righteous spokespeople back in the 1960s and 1970s, or more recently in the 2ooos, there would have been no Lexus and no Samsung, and no BRICs, which is how journalists and economists refer these days to the emerging countries and economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China. It is also a fact that the alleged 'only path' in the global economy led not to prosperity and success, but to the Great Recession. The emerging economies of today have responded better to the Great Recession than the 'developed' ones, not because they fitted themselves with the straight jacket and followed or imitated the 'unique path' to success, but precisely because they chose not to follow it, and distanced themselves from the recipes of free-trade economists and ideologues. Consideration of these facts in the uncertain climate of the Great Recession obliges us to set the record straight and take a closer look at the official history of glo balisation. The Official History According to the official history of globalisation, Britain first adopted free-market and free -trade policies in the eighteenth century, well ahead of other countries.4 By the middle of the nineteenth century it had consolidated its spectacular economic success, and other countries started imitating Britain's liberalisation or borrowed from it, together with democracy and the rule of law, through colonial channels. Everything was fine until the Great War when, in response to the ensuing instability of the world economy, countries unwisely started erecting barriers to free trade once again, such as the infamous US Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of the 1930s. In 1932, Britain itself, the champion of free trade around the world, ceded to temptation and introduced tariffs. Only after W odd War II was the world economy re-established along liberal lines, this time with the United States taking over the position of global dominance vacated by Britain. And although protectionism and state intervention prevailed in various parts of the developing world, or so the story goes, by the 198os such policies had been abandoned following the failure of the so-called Import Substitution Industrialization (lSI) model in these countries, and the rise of neoliberalism. After the East Asian 'economic miracle' and the Third World debt crises of the 198os, the remaining developing countries still hanging on to the lSI idea- that a backward country starts producing industrial products that it used to import and makes imports artificially expensive by means of tariffs, or gives domestic subsidies, thereby substituting imported industrial goods with domestically produced equivalents - finally embraced neoliberalism. These changes were made all the more necessary by the global integration and the possibilities opened up by new communication and information technologies 'flattening' the whole world and making it homogeneous. The crowning glory of this historical shift was the fall of communism in 1989 and the rise of the globalised world economy, hailed by the advent of the liberalising World Trade Organization (WTO), now at the centre of global governance together with the IMF and the World Bank. It was, we have been told, the end of history. The official history is widely accepted. One of its corollaries is that in the brave new world of globalisation there is no room for rich social relations, forms of common ownership or deeper links to Nature of the kind advocated by the indigenous peoples of Latin America and other opposition movements. At best, these are relics of the past; at worst, they are dangerous and empty ideals. To speak of a 'carnal connection with goddess-mother earth' is dismissed as hippie-talk or political and economic nonsense. Moreover, when native peoples and activists use that language they denwnstrate that they have no one else to blame but themselves for their backward status. 'Underdevelopment is in the mind' then becomes an acceptable slogan. And if political correctness calls for a prudent qualification of the slogan, underdevelopment then becomes a matter of faulty institutions, corruption and conflict-prone social or cultural tendencies. Today, however, Latin American nations and social movements led by activists and native peoples in the region are resisting the pressure of neoliberalism. Furthermore, they are setting up innovative economic and environmental arrangements outside the mainstream of globalist market strictures. Now that the Great Recession has made it clear that a new dispensation is required, their call to set the record straight and redefme the international monetary and economic system has become relevant to us all. Setting the Record Straight Latin America's new advocates - the natives of Bolivia, Mexico and southern Colombia, the landless of Brazil, the free associations of Chile and Argentina, and the Latino community organisers of the United States- together ~ith a new generation of economists and historians,5 point out that the real history of globalisation includes such episodes as: the river of silver and gold flowing between Spanish America and Europe from the sixteenth century to the late eighteenth century; the capture of Porto Bello in Panama by the British admiral Sir Edward Vernon in I739; Vernon's siege of Cartagena de Indias in I74I as part of the so- called War of Jenkins' Ear; the Opium Wars of I78I and I 8 56 in East Asia, the Mexican-American and the Spanish-American wars that ended with formal or de facto dominion of the United States over California, Texas, New Mexico, Cuba and Puerto Rico together with Guam and the Philippines via the Treaty of Paris of I 898; the Anglo-German blockade of Venezuela in I902 with the purpose of claiming overdue debts from the South American country; and the US-assisted separation of Panama from Colombia in I903 that resulted in US control of the Panama Canal until 2000. They see this recollection as both a cautionary tale in relation to the War on Drugs, the debt crisis, neoliberal globalism and the merging of development and security that has been taking place in Latin America and elsewhere during the last three decades, and also as a springboard for creativity and experimentation in history.6 The truth is that the free movement of money, goods and people that developed first during the 'silver and gold river' years of Spanish and Portuguese dominion over the Americas, starting in the I 5 sos and continuing until the I85os, and thereafter during the second episode of globalisation and industrialisation between 1870 and I9I3, this ti1ne dominated by British sea power, was made possible for the most part by military might rather than 'free' market forces . The dirty secret of globalisation is that direct or indirect colonial relations, underpinned by force, played a key role in bringing into existence a world circuit of global trade in the late sixteenth century, and then in promoting 'free trade' across the globe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries through empire, neocolonialism and unequal treaties or financial commitments. To begin with, there is little doubt that it was not until Spanish and Portuguese American exports of silver and gold began to generate large transatlantic and transpacific trade flows, that the full circle of global exchange of goods and resources was joined, making world trade a reality.7 There is also no doubt that the many misdeeds of empire and indirect colonialism, from plunder and the enslavement of entire populations across continents, to gunboat diplomacy and debt conditionality, cannot be justified by the argument that empire was a good thing overall because it was the cheapest way to ensure free trade, which benefits everyone. This argument, which simplifies David Ricardo's mainstream assumptions about trade and economics, and turns them into an iron-law or a consequentialist account ofhistory, has been espoused in recent years by British historian Niall Ferguson, among others. At least Ferguson has the honesty to mention the Opium Wars, unlike most of the authors in the already long and convoluted literature on the history and signiftcance of globalisation. However, the argument flies in the face of evidence indicating, first, that not everyone benefited, and, second, that to justify the costs from the . perspective of the totality - the consequential overall and ultimate good is both suspect and immoral. It is suspect because such a justification .depends upon the questionable assumption that it is incumbent upon thought or historical observation to uncover a reason that would prove capable of accounting for everything, including its own standpoint as observer of the totality of history up until today. This judgement calls for a reason not conditioned by any other. Only then, once the unconditioned reason of everything has been provided, could the observer survey the whole of history and conclude that the costs were necessary because they brought about something that was necessary as an overall good in history.8 It is immoral because it justifies evil, which is a practical choice, as a necessary or inevitable sacrifice. Checking the Facts Did the Opium Wars in particular, for instance, or colonial relations in general benefit everyone? Evidence suggests that countries under direct colonial rule or indirect, neocolonial and unequal debts and treaties did poorly. Between I87o and I9I3, the period ofthe second globalisation under British predominance, per capita income in Asia grew on average at 0.4 per cent per year, while that in Africa grew at 0.6 per cent per year. In contrast, the figure for western Europe in that period is 1.3 per cent and I.8 per cent per year for the United States. Interestingly, during the same period, the annual per capita income growth rate in Latin America rose to I.8 per cent, in comparison to -0.03 per cent per year between I 820 and I 870. The reason? Independence was consolidated throughout Latin America only after that period, and most countries were still subjected to unequal treaties and trade relations. Once Latin America recovered tariff autonomy, things changed. Between I87o and I9I3 average tariffs varied between I7 per cent in Mexico and 47 per cent in Colombia; and yet the region grew at the same level as the United States of America.9 While they were busy securing free trade through colonial relations and unequal treaties, Britain and other European powers, later on America as well, kept protectionist measures for themselves. Britain only embraced free trade when its industry, the wool industry in particular, was ready- around the mid-nineteenth century. Between the I86os and I87os Britain featured zero tariffs and other European countries followed a similar route. Protective measures were raised again in Europe from the I88os onwards, in part to protect local production from cheaper and technologically more advanced meat and other Latin American food industries, and also to promote emerging European steel, chemicals and other heavy industries. Competitor and successful protectionist countries like the United States, which chose to defY the advice of Adam Smith and instead follow the blueprint outlined by the first US Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, led Britain to rethink its path in the global economy. By the I920S and I930s, the United Kingdom was once more attempting to impose unequal treaties on Latin American countries, and succeeding in the case of Argentina - its main commercial partner for meat and wheat - while erecting its own barriers. The argument of Latin America's nations breaking a new path, and that of maverick economists and historians, is that the official history of globalisation is misleading and fundamentally wrong. It distorts our understanding of how we got to where we are and where we may be heading for. After having witnessed South American countries fare better than most during the Great Recession, make their mark in global debates about climate change, or even 'take off' and assume their role as world leaders, as in the case of Brazil, the rest of the world seems ready to listen. Indeed, Latin America no longer specialises in losing.

## K Prior

#### We should analyze the ideological justifications for economic engagement. Focus on a particular policy produces cover for structural exploitation.

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One helpful perspective is to focus attention on the generation, diffusion, and adoption of a set of ideas about economic policy and, most important, on why the elite consensus achieved in the 1980s did not hold. This seems particularly relevant if we are to say something about the content of future economic policy in the region. Seen from this angle, the first question is therefore how neoliberal ideas became accepted by policy elites and incorporated into policies as crucial components of a new development strategy. This is an aspect of the process of reform that has been relatively little studied, but its relevance has been acknowledged from several perspectives. Indeed, after reviewing alternative explanations for reform, Haggard and Kaufman (1992: 36) conclude: In the final analysis, it is entirely possible that neither interest-based explanations nor institutional ones will be entirely satisfactory for explaining how societies cope with the challenges of policy reform and consolidation. Consolidation may also require the evolution of a broader ideational consensus among leaders, interest groups, party elites, and attentive publics that sets some boundaries on the range of economic debate. Long-term sustainability of policy choices will depend on a convergence of thinking about fundamental means-ends relationships in the economy. Then, the formation of elite preferences, ideas, and ideology, as well as the evolution of public opinion, are potentially important explanatory variables. In addition, studies about the impact of ideas on economic and foreign policy making highlight the relevance of ideas, particularly in reference to processes of substantial policy innovation such as the neoliberal turn examined here. Peter Hall (1989: 361) argues, “It is ideas, in the form of economic theories and the policies developed from them, that enable national leaders to chart a course through turbulent economic times, and ideas about what is efficient, expedient, and just that motivate the movement from one line of policy to another.” Comparative research indicates that there are at least three ways in which ideas may influence policy outcomes. Ideas may serve as **road maps**, helping actors to assess their preferences and the alternatives available to reach their goals. They may affect strategic interactions by facilitating or hindering cooperative efforts. They may also have a long-lasting influence once they become institutionalized, thus **constraining future policy choices** (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993). Undoubtedly, the capacity of the neoliberal discourse to provide a simple answer to the crisis of the 1980s illustrates the impact of ideas on policy makers’ actions. The crisis helped to undermine the already discredited policies of the past and opened a window of opportunity for new ideas. Despite some criticism and resistance, the exhaustion of import-substitution industrialization, the failure of heterodox experiments, and the sense of urgency generated by a deepening economic crisis paved the way for a relatively widespread acquiescence in policy innovation. The literature on structural reforms in Latin America has, however, only indirectly addressed ideational issues. There are extensive studies on the role of technocrats or technocratic teams who, acting in tandem with strong executives in the most aggressive cases of reform in the region, became the “transmission belts” for the diffusion and implementation of policy recommendations. They embodied the consensus and worked as amalgamators of different interests within the new governing coalitions (Centeno and Silva, 1998). These studies clearly provide us with a grounded explanation of the diffusion of ideas. As Hall (1989: 390) reminds us, “ideas have real power in the political world, but they do not acquire political force independently of the constellation of institutions and interests already present there.” Furthermore, **technocratic cadres** are part of the **rising transnational elite** who are now pursuing a **post–Washington Consensus** as one way of solving global economic problems and securing the legitimacy of the capitalist system (Robinson, 2005). However, a critical cadre of officials was sometimes absent or failed to obtain the necessary political support, and in these cases the reform attempt failed (e.g., Venezuela under Carlos Andrés Pérez, 1989–1993). Also, looking at those actors and their positions in the decision-making structures does not tell us much about the ideas they promoted. The policies recently adopted in Latin America did not originate in the region; technocrats imported them from developed countries. The consensus formed around the new policy orientation emanated mainly from intellectual and policy circles in the United States and was endorsed by international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Thus, although the insights provided by studies on technocrats’ socialization and professional networks are relevant, we need to know more about the links and alliances between domestic and foreign policy elites that provided the basis for a new coalition with vested interests in the reforms and the mechanisms through which their shared views contributed to the formation of widespread consensus. In fact, those links were not a new phenomenon. The **promotion of neoliberal policies** in Latin America by the United States can be seen as part of a long-term process of **expansion, rebuilding, and consolidation of U.S. hegemony**. The technocrats mentioned above resemble the U.S. consultants who promoted laissez-faire ideas across the region from 1890 to 1920 (Drake, 2000). Then and now, **economic policy consensus** served the hegemon’s interest by persuading subordinate states to **accept certain rules of the game**, this time reinforced by a new enforcement mechanism (financial conditionality) and complemented by a renewed impulse toward the promotion of democracy. Yet, according to Robinson (2005), what the current attempt entails is not another round of old-style imperialism but rather new and **more subtle** forms of **global capitalist domination.** In his words (1999: 44), Neoliberalism is the “grease” by which global capitalism tears down all nonmarket structures that have in the past placed limits on, or acted as a protective layer against, the accumulation of capital. By prying open and making accessible to transnational capital every layer of the social fabric, neoliberalism extricates the global economy from global society, and the state defers to the market as the sole organizing power in the economic and social sphere.

#### Neoliberal political economy shapes knowledge-production. North American models of expertise and disciplinary norms reinforce inequality.

Catherine **WALSH** Estudios Culturales Latinoamericanos de la Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar **‘12** “The Politics of Naming” *Cultural Studies* 26:1 p. 110-111

The problem of scientific disciplinarity The problem of scientific disciplinarity began in Europe and later spread to other parts of the world; imposed and reconstructed in the twentieth century as the model of modern Latin American universities. Here, I refer, on one hand, to the establishment of the natural sciences as the central framework and arbitrator of information considered objective or neutral. And, on the other hand, to the emergence of the social sciences in Europe (and later in the USA) at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries following this same ‘scientific’ model with a state-centric focus. It was within the academic disciplines of economics, sociology and political science that the social sciences were first organized in an attempt to strengthen the then hegemonic states (Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy, and later the USA) and ensure their position as the organizers both of capitalist markets and of knowledge. In this disciplinary structure of the ‘sciences’, the humanities were set up not as areas of knowledge per se, but instead as something more ephemeral, as non-sciences built on and rooted in the cultural, mental and spiritual production of ‘civilized’ societies. This is to recall the ways that the humanities have helped strengthen nationalism through art and literature, for example, but also the ways they have served as an organizing base for the universals of modern reasoning and philosophical thought. This model of discipline is what structures universities; it is also the model that guides the study of and the thinking about the world. As a transdiciplinary and according to some an anti-disciplinary field Cultural Studies has opened up spaces that question, challenge and go beyond this model, something that the Gulbenkian Commission made clear a couple of decades ago in its critique of the structural and institutional discipline of the social sciences (see Wallerstein 1996). How can we relate these debates and this legacy of Cultural Studies to a Latin American context? As I have argued elsewhere (Walsh 2007), in Latin America or Abya Yala, the field of social sciences has been part of the neoliberal, imperial and globalizing tendencies of capitalism and modernity. These are tendencies that supplant local history with monolithic, mono-cultural and ‘universal’ theoretical formulations that proclaim western scientific knowledge as central, denying or relegating to a non-knowledge status, all knowledge based on place and produced from different cultural and social rationales. This hierarchy makes certain basic assumptions about universality, neutrality and the non-place of hegemonic scientific knowledge; it establishes the superiority of western logo-centricism as the only rationality capable of organizing the world. As I have mentioned, these are the suppositions taken to be true that have organized and oriented the hegemonic social sciences from their beginning. Since the 1990s we are witnessing, in Latin America, a strengthening of these suppositions as part of neo-liberal globalization and its extension into the fields of science and knowledge. With this strengthening (evident in universities across the region), the Cartesian schism between the self, doing and knowing and between science and human practice remains firm. The westernEurocentric canon is repositioning itself as the main framework of theoretic interpretation; the erasing of place (including the importance of experiences based on place) is taken on without questioning. The consequences, as Arturo Escobar (2005) argues, can be felt, on one hand, with regard to the asymmetries brought on by globalization (where place and tradition will be local, and space, capital and history will be global), and, on the other hand, with regard to the concepts of knowledge, culture, nature, politics and economy and their interrelationships. In recent years, some global debate has centred on science and specialized academic knowledge in general, and especially on the social sciences and the dominant political, cultural and social positions taken in their theorizations.2 Nevertheless, it appears that these debates have had almost no impact on LatinAmerican thinking and social science. Unlike the initiatives in the 1960s and 1970s that intended to construct endemic and critical social sciences, promote SouthSouth dialogues and promote a thinking and praxis of Latin America from within,3 more recently, the region has regressed to the liberal paradigms of the nineteenth century, including the meta-narratives of modernity and progress, and to a position of no involvement (Lander 2000a). But, as Santos argues, there is also evidence in the region of a new scientific rationality that ‘denies the rational character of all forms of knowledge that are not based on epistemological principles and their methodological rules’ (de Sousa Santos 1987, pp. 1011). The problem in Latin America, as such, does not lie in simply opening, rethinking or restructuring the social sciences as some studies have suggested, but better yet by questioning their very basis. It is to say, to refute the suppositions that place the production of knowledge only in academia, between academics and within scientificity, and the established paradigms and canons. It is also to refute the concepts of rationality that govern the so-called ‘expert’ knowledge,4 a knowledge that works to negate and detract from practices, skills and agents that do not fit inside the hegemonic and dominant rationality. Such refutation does not involve a wholesale rejection of this rationality, but exposes its colonial and imperial intentions and disputes its position as singular. This causes us to also question the supposed universality of scientific knowledge that governs the social sciences, to the extent that it does not capture the diversity and wealth of social experiences or the epistemological and counter-hegemonic alternatives that come from these experiences. As I argue later, it is this refutation and questioning that we consider central to the thinking and construction of Cultural Studies as an inter-cultural, interepistemological project of de-colonial focus. But before arriving at this, our second question, we will analyze the other legacies present in Cultural Studies and important to our project.

#### Economic engagement relies on Eurocentric assumptions that threaten human survival.

Edgardo **LANDER** **‘2** “Eurocentrism, Modern Knowledges, and the “Natural” Order of Global Capital” *Nepantla* 3.2 p. 245-249

In recent debates about hegemonic knowledge in the modern world, a number of basic assumptions have emerged that allow us to characterize the dominant conception of knowledge as Eurocentric (Lander 2000a). After providing a concise description of its main assumptions, I will explore here the pervasiveness of the Eurocentric perspective in the principles or fundamentals that guide current practices by which the global order of capital is planned, justified, and naturalized (i.e., made less artificial). Along these same lines, I will demonstrate the presence of the fundamentals of Eurocentrism in the international norms of protection of private investment in the failed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) and in the protection of intellectual property set out byWorld Trade Organization (WTO) agreements. The perspective of Eurocentric knowledge is the central axis of a discourse that not only naturalizes but renders inevitable the increasingly intense polarization between a privileged minority and the world’s excluded, oppressed majorities. Eurocentric knowledge also lies at the center of a predatory model of civilization that threatens to destroy the conditions that make life possible on Earth. For this reason, the critique of Eurocentrism and the development/recovery of alternate knowledge perspectives cannot be interpreted as merely an esoteric intellectual or academic preoccupation, or for that matter as a topic for interesting debates within a narrow community of scholars working on epistemological problems. In reality, these issues are closely related to vital political demands, both local and global, which are linked in turn to communities, organizations, and movements that (in a variety of ways) confront and resist the growing hegemony of transnational capital throughout the world. Basic Assumptions of Eurocentric Knowledge The main assumptions of the perspective of Eurocentric knowledge can be summarized in the following terms. 1. Eurocentric knowledge is based on the construction of multiple and repeated divisions or oppositions. The most characteristic and significant of these—but not the only ones, to be sure—include the basic, hierarchical dualisms of reason and body, subject and object, culture and nature, masculine and feminine (Berting 1993; Quijano 2000; Lander 2000b). 2. European regional or local history is understood as universal History. According to this perspective, Europe serves as the model or reference for every other history, representing the apex of humanity’s progress from the “primitive” to the “modern” (Dussel 2000; Quijano 2000). 3. Differences from others are converted into value differences (Mignolo 1995), time-space distances (Fabian 1983), and hierarchies that define all non-European humans as inferior (“savage,” “primitive,” “backward,” “underdeveloped”). The category of race as an instrument for classifying the different peoples of the world—on a scale from superior to inferior—plays a central role here (Quijano 2000). 4. Scientific knowledge and technological development advance in an upward linear direction toward ever higher levels of knowledge and greater ability to usefully transform the environment. The hegemony of these assumptions has had multiple consequences for the constitution of modern social knowledge. Here, I will simply highlight the following: First, one particular kind of knowledge—Western scientific knowledge—is understood to be true, universal, and objective—the form by which all other ways of knowing are simultaneously defined as ignorance or superstition. InWestern knowledge, the separation of reason and body lies at the base of a “disembodied,” desubjectified knowledge; these divisions sustain its pretensions to objectivity and detachment from time and space as a universal knowledge. Second, through the oppositions of reason/body and culture/nature, a relationship of exteriority to “nature” is established. This is a condition for the appropriation/exploitation that grounds theWestern paradigm of unlimited growth. Third, by ignoring the colonial/imperial relationships between peoples and cultures—ones that made the modern world-system possible— Eurocentric knowledge understands modernity to be an internal product of European genius, owing nothing to the rest of the world (Coronil 1997, 2000). Similarly, the current condition of the other peoples of the planet is seen as having no connection to the colonial/imperial experience. Their present status of “backwardness” and “poverty” is the result, rather, of insufficient capitalist development. Instead of being seen as the products of modern experience, such conditions are interpreted as being symptoms of the absence of modernity. We are therefore dealing with a history that dehistoricizes and conceals the constitutive relationships of the modern colonial world-system (Coronil 1997, 2000; Mignolo 2000a, 2000b; Quijano 2000). Fourth, proceeding from the basic assumptions of Eurocentrism, liberal society is assumed as the natural order of things. Once former “primitive” or “backward” historical phases are overcome, the particular historical experience of liberal capitalist society and the liberal worldview are ontologized as the “normal” state of society. In this way, possessive individualism (Macpherson 1970), the separation of the fields of collective life (political, social, cultural, economic), and a conception of wealth and the good life unilaterally associated with the accumulation of material goods characteristic of liberal society are transformed into a universal standard for judging the deficiencies, backwardness, or poverty of the rest of the peoples and cultures of the planet. It follows from the hegemony of this articulated body of assumptions that the main transformational practices of the contemporary world— including the globalization of markets and of financial movement, the politics of deregulation and opening, as well as structural adjustment and the dismantling of state social policies—are simply adaptations to “technological transformations,” or new conditions created for “globalization.” These conditions are understood to be a new stage of “modern” or “postmodern” society. Given the common sense established by the hegemony of liberal thought, these practices are inevitably assumed to represent the course of natural history. In the analyses and debates surrounding these practices, the players, along with their interests, strategies, contradictions, and oppositions, disappear. The most powerful effect of the naturalization of social practices is its effectiveness in clouding the power relationships underlying the hegemonic tendencies of globalization. The “Natural” Order of Liberal Society The view of liberal society as the natural, most advanced form of human experience has been an inseparable part of modern world history for the past three centuries. This view has been the legitimizing basis of the civilizing mission of the colonial/imperial system; in more recent times, since the end of the Second World War, it has acquired renewed vigor with the “colonization of reality by the discourse of development” (Escobar 1995, 22). Along with the development imaginary, the process of conquest of the rest of the planet intensified and accelerated, by way of a dense global institutional network that defined (using the diagnosis provided by the social sciences) the vast majority of the planet’s population as lacking, poor, and backward, justifying a massive intervention to rescue it from such a pitiful condition. A type of development was promoted which conformed to the ideas and expectations of the affluent West, to what the Western countries judged to be a normal course of evolution and progress. . . . by conceptualizing progress in such terms, this development strategy became a powerful instrument for normalizing the world. (ibid., 26) Behind the humanitarian concern and the positive outlook of the new strategy, new forms of power and control, more subtle and refined, were put in operation. Poor people’s ability to define and take care of their own lives was eroded in a deeper manner than perhaps ever before. The poor became the target of more sophisticated practices, of a variety of programs that seemed inescapable. From the new institutions of power in the United States and Europe; the offices of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the United Nations; from North American and European campuses, research centers, and foundations; and from the new planning offices in the big capitals of the underdeveloped world, this was the type of development that was actively promoted and that in a few years was to extend its reach to all aspects of society. (85) The organizing premise was the belief in the role of modernization as the only force capable of destroying archaic superstitions and relations, at whatever social, cultural, and political cost. Industrialization and urbanization were seen as the inevitable and necessarily progressive routes to modernization. (86) Far from referring us to the colonial/imperial past that informs the relationships between people and cultures of the modern world-system, these assumptions maintain an extraordinary efficiency, both legitimizing and naturalizing the most significant practices of design, negotiation, and establishment of the new global institutional order of capital. These assumptions make up a theoretical and normative patrimony on the basis of which the global technocracy of commerce and international finance legitimizes its expertise. In this sense, the content of the (failed) negotiations of the MAI1 and the agreements of the WTO are particularly significant.

#### We should consider the ideological, social, and cultural context of economic policy. Starting with the top-down perspective of the 1AC depoliticizes Latin America policy.

Kenneth **ROBERTS** Gov’t @ Cornell **‘9** “Beyond Neoliberalism” in *Beyond Neoliberalism in Latin America?* Eds. Burdick, Oxhorn, and Roberts p. 1-7

In recent years voters in Latin America have elected a series of left-of-center presidents, starting with Venezuela in 1998 and continuing (to date) with Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Paraguay. Although this political "left turn" has bypassed a number of countries, and the new governments that are part of it comprise a remarkably heterogeneous lot, there seems little doubt that the political winds have shifted in the region. The turn to the left has followed a decade-and-a-half of free market or "neoliberal" reform, when technocrats throughout the region-with staunch support from the U.S. government and international financial institutions-forged a powerful policymaking consensus around the virtues of free trade, deregulated markets, and private entrepreneurship. Since it is not clear whether the region's new leftist governments have identified, much less consolidated, viable alternatives to market liberalism, it is far too early to claim that Latin America has entered a post-neoliberal era of development. What is clear, however, is that the shift to the left signals a "repoliticization" of development issues in Latin America-that is, a demise of the "Washington Consensus" (Williamson 1990) for free market capitalism and the onset of a highly contested search for alternatives that lie "beyond neoliberalism." In short, Latin America is no longer (if it ever was) suspended at "the end of politics" (Colburn 2002), where technocratic consensus is complemented (or secured) by a combination of social demobilization, political resignation, and mass consumerism. The repoliticization of development has both policy and process dimensions. On the policy front, it signifies that neoliberalism is no longer the only game in town; although predefined socialist alternatives to capitalism have long since evaporated, vigorous debates have emerged around non-neoliberal "varieties of capitalism" that envision a more active role for state power in asserting national autonomy, shaping investment priorities, ameliorating inequalities, and providing social services and other public goods. In terms of process, repoliticization entails the emergence or revival of popular subjectivities that are contesting the technocratic monopolization of policymaking space-in some cases at the ballot box, in others on the streets. Repoliticization, therefore, involves a reciprocal interaction between the rise of new actors and an expansion of the issue agenda to include a broader range of alternatives. This book tries to make sense of these new subjectivities-that is, to identify some of Latin America's new social and political actors and to explain the origins, inspirations, and interests that lie behind their activation. In contrast to much of the emerging work on Latin America's left turn, we look beyond the rise of left-leaning governments and their policy choices to focus attention on the socioeconomic and cultural terrain in which new political options are being forged. Individual chapters thus explore how neoliberalism has shaped and constrained popular subjects by breaking down some traditional actors, transforming others, and providing a stimulus for the emergence of new ones-at least some of which bear the seeds of potential social orders beyond neoliberalism. Our approach starts with the recognition that neoliberal "structural adjustment" programs represented much more than a simple change in development policies. By slashing tariffs and other trade barriers, privatizing state-owned enterprises and social services, and deregulating markets to encourage the free flow of capital, neoliberal reforms realigned existing relationships among states, markets, and societies in fundamental ways (Garret6n 2003a). As such, they transformed the social, political, and cultural landscapes that had developed during the mid-twentieth-century era of state-led import-substitution industrialization (ISI). Initially, this meant breaking down the popular collective subjects of the lSI era-in particular, organized labor and labor-based parties-and imposing market discipline over everlarger swaths of social life. As labor unions weakened, however, new popular subjects, such as community-based organizations and indigenous movements, that rejected the insecurities of market individualism and its commodification of social relationships began to emerge. Their diverse attempts to reweave the social fabric are the primary focus of this volume. The essays included here trace many of the contours of this rapidly evolving, neoliberal social and political landscape. Collectively, the essays explore three basic sets of questions. First, what are the new patterns of social interaction generated by the process of market restructuring, and how do these reshape the ways in which societal interests and identities are articulated, organized, and represented in the political arena? Interests and identities are often redefined as market reforms create new economic niches (or destroy old ones), commodify social relationships, alter traditional uses of land, water, or natural resources, and shift the scale or locus of public policymaking. Second, what new social and political actors have emerged, and how do they respond to the multifaceted changes associated with market restructuring? Traditional actors may enter into decline, but new ones invariably arise; we must ask, then, how these new actors are constituted, how they adapt to market opportunities and insecurities, and what strategies they follow when they try to enter the political arena, redefine the policy agenda, and contest public authority. Third, and finally, to what extent do these actors and their responses provide the building blocks for new paths of social, economic, and political development that might be more equitable and inclusive than those that have characterized the neoliberal era? What lies "beyond neoliberalism" is unlikely to be determined by grand ideological visions or political blueprints; instead, it will be constructed piece by piece, from below, through the grassroots participation and decentralized experimentation of new popular subjects. This volume offers no simple answers to these complex questions, much less a new theory of neoliberal politics. Instead, it offers a series of portraits written from a variety of disciplinary perspectives about how people adapt and respond-both individually and collectively-when their economic moorings shift and the social fabric is torn asunder. These portraits are hardly comprehensive; they do not cover every country in Latin America, much less all the stations in the region's heterogeneous and fragmented sociocultural landscape. The editors do not claim that the particular set of actors and issues included in this volume is the best or the only one that could have been chosen. Nevertheless, we have selected topics based on their importance and the quality of research they have generated, and we believe our portraits jointly illuminate the diverse experiences of social actors during the neoliberal era. These portraits provide compelling evidence that capitalism is, as Schumpeter (1950) aptly characterized it, a force of "creative destruction" that simultaneously breaks down and reconfigures various fields of social interaction. Our chapters are replete with examples of the dialectical interplay between capitalism's advance and the social, cultural, and political responses it elicits-though not, as will become evident, in the manner classically envisioned by Marx. These responses, whether deliberate or reactive, bear the seeds of what may in fact lie beyond neoliberalism, a horizon that remains opaque but is increasingly being sketched by a diverse array of popular movements in the region. As explained later, the various dimensions of this dialectical interplay lie beyond the scope of any single academic discipline, making an interdisciplinary approach vital to a more comprehensive understanding. An Integral Approach to Economic Reform, Social Change, and Political Response Social and political changes in Latin America have long been conditioned by patterns of economic development. This can be seen, for example, in the nineteenth-century association between oligarchic politics and agro-export development models, or in the rise of populist social and political mobilization during the early stages of industrialization in the middle of the twentieth lower class groups. These demands were typically funneled through the corporatist intermediary channels of mass party and union organizations, which brokered exchanges between states and organized societal interests. In short, lSI encouraged groups-defined primarily in terms of class categories-to self-organize in order to advance their interests in a policymaking environment where states increasingly penetrated and regulated social and economic relationships, including labor markets and land tenure arrangements. Together, these two processes encouraged strong labor and, in some cases, peasant movements to develop, which in turn provided a social foundation for Latin America's first mass party organizations. The social, cultural, and political construction of popular subjects during the lSI era was thus anchored in the favorable combination of rapid industrialization, state interventionism, and social reform. These linkages between state-led industrialization and grassroots organization were frayed, however, by economic pressures and political polarization in the 1960s and 1970s (O'Donnell 1973), and they were largely severed by the debt crisis of the 1980s. While neoliberal structural adjustment policies helped restore economic stability in the aftermath of the debt crisis, they exacerbated-indeed, they often institutionalized-the social dislocations wrought by the crisis itself. Changes in labor markets-in particular growing informalization, a greater reliance on subcontracting and temporary labor, and flexible rules for hiring and firing-made collective action in the workplace increasingly difficult to sustain, leading to a sharp decline in trade union density in most of the region. Likewise, the parcelization of landholdings and the penetration of market relations in the countryside undermined historic patterns of peasant mobilization for land reform in much of the region (Kurtz 2004). The retreat of the state subjected new sectors of the economy and society to market discipline, undermining the rationale and effectiveness of collective action aimed at eliciting state redress . Historic labor-based parties entered into decline or adapted in part by distancing themselves from labor and other organized mass constituencies. This trend that was propelled both by the structural conditions of neoliberal capitalism and by technological advances in political communication (most prominently, television) that rendered mass party organizations increasingly dispensable for electoral mobilization. Following the restoration of democratic rule in most of Latin America in the 1980s, U.S.-style media-based advertising and campaign tactics diffused rapidly across the region, allowing candidates to appeal directly to voters without the mediation of mass membership party organizations. Latin America entered the new millennium, then, largely devoid of the mass social and party organizations that dominated the landscape during the populist/lSI era. Labor movements had been downsized and politically marginalized, and they were less capable of representing the diverse interests and identities of a precarious and in formalized workforce. Likewise, where they survived at all, mass parties were transformed into professionalized or patronage-based electoral machines (see, e.g., Levitsky 2003); elsewhere, they were displaced by independent personalities and populist outsiders. The dominant trends pointed toward a fragmentation and pluralization of civil society-with a multitude of interests, identities, and decentralized groups struggling to make their voices heard (Ox horn 1998a)-and a deinstitutionalization of political representation, as evidenced by extreme levels of electoral volatility and the rise of personality-based, antiparty candidates. A bottom-up perspective is thus essential to understand how the demise of lSI and the transition to neoliberalism realigned the social landscape in ways that disarticulated the class-based popular subjects of the lSI era. Such a perspective is also essential, however, for explaining popular responses to market liberalization and the openings that eventually emerged for the construction of new types of collective subjects that bear the seeds of what may lie beyond neoliberalism. Neoliberal reforms are directed-indeed, often imposed-by state officials in collaboration with (or under the pressure of) transnational power centers, but civil society and grassroots actors are hardly passive bystanders (Arce 2005). These actors invariably seek to exploit, resist, evade, or cope with state initiatives, and their responses often produce outcomes that are quite different from those envisioned by policymakers and economic elites. In particular, grassroots actors employ a variety of measures to alleviate material hardships and reduce exposure to market insecurities; as Karl Polanyi (1944) argues, there are social and political limits to the commodification of social relationships, and these limits may be quickly breached in contexts of egregious inequalities such as those prevailing in contemporary Latin America. Popular responses thus attempt to reweave a social fabric torn by economic crisis and market dislocation. These responses are often local, decentralized, and territorially based, building on traditions of communitybased organizing, or focused on ethnic and cultural claims rather than the class/corporatist patterns of interest representation that were hallmarks of the lSI era. Although new popular subjects may not initially target public authorities or policymaking arenas, grassroots activism often becomes politicized over time, posing the formidable challenge analyzed by Benjamin Goldfrank in chapter three-that of translating local initiatives into nationallevel political alternatives. This challenge highlights the importance of a bottom-up perspective in the construction of new popular subjects in the neoliberal era. The primary objectives of this volume, then, are to develop an interdisciplinary perspective on the multiple forms of societal responses to market liberalization and to assess their effects. We do this in four principal fields where neoliberalism has altered the social landscape: electoral politics, ethnic mobilization, environmental governance, transnational migration. In each area we explore new patterns of social interaction, identify various responses, and analyze the potential impact of emerging popular subjects.

#### The 1AC’s political-economy intersubjectively constitutes reality. Class and racial positioning produces our sense that the 1AC is self-evident.

Roger **TOOZE** Frmr Prf @ London School of Economics **‘2K** in *Strange Power* Eds. Thomas Lawton, James Rosenau and Amy Verdun p. 191-192

From this critical conceptioni of ideology it is clear that the process of neoliberal globalization has gone hand-in-hand with the **construction** of **enabling** and supporting intersubjective meanings. The apparent triumph, of neoliberal ideology in recent years is, however, the result of a long historical process in which the basic concepts of social life have been defined and constructed in certain ways (see Polanyi 1957). In this historical process even the unquestioned meanings of deeply embedded core social practices, such as what constitutes economic activity, become changed to fit particular interests, but are kept in the realm of what Bourdieu calls 'doxa', where 'the natural and social worlds appear as **self-evident'** (Bourdieu 1977: 164; also see MacLean 2000). Hence the purpose of neoliberal ideology is the construction of a sense of reality that the present social structure of global capitalism and the distribution of wealth and power engendered by that social structure **is, and should be, natural**. That is that the global capitalist society is not the product of power and arbitrariness, but of normal and natural processes that have to be accepted. In this context, the summary argument that Bauman makes re- garding neoliberal ideology needs emphasizing here: The point of similarity between the neo-liberal world-view and a typical 'classic' ideology is that both serve as a priori frames for all future discourse, setting what is seen apart from what goes unnoticed, award- ing or denying relevance, determining the logic of reasoning and the evaluation of results. What, however, makes the neo-liberal world view sharply different from other ideologies indeed, a phenomenon of a separate class - is precisely the absence of questioning; its surrender to what is seen as the implacable and irreversible logic of social reality. (Bauman 1999:127) In the 'natural' processes of globalization the political goal is to achieve a 'self-evident' structure of (global) society in which there is as near as possible a 'quasi-perfect correspondence between the ob- jective order and the subjective principles of organization'. In order to achieve this, those who wield power must capture the **'instruments of knowledge** of the social world', as these are political instruments which contribute to the reproduction of the social world by producing immediate adherence to the world, seen as self-evident and undisputed, of which they are the product and of which they reproduce the structures in a transformed form. (Bourdieu 1977:164) Hence the importance of not allowing epistemology (one of the key 'instruments of knowledge of the social world') to be defined as 'given', as outside the parameters of what we in academic IPE should question. As Strange argued in the last lines of her last piece of writing, 'although **academic debate** by itself rarely changes the basic ideas that at any time dominate the knowledge structure, academic debate when it takes place against a background of growing disillusion, of doubt and uncertainty can act as a catalyst to action'." One can only hope that, as in so many other aspects of IPE, she is right.

#### We must reflect on the social, economic, and cultural location of the theories that make the 1AC make sense. Privileging US economic globalization sanctions systematic violence.

Eduardo **MENDIETA** Philosophy @ Stony Brook **‘5** RE-MAPPING LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES: POSTCOLONIALISM, SUBALTERN STUDIES,POSTOCCIDENTALISM AND GLOBALIZATION THEORY *Dispositio* 25 (52) p. 184-187

The Space of Theory I briefly looked at a very insightful and critical approach to the crisis of the social sciences. Yet, I find it inadequate not just because it is bereft of any constructive suggestions, but also because it fails to give an account of its own theoretical position that does not presuppose what it is ultimately criticizing, namely the epistemological primacy of an ontology of history, or what we generally call a triumphalist teleology of the West. Pletsch pre- supposes the historical soil of theory when he criticizes the conceptual matrix of 20th century social science, that is, he is able to criticize what stands before his eyes because he stands at the most forward moment in the historical continuum he seeks to criticize. But, in what way can I engage in a criticism of a conceptual apparatus without at some level presupposing the very elements that constitute the normativity of that very apparatus? I want to suggest that in order to be aware of our own blind spot, or, in other words, in order to be able to justify our criticism without occluding the place from which we enunciate that criticism, we have to engage in a doubling operation. We observe ourselves in the act of observing. If we cannot see the place from which we observe, we could at least observe what it is that we observe and how it is that we observe it. The language is that of systems analysis, or complex systems, but the intent is different, as we will see. The goal is to make sense of the plethora of theories that are available now in the marketplace of ideas. I am interested in making sense of this theoretical cacophony, not because I think that theoretical diversity is a sign of the decay or obsolescence of theory. The opposite is more true: the plurality of theoretical wares in the marketplace of ideas reflects the very level of theory commodification that is necessary for the health of the exchange of ideas as the exchange of a cultural semantics that imposes a certain type of social semantics. I am interested in how theories operate in the circulation of cultural wealth, and how they grease the wheels of a global market in which what is traded is a product whose use value is as important as its exchange value, where cultural and theoretical capital stand on the same level as commercial and technological capital. But, at the same time, I am interested in how, in this uncircumventable situation of extreme commodification and reification of the theoretical, of its coagulation into theory, we might nonetheless discover a place of criticism. I will begin be laying out a criteria for the development of a typology of theories. Thus, in contrast to Pletsch, who wanted the conceptual matrix of social theory writ large, I am interested in the ways in which, in a saturated theoretical market, we might begin to differentiate between theories and their effects. First criteria: we have to determine what is the epistemograph or ontograph that is inscribed by a group of theories or theory. This is the lan- guage of Spivak (1999), but it is a terminology that one can claim descends also from Henri Lefebvre and David Harvey. But by ontograph or epistemograph I mean the following: every theory, whether consciously or unconsciously, is determined by spatial imaginary. This spatial imaginary operates at both macro and micro-levels. The classic example is Hegel and his idea that Europe is the privileged center for the substantialization of reason. Another example would be how in Kant, as Spivak and LeDouff have shown, the categories of cognition are inscribed within a particular geography of the imagination. In Dussel's language, every philosophy participates in a geo-political locus, not only in the sense that philosophy is determined by its place of enunciation, but also in the sense that philosophy also projects a certain image of the planet, the ecumene, and the polis as the space of what is civilized, or the place of civilization, which may or may not be besieged by the barbarians. Philosophy enacts an act of spatialization at the very same time that it is spatialized by its locus of enunciation. Every philosophy, again, inscribes an ontos or epistemograph. Second criteria: we have to make explicit the locus of the instantiation of the social. Every theory offers one or a group of structures and social processes that are the privileged locus for the substantialization of reason or logos. In other words, reason materializes in certain social structures in a form, and some might claim, in a normative way. It is for this reason, for instance, that Hegel could undertake a phenomenology of the spirit as an analysis of sociality, or society. Clearly, this relation between reason and social structure is what allows someone like Habermas to speak of modernity as the process of the rationalization of systems and the life world. A theory of rationality in turn becomes a theory of social differentiation, which in turn becomes a theory about the modernity (read rationality) of certain forms of society that results in a differential hierarchy in which some societies are primitive, and others pre-modern, and still others modern. Conversely, in this view there are social spheres that have not been rationalized, or have been insufficiently rationalized. For this criterion the central question is: what is the institutional focus of a group of theories or theory? Third criteria: this one refers to what is taken to be the normative criteria or criteria or evaluation that allows one to adjudicate whether a society has achieved what is putatively taken to be the actualization of reason in the social world. In other words: what is normative for each group of theories or theory? Let me illustrate by stating that in some theories of modernity the criteria for determining whether societies are modern or not is dependent on whether a society has obtained a high level of bureaucratization, formalization, institutionalization of abstract universality, self-reflexivity, or even contextual un-coupling (as one can say that both Giddens and Habermas argue). Another example: what is the operating evaluative norm when one says that societies are globalized or have been globalized, or that they should be globalized? Is it that a society has accepted the austere policies of the World Bank, and that national economies have been liberalized and are open to the onslaught of trans-nationals? Fourth criteria: what are the political consequences of an epistemological project, or to put it differently, in what ways does a certain onto- graph or epistemograph turn into an actual political project? Put differently, every theory has a political impact, or rather, contributes towards sanctioning, legitimating, and normalizing certain forms of social violence. Or, conversely, a theory or group of theories contribute to the de-mystification of the supposed naturalness of certain social processes, and, in this way, can call into question the impact of certain forms of social violence that are tolerated and neglected because they had been naturalized. The question that is important with respect to this criterion is: which political projects are sanctioned when certain processes, loci of materialization of reason, epistemograph or ontographs are theoretically defended and articulated? The Fifth and final criteria is that this whole form of articulating criteria could be stylized and formalized by asking: who is the subject who thinks what object, and, more acutely still, where is this subject and how does it project and localize its object of knowledge? A different way of saying this would be: who speaks for whom and who speaks over or about whom? This is a way of asking questions about the production of theory, and the position of theoretical agents, the agents that produce theory. It is a form of looking at the production of theory that makes explicit how there are subjects who are authorized to make theoretical pronouncements while there are other "subjects" that are merely spectators and who are relegated to being mere objects of knowledge. Some subjects are credible epistemic and theoretical witnesses, while others are from the outset suspect and illegitimate subjects of credible theoretical reflection. This all concerns the practices of partitioning, parceling, or, as one may say in Mexico, of fraccionamientos , and what we in the US might call theoretical gerrymandering or gentrifícation. Who speaks, or who is authorized to speak about, and for others, occupies a privileged epistemological place. This place, in turn, is made available by the theories and epistemological practices that are used by theorists. There is what Walter Mignolo calls a locus of enunciation and a practice of enactment (Mignolo 1994, 2000). Theorizing, or philosophizing is a habitus that is always accompanied, or framed by a configuration of both social and imaginary space (all space is imaginary and social, and the social is always conditioned by a certain imaginary). To think our locus of epistemological privilege, or to think the place of our epistemological scorn and segregation, this is what Raymond Pannikar has called a plurotopic hermeneutic.

## Links

### General Links

#### Enagement consolidates neoliberal control. Implementation marginalizes groups advocating social and economic reforms and favors transnational elites.

William **ROBINSON** Sociology @ UC Santa Barbara **‘5** “The Battle for Global Civil Society” http://www.iefd.org/articles/global\_civil\_society.php

How can one tell NGOs and human rights groups genuinely dedicated to promoting social, economic, and human rights apart from the NED-fed variety? Let me clarify that my argument in no way suggests that democratization movements around the world are creatures of foreign policy, on the contrary, the argument is that changes in U.S. foreign policy and new modalities in U.S. intervention are meant specifically to challenge, and undermine, limit, and control the extent of social and political change in countries where masses of people—including the elite—are struggling for democracy and democratization. Entirely to the contrary, U.S. political intervention under the banner of "democracy promotion" is aimed at undermining authentic democracy, at undermining and gaining control over popular movements for democratization, at keeping a lid on popular democracy movements, at limiting any change that may be brought about by mass democratization movements so that the outcome to democracy struggles will not threaten the elite order and integration into global capitalism. If by democracy we mean the power of the people, we mean mass participation in the vital decisions of society, a democratic distribution of material and cultural resources, then democracy is a profound threat to global capitalist interests and must be mercilessly opposed and suppressed by U.S. and transnational elites. What is new about the strategy of "democracy promotion" is that this opposition, this suppression, is now conducted ironically under the very rhetorical banner of promoting democracy and through sophisticated new instruments and modalities of political intervention Having said that, the question is very legitimate. I think what's going on is that as every country and every community in the world becomes turned upside down by the penetration of capitalist globalization and the massive changes that we've seen in the last ten to twenty years, older forms of political authority—authoritarianism, dictatorship, etc.—are delegitimated and challenged from below. It's at that point that the U.S. attempts with these democratization movements to control the type of political change that's going to take place, attempts to control the outcome of these democratization movements, and attempts to get certain groups in power and marginalize other groups. In this context, if the U.S. moves into a country such as Kyrgyzstan—which I haven't studied in as much detail as the Ukraine, for example—all different groups that are going to be involved in the democratization struggle are going to, in some way or another, come under U.S. purview. Some will be brought into U.S. programs through funding and technical liaisons and advisors, and so forth, while others will be marginalized. You asked if all these different groups are stooges of U.S. foreign policy. Not at all; those that are struggling for a completely different vision, one contrary to U.S. interests and global capital's interests are going to be marginalized if they can't be bought. There are going to be alternative or parallel organizations set up by U.S. operatives (and their local allies and agents) and funding that are more powerful, more moderate, more centrist, more elite-oriented. These organizations and NGOs are going to receive international media attention, they're going to receive funding, they're going to liaise with other forces abroad. So we could summarize by saying that there are three different categories of groups. There are those that are clearly instruments of U.S. foreign policy objectives, and these are not groups that are promoting democratization but are trying to limit democratization and control change. There are those that are marginalized and pushed aside, and then there are those that the U.S. cannot or it is not in the interest of U.S. foreign policy to marginalize or challenge, and then they attempt to co-opt these organizations and to moderate them. Very often you get well intentioned people and you get people who have a legitimate political agenda: democratization, regime change from an authoritarian regime, and so forth, that because structural or on-the-ground circumstances don't allow anything else, become sucked up in U.S. and transnational elite foreign policy operations or interventions.Where does the US seek to "promote democracy"?

There are two different categories of "democracy promotion" programs: The first are programs in those countries that are already ruled by elites and in the camp of global capitalism. In these countries, political intervention programs seek to bolster neo-liberal elites, to achieve this elite's control over the state and to cultivate its hegemony in civil society. Cultivating this neo-liberal elite and its domination and hegemony is the political dimension that complements the economic dimension, which is neo-liberal structural adjustment and integration into the emerging global capitalist economy. The flip side of this effort is to isolate, marginalize, and discredit popular, nationalist, revolutionary and other progressive forces that may pose a challenge to the stable domination of local pro-US elites or neo-liberal regimes. These types of programs have been conducted in dozens of countries around the world. To mention just one example, in el salvador, "democracy promotion" programs that had been conducted throughout the 1990s and early 21st century were expanded in 2003 as presidential elections approached. These programs provided diverse forms of support for civic and political groups aligned with the ruling ARENA party and marginalized the FMLN. The other is to use "democracy promotion" to overthrow regimes that the U.S. is not favorable towards or to bring about a "transition to democracy" in cases where so-called "regime change" is seen by Washington as necessary for the country's stability and continued integration into global capitalism. Countries that Washington wishes to destabilize in recent years through "democracy promotion" (along with other forms of intervention) include Venezuela, Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua in the 1980s, and so on. The groups and individuals that participated in the destabilization of the government of Jean Bertrand Aristide and that are now in power in Haiti were precisely those groomed and cultivated by U.S. "democracy promotion" programs dating back to the late 1980s and undertaken continuously right up to the march 2004 U.S. coup d'état. In Venezuela, the opposition to the government of Hugo Chávez has been working since the late 1990s closely with the U.S. "democracy promotion" network.Then there are those countries targeted for a "transition to democracy," that is, a U.S.-supported and often orchestrated changeover in government and state structures. South Africa and Eastern European countries fell into this category in the 1990s, as does the current situation in Iraq. What is the connection between the NED and the U.S. government? The fact that the NED receives its funding from Congress is hardly its most direct link to the government. NED operations are designed in the State Department and the White House, often in coordination with [CIA headquarters at] Langley, and everything is undertaken in liaison with the Embassy on the ground in a particular intervened country. The officials put in charge of these operations are typically engaged in a revolving door relationship with the U.S. state. They move in and out of other government positions at the White House, the State Department, and so on. What we're seeing is the battle over global civil society, and it's heating up, because there's no place left in the world that has not been integrating very rapidly into the global system. Venezuela is one of those places at the front-line of this battle. The overt funding channels established through NED operations, which even then are not entirely above ground, generate an infrastructure of contacts, networks, channels of influence, and so forth, that are then available for covert funding and operations. That's the pattern that we see everywhere. In Nicaragua around the 1990 elections, for every dollar of NED or AID funding there were several dollars of CIA funding. We know that much from the tip of the iceberg we were able to uncover. The NED—though maybe it has gotten the most attention—is hardly the only organization involved in this kind of intervention conducted under the umbrella of the U.S. State Department and the Executive. There are many other branches of the U.S. State dedicated to promoting "democracy," and other countries are setting up similar branches as well. I think the weakness in progressive forces internationally is to see the political dynamic in the world today as an effort at U.S. empire. And so the story becomes the U.S. against the rest of the world, and that's a grave mistake. One of the things that has taken place—one of the key aspects of globalization—is the rise of a transnational elite that shares an interest in attempting to preserve the current global capitalist order, in defending it and extending it, and they also share the view that "democracy promotion" is one key instrument in advancing and stabilizing this global capitalist order. There might be tactical differences and there might be strategic differences in how to do that—what happened in Iraq, for example. In Venezuela we see the same thing: Western Europe, Canada, and most Latin American governments would like to see Chávez out of power and an elite order restored, but the question is how to go about it. The U.S. strategy has largely backfired so far. So there are tactical and strategic differences, but there is a commonality of interest among the leading capitalist states.

#### International economic engagement is a tool for ensuring neoliberal consensus in Latin America.

Atilio **BORON** Poli Sci @ Latin American Social Sciences Institute and @ University of Buenos Aires ‘**8** “Promises and Challenges: The Latin American Left at the Start of the Twenty-first Century” in *The New Latin American Left* eds. Barrett, Chavez & Rodríguez-Garavito p. 246-247

THE DIFFICULT TRANSITION TO POST-NEO-LIBERALISM A brief look at Latin America's recent history helps to illustrate the serious obstacles that seem to affect governments that are, at least in principle and according to their rhetoric, animated by an eagerness to tum the page on the sad history of neo-liberalism in the region. What is certain is that, at times in a grotesque way and at others in a tragic way, the continued supremacy of neo-liberalism in the economic sphere goes unaltered despite the fact that citizens have resoundingly rejected it in the voting booth. In the 2002 presidential elections in Brazil, Lula defeated Fernando H. Cardoso's representatives of neo-liberal continuism, and something similar occurred in 2006. Comparable displays of popular rejection of neo-liberalism have been produced on a variety of stages: the umpteenth ratification of the formidable electoral and social popularity of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, once again confirmed in December 2006; Daniel Ortega's victory in the 2006 Nicaraguan elections and the election of Rafael Correa in Ecuador in the same year; the massive protests that brought down the Sanchez de Lozada and Mesa governments in Bolivia and culminated in the resounding electoral victory of Evo Morales in late 2005; the unprecedented popularity attained by Nestor Kirchner in Argentina during his first term of office; the stubborn rejection by Uruguayans of the privatisation of state-owned companies in a series of referenda during the past decade and the subsequent triumph of Tabare Vazquez in the 2004 presidential elections; followed by the triumph of Michele Bachelet in Chile. Nevertheless, it is necessary to broach a serious question: Why is it that almost all governments who come to power on an impressive wave of popular votes, and with an express mandate to bring an end to the primacy of neo-liberalism, surrender when it comes time to introduce a post-neoliberal agenda? Various factors explain this situation. First, it can be explained by the increased power of the markets - in reality, of the monopolies and large corporations that control them - as against the diminished capacities of the state after decades of application of neo-liberal policies aimed at ' shrinking' the state, dismantling its agencies and organisms, and privatising state-owned enterprises. All this confers on the dominant sectors a capacity for blackmail - capital flight, investment strikes, speculative pressures, bribery of officials and the like - over governments that is difficult, if not impossible, for them to resist, and which makes them file away their electoral promises for better times. A second factor is the persistence of imperialism and its many traps and mechanisms that ' discipline' unruly governments via a range of instruments that assure the continued force of neo-liberal policies. On the one hand, there are the pressures deriving from the need for heavily indebted governments to count on the benevolence of Washington to make their governmental programmes viable, whether by way of a 'preferential treatment' that guarantees their products access to the North American market, the indefinite renegotiation of their foreign debt, or the approval needed to facilitate the flow of capital and investment of various sorts into their economies. All this is expressed in the long list of 'conditionalities ' that the guard dogs of imperialism - principally the IMF and World Bank, but also the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) - impose on the governments of the region (see Boron, 2002). On the other hand, the coercion exercised by imperialism also follows other paths, ranging from the direct political demands presented in the context of military aid programmes, the eradication of coca crops, and technical assistance and international co-operation, to the ideological manipulation made possible by big capital's almost exclusive control of the mass media, the creators of the 'common sense' of the times. Finally, a third factor must be added: the anti-democratic regression that the Latin American states have suffered, which, as I mentioned above, has progressively emptied the democratic project of all content and irreparably weakened, in the current framework of institutional organisation, its capacities for intervention in social life. One of the defining characteristics of this crisis is the progressive displacement of a growing number of issues that affect collective well-being into fields that are supposedly more ' technical' and therefore distant from the popular will as expressed at election time. This means that, far from being publicly debated, these issues are dealt with in the shadows by 'experts', completely encapsulated and beyond almost any sort of democratic scrutiny. Despite their enormous social impact, these questions are resolved by accords sealed between capitalists and their state representatives. This entire fraudulent operation is accompanied by absurd justifications, such as 'the economy is a technical matter that must be managed in a manner independent of political considerations'. The economy, the science of scarcity and for that very reason the political science par excellence, attempts to pass itself off as a mere technical specialisation. The sadly celebrated 'independence of the Central Bank' is an eloquent example of this absurdity: such independence is only in relation to popular sovereignty, as the central banks in our region enjoy no independence vis-a-vis financial capital and imperialism, which they serve unconditionally.

### Free Trade Link

#### Free Trade discourse justifies elevating market logic above all other concerns.

Edgardo **LANDER** **‘2** “Eurocentrism, Modern Knowledges, and the “Natural” Order of Global Capital” *Nepantla* 3.2 p. 249-253

The Market (and Free Trade) as Natural Order (Any Obstacle to This Order Represents an Unnatural Distortion) We are writing the constitution of a single global economy. —Renato Ruggiero, first director general of the World Trade Organization The significance of establishing a global system called “free trade”2 is illustrated by the importance attributed by the WTO to the prolonged negotiations known as the Uruguay Round, which culminated in the creation of this global organization. “It was quite simply the largest trade negotiation ever, and most probably the largest negotiation of any kind in history” (WTO 1999b, 12). The goal of this organization is to create “a system of undistorted commerce”: The WTO (ibid., 7) “is a system of rules dedicated to open, fair, and undistorted competition.” “Essentially, trade is distorted if prices are higher or lower than normal, and if quantities produced, bought, and sold are also higher or lower than normal—i.e. than the levels that would usually exist in a competitive market” (17). This view of a normal, natural way of doing things, in contrast with distorted (or unnatural) approaches, can be seen quite clearly in the justifications for performance requirement bans envisaged by investment treaties— whether in the extensive range of bilateral agreements negotiated over the last few years on the promotion and protection of investment, or in the MAI negotiating text. In official U.S. government documents referring to this treaty, it is repeatedly affirmed that “‘performance requirements’ generally distort trade and investment decisions that an investor would otherwise make in a free market” (Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs 1998). “Performance requirements” is the term used to describe a wide range of public policies that could curb in some way the full freedom of the investor. The MAI negotiating text details the performance requirements that governments are explicitly banned from using. AContracting Party shall not, in connection with the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment, sale or other disposition of an investment in its territory of an investor of a Contracting Party or of a non-Contracting Party, impose, enforce, or maintain any of the following requirements, or enforce any commitment or undertaking: a. to export a given level or percentage of goods or services; b. to achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content; c. to purchase, use or accord a preference to goods produced or services provided in its territory, or to purchase goods or services from persons in its territory; d. to relate in any way the volume or value of imports to the volume or value of exports or to the amount of foreign exchange inflows associated with such investment; e. to restrict sales of goods or services in its territory that such investment produces or provides by relating such sales to the volume or value of its exports or foreign exchange earnings; f. to transfer technology, a production process or other proprietary knowledge to a natural or legal person in its territory, except when the requirement: i) is imposed or the commitment or undertaking is enforced by a court, administrative tribunal or competition authority to remedy an alleged violation of competition laws, or ii) concerns the transfer of intellectual property and is undertaken in a manner not inconsistent with the TRIPS Agreement;3 g. to locate its headquarters for a specific region or the world market in the territory of that Contracting Party; h. to supply one or more of the goods that it produces or the services that it provides to a specific region or the world market exclusively from the territory of that Contracting Party; i. to achieve a given level or value of research and development in its territory; j. to hire a given level of nationals; k. to establish a joint venture with domestic participation; or l. to achieve a minimum level of domestic equity participation other than nominal qualifying shares for directors or incorporators of corporations. (OECD 1998, 18–20)4 In accordance with this, the full freedom of the investor should always take precedence over any other social, cultural, political, or economic interest, goal, or value of the countries, regions, and communities toward which the investment is directed. Any effort to redirect, change, regulate, promote, limit, or ban any of the investor’s activities constitutes discrimination or distortion. It follows that what is natural remains the free decision of the investor in a market that is equally free. From this perspective, any conditions attached to this freedom—as a result of social, cultural, or ethical criteria—become an unacceptable distortion of the natural order of things. Performance requirements are considered as “distorting investment decisions to the benefit of the jurisdiction imposing the requirement” (Singer and Orbuch 1997). Natural Order and Legitimate Functions of Government In accordance with the stipulations just listed, no country, region, or local community could legitimately establish criteria to direct or shape investment carried out within its jurisdiction in terms of its own goals. This even holds true in cases where these terms were democratically established and represent a wide popular consensus. The various levels of government, in other words, must be content to be passive spectators, awaiting decisions made by national or foreign investors regarding the use of national or local resources, land, and human potential. The boundary determining what constitutes the very limited— and thus legitimate—core responsibilities of the states, in contrast with functions that are illegitimate (all the laws, standards, regulations, policies, or public investments that can in any way distort the functioning of the market and the free will of investors), represents one of the most significant normative concepts in the entire MAI text. According to the U.S. representative (the vice president of the negotiating group), in spite of the wide spectrum of limitations that the treaty imposes on public policy, a few exceptions are allowed. “These exceptions make sure that governments are assured they have the ability, subject to certain constraints, to do what they feel is necessary to carry out some of the core responsibilities of government” (Larson 1997). This restriction on state investment is similarly present in WTO treaties. In the case of farming, for instance, the following terms establish which public investments are allowed and which are banned: The Agriculture Agreement distinguishes between support programmes that stimulate production directly, and those that are considered to have no direct effect. Domestic policies that do have a direct effect on production and trade have to be cut back. (WTO 1999b, 18)5 From this naturalizing perspective, only public policies and government actions that move toward liberalization and deregulation are legitimate. Any policy aimed in the opposite direction is, by definition, the policy of “special interest groups interested only in protecting their own privileged positions at the expense of the rest of the population” (ibid., 58). For this reason a transnational judicial order is needed to safeguard governments from their societies’ democratic demands.6 This is the clear meaning of the following WTO text: Every nation rightly wants to safeguard its economic sovereignty. Most would rather introduce economic reforms of their own, without outside pressure. But the reforms can be delayed or blocked by domestic special interest groups which put their own economic welfare ahead of that of the country as a whole. In such cases, the need to fulfil multilateral obligations can assist a government to promote economic growth and development through economic reform. In similar ways, the opportunity to engage in reciprocal trade negotiations withWTOpartners—a country succeeding in obtaining lower trade barriers for some of its exports in return for lowering its own barriers on imports, for example—can also help a government overcome domestic special interest groups interested only in protecting their own privileged positions at the expense of the rest of the population. (ibid.) As Pierre Bourdieu (1998) has aptly demonstrated, beyond limiting the state’s ability to act, this new global legal order is designed to “call into question any and all collective structures that could serve as an obstacle to the logic of the pure market.”

#### Aff evidence suspect – the free trade regime assumes economic and environmental decision-making are purely technical and neutral.

Edgardo **LANDER** **‘2** “Eurocentrism, Modern Knowledges, and the “Natural” Order of Global Capital” *Nepantla* 3.2 p. 253-255

Expert Knowledge The naturalization of these processes of free circulation of investment and trade, as criteria that dictate the terms under which all societies on the planet necessarily must be organized, is explicitly supported by the expertise of those who speak in the name of specialized knowledges, in this case of economic science (a knowledge in the singular): It is widely recognized by economists and trade experts that the WTO system contributes to development. (WTO 1999b, 7) The economic case for an open trading system based upon multilaterally agreed rules is simple enough and rests largely on commercial common sense. But it is also supported by evidence: the experience of world trade and economic growth since the SecondWorldWar. (8) Economists agree that the greatest gains go to the country that slashes its own trade barriers. Readiness to open up to foreign suppliers of consumer goods and of inputs to production improves choices as well as competition in price and services offered. Protection that gives special favours to one sector or another of the economy distorts the way a country uses its productive resources. Removal or reduction of distortions allows resources to be used more efficiently. (WTO 1999a, 5) Another manifestation of the “naturalization”/depoliticization of the issues at stake in international economic relations is the tendency to turn disagreements into technical issues that can be resolved in an “objective” and “impartial” manner by the relevant specialists. The Multilateral Agreement on Investment establishes that regulations (including environmental or health-related regulations) that can be considered polemical from the point of view of their scientific justification may be submitted to a body of scientific experts for consideration (OECD 1998, 66). Similar practices are established in WTO agreements. A separate agreement on food safety and animal and plant health standards (sanitary and phytosanitary measures) sets out the basic rules. It allows countries to set their own standards. (WTO 1999b, 19) Member countries are encouraged to use international standards, guidelines and recommendations where they exist.However, members may use measures which result in higher standards if there is scientific justification. (ibid.) What in these texts appears to be the simple application of objective scientific criteria in reality relates to extremely complex and controversial matters. This is the type of situation that arises when, whether on the basis of scientific evidence (on which consensus may or may not exist) or based on specific preferences on the part of the population, standards are established that regulate, limit, or block the use of a certain product or technological process. This can be seen in the heated debate surrounding foods derived from genetically modified plants and animals. One well-known case illustrating the application of WTO standards is the U.S. lawsuit involving the European Union’s ban on the sale—in E.U. territory—of beef treated with growth hormones. The WTO ruled in favor of the United States, categorizing this ban as an unfair, protectionist practice that went against free trade, forcing the European Union to either allow the importation of these products or face severe sanctions, in spite of the opposition of a great majority of the continent’s population. The opinion of a few experts, chosen by the WTO authorities dealing with conflict resolution, thus overruled the democratically expressed wishes of the people of the European Union. In this case it was determined that the fear of consuming beef treated with growth hormones lacked scientific basis; inside the new world order defined by the WTO, this preference was not one for which people could legitimately opt. The majority of the ethical and political confrontations having to do with techno-scientific matters do not have a univocal scientific solution, and differences of opinion and interpretation can continue indefinitely (Nelkin 1977, 1984). Generally, the issues at stake cannot be resolved solely on the basis of experts’ opinions. People are being denied the sovereign right to found their decisions on ethical choices or on particular cultural contexts. This is an example of the growing authoritarianism of the global capitalist order, exposing the population to the potentially harmful effects of certain techno-scientific processes against its expressed will, merely because “specialists” consider that their opposition is based on nothing more than prejudice. These are not issues that depend on the existence or absence of consensus in the scientific community. In any case, as Hans Jonas (1984, 118) argues, human capacity to wield power over nature is always greater than the predictability of this power’s long-range effects, which, in case of doubt, calls for an ethics of responsibility.7 This ethical choice is denied when it is assumed that, to make this type of decision it suffices to take into account the opinions of experts and the rights of investors (Lander 1994). Beyond the internal controversies within Western, techno-scientific communities lies the fact that in the thousands of conflicts occurring in the world today between the interests of transnational capital and those of rural or indigenous people concerning the use of the environment, there is generally also a conflict in the parties’ views of the cosmos, an antagonism between different knowledge systems and different ways of conceiving the relationships between culture and nature. Nevertheless—and this is a perfect expression of the continual functioning of colonial mechanisms—in the new global capital order only one form of knowledge is recognized: Western scientific knowledge. From this discourse of knowledge the criteria and procedures are established by which all controversies are decided.

### Human Rights Link

#### The rhetoric of human rights and democratic accountability is a Trojan horse for neo-colonial dominance by the U.S.

Tony **EVANS** Politics @ Southampton **‘1** *The Politics of Human Rights* p. 86-88

Democracy and Global Order Why then have the generally held assumptions about human rights and democracy been so vigorously promoted in some quarters? The answer to this question is found by looking at the failure of development in the less developed world. According to this argument, the threat of social unrest, which would disrupt the supply of raw materials, restrict investment opportunities and severely damage prospects for exploiting low-cost labour, cannot be avoided by using coercive policing and military suppression, as it was during the Cold War period. During the Cold War such coercion was legitimated by the argument that the threat of communism justified support for any tyrannical government provided it was avowedly anti-communist (Mahbubani 1992). Violence was justified 'because the Third World people were being killed to protect them from the evil incarnate -communism' (Shivji 1999: 257). The collapse of the Soviet bloc removed this rationale for maintaining order at the expense of human rights and justice. Instead, policy makers turned to democracy as the moral justification for maintaining economic and political relations with governments known to violate human rights. This left those who trade with repressive regimes, or those who want to maintain cordial relations for political reasons, with the dilemma of promoting a new rationale that justified continuing economic and political relations. The distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, which assumes that the former represents a transitory stage in the move to full democracy, while the latter does not, offers a well-known foundation for resolving this dilemma (Kirkpatrick 1982). The success of this move can be judged by the way that the democracy discourse increasingly replaces the human rights discourse in US foreign policy circles (Carothers 1994). Through this device, it remains legitimate to continue with economic relationships, to call for extended aid programmes and to develop new trade and business relations, **unhindered by moral concerns**, provided a country has created the institutions of democracy. However, the promotion of democracy was not necessarily concerned with **social justice, human rights, human security or ideas of human worth**, but the need to create an appropriate global order for the continued **expansion of global capital**. In support of this aim, powerful capitalist states sought to promote democracy in its procedural guise: as a set of democratic institutions rather than as a means of achieving social and economic transformation that would have empowered the poor and the socially excluded. This form of **'low-intensity democracy'** may be understood as a component of 'low-intensity conflict', a policy that the US sought to promote as a means of securing anti-communist and antireformist support that avoided either unstable representative democratic systems or military dictatorship: Democracy was thus used as a form of intervention. **Its intent was to pre-empt either progressive reform or revolutionary change.** Beyond seeking to demobilise popular forces, it also sought to legitimise the status quo. Authoritarianism was thus discredited and delegitimised. The new 'democratic' regime, which temporarily enjoys increased legitimacy, can in fact undertake economic and social policies of 'adjustment' that impose new hardships on the general population and compromise economic sovereignty. The paradox of Low Intensity Democracy is that **a civilianised conservative regime can pursue painful and even repressive social and economic policies with more impunity and with less popular resistance than can an openly authoritarian regime**. From the point ofview of the US and conservative domestic elites in these countries, this quality must make it an interesting and useful alternative to traditional overt authoritarianism. (Gills, Rocamora & Wilson 1993: 8) This paradox does not escape the consciousness of citizens where low-intensity democracy operates. As incidents of resistance to globalization often remind us, the economic conditions suffered by many people, together with an absence of basic liberties, stimulates challenges to established systems of government, which are seen 'domestically as predatory and corrupt and internationally, servile executors of the economic agenda of ruling classes of the major OECD nations' (Cheru 1997: 164). By adopting a definition of democracy that places emphasis on the creation of formal institutions, which promises limited changes to civil and political rights but has little to say about economic and social reform, 'repressive abuses of human rights continue usually against the familiar targets of labour, students, the left and human rights activists' (Gills, Rocamora & Wilson 1993: 21). For those countries who adopt the institutions of low-intensity democracy, the economic support offered by international financial institutions and aid programmes, together with the promise of corporate investment, is conditional upon maintaining a particular type of democracy that plays a crucial role in maintaining the conditions of globalization. If reformist groups attempt to transcend the limitations imposed by low-intensity democracy, and instead promote a version of popular democracy that includes social reform and justice, then su**pport is withdrawn and the spectre of military intervention surfaces** (Chomsky 1998). In short, democracy often means little more than a 'thin veneer of Western parliamentary institutions and the 'rule of law', all of which are intended to subdue ethnic, cultural and religious tensions in the effort to secure an order fit for economic growth and development (Mahbubani 1992). For critics of democracy, however, the claim to have established a democratic form of government must rest upon something more than the introduction of formal institutions, which often do nothing to provide for social, economic and political reforms or the rights of the people. In countries where low-intensity democracy operates, governments give little attention to developing an open, rights-based culture. On the contrary, the governments of low-intensity democracies commonly work to ensure that trade unions are weak, wages are kept at a level beneath that necessary for a dignified life, non-governmental organizations are marginalized or declared illegal and the press and media are censored. The practice of offering fledgling democracies technical and training assistance to strengthen some state institutions -the police and the military, for example -can provide the means for maintaining a domestic order that pays little attention to human rights and social justice (Carothers 1994; HRW 1999). Furthermore, the social structures and traditions that support low intensity democracy often mean that in practice access to public office is restricted to particular groups. While the existence of the institutions of democracy may help to legitimate external relations, particularly where the established democracies of advanced technological states remain squeamish about trading with authoritarian governments, the protection of universal human rights is not necessarily guaranteed. Although some commentators defend the introduction of low-intensity democracy, arguing that it is the **first stage in a journey** that ends in full democratic participation and social reform, Gills, Rocamora and Wilson argue that it is **more accurate to understanding it as an end in itself** -as a way **of maintaining an order** that supports the interests of global and national capital.

### Softpower

#### Softpower manipulates and denies agency – it’s the velvet glove for the iron fist.

John **DRYZEK** Prf. Research School @ Australian Nat’l **‘6** “Transnational Democracy in an Insecure World” *Internaitonal Political Science Review* 27 (2) p. 110-112

At the discourse level, US actions and communications since 9/11 have often served to alienate erstwhile friends and solidify the opposition of enemies, thus producing exactly the opposite of the safety and security that is ostensibly the main concern of US policymaking. Many US-based opponents of the unilateralism with which the George W. Bush administration engaged the world at both military and discourse levels favor a more solicitous approach with an important discourse aspect. The key concept here is "soft power": the ability to induce others to share one's values and goals, to attract them to one's viewpoint, and to persuade them to engage in supportive actions. The concept is associated in particular with Joseph Nye (2002, 2004). Soft power is not necessarily a more multilateralist option than the war of ideas. As Reus-Smit (2004: 65) points out, neoconservatives in the USA can treat it as a **supplement** to their promotion of a particular agenda of liberal democracy and capitalism via the exercise of hard power. Moreover, the combination of a war of ideas and soft power could be interpreted in good-cop/bad-cop terms, as comple mentary aspects of a strategy to achieve discourse hegemony - however odd this might look to proponents of the two doctrines. Soft power operates at the level of both cultural dissemination and public policy. Nye himself stresses the cultural aspect when he discusses the impact of Hollywood films, other products of popular culture, and the content of the Internet. He also emphasizes the role of the US higher education system (which hosts students from many countries). At the public policy level, Nye disdains propaganda on the grounds that it lacks credibility. On the other hand, he supports "government broadcasting to other countries that is evenhanded, open, and informative" (Nye, 2003). The other way to pursue soft power through public policy is through sensitivity toward the interests of other actors in the international system (except, of course, clear enemies). As Nye (2003) puts it, "To the extent that America defines its national interests in ways congruent with others, and consults with them in the formulation of policies, it will improve the ratio of admiration to resentment." Intelligent pursuit of soft power would avoid unnecessary alienation of actual and potential friends. The beginning of the war on Iraq was accompanied by a wave of anti-French hysteria in Washington, DC, as politicians outbid each other to pour scorn on French opposition to the war. Respect for honest disagreement with allies who, in the end, share most of the values proclaimed as the impetus for US foreign and security policy, but disagree about some of the means, would be more productive in light of soft-power considerations. Maximizing soft power would presumably also mean leading by example, as opposed to proclaiming oneself above the rules and norms to which others are expected to comply. However, there are severe limits to the degree to which the USA can exercise soft power. To begin, many of the agents required to exercise soft power (inparticular, producers of popular culture and academics) are outside the control of the US government. Hollywood is in the business of making money, not dissemi nating positive images of the USA and its values. Sometimes positive images may be disseminated. Sometimes they may not. There are plenty of films that show the dark side of life in the USA. The picture when it comes to television news is different, with the major US-based networks more or less in tune with dominant views in the US government, sometimes aggressively so. However, aside from CNN, these networks are not widely viewed outside the USA. Academics for their part are a fractious lot, and among them are critics as well as supporters of various aspects of US values. A more profound reason why coordinated pursuit of soft power by the USA is so difficult stems from the relative size of the political stakes at home and abroad for US political actors. The stakes at home can be very high, which means that the consequences abroad are either ignored or treated as secondary. The president's orientation to the rest of the world is often a by-product of domestic politics. Uncritical support of the Israeli government in its confrontation with the Palestinians makes electoral sense due to the number of Jewish and fundamen talist Christian voters for whom this is a key issue. But this kind of uncritical support undermines any soft power the USA might exercise in the Arab world. As I have already pointed out, messages that play well at home may play very differently abroad. George W. Bush declared he was a "war president," and to the degree he can keep public attention on the threat of conflict his re-election chances are improved. But to many in the rest of the world, invoking the idea of being a "war president" sounds like a declaration of belligerence. Joseph Nye (2003) argues that "Now that we Americans have a big stick, we should learn to speak softly." The problem is there is no "we" to do this collectively. Instead, there are many American "I's," be they presidents, members of Congress, lobbyists, corporations, popular culture producers, or academics, whose particular interests point in quite different directions. A still more fundamental problem with the idea of "soft power" is that it works best to the degree that the rest of the world is a tabula rasa in discourse terms. The imagery involves dissemination of US values, norms, and viewpoints. But those on the receiving end have their own values, norms, and viewpoints too. The "war of ideas" metaphor at least recognizes that there are other powerful points of view, though only in terms of opponents that need to be defeated. "Soft power" looks like it takes the views of other actors seriously because it recognizes the need to work with them. However, there are limits to how seriously these other points of view can be taken before the whole idea of soft power dissolves. The important distinction here is between imposition of one's own discourse on the rest of the world and serious engagement with the discourses of others. Even if accompanied by subtlety and solicitude, soft power will betray the intentions of its proponents to the degree it involves attempted imposition or manipulation. But if it eschews imposition entirely, then it is hardly "power" at all, or, rather, it is a "power" that many others in the international system can exercise too. When it comes to issues of security, discourse within the USA is quite different to that in most other countries of the world (except perhaps Israel and one or two eastern European states). The run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq was not accompanied by much in the way of an attempted exercise of soft power by the government of the USA. But let us imagine it had been. The events of 9/11 leftthe USA with a sense of righteous victimhood, which became allied to a renewed and almost messianic nationalism (Lieven, 2004b). Should soft power have been exercised in order to persuade leaders of other countries and their societies to accept this discourse? As Lieven (2004a: 31) points out, Europeans in particular remember the catastrophic consequences of their own messianic nationalisms in the 20th century, and as a result built international institutions such as the EU to suppress them. The reasons for the European position deserve respect; but respect here would involve bringing European discourse into critical engagement with the dominant US discourse. There would be no guarantee that soft power would ensure that the US discourse prevailed.3 It may be that the values pushed by the USA would emerge on top in such an engagement, but they might not (and in all probability, would not). This indeter minacy might make even proponents of soft power in the USA uncomfortable. For soft power is still in the end about power, and the right to wield it over others seems backed ultimately by the fact that the USA dominates when it comes to economic and military resources. **Letting go of this link moves us closer to discursive democracy**. So soft power can best be thought of as an uneasy halfway house between unilateral discourse manipulation and transnational discursive democracy. Contemplation of the limits of soft power points directly to uneasy halfway house between unilateral discourse manipulation and transnational discursive democracy. Contemplation of the limits of soft power points directly to a more decentralized and potentially more democratic engagement of discourses.

#### Cooperation with the U.S. occurs only to support the rule of capital.

Atilio **BORON** Poli Sci @ Latin American Social Sciences Institute and @ University of Buenos Aires ‘**8** “Promises and Challenges: The Latin American Left at the Start of the Twenty-first Century” in *The New Latin American Left* eds. Barrett, Chavez & Rodríguez-Garavito p. 253-254

In any case, in conclusion, it is worth recalling here the lessons derived from the Cuban case. Despite all the obstacles it has faced for nearly half a century, Cuba has been able to make significant advances in the construction of a democratic society - that is to say, a society in which the distribution of goods and services of all types is highly egalitarian, and in which the scandalous gap in wealth that separates the governors from the governed in the rest of Latin America does not exist. Going beyond the peculiarities of the Cuban political regime, imagine what could be achieved by such countries as Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela, which are blessed with many more resources, and are distant from the unhealthy North American obsession with the Caribbean island. When I say that Cuba has made significant advances in the construction of a democratic society, I am saying that, despite such unfavourable conditions - such as the nearly half-century-long blockade and the permanent belligerence of the United States - this country succeeded in guaranteeing standards of health, nutrition, education and general rights (for women, children, the disabled, etc.) that have not been attained even in some developed capitalist countries. If Cuba did it under those conditions, what are the insurmountable obstacles that prevent similar achievements in countries that enjoy much more promising prospects? The answer will not be found in economic determinisms - which in most cases, are just a convenient pretext - but rather in the weakness of political will. Without a determined will to change the world, the world will go unchanged. But whoever undertakes this task must know two things. First, that by doing so, they will confront the tenacious and absolute opposition of dominant classes and social groups, who will use every possible tool at their disposal, from seduction and persuasion to the most atrocious violence, to frustrate any effort at transformation. It is this reality that is the cause for concern regarding certain Zapatista formulations, such as 'democracy for all ', which reflect a political romanticism from which nothing good can be expected (Boron, 2001). Second, that there is no truce in this conflict: if the governors who attempt to change the world are not attacked, it is because their actions have become irrelevant, or, a perverse hypothesis, because they have joined forces with their enemies. It is not that the old masters have become resigned to losing their prerogatives and privileges, but rather that they have realised that their eventual opponents have laid down their arms and can no longer hurt the old order. For this reason, today more than ever, the praise and applause of Washington and its friends are sure signs that the wrong path is being pursued.

### Democracy Link

#### Democracy promotion consolidates neoliberal control. Implementation marginalizes groups advocating social and economic reforms and favors transnational elites.

William **ROBINSON** Sociology @ UC Santa Barbara **‘5** “The Battle for Global Civil Society” http://www.iefd.org/articles/global\_civil\_society.php

How can one tell NGOs and human rights groups genuinely dedicated to promoting social, economic, and human rights apart from the NED-fed variety? Let me clarify that my argument in no way suggests that democratization movements around the world are creatures of foreign policy, on the contrary, the argument is that changes in U.S. foreign policy and new modalities in U.S. intervention are meant specifically to challenge, and undermine, limit, and control the extent of social and political change in countries where masses of people—including the elite—are struggling for democracy and democratization. Entirely to the contrary, U.S. political intervention under the banner of "democracy promotion" is aimed at undermining authentic democracy, at undermining and gaining control over popular movements for democratization, at keeping a lid on popular democracy movements, at limiting any change that may be brought about by mass democratization movements so that the outcome to democracy struggles will not threaten the elite order and integration into global capitalism. If by democracy we mean the power of the people, we mean mass participation in the vital decisions of society, a democratic distribution of material and cultural resources, then democracy is a profound threat to global capitalist interests and must be mercilessly opposed and suppressed by U.S. and transnational elites. What is new about the strategy of "democracy promotion" is that this opposition, this suppression, is now conducted ironically under the very rhetorical banner of promoting democracy and through sophisticated new instruments and modalities of political intervention Having said that, the question is very legitimate. I think what's going on is that as every country and every community in the world becomes turned upside down by the penetration of capitalist globalization and the massive changes that we've seen in the last ten to twenty years, older forms of political authority—authoritarianism, dictatorship, etc.—are delegitimated and challenged from below. It's at that point that the U.S. attempts with these democratization movements to control the type of political change that's going to take place, attempts to control the outcome of these democratization movements, and attempts to get certain groups in power and marginalize other groups. In this context, if the U.S. moves into a country such as Kyrgyzstan—which I haven't studied in as much detail as the Ukraine, for example—all different groups that are going to be involved in the democratization struggle are going to, in some way or another, come under U.S. purview. Some will be brought into U.S. programs through funding and technical liaisons and advisors, and so forth, while others will be marginalized. You asked if all these different groups are stooges of U.S. foreign policy. Not at all; those that are struggling for a completely different vision, one contrary to U.S. interests and global capital's interests are going to be marginalized if they can't be bought. There are going to be alternative or parallel organizations set up by U.S. operatives (and their local allies and agents) and funding that are more powerful, more moderate, more centrist, more elite-oriented. These organizations and NGOs are going to receive international media attention, they're going to receive funding, they're going to liaise with other forces abroad. So we could summarize by saying that there are three different categories of groups. There are those that are clearly instruments of U.S. foreign policy objectives, and these are not groups that are promoting democratization but are trying to limit democratization and control change. There are those that are marginalized and pushed aside, and then there are those that the U.S. cannot or it is not in the interest of U.S. foreign policy to marginalize or challenge, and then they attempt to co-opt these organizations and to moderate them. Very often you get well intentioned people and you get people who have a legitimate political agenda: democratization, regime change from an authoritarian regime, and so forth, that because structural or on-the-ground circumstances don't allow anything else, become sucked up in U.S. and transnational elite foreign policy operations or interventions.Where does the US seek to "promote democracy"?

There are two different categories of "democracy promotion" programs: The first are programs in those countries that are already ruled by elites and in the camp of global capitalism. In these countries, political intervention programs seek to bolster neo-liberal elites, to achieve this elite's control over the state and to cultivate its hegemony in civil society. Cultivating this neo-liberal elite and its domination and hegemony is the political dimension that complements the economic dimension, which is neo-liberal structural adjustment and integration into the emerging global capitalist economy. The flip side of this effort is to isolate, marginalize, and discredit popular, nationalist, revolutionary and other progressive forces that may pose a challenge to the stable domination of local pro-US elites or neo-liberal regimes. These types of programs have been conducted in dozens of countries around the world. To mention just one example, in el salvador, "democracy promotion" programs that had been conducted throughout the 1990s and early 21st century were expanded in 2003 as presidential elections approached. These programs provided diverse forms of support for civic and political groups aligned with the ruling ARENA party and marginalized the FMLN. The other is to use "democracy promotion" to overthrow regimes that the U.S. is not favorable towards or to bring about a "transition to democracy" in cases where so-called "regime change" is seen by Washington as necessary for the country's stability and continued integration into global capitalism. Countries that Washington wishes to destabilize in recent years through "democracy promotion" (along with other forms of intervention) include Venezuela, Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua in the 1980s, and so on. The groups and individuals that participated in the destabilization of the government of Jean Bertrand Aristide and that are now in power in Haiti were precisely those groomed and cultivated by U.S. "democracy promotion" programs dating back to the late 1980s and undertaken continuously right up to the march 2004 U.S. coup d'état. In Venezuela, the opposition to the government of Hugo Chávez has been working since the late 1990s closely with the U.S. "democracy promotion" network.Then there are those countries targeted for a "transition to democracy," that is, a U.S.-supported and often orchestrated changeover in government and state structures. South Africa and Eastern European countries fell into this category in the 1990s, as does the current situation in Iraq. What is the connection between the NED and the U.S. government? The fact that the NED receives its funding from Congress is hardly its most direct link to the government. NED operations are designed in the State Department and the White House, often in coordination with [CIA headquarters at] Langley, and everything is undertaken in liaison with the Embassy on the ground in a particular intervened country. The officials put in charge of these operations are typically engaged in a revolving door relationship with the U.S. state. They move in and out of other government positions at the White House, the State Department, and so on. What we're seeing is the battle over global civil society, and it's heating up, because there's no place left in the world that has not been integrating very rapidly into the global system. Venezuela is one of those places at the front-line of this battle. The overt funding channels established through NED operations, which even then are not entirely above ground, generate an infrastructure of contacts, networks, channels of influence, and so forth, that are then available for covert funding and operations. That's the pattern that we see everywhere. In Nicaragua around the 1990 elections, for every dollar of NED or AID funding there were several dollars of CIA funding. We know that much from the tip of the iceberg we were able to uncover. The NED—though maybe it has gotten the most attention—is hardly the only organization involved in this kind of intervention conducted under the umbrella of the U.S. State Department and the Executive. There are many other branches of the U.S. State dedicated to promoting "democracy," and other countries are setting up similar branches as well. I think the weakness in progressive forces internationally is to see the political dynamic in the world today as an effort at U.S. empire. And so the story becomes the U.S. against the rest of the world, and that's a grave mistake. One of the things that has taken place—one of the key aspects of globalization—is the rise of a transnational elite that shares an interest in attempting to preserve the current global capitalist order, in defending it and extending it, and they also share the view that "democracy promotion" is one key instrument in advancing and stabilizing this global capitalist order. There might be tactical differences and there might be strategic differences in how to do that—what happened in Iraq, for example. In Venezuela we see the same thing: Western Europe, Canada, and most Latin American governments would like to see Chávez out of power and an elite order restored, but the question is how to go about it. The U.S. strategy has largely backfired so far. So there are tactical and strategic differences, but there is a commonality of interest among the leading capitalist states.

### U.S. Key Link

#### U.S. key arguments construct international politics in Western-centric terms. We should allow space for marginalized actors to speak.

Meghana **NAYAK** Poli Sci @ Pace **AND** Eric **SELBIN** Poli Sci @ Southwestern **’10** *Decentering International Relations* p. 1-3

When we teach or learn International Relations (IR), we are purportedly attempting to understand for whom power works and how, with the added dimension of where power resides. Thus, the outsized role the US has come to play in world affairs cannot (and should not) be ignored. At the same time, it is a common mistake to read the US as some **omnipotent potentate** endowed with particular gravitas and **uniquely equipped** to understand and solve the problems of the world and its population at every level from the local to the global. The world's people do not greet their day wondering what it is 'we' think or what it is 'we' want them to do. And, surely, there must be a way to speak about those directly affected by US hegemonic power without lapsing into multiple, barely substantiated presumptions. While the US has had a disproportionate role in shaping certain processes and situations for some hundred years now, the myriad possibilities of global politics are not delimited by US actions or power. This book claims that IR - as a body of knowledge and set of discourses, as a discipline/field of study in which we participate as scholars, theorists, and students, and as a field of 'practical' political decisions and structures! - is 'centered.' This centering has four main attributes. First, IR focuses primarily on and legitimizes the actions and decisions of the US and the global North/West. Second, IR privileges certain political projects, such as neoliberal economic policies, state-centrism, and Northern/Western liberal democracy.2 Third, IR legitimizes the most privileged sociopolitical players and institutions, in both the Global North/West and the Global South,3 to produce knowledge and make decisions about the rest of the world, thus replicating or maintaining certain unequal power relationships. Finally, IR examines certain understandings of political concepts (such as sovereignty) and particular narratives that can elide, distort, or completely miss multiple ways of understanding and living in the world. Why do our studies, questions, policies, and research **always start and end this way** - in the center, in the North/West? When we say 'North/West,' we mean primarily the US, but also Great Britain, 'Western' European countries, and, depending on context, limited others.4 It is not always entirely clear, beyond geography, what makes these places 'Western,' but countries, people, scholars, and institutions ensconced in the Global North/West represent themselves as 'universal,' developed, and civilized - erasing how they got into privileged military, economic, socio-cultural, diplomatic, and political relationships with the so-called Third World/Global South.5 Think of the 'center' as the nucleus: this is where decisions are made, discourses are legitimized, and people and entities are put in positions to further entrench the most privileged ways of thinking about the world. How do you see the 'centers' of power operating? Who is in your 'we,' and who is (most) decidedly not? **Even when you say 'we' should hold 'our' government accountable** for 'our' foreign policy because 'our' taxes are paying for unpopular wars, have you asked yourself what benefits you derive from being a part of this 'we'? Do you ever wonder if the peasants, farmers, oppressed women, child soldiers, sick and dying, poor - or others you study, categorize, and write about - are sitting around somewhere wondering about you, ready to compile a list of recommendations about what to do about you and your problems? If you are a student or scholar of IR, or any discipline that explores global politics, if you are part of a governmental or nongovernmental organization with an international focus, if you practice international law or engage in international commerce, or if you are an activist involved in various global issues, we would like you, with us, to question what we have been taught, by whom, and how, and the effects of what we study and do. Even if you believe you have nothing to do with IR theories, scholarship, professors, or organizations, they have something to do with you; and the way you think, live, and act in the world matters fundamentally. We are articulating the thorny recognition that IR, as we practice, teach, learn, and fund it, is more likely to reinforce domination than to encourage discussion and dissent; despite our very real desires, this is the case no matter how good anyone's intentions are (a point to which we will return).What kind of way is this to think about, to 'do,' IR? And, what can and should we do about it? As two professors of political science located in the US, we have found that it is often difficult to teach, learn, and speak about IR in any other way. We return to our offices after class, wondering whether we offered adequate challenges to, and rethinking of, the usual ways of doing IR. So this book emerged out of a seemingly simple question: given how Northern/Western scholars, practitioners, analysts, discourses, concepts, and political projects dominate IR (the discipline, the body of knowledge, the practical politics), is it possible to decenter IR, to decenter the US and the Global North?

### Bilateral Link

#### Piecemeal engagement implements a divide-and-conquer strategy to negotiate on terms most favorable to the U.S.

Jorge **NEF** Director of Latin American and Caribbean Studies @ South Florida **AND** Richard **HARRIS** Global Studies @ CSU Monterey Bay **‘8** “Capital, Power, and Inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean” in *Capital, Power, and Inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean* eds. Harris and Nef p.306-307

Meanwhile, Washington has followed a divide-and-conquer strategy that it calls "competitive liberalization." This approach has involved negotiating separate free trade agreements (FTAs) with the Central American countries (the CAFrA-DR), Panama, some of the Andean countries (Colombia and Peru), and Chile. These "bilateral" FrA treaties have enabled the U.S. government to coerce small countries into accepting its aggressive free trade conditions while giving little in return. For example, a report on this subject by Scott Sinclair and Ken Traynor (2005) states, Under its "competitive liberalization" strategy, U.S. priorities have shifted from the stalled FTAA to wrapping up bilateral free trade agreements wherever possible. The U.S. now has free trade deals in place with Mexico, Canada, and Chile; signed (but not ratified) treaties with Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic; and negoti ations underway with Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Panama. The U.S. is using these bilateral negotiations to isolate and build pressure on the FTAA holdout countries-clearly a "divide-and-conquer" strategy. (25) The "piecemeal" nature of this U.S. strategy of negotiating separate free trade agreements was made public in 2002, when U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick (2002) said the United States preferred "to negotiate with all the democracies of the Americas through the FrAA" but that it was prepared to move "step-by-step toward free trade if others turn back or simply are not yet ready" for a hemispheric trade agreement. On several occasions thereafter, he distinguished between the "won't-do" and the "can-do" countries and said the United States was going ahead with its efforts to promote hemispheric free trade by working with the can-do countries (Sinclair and Traynor 2005, 26). As James Petras (2004b) has noted, even though popular rebellions have forced the resignation of pro-FrAA neoliberal governments, and leftist leaders critical of the U.S. agenda for the hemisphere have been elected in an increasing number of countries, the United States has still gone ahead with its plans to construct the FfAA according to its own agenda. Petras argues that Washington is "less concerned with the past political positions, current 'radical' labels or popular social background of the Latin American presidents" than with their willingness to collaborate with the United States "in pursuing neoliberal socioeconomic policies and pro-empire foreign policies." Petras has pointed out that Lula's government in Brazil cooperated with the United States on a number of important issues. For example, Lula's government took the lead in trying to negotiate a "light," or compromise, version of the FrAA at the Miami Summit in November 2003, and his government also provided the lead contingent for the United Nations' multinational force sent to maintain order in Haiti after the U.S. government forced democratically elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide into exile (Petras 2004b). However, another way to look at these moves on the part of Lula's government is that they were designed to dilute Washington's influence. In other words, by taking an active role in shaping these efforts as opposed to standing back, Brazil kept the United States from running the show. This may also explain why Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay decided to send troops to Haiti once Brazil decided to provide the lead contingent for the United Nations' peacekeeping force (Zibechi 2004).

## Impacts

### Structural Inequality/Environment

#### Neoliberal policies produce structural violence in Latin America.

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These macroeconomic policies have been carried out under the mantle of the so-called Washington Consensus, the neoliberal agenda of the U.S. government and the IMF, World Bank, and IDB, which all have their headquarters in Washington (Harris 2005, 367-68). These policies have brought about a drastic reduction of government services, public subsidies, and public employment. In addition, they have involved the wholesale privatization and denationalization of state-owned utilities and enterprises, the deregulation of market relations and the human impact on the environment, and the abolition of protective tariffs and other forms of support for local industries. Currencies in Latin America and the Caribbean have also been devalued and/or dollarized, the growth of exports (particularly so-called nontraditional exports such as fruits, vegetables, and assembled manufactured goods) have been promoted in order to earn sufficient foreign exchange to pay the huge foreign debts of the Latin American countries, and previous efforts at import substitution have been largely abandoned. A series of harsh "austerity measures" have been adopted by the governments of most of the countries in the region in order to reduce their expenditures so that they can make their debt payments. The South, as well as the North, has been dramatically affected by labor "flexibilization" policies whose net effect has been to destroy many of the hard-won gains of the working classes during the twentieth century. These measures have adversely affected the income and living standards of not only the lower classes but also the majority of the middle class. The consequences of these policies, in tandem with the effects of a major global economic recession during the 1980s and early 1990s, were graphically described by Juan de Dios Parra, head of the Latin American Association for Human Rights, at the beginning of the 1990s: In Latin America today there are 70 million more hungry, 30 million more illiterate, 10 million more families without homes and 40 million more unemployed persons than there were 20 years ago .... There are 240 million human beings who lack the necessities of life and this when the region is richer and more stable than ever, according to the way the world sees it. (Press 1993, E20) In addition to causing human suffering and losses, these neoliberal economic measures have also jeopardized the advances toward political democracy and political democratization underway throughout the continent. Although these regressive policies were introduced mostly under military rule, the fact that the elected civilian governments that replaced the military dictatorships have continued these unpopular measures has undermined the legitimacy of these elected governments and tainted their democratic credentials. As a result of both global and local conditions, the Latin American economies are increasingly being integrated into the U.S. -dominated hemispheric trading sphere and global capitalist economy. This has involved the expansion of the number and activities of transnational corporations throughout the region, both in the form of direct investments and through the external financing of local economic activities (MacEwan 1994). There is also an increased dependence on external trade as a result of the recent efforts of the Latin American countries to expand their exports and reduce their tariff barriers to foreign imports. Efforts at regional economic integration and interdependence have also increased, as evidenced by the growth of binational trade pacts, multinational free trade areas such as NAFTA, and the increased quantity of trade between the Latin American nations (Brooke 1994, 3). However, these developments are not strengthening the position of Latin America in world trade; instead, they are transforming the economies of many of the Latin American and Caribbean countries into captive markets for transnational corporations and U.S. investors. Moreover, as Guido Pascual Galafassi reveals in chapter 10, the supposition that there is an unlimited supply of natural resources has resulted in a continuing, and in some cases increasingly deep, process of environmental deterioration. The high natural fertility of certain regions has hidden this deterioration process until recent times. The pattern of resource extraction that has been established in the region involves the unrestrained pillage of one area after another without any regard for resource renewal and conservation. The capitalist logic of minimizing costs and maximizing profits has resulted in the pillage to exhaustion of resources, and the geographic mobility of the transnational companies and foreign investors involved has made it possible to continuously repeat this pattern in new areas. Needless to say, the remaining virgin lands in Latin America are an incomparable natural treasure waiting to be pillaged. The dominant style of development is characterized by what Galafassi describes as a unimodal approach in agriculture and resource extraction that assumes all regional ecosystems have the same stability and resistance. This assumption has led to the depletion of biodiversity and the destruction of the most fragile ecosystems. Contemporary productive practices have acquired a pattern of uniformity and homogeneity that has given rise not only to the depletion of biodiversity but also to the destruction of the cultural variability of the indigenous and peasant communities affected by these patterns of production.

### Turns the Case - Security

#### Neoliberal engagement undermines collective human security. Integration on US terms justifies authoritarian politics and economic devastation.

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Assessing Re-democratization and De-democratization The politics of limited democratization combined with neo-liberal economics, while an improvement over the human rights abuses of the military dictatorships of the 1970s, imposes built-in constraints that block the realization of a truly stable and sustainable system of democratic politics in the Americas. This has caused a profound structural contradiction to emerge in the region's systems of governance. If elected governments stress democracy, equity, popular rule, and the interests of the general public, they encounter relentless opposition from the domestic and transnational elites who dominate the region's economies. The course taken by most governments in the region is to rule in the interest of the elites, stressing economic liberalism and ignoring the interests of society in general. This is what, in the North American context, Ralph Nader ( 1992) has labelled a plutocracy. The long-term political cost of this option is high: loss of popular and national sovereignty and th e erosion of trust between elected officials and the electorate, a central tenet of both democratic governance and pluralist politics. Moreover, if the neo-liberal economic policies continue to fail to produce better standards of living for the alienated majorities, and should the structural crisis deepen, it is likely that these civilian regimes may be replaced by repressive civil-military regimes once again in the name of national security. The national security ideology remains the cultural software of the security establishments in most countries of the Americas; it is a staple in the training of the military, police, and paramilitary forces throughout the hemisphere. The communist subversion of yesteryear has been expanded to include new internal enemies: terrorism, anarchy, and drug traffickers, anything that threatens the investment climate or core elites' interests qualifies as a threat to national security. Moreover, the post-9/11 atmosphere has had a deleterious effect on the prospects for democracy in the Americas, having granted the US government the opportunity to assume a hard-line counter-terrorist posture that justifies authoritarian measures and the violation of civil rights. Given the level of political alienation throughout the region, it is not surprising that there have been popular insurrections by communities that have risen up to confront the growing threats to their livelihood and dignity: Chiapas (1994), Quito (2000), Buenos Aires (2001), and La Paz (2003 and 2005). These popular insurrections have had broad domestic and international implications. They are specific examples of the Latin American variant of the Global Justice Movements. They reveal grassroots attempts to recreate the kind of civil society and popular organizations that were crushed by the double squeeze of military rule in the 1970s and the neo-liberal economic restructuring of the 1980s and 1990s. They also reveal that, in recent years, populism and anti-status quo feelings have been on the rise throughout Latin America. A more institutional manifestation of this expanding protest movement is the series of electoral victories of populist, nationalist, and left-of-centre parties in Argentina (Nestor and Kirchner), Brazil ("Lula"), Uruguay (Vazquez) , Nicaragua (Ortega), Bolivia (Morales), Venezuela (Chavez), and other unprecedented turns to the left in Ecuador (Correa), Paraguay (Lugo), Guatemala (Col om), and El Salvador (Funes), all of them at odds with Washington's neoconservative politics (Latin Reporters 2004). These developments suggest that popular movements and popular rebellions remain an important element in the new globalized regional order (LAWR 1994a, 1994b). Inter-American relations dominated by the US monologue and the Washington Consensus are increasingly being challenged. Leftist groups and platforms have re-emerged as political options and it is likely that we may witness more popular mobilizations in the near future. This has had immediate consequences in reshaping the institutional configuration of the regional system, away from the Washington- centred organizations, including a significant shift within the Organization of American States (OAS) itself. Instability in the once-hegemonic regional order is increasing despite the illusion of US-driven regional integration characterized by NAFTA and CAFTA. By challenging the legitimacy of the inter-elite and transnational regional arrangements, the new modes of resistance reveal the intrinsic weakness and precarious legitimacy of the post-transition regimes. Even the United States is not exempt from this turmoil and protestation. Two important events deserve special attention. The first was the massive mobilizations in 2006 that, despite growing electoral apathy, securitization, and cynicism in the American body politic, brought millions of protestors to the streets of Los Angeles, New York, and Chicago. These protestors, the majority of which were of Hispanic origin, demonstrated against attempts by right-wing elements in the US government to criminalize the large number of undocumented immigrants in the United States under the rubri~ of the "War on Terror" and the strengthening of"homeland security" to fight what Samuel Huntington called the "Hispanic Threat" (Huntington 2004). This momentous event indicates that social movements against the status quo are becoming ubiquitous throughout the hemisphere. The second, even more important, event was the victory of Barack Obama in the 2008 presidential election and his platform for change. Recent mild overtures by the new administration in Washington regarding Cuba and the statements made by the president himself in the 2009 Summit of the Americas in Trinidad-Tobago provide a glimmer of hope for a more constructive engagement. This is something not seen since FDR's Good Neighbor Policy in the 1930s. However, as demonstrated by experience, the past has an ability to persist and reproduce its nastier strains. As the entire region becomes more closely integrated, a potentially dysfunctional system of mutual vulnerability constitutes a real and present danger. Its impact on the life of millions throughout the Americas is potentially catastrophic. The unfolding scenarios, in the context of a world economic meltdown, indicate dysfunctional trends feeding upon each other and transcending national boundaries. These include poverty, growing unemployment, criminality, health hazards, environmental decay, drug addiction, massive population displacements, and repression. Without profound changes in both the South and the North, the possibility of arresting or reversing the existing threats to human security will remain doubtful. Short of a radical reorganization of the pattern of governance throughout the Americas, including decision-making, accountability, and regional cooperation, multiple and critical dysfunctions are likely to increase Within these societies. The limited and substantially meaningless democracy designed and supported by Washington is deeply flawed. This model of democratic development, advocated by transition theorists and the neo-authoritarians at the core of the hemispheric order, impedes rather than facilitates the materialization of a sustainable security community and real democracy for the region. So does the persistence of neo-liberal economic dogmatism and the re-emergence of the national security doctrine designed to combat global "enemies." That narrowly defined concept of military security as practised in the Americas is, in fact, flawed with insecurity. This link underpins the insurmountable contradiction between globalization and militarization (Benitez-Manaut 2004, 59). In this context, real regime change throughout the Americas, and especially in the United States, is a necessary condition for human security and the wellbeing of the vast majority Of its peoples.

#### Turns the case – decreases human security and environmental quality.

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Apart from the ceremonial transfer of office by electoral means and the absence of direct military rule, democracy in the Americas has not been consolidated in this decade. The transition remains incomplete and in some cases there has been a process of "undoing democracy" (Close 2004). Oligarchies throughout the continent have shown a remarkable ability to prevail. The old practices of executive continuismo and dynastic-type succession have resurfaced in unexpected places like Costa Rica and the United States. There is also significant continuity of policy: neo-liberal formulas have become entrenched in the conditionalities attached to debt-alleviation, regional trade agreements (such as NAFTA or MERCOSUR), and the macroeconomic equilibrium policies. These effectively remove fiscal, monetary, and credit policy decisions from national political and democratic control. In addition, the new war against terrorism in the context of US unipolarism, with its pseudo-moralistic and messianic discourse, is undermining genuine progress toward greater democracy, sustainable and equitable development, and human security.

### Turns the Case – Economy

#### Neoliberal economic engagement destroys sustainable economic growth.

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Neoliberal ideology has provided the "scientific" justification for the measures that the U.S. government and the IFis have insisted governments in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as in other peripheral countries in the world capitalist system, impose on their popular classes (Green 1995, 2-4). In fact, neoliberalism has served as an ideological smoke screen for these largely unpopular and inequitable measures. This ideology has provided the rationale for giving the transnational corporations and transnational investors unrestricted access to the natural resources, cheap labor, local capital, and consumer markets of the region. The neoliberal agenda shared by the U.S. government, the IFis, and the polyarchical regimes in the region has negatively affected the balanced and sustainable development of the Latin American and Caribbean countries. The "reforms" have promoted the inequitable, uneven, and environmentally destructive mode of development discussed throughout this book The human consequences in terms of unemployment, loss of income and personal savings, and poor living standards have been incalculable. Even prominent U.S. economists such as Joseph Stiglitz (2002, 84 ), former chief economist and senior vice president of the World Bank and the winner of the 2001 Nobel Prize in Economics, have criticized the disastrous effects of such policies and programs. The above-mentioned policies and programs have redistributed wealth from the poor to the rich and drastically increased the number of people living in poverty within the region. Thus, during the first decade of neoliberal economic restructuring (the 1980s), the number of people living in poverty increased from 120 million in 1980 to 196 million in 1990, a 42 percent increase, or almost double the population growth rate of 22 percent during this period (Vilas 1996, 16). Between 1990 and 2003, the number of people living in poverty increased to 220 million, which resulted in an incredible 44 percent of the region's population living below the poverty line (Gonzalez 2003). Consequently, instead of wealth trickling down to the poor as promised by the advocates of neoliberalism and so-called globalization, millions of people have trickled down from the middle and working classes into the impoverished masses. Moreover, the "global competitiveness" of the economies of most of the Latin American and Caribbean countries has not improved as they have been further "integrated" into the global economy. In 2001, according to the IDB, Latin America occupied fifth place among the seven major regions of the world in terms of its global competitiveness, only slightly ahead of the poor countries of Asia and the small group of African countries in the IDB's survey (IDB 2001, 19).

## Alternatives

### Alternative – Collective Control of Capital

#### Collective and social control over economic decision-making is the only way to stop the permanent crisis of neoliberal engagement.

Atilio **BORON** Poli Sci @ Latin American Social Sciences Institute and @ University of Buenos Aires ‘**8** “Promises and Challenges: The Latin American Left at the Start of the Twenty-first Century” in *The New Latin American Left* eds. Barrett, Chavez & Rodríguez-Garavito p. 232-240

In his day, Edward H. Carr ( 1946) observed that to the nostrils of the bourgeoisie and their allies in the mid nineteenth century, democracy gave off a very disagreeable stench. The smell ofthe expressions ' left' , ' leftist' and 'populist' is proving to be just as disagreeable to their senses today. These names are usually used to refer to political positions or proposals that the mandarins of conventional wisdom strike down as being 'foolish', 'at odds with the times' or simply 'demagogic' . In the ideological context in which we live, 'good sense' means obedience to the policies (not only economic) dictated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and, more generally, by the exponents of the Washington Consensus. Reconciliation with the ineluctable demands of the era means that political actors have realised we live under the empire of globalisation and that, as President Fernando H. Cardoso once commented, with a resignation that does not cease to surprise us, ' inside globalisation there are no alternatives; outside globalisation there is no salvation.' Thus, in order not to be at odds with the times, governments must silently comply with the orders of the Washington Consensus, and act accordingly. In this way, the undisputed reign of la pensee unique and its correlate, la politique unique, is established. The root of such nonsense is not difficult to ascertain: the final and definitive triumph of the markets will translate, according to the neo-liberals, into the existence of a single policy type. This is none other than that which takes us down the narrow paths of fiscal discipline, the fight against inflation, the absurd 'independence' of the central banks (an independence that, of course, does not exist in relation to financial capital and its allies), and the eternal and Sisyphean task of attracting the confidence of investors with renewed concessions that threaten humanity's very survival. Neo-liberal theorists repeatedly complain about the ' noise' democracy introduces into the supposed serenity of the markets. To summarise, republican good sense and accountability to both society and history are incompatible with the ' demagogy' that characterised the dark times of populism and socialism in Latin America. Times in which political leaders, in an unbridled display of irresponsibility, proposed- and attempted to implement- aggressive redistribution of income and property, nationalised and/or took state control of foreign monopolies, redistributed land among campesinos and rural labourers, and established irritating regulations in the fields of labour, commerce and finance. The regulations shackled what Joseph Schumpeter cynically described as the capitalist process of 'creative destruction'. This era of demagogy was, if we accept the dominant neo-liberal discourse, the principal cause of the wave of dictatorships that swept through the region's fragile democracies. Leaders such as Salvador Allende in Chile and Juan Jose Torres in Bolivia paid with their lives for their fascination with these out-dated and utopian discourses. Others were forced into exile, and the peoples of the region suffered for many years under some of the bloodiest tyrannies in the region's history. THE PARADOXICAL CRISIS OF NEO-LIBERALISM The situation has changed. Large social movements blossomed during the closing decade of the last century, starting with the pioneering Zapatista revolts in 1994, the appearance of the Argentinean piqueteros, the massive citizens' and workers' strikes in France and South Korea shortly afterwards and, towards the end of the century, the ripening and international consolidation of the protests and alternative summits in Seattle and Porto Alegre. The massive popular mobilisations in Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru, which brought down unpopular governments, form part of the same tendency. Consequently, new political forces, loosely defined as 'progressive', have come to control governments (in countries such as Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and, more recently, Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua). These governments are considering the need to abandon policies that have, as everyone is all too well aware, wreaked havoc in the past. This was demonstrated with rare didactic force by the catastrophic collapse brought about by neo-liberal policies in Argentina. Nonetheless, we must be clear that, in general, the most significant changes have been produced in the blandest terrain of discourse and rhetoric (the cases ofLula da Silva, Nestor Kirchner and Tabare Vazquez) and not in the tough and harsh terrain of economic policies (with the exception of the cases of Hugo Chavez and Evo Morales). However, even with all these limitations, the change in the Latin American ideological climate is very significant, and it would be a mistake to underestimate its scope. In a previous work (Boron, 2003a), I reviewed some of the most important transformations that have taken place in Latin American countries, all of which strongly influenced the emergence of new forms of social protest and political organisation. Briefly, I draw attention there to the extraordinary complexity that has come to characterise the slow but progressive exhaustion of neo-liberalism in this region. Without a doubt, the decline of neo-liberalism since the mid 1990s has reversed the overwhelming influence it had acquired since the 1970s at the hands of the two bloodiest dictatorships in memory, Chile and Argentina. It may be absurd to argue that neo-liberalism is, today, in retreat. It is, however, no less absurd to state that its influence over Latin American societies, cultures, politics and economies has remained unscathed with the passing of time (see Gentili and Sader, 2003). In this sense, the spectacular collapse of the neo-liberal experiment in Argentina- for many years the 'model country' of the IMF and the World Bank - has played an immensely important educational role. Crises teach, and crises like the one suffered in Argentina have revealed with exemplary efficiency the consequences produced by the strict application of neo-liberal policies. What we are seeing now is somewhat peculiar. There is a striking disjunction between the consolidation of neo-liberalism, particularly in the crucial areas of the economy and policy-making (that is to say, in the minds of civil servants, treasury and economy ministers, central bank presidents, political leaders and others) and its manifest weakening in the fields of culture, public consciousness and politics. Neo-liberal economic policies follow their course. However, in contrast to what happened in the 1980s and early 1990s, they can no longer count on the support - manipulated, to be sure - that in past years was guaranteed by a civil society striving to leave behind the horrors of dictatorship and therefore willing to accept, at times reluctantly, the recipe promoted by the imperial masters and their local representatives. In any case, this disjunction between the economic and the politicoideological components of hegemony is far from unprecedented in Latin America. In the work mentioned above, I suggest a certain analogy between the prolonged crisis of the oligarchic hegemony in our region and the current decline of neo-liberalism. If the former reached its apogee in the period immediately before the Great Depression of the 1930s, its slow decay was to extend over several decades. As Agustin Cueva (1976) demonstrated in a text that is a classic of Latin American social sciences, the irreversible deterioration of the material bedrock of the oligarchic hegemony did not lead to its immediate collapse. Instead, it meandered down a number of routes that influenced, and in some cases postponed, its final decline for decades, precisely until the irruption of the populist regimes. While it is not possible to draw linear conclusions from historical experience, perhaps it would be reasonable to consider a hypothesis - dishearteningly pessimistic, to be sure - that predicts that the unquestionable bankruptcy of the basic economic conditions that made the rise of neo-liberalism possible will neither necessarily nor immediately lead to its disappearance from the public stage. The ideological and political components amalgamated in its economic primacy can guarantee it an unexpected survival, even in the midst of extremely unfavourable conditions. To paraphrase Gramsci, it could be said that the slow agony of neo-liberalism is one of those situations in which 'the old is dying and the new cannot be born'. As the great Italian theorist reminds us, at such moments, all manner of aberrant phenomena often appear. Examples of political aberrations include: the clamorous breach of electoral contract perpetrated by governments which upon reaching power immediately break their campaign promises; the shameless betrayal of principles by certain 'left wing' parties and organisations; the prolonged political survival of characters such as Augusto Pinochet in Chile, Carlos Menem in Argentina, Alberto Fujimori in Peru and others of their ilk; or the outrageous social situation in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, where large majorities of the populations needlessly go hungry in countries that could be the granaries of the world. WHY NOW? A question that arises is why these new rebellious political and social forces have appeared at this moment: The reasons are, of course, many and complex, and their impact varies from country to country. Nevertheless, there are some basic underlying causes. First, there is the exhaustion of neo-liberalism mentioned above. This process heightened the contradictions generated by the painful economic and social restructuring that took place in the preceding years, creating new social actors (such as the piqueteros in Argentina), and increasing the influence of others that already existed but were not mobilised or organised (such as the campesinos in Brazil and Mexico, or the indigenous peoples of Ecuador, Bolivia and parts of Mexico, to name only a few). The increasing poverty and social exclusion generated by the policies of the Washington Consensus also attracted intermediate social groups and sectors (the so-called 'middle classes') to the ranks of those opposed to neo-liberalism. Second, it is necessary to mention that the emergence of these new expressions of the political left is closely tied to the failed models of democratic capitalism in the region. I have explored this theme extensively elsewhere, and therefore will not repeat all those arguments here (Boron, 2000). Suffice to note that the frustration generated by the actions of the so-called democratic regimes in this part of the world has been intense, profound and prolonged. It was under these peculiar 'democracies' that bloomed in the region beginning in the 1980s that social conditions worsened dramatically. This took place, moreover, in a context of intensifying globalisation, which among other things, has magnified the unsettling impact of the so-called 'demonstration effect' . While in European countries, democratic capitalism appears to be the generator of material well-being and social justice - and I say 'appears to ' because these things are in fact the product of the social struggles of subordinate classes against capitalists, rather than some kind of natural byproduct of democratic capitalism - in Latin America, democracy has brought structural adjustment and stabilisation policies, increasingly precarious labour conditions, high levels of unemployment, a dizzying increase in poverty, external vulnerability, unbridled debt and the foreign takeover of our economies. Democracies, in other words, that are empty of all content, reduced- as Fernando H. Cardoso recalled before becoming President of Brazil - to an unemotional facial gesture incapable of 'eliminating the stench of farce from democratic politics'. A stench that was produced - as he assured us - by the inability of this political regime to introduce fundamental reforms in the system of production and in the forms of distribution and appropriation of wealth (Cardoso, 1985, 1982). Our region has barely attained the lowest level on the limited scale of democratic development permitted by the structure of capitalist society. We have merely electoral democracies; that is, political regimes that are essentially oligarchic in character, controlled by big capital - which enjoys complete independence from the governing parties who assume the tasks of managing the country in its name. The people, meanwhile, manipulated at will thanks to the control exercised by dominant groups over the mass media, are called upon every few years to elect those who will be charged with the task of subjugating them. In democracies of this sort, it is no accident that, following repeated frustrations, rebellious social forces begin to emerge (see Boron, 2006). Third, it must be said that this process has also been fed by the crisis that has brought down traditional forms of political representation. There is little doubt that the new morphology of social protest in our region is a symptom of the decadence of the great mass political parties of the past, and of the traditional models of trade union organisation. This decadence can, without question, be explained by the transformations that have taken place in the 'social base' of these forms of organisation as a result of the policies of neo-liberal restructuring characteristic of contemporary peripheral capitalism: the growing heterogeneity of labouring classes, tied to their declining relative position among subordinate classes as a whole; the appearance of a massive 'sub-proletariat' (or what Frei Betto has called the pobretariado ), which reflects the increasing economic and social exclusion of contemporary capitalism that discards growing segments of the popular classes as un-exploitable; the significant rise in the ranks of the unemployed and those working in conditions of extreme precariousness, with very weak ties to the formal economy; and finally, the explosion of multiple identities (ethnic, linguistic, gender, sexual orientation and others) that have significantly reduced the relevance of traditional class-based variables. If we add to this the inability of political parties and trade unions to 'read' the new realities of our time correctly, the sclerosis of their organisational structures and practices, and their outdated discourses, it is very easy to understand why they have entered into crisis and new social protest movements have emerged. A fourth and final factor, in what is not intended as an exhaustive list, is the globalisation of the struggles against neo-liberalism. These struggles began and spread rapidly ~und the globe, based on initiatives that did not emerge from political patties or from trade unions. In the case of Latin America, the star role was played by Zapatismo when it emerged from the Lacandon Jungle on 1 January 1994 and declared war on neo-liberalism. The tireless work of the MST in Brazil, another nontraditional organisation, significantly amplified the impact of the Zapatistas. This was followed, in a veritable avalanche, by large mobilisations of campesinos and indigenous peoples in Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and some regions of Colombia and Chile. The struggles of the Argentine piqueteros form part of the same general trend. The events of Seattle and similar actions in Washington, New York, Paris, Genoa, Gothenburg and other major cities in the developed world gave the protests against the Washington Consensus a universal stamp, ratified year after year by the impressive progress made at the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre. In this way, a kind of 'domino effect' was produced, which, without a doubt, and contrary to the widely circulated theories expounded by Hardt and Negri (2000) in Empire, revealed the intimate connection between social struggles and political processes in play in the most distant corners of the planet. Given the above, is it possible to say that we are experiencing the emergence of an alternative- or alternatives - to neo-liberalism? From the outset, I would argue that the problem should be framed differently. Why? Quite simply, because history does not work that way. History is not constructed according to a preconceived plan. This vision of History, with a capital H, which is nothing more than a text written by God, the Fuehrer, a central committee or a prophet, and blindly carried out by mankind, is one possible vision, derived from Hegel. The other, which is the one taken by Marx, is that of history as a dialectic process, in which there are no preconceived guidebooks, and the outcomes are undecided. Marx said that revolution was indispensable to the historic overthrow of capitalism. Of course, indispensability is not the same as inevitability. Something may be necessary, but that does not mean that its appearance is inexorable. For this reason, the founder of historical materialism spoke of how the final crisis of capitalism could resolve itself positively, in the direction of socialism, or negatively, plunging humanity into the most terrible barbarism. It clearly follows that there are alternatives to neo-liberalism and to capitalism. However, they are neither written in a book, nor (thankfully!) is there a manual to tell us what these alternatives are. This was precisely what Gramsci meant when he wrote his incisive article shortly after the Russian Revolution. He called it 'The Revolution against Capital ' precisely in order to demonstrate, using Marxism, that revolutionary processes are not born of books, however brilliant these may be. The French Revolution did not flow from the quill of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, nor was the Russian Revolution made in the pages of Marx's Capital or Lenin's The Development of Capitalism in Russia, nor did the Chinese Revolution emerge from Mao's On Contradiction. Leaving aside the raucous character of these revolutions, we can say that the less clamorous re-composition of capitalism following the 1930s was also not the product of John M. Keynes ' General Theory, nor was the era of post-1970s neo-liberalism the product of Friedrich von Hayek's The Road to Serfdom. That the ideas contained in these books were very important is beyond doubt. However, it is not possible to argue that it was the books that 'made history'. History was made by the people, through their struggles, or it was made by the dominant classes, when the correlation of forces was in their favour. So-called 'Keynesianism' is a phenomenon that transcends Keynes' work, just as neo-Jiberalism cannot be reduced to Hayek's thesis. In the same way, today, we can say that there is a set of ideas that contradicts the axiological premises and specific policies ofneoliberalism. However, none of this gives rise to any sort of 'model' or set of commandments, such as the famous Washington Consensus popularised by John Williamson. In reality, 'models' and commandments are inevitably post festum theoretical constructions, codifications of practices set in motion throughout the historical process. That said, the starting point is the recognition that alternatives do indeed exist. The dominant pensee unique, which has been one of neoliberalism's basic weapons, incessantly preaches Margaret Thatcher's TINA: 'There Is No Alternative' . And this was done so successfully that many left-wing intellectuals and politicians, not to mention that nearly extinct species known as the ' left-wing economist', ended up accepting the neo-liberal mandate to the letter. This is the only-way, there are no alternatives, all else is either madness or foolishness. In reality, madness and foolishness more aptly describe those who think that it is possible for things to continue as they are, and that there is no alternative to the depressing panorama of social disintegration and permanent economic crisis prevailing in the region. How can there be no alternative to mass unemployment, the poverty of more than half the population, the absence of social policies, and the unsustainable weight of inequitable and illegal foreign debts? What has been lacking, until now, is a correlation of forces that would make it possible to attempt the existing alternatives, which do not require too much imagination. The problem is not cognitive, but rather political. The good news is that, little by little, this correlation of forces is changing in favour of popular classes and social strata. Based on the experience of the last quarter of the twentieth century, it has become evident that the alternatives to neo-liberalism (ofwhich there will no doubt be many) will contain, in varying degrees, the following elements. The first is a vigorous reconstruction of the state, which has been destroyed or shrunk by orthodox policies. The state is the foundation on which it is possible to support the democratisation of society, unless one believes that it is possible to establish democracy within the market, or in a civil society divided into classes. Furthermore, without a state there is no force capable of assuming the Promethean task of subjecting markets to a regulatory framework that defends the general interest, preserves public goods, and protects the large majorities whom neo-liberalism has stripped of their most basic rights. Second, the course of economic development should be radically re-oriented towards the internal market, the redistribution of wealth and income, the promotion of development and ecological sustainability. This does not mean a return to the period of import substitution, or to an illusory 'national capitalism', which would be anachronistic in the current context. Instead, it means that the community, through its political expression, the state, should assume control of the processes of production and distribution of wealth. It is essential to revise everything done during the neo-liberal era. For example, privatised companies should be placed under democratic public control; the same applies to the central banks, whose supposed autonomy is a farce. Some firms will remain in the hands of their current owners, while others will become part of the public sector, and still others will become new forms of mixed property under a variety of modalities that involve different degrees of participation from distinct sectors: foreign capital, national capital, the public sector, workers, consumers, the general public and NGOs, among others.

### Regional Bloc

#### Now is the time for a sea change in hemispheric relations. Align yourself with opposition to engagement on terms set by the U.S. and global capital.

Jorge **NEF** Director of Latin American and Caribbean Studies @ South Florida **AND** Richard **HARRIS** Global Studies @ CSU Monterey Bay **‘8** “Capital, Power, and Inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean” in *Capital, Power, and Inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean* eds. Harris and Nef p. 293-296

HEMISPHERIC ECONOMIC INTEGRATION VERSUS REGIONAL INTEGRATION The IFis, as well as the U.S. government and the transnational corporations that operate in the region, have pressured the Latin American and Caribbean governments since the 1980s to "open" and "integrate" their economies into the evolving global trade regime that is being created by the transnational bloc of forces mentioned earlier. This global trade regime consists of two levels of regulation: ( 1) at the global level, there are the WTO and other trade-related regimes, and (2) at the regional level, there are various bilateral and regional "free trade" associations, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the hemispheric Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which the U.S. government and its neoliberal "free trade" allies within the hemisphere have been trying to create since the 1990s. In order to secure their privileged position within the Western Hemisphere and thereby strengthen their position in the highly competitive world capitalist system, the U.S.-based transnational corporations and the U.S. government have tried to create a hemispheric "free" trading sphere (encompassing Canada, the United States, Latin America, and the Caribbean). Using this hemispheric trading regime, it is hoped that the U.S.-based transnational corporations and investors will be able to extend their predominance over trade, finance, and transnational production, both within the hemisphere and globally within the entire system. The establishment of NAFTA by the elites of the United States, Canada, and Mexico was the first stage in the institutionalization of this hemispheric trading regime. The second stage has involved the establishment of bilateral free trade associations between the United States and individual countries or groups of countries, such as the United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, the United States-Central American and Dominican Republic Free Trade Association (CAFTA-DR), and the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement. According to Robert B. Zoellick, the U.S. trade representative, these bilateral associations are part of the larger U.S. global trade strategy, which is to "pursue multiple market-opening initiatives on a global, regional and bilateral basis" (Zoellick 2004, 4). The U.S. government sees these bilateral agreements as the steppingstones toward achieving the ambitious goal of creating the FTAA, which would encompass all the countries within the Western Hemisphere, except Socialist Cuba. This approach to global integration has been characterized by Robinson (1998/1999) as both part of the "logic of global capitalism" and the "logic of regional accumulation" pursued by the transnational capitalist elites throughout the Americas. In the logic of global capitalism, the cheapening of labor and its disenfranchisement by the neoliberal state are considered fundamental conditions for the creation and maintenance of globally integrated production, distribution, and capital accumulation networks. The transnational factions of the capitalist class in Latin America and the Caribbean perceive that their wealth, power, and privileges lie in following this logic of global capitalism and the logic of regional accumulation associated with it. As these elite groups have become integrated into what Robinson calls the emerging "transnational capitalist class," they have created a new pattern of capital-labor relation that is based on this class's contemporary logic of regional accumulation. This logic requires peripheral regions such as Latin America and the Caribbean to provide a docile supply of cheap labor to the emerging global economy, a platform for the assembly of "global products," and the continuing provision of cheap natural resources. In this logic, these factors are the region's "comparative advantage" in the international division of labor that lies at the foundation of the rapidly globalizing world capitalist system. It is important to note that there is a convergence of interests and consensus about this "logic" of regional accumulation between the transnational corporate elites based in the United States and Canada (as well as in Europe and Asia) and the transnational business elites in most of the Latin American and Caribbean countries.3 This convergence of interests is based on amalgamating the Latin American economies into the increasingly integrated structure of the emerging global economy that is being created by the world capitalist system. They share mutual interests in "restructuring" (denationalizing) the Latin American and Caribbean economies so that capital labor relations in these economies facilitate the global integration of production and the accumulation of capital on a transnational rather than national basis. Since most of the Latin American and Caribbean countries (as well as most countries in the world) are members of the WTO, they are bound by the provisions of their membership in this intergovernmental organization to conform to its neoliberal standards. These standards benefit the transnational corporations and strip the member countries of their economic sovereignty, including their authority to regulate most of the actions of the transnational corporations within their economies. The WTO is the successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and was created as a global intergovernmental regulatory organization capable of overriding national sovereignty and protecting the interests of transnational capital (Kohr 1993). In the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, this global regime for regulating international trade has institutionalized the already existing subordination of the most important sectors of the Latin American and Caribbean economies to the interests of the transnational corporations. It gives the latter the ability under international law to challenge and potentially overturn domestic laws and regulations that restrict their mobility and access to the markets and resources of the these countries (as well as other economies in the world). The proposed FrAA is designed to extend and lock in place the subordination of the Latin American and Caribbean countries to transnational capital, particularly U.S.-based transnational corporations. That is to say, this trade regime is designed to maintain the marginal or peripheral position of the Latin American and Caribbean states in the world capitalist system as the source of cheap labor and natural resources, as well as the captive markets for the U.S.-based transnational corporations and their allies in theregion. That is to say, it is designed to "integrate" them into a dollarized hemispheric trading block dominated by U.S.-based transnational corporations and the U.S. government (Prevost and Weber 2005) . RESISTANCE TO GLOBALIZATION AND NEOLIBERALISM However, there is growing resistance among many Latin American and Caribbean governments and from a broad spectrum of civil society organizations in the region to the loss of economic sovereignty associated with the hemispheric trade regime that the U.S. government, the IFis, and U.S. transnational corporations have been trying to impose on the region (Prevost and Weber 2005). In fact, this opposition represents a serious challenge to U.S. hegemony and is causing a growing conflict over the nature and direction of capitalist development in the region. As a result of this opposition, it seems increasingly possible that counterhegemonic forces within the region and supportive conditions outside the region will lead to a major transformation in the nature of inter-American relations. Instead of Washington's neoliberal agenda for controlling the capitalist development of the Western Hemisphere under U.S. hegemony, a more progressive alternative agenda for the regional integration of the Latin American and Caribbean countries is being advanced that calls for their autonomous economic development. Consequently, this development poses a fundamental threat to U.S. hegemony and the dominance of transnational capital in the Americas, as well as to the globalization of the world capitalist system in general. Throughout the region, there is a growing popular backlash against the policies and ideology of neoliberalism, as well as the effects of so-called globalization (i.e., the corporate-dominated privatization and denationalization of the national economies of the Latin American and Caribbean countries). This backlash is coupled with a widespread loss of confidence in the existing political institutions due to their susceptibility to corruption and the fact that they are widely perceived to have been appropriated by the local business elites, transnational corporations, and other privileged sectors of the population. This is having a devastating impact on the very fabric and sustainability of the state. As we noted in the first edition of this volume, despite the rhetoric of a pretended "democratization" in the 1980s, the dominant political forms in the region are characterized by "low-intensity," restricted, or limited forms of participation. The bulk of civil society is excluded from any meaningful involvement in the governance of these countries. The IMF-imposed structural adjustments and neoliberal reforms have reduced the size and scope of the state, and the existing "receiver states" have allowed a large number of unfulfilled demands to accumulate. As a result, the political process in most of the countries in the region has become a combination of recurring frustrations, unrest, and virtual rebellion, coexisting with authoritarianism and policy deadlock. These may not yet be failed states, as we have seen in Africa, Central Asia, and the Balkans, but the trends so far include acute social disintegration, national fracturing, and institutional decomposition. Increasing popular opposition and the political mobilization of the most disadvantaged sectors of the population have developed in the region's restricted, low-intensity democracies. These states reflect the region's incomplete transition from authoritarian rule to democratic governance. Since there is in these receiver states little room for substantive democracy, let alone equity-producing policies, popular opposition to neoliberal reforms and the kind of economic globalization these regimes support has developed largely outside the formal structures of the political system. The extent of popular mobilization that has taken place in opposition to neoliberalism and globalization appears to be producing a realignment of political forces and a sea change in the politics of the region (Vanden 2005). There is a definite movement away from the traditional politics and authoritarian political culture that have dominated the political systems of the region to a new politics based on new forms of popular democratic participation and organization. Civil society, especially the popular sector, is becoming the new locus of political expression and organization throughout the region (Vanden 2005). Traditionally excluded sectors of the population are seeking new forms of political organization that they can call their own, and there is an ongoing search for new structures that can respond to the demands being formulated by the popular sectors of society. In part, this is because common people have become less tolerant of the traditional patterns of politics (i.e., corruption, deceit, patronage, ineffective governance, and vacuous political discourse).

#### Progressive regional integration starts with subordinating economic to social and environmental concerns. Building an alternative Latin American bloc transforms the neoliberal model of globalization.

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FINAL CONSIDERATIONS The foregoing analysis of the global context of inter-American relations at the beginning of the twenty-first century reveals that the neoliberal agenda pursued since the 1980s by the U.S. government, the IFis, the transnational corporations, and the transnational elites is in serious trouble. Neoliberal policies and corporate-driven "globalization" have engendered growing popular resistance and a counterhegemonic response from both civil society organizations and elected leftist political leaders in the region. In particular, there is growing opposition from a coalition of Latin American and Caribbean governments, as well as from a broad spectrum of civil society organizations, which are particularly opposed to the hemispheric "free trade" regime that the U.S. government, the IFis, and the U.S.-based transnational corporations have sought to impose on the region. The expanding popular opposition to neoliberalism and so-called globalization and the shift to the left in the region's politics represent not only a serious challenge to U.S. hegemony but also growing conflict over the nature and direction of capitalist development in the region. Central to Washington's strategy for the hemisphere has been the imposition of a neoliberal model of capitalist development on the Latin American and Caribbean economies and the integration of these economies into a U.S.-dominated hemispheric "free trade" area. This project is itself a vehicle for the domination of the global economy by U.S. transnational corporations and the government that represents them. The restructuring of the economies of the region under the mantra of neoliberalism and the banner of globalization was aimed at giving the U.S.-based transnational corporations and investors free reign within the region and a strong hemispheric base from which to dominate the global economy. In contrast to the neoliberaL polyarchical, and globalizing model of development imposed by the U.S. government and its allies in the region, a growing movement for an alternative form of development that is genuinely democratic, autonomous, and environmentally sustainable appears to be gaining ground in various parts of Latin America and the Caribbean. This alternative form of development involves the reorganization and realignment of the existing economies in the region, as well as the replacement of the existing political regimes, which serve the interests of the transnational bloc of forces that are behind the integration of the region into the globalized structures of the world capitalist system. New popular democratic regimes are needed to serve the needs and interests of the majority of the people rather than the ruling elites, the transnational corporations, and the transnational capitalist class. An essential requirement for realigning these economies so that they produce people-centered and environmentally sustainable development is their integration into a regional economic and political union that has the resources, the structures, and the power to operate independently of the U.S. government and the U.S.-based transnational corporations. If this type of regional integration takes place, it will enable the Latin American and Caribbean states to break free of the hegemonic influence of the U.S. government and the U.S. transnational corporations and to stop the denationalization ("globalization") of the Latin American and Caribbean economies. Instead of the corporate-driven hemispheric integration of the region under U.S. hegemony, a new system of regional economic cooperation and sustainable development has been proposed to improve the lives of the vast majority of the people living in Latin America and the Caribbean. This type of regionaL autonomous, and sustainable development can only be successfully carried out by truly democratically elected political leaders with broad-based popular support who are sincerely committed to achieving this alternative rather than the elitist neoliberal model. Regionalism has been the dream of the democratic Left for some time. The European Union has its origins in the French Socialist dream of ending Franco-German enmity through unifYing Europe, and African regionalism was the vision of African Socialists, such as Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, who saw regional integration as the means to progress beyond tribalism and colonialism and create a united Socialist Africa (Faux 2001, 4 ). Viewed from the perspective of those who want to create a people-centered, democratic, and environmentally sustainable social order in the Americas, the corporate dominated process of capitalist pseudoglobalization taking place in the region urgently needs to be replaced by what Samir Arnin has referred to as a new system of "pluricentric regulated globalization" (Arnin 2001a). This alternative form of globalization requires the development of regional economic and political communities in Europe, Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, and elsewhere, which collaboratively promote people-centered, democratic, and environmentally sustainable forms of development. According to Arnin, these regional unions of states are needed to collaborate as partners in collectively regulating the global restructuring of the world economy for the benefit of the vast majority of humanity rather than the transnational corporations and the centers of the world capitalist system (Arnin 200 1a). This type of regional-based regulative order can redirect international economic, social, and political relations so that they serve the interests and needs of the vast majority of the world's population. The present structure of the world capitalist system provides the supporting global context for the transnational, corporate-driven restructuring ofthe region's economies and societies. The Latin American and Caribbean countries need to "delink," step by step, from this highly unequal and inequitable system. They need to redirect and restructure their economies so that they serve the needs of the majority of their people while also protecting their natural resources and ecosystems. The alternative policies of economic and social development proposed by the new leftist leaders, the progressive civil society organizations and their supporters, and the project of regional integration associated with the new Community of South American Nations are important indications of movement in this direction. A growing number of civil society organizations and social movements throughout the Americas are pressuring the governments of the region to follow what the Hemispheric Social Alliance (HSA), a network or forum of progressive organizations and movements, calls a regional model of integration that supports the sustainable and democratic development of all the societies in the region (see ASC-HSA 2006). The HSA (which is called Alianza Social Continental, or ASC, in Spanish and Portuguese) also contends that the South American Community of Nations is being threatened by the free trade agreements that Washington has negotiated with Chile, Colombia, Peru, and the Central American countries. According to the HSA, it is fundamental to reverse these agreements and to promote in their place trade agreements that do not compromise sovereignty, medicines, health, water, education, culture, biodiversity, food sovereignty, government purchases, and natural resources but rather promote the sustainable development of these countries. The "Alternatives for the Americas" proposal developed by this inter-American network of progressive organizations and social movements calls on all governments in the region to "subordinate trade and investment to policies that prioritize sustainability and environmental protection" (HSA 2002, 5). A regional model for sustainable and democratic development requires the incorporation of the principle and objective of sustainability in all the subjects addressed. These issues should be negotiated with the objective of resolving with the support of national policies-our region's grave social problems, including inequality, unemployment, and environmental degradation. (HSA2002, 5) The HSA represents what various progressive analysts have predicted since the mid-1990s: the emergence of new social movements capable of challenging the agenda of neoliberal capitalist globalization promoted by the U.S. government, the IFis, and the transnational corporations. Today, these movements are advocating an alternative agenda that is gaining increasing support from other civil society organizations, political parties, and political leaders throughout the Americas and beyond. These social movements and civil society organizations, in combination with progressive political parties and trade unions, have in recent years brought about the popular election of left-of-center presidents- Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Lula da Silva in Brazil, Nestor Kirchner in Argentina, Tabare Vazquez in Uruguay, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua- all critics of neoliberalism, U.S. hegemony, and transnational corporate-driven globalization. These movements and organizations have also organized the popular protests and mobilizations that forced the resignation of neoliberal presidents in Argentina, Ecuador, and Bolivia and created the political conditions for the shift to the Left that has taken place in recent years throughout the region. They provide unquestionable evidence of the emergence of the social forces and political conditions that Panitch (1996, 89) and others (e.g., Harris 1995, 301-302; Jonas and McCaughan 1994) predicted in the 1990s would arise in opposition to neoliberalism, capitalist globalization, and U.S. hegemony. It seems increasingly possible that these forces and political conditions will transform the nature of inter-American relations, bring about the regional integration of Latin America and the Caribbean, and move the Americas away from "turbo-capitalism" toward a people-centered, genuinely democratic, and environmentally sustainable form of economic, social, and political development.

## 2NC

### AT: Perm

#### Neoliberalism coopts reform. Pragmatism for Latin American governments results in control by international capital.

Atilio **BORON** Poli Sci @ Latin American Social Sciences Institute and @ University of Buenos Aires ‘**8** “Promises and Challenges: The Latin American Left at the Start of the Twenty-first Century” in *The New Latin American Left* eds. Barrett, Chavez & Rodríguez-Garavito p. 242-245

THE CURSE OF CONSERVATIVE 'POSSIBILISM' Given the above, and granting the existence of alternatives to neo-liberalism, a disturbing question arises: is there room for neo-liberal policies? The answer must be qualified. In some cases it is an unequivocal yes; in others, the response is still positive, but with some reservations. Let us consider the most optimistic case: Brazil. When one asks friends in the Brazilian government why it has not pursued an economic policy that diverges, even slightly, from the rules of the Washington Consensus and that aims to be something other than an intensification of the neo-liberal policies that preceded it, the response from Brasilia is an exact replica of what is taught in US business school textbooks: Brazil needs to gain the confidence of international investors, we need foreign capital and we must observe strict fiscal discipline, because if we don't, the country risk rating will go sky high, and no one will invest a single dollar in Brazil. This was the premise that guided Lula's first term, and nothing suggests that things will be any different following his re-election. It does not require a great deal of effort to demonstrate the weakness of that argument. If there is a country in the world that has all the necessary conditions to pursue a successful post-neo-liberal policy, it is Brazil. If Brazil cannot do it, who can? Rafael Correa's Ecuador? Taban\ Vazquez's Uruguay? Evo Morales' Bolivia? Perhaps Venezuela, under the leadership of Hugo Chavez, or even Argentina, but only with a strong political will and under extremely favourable international conditions. Brazil, on the other hand, has everything. It covers an immense territory that encompasses every kind of natural resource. It has huge agricultural and livestock resources, enormous mineral wealth, phenomenal sources of renewable energy in some of the largest rivers on the planet, 8,000 kilometres of coastline with extremely rich fish stocks, a population of close to 200 million inhabitants, one of the most important industrial infrastructures in the world, a society weighed down with poverty but with a high level of social and cultural integration, a first-class intellectual and scientific elite, and an exuberant and pluralistic culture. Furthermore, Brazil has sufficient capital, and a potential tax base of extraordinary magnitude, although one which remains unexploited owing to the power of the moneyed classes who have vetoed any initiative in this direction. If, with this super-abundance of conditions, Brazil cannot extricate itself from neo-liberalism, then we are lost, and the best we can do is to prostrate ourselves humbly before the verdict of history that consecrates the final and definitive victory of the markets. Fortunately, that is not tlie'case. The corollary of ' conservative possibilism', beloved offspring of the pensee unique, is that nothing can change, not even in a country with Brazil's exceptional conditions. Going beyond the horizon of the possible and abandoning the dominant economic consensus, certain eminent government officials assure us, would expose Brazil to terrible penalties that would put an end to the Lula government. Nevertheless, a close look at the recent economic history of Argentina may be instructive. 'Possibilism' was intensely cultivated in Argentina, from the early days of Raul Alfonsin's government to the final catastrophic moments under Fernando de Ia Rua's administration. This false realism, ceaselessly promoted by neo-liberal think-tanks throughout the world, drove Argentina to the worst crisis in its history by shackling political will and the administration of the state to the whims and the greed of the markets. What is more, when in the middle of the deepest and most extensive crisis the country had ever known, Buenos Aires defaulted on the foreign debt and began timidly implementing some heterodox policies- the clearest example of which was the cancellation of approximately 70 per cent of foreign debt bonds -the country started on a path of very high rates of economic growth, comparable only to those of China, which have continued uninterrupted for four years now (through early 2007, as the first edition of this book went to press). As I noted in an analysis written prior to Lula's assumption of office, the 'possibilist' temptation always lies in wait for any government driven by reformist aims (Boron, 2003b). Faced with the objective and subjective impossibility of revolution - a characteristic feature of the current situation not only in Brazil but in the region as a whole - a misunderstood notion of common sense leads to accommodation with one's adversaries, and to a search for some small escape route within the interstices of reality that will avoid total capitulation. The only problem with this strategy is that history teaches us that it is later impossible to avoid the transition from 'possibilism' to immobilism, and then to catastrophic defeat. This was clearly the Argentine experience with the 'centre left' Alianza government, and more generally with social-democratic governments in Spain, Italy and France. In more general terms, this was also Max Weber's theoretical conclusion when he stated, in the final paragraph of his celebrated lecture 'Politics as a Vocation' , that 'all historical experience confirms the truth - that man would not have attained the possible unless time and time again he had reached out for the impossible' (Weber, 1982). Weber's words are all the more important in a continent such as ours, in which the lessons of history indisputably demonstrate that real revolutions were needed to institute some reforms in the social structures of the most unjust region of the planet, and that without a bold utopian political vision capable of mobilising people, reformist impulses die out, government leaders capitulate, and their governments end up focusing on the disappointing administration of daily tasks. The hopes invested in vigorous reformism, while undoubtedly possible, should not mean turning a deaf ear to the warnings of Rosa Luxemburg, who argued that social reforms, however genuine and energetic they may be, do not change the nature of the pre-existing society. What happens is that as revolution is not on the immediate agenda of the great masses of Latin America, social reform becomes the most likely alternative, above all in times of retreat and defeat such as those that have characterised the international system since the implosion of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of the socialist camp. Reform, Luxemburg also reminds us, is not a revolution that advances slowly, or in stages, until, with the imperceptibility of the traveller who crosses the equator - to use Edouard Bernstein's famous metaphor - it arrives at socialism. A century of social-democratic reformism in the West irrefutably demonstrated that reforms are not enough to 'overcome' capitalism. It did, without a doubt, produce significant changes 'within the system', but it failed in its stated goal of 'changing the system'. In the current national and international context, reformism appears to offer the only opportunity for moving forward, until the necessary objective and subjective conditions can be created for the pursuit of more promising alternatives. The mistake of many reformists, however, has been to confuse necessity with virtue. Even if reforms are currently all that can be achieved, this does not make them adequate tools for building socialism. They can, if undertaken in a certain way, constitute an invaluable contribution to advancing in that direction, but they are not the path that will lead us to that destination. In the present circumstances, they are what is possible, but not what is desirable in a barbaric world in need of fundamental transformation, not simply marginal adjustments. If, as the Zapatistas say, it is a question of 'creating a new world', such an undertaking greatly exceeds the cautious limits of reform. However, we cannot wait with our arms folded for the ' decisive day' to arrive. If the reforms are imbued with energy and build popular power, that is to say, if they modify the existing correlation of forces, shifting it in favour of the condemned of the earth, then those reforms contain a transformational potential of extraordinary importance. This is the kind of reformism that, for now and in the absence of a better alternative, we need to see in Latin America. The case of Argentina demonstrates that in practice even a country that is far weaker and more vulnerable than Brazil can grow despite the very bad (according to Joseph Stiglitz) advice given to Argentina by the IMF for decades and the highly publicised support of the ' international financial community', which today lavishes Lula with the same praise that it previously reserved for the Menem administration. Is it a characteristic of ' realism ' to follow the advice of those who, according to Stiglitz, became the principal promoters of crisis throughout the world? Crises that, incidentally, enriched speculators and parasites -those for whom the phlegmatic John M. Keynes recommended euthanasia- while condemning the rest to servility. What serious economist - and we are speaking of economists, not spokespersons for business interests disguised as economists - can believe that a country can grow and develop by fostering economic recession through exorbitant interest rates, reducing public spending, constricting the internal market, increasing unemployment, restricting consumption, facilitating the flow of speculative short-term capital and overwhelming the poorest members of the population with indirect taxation, while subsidising the rich, and consolidating the right of large monopolies to go untaxed? Can this be the path to liberating our countries from the ravages of neo-liberalism? Successive Argentine presidents opted for governing according to the rules of 'possibilism', calming the markets and punctually satisfying every one of its complaints. The voices of big capital and the IMF resonated deafeningly in Buenos Aires, and the government of the day did not hesitate for a minute in responding to their commands. That same government, however, was deaf to the groans and cries of the condemned. The results are plain to see. The Brazilian experience during Lula's first term painfully proved that neither a respectable leadership nor what was once a great party of the masses like the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers' Party, PT) was enough to guarantee the correct course of government. Brasilia has gone down the wrong road, at the end of which we will not find a new, more just and democratic society - the goal that gave birth to the PT little more than 20 years go - but rather a capitalist structure more unjust and less democratic than the previous one. A country in which the dictatorship of capital, with a pseudo-democratic veneer, will be even stronger than before, demonstrating that George Soros was right when he advised the Brazilian people not to bother electing Lula, because the markets would govern the country in any case.

#### Using economic engagement as a starting point provides legitimacy to the neoliberal ideological program.

Philip **OXHORN** Poli Sci & Director of Centre for Developing Area Studies @ McGill **‘9** “Beyond Neoliberalism Latin America’s New Crossroads” in *Beyond Neoliberalism in Latin America?* Eds. Burdick, Oxhorn, and Roberts p.223-224

The neoliberal reform process also suffered from fundamental flaws that continue to limit the ability of governments to achieve more satisfactory developmental outcomes. These stem from the nature of the reform packages, which with hindsight are now referred to as "first generation" reforms as policymakers seek to develop "second generation" reforms that can fill in the voids left or created by the first round of reforms (Birdsall et al. 2001). The problem is not that second generation reforms such as improving the social safety net and strengthening basic state institutions, including the judiciary, are not important goals. Rather, the problem lies in the fact that they are considered as the necessary, if not logical, continuation of earlier reforms that have fallen short of expectations. Proponents of neoliberal reforms viewed neutral or apolitical market mechanisms for deciding distributional issues as inherently superior to state (i.e., political) institutions, if not as panaceas. Reform advocates deliberately removed issues of distribution, including employment creation, from consideration, on the assumption that the reforms would be sufficient to ensure that they would ultimately be addressed through markets. Yet "successful" reforms generally had implications that went far beyond the immediate need of restoring short-term economic stability. For example, sharp reductions in the size of the state and its ability to inf1uence (both positively and negatively) the economy also sharply limit its capacity to redistribute resources to address the region's notorious problems of structural inequality, at the same time that the state apparatus may suffer a significant loss of human capital as jobs are slashed and the most skilled seek employment in the private sector where opportunities are greater. The confidence of the authors of these policies in the uncontestable wisdom of their prescriptions was at the heart of this problem. Even after years of unsatisfactory economic performance, they still are very reluctant to even consider any fundamental changes to their basic policy prescriptions, let alone a genuine "post-neoliberal alternative" (Kingstone 2006). Seen from this perspective, at best the crises that induced large scale reform were seen as requiring immediate, decisive action to restore economic normalcy before other considerations could be taken into account. At worst, these crises were seen as opportunities to impose a particular kind of development model that under normal circumstances could not survive the rigors of the same democratic competitive processes with which it has become associated? The fact that such policies normally were so politically contentious also underscores how markets themselves are politically constructed; they are not the natural or neutral outcomes of economic exchange. The politics of implementing allegedly apolitical policies ultimately became one of the most glaring contradictions of neoliberal reforms. New rents were created to attract private sector investors (Schamis 1999; Schvarzer 1998) and co-opt potential sources of opposition, including labor union elites (Buchanan 1997; Murillo 1997). In the process, new economic and political interests emerged through the partial implementation of reforms and these interests erected numerous obstacles to further reforms that threatened them (Hellman 1998). Ironically, policies intended to curb corruption by removing politics from distributional issues actually contributed to an often very public growth in corruption. It is not a coincidence that Fernando Collar de Mello in Brazil, Alberto Fujimori in Peru, and Carlos Menem in Argentina were the first politicians to successfully implement large scale neoliberal reforms in their respective countries and all ended their political terms in office mired in notorious corruption scandals. The formal institutions of the region coexist with informal, particularistic institutions that have withstood the neoliberal onslaught (O'Donnell 1996), as the new market logic comes to permeate entire polities to an unprecedented degree, bringing with it the perhaps unintended consequence of inf1uence peddling.8

### AT: Perm (Poverty Reduction/Inequality)

#### Neoliberal engagement incorporates poverty reduction and participation into export-led exploitation.

Warwick **MURRAY** Geography @ Victoria (New Zealand) **AND** John **OVERTON** Geography @ Victoria (New Zealand) **’11** “Neoliberalism is dead, long live neoliberalism? Neostructuralism and the international aid regime of the 2000s” *Progress in Development Studies* 11 (4) p. 316-318

V Conclusions: neoliberal or neostructural aid? Neostructuralism did not parallel but preceded the more general rise of Third Way politics in the global North in the late 1990s. It came about as a response to the hegemony of neoliberalism that existed at the time. It came to permeate development institutions right to the most infl uential: the World Bank and the IMF. The poverty agenda and the good governance agenda of the late 1990s are couched in neostructural language. The later shift to the failed states approach is also built upon neostructural logic. Work on the exact chronology of the adoption of these ideas would be a useful addition to the literature on the impact and influence of neostructuralism and postneoliberalism. Generally speaking, we concur with the view that neostructuralism is an extension of the neoliberal orthodoxy designed to sustain free market capitalism politically. Specific policies may have changed but the goal remains much the same. The façade of neostructural inclusiveness and self-determination are thus central to the political sustainability of free market regulation. Policies such as state–civil alliances, public–private partnerships and participatory governance models are in fact ways of legitimizing and sustaining the dominant regime of accumulation. Notwithstanding this, signifi cant differences do exist, as the shifts in the aid sector exemplify. The ostensible concepts of the neostructural paradigm, such as participation, good governance, inclusiveness and cohesion, certainly infl uenced the design of aid modalities and the general direction of the regime. Furthermore, the reinvigoration of the state is a central component of the paradigm’s analysis. At the core, though, there is no large-scale shift away from export orientation or the centrality of market logic. On the contrary, social cohesion and participation are seen as ways to make such development more sustainable.2 The laudable social and political goals of neostructuralism as played out in the aid regime are not goals at all – they are means to a neoliberal end. The new regime purports to be more holistic in its targets; and it is indeed true that there has been a shift away from the narrow focus on economic growth to broader concepts. But underlying this quite clearly is the promotion of open regionalism and free market allocation. Although the lexicon might be different, the conditionalities that are involved in the new aid regime bear much in common with the neoliberal approach. We argue that criticisms directed at neostructuralism should be launched more specifi cally at its manifestation in the sector. There are three main sets of criticisms: 1. The new aid regime is not as different from the past as might appear superfi cially. 2. Power relations are not dealt with effectively in the new aid regime, leading to a bias towards donors that is particularly acute in smaller nations. 3. The attempt to enable a newly invigorated state actually creates a greater dependence on external consultants, as in the heterodox paradox predicted by Leiva (2008). There is much rhetoric with respect to participation and inclusiveness in the new process. In reality, however, the harmonization process means that donors still have the greatest power in determining the general direction of policy (Eyben, 2007). In accordance with the harmonization principle of the Paris Declaration, donors act in concert, and may appear to be less heavy handed (due to other Paris principles of ownership and alignment). However, in practice, lead donors have considerable weight in negotiations and recipients lose the opportunity to play donors off against each other (Hyden, 2008). So, conditionalities can still be imposed, despite new fuzzy rhetoric of recipient ownership (Gould, 2005). As such, small and peripheral aid recipients become policy-takers rather than policy-makers. In this sense, the new aid regime does not take into account power relations and the importance of the political economy of the structures of power in determining aid policy and outcomes. States are given ownership, but the question arises: whose state? What happens in the case of contested states? And who determines how the state operates (Buiter, 2007)? In the realities of current aid practice, we see the reproduction of the Western state in a manner that is akin to neo-colonial political change, and in a way that echoes the economic colonialism of the neoliberal aid regime. This new aid regime is seductive in that it promises to transcend overt top-down and bottom-up approaches to development, towards centre-out policy. Utilizing the rhetoric of ‘participation’, it offers – to use a central neostructural catchphrase – ‘development from within’ (ECLAC, 1990). Ultimately, though, the new aid modality – like the development paradigm that inspired it – does not represent a fundamental break with the past. Rather, it operates as a smokescreen that allows continued accumulation along neoliberal lines, but manages to make this more palatable to the electorate. In this sense, neostructuralism has influenced the unfolding of aid policy by providing a means to obfuscate the underlying and persistent objective of neoliberal accumulation, namely, the control of the periphery by the core so that benefits might be extracted from the former by the latter.

#### Poverty reduction and social welfare provide cover for the exploitative effects of the aid regime in Latin America.

Warwick **MURRAY** Geography @ Victoria (New Zealand) **AND** John **OVERTON** Geography @ Victoria (New Zealand) **’11** “Neoliberalism is dead, long live neoliberalism? Neostructuralism and the international aid regime of the 2000s” *Progress in Development Studies* 11 (4) p. 308-310

Contemporary development practice, then, would seem ostensibly to be far removed from the structural adjustment programme version of neoliberalism. Following international agreements to adopt the Millennium Development Goals in 2000, to increase substantially the level of aid and – perhaps most importantly – to focus on aid effectiveness following the Paris Declaration of 2005, the present aid landscape appears to be structured by some rather different principles. Rather than diminishing the role of states in development, current aid policies appear to be aimed at improving the capacity of states to deliver basic welfare services. Also, there is now an explicit focus on poverty elimination, and donors seem to have accepted that recipients should ‘own’ their own development strategies. Associated with these changes in objectives have been a series of signifi cant changes in the way aid is delivered, with a shift from discrete development projects to much more long-term sustained programmes, which are run by recipient governments and funded by themselves and aid ‘partners’. We argue that this new aid approach has much in common with neostructuralism as a development theory, promoting a mixed model of state direction and market accumulation and displaying concern for inequality, welfare and the environment. This article, then, critically examines the parallels between the new aid agenda and the theory of neostructuralism. We assess whether the concepts of neostructuralism have, indeed, infl uenced and informed a signifi cant turning point in the aid regime, shifting it back to state-led market governance, or whether this is merely neoliberalism in a new guise. II Neoliberalism and aid The fundamental elements of neoliberalism – free market resource allocation and the rolling back of the state – provided the pillars of what might be regarded as the orthodox phase of the neoliberal aid regime. This regime was encapsulated in the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) advocated and disseminated through the Washington Consensus. These programmes, enforced when heavily indebted countries sought debt relief or rescheduling through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, were the price of continuing aid support and were common through the late 1980s and early 1990s. In brief, the SAPs sought to dismantle the apparatus of state-controlled economic institutions and regulations. State-owned assets were privatized; balanced budgets and independent central banks brought infl ation under control and liberated money markets; and taxes on consumption rather than income were imposed. Further to this, austerity measures dramatically cut government services and costs; exchange rates were deregulated; subsidies, import controls and export incentives were abolished; the plethora of restrictions on markets and trade were dismantled through a widespread process of deregulation; new modes of public sector management were introduced; and restrictions on foreign investment and ownership were lifted. Alongside these well-documented effects of harsh neoliberal reform, there were some significant political developments. With a (sometimes radically) diminished state sector and a weak private sector, delivery of basic welfare services often fell into the hands of civil society, whether through family and community networks or constituted nongovernmental organizations (Fine, 1997). Aid agencies were quick to recognize and work with this sector, for they continued to distrust what they saw as ineffi cient and corrupt state institutions. Instead, they looked favourably on ‘community’ and ‘civil’ organizations which they regarded as closer to the people and therefore more democratic and effi cient at service delivery. Hence, as shown earlier, ‘pure’ neoliberalism greatly infl uenced aid policies throughout the 1990s. However, mounting criticism of the harsh austerity measures this approach entailed led, by the second half of the decade, to the adoption of progressively more complex and moderate aid strategies (Craig and Porter, 2006). We argue that in order to interpret the roots and implications of these changes, it is useful to consider the concept of neostructuralism. In the following, we explore the rise of neostructuralism as a theoretical frame informing development practice. III The rise of neostructuralism as theory and practice Neostructuralism is a body of development theory and related policy that has risen to considerable influence in Latin America. It has evolved in large part out of the work of thinkers at the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC or CEPAL in Spanish). In many ways, it builds upon the legacy of structuralist analysis written in the 1950s, which was led in particular by Raul Prebisch (1949, 1959; Kay, 1989). However, as the prefi x neo implies, this body of theory and policy holds crucial differences to its predecessor. In Latin America at least, the rise of neostructuralism can be seen as an attempt to forge a postneoliberal paradigm, and in terms of commanding the attention of policy makers and governments it has been successful (Gwynne and Kay, 2000; Murray and Pastor, 2008). The explicit arrival of the theory can be traced back to 1990 and the launch of the ECLAC (1990) document Changing Production Patterns with Social Equity. Since then, it has risen to prominence among centre-left governments in particular, who have pedalled it as a viable alternative to the market orthodoxy of neoliberalism that is palatable to the voting public. It is a paradigm that diverges from a blind neoliberal faith in the market, and yet one that shares similar end goals towards globalised modernity. 1 Historical roots of neostructuralism As with all development theories, neostructuralism is a product of its time. By the early 1990s, all of the neoliberal dictatorships in Latin America had fallen. These regimes had been covertly and sometimes overtly backed by the West, and were built on the so-called lessons of Chilean free market ‘miracle’ of the 1970s (Barton and Murray, 2002). In taking power the dictatorships guaranteed the harsh austerity measures required by international institutions and global capital in the wake of the debt crisis of the early 1980s. Following the fall of communism, however, the US and its allies had less reason to back such authorities. The dominant development paradigm was to be underpinned by democracy and good governance, and involve the enabling of the new slim-line state. Following 9/11, the prospect of failed states as harbours for terrorists became a new priority, and thus attempts were made to reinvigorate the nation-state through aid and loan conditionalities focusing on institutional effectiveness. The ideas and theories that comprise the neostructural paradigm fit very well with this latter geopolitical reality. It has seduced many thinkers and politicians in that it carves out a middle road to globalization, which promises modernity without the austerity required under pure neoliberalism. In this sense, it has come to infl uence the policy of international institutions, and has mimicked much of the participatory development paradigm, drawing on terms and concepts such as participation, social inclusion, growth with equity and globalization from within (Brohman, 1996). As a consequence of this broad appeal, neostructural ideas have been successfully adopted by centre-left presidents and governments across South America, including Lagos in Chile (2000–06), Lula da Silva in Brazil (2002–present) and Correa in Ecuador (2007– present). Arguably, it was in Chile under the historically popular President Bachelet (2006–10) that neostructuralism found its most resounding expression yet – even if the government did not often refer to it as such (Murray and Rabel, 2008). In other countries, a shift further to the left associated with anti-US sentiments and more explicit anti-neoliberal rhetoric has taken place, as in Venezuela (Chavez, 1999–present) and Bolivia (Morales, 2006–present). All of the above has been underpinned by the revitalization – in different ways in different places – of some of the core sentiments of structuralist interpretations of development theory and policy, which distinguish this period to an extent from the neoliberal phase. The idea of neostructuralism preceded other related ‘Third Way’ concepts and evolved in Latin America as an explicit response to neoliberalism. In this sense it represents another example of the periphery theorizing back to the core in ways that are eventually subsumed into the orthodoxy. The paradigm has gone on to inform international development agencies – including the IMF and the World Bank – and its ideas now permeate all the main development institutions. Often, the origin of these ideas is not traced back to Latin American neostructuralism, and the Third Way politics of Blair and Clinton are often credited as the source of this turn. As has often been the case, Latin America is fertile ground for the production of economic theory and has led the way in terms of development ‘experiments’ at key moments in global political economic history. Despite its undeniable rise in terms of influencing continental and world affairs, there has been little explicit study of neostructuralism. As Leiva (2008: 2) argued, ‘despite growing intellectual infl uence, no systematic and comprehensive critical appraisal of the new postneoliberal development approach is available’. Structuralism was similarly underanalyzed in the 1950s, although its radical child – dependency theory – did receive much attention. Hence, by analyzing how neostructuralism has influenced, and impacts upon, the new aid regime, we attempt to provide further critical analysis of the paradigm beyond its hearth in Latin America.

### AT: Cede Political/Coalitions

#### Left-wing Latin American alternative requires refusal to compromise with neoliberalism. Cooperation with the political center produces passivity not momentum.

Steve **ELLNER** Int’l and Public Affairs @ Columbia **‘4** “Leftist Goals and the Debate over Anti-Neoliberal Strategy in Latin America” *Science & Society* 68 (1) p. 19-21

3. The Center-Left Strategy: Ideological and Programmatic Evasion In the short run, the center-left strategy has proved instrumental in initiating democratic consolidation in Latin America. Pinochet's exit from power and that of Mexico's PRI would not have occurred when they did otherwise. But in the long run, Castañeda's coalition strategy only aggravates a central problem facing Latin American democracies in the age of neoliberalism: the blurring of ideological and programmatic differences. True, Castañeda drafted a set of innovative, anti-neoliberal proposals for his Buenos Aires Consensus with the aim of promoting a necessary polarization that pits neo- liberals against anti-neoliberals. The fatal flaw of Castañeda's approach, however, is that the parties at the center he seeks to win over do not come close to adhering to clear anti-neoliberal positions. The Christian Democratic Party of Chile, for instance, has historically pushed social programs including the current labor legislation doggedly opposed by the right, but it has stopped short of breaking with the economic orientation established during the Pinochet years. The Argentine Radical Party also failed to break decisively with orthodox economic policy, in spite of its criticisms of Menem's shock treatment approach. Vicente Fox's economic policies are even more distant from the anti-neoliberal camp. The left, by endorsing governments that vacillate, encourages cynicism, apathy and abstention (Riquelme, 1999, 33), or an overreaction in the form of a hard left that simplistically categorizes all political actors as either friend or foe. The lack of clear ideological and programmatic definitions represents a major liability for Latin America's still "unconsolidated" democracy in general, and undermines the efforts to democratize political parties in particular. This shortcoming has been made evi- dent by political party primaries, which provide an opportunity to spell out internal differences and stimulate internal debate among the rank-and-file. Anti-neoliberalism awaits precise definitions, and party primaries represent the ideal arena to achieve this objective. When in the 1980s leftist parties such as Venezuela's MAS and the Chilean Socialists were among the first to hold primaries for the selection of party authorities, and thus "legalize" internal currents of opinion, internal rivalry centered on ideological differences. In his bid to represent MAS as its presidential candidate for the 1978 and 1983 elections, theoretician Teodoro Petkoff argued that he was in a better position than his main rival - who was also a socialist but a non-party member - to contribute to MAS's ideological solidifi- cation (Ellner, 1988, 117). Ideology was very much on the minds of MAS members at all levels and was indeed the grist of internal party discussion. In spite of MAS's pioneer reforms in party democracy, the organization's internal politics by the 1990s was largely reduced to personality con- flicts devoid of debate around substantive issues. As a result, the party lost interest in primaries for the nomination of candidates at all lev- els. At the outset of Hugo Chavez's 1998 presidential campaign the MASistas were ill-prepared for the issues of substance that came to the fore. Amazingly, virtually none of MAS's national leaders endorsed Chavez's presidential candidacy until pressure from below convinced them to jump on the bandwagon. Equally amazing, none of these national leaders embraced anti-neoliberalism, in sharp contrast with much of the rank-and-file. As a result, the party split in half twice (in 1998 and 2001), and by the second time none of MAS's veteran national leaders joined the pro-Chávez split-off group. The experience demonstrates that party primaries and other internal democratic practices in the absence of ideological and programmatic debate end up as a vacuous exercise. The failure of left-leaning par- ties like MAS to come up with a clear position on neoliberalism - in spite of their pioneering efforts at internal democratization - puts in evidence the special challenge that the formulation of an anti- neoliberal model represents for the third-world left. Petkoff 's "go-it-alone" argument in favor of ideological and pro- grammatic clarity is applicable to Latin American anti-neoliberalism at the current juncture. A large part of the movement is anti-neoliberal in sentiment, but lacking in specifics with regard to strategy and goals. Those who oppose Castañeda's center-left approach argue that the anti-neoliberal coalition needs to be more anti-neoliberal, and more selective as to who enters, than what the Mexican writer advocates. Such an approach was at first not as successful at the polls as was Castañeda's strategy which bore fruit in Chile, Venezuela (with the election of Rafael Caldera in 1993), and Argentina. But the failure of center-left alliances to successfully challenge neoliberal economic policy, as discussed above, puts in evidence the need for a hard-line approach that avoids compromises on issues related to neoliberalism. Only in this form can the anti-neoliberal movement demonstrate to the general population that an authentic alternative to neoliberalism exists, other than the centralized, statist model of the traditional left. Of equal importance, a more selective policy of alliance building will compel the anti-neoliberals themselves to come up with a long-term strategy and to define their goals beyond the form of a rough sketch.

### AT: Engage the State

#### Latin American receiver states reflect the interests of transnational capital.

Jorge **NEF** Director of Latin American and Caribbean Studies @ South Florida **AND** Alejandra **RONCALLO** IR @ Bucknell **’10** “Latin America and the New Pax Americana” in *Latin American Identities After 1980* eds. Yovanovich and Huras p. 10-12

The mounting debt and regime crises set the conditions for the emergence throughout the Americas in the mid-1980s of a new political configuration: the "receiver state," blending limited democracy with neo-liberal economics. This type of state acts in partnership with foreign creditors and international financial institutions as the manager, executor, and liquidator of assets in a bankrupt country. The central function of the state is the administration of national and international debts, combined with the implementation of structural adjustment packages (SAPs). Such policies are geared to assure the payment of debts through the privatization of the state's assets and the denationalization of the economy. This state is highly transnationalized, weak and has only narrow spaces for popular political participation. Generally speaking, national economic and fiscal policies, with structuring capacity to set the rules of the game, are effectively excluded from domestic political debate. Meanwhile, SAPs possess the metapower to define such rules, and discipline and impose strict limits on all domestic social and economic policies, including investment, labour, education, health, environment, social security, and other related fields. This system has perpetuated the economic dependence and underdevelopment of Latin American and Caribbean economies. The SAPs imposed to manage debt have given rise to the institutionalization of the above mentioned vulnerability to external economic and political influences. In a vicious cycle, Latin American and Caribbean states require increasing amounts of external involvement and financial support. This situation is exemplified by the inability of these countries to extricate themselves from their chronic indebtedness: they are caught in a "debt trap" (Martinez 1992; World Bank 1988, 1990, 1992).4 Debt-management became the number one state function in the regional agenda during the early 1980s. The service of the region's debts, both payments of principal and interest, grew from slightly over 40 per cent of the total value of annual exports in 1979 to over 65 per cent in 1983. Despite the fact that about half of the countries in the region had reduced their debt liabilities by 1990-91, the total debt in the region had grown to $421 billion. By 2001, it reached $740 billion, subsequently expanding at an average annual rate of 5 per cent (ECLAC 2001).5 Out of the seventeen most indebted countries in the world in 1992, twelve were in Latin America. On an average, the annual interest rate payments fell from 33 per cent of all exports in 1987 to 22 per cent in 199Las the lost decade of the 1980s came to an end. Between 1992 and 1999, the burden was reduced even further in Brazil and Mexico, which decelerated their rate of indebtedness from triple to double digit annual rates. Even this improvement was unsustainable by any stretch of imagination. Argentina accelerated its rate of indebtedness from a fifteen-year average annual growth of 178 per cent to 256 per cent between 1970 and 2000. Venezuela, in turn, went from a yearly increase of 320 per cent between 1970 and 1985 to 465 per cent between 1970 and 2000. An analysis of the ratio between exports and debt service shows figures that are equally gloomy. The debt service in relation to the total value of export earnings for Argentina moved from 34 per cent in 1990 to over 71 per cent in 2000. For Brazil, the increase was from 23 to 91 per cent. In 2003, the average annual debt service for Latin America had climbed to 201 per cent of the value of exports (World Bank 2003). So far, despite major economic crises in Mexico (1994), Ecuador (1999), Argentina (200 1), Brazil (2002), and Bolivia (2003), most countries in the region have not defaulted outright on their loans. The pursuit of this policy of fiscal responsibility has been extremely hard on the general population, which has had to absorb the full impact of the use of a major portion of their countries' export earnings and revenues for debt payments.6

### AT: Inevitable

#### Inevitability claims are just ideological posturing. Latin America can develop regional alternatives to neo-liberal dependence.

Benjamin **GOLDFRANK** Poli Sci @ New Mexico **‘9** “Neoliberalism and the Left” in *Beyond Neoliberalism in Latin America?* Eds. Burdick, Oxhorn, and Roberts p. 57-59

Conclusion: TINA versus AWIP Does the moderation of Lula's government mean that Colburn, Weyland, and others are correct when they insist that neoliberalism has triumphed, there is no alternative, and the left is dead? Perhaps oddly, such a conclusion would appear depressing to Weyland (2004a: 294; 2004b), who argues not only that "the economic performance of the neoliberal model has proven mediocre" in Latin America, but also that neoliberalism is weakening the quality of democracy, even if making democracy more stable at the same time. For Weyland (2004b), neoliberalism diminishes the quality of democracy by weakening unions, social movements, and political parties, and by restricting voters' choices because elected governments cannot change economic or social policy for fear of generating a backlash from foreign investors (143-9). As Weyland (2004b) writes, "No wonder electoral abstention has increased in many Latin American countries while satisfaction with democracy and trust in democratic institutions has diminished" (146). The TINA conclusion-that "there is no alternative" 9-would seem to condemn Latin America to eternal poverty, inequality, and feeble democracy. But it is not the only conclusion one might draw. Even if mainstream political scientists are right that major changes to the market model are not on the immediate horizon, if one looks locally (yet again), regionally, and transnationally, there are signs that the neoliberal wave is slowing, if not stopping, and that other options might yet emerge.10 At the local level, the early twenty-first century has witnessed both massive protests in many cities against privatization or free trade agreements, such as those in Arequipa, Quito, San Salvador, and El Alto (some organized or supported by mayors on the left), and diffusion of the left's participatory policies, particularly participatory budgeting. Yves Cabannes (2004: 27) estimates that 250 cities use some form of participatory budgeting worldwide whereas Leonardo Avritzer (2003: 16) estimates that in Brazil alone there were 300 such programs during the 2001-2004 period, growing from 140 in the prior period (0 Estado de Siio Paulo March 5, 2001), and the numbers continue to grow. Since 2003, all of Peru's 1,821 municipal districts, 194 provinces, and 25 regions are required by law to use participatory budgeting and in 2007 the Dominican Republic passed a similar law mandating the practice in the country's 154 municipalities. Participatory budgeting has spread to African and European cities as well, including Johannesburg, Seville, Naples, St. Denis, and several British cities. The widespread diffusion of participatory budgeting may only partially represent an indicator of alternatives to neoliberalism, as both the agents of diffusion and the resulting practices on the ground vary considerably. Promoters of participatory budgeting include left parties, particularly the PT, which requires its mayors of large cities to implement the practice and sends representatives around the world to provide advice and encouragement to allies adopting it. Yet IF Is are the other major endorsers of participatory budgeting, and they have more resources to spend promoting it and a different agenda. It is in the cities governed by left-leaning and indigenous mayors that participatory budgeting has more often resulted in genuinely democratic, deliberative decision-making processes and the strengthening of collective local actors (Goldfrank 2007). Regionally, while the U.S.-inspired Free Trade Area of the Americas failed to meet its target start date and seems lifeless despite the signing of CAFTA, the (traditionally empty) talk about Latin American and particularly South American integration has begun to be complemented by concrete cooperation, and not always or only along market lines. New collaborative ties can be seen in the expansion of Mercosul to include Venezuela, in the numerous deals Chavez has made throughout Latin America exchanging oil at subsidized prices for various services (the most widely known being the health care services performed by Cuban doctors), in the creation of Telesur (a joint Argentine-Brazilian-Uruguayan-Venezuelan television station), and in the creation of the Bank of the South, a multilateral lender with government funds from Venezuela, Brazi l, Uruguay, Argentina, Paraguay, Bolivia, and Ecuador, which offers loans throughout South America without IMP-style conditionality. More promising developments are occurring at the transnational level. Most important was the creation of the World Social Forum (WSF) in 2001 as a transnational space/movement/network for those opposed to neoliberal globalization and united around the slogan "another world is possible" (or AWIP). Since its inception, the WSF convened in Porto Alegre each January at the same time as the World Economic Forum, a gathering of those who benefit from neoliberal globalization in Davos, Switzerland.11 In 2005, over 150,000 activists representing 6,872 organizations from 151 countries presented more than 400 proposals for what the other possible world should include and how to get there (see the "Library of Alternatives" on the WSF web page: www. forumsocialmundial.org.br). Although the proposals discussed at the WSF are incredibly diverse-ranging from anti-war to debt cancellation to alternative media-and impossible to summarize adequately, one of the major themes running throughout the forum's events is that of deepening democracy in all spheres: IFis; political parties; social movements; workplaces; the WSF itself; and local, national, and international governing bodies. It is no accident, then, that the WSF's Brazilian and French architects chose Porto Alegre as the original host city. Bernard Cassen (1998), editor of Le Monde Diplomatique and founder of Attac (an international organization advocating the Tobin Tax on transnational capital flows) and cofounder of the WSF, suggested Porto Alegre after praising participatory budgeting as "an experiment in direct democracy like no other in the world" in his influential journal. While external constraints certainly limit the left's national governments at present, local, regional, and transnational trends suggest that TINA and end of history arguments are exaggerated and that another, post-neoliberal, World is possible. It is difficult to imagine that these trends could exist had elements of the left not succeeded at the local level.

### AT: Economic Indicators

#### Quantitative Latin American growth measures mask qualitative declines.

Guido **GALAFASSI** Social Theory @ Universidad Nacional de Quilmes **‘8** “Ecological Crisis, Sustainable, and Capitalism” in *Capital, Power, and Inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean* eds. Harris and Nef p.251-252

Above alL Latin America is largely a derivative market economy: a peripheral copy of the growth economies in the North, exhibiting extreme income concentration and uneven development. The acceleration of economic growth, when it has taken place, has gone hand in hand with the deceleration of national socioeconomic development. While quantitative macroeconomic indices improve, the indicators that measure qualitative changes have generally deteriorated. In this context, to explain the ecological crisis in Latin America, it is important to consider not only the different environmental impacts but also the socioeconomic factors and contradictions extant in derivative capitalistic development. This chapter concentrates on two interconnected issues. One is the general pattern that social and economic development has taken. The other is the relationship among industrialization, natural resource exploitation, and urbanization. In order to study the relationship between development and ecological crisis, it is important to pay attention to new perspectives that can give us more analytical insight into the relationship between society and nature. Traditional interpretations of Latin American development have not taken into account the complexity of the existing relations among socioeconomic, political, and environmental factors. These interpretations mainly conceive society as "disconnected" from its natural surroundings. This perspective does not consider the interrelations, influences, and conditions that define the concrete historical processes, which are always (directly or indirectly) forged by the interaction between social and natural processes. To study the relationship between society, nature, and development, we need to begin by considering one of the basic tendencies of capitalism: to debilitate and destroy its own conditions of production, as noted by O'Connor (1988). These conditions include the physical environment, the regional or urban infrastructure, and human labor power. This basic tendency of capitalism is what O'Connor calls the second contradiction of capitalism (O'Connor 1988). The first contradiction of capitalism (between forces and relations of production, or capital versus labor) is internal to the system and has nothing to do with the conditions of production. The second contradiction "focuses on the way that the combined power of capitalist production relations and productive forces self-destruct by impairing or destroying rather than reproducing their own conditions-' conditions' defined in terms of both their social and material dimensions" (O'Connor 1988, 12). Thus, the second contradiction involves capital against nature, labor power, and space. An intense and continuous exploitation of natural resources, space, and labor power is required for capital to increase its value. As O'Connor puts it, "The basic cause of the second contradiction is capitalism's ... self-destructive appropriation and use of labor power, urban infrastructure and space, and external nature or [the] environment" (O'Connor 1988, 13). It is self-destructive because the costs of health and education, urban transport, housing and commercial rents, and extracting capital from nature rise, and private costs are turned into social costs. In the first contradiction of capitalism, the rate of exploitation of labor is a clearly identifiable element. In the second contradiction, a unique term that summarizes the totality of the human-environmental contradiction does not exist. It is possible today to find a multiplicity of social movements with diverse grievances clustered around this second contradiction. These new social movements, together with the historical labor movement, are the agents of current social struggle and transformation. They represent the force of new social snuggles that, among others, involve the nature of pr.oduction, the workplace, health and safety, toxic-waste generation and diSposal, air pollution, natural resource depletion, the deteriorating conditions of urban life, and radical democracy as a way to solve social and ecological problems and to make social and political decisions.

#### Latin America doesn’t benefit from economic engagement. Transnational elites cooperate to extract concessions that decrease quality of life.

Jorge **NEF** Director of Latin American and Caribbean Studies @ South Florida **AND** Richard **HARRIS** Global Studies @ CSU Monterey Bay **‘8** “Globalization and Regionalization in the Americas” in *Capital, Power, and Inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean* eds. Harris and Nef p.278-283

Other chapters ( Nef and Galafassi) reveal how the globalization of the region's economies can be seen as a multifaceted process in which transnational alliances between the economic and political elites in both the center and the periphery are pursuing a regional and global strategy of eliminating the barriers that stand in the way of exploiting the region's abundant supply of cheap labor. This strategy involves rolling back the labor rights gained during earlier periods of popular mobilization at the national level. It also involves privatizing the public sphere and deregulating the extraction of the region's valuable, but in many cases nonrenewable, natural resources. The exclusive nature of the type of "democracy" that has emerged in the Americas and the continuing authoritarian tendencies in most of the region's political systems have facilitated the implementation of the profoundly reactionary measures that have been introduced in the sphere of employer-labor relations. The net result is a significant deterioration in the employment security of most working people and the generation of democratic deficits- not only in the countries that lie south of the Rio Grande but also in those that lie north of this international, but increasingly porous and artificiaL boundary. Asymmetrical penetration, both formal and informal is continuously taking place between the northern and southern regions of the hemisphere. Northern elites, by themselves or in alliance with their Latin American and Caribbean counterparts, exert hegemonic control over the subordinate groups, classes, and clients in the region. In the complex international division oflabor that has developed between the capitalist centers in the North and the markets and labor forces of the South, investment capital technology, and ideology flow south, while profits and people in search of employment flow north. Despite the neoliberal rhetoric that has been used to justify the so-called structural adjustments made in the region's economies since the 1980s, these transformations have not improved the "competitiveness" of these economies in the global economy or their industrial strength; nor have they raised the standards and quality ofliving of the majority of the population. Putting all rhetoric aside, they have been undertaken to facilitate the more effective mobility of transnational capital and the transfer of increasing amounts of wealth from these economies to the headquarters of the transnational corporations and the private transnational banks in the advanced capitalist countries in the North. Behind the mantra of "free market" and "free trade," which provide an ideological camouflage for the real purposes of the restructuring, the evidence overwhelmingly indicates that the neoliberal structural "reforms" have succeeded in transferring much of the wealth created in the region to the transnational corporations and financial institutions that are based in the centers of the world capitalist system. As many mainstream economists have acknowledged, the last several decades have been marked by "a tremendous increase in the mobility of international capital" (Kohli 2003, 2), as well as a decline in the flow of "official capital" (from governmental and intergovernmental sources) into the so-called developing countries (i.e., the peripheral societies of the world capitalist system). In the region, loans and financial assistance from the U.S. government and the international financial institutions (IFis) have drastically declined, while the flow of private capital into and out of the economies of the Latin American and Caribbean countries (and other peripheral countries around the world) has increased dramatically. The flows and backflows of private capital have been facilitated by the Latin American and Caribbean governments, which, under the spell of the Washington Consensus, have removed or weakened their controls on the financial sectors of their economies and on the investments and profit repatriation of the transnational corporations. As a result, private capital flows now dominate, and official flows of capital have been "reduced to a trickle" (Kohli 2003). The IMF data in table 11.1 reveal that the flow of private capital into Latin America and the Caribbean is much greater than the flow of official capital into the region. Moreover, the data reveal that between 2000 and 2006, the total amount of capital that flowed out of the region was much greater than the total amount that flowed into the region. Depending upon the year in question, there was a net transfer of capital out of the region in the form of private portfolio flows, other private capital flows, and/or official capital flows, plus a continuing outflow of service payments on the large external debts of many of the countries in the region. As table 11.1 indicates, the combination of these outflows every year exceeded the total amount of foreign (private) direct investment and private portfolio flows that went into the region during these years. In fact, according to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) (2005), the estimated net outflow of capital in 2004, which was $12.5 billio n, was greater than the outflow of capital during the worst years of the 1980s, when the region suffered both a severe debt crisis and capital flight in dramatic proportions. But at least during the 1980s, the outflow of capital from the region was offset somewhat by the inflow of loans from official sources and other financial mechanisms (IDB 2005). Since these official flows have been reduced to a trickle in more recent years, they no longer offset the outflow of repatriated profits and the sizable loan payments on external debts. According to data collected by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (2005, 173), there has been a net outward transfer of financial resources from Latin America and the Caribbean every year since 1999 (not to mention the years before this). In 2005, the total amount of this outflow of resources was valued at over $67 billion, with Brazil contributing $27.4 billion, Venezuela another $23.6 billion, and Chile $9.6 billion. These negative net transfers of financial resources mean that these countries lose invaluable financial resources that could be used to finance their own development. Instead, they transfer these financial resources to the companies, transnational banks, and IFis in the United States and other advanced capitalist countries that are the recipients of these transfers. More specifically, these net transfers represent a reduction in the financial resources available for domestic consumption and investment, as well as improving real per capita incomes (Kregel 2004, 6-8). It must be noted that since 2002 the countries with negative net resource transfers contain the majority of the region's population. Thus, these transfers have affected the consumption and per capita income of the majority of the population living in Latin America and the Caribbean. The authors of the ECLAC report that contains the data on net transfers mentioned above downplay the significance of the net outflow of capital from the region. They state that these negative transfers represent merely a deficit in accounting terms because most of the capital transferred was used to pay down the external debts and build up the foreign reserve accounts of the countries involved (ECLAC 2005, 42-43). However, Kregel (2004), who has researched negative net transfers as part of his responsibilities at the United Nations Financing for Development Office, contends these negative net resource transfers are the price that many developing countries with large external debts have to pay to remain current on their external payments and to obtain the IMF' s "seal of approval." According to Kregel (2004 ), negative net resource transfers of capital characterized most of the 1980s in the Latin American countries recovering from the 1982 debt crisis under IMP-mandated stabilization and macroeconomic restructuring programs. By the beginning of the 1990s, private capital began to flow into the region, and the net transfer of capital turned positive in most of the Latin American and Caribbean economies. The capital flow turned negative again, however, in the late 1990s. This pattern of negative financial flows reflects the cost of the IMF's "seal of approval." In order to obtain the IMF's approval, these countries have been forced to follow macroeconomic policies that restrict domestic demand so that their economies produce a surplus from their trade in goods and services. However, this surplus has not been sufficient in most cases for them to build up their reserves and/or pay down their existing debts. As a result, these countries continue to depend on new inflows of external private capital to remain current on their external payments and build up their reserves (Kregel 2004, 6-7) . Kregel further notes that in order to receive the IMP's continued seal of approvaL the Latin American and Caribbean governments have continued the IMP's mandated policies of keeping high real interest rates and large fiscal surpluses, even though these mandated monetary restraints make it almost impossible for them to finance the rapid growth of their economies. This situation involves the transfer of a sizable amount of the wealth that is generated by the producers in these countries to the transnational elites in the advanced capitalist societies. The neoliberal economic policies and economic restructuring have also transferred wealth from the popular classes to the upper classes in the region. The latter have, for the most part, been eager local collaborators in the restructuring and denationalization of their economies. They have in essence facilitated the transfer of capital accumulated in their countries to the executives and owners of the large transnational corporations (both production and financial companies) based in the United States, the European Union, and Japan (Robinson 2004). For the popular classes in Latin America and the Caribbean, which produce the exports that earn their countries the foreign exchange used to pay their countries' external debts, the financial resource transfers have cost them dearly. They have suffered declining wages and lower real incomes, double-digit unemployment, the loss of savings and property, the elimination of benefits and pensions, and declining social services (e.g., health and , education) as a result of the restructuring of their economies. They have also suffered increases in the cost of the basic commodities they consume, as well as the costs of housing and transportation, which combined with their declining wages and/or lower real incomes have been responsible for their falling or stagnant standards of living and their impoverishment. In view of the continuing net transfer of capital out of their economies and the unfair terms of trade that limit their export earnings and development, the vast majority of the Latin American and Caribbean countries has little chance of "catching up" with the advanced capitalist countries or becoming genuinely "competitive" participants in the "global economy" in the near future. They are especially unlikely to achieve either of these outcomes if their governments continue to follow the neoliberal prescriptions of the IFis, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the Group of 7 governments led by Washington. These powerful guardians of the contemporary world capitalist system insist these countries must completely open their economies to foreign competition and hold down their wages so that they will be forced to become more efficient and productive and supposedly more competitive in the global marketplace. However, the uneven development of these economies, the unfavorable terms of trade that handicap them, their shortage of finance capital, and their extremely inequitable distribution of income cannot be solved by further opening up their economies and holding down their wages so that they obey the "objective laws of the market" as advocated by the IFis, the U.S. government, the transnational corporations, and the WTO. Most of these countries cannot improve the "competitiveness" of their economies in the global economy because their present lack of competitiveness is the product of a complex cluster of constraining economic, political, and social conditions that have been imposed on them by the world capitalist system and by the nature of their past historical development within this system (Amin 200lb, 15). That is to say, the power relations and international structures that regulate the global system obstruct their economic, political, and social development. The structures of this system provide a stratified political and economic exoskeleton that constrains all national efforts to pursue any significant degree of self-directed, inward-oriented, and environmentally sustainable development. Indeed, the geopolitical power structures that preserve and support the world capitalist system have made it almost impossible for the populations of the less developed countries in the periphery of the system to pursue a path of inward oriented and sustainable development (Amin 200lb, 20). More specifically, in the present expansive phase of capitalist globalization, the development of the so-called less competitive economies within the world system is effectively constrained by the international financial and trade regimes created to regulate this system. These structures regulate the system in the interests of the new transnational bloc that dominates the system. At the national level, the hierarchical power structures within the peripheral countries are dominated by what Petras (2003) has called "the collaborator classes whose function it is to organize the state and economy in accordance with the core definitions of the international division of labor" (170). These classes impede the autonomous and sustainable development of their countries. Indeed, as progressive critics have contended for some time, the development of these societies is obstructed and largely sacrificed for the sake of the expansion and accumulation of capital in the advanced centers of the world economy. The pressures and demands placed on the governments, economies, and populations of the peripheral countries by the dominant centers of the world capitalist system and by the collaborative domestic elites within these neocolonial countries in the periphery of the system have created a host of contradictions and problems in these societies. On the one hand, these countries are subjected to the conditions for loans, credits, debt payments, investments, developmental assistance, and trade that are set by the IMF, the World Bank, the IDB, the WTO, the transnational corporations (including the major transnational banks), the U.S. government, and the governments of the other advanced capitalist countries. These power structures have pressured and coerced the governments of the Latin American and Caribbean countries into pursuing economic policies that have denationalized their economies and stunted their own national development. Under the hegemony of the bloc of transnational forces that largely control the system, the governments and elites of these peripheral countries have relinquished control over their economies by "opening" them up to transnational capital. The powerful guardians of the world capitalist system have required them to create a "favorable business climate" for the investments, goods, and services of the transnational corporations and investors that are the main agents of the present global expansion and integration of the capitalist system (Harris and Seid 2000, 7-11).

#### Capitalism impact turns are an ideological symptomatic of a class seige mentality – they interpret any specific challenge as the destruction of everything.

Leslie **SKLAIR** Emeritus Sociology @ London School of Economics **’97** Social Movements for Global Capitalism: the transnational capitalist class in action” *Review of International Political Economy* 4:3 p. 516-519

Enter Gramsci, again. ‘A “crisis of authority” is spoken of: this is precisely the crisis of hegemony, or general crisis of the state’ (1971: 210). Whereas Gramsci (writing in the 1930s from a fascist prison) saw the latest ‘crisis of hegemony’ resulting from the First World War and the communist advances since then and would undoubtedly have seen the next ‘crisis of hegemony’ for international capitalism resulting from the Second World War, it is not so clear what the position is today. Theories of capitalist crisis (fiscal crisis of the state, crisis of welfare, crisis of deindustrialization, the environmental crisis are just a few of the contenders) have been articulated from all sides. These have generally been seen as crises which need global as well as national solutions (Ross and Trachte, 1990). My argument is that the global capitalist project is gaining ground as the emerging solution to all these crises (Sklair, 1995) and, as befits a hegemonic crisis of the first order, the solution is a new conception of global hegemony, ‘in other words, the possibility and necessity of creating a new culture’ (Gramsci, 1971: 276; written in 1930). But while Gramsci was thinking of a new socialist order, for the 1990s this raises the prospect of what Ranney (1994) terms an ‘emerging supranational corporate agenda’.

The devastation of the 1970s oil shocks, the subsequent debt crises, corporate restructuring and ‘downsizing’ (the race to the bottom) and the apparent inability of politicians to deal with these problems in any other way than by short-term palliatives, suggest that the local effects of globalization increase the pressures on capitalist corporations, state apparatuses, politicians and professionals and cultural-ideological elites, what I shall go on to define as the transnational capitalist class, to deliver. If this is true, and I shall argue that it has been increasingly the case since the ‘prosperous’ 1950s and 1960s, then what I describe as the ‘siege mentality of global capitalism’ is not such a surprising outcome.

II THE SIEGE MENTALITY OF CAPITALIST RULING CLASSES

All ruling classes in all social systems not characterized by ‘pure democracy’ have to ensure their power to sustain the ‘normal processes of interaction’. So police forces, courts of law, armies, gods (religious and/or secular), superego, posterity and other mechanisms of social control play their part to defend the integrity of the social system, to permit accommodation to change, and even (on occasion) to ensure the success of inevitable revolutions in human affairs. The functionalist theory of social control, notwithstanding the imputed normalcy of the processes involved, demonstrates most completely the existence and salience of what I have called the ‘siege mentality of capitalism’ (Sklair, 1993). The siege mentality entails the view that social systems are always potentially vulnerable to attack, no less from inside than from outside. Approval, and reward for behaviour which sustains it, must be maintained to ensure the persistence of the system; adaptation and change of system properties must be possible where the defiance proves to be too strong for the system to resist; accommodation where neither the system nor the deviance is clearly more powerful – the siege of Troy is reputed to have lasted ten years. But sieges imply stable territory to be defended and identifiable enemies to take aggressive action.

What is the stable territory of capitalism in the era of globalization? In the classical literature of functionalism, Merton, by stipulating that the opposition between cultural goals and institutional means might provoke deviant responses in people unable to live up to either or both, is not speaking of any old goals or means. As has often been pointed out, Merton is really speaking about how a dominant system (in this case, middle-class, white America) defines its goals and means not only for itself but for the **whole society** – all the other systems and sub-systems. The development of ‘subcultural theory’ was a recognition of the fact that Merton was often rather ambiguous about the system in question, sometimes suggesting that it was in fact the whole society he was referring to, at other times suggesting that it was the less inclusive system of middle-class, white America. If the former, then it was patently not the case that the goals and means he identified held for every system and sub-system in the total society; if the latter, the theory can cover only those who were part of the system in the first place – you cannot deviate from goals and means pertaining to a social system within which you have no part, on the functionalist definition. Parsons’s avowed aim to found a general theory of action for the social sciences meant that he was always on the look-out for general features of social action and interaction. The most important of these is that: ‘All social action is normatively oriented, and . . . the valueorientations embodied in these norms must to a degree be common to the actors in an institutionally integrated interactive system’ (1951: 251). This is not all. Parsons goes on to say: ‘Probably a stable interactive relationship without common value-patterns is not empirically possible’ (1951: 261). This is consensus theory (the functionalist theory of hegemony) with a vengeance. All systems are, as it were, crucially tied in with the big system which makes society possible. Thus: Without deliberate planning on anyone’s part there have developed in our type of social system, and correspondingly in others, mechanisms which, within limits, are capable of forestalling and reversing the deep-lying tendencies for deviance to get into the vicious circle phase which puts it beyond the control of ordinary approval–disapproval and reward–punishment sanctions . . . there are, in fact, important unplanned mechanisms in the social system which in a sense ‘match’ the inherent tendencies to socially structured deviance. (Parsons, 1951: 319–20)

What is lacking in the functionalist theory of hegemony, and what renders it quite inferior to marxist theories of hegemony, is a concept of interests, particularly class interests. In a system genuinely based on consensus, conformity to basic system goals would clearly be unobjectionable and probably very simple to implement. But when privileged minorities try to impose their definitions of goals, means and needs on majorities, conformity becomes objectionable on moral grounds, and complicated rationales have to be constructed to justify its imposition.2 Parsons asks the same questions as Hobbes – how do we solve the problem of order? – and reaches a not dissimilar conclusion: people make (or act as if they had made) a social contract, without looking at the small print of the contract, and they are encouraged to speculate continually on the dire consequences of violating its precepts or, worse, giving it up altogether. But both had the siege mentality, both could not help but see that social order was a real problem only for those with privileges to defend, and both feared the consequences when the masses started to challenge these privileges. The functionalist approach to hegemony is a special case of this general position.

The siege mentality, therefore, is only politic, for any social conformity not based on consensus will always tend to break down, challenges to hegemony will always be imminent. The power to create conformity and to reward it rests with some social groups rather than others, and with some strategically located individuals rather than others. A clear illustration of the correctness of this interpretation of the fragility at the core of capitalism is the ‘problem of business’ in the heartland of capitalist hegemony, the USA. In a path-breaking article, Dreier (1982: 111) shows that since the 1970s, big business in the USA has been mobilized ‘to reverse a dramatic decline in public confidence in big business which they blame on the media’.3 To counteract this, business mobilized a five-prong campaign, establishing thinktanks to provide ‘expert comment’ (American Enterprise Institute, Ethics and Public Policy Center, etc. and institutions like the Hoover, Heritage and Hudson, all revitalized with corporate money); university business journalism courses (the National Association of Manufacturers’ Foundation for Economic Freedom textbook and workshops, journalism schools funded by GM, ITT, etc.); awards and prizes to encourage more favourable reporting (UCLA’s Loeb Awards, Champion at Dartmouth, DeKalb at the University of Missouri); detente between business and media through conferences (the Ford seminars, for example); advocacy advertising and increased TV sponsorship of culture (notably the Mobil series, the Advertising Council’s campaign on the American System, corporate adverts in *Columbia Journalism Review*, Friedman’s ‘Free to Choose’ TV series, US Chamber of Commerce’s ‘What’s the Issue’, prerecorded interviews for broadcast, canned editorials, columns and cartoons for newspapers, PR consultants as ‘experts’). An important addition to Dreier’s list is the development of ‘business ethics’, both as an area of academic research (in their survey article, Tsalikis and Fritzsche, 1989, identify over 300 sources) and as a set of responses for big business under threat, elegantly exposed in, appropriately enough, an article in *Propaganda Review* by Graziano (1989). Dreier concludes, correctly in my view, that the reason for all this activity is that the ‘capitalist class always faces the threat of challenge from below’ (1982: 130). No doubt at some periods, in the USA and elsewhere, big business is more popular than at others, but the point is that capitalist hegemony needs constant support, attention and originality to sustain it.4 The question now needs to be raised: Is this more or less true for capitalism in the global as compared with the national context?

#### Neoliberalism undermines the productive parts of capitalism. Their economic ideology is dedicated to market globalization for the benefit of the few– externalizing consequences onto everyone else.

Ankie **HOOGVELT** Sociology @ Sheffield **‘1** *Globalization and the Postcolonial World: The New Political Economy of Development* 2nd Edition p. 154-155

In an impressive book, The Trouble with capitalism, Harry Shutt catalogued the many ways in which state policy in the OECD countries since the late 1970s has been geared towards keeping the return on financial assets high, whatever the cost to the underlying economy and the livelihoods of ordinary people. His argument is that, while capitalism has always been blessed (or has blessed itself) with a ruling class in power that would look after its interests, today the dominant form of capital is the financial form (which, as we have seen before, is most completely globalized), and hence public policy is predicated on helping to maintain the value of financial assets as contrasted and even opposed to those of productive and commercial assets. Shutt's list of policies include bail-outs, as in the US government's bail-out of the Savings and Loans disaster in the late 1980s, and the more recent bail-out of the hedge fund LTCM; government purchases of securities on the stock markets; radical reforms of the pension fund regulations, moving them from pay-as- you-earn systems to other schemes run by private financial institu- tions and invested on the stock markets; tax breaks to investors and savers; repeal of legislation that forbade the buy-back of shares by companies; curtailment of capital gains; cutting interest rates to help unfortunate speculators to borrow money at lower rates to 'close' their positions; and, most importantly, political legitimation of all of the above through the dispersal of share ownership. 32

The active regulation and social manipulation by governments so as to adjust their economies and societies to the forces of globaliza- tion is an entirely political project that is coherently, even if falsely, framed in an ideology that is perhaps best summed up as the ideology of 'globalism'. The distinction between globalization and globalism is all-important. Whereas globalization is an objective, real historical process which marks, in a sentence, the ascendancy of real-time, trans-border economic activity over clock-time economic activity (whether domestic or trans-border), globalism is the reification of this process of globalization as some meta-historical force that develops outside of human agency, conditioning and limiting the scope for action of individuals and collectivities alike, be they nation-states or local groups. Globalism as an ideology adds a belief in the inescapability of the transnationalization of economic and financial flows to the existing credos of neo-liberalism, namely the belief in the efficiency of free competitive markets and the belief that this efficiency will maximize benefits for the greatest number of people in the long run. These beliefs are based on what Pierre Bourdieu has described as 'doxa' - 'an **evidence not debated and undebatable'**.33

# Aff

### Perm

#### Permute: Latin American leftists should cooperate with non-leftists for long term economic sustainability.

Steve **ELLNER** Int’l and Public Affairs @ Columbia **‘4** “Leftist Goals and the Debate over Anti-Neoliberal Strategy in Latin America” *Science & Society* 68 (1) p. 29-30

Petras' celebration of grass-roots struggles and his criticisms of globalization concepts place him at the opposite extreme from the defensive strategies of Castañeda and Harnecker. Petras takes issue with the tendency of the globalization paradigm to view national actors as locked into internationally imposed relations and to posit limited op- tions (Ellner, 2002, 78). Far from characterizing relations between developed nations as harmonious, as globalization writers do, Petras stresses inter-imperialist rivalry, which he claims has intensified since September 11, 2001. In addition to objective factors, Petras takes issue with globalization writers who downplay social struggle and dissolve the issue of class altogether (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2001, 78). In arguing that subjective conditions are ripe to produce radical change in Latin America, Petras is at odds with another tendency of globalization writers: to write off subjective factors as irrelevant in light of the inevitability of the emerging structures brought on by globalization. Petras' anti-determinist view is carried to an extreme by other writers who are opposed to Castañeda's and Harnecker's defensive strategies. Venezuelan leftist activist Toby Valderrama, for instance, questions Harnecker's argument that the left needs to put off far- reaching change due to the lack of international support by saying: "No revolution - and this is a law - has ever been initiated under favorable conditions for the revolutionaries; on the contrary, they always act [in these circumstances] in the face of desperate condi- tions." Valderrama points out that Fidel Castro's attempted seizure of power on July 26, 1953 occurred against all odds, but that the revolution's triumph (as Che Guevara pointed out) refuted the no- tion held by orthodox Communists of the impossibility of a revolu- tion just 90 miles from U. S. shores (Valderrama, 2002). Indeed, Valderrama's vanguardist argument could also be applied to the quixotic coup staged by Hugo Chavez on February 4, 1992. In short, Petras and others who raise the possibility of far-reaching change in the current stage emphasize the importance of subjective factors per se, and are optimistic in their assessment of those condi- tions. At the other extreme, Castañeda belittles the effectivenes social movements (as he did at the time of the Zapatista uprsing in 1994) and instead favors negotiations from above, an approach that militant, autonomous social movements could undermine. Harnecker occupies a middle space on the optimist-pessimist spectrum. On the one hand, she considers that conditions are not ripe for adopting an anti-imperialist strategy. On the other hand, she considers the left sufficiently strong to be able to play a dominant role in anti-neoliberal alliances with groups to its right. The recent events discussed in this article are helpful in assess- ing the viability of the three strategies. Thus, the left's political fiasco in Argentina under de la Rua, and the failure of the governments of Fox, Caldera and (to a lesser extent) Lagos to follow an anti-neoliberal course, place in doubt the effectiveness of Castañeda's approach. In the second place, Bush's foreign policy puts the lie to the claim that the United States has turned its back on its imperialistic past in favor of the defense of a grandiose "global" order. These developments may indicate that the proclamation of the end of anti-imperialist revolu- tions by Sandinista leaders, which influenced Harnecker in the for- mulation of her anti-neoliberal strategy, may have been premature, to say the least. Finally, the Chavez and Lula phenomena point to the advantages and even necessity of alliances with organizations representing non- leftists, at least at an initial stage, contrary to Petras' approach. In the case of Venezuela, the non-leftists who supported Chavez (MAS and the followers of Luis Miquilena) unceremoniously left the government coalition prior to the April 2002 coup. However, Chavez's rise to power might not have occurred in the first place - nor might the Chavista constitution of 1999 have been promulgated - had it not been for the support and participation of these non-leftists at the time. Simi- larly, Lula's electoral agreement with the Liberal Party, which led to his embrace of free-market reforms, may not be a "sell-out," as Petras claims. An alliance between Lula and President Néstor Kirchner of Argentina (joined by Alan Garcia of Peru at a future date) may pro- vide an arena for the formulation of anti-neoliberal positions that would ease pressure on Venezuela's Chavez. These stands may include collective negotiation of the foreign debt and South American tariff agreements prior to the establishment of the FTAA. Thus Petras' rejection of the organizational support of non-leftists - like Trotsky's position before him - deprives the left of allies, which, while not reli- able for achieving long-term goals, are useful in the struggle against neoliberalism.

#### Latin American left-wing strategy should be plural and coalitional. We shouldn’t leave state-based politics in the hands of neoliberals.

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By contrast with the left that preceded it - which, as we saw, emphasised theoretical unity and strategic centralisation - the new left is distinguished by a marked plurality. With respect to organisational strategies, in place of the Leninist unitary political subject - the vanguard party or party-state the predominant forms are 'broad fronts ' of parties and movements, coordinadoras (networks) of social movements, or encuentros (gatherings) of activist organisations. In all cases, we see coalitions or networks whose participant organisations contribute to common political purposes - for example, an election, a campaign or a cycle of protests - without losing their organisational autonomy. 4 The Uruguayan Broad Front (FA) and the PT in Brazil are the paradigmatic cases of the first type of coalition between parties and leftist movements, a model that sectors of the Colombian left have attempted to reproduce via the creation of the Social and Political Front and the Alternative Democratic Pole. The Coalition in Defence of Water and Life in Cochabamba - internationally renowned for having prevented the privatisation of the city's water - is the most visible example of articulation between social movements (Olivera, 2004). With respect to gatherings of activists and NGOs with left-wing agendas, the innumerable encounters that led to the growth of the feminist movement (Alvarez, 1998; Vargas, 2003) and the regional indigenous movement (Cecefia, 1999; Brysk, 2000; Bartra, 2004; Rodriguez-Garavito and Arenas, 2005; Escarzaga and Gutierrez, 2005) stand out. The same plurality is reflected in the strategic political objectives of the contemporary left. Winning government office and the democratic reform of the state remain central objectives for many of the new political forces. Alongside these, however, a significant group of social movements promotes an anti-party, anti-state position, based on civil resistance and self-management. Among these, Holloway (2001) and Zibechi (2003) have highlighted the Zapatistas in Mexico and the pique teras in Argentina. This strategic position and the reaction it has provoked among analysts have given rise to some of the most intense academic and political debates about the new left, as we shall see at the end of this introduction. For now, however, we want to emphasise that, when viewed as a whole, the strategy of the forces of the contemporary left is as distant from the old Leninist obsession with taking national power as it is from the extreme vision of authors such as Hardt and Negri (2002, 2004), according to which the new left consists of a hyper-decentralised international network of local organisations that seek global forms of co-ordination, rather than the reform of the state or seizing national power. Between these two poles, one can find a wide range of strategies that includes, in addition to competing in elections for local and national power, the construction of what Nancy Fraser (1993) has called multiple public spheres, which are set in contrast to the Habermasian idea of a unitary public sphere as a counterpart to the state. The multiple public spheres include spaces of community self-government - such as the campesino councils and the committees of Bolivian farmers organised around irrigation rights (see Chapter 8), the Zapatista Juntas de Buen Gobierno ('good government committees') and autonomous municipalities (see Chapter 7), and the Argentine neighbourhood assemblies (see Chapter 6) - as well as citizen forums for democratic deliberation that are linked to the state, such as the Brazilian and Uruguayan participatory budget assemblies (see Chapters 2 and 4) and the Venezuelan grassroots committees (see Chapter 3). Multiplicity of social bases and political agendas A second characteristic, directly related to the first, is the broadening of the social bases and political agendas of the left. The economic, political and social changes that eroded the political primacy of trade unions and the monopoly of the struggle against class inequality within the heart of the left - and the resulting emergence of 'new social movements'- have been extensively analysed by social scientists (see Melucci, 1996). The same shift is obvious in the Latin American left. In fact, some of the most effective forms of popular mobilisation involve actors whose agendas are based as much on the classic demands for social equality as they are on demanding respect for difference. The paradigmatic example of this type of mobilisation is the new continental indianismo that has expanded since the indigenous peoples rising organised around Ecuador's Confederation oflndigenous Nationalities (CONAIE) in 1990. Today this forms the main social base of the Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement Towards Socialism, MAS) in Bolivia and - to a lesser extent - of Rafael Correa's new government in Ecuador, and it is a social and political force on the rise in Colombia and Mexico as well. The inclusion in the new left agenda of the right to difference, on a par with the right to equality - or the extension of the classic objective of promoting equality to include the struggles against forms of discrimination based on ethnicity/race, gender, sexuality and the like - contrasts with the historical trajectory of the left in the last century. As Luis Tapia demonstrates in his analysis of Bolivia, the response of the historic left to the cause of multiculturalism was unenthusiastic at best, and in the worst case was openly hostile. This kind of response was demonstrated before by the repression of the Miskito autonomous indigenous movement by the Sandinista government in the 1980s. Although the history of the Latin American left shows the persistence of profound internal tensions within the left around this theme - for example, between the historic left and the CONAIE in Ecuador (see Davalos, 2005) - the dominant tendency is towards what Norbert Lechner (1988) has called the logic of politics (as opposed to the exclusionary logic of war), which imposes mutual recognition on the different actors on the left. In order to capture the plurality of agendas, strategies and social bases of new left forces, Schuster and Bartra propose in their chapters that we speak of lefts in the plural. In the same vein, in Chapter 10, Santos argues eloquently that the new left's possibilities for cohesion will depend on the creation of 'depolarised pluralities'- that is, on a labour of translation and mutual intelligibility among the parties, movements and organisations that from different angles are opposing neo-liberalism, imperialism and other sources of inequality and domination. The international movement for an alternative form of globalisation, articulated through the WSF, is striving for the same type of co-ordination of plurality (Seoane and Taddei, 2001 ; Sader, 2002; Sen eta!., 2004; Santos, 2005). Prominence of civil society A recurring theme among contemporary left forces is the defence of civil society as a space for political action. This new addition to the left's ideology and programmes can be explained as much by the fact that civil society was the focal point of resistance to the region's right-wing military dictatorships as by the rejection of traditional Leninist statism mentioned above. According to Francisco Weffort, 'the discovery that there was more to politics than the state' ( 1984:93) began for the Latin American left with the experience of the solidarity of the Catholic Church, human rights organisations and other members of civil society during the period of authoritarian military rule, and continued in the two decades that followed with the multiplication of progressive NGOs and autonomous spaces for citizens' deliberation, such as the Mexican and Brazilian neighbourhood associations in the 1990s (Avritzer, 2002). The international left has taken the same path, as demonstrated by the dominance of social organisations within the WSF and the explosion of theoretical and empirical analyses of civil society. The prominence given to civil society has generated intense internal tensions and debates within the left. In his chapter, Atilio Boron emphasises the ambiguity of the concept and the risks it poses for the left when the term is understood as the condensation of political virtues, in opposition to the state. In the same vein, Emir Sader (2002) has criticised the international left's concentration on civil society, and its consequent abandonment of the task of transforming the state, which would thereby remain in the hands of neo-liberal reformers. Alvarez (1998) and Pearce and Howell (200 1) - among other analysts - have warned of the risks of NGOisation of social movements: that is to say, the possible domination by NGOs of social activist agendas and forms of action. Some of the case studies confirm the dangers identified by these analysts - for example, the Argentine neighbourhood assemblies analysed by Schuster, which, in the absence of an articulation with the state, dissolved as the diverse interests that they accommodated moved in opposing directions. However, other cases illustrate the vitality of civil society as a space for mobilisation on the left- for example, the Bolivian indigenous and campesino councils for self-government. Meanwhile, a third group of experiences clearly exhibit an articulation of society and the state - for example, the local participatory budgeting programmes in Brazil and Uruguay - and, in this way, have contributed to the democratisation of both the state and civil society. We will return to these issues in the final section of this chapter.

#### Complete rejection of neoliberalism is politically disastrous. Economic and social reforms within capitalism are a better strategy for Latin America.

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The national obstacles to changing economic course are also significant. One of the fundamental reasons that neo-liberalism has been able to resist the rise of the left and popular discontent is the inertia of institutions and economic cadres formed during the neo-liberal era. As Sanchez, Machado Borges Neto and Marques demonstrate in Chapter 2, monetarist economists and other neo-liberal reformers are firmly entrenched within the Central Bank, the Ministry of Economics, and the Finance Ministry of Brazil. It is for this reason that the Lula government has maintained an orthodox monetary and fiscal policy that sets these members of the socalled economic team against members of the PT's political team, who occupy other positions in the government and the party, and who prefer (or preferred) a decided shift away from neo-liberalism. In this way, in Pierre Bourdieu's terms (1999), the legacy of neoliberalism in the region is felt today in the tension between a 'right hand' of the state, charged with maintaining economic orthodoxy, and a 'left hand', generally represented by the ministries of education, health, labour and social welfare, seeking to push policy in a post-neo-liberal direction. The Venezuelan case, as Edgardo Lander demonstrates in Chapter 3, vividly illustrates both the presence of these national and international restrictions and how circumstances can make them less restrictive. Lander points out that Chavez's Fifth Republic Movement government has generated an unprecedented increase in social spending, channelled primarily through the so-called misiones: programmes to expand the coverage, and improve the quality, of basic public services (health, education, infant nutrition, etcetera) in poor areas. This social policy~ whose popularity has been evident in the many elections in which marginalised classes have consistently voted for Chavez, including a recall referendum (see Lopez Maya, 2004) ~ was made possible by the reorientation toward social spending of Venezuela's oil revenue, which has been exceptionally high in recent years and is without parallel in other countries of the region. This extraordinary source of foreign exchange has diminished the influence of international financial institutions and the restrictions burdening other leftist governments that are dependent on international capital. At the same time, the Venezuelan experience illustrates the tight restrictions produced by national resistance to changes in economic policy. The redirection of oil income towards social investment took place only after a prolonged strike by the Venezuelan business class, who were joined by the personnel of the state-owned oil company. While these and other obstacles are recognised by the parties, governments and movements of the new left, there are profound debates and divisions over the possible room for manoeuvre within the indicated limits, and the capacity of governments, whether on their own or with the support of social movements, to go beyond those limits and increase the possible range of economic policies. As Daniel Chavez asks in his chapter on Uruguay, to what extent are the narrow margins for manoeuvre a product of the decisions of the governments themselves? To what extent are these governments being more 'fundist' than the International Monetary Fund? Judging by the intense controversy surrounding the Lula government, both internal and external to the PT - which even led to the December 2003 expulsion of PT members of Congress who had criticised the government - these questions trace deep lines of division within the new left.6 While the government and the PT leadership contend that prudence and orthodoxy are necessary conditions for opening space for post-neo-liberal policies, their critics call for a change of course and assert that the imperatives of macroeconomic stability are equivalent to a permanent conversion to neo-liberalism. This state of things might lead one to conclude that there is, in effect, 'no alternative' to neo-liberalism, as Margaret Thatcher proclaimed two decades ago. Nevertheless, the chapters in this book show that the problem lies more in the question than in the response regarding the existence of an alternative. If the question is whether the new Latin American left has a fully developed and clear alternatiye to the neo-liberal model, the answer is clearly no. Instead, what we find in the case studies are multiple local or national initiatives with diverse degrees of effectiveness and originality. The path followed by several 'progressive' governments suggests that the reconstitution of the Latin American left is no longer defined by radical changes in institutional politics and macroeconomic policies, but by the implementation of social reforms. This apparent new left 'agenda' takes for granted the basic principles of market economics, while promoting reforms such as the implementation of welfare programmes for the poorest members of society (such as the Fame Zero in Brazil or the Panes in Uruguay), a renewed concern for public security, a more active role for the state as regulator and mediator between capital and labour, the expansion and improvement of public services, and the introduction of a more progressive tax regime.7 Despite making a positive difference in the lives of the citizens affected by these policies, they do not add up to a comprehensive alternative model to neo-liberalism. Moreover, these and other post-neo-liberal experiences are far from consolidated, and the political actors themselves promote them in an atmosphere of considerably greater uncertainty than that which drove the ideology and programmes of the old left. Indeed, it bears noting that in all the countries governed by the left, we observe the existence of actors that are not simply anti-neo-liberal but also anti-capitalist and have thus positioned themselves to the left of the progressive parties in government. This implies growing pressure from both sides of the political spectrum and a much more complex equilibrium than the bipolar left- right contradiction hegemonic throughout the region. In this context, we see the left both in government and against the government, with the line separating supporters and opponents not always clear. As seen in Brazil and Venezuela with the re-election of Lula and Chavez, the poor tend to support the government, whereas those with higher levels of formal education tend to adopt a more critical stance. At the same time, the economic policies implemented by some of the progressive governments analysed in this volume are endorsed by social and economic sectors that not long ago were at the forefront of resistance to the left. In short, the very same governments are seen by some critics as 'sold out to market forces' and neo-capitalists, whilst others perceive them as not market-friendly enough. For all these reasons, Latin America is at this moment a privileged laboratory for analysing the identity and future evolution of the left and progressive left politics in and beyond the region. In one important respect, the uncertainty characterising the contemporary Latin American left may be seen as an advance over the old left. Indeed, as Atilio Boron contends in Chapter 9, the construction of economic and social alternatives never proceeds in accordance with a manual or a pre-conceived model. Rather, it is a historical, dialectical and ultimately unpredictable process with multiple possible outcomes.8 The inflexible pursuit of a pre-conceived model is therefore more likely to serve as a hindrance to the construction of an alternative than as a reliable guide. Similarly, in an essay exploring the problems of the transition to socialism, Erik Olin Wright (2004: 17) contends that such a transition is best conceived as moving in a general direction, rather than toward a specific institutional destination. This approach, he asserts, is like: leaving for a voyage without a map of the journey, or a description of the destination, but simply a navigation rule that tells us if we are going in the right direction and how far we have travelled. This is obviously less satisfactory than a comprehensive roadmap, but it is better than a map whose destinations are constructed through wishful thinking and which give a false sense of certainty about where we are headed. From this broader perspective, an extensive range of proposals, programmes and experiments becomes visible, and it becomes possible to analyse and evaluate the extent to which the actors on the left today offer alternatives to neo-liberalism. Thus, rather than a fixed destination, a more useful analytical criterion consists of determining to what extent these economic initiatives go in the direction of the values widely recognised by the left itself, such as decreasing inequality between classes and countries, economic democracy and environmental sustainability. In other words, these aspirations constitute the essential points of reference on the left's navigation rule.

### Engage State (Latin America)

#### Latin American Left needs to engage state-based politics.

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Social movements are therefore not limited simply to blocking state action or 'pressuring from below' . They are also capable of transforming the state, both by redirecting its modes of intervention (in order to lessen social and economic inequalities and thus alter the balance of social forces) and by transforming its forms of representation (in order to make it more accessible and thus more susceptible to pressure from below). Thus, building on the concepts of non-reformist reforms and democracy as an object of change discussed above, the relationship between social movements and the state should be understood as a dialectical one. For the manner in which social movements engage the state will be crucial to determining not only the latter 's institutional capacities and strategic direction, but also their own power and capacity for constructing an alternative society. Similarly, political parties can play a critical role in advancing the cause of a viable left alternative. More specifically, they perform three fundamental tasks related to this objective. First, a political party (or parties) of the left can serve as the political arm of social movements, enabling them to project their social power and express their demands in the political arena and providing them with a necessary means for gaining access to the state. Second, a political party is uniquely positioned to promote a broadly conceived socio-political project capable of integrating diverse social actors and movements and can thus play a key role in providing an overarching vision and point of connection for social movements with distinct 'sectoral' concems.11 Finally, organised political force in the form of parties is of great importance to giving the diverse activities of the state's various agencies a specific strategic direction and providing the political support necessary to sustain it (see Boix, 1998). While political parties are uniquely positioned to carry out these tasks, their essentially electoral logic very often works in direct conflict with the logic of social movements. As Adam Przeworski ( 1985) argued in his classic work, the imperative of winning elections forces leftist parties to offer a programme that appeals not only to their primary base among subordinate classes, but also to centrist voters among the middle and even upper classes. As a result, not only are the demands of social movements at risk of being marginalised, they are also under enormous pressure to refrain from making use of their principal power resource (social mobilisation), particularly if it involves acts of disruption. 12 This tension only becomes intensified if the party proves victorious and assumes office. Schuster's account (Chapter 6) of the Kirchner government's effort to demobilise the social movements that helped bring him to power provides a clear illustration of this tension, as well as its potential long-term consequences. As Schuster notes, if Kirchner succeeds in this effort, he will probably gain a degree of political stability, a goal to which all governments aspire. But it is likely to come at the cost of diminishing the government's power (and room for manoeuvre) vis-a-vis Argentina's dominant classes, and thus its capacity to undertake more significant reforms. Thus, the balancing act of the left parties consists of carrying out the promised programmes that mark the difference between them and the centre or the right, but within the economic, political, national and international restrictions that tend to cause them to gravitate towards the centre. Several of the case studies demonstrate that, in practice, the parties of the left have followed a common path to building their political capacity and mitigating the dilemmas that they face. It involves a multi-level strategy that proceeds from advances at the local and provincial levels to electoral victories at the national level. As students of leftwing local governments have documented, the latter have invariably been the launch pads for national candidates and political platforms (Stolowicz, 1999; Chavez and Goldfrank, 2004). The most prominent examples are, once again, the Broad Front, which built its national prestige on 15 years of governing Montevideo prior to its rise to national power in 2005, and the PT, which rose to the presidency after more than a decade of success in municipal administration in cities like Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte, Fortaleza and Sao Paulo. The distinct logics driving movements, parties and governments can thus give rise to diverse relationships of collaboration or confrontation. An ideal scenario for the left would consist of the presence of, and dynamic articulation among, strong popular movements, parties and governments, thereby maximising the left's overall capacity to build and sustain a viable alternative. Under this scenario, the first provide the grassroots demands and pressure necessary for the second to carry out their programmes and fulfil their responsibilities as instances of ideological and strategic articulation, and for the governments to drive the (non-reformist) reforms that comply with the programmes and create the possibilities for even more profound change, including the further strengthening of social movements and the deepening of democracy.

#### Rejection of existing democratic and economic institutions fails.

Armando **BARTRA** Investigador de la División de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades de la UAM – Xochimilco **‘8** “Mexico Yearnings and Utopias” in *The New Latin American Left* eds. Barrett, Chavez & Rodríguez-Garavito p. 202

However, there were also anti-political voices coming from the progressive, sunny side of the street, which rejected elections as a means of change and agreed with the right on the disqualification of Lopez Obrador. Neo-zapatismo and its followers hold that the parliamentary left has no agenda and that when it governs it behaves the same as the right; that the once-progressive parties only want to win elections in order to obtain public sinecures; that the political left rides on the backs of popular movements and recruits their leaders; that certain social leaders have sold out their movements for a seat in the Chamber of Deputies; or that if occasionally left-wing leaders such as Lopez Obrador are popular, it is undoubtedly because they are populists. Nor could we do without the old cannibalistic and paranoid syndrome of the left, according to which we have in every leftist politician, either potentially or in their actions, a traitor to the social movements (in other times, they would have been called reformists, agents of imperialism or revisionists). There is a lot of truth in this: we suffer from a crisis of utopias, vote-chasing parties and corrupt leaders. However, once again the problem is in the tone. And in the anti-systemic left, the melody behind the precise critique of institutional politics is not fascism (which to be sure exists), but rather the apocalyptic hypothesis that national states are totally devoid of content, that representative democracy as a political system is no longer useful, and that there is no alternative other than the globalisation of resistance and local self-governance. These generous and visionary ideas call our attention to relatively new phenomena, but by exaggerating their conclusions, they confuse certain tendencies with all-encompassing realities. Even more serious is that when the arena of institutional politics is deserted, the terrain is ceded not to traditional party bureaucrats and their ancient rituals, but to the Thermidoreans of the PRI and the neo-authoritarians of the PAN. Because in the current Mexican conjuncture, the discrediting of representative democracy, institutions and formal public procedures does not help to overcome the alienation from bureaucratic apparatuses, but rather to restore submission; it does not foment postpolitics, but rather pre-politics.

Mexico

### Perm Net Benefits

#### Ceding economic cooperation to neoliberals paves the way for authoritarianism.

Armando **BARTRA** Investigador de la División de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades de la UAM – Xochimilco **‘8** “Mexico Yearnings and Utopias” in *The New Latin American Left* eds. Barrett, Chavez & Rodríguez-Garavito p. 211-212

But reclaiming the value of informal or non-professional politics is not to disparage public institutions (such as parliaments and political parties), where there is a bit of everything, both good and bad, or the arena, norms and practices of formal democracy. The state is not a dead dog, especially if is a question of maintaining the existing order (with its colonial wars, counterinsurgencies and repressive campaigns). But it is also not completely inadequate when it is a question of changing the existing order. In order to maintain things as they are, power from above is sufficient. But in order to bring about fundamental change, it is essential to have power from above and below, from outside and inside. We are in need of both the positive force of the stone and the negative force of the flame: structures that stabilise and processes that counteract their inertia. At times of crisis of the political system, to reject the institutional sphere as a strategic terrain and to bet on reactive 'rebellions' or to entrench oneself in autarchic 'resistance' (with the logic of someone seated at the entrance to a house waiting for the system's corpse to pass by) is to cede half the terrain to authoritarianism. Representative democracy spurns direct democracy, but as Santos reminds us, the latter also has its delegated representatives. Thus, we need a basically participatory democracy that also employs the mechanisms of representative democracy. Formal democracy (trustworthy elections, pluralist competition, freedom of assoc1at10n and expression, transparency, accountability, the possibility of removing officials from their posts and the right to information) is essential; but without broadened democracy (referenda, informed deliberation, participation in consensus administration and creation), formal democracy is empty of content. And without participation, representative democracy becomes discredited and gives way. But it is not self-management itself that is validated, but rather authoritarian procedures. For self-management to flourish, we need a democratic, active, energetic and strong state. Low-intensity democracies are fragile and cannot support pluralist participation and thus tend towards authoritarianism. In contrast, high-intensity democracies, with robust and legitimate institutions, welcome and favour the broadest and most diverse selfmanagement, which allows them to become consolidated, because there is in fact not a single democracy, but several; that is, diverse but articulated ways of sharing authority, which coexist, overlap, compete, confront and succeed each other. In reality, there is no one democratic system or even many democratic systems; rather, there are transitional democracies or processes of democratisation. And at a time when the struggle against the culture of 'power over' and the shared exercise of 'power for' is not yet over, but rather is in the process of being destroyed and rebuilt, norms and institutions must be fluid, flexible and provisional.

### AT: K Prior

#### Reject their K prior claims – without comparing to available options, their alternative can’t distinguish between Bush and Carter.

**Sikkink 8**

Kathryn, Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota. “The Role of Consequences, Comparison, and Counterfactuals in Constructivist

Ethical Thought” 2008 http://www.polisci.umn.edu/centers/theory/pdf/sikkink.pdf

Ethical arguments of these different types are ubiquitous and necessary. But because they are also slippery and open to manipulation and misuse, we also need to be very careful and precise about how we go about using them. I would recommend that first we distinguish very carefully between the comparison to ideals and historical empirical comparison. I believe that many critical constructivist accounts rely on the comparison to the ideal or to the conditions of possibility counterfactual argument. In almost every critical constructivist work there is an implicit ideal ethical argument. This argument is implicit because it is rarely clearly stated, but it is found in the nature of the 36 critique. So, for example, in her discussion of U.S. human rights policy, Roxanne Doty critiques a human rights policy carried out by actors who sometimes use it for their own self aggrandizement and to denigrate others. 42 The implicit ideal this presents is a human rights policy that is not used for denigration or surveillance or othering those it criticizes or conversely, of elevating those who advocate it. What would be examples of such a policy? The book does not provide examples. We do not know if examples exist in the world. So the implicit comparison is a comparison to an ideal – a never fully stated ideal, but one present in the critique of what is wrong with the policies discussed. Nicolas Guilhot makes a similar argument in his recent book. The promotion of democracy and human rights, he argues, are increasingly used in order to extend the power they were meant to limit. “The promotion of democracy and human rights defines new forms of administration on a global scale and generates a new political science.” He historically examines how progressive movements for democracy and human rights have become hegemonic because they “systematically managed to integrate emancipatory and progressive forces in the construction of imperial policies.” But once again, **the book offers no alternative political scenario.** In the final sentence of the book, the author clarifies that “this book has no other ambition than to contribute to the democratic critique of democracy.” 43 In the introduction, he clarifies, “This book does not provide answers to these dilemmas. At most, its only ambition is to highlight them, in the hope that a proper understanding constitutes a first step toward the invention of new courses of action.”44 Ethically, I believe this is a cop-out. Politically and intellectually, I find it too comfortable and too easy. This critique has a crucial role to play in pointing to hypocrisy (as Price highlights in the introduction). It could also serve as a catalyst for policy change in the direction of policy that would include less surveillance or less cooptation of human rights discourse. **But it is unlikely to serve as a catalyst for new action or policy change unless it ventures something more than pure critique, unless it risks a political or ethical proposal**. Without that, it has the impact of delegitimizing any human rights policy without suggesting any alternative. Any policy to promote human rights of democracy policy is shown to be deeply flawed or even pernicious. It is portrayed as part of the problem, certainly not as offering any kind of solution. Human rights policy appears to make the situation worse, not better. The critique has the effect of telling us clearly what we do not want, what we can not support—human rights policies by imperfect and hypocritical actors like the U.S. In its historical comparisons, it also lumps human rights policy together with colonialism and does not provide any elements to distinguish between one policy of surveillance and other. All are equally flawed. The ethical effect is to remove normative support from existing policies without producing any alternatives. This is similar to what Price means when he says that “critical accounts which do not in fact offer constructive normative theorizing to follow critique ironically lend themselves to being complicit with the conservative agenda opposing erstwhile progressive change in world politics.” Neither Doty nor Guilhot, for example, contrast two human rights policies to give examples of policies that are more of less hypocritical or where there has been more or 44 Guilhot, p. 14. 38 less surveillance. **They don’t contrast human rights policies or democracy promotion policies to previous policies that were also hypocritical and self aggrandizing, but more pernicious** – e.g. national security ideology and support for authoritarian regimes in the third world. By presenting no contrasts, **the critique would appear to say that there is no ethical or political difference between a policy that supports coups and funds repressive military regimes and a policy that critiques coups and cuts military aid to repressive regimes.** These policies would appear to be ethically indistinguishable. Indeed, by these standards, a realist policy (a la Kissinger) might be preferable. Kissinger didn’t denigrate his authoritarianism allies. He took regimes as they were. He treated them as valuable allies. He didn’t lecture them on how they should change. He also, in doing so, encouraged, in some cases, coups and mass murder. **But at least he didn’t “Other”.** Doty and Guilhot give me no ethical criteria to distinguish between the policies of the Kissinger administration, the Carter administration, and current Bush administration policy. Because the comparison is an implicit ideal, never an empirical real world example, the critique is very telling and can delegitimize the critiqued policy. But nothing is put in its place. So, **it demobilizes any support we might have for any human rights policy**. **It puts the analyst in an ethically comfortable position, but by not proposing any explicit comparison, it demobilizes the reader**. We learn what to oppose, to critique, but we don’t learn explicitly what to support in its stead. **The result can be political paralysis.** One finds it difficult to act.

#### Don’t treat discourse as prior. Role of the ballot arguments over-privilege the importance of any individual. Making political theory into an end in itself undermines decision-making.

Sophia **MIHIC** Poli Sci & Philosophy @ Northeastern Illinois **’10** in *Democracy and Pluralism: The Political Thought of William E. Connolly* ed. Finlayson p. 96-98

The recent renewal of interest in interpretation, as found within the 'Perestroika' movement, has for the most part merely been a return: a reprise and re-application of the earlier arguments against behavioral approaches to the study of politics. Stephen White has lamented the inferiority of these current debates and initiatives in political science when contrasted with the field's selfquestioning in the 1970s, a disciplinary critique 'characterized by a rich discussion' about what the study of politics could be and should do (White, 2002: 179). I The takers of the linguistic turn have been congratulated, rightly, for insisting that evaluation is constitutive of the 'what' that is politics. Debate over what a more engaged practice of political theory might be has been advanced by theorists working on new approaches to relationships between abstraction and concrete analysis.2 But the linguistic tum itself has been neglected as an object of theoretical solicitude. What interpretive limitations, or even traps, were produced in that initial encounter between political theory and behavioral inquiry? And how do the effects of these limitations persist? l This chapter returns to the linguistic turn of the 1970s and explores the effects of arguments against the fact/value dichotomy in political science, not with respect to the behavioral approaches against which they were posed, but within the work of political theorists who posed the criticisms.3 Focusing on the work of William Connolly and Charles Taylor, I argue that in the aftermath of debates over the fact/value dichotomy they shrink from constituting the seeable - from the theoretical tasks of pursuing the descriptive and evidentiary implications of their own arguments - because they are caught up in what I identify as the hegemony of normative theorizing.4 I am not suggesting that this shrinking - from what less generically we might refer to as the empirical, the concrete, or the material - is reducible to the intent of either author. Likewise in the subfield of political theory the hegemony of normative theorizing, which compels and allows this retreat, is not the conscious program of an author or of any group of theorists. It is better understood as a language game, or discursive formation, within which political theorists in North America work and of which they are for the most part unquestioning. The hegemony of normative theorizing is a force in language and practice that compels the political theorist to present his or her work in a particular form : the disciplinary demand of their subfield is that theorists clearly articulate and affirm the evaluative implications of their own findings. 5 ] will demonstrate how this requisite normative declaration produces a nonchalance and disregard toward facticity - toward, that is, the constitution and hence the quality of fact. Further, I will argue that this discursive compulsion, or move in the language game, effects a second move: the exaggerated emphasis on evaluation creates an undue emphasis on the evaluator as political actor and/or position-taking political theorist. I cannot argue that either of these moves is wrong. To engage the constitutive force of just one of language, thought or world is to engage the others also - to engage normativity is to engage facticity. But what does consistently entering into interpretation with the goal of evaluative declaration conceal? What is foreclosed when we ask the political theorist to explicate and affirm his or her position in every interpretation? The hegemony of normative theorizing is supported by the widely held view that political theory is concerned with justice - with articulating alternative conceptions of the 'good' political life. But my concern is not solely with such expressly normative theories as Rawls' monumental reduction of the social theories of welfare liberalism to a moral choice, or political theory concerned with evaluative perspicuity or expertise in ethics. We find the hegemony of normative theorizing, the entreaty to endorse and a compulsive subject-centeredness, in the work of diagnostic political theorists like Connolly and Taylor in whose work the emphasis on evaluation characteristic of the hegemony of normative theorizing emerges as a reactive response to the goal of value-neutrality in behavioralism. I will argue that the concomitant glorification of the perspective of the agentic human subject is a reactive response to the presumptive blank space that is the behavioral subject. These responses are reactive in a theoretical sense: we will see that the hegemony of normative theorizing in Connolly's and Taylor's work is evidenced, first, in their conversations with their opponent (behavioralism) and in arguments with each other. The chapter seeks to trouble our familiarity with such debates so as to identify paths not taken. A presumption of my argument is that the linguistic tum, as taught to us by Connolly and Taylor, suggested interpretive possibilities that are greater than those realized by either theorist.6 The early lessons of 'Perestroika' seem to have been that political theorists should learn some facts - rendered by our empirically-trained sister political scientists - and theorize about them. But we will see that the prepositional remove of this 'about' suggests a sanguine empiricism in contrast to the possibilities of an interpretive political science sketched during the I 970s. As evidence of this under-realization, the chapter will examine the lingering effects of the struggle with behavioralism in exchanges between Connolly and Taylor over the work of Michel Foucault. Here, we will see their shrinking from the constitution of the seeable as an aversion to interpretation in the third person - an aversion, that is, to nonagent- centered argumentation. They each struggle with and cannot accommodate arguments with structural valences and/or dimensions. For both, any theorizing in the third person is the voice of science and of the foe to be avoided.7 Thus, I am reading Connolly and Taylor canonically, as enunciative modalities, situated within disciplinary conditions that contain the epistemic insights of the radical theory that inheres within the continental philosophies on which writers such as they draw; the subject-centered focus permeating their thinking is not simply a matter of authorial choice.8

#### Method shouldn’t be treated as a prior issue.

Samuel **BARKIN** Poli Sci @ Florida **’10** *Realist Constructivism* p. 83-85

Among these constraints are the need to contextualize power, the need for reflexivity, and the need for research methods that are both social and contextual. These three constraints can all be deduced through similar reasoning, which involves the application of the logics of the social and of historical contingency to specific questions of ontology, epistemology, and methodology. I The reasoning in all three cases focuses on a combination of intersubjectivity and historicity. Intersubjectivity in this context means that the use of the concept of power, the approach to reflexivity, and the methodological demands of both constructivist and classical realist logic all need to be understood in ways that focus on mutual understandings and common discourses among actors, rather than on individual understandings and individual readings of text. Historicity in this context means that these three constraints limit the degree to which both constructivists and realists can generalize, and also limit the extent to which both can reasonably speak in absolutes. The term "reasonably" as used in this context is carefully chosen. It is used not in the instrumentally rational sense of rational choice theory, but in a more colloquial sense, indicating thoughtfulness and appropriateness. 2 Doing research that looks at processes of social construction in a historically contingent way requires, for want of a better term, reasonableness. It requires, for example, a recognition that boundaries, among both social groups and historical contexts, are imprecise. A recognition that there is no precise ratio or threshold at which a norm can be considered intersubjectively held, no specific number of iterations beyond which a discourse becomes constitutional of politics. 3 Determining these things requires reasoned argument on the part of the researcher, and an open but critical mind on the part of the reader. In this sense, the requirements of this sort of research are the opposite of those of statistical analysis, which requires clear and explicit categorization.4 Reasonableness also needs to be applied to concepts such as power and reflexivity, and to questions of method. Fetishizing these concepts, or **fetishizing questions of method**, undermines our ability to study politics inductively, by prioritizing concept or method over empirics. By fetishizing I mean focusing on power, or reflexivity, or **method as an end in itself**, rather than as something that is important to take into account in the study of international relations insofar as it illuminates the politics that are the ultimate point of the study.5 **It is the difference between arguing that something matters, and arguing that only that thing matters.** For example, to argue that power is a common feature of politics is a reasonable observation. It can even be a definitional statement - Morgenthau, for example, defines politics as the realm of social power.6 But to argue that only power matters is different, because to do so is to argue that other things do not matter, and this is a much more difficult argument to make. Morgenthau, to continue with the example, spoke of peace as the ultimate goal,7 Whether or not one agrees with this goal, to state it is clearly an admission that something matters in politics beyond power.

#### K prior claims incentivize over-generalization. Extrapolating root causes eliminates agency and contingency – internal link turns their impact.

Samuel **BARKIN** Poli Sci @ Florida **’10** *Realist Constructivism* p. 147-151

Over theorizing Both the brand dilution and the theory imperialism effects can to some degree be mitigated by scholars simply specifying precisely what it is they are doing, clearly placing themselves in a theoretical and epistemological context. Doing so will make it clear whether a particular piece of research fits into a narrower or broader definition of constructivism, and whether another descriptor might be more applicable. But the degree of mitigation of this problem is limited, because even if the description of theoretical and epistemological underpinning is made clear in the text, label effects still matter. Furthermore, too much emphasis on theory-specification can lead to another problem, overtheorizing. By overtheorizing I mean the inclusion of long discussions of theory, epistemology, and method in works in which they are not necessary. This manifests itself in articles, chapters, and manuscripts in which there is a lengthy theory section, that either describes new methodological tools, or stakes out very specific grounds in epistemological debates, or makes strong claims about the need for a theory of the sociology of international politics. There is then an empirical section that describes a particular case. This mode of construction of an argument is perfectly reasonable, as long as there is a clear connection between the first section and the second. But there is perhaps more theorizing going on out there under the rubric of constructivism than is made necessary by the demands of the empirics. One might respond that empirical work needs to be grounded in a solid theoretical structure, that epistemological and methodological assumptions need to be made clear, and that all social science has an ontology that should be confronted directly rather than assumed implicitly.23 This is true up to a certain point, but not beyond it. There is an analogy in quantitative studies of international relations. The way one reads a particular quantitative result may well be impacted by one's epistemology or ontology. For example, a philosophical realist may read a particular correlation between political structure and war in a different way than a logical positivist. But it is often the case that the statistical study itself can be carried out and presented without specifying an ontological intent. The mechanical process of regression analysis is the same either way. Similarly, a case study looking at the co-constitution of a particular set of agents and structures in international politics need not always take sides in the debate between thick and thin constructivism. Where one places oneself in this epistemological debate may well affect how one reads the case. But that does not necessarily mean that it need affect how one writes the case, or even how one conducts the case study. If one focuses on discourse, the discourse is the same whether or not one sees norms underlying it. If one focuses on norms, one accesses those norms, ultimately, through discursive evidence, which can be read in its own terms. An extensive discussion by the author of her or his views on these debates, therefore, may have little effect on the way in which the reader interprets the empirical evidence. An example of this point can be found in a recent forum on constructivist methods in international relations edited by Audie Klotz. In this forum, Jeffrey Checkel makes the case for a positivist constructivist method, and Kevin Dunn for a postmodern one. Klotz and Cecelia Lynch argue that, despite differences in epistemology, the differences in method between these two approaches are in fact quite modest.24 Checkel and Dunn look to different sources of information, because they are asking different questions about different cases. But both ultimately rely on concepts of reasonableness in their decisions about sources of information, sufficiency of information, and suchlike things. Klotz and Lynch make a similar argument at greater length in Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations.25 Three factors that may contribute to the tendency to overtheorize are big-tent definitions of approaches to the study of international relations, a tendency within the pedagogy of constructivism toward social theorizing, and an incentive structure in the discipline that favors grand theory. The big-tent (and to a lesser extent the expansive) approach to definition has the effect of diluting the content of descriptive terms. When a fairly restrictive definition of a term like constructivism is generally accepted, then the term by itself can be used as a shorthand for describing the epistemological and methodological context of a specific piece of research. But the broader the definition, the less effective it is to use the term in this shorthand way. With a bigtent definition, in which the term is used to describe membership in a **self-selected community** rather than a particular aspect of political or social theory, the effectiveness of the term as a research shorthand almost entirely disappears. This leaves the researcher with a need to describe the theoretical, epistemological, and methodological underpinnings of the research more or less from scratch. But if, as Klotz and Lynch argue, 26 there is a common set of methodological tools that constructivists can agree on, and if it is unnecessary to engage in broader epistemological debates to use those tools in the context of specific empirical cases, then these descriptions may often be distracting from rather than contributing to the **value of the case** study. A second contributing factor to the tendency to overtheorize may be found in the way we are taught to think about constructivism. Disciplinary pedagogy, the way we teach graduate students, tends to **emphasize social theorizing over case work** in the teaching of sociological approaches to the study of international relations (in those doctoral programs that teach sociological approaches, that is27). The constructivist works that most consistently appear on IR theory syllabi are those that set out the social theory underpinning constructivism, rather than case studies that apply it. 28 Focusing on these works certainly makes sense as pedagogy - understanding the underpinnings of the approach is more important for disciplinary preparation than, say, understanding foreign policy discourse in Canada. But it may be that the lesson that many students take away from these syllabi is that what constructivists do is theorize. The effects of this emphasis on pedagogy and theorizing are exacerbated by the relationship between constructivism and critical theory. As noted in Chapter 5, these two approaches are often taught as closely related. And in some ways they are, particularly when contrasted with, say, the quantitative mainstream. But teaching them as closely related can mask key differences, such as those discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 relating to the different uses of theory in the two approaches. Conflating critical approaches, with their assumption that social theory cannot be separated from empirics and their emphasis on the emancipatory role of theorizing, with constructivism and its more empiricist starting point, can lead to a greater emphasis on social theorizing in empirical constructivist work where it is not necessary. A third contributing factor to the tendency to overtheorize in constructivist research applies more broadly to the discipline of international relations, particularly in the United States. This factor is a professional incentive structure that privileges generalizable theory over case studies. The tendency is for more prestigious journals, in their review processes, for example, to privilege articles with conclusions that can be generalized, rather than conclusions that apply only to a specific case. 29 There is therefore an incentive for scholars, whatever their methodology, to claim generalizable conclusions. Furthermore, the more general an article or book, the more likely it is to be widely cited, because it applies in a broader set of circumstances. This is particularly true of grand theory. To the extent that citation is used as a marker in the discipline for success,30 there is an incentive to theorize, whether or not it is appropriate to the case material being studied. One of the potential effects of overtheorizing in the context of constructivism that is most problematic is that it can lead to claims of generalizable conclusions that are not in keeping with the historical contingency that is a key element of the approach. Constructivist logic is **incompatible** with **transhistorical claims about the discursive or normative content of social structures**. As such, **any** claim that agents and norms necessarily interact in a specific way, or that agents respond to and recreate discourses in a particular way, is **suspect.** Similarly, claims that processes in international politics necessarily follow a particular course are suspect. To argue, then, that a particular process can be identified historically is, in constructivist terms, reasonable. To claim that the pattern, having been found in some instances, is worth looking for in others, is similarly reasonable. But to try to create a broader theory of constructivist political process is not. It defies a core tenet of constructivist logic, which is that agents can recreate social structure in ways that we cannot predict.

### AT: Ethics Prior

#### Policymakers should privilege prudence above other values. Weighing of concrete policy possibilities is a prerequisite for any ethical assessment.

Stefano **RECCHIA** IR Grad Student @ Columbia **‘7** “Restraining Imperial Hubris: The Ethical Bases of Realist International Relations Theory” *Constellations* 14 (4)

The content of this ethics of lesser evil – or ethics of responsibility – becomes further clarified in the emphasis put by several realist scholars on the concept of prudence as a guideline for responsible statecraft. Morgenthau called prudence "the supreme virtue in politics."47 In a first approximation, prudence can be seen as stressing the consequentialist aspect of realist IR theory; prudence first of all implies a careful weighting of the consequences of alternative political actions. However, it would be wrong to reduce the concept of realist prudence to a mere consideration of "what is possible" in international relations, implying a dispassionate strategic calculus aimed at selecting the most appropriate means to achieve some given end. Rather, it appears that in most traditional realist scholarship, "means are matched to ends within a context in which the choice of means and ends alike is constrained by ethical principles."48 This suggests that the entire notion of political ethics underpinning American realism is quite heavily influenced, not by Machiavellian raison d'état, but by the older Thomistic notion of prudent statecraft, which itself has deep roots in the Aristotelian conception of practical wisdom. It was Reinhold Niebuhr, the Protestant theologian and an important realist figure in his own right, who combined Augustine's utter pessimism about human nature with the Thomistic notion of prudent self-restraint. Niebuhr thus established a coherent and deeply moral political theory that seems to have had great appeal for secular scholars such as Morgenthau and Wolfers. Niebuhr crucially believed that individuals and nations alike are largely driven by egoism and pride, which he saw as resulting in an inherent "will-to-power" and domination. Yet he also laid the foundations for the ethical outlook that was to characterize subsequent generations of realist scholars, emphasizing that "even the collective behavior of men stands under some inner moral checks;" and in the mid-twentieth century more than ever "the peace of the world require[d] that these checks be strengthened."49 In many regards, Morgenthau did little more than reformulate Niebuhr's Christian universalism and his ethics of lesser evil for a secular audience of foreign-policy experts. The realists' absorption of the Aristotelian/Thomistic view of practical wisdom can be seen as one of the main reasons why they did not accept that international relations can be a fully rule-governed activity. If international relations were fully moralized and specific rules governed each individual foreign-policy decision, this would presumably eliminate the need to engage in complex moral trade-offs when state survival is believed to be at stake. However, once again, political realists believed that this would be impossible and probably undesirable. The uncertain nature of international politics, with unexpected feedback-loops resulting from **complex patterns of strategic interaction**, necessarily requires sustained political and moral judgment by the actual **policy maker**. As Robert Tucker adequately put it, "whether prudence permits the observance of restraints, and if so what restraints, are dependent upon circumstance and cannot be answered in the abstract."50 Hence the central role of the morally responsible statesman in realist international relations theory; someone who is allowed substantial discretion in deciding what morality requires under particular circumstances and when conditions of "supreme necessity" apply.

Notwithstanding their pessimistic outlook on human affairs, most traditional American realists recognized that "survival" is not always immediately at stake in international relations. As Arnold Wolfers put it in his famous analogy: even in the darkest days of the Cold War international relations did not fully resemble a "house on fire," which would have left individual statesmen with no room for deliberation, simply compelling them to run towards the exit. Rather, the appropriate analogy was that of a house merely "overheated," thus leaving sufficient room for moral and political choice although the temperature was not always comfortable.51 The traditional American realists all seem to have agreed – either explicitly, or more implicitly in the context of their broader theory – that whenever national survival is not unequivocally at stake, responsible statecraft cannot be simply reduced to a matter of choosing the lesser evil among available policy options. In slightly different terms: whenever international systemic imperatives are not compelling, responsible foreign policy makers ought to choose the most effective policy actually compatible with the moral good, with the latter defined by universal standards. Morgenthau himself came to stress in some of his later writings that whenever survival is not at stake, morality should be seen as proscribing any deviation from the moral code altogether:Morality is not just another branch of human activity, co-ordinate to the substantive branches, such as politics or economics. Quite to the contrary, it is superimposed upon them, limiting the choice of ends and means and delineating the legitimate sphere of a particular branch of action altogether. This latter function is particularly vital in the political sphere."52Notwithstanding the almost Kantian overtones of this latter quote, it seems that for Morgenthau and his fellow American realists, the possibilities for moral behavior in international relations depend almost entirely on the qualities of the statesman; i.e. essentially his moral and political wisdom. Morgenthau is representative of much realist thinking, when he argues that politics is an art, not a science, and that what is required for its mastery is "the wisdom and the moral strength of the statesman."53 What the scholar can do is to illuminate the inherent tensions between the moral code and the empirical constraints that influence the determination of foreign policy, and this the traditional American realists attempted to do throughout their academic careers.

### AT: Neoliberalism

#### You should reject their impact framing. The terminology of “neoliberalism” encourages fake radicalism, oversimplification, and greater levels of cooptation.

Clive **BARNETT** Faculty of the Social Sciences @ Open University (UK) **‘5** “The Consolations of ‘Neoliberalism’” *Geoforum* 36 (1) p. Science Dirct

3. There is no such thing as neoliberalism! The blind-spot in theories of neoliberalism—whether neo-Marxist and Foucauldian—comes with trying to account for how top-down initiatives ‘take’ in everyday situations. So perhaps **the best thing to do is to stop thinking of “neoliberalism” as a coherent “hegemonic” project altogether**. For all its apparent critical force, the vocabulary of “neoliberalism” and “neoliberalization” in fact provides a double consolation for leftist academics: it supplies us with plentiful opportunities for unveiling the real workings of hegemonic ideologies in a characteristic gesture of revelation; and in so doing, it invites us to align our own professional roles with the activities of various actors “out there”, who are **always framed as engaging in resistance** or contestation. The conceptualization of “neoliberalism” as a “hegemonic” project does not need refining by adding a splash of Foucault. Perhaps we should try to do without the concept of “neoliberalism” altogether, because it might actually compound rather than aid in the task of figuring out how the world works and how it changes. One reason for this is that, between an overly economistic derivation of political economy and an overly statist rendition of governmentality, stories about “neoliberalism” manage to reduce the understanding of social relations to a residual effect of hegemonic projects and/or governmental programmes of rule (see Clarke, 2004a). Stories about “neoliberalism” pay little attention to the pro-active role of socio-cultural processes in provoking changes in modes of governance, policy, and regulation. Consider the example of the restructuring of public services such as health care, education, and criminal justice in the UK over the last two or three decades. This can easily be thought of in terms of a “hegemonic” project of “neoliberalization”, and certainly one dimension of this process has been a form of anti-statism that has rhetorically contrasted market provision against the rigidities of the state. But in fact these ongoing changes in the terms of public-policy debate involve a combination of different factors that add up to a much more dispersed populist reorientation in policy, politics, and culture. These factors include changing consumer expectations, involving shifts in expectations towards public entitlements which follow from the generalization of consumerism; the decline of deference, involving shifts in conventions and hierarchies of taste, trust, access, and expertise; and the refusals of the subordinated, referring to the emergence of anti-paternalist attitudes found in, for example, women’s health movements or anti-psychiatry movements. They include also the development of the politics of difference, involving the emergence of discourses of institutional discrimination based on gender, sexuality, race, and disability. This has disrupted the ways in which welfare agencies think about inequality, helping to generate the emergence of contested inequalities, in which policies aimed at addressing inequalities of class and income develop an ever more expansive dynamic of expectation that public services should address other kinds of inequality as well (see Clarke, 2004b J. Clark, Dissolving the public realm? The logics and limits of neo-liberalism, Journal of Social Policy 33 (2004), pp. 27–48.Clarke, 2004b). None of these populist tendencies is simply an expression of a singular “hegemonic” project of “neoliberalization”. They are effects of much longer rhythms of socio-cultural change that emanate from the bottom-up. It seems just as plausible to suppose that what we have come to recognise as “hegemonic neoliberalism” is a muddled set of ad hoc, opportunistic accommodations to these unstable dynamics of social change as it is to think of it as the outcome of highly coherent political-ideological projects. Processes of **privatization, market liberalization**, and de-regulation have often followed an **ironic pattern** in so far as they have **been triggered by citizens’ movements arguing from the left of the political spectrum against the rigidities of statist forms of social policy** and welfare provision in the name of greater autonomy, equality, and participation (e.g. Horwitz, 1989). The political re-alignments of the last three or four decades cannot therefore be adequately understood in terms of a straightforward shift from the left to the right, from values of collectivism to values of individualism, or as a re-imposition of class power. The emergence and generalization of this populist ethos has much longer, deeper, and wider roots than those ascribed to “hegemonic neoliberalism”. And it also points towards the extent to which easily the most widely resonant political rationality in the world today is not right-wing market liberalism at all, but is, rather, the polyvalent discourse of “democracy” (see Barnett and Low, 2004). Recent theories of “neoliberalism” have retreated from the appreciation of the long-term rhythms of socio-cultural change, which Stuart Hall once developed in his influential account of Thatcherism as a variant of authoritarian populism. Instead, they favour elite-focused analyses of state bureaucracies, policy networks, and the like. One consequence of the residualization of the social is that theories of “neoliberalism” have great difficulty accounting for, or indeed even in recognizing, new forms of “individualized collective-action” (Marchetti, 2003) that have emerged in tandem with the apparent ascendancy of “neoliberal hegemony”: **environmental politics and the politics of sustainability**; new forms of consumer activism oriented by an ethics of assistance and global solidarity; the identity politics of sexuality related to demands for changes in modes of health care provision, and so on (see Norris, 2002). All of these might be thought of as variants of what we might want to call bottom-up governmentality. This refers to the notion that non-state and non-corporate actors are also engaged in trying to govern various fields of activity, both by acting on the conduct and contexts of ordinary everyday life, but also by acting on the conduct of state and corporate actors as well. Rose (1999, pp. 281–284) hints at the outlines of such an analysis, at the very end of his paradigmatic account of governmentality, but investigation of this phenomenon is poorly developed at present. Instead, the trouble-free amalgamation of Foucault’s ideas into the Marxist narrative of “neoliberalism” sets up a simplistic image of the world divided between the forces of hegemony and the spirits of subversion (see Sedgwick, 2003, pp. 11–12). And **clinging to this image only makes it all the more difficult to acknowledge the possibility of positive political action** that does not conform to a **romanticized picture of rebellion**, contestation, or protest against domination (see Touraine, 2001). Theories of “neoliberalism” are unable to recognize the emergence of new and innovative forms of individualized collective action because their critical imagination turns on a simple evaluative opposition between individualism and collectivism, the private and the public. The radical academic discourse of “neoliberalism” frames the relationship between collective action and individualism simplistically as an opposition between the good and the bad. In confirming a narrow account of liberalism, understood primarily as an economic doctrine of free markets and individual choice, there is a peculiar convergence between the radical academic left and the right-wing interpretation of liberal thought exemplified by Hayekian conservatism. By obliterating the political origins of modern liberalism—understood as answering the problem of how to live freely in societies divided by interminable conflicts of value, interest, and faith—the discourse of “neoliberalism” reiterates a longer problem for radical academic theory of being unable to account for its own normative priorities in a compelling way. And by denigrating the value of individualism as just an ideological ploy by the right, the pejorative vocabulary of “neoliberalism” invites us to take solace in an image of collective decision-making as a practically and normatively unproblematic procedure. The recurrent problem for theories of “neoliberalism” and “neoliberalization” is their two-dimensional view of both political power and of geographical space. They can only account for the relationship between top-down initiatives and bottom-up developments by recourse to the language of centres, peripheries, diffusion, and contingent realizations; and by displacing the conceptualization of social relations with a flurry of implied subject-effects. The turn to an overly systematized theory of governmentality, derived from Foucault, only compounds the theoretical limitations of economistic conceptualizations of “neoliberalism”. The task for social theory today remains a quite classical one, namely to try to specify “the recurrent causal processes that govern the intersections between abstract, centrally promoted plans and social life on the small scale” (Tilly, 2003, p. 345). Neither neoliberalism-as-hegemony nor neoliberalism-as-governmentality is really able to help in this task, not least because both invest in a deeply embedded picture of subject-formation as a process of “getting-at” ordinary people in order to make them believe in things against their best interests. With respect to the problem of accounting for how “hegemonic” projects of “neoliberalism” win wider consensual legitimacy, Foucault’s ideas on governmentality seem to promise an account of how people come to acquire what Ivison (1997) calls the “freedom to be formed and normed”. Over time, Foucault’s own work moved steadily away from an emphasis on the forming-and-norming end of this formulation towards an emphasis on the freedom end. This shift was itself a reflection of the realization that the circularities of poststructuralist theories of subjectivity can only be broken by developing an account of the active receptivity of people to being directed. But, in the last instance, neither the story of neoliberalism-as-hegemony or of neoliberalism-as-governmentality can account for the forms of receptivity, pro-activity, and generativity that might help to explain how the rhythms of the everyday are able to produce effects on macro-scale processes, and vice versa. So, rather than finding convenient synergies between what are already closely related theoretical traditions, perhaps it is better to keep open those tiresome debates about the degree of coherence between them, at the same time as trying to broaden the horizons of our theoretical curiosity a little more widely.

### AT: K of Hegemony

#### Blanket kritik of hegemonic (economic) power is ethically unjustifiable. Reigning in worst aspect of bush administrations’ use of military threats solves their offense, but preserves ethical good of avoiding conflict.

Christian **REUS-SMIT** IR @ Australian Nat’l **‘4** *American Power and World Order* p. 109-115

The final ethical position — the polar opposite of the first — holds that the exercise of hegemonic power is never ethically justifiable. One source of such a position might be pacifist thought, which abhors the use of violence even in unambiguous cases of self-defence. This would not, however, provide a comprehensive critique of the exercise of hegemonic power, which takes forms other than overt violence, such as economic diplomacy or the manipulation of international institutions. A more likely source of such critique would be the multifarious literature that equates all power with domination. Postmodernists (and anarch­ists, for that matter) might argue that behind all power lies self-interest and a will to control, both of which are antithetical to genuine human freedom and diversity. Rad­ical liberals might contend that the exercise of power by one human over another transforms the latter from a moral agent into a moral subject, thus violating their in­tegrity as self-governing individuals. Whatever the source, these ideas lead to radical scepticism about all institutions of power, of which hegemony is one form. The idea that the state is a source of individual security is replaced here with the idea of the state as a tyranny; the idea of hegem­ony as essential to the provision of global public goods is A framework for judgement Which of the above ideas help us to evaluate the ethics of the Bush Administration's revisionist hegemonic project? There is a strong temptation in international relations scholarship to mount trenchant defences of favoured para­digms, to show that the core assumptions of one's pre­ferred theory can be adapted to answer an ever widening set of big and important questions. There is a certain discipline of mind that this cultivates, and it certainly brings some order to theoretical debates, but it can lead to the 'Cinderella syndrome', the squeezing of an un­gainly, over-complicated world into an undersized theor­etical glass slipper. The study of international ethics is not immune this syndrome, with a long line of scholars seeking master normative principles of universal applic­ability. My approach here is a less ambitious, more prag­matic one. With the exceptions of the first and last positions, each of the above ethical perspectives contains kernels of wisdom. The challenge is to identify those of value for evaluating the ethics of Bush's revisionist grand strategy, and to consider how they might stand in order of priority. The following discussion takes up this challenge and arrives at a position that I tentatively term 'procedural solidarism'. The first and last of our five ethical positions can be dismissed as unhelpful to our task. The idea that might is right resonates with the cynical attitude we often feel to­wards the darker aspects of international relations, but it does not constitute an ethical standpoint from which to judge the exercise of hegemonic power. First of all, it places the right of moral judgement in the hands of the hegemon, and leaves all of those subject to its actions with no grounds for ethical critique. What the hegemon dictates as ethical is ethical. More than this, though, the principle that might is right is undiscriminating. It gives us no resources to determine ethical from unethical hegemonic conduct. The idea that might is never right is **equally unsatisfying**. It is a principle implied in many critiques of imperial power, including of American power. But like its polar opposite, it is **utterly undiscriminating**. No matter what the hegemon does we are left with one blanket assessment. No procedure, no selfless goal is worthy of ethical endorsement. This is a **deeply impoverished ethical posture**, as it **raises the critique of power above all other human values**. It is also completely counter-intuitive. Had the United States intervened militarily to prevent the Rwandan genocide, would this not have been ethically justifiable? If one answers no, then one faces the difficult task of explaining why the exercise of hegemonic power would have been a greater evil than allowing almost a million people to be massacred. If one answers yes, then one is admitting that a more discriminating set of ethical principles is needed than the simple yet enticing propos­ition that might is never right.

#### Turn: total rejection of u.s. leadership would increase imperialism and colonialism. We should pragmatically reform leadership.

Christian **REUS-SMIT** IR @ Australian Nat’l **‘4** *American Power and World Order* p. 121-123

My preference here is to advocate a forward-leaning, prudential strategy of institutionally governed change. By `forward-leaning', I mean that the progressive realization of cosmopolitan values should be the measure of success­ful politics in international society. As long as gross viola­tions of basic human rights mar global social life, we, as individuals, and the states that purport to represent us, have obligations to direct what political influence we have to the improvement of the human condition, both at home and abroad. I recommend, however, that our approach be prudent rather than imprudent. Historically, the violence of inter-state warfare and the oppression of imperial rule have been deeply corrosive of basic human rights across the globe. The institutions of international society, along with their constitutive norms, such as **sover­eignty,** non-intervention, self-determination and limits on the use of force, have helped to reduce these corrosive forces dramatically. The incidence of inter-state wars has declined markedly, even though the number of states has multiplied, and imperialism and colonialism have moved from being core institutions of international society to practices beyond the pale. Prudence dictates, therefore, that we lean forward without losing our footing on valu­able institutions and norms. This means, in effect, giving priority to **institutionally governed change**, working with the rules and procedures of international society rather than against them. What does this mean in practice? In general, I take it to mean two things. First, it means recognizing the principal rules of international society, and accepting the obligations they impose on actors, including oneself. These rules fall into two broad categories: procedural and substantive. The most specific procedural rules are embodied in insti­tutions such as the United Nations Security Council, which is empowered to 'determine the existence of any threat to peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression' and the measures that will be taken 'to maintain or restore international peace and security'.28 More general, yet equally crucial, procedural rules include the cardinal principle that states are only bound by rules to which they have consented. Even customary international law, which binds states without their express consent, is based in part on the assumption of their tacit consent. The substantive rules of international society are legion, but perhaps the most important are the rules governing the use of force, both when force is permitted (jus ad bellum) and how it may be used (jus in bello). Second, working with the rules and procedures of international society also means recognizing that the principal modality of in­novation and change must be communicative. That is, establishing new rules and mechanisms for achieving cosmopolitan ends and international public goods, or modifying existing ones, should be done through persua­sion and negotiation, not ultimatum and coercion. A pre­mium must be placed, therefore, on articulating the case for change, on recognizing the concerns and interests of others as legitimate, on building upon existing rules, and on seeing genuine communication as a process of give and take, not demand and take. Giving priority to institutionally governed change may seem an overly conservative strategy, but it need not be. As explained above, the established procedural and substantive rules of international society have de­livered international public goods that actually further cosmopolitan ends, albeit in a partial and inadequate fash­ion. **Eroding these rules would only lead to increases in inter-state violence and imperialism**, and this would almost certainly produce a radical deterioration in the protection of basic human rights across the globe. Saying that we ought to preserve these rules is prudent, not con­servative. More than this, though, we have learnt that the institutions of international society have transformative potential, even if this is only now being creatively exploited.

### Alt Fails

#### Revolutionary politics generates atrocities. History of 20th century revolutions proves we should choose liberal reformism.

Fred **HALLIDAY** IR @ London School of Economics **‘3** “Finding the Revolutionary in Revolution” in *The Future of Revolutions* ed. John Foran p 306-309

A second issue central to discussion of revolution today is that of the historic legacy of revolutions. Writers on revolution like to invoke Marx's observation about the weight of past generations lying on the minds of the present; it has been often stated that all revolutions invoke symbols and claims derived from the past, real or imagined. The revolutionaries of the twentieth century all looked, in some degree, backwards: Lenin and Trotsky to 1789, Mao and Ho to I9I7, Castro to the 1890s, Khomeini to the seventh century. The present discussion of revolution seems, at first sight, not to do this. Political sociologists do look at earlier revolutions, but this is without practical import. Discussion of the possibility of change, particularly that linked to the anti-globalization movement, seems to be curiously ahistorical. The price of this is, however, that not only is inspiration from the past muted but, equally, lessons are not learnt. Here something curious seems to have happened since the collapse of communism: the amnesia of neoliberal discussion, which consigns all that was associated with the communist experiment to the dustbin, seems to be replicated in the case of the radical movements of today. But to do this is questionable. In this latter respect, there are dangers, of an amnesia that is **long on enthusiasm but short on responsibility and realism**. For the fact is that the history of revolution in modern times is one not only of resistance, heroism and idealism, but also of terrible suffering and human disaster, of chaos and incompetence under the guise of revolutionary transformation, of the distortion of the finest ideals by corrupt and murderous leaders, and of the creation of societies that are far more oppressive and inefficient than those they seek to overthrow. The anti-globalization movement makes much of revolutionary internationalism: tills is not some benign panacea, but a complex, often abused, transnational practice (Halliday I999). All of this entails confronting something that revolutionaries have always assumed but too often failed to discuss: the **ethics** of revolution. **Denunciation of the given and invocations of an ideal other are not enough** (Geras 1989). To grasp this involves a shift beyond the political sociology of revolutions, an academic pursuit that focuses in large measure on the incidence of revolutions, to an analysis of the **consequences** and **longerterm records of revolutionary states**. In the course of recent years, in writing my own work on revolutions, I have had reason to visit a number of cities that had served as the centers of world revolution and, if not revolution, anti-imperialist radicalism: Beijing, Havana, Tripoli, Tehran. These were the culminations of upheavals that had produced revolutionary regimes by some strange numerical consistency in, respectively, I949, I959, I969, I979· In every case, one could still discern the outlines of the original revolutionary project: a rejection of exploitation, foreign and domestic, a comnlitment to the transformation of society, internationalist support in rhetoric and deed for those resisting oppression elsewhere. But in the 1990S this had all **faded**: these were not the wave of the future. Whatever else, it could not be said that the initial revolutionary project was in good shape: few in these countries now believed in the ideological project that had initiated the revolution; corruption and inefficiency were widespread; there was a **pervasive desire for** change, towards a more open, **liberal, society**; the initial internationalist appeals had faded. Revolution had, in effect, become tired. It was indeed capitalism, not revolutionary socialism and third-worldism, which in the 1990S formed the global vision of the future. This haphazard and impressionistic response has, however, to be compounded by a reflection on the overall legacy of the century of revolutions: neither form of amnesia - counterrevolutionary or revolutionary - is acceptable. Indeed, amnesia invites the repetition of another common saying with regard to revolutions, that those who ignore history are doomed to repeat it. Here perhaps is one of the most worrying aspects of the contemporary radical movement, be it in its national or internationalist forms: the failure to reflect, critically, on the past record of revolutionary movements. This pertains to models of alternative political and social orders. It pertains to the dangers inherent in any utopian, radicalized, mass movement that **lacks clear forms of authority and decision-making**. It also involves the espousal, spirited but onlinous, of alternative social orders that could work only if imposed by an **authoritarian state.** A pertinent contemporary example is that of radical environmentalism: the program of de-industrialization, and restricted consumption and travel, entailed by such ideas could only be established, and maintained, by a coercive state. In the international sphere, the simple invocation of solidarity may too often conceal interests of power, and manipulation. In the days of authoritarian Communist Parties, but equally in that of national and communal movements today, unconditional solidarity with repressive organizations may be at odds with any commitment to emancipatory values. Such a critical reflection has to apply, too, to the individuals often invoked for contemporary purposes: Lenin was a visionary, but also a cruel, pompous bigot; Che was a man of heroism and solidarity, but his econonlic programs were a disaster and his austere romanticism at times led to cruelty; Mao freed a quarter of mankind from imperialism, but also repeatedly plunged his society into barbarous conflict and socialexperimentation; Khomeini overthrew the Shah, but his social and political program was reactionary and repressive. A similar pause in romanticization might be applicable to some of the supposed components of the anti-globalization front today: few might defend Saddam Hussein, Kim Jong-il or Ayatollah Khamenei, but there is perhaps too little questioning of the commitment to emancipatory values of the PKK in Turkey, Sendero Luminoso, the FARC in Colombia, the Chechen rebels, to name but some. The Zapatista movement has become for many an icon of hope: but, as contributors to this volume make clear, it is not always itself a model of democratic practice. More importantly, one has to ask if this is the most important experience in the Latin America of the I990S to study: it is part of, but only one part of, a broader crisis of the authoritarian PRI regime that beset Mexico and resulted in the rise on the one hand of the PRD and on the other of the election of Fox in 2000. An open assessment of challenges to authoritarian, and neoliberal, policies in Latin America in the I990S would also examine **democratization in Brazil and Chile**, and the experience of social movements, be they of women, workers or indigenous peoples, who engaged with **reformist states**. This need for a critical retrospective on the historical legacy of revolutions is, however, linked to another, perhaps even more pressing, issue, one that pervades the pages of this book, namely the relation of revolution to liberal democracy as a whole. Several contributors point out that where liberal democracy is established revolution is off the agenda. But this reflection may be taken further to ask the question of whether, faced with the alternative, one or other outcome is preferable. The implication of much 'revolutionary' writing over the past century has been that liberal democracy is to be denounced, and those who engage with and in it are reformists, dupes, or, in older language, 'class traitors'. Such a view lives on, in some of the contributions to this book, as in parts of the left. Yet this contrast of reform with revolution is not some eternal polarity. It too needs to be set in historical context, and seen for what it is, a product of the particular context of the twentieth century, starting with the split between the moderate and revolutionary factions of the socialist movement in I9I4. The costs of this division are evident enough, and it would be desirable, in the aftermath of the collapse of the revolutionary socialist models, to re-examine it (Therborn I989). Part of this re-examination would involve a questioning of the automatic antinomy of reform and revolution present in much contemporary and recent writing, and of the assumed contradictory relation of revolutionary ideas to those of another critical, and internationalist, trend produced by modernity: liberalism. This has immediate implications for the discussion in this book. In particular, it relates to an issue that is widely present in contemporary academic and political discussion, but that writers on revolution tend to avoid, namely the question of rights. The language of rights was long denounced by the left, and its revolutionary part, as a bourgeois myth, except where it was for tactical reasons deemed pertinent to use it, as with regard to workers' rights, or the right of nations to selfdetermination. The record of the revolutionary tradition, once it came to power, is a very mixed one: a strong commitment to certain social and economic rights, whose abolition by neoliberal policies many in the former Communist states regret; and a sustained, cruel and dogmatic denial of political rights, collective and individual. Yet the program of rights embodied in national, regional and international codes is, as much as any flamboyant radicalism, both a critique and a program that confronts the contemporary world. Faced with the record of the Communist tradition on rights on the one hand, and the aspirations of liberalism on the other, this disdain for rights, and the related adherence to a denunciation of reformism and liberalism, should be questioned. Invocations of a romanticized I968, of the nicer cases of armed struggle, or of Seattle may be fine for mobilization: they are not a serious answer to the problems of the contemporary world.

#### No revolutionary change. Capital flight from globalized economies proves the best we can hope for is democratic social reform.

Jeff **GOODWIN** Sociology @ NYU **‘3** “Finding the Revolutionary in Revolution” in *The Future of Revolutions* ed. John Foran p 70-71

Democracy may be an especially powerful barrier to revolution in an age of corporate globalization. And globalization, in turn, may help underpin democracy. Certainly, the unprecedented speed and mobility of capital in the current era hang like the **sword of Damocles** over those on both the left and right who would disrupt predictable business climates and 'investor confidence'. In the new world order, the fear of capital flight or boycott may stay the hand of would-be Pinochets as well as that of would-be Lenins. Globalization, in other words, notwithstanding its often disastrous socioeconomic effects on working people, may actually help undermine authoritarianism and preserve democratic and quasi-democratic regimes. This may explain the striking coincidence of globalization and democratization, which many analysts view as contradictory, during the past two decades. Elisabeth Wood, for example, has shown how globalization facilitated democratization - and defused revolutionary challenges - in El Salvador and South Africa: the integration of domestic markets into the global economy and 'the growing hegemony of neoliberal economic policies made it unlikely that postconflict states would have the capacity to implement confiscatory redistributive policies that would threaten elite interests. Deviation from the neoliberal model would be punished by capital movements' (Wood 2000: 15). Globalization thus provided an incentive for previously authoritarian economic elites finally to accept the full political inclusion of subordinate classes, since the latter would have limited means to threaten elite interests. In effect, elites accepted democracy, while their opponents accepted capitalism. Today, the former revolutionaries of EI Salvador's Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) and South Africa's African National Congress (ANC) seek at most to reform capitalism, not to overthrow it. Capital mobility also haunts the 'parliamentary road' to revolutionary change. For the reasons previously discussed, this is not a well-trodden path. (And the best example of it, the Popular Unity government in Chile, suggests how truly treacherous it can be.) Those tempted to take this path to revolution will face the same threats as erstwhile revolutionaries in EI Salvador and South Africa: capital flight, capital boycott and the **economic nightmare** that would **predictably follow.** In fact, the moret ightly a national economy (to the extent that this concept still makes sense) is integrated into global circuits of capital, the greater the economic costs of any anti-capitalist political program. Some of these costs might be avoided if a whole bloc of countries simultaneously enacted such a program, but this scenario - so ardently hoped for by Trotsky, Lenin and the old Bolsheviks after the Russian revolution - **seems no more probable than in the past.** On the other hand, it would presumably be the 'parliamentary road' to revolution which would be taken if and when masses of people in a democracy - ideally, a substantial majority - became convinced that radical socioeconomic change was the only solution to their most urgent, everyday problems. In the midst of a very severe economic crisis, such a possibility certainly cannot be ruled out. Yet revolutionaries would no doubt have to compete for popular support in this context with reformists and populists of various types, including proponents of authoritarian 'solutions'. Even severe capitalist crises, history teaches us, do not guarantee radical, let alone revolutionary, change.

#### Revolutionary changes unlikely.

Jeff **GOODWIN** Sociology @ NYU **‘3** “Finding the Revolutionary in Revolution” in *The Future of Revolutions* ed. John Foran p. 62-63

This last question brings us to the topic of this volume, namely, the future of revolutions in an age of globalization. In my own view, many new socialist movements will of necessity be militant and even violent, but very few of them will be practically (as opposed to rhetorically) revolutionary, in the sense of seeking to recast radically whole societies by seizing state power through extra parliamentary, though not necessarily violent, means. As a result, there will be fewer social revolutions in the foreseeable future than occurred in the recent past. (Regime transitions and democratic revolutions, on the other hand, are more likely, albeit precisely to the extent that they eschew radical change, as I argue below.) The decline of great Revolutions (with a capital 'R') is already evident in the post-cold war era. We have witnessed considerable ethnic conflict and several regime changes in recent years, including popular revolts in Indonesia and Serbia which unseated dictators but did not bring about substantial socioeconomic change. The rebellion in Chiapas contributed significantly to the democratization of Mexico and inspired millions of people in Mexico and beyond, but the Zapatista movement failed to spread beyond a few rather isolated regions of that state. In fact, **not a single social revolution has occurred in the dozen or so years since 1989, nor does one seem likely in the immediate future**. Of course, this period may be too short to draw firm conclusions about broad historical tendencies, but I believe that the absence of social revolutions in the post-cold war period is far from coincidental. The conclusion to be drawn from this fact, however, is not that history has somehow ended; mass movements for social justice obviously continue and, I have suggested, are likely to become even more prominent in the medium term. For good political and strategic reasons, however, most of these movements are not and will probably not become revolutionary, and those that do will find it more difficult than ever to seize power. Before examining these political and strategic realities, however, I should note that this reading of contemporary global politics is in no sense a conservative position, as it might appear. It is, I think, a realistic position. Lenin and Trotsky were famously pessimistic about the prospects for revolution on the very eve of the Russian revolution, but that hardly made them conservatives. And cold warriors were hardly radicals because they accepted the 'domino theory', according to which revolutions were a real and even likely possibility from India to Japan. My pessimistic assessment of the likelihood of future revolutions is simply orthogonal to any particular political or moral stance. With Gramsci, moreover, one may be an ., optimist of the will and a pessimist of the intellect.

#### Failure to specify revolutionary goals justifies authoritarian atrocities. The burden of proof should be high for their alternative.

Jeff **GOODWIN** Sociology @ NYU **‘3** “Finding the Revolutionary in Revolution” in *The Future of Revolutions* ed. John Foran p 63-64

The decline of revolution, furthermore, is not something that should immobilize socialists or other people concerned with social justice. After all, it is not as if social revolutions have an unblemished record in terms of bringing about peace, justice, democracy and equality. It is no longer possible, if it ever was, to believe in the inherent progressivity of revolutions. Not after Stalin, Mao, Kim 11 Sung, Pol Pot, Khomeini and Abimael Guzman's 'Shining Path'. The burden of proof in this respect falls clearly upon those who would claim that 'the social injustices of this world can be erased only by revolutionary means' (Harris 2000 [1970]: 20). I personally do not accept this view, which seems to me a truly pessimistic position, but neither ought one subscribe to the notion that social revolutions - whatever the intentions of revolutionaries - are inherently disastrous in their consequences. According to this view, the breakdown of state power, which is a defining feature of social revolutions, invariably touches off a bloody struggle among rival domestic actors and foreign powers to reconsolidate power. According to Jack Goldstone, The exigencies of this struggle generally lead to terror, disorder, and the growing dominance of military men. The rebuilt armies of the revolution embody its energy and ideals but have little patience with national democracy or individual freedom .... In short, revolution is not part of the solution to authoritarianism and tyranny; instead it is part - indeed, a recurrent part - of the problem. (1991: 479-80) This view seems overdrawn to me, failing to describe accurately the course and consequences of a good many revolutions. Still, there is more than a kernel of truth to this perspective. Socialists and other progressives certainly cannot assume that revolution will get them where they want to go. We must at least ask - and here I agree completely with John Foran's reflections in this volume - how future revolutions might have better endings. To paraphrase Marx, the socialist movements of the twenty-first century cannot draw their poetry from the past, but only from the future. And of course socialists and other radicals must continually strive to redress or mitigate social injustices in ways that fall short - perhaps well short - of revolution. In thinking about the likelihood of future revolutions, we should also remember that great revolutions have always been relatively rare and unexpected. Those who have planned (or simply predicted) revolutions - including revolutions that would have better endings than those that came before - have **failed much more often than they have succeeded**. Eric Hobsbawm (r962) wrote a book about a putative 'age of revolutions', stretching from 1789 to r848, during which precisely one successful revolution occurred. During the two centuries prior to the Second World War, in fact, there occurred exactly three social revolutions: the French, Russian and Mexican. Many more revolutions occurred during the cold war era, but, as I have argued elsewhere (Goodwin 2oora), almost all of these were incubated by, and overthrew, three rather peculiar types of political order that have now almost completely passed from the scene: the rigidly exclusionary colonies of relatively weak imperial powers (Vietnam, Algeria, Angola, Mozambique); personalistic, 'above class' dictatorships (Cuba, Iran, Nicaragua); and dependent, Soviet-imposed Communist regimes (Eastern Europe). Broad, multi class coalitions overthrew these unusually narrow political orders, which even economic elites and foreign patrons eventually abandoned. Very few political orders, it must be stressed, facilitate the formation of such broad revolutionary coalitions.

#### Radical economic kritiks *must* provide specific alternatives to existing economic methods. Failure to specifically explain an alternative crushes hope for transition.

Andrew **SAYER** Reader in Political Economy @ Lancaster **’95** *Radical Political Economy: A Critique* p. 7-8

Radical political economy is of course a critical social science, both explaining and criticizing the practices it studies, with the explicit aim of reducing illusion and freeing people from domination and unwanted forces. But it can only hope to have an emancipatory effect if it considers its own critical standpoints and the alternative social arrangements they imply. Unfortunately it rarely does this, with the result that its stand- points and implicit alternatives are often contradictory, infeasible, or undesirable even if they are feasible. Marxist-influenced work still bears the traces of the tension between the standpoints of a socialist or communist society which has pre-industrial communitarian qualities and one in which the forces of production are developed beyond current levels of industrialization. More generally, there is a strong modernist tendency in which it is assumed that problems can be progressively unravelled without creating new ones at the same time, as if eventually all trade-offs or dilemmas could be overcome through a triumph of reason. We shall argue through substantive examples that such optimism is not only misplaced but likely to be counterproductive, limiting progress. There are always likely to be 'dilemmas of development' (Toye, 1987. The problem of critical standpoints has become more acute in recent years, indeed it is central to the crisis of the Left. There is no longer asingle standpoint or alternative (socialism/communism) counterposed to a single, overarching target (capitalism). Now there are many targets -patriarchy, racism, homophobia, militarism, industrialism - and corre- spondingly many critical standpoints with complex relations between them. That critical social science is no longer seen as synonymous with a socialist perspective is a sign of considerable progress, and cause for optimism too, as failure on the traditional front of class politics is compensated by progress on other, newer fronts such as the politics of gender. But it is also a source of heightened uncertainty. While there was always a problem of inconsistencies between critical standpoints, it has deepened and widened with the rise of 'green' concerns, for they bring into question the feasibility and desirability of non-capitalist as well as capitalist industrial societies. Is the problem capitalism, industrial society in general, or modernity?; and what are the alterna- tives? Equally, increasing awareness of problems of ethnocentrism and value pluralism throws doubt over the familiar, implicit critical stand- points of Western radical social science. How do we decide what is a problem? What if we cannot reach a consensus on this? Until recently, it seemed that the problems or targets of critical social science could be relied upon to emerge from the investigation of existing practices, where one would encounter the felt needs, frustrations and suffering of actors, and in discovering the sources of these problems, work out what changes would lead towards emancipation (e.g. Fay, 1975, 1987; Collier, 1994h(. This was coupled with an implicit view that emancipation was a form of escape from domination, illusion and unwanted constraints, with little or no acknowledgement that it depended on the construction of superior, alternative, progressive frameworks which could replace the old ones. But it is now increasingly apparent that normative questions of possible alternatives and what is good or bad about them **cannot be evaded**. How, without addressing such questions, could one decide what constitutes a superior alternative? Should there be a presumption in favour of community as a basis of social organiz- ation over other forms? Does liberalism provide the best framework for multicultural societies? What should be people's rights and responsibili- ties? What are our responsibilities to distant others, future generations, and to other species? There is **little hope of achieving the goal of an emancipatory social science** if it shuns normative discussions of issues such as these.

#### Failure to specify how the alternative can create an economic transition will produce either tyranny or ineffectiveness.

Andrew **SAYER** Reader in Political Economy @ Lancaster **’95** *Radical Political Economy: A Critique* p. 13-14

Yet while the 'velvet' character of the revolutions was remarkable enough, there was little else that the Left could celebrate about them. As Habermas points out, they were also singularly depressing in that they were devoid of 'ideas that are either innovative or orientated to the future' (1991, p. 27). Whether Habermas meant it or not, I would add that it was Western Marxists as well as people in the former socialist states who lacked ideas about alternatives. In this context, market triumphalism could divert attention from the continued failings of capitalism, as if the 'victory' of capitalism meant that no one had any right to criticize it. Again, as Habermas put it, 'it is not as though the collapse of the Berlin Wall solved a single one of the problems specific to our system' (Habermas, 1991, p. xii). While the latter statement is surely correct it could be read as implying that it was 'business-as-usual' for the Left. It is my view that this kind of interpretation, together with those of Jameson and Callinicos, are complacent and hopelessly inad- equate. One can agree with Jameson that Marxism is primarily a theory of capitalism, but this position is nevertheless all too smug, for it begs the question of whether its account of capitalism is at all adequate.' Similarly, Callinicos implies that there are no lessons to be learned from the demise of state socialism, save that it wasn't real socialism, and there are certainly no lessons for the critique of capitalism. This book is motivated by the view that such complacency is **entirely unwarranted**. The **totalitarian** character of state socialism and its problems of economic motivation and coordination are not historical aber- rations but are presaged by Marxism's lack of a sufficiently materialist understanding of the social division of labour and its associated division and dispersion of knowledge in advanced economies. This failing not only explains the inadequacies of state socialism's attempt to plan such an economy centrally, but is the **major unresolved flaw** in Marxist theory of capitalism. The reluctance of the Left to think through alternatives (for fear of producing 'blueprints' which might pre-empt future struggles) meant not only that radical political movements had little idea of **feasible and desirable objectives**, but that the standpoints from which capitalism and its problems were explained and criticized were unexamined and often **incoherent** or undesirable. There is no way the Left can reply to market triumphalism and the lack of alternatives without giving some consideration to the old problems of political economy.