Table of Contents

China DA – 1nc 2

China DA – Lk Ext 6

China DA – PLA ILk 7

Impact: Miscalc war 9

AT: China DA 12

Politics Link – NADBank Specific 14

Politics DA – Turns case 15

AT: Politics – 2ac lkouts 16

AT: Politics Turns Case 17

Trusted Traveler CP – 1nc 19

Trusted Traveler CP – Ext 21

AT: Trusted Traveler CP 23

# China DA – 1nc

#### China-Mexican relations are improving. China needs access to Mexican oil to sustain its economic growth. It will compete with the US for access

**Fox News 13** [“China's President Wants To Open The Floodgates Of Trade With Mexico,” June 02, 2013, pg. <http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/money/2013/06/02/china-president-wants-to-open-floodgates-trade-with-mexico/#ixzz2Yg3Dkk2w>

Over the last few years, China has invested heavily in resource-rich Latin America, striking major trade deals with governments from Venezuela to Argentina.

And now the Asian power house is reaching out to Mexico, one of the few countries in the region where ties have been slow to develop.

On Tuesday President Xi Jinping begins a three-day visit to the region just as Mexico debates opening its highly regulated energy sector to more foreign investment.

China's president has said he plans to address Mexico's large trade deficit with the Asian power and discuss ways to increase Mexican exports. Analysts say that could mean oil, which Mexico has and China needs to fuel its expanding economy and the cars of its growing middle class.

"Access to strategic raw materials is key to understanding the dynamic of relations with China," said Hugo Beteta, director for Mexico and Central America of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. "Clearly there is an interest by China in Mexican oil."

The trip is part of a four-country regional tour that ends in the United States. Xi started in Trinidad and Tobago, where he also met with leaders of other Caribbean countries, and he arrives Sunday night in Costa Rica.

China and Trinidad have had diplomatic ties for almost 40 years, and Trinidad is a major trading partner in the Caribbean for China. Costa Rica is the only country in Central America to have diplomatic relations with China.

U.S. trade still dwarfs China's for the three countries Xi is visiting. But China's trade with Costa Rica and with Mexico has tripled since 2006, according to the International Monetary Fund.

Relations with Mexico had been chilly in the past, especially when former President Felipe Calderon hosted the Dalai Lama in 2011, something China's Foreign Ministry said "hurt the feelings of the Chinese people and harmed Chinese-Mexican relations."

President Enrique Pena Nieto, who took office in December, has been aggressive so far about changing that, and the two new presidents reportedly hit if off on a personal level when Pena Nieto visited China and met with Xi in April. That resulted in an unusually quick diplomatic follow-up, just two months into Xi's presidency.

During the April talks, Xi said "he is committed to working with Mexican authorities to help Mexico export more," Mexico's vice minister of foreign relations, Carlos de Icaza, told The Associated Press.

That's key for Mexico, because its trade deficit with China is exploding, far surpassing that of any other Latin American nation.

While China is looking to assure supplies of raw materials, Mexico is looking to diversify its trade and investment, which have long been dominated by its superpower neighbor to the north.

"In the new global geopolitical and economic map, China is, and I think it has arrived to stay, the world's second economic power," De Icaza said. Mexico "has to understand and strengthen relations with a nation that has such great strategic value."

De Icaza said the countries hope to sign at least a dozen agreements in the fields of trade, energy, tourism, science and technology during Xi's visit.

Mexican exports to China came to a bit over $5.7 billion in 2012, while its imports from that country stood at almost $57 billion, according to statistics from Mexico's Economy Department. Cell phones, video games and parts for electronics factories have been pouring into Mexico, which sends China minerals such as copper and lead.

Overall trade between China and Latin America has expanded quickly over the past decade and the continent now imports more from China than it does from the European Union, according to the U.N. economic agency for the region.

Many countries balance those imports by sending China raw materials: oil from Venezuela, copper from Chile, soybeans from Argentina. But Mexico's exports go overwhelmingly to the huge U.S. market right on its border.

Beteta noted that China imports three-quarters of the oil it consumes.

"China needs to guarantee oil for its citizens' cars, but also obviously for its economy as a whole, which has a high energy intensity, and Mexico is an oil power," he said.

Read ZERO SUM Internal link

#### Lack of access to Mexican oil risks Asian oil wars. PLA Navy’s expanding influence and it’s desire to access “close to home” oil supplies makes war inevitable

**Storey 11** - Fellow @ Institute of Southeast Asian Studies - Specializes in Asian security issues with a focus on Southeast Asia. [Dr. Ian Storey, “Asia’s Changing Balance of Military Power: Implications for the South China Sea Dispute,” [Maritime Energy Resources in Asia: Energy and Geopolitics](http://www.nbr.org/publications/issue.aspx?id=248), Dec 2011, pg. http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=564]

Conflicting claims over ownership of the islands, especially the Paracel and Spratly Islands, have existed since the end of World War II but only rose to prominence in the post—Cold War era as the superpower presence receded and the littoral states moved to protect their maritime interests by strengthening their jurisdictional claims and augmenting air and naval power. Since the 1990s, tensions in the South China Sea have been cyclical; since 2007 tensions have been on the upswing. Several reasons explain this trend: continued **demand for energy** resources, **rising nationalism**, disputes over fishing grounds, advances in military capabilities, and attempts by the various claimants to bolster their sovereignty claims through domestic legislation, the establishment of administrative bodies, and submissions to international legal regimes.

Rising tensions in the South China Sea have underscored the limited effectiveness of existing dispute management mechanisms, specifically the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC). [[1]](http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=564#footnote1) The DoC is essentially an attempt at preventive diplomacy and was conceived to freeze the status quo in terms of prohibiting the “habitation” of unoccupied features, as well as to promote confidence-building measures (CBM) among the claimants (except Taiwan, which was not invited to sign). The DoC, however, was a compromise document—a political declaration without binding legal force. And while none of the claimants have occupied new features in the Spratlys since it was signed, nearly all have vigorously expanded their existing facilities, thereby violating the spirit of the agreement if not the letter. Moreover, the DoC was designed as an interim measure, the ultimate goal being to sign a more formal and binding code of conduct (CoC) for the South China Sea. Yet discussions between the two sides on guidelines to implement the DoC—let alone move forward on a formal code—were, until recently, stalled due to differences between the two sides over modalities: ASEAN members sought to consult with one another prior to meeting with China, an approach rejected by Beijing. [[2]](http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=564#footnote2) In July 2011, however, ASEAN and China agreed on a set of draft guidelines to implement the DoC. The agreement was broadly welcomed as an encouraging step forward, though tensions are likely to ebb and flow until CBMs are put in place. [[3]](http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=564#footnote3)

The lack of progress in the concrete implementation of dispute management mechanisms for the South China Sea is all the more worrying because Asia’s balance of military power is shifting decisively toward the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Three decades of sustained economic growth has provided the PRC with the financial resources to transform the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In 1990 the combined defense budgets of the ten Southeast Asian countries that now make up ASEAN amounted to $11.4 billion, only slightly less than China’s $11.85 billion. [[4]](http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=564#footnote4) By 2008, however, China’s defense spending was double that of ASEAN: $61 billion versus $30.8 billion. [[5]](http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=564#footnote5) In 2011, China’s defense budget rose to $91.5 billion. [[6]](http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=564#footnote6) China not only possesses the economic muscle to strengthen its armed forces but increasingly the technological capabilities and, crucially, the political will. In short, the PRC is rapidly emerging as Asia’s preeminent military power.

As China emerges as a global maritime power, it is natural that it should seek to augment its naval power. But the transformation of the PLA Navy (PLAN) changes the strategic context of the South China Sea dispute. As the U.S. Defense Department notes, the development of the PLAN’s power-projection capabilities “increase Beijing’s options for **military coercion** to press diplomatic advantage, advance interests, or resolve disputes in its favor.” [[7]](http://www.nbr.org/publications/element.aspx?id=564#footnote7) The growing asymmetry in military power puts Southeast Asian claimants in the South China Sea at a disadvantage and has become a source of concern for their governments. Moreover, over the medium to long term, China’s rapid military growth is likely to render the status quo unsustainable.

So long as tensions in the South China Sea persist, the risk of a **military clash** will escalate, with worrying implications for regional stability. Due to the complexities of the problem, the prospects for a legal settlement to the sovereignty dispute are exceedingly slim. As a consequence, it is more important than ever to **implement CBMs** to defuse tensions, preserve freedom of navigation, build trust, and prevent clashes at sea. Effective CBMs could be negotiated either under the framework of the DoC or through bilateral agreements.

**The situation could quickly spiral out of control and trigger a US-China nuclear war – Island disputes are the most likely scenario**

**Fisher 11** – Associate editor at The Atlantic, where he edits the International channel [Max Fisher, “5 Most Likely Ways the U.S. and China Could Spark Accidental Nuclear War,” The Atlantic, Oct 31 2011, 1:49 PM ET, pg. http://tinyurl.com/6nh9yjm]

Neither the U.S. nor China has any interest in any kind of war with one other, nuclear or non-nuclear. The greater risk is an accident. Here's how it would happen. First, an unforeseen event that sparks a small conflict or threat of conflict. Second, a rapid escalation that moves too fast for either side to defuse. And, third, a mutual misunderstanding of one another's intentions.   
This three-part process can move so quickly that the best way to avert a nuclear war is for both sides to have absoThlute confidence that they understand when the other will and will not use a nuclear weapon. Without this, U.S. and Chinese policy-makers would have to guess -- perhaps with only a few minutes -- if and when the other side would go nuclear. This is especially scary because both sides have good reason to **err on the side** of assuming nuclear war. If you think there's a 50-50 chance that someone is about to lob a nuclear bomb at you, your incentive is to launch a **preventative strike**, just to be safe. This is especially true because you know the other side is thinking the exact same thing. In fact, even if you think the other side probably won't launch an ICBM your way, they actually might if they fear that you're misreading their intentions or if they fear that you might over-react; this means they have a greater incentive to launch a preemptive strike, which means that you have a greater incentive to launch a **preemptive strike**, in turn raising their incentives, and on and on until one **tiny kernel of doubt can lead to a full-fledged war** that nobody wants.  
The U.S. and the Soviet Union faced similar problems, with one important difference: speed. During the first decades of the Cold War, nuclear bombs had to be delivered by sluggish bombers that could take hours to reach their targets and be recalled at any time. Escalation was much slower and the risks of it spiraling out of control were much lower. By the time that both countries developed the ICBMs that made global annihilation something that could happen within a matter of minutes, they'd also had a generation to sort out an extremely clear understanding of one another's nuclear policies. But the U.S. and China have no such luxury -- we inherited a world where total mutual destruction can happen as quickly as the time it takes to turn a key and push a button.  
The U.S. has the world's second-largest nuclear arsenal with around 5,000 warheads (first-ranked Russia has more warheads but less capability for flinging them around the globe); China has only about 200, so the danger of accidental war would seem to disproportionately threaten China. But the **greatest risk** is probably to the states on China's periphery. The borders of East Asia are still not entirely settled; there are a number of small, disputed territories, many of them bordering China. But the **biggest potential** conflict points are on water: disputed naval borders, disputed islands, disputed shipping lanes, and disputed underwater energy reserves. These regional disputes have already led to a handful of small-scale naval skirmishes and diplomatic stand-offs. It's not difficult to foresee one of them **spiraling out of control**. But what if the country squaring off with China happens to have a defense treaty with the U.S.?  
There's a near-infinite number of small-scale conflicts that could come up between the U.S. and China, and though none of them should escalate any higher than a few tough words between diplomats, it's the unpredictable events that are the **most dangerous**. In 1983 alone, the U.S. and Soviet Union almost went to war twice over bizarre and unforeseeable events. In September, the Soviet Union shot down a Korean airliner it mistook for a spy plane; first Soviet officials feared the U.S. had manufactured the incident as an excuse to start a war, then they refused to admit their error, nearly pushing the U.S. to actually start war. Two months later, Soviet spies misread an elaborate U.S. wargame (which the U.S. had unwisely kept secret) as preparations for an unannounced nuclear hit on Moscow, nearly leading them to launch a preemptive strike. In both cases, one of the things that ultimately diverted disaster was the fact that both sides clearly understood the others' red lines -- as long as they didn't cross them, they could remain confident there would be no nuclear war.   
But the U.S. and China have not yet clarified their red lines for nuclear strikes. The kinds of bizarre, freak accidents that the U.S. and Soviet Union barely survived in 1983 might well bring today's two Pacific powers into conflict -- unless, of course, they can clarify their rules. Of the many ways that the U.S. and China could stumble into the nightmare scenario that neither wants, here are five of the most likely. Any one of these appears to be extremely unlikely in today's world. But that -- like the Soviet mishaps of the 1980s -- is exactly what makes them so dangerous.

(1) China or the Philippines seize a disputed island. Many of these islands are resource rich, important to controlling the South China Sea (one of the world's most important shipping lanes), or both. It's also not clear who owns which. The U.S. has worked hard to create dispute-resolution mechanisms so that the Pacific rim nations can peacefully resolve conflicts over disputed islands. But it's always possible that confusion, greed, or domestic politics could drive one of these three countries to act rashly. There's an off chance that could lead to a naval skirmish, then maybe even a troop deployment. China, which has one of the world's largest militaries, might be tempted to use overwhelming force to quickly and decisively end such a dispute. This might lead the Philippines to act disproportionately aggressive. If the two countries escalate rapidly and unpredictably, the Philippines could remind the U.S. about their mutual defense treaty. And that's how the threat of a Sino-Filipino war could become the threat of a **Sino-American war**. Photo: Philippine marines watch as U.S. Marines storm a beach with Philippine counterpart during a joint military exercise.

China-watchers may have noticed something missing from this list: a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. It's possible though unlikely this could happen, and just as possible (though even less likely) that it could happen and it could escalate to the point of drawing in U.S. involvement. But this probably poses the least risk of escalating into nuclear conflict precisely because the U.S. and China have spent so much time discussing it and have achieved such mutual clarity on the matter. The U.S. knows exactly where China and Taiwan stands; China knows exactly where Taiwan and the U.S. stand. Even if a Chinese invasion ever does happen, there's enough mutual understanding that both sides will have a good idea how to avoid unwanted escalation. And that's exactly what the U.S. and China need more of if they want to prevent nuclear war: clarity, understanding, and if not trust in each other, then at least **trust in each other's incentives and intentions**. In the coming decades, one of the above five incidents may very well happen. Where it leads will depend a great deal on what kind of **groundwork** the U.S. and China can lay now.

# China DA – Lk Ext

#### China-Mexico relations are improving. China wants access to Mexico’s oil

**Zissis 13** [[Carin Zissis](http://www.as-coa.org/bio/carin-zissis), “Xi's Trip to Mexico: Sino-Mexican Relations Revisited,” Americas Society - Council of the Americas June 04, 2013, pg. http://www.as-coa.org/articles/xis-trip-mexico-sino-mexican-relations-revisited

Chinese President Xi Jinping [visits Mexico](http://www.globaltimes.cn/SPECIALCOVERAGE/XisAmericavisit.aspx" \t "_blank) this week as part of the leader’s four-country visit to the Americas. Official Chinese news outlet Xinhua [reports bilateral relations](http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/786316.shtml" \l ".Ua4O5-s8Jw0" \t "_blank) “have enjoyed sound development since the two countries established diplomatic ties 41 years ago.” But a look back at Sino-Mexican relations shows a path not without its share of potholes, worsened by Mexico’s growing trade deficit with China, among other reasons. Now six months in office, Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto is taking steps to warm up the relationship. With new leaders in both countries—Peña Nieto’s December 2012 inauguration took place within a month of Xi’s ascension as head of the Communist Party—Beijing appears receptive to Mexico’s advances, especially given the possibility of a [Mexican energy reform](http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/06/02/china-president-visits-latin-america-eyes-mexico-plans-to-open-energy-sector/" \t "_blank).

The past few years saw some diplomatic bumps while the last two presidents of each respective country were in power. China took offense in 2011 when then-President Felipe Calderón [hosted the Dalai Lama](http://www.americasquarterly.org/oas-xi-jinping-mexico-us-immigration-reform-julian-assange" \t "_blank). Before that, in 2009, Mexico was none too pleased when China [decided to quarantine](http://www.as-coa.org/sites/all/themes/ascoa/www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/may/03/china-quarantines-mexicans-swine-flu" \t "_blank) more than 70 apparently healthy Mexican tourists over a swine flu scare.

However, trade stands as a bigger bilateral sticking point, particularly for Mexico. When China went after a unanimous vote to gain accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) back in 2001, Mexico [stood as the last obstacle](http://www.as-coa.org/articles/times-sino-mexican-trade-barriers" \t "_blank). The two countries came to an agreement that gave China the WTO membership it wanted while allowing Mexico to maintain countervailing duties—[slated to expire](http://www.cnnexpansion.com/manufactura/2011/12/12/mexico-elimino-cuotas-a-productos-chinos" \t "_blank) in 2007 but extended through 2011—on a host of Chinese products.

Regardless of those “grace period” tariffs, and others Mexico has levied in an attempt to stave off a flood of Chinese goods, the Latin American country’s trade deficit with China yawned wide open over the course of a decade. The deficit rose from $8 billion in 2003 to [$51 billion](http://www.economia.gob.mx/comunidad-negocios/comercio-exterior/informacion-estadistica-y-arancelaria" \t "_blank) last year, according to the Mexican Economy Secretariat. Even on trade figures the two countries have differed, with China placing its 2012 exports to Mexico at [$37 billion](http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/786316.shtml" \l ".Ua4O5-s8Jw0" \t "_blank) while Mexico puts the figure closer to $57 billion. Meanwhile, China dislodged Mexico as the second-biggest U.S. trading partner in 2007.

But changes are afoot. Some observers say [rising labor costs in China](http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CDAQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fblogs.ft.com%2Fbeyond-brics%2F2013%2F04%2F05%2Fmade-in-mexico-now-cheaper-than-china%2F&ei=aDmuUfr4D8fc4AODpoC4Bw&usg=AFQjCNEaEed1XVXz-ztU3FaO3mU65Orlyw&sig2=wWZsqWA5zz2y0Vji7M5beg&bvm=bv.47244034,d.dmg" \t "_blank), coupled with that country’s geographic distance from the United States, give Mexico a new leg up in competition for the U.S. market. Mexican daily El Universal makes the case that “[elevated potential](http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/graficos/pdf13/gran_posibilidad.pdf" \t "_blank)” exists for bilateral investment. “Mexico needs to get over its obsession with the trade deficit, a number that fails to capture the complexity of the countries’ commercial relationship and obscures opportunities for positive-sum cooperation,” writes Theodore Kahn for [The Diplomat’s China Power blog](http://thediplomat.com/china-power/xi-jinping-in-mexico-relaunching-a-relationship/" \t "_blank).

New governments could also signal a “new stage” in Chinese-Mexican ties, as the Mexican leader’s website heralds in [official communication](http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/mexico-y-china-hacia-una-balanza-comercial-mas-equilibrada/" \t "_blank) about the Chinese leader’s visit. Peña Nieto visited Xi in China in April, and the latter’s June 4-6 stop in Mexico comes a few quick weeks later. Ahead of his trip, Xi sought to [address Mexican concerns](http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-05/31/content_16554217_4.htm" \t "_blank) on the trade deficit, saying China “is ready to join in efforts with the Mexican side to tap into potential, expand the scale and optimize the structure of bilateral trade and seek balance of trade in an active way.”

One way that could occur would be if a promised energy reform, included in the ambitious [Pacto por México](http://www.as-coa.org/articles/explainer-what-pacto-por-m%C3%A9xico) reform package, [opens up](http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-05-07/world/39073749_1_energy-industry-foreign-oil-petroleos-de-mexico" \t "_blank) the country’s hydrocarbon sector to foreign investment. Such a move could help feed China’s commodity hunger and build on Mexico’s growing oil exports to China; during Peña Nieto’s April visit to China, it was revealed that Mexico would [increase oil exports](http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/06/mexico-china-oil-idUSL2N0CT0CH20130406" \t "_blank) to China by 30,000 barrels per day.

# China DA – PLA ILk

**PLA hedge increases the risk of crisis escalation**

**Swaine 12** – Senior Associate in the Asia Program @ The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace [Dr. Michael D. Swaine (PhD in Poli Sci from Harvard University), China’s Assertive Behavior Part Four: The Role of the Military in Foreign Crises,” [China Leadership Monitor](http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-monitor),  [April 30, 2012, no. 37](http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-monitor/9026), pg. http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-monitor/article/116016

Unplanned or Uncontrolled Behavior

It is axiomatic that intense events such as political-military crises can involve unplanned or uncontrolled behavior by direct or indirect participants that influences developments before, during, and after the event. As suggested in CLM 36, in a defense-related area, PLA actions can certainly play an important role in precipitating and shaping the course of a crisis in ways unintended by the senior civilian leadership. This is largely because local PLA entities are not necessarily under the close direction of the senior civilian (or perhaps even military) leadership and thus can at times take actions that run counter to the overall intent and strategy behind PRC foreign policy.

Possible past examples of such unplanned or uncoordinated behavior that resulted in incidents or crises include: PLAN submarine incursions into Japanese territorial waters during November 2004; PLAN or PLAN-related “aggressive” ship or aircraft maneuvers in or over contested waters of the East China Sea or within the PRC EEZ at various intervals during the past decade; military clashes in the South China Sea in 1974 and 1988; the surfacing of a PLAN submarine within the defense perimeter of a U.S. carrier in 2007; and the refusal to give safe harbor to two U.S. minesweepers during a storm in 2007, along with the last-minute denial of a request for a visit by the Kitty Hawk to the port of Hong Kong a few days later.20

The military, or at least some military officers, could also influence the course of a crisis indirectly through comments, statements, or articles published in China's increasingly raucous public media and cyber sphere. These avenues of public expression are open to a growing number and variety of Chinese citizens, including retired or semi retired military scholars and officers. In a **crisis with major military dimensions**, the role of such **military commentators could shape** public views significantly.21 That said, in a truly serious crisis, the senior party leadership would almost certainly seek to control, guide, or (more likely) censor military views, and especially those that did not accord with their approach or policies. Military officers or scholars who ignored such efforts would likely be doing so at their peril.22

Finally, the potential adverse impact on crisis management of unplanned or uncontrolled behavior by the PLA is likely reinforced due to problems of military signaling during a crisis. As one of China’s leading crisis management specialists explained in an interview with Alastair Iain Johnston, the Chinese military’s ability to engage in external signaling is underdeveloped and largely limited to military signaling on the Taiwan issue. As a result, it is entirely possible that attempts to convey benign intentions during a crisis, for example, are undermined by poor messaging by local or perhaps even central PLA actors.23 Further compounding this potential problem is the apparent fact that, in the early stages of a crisis, China tends not to coordinate diplomatic and military moves when signaling. Rather, if the crisis is **predominantly diplomatic**, the impulse of Chinese officials is **not to employ the PLA** to reinforce diplomatic messages. Thus, the threshold at which military actions are required may be higher, relative to the United States.24 pg. 7-9 //1ac

#### PLA Navy is the most likely source for war – We must provide the political leadership with the tools to curb the PLAN’s assertiveness

**Buszynski 12** – Professor of International Relations @ International University of Japan [Dr. Leszek Buszynski (Visiting Fellow with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre @ Australian National University), “The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and U.S.—China Strategic Rivalry,” The Washington Quarterly, 35:2 SPRING 2012, pp. 139-156]

What was once a maritime territorial dispute involving China, Vietnam, and the other littoral ASEAN states has become something more disturbing for the peace and stability of the Western Pacific. China has been the only claimant to resort to force in the dispute when it removed South Vietnam from the Western Paracels in January 1974 and when its naval vessels sunk three Vietnamese ships in 1988. These clashes were contained because they did not involve the external great powers; though ASEAN was alarmed by the 1988 clash, it did not concern the United States. When the ASEAN claimants engaged in energy exploration in the 1990s, there were various incidents that involved China, and several between the ASEAN countries themselves, but there was little danger of outright conflict. That **time has now passed** as naval expansion programs make the South China Sea area more important to China.

The Chinese Navy requires safe bases in Hainan, which can be defended against submarine and air attack, and secure access through the South China Sea to the open sea beyond, to fulfill the missions it has assigned itself. For these reasons, China is compelled to seek greater control over the area and to keep the U.S. Navy at a safe distance. China’s assertiveness over the issue has already prompted the ASEAN claimants to **draw in the U**nited **S**tates and to engage in their own **naval modernization** programs. For instance, Vietnam has purchased from Russia six Kilo class submarines and eight Su-30MK2V multi-role fighters, and Indonesia has contracted to purchase three submarines from South Korea. Hu Jintao’s dispatch of Dai Bingguo to Vietnam in an effort to calm the troubled waters indicated that China recognized the risk in these trends.

The Hu Jintao leadership’s move to reduce tensions was indeed welcomed by many, but the days when Mao or Zhou Enlai could assert control over Chinese policy simply by decree are long since gone. Chinese decisionmaking has become much more complicated, as power has become more diffuse and less open to direct intervention from the top. China may issue declarations of friendship with the outside world, but its naval capabilities continue to expand according to schedules spanning decades. These schedules then develop a life of their own as budgets are committed and national ambitions are aroused. They accumulate powerful institutional stakeholders in the PLA and the security establishment, which see them as a means to realize their own frustrated ambitions and to restore China to her greatness. When the **aircraft carriers** come online with their escorts and more Jin-class SSBNs and nuclear attack submarines are deployed, the pressure upon ASEAN claimants in the South China Sea will be heightened and rivalry with the United States will increase.

The United States could face the prospect of exclusion from the Western Pacific, which is why the Obama administration has little choice but to assert its interest in the South China Sea. In the worst case scenario, Chinese naval strategy would dictate Beijing’s policy over the South China Sea, and China would then stumble down the road to confrontation with the United States and the region. Indeed, there is the danger that a **nationalistic military** could challenge the party leadership during the transition from the Hu Jintao administration this summer and force a more **hardline posture** on issues like the South China Sea.

This dismal scenario need not be inevitable, as China’s political leadership is strongly interventionist and would be likely to act to avert this outcome. If the political leadership curbs China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea, if it suppresses the demand for exclusive control over all of the area, if it upholds freedom of navigation for others as well as itself, and if the new leadership implements Dai Bingguo’s assurances that the South China Sea issue will indeed be left to future generations to resolve, Beijing could **make Chinese naval deployments** more **acceptable** to the region. In this way, China would also avoid directly challenging the United States. Pg. 151-152

# Impact: Miscalc war

#### US and Chinese energy policies are being militarized – Misperceptions will overwhelm reasoned analysis

**Pollack 08** - Professor of Asian and Pacific Studies at the Naval War College [Jonathan D. Pollack, “Energy Insecurity with Chinese and American Characteristics: implications for Sino–American relations,” Journal of Contemporary China (2008), 17(55), May, pg. 229–245

The world is awash in energy anxiety. These fears are driven by **perception**, domestic politics, corporate and governmental interests, psychology, and (not infrequently) media hyperventilation. Amidst this cacophony of voices, the policy agendas of oil producers, consumers, and defense strategists threaten to **overwhelm reasoned analysis**.1 This essay focuses on energy strategy in the United States and China. It presents data on Chinese and (to a lesser extent) US energy requirements, and then examines how both countries view the energy issue in Sino–American relations.

There are major differences among American and Chinese analysts about the definition of energy security, in particular its characterization as a defense planning issue. Moreover, the underlying assumptions and larger context of energy strategy are often insufficiently examined. A comprehensive assessment of energy alternatives would entail close attention to aggregate supply and demand factors; the political and bureaucratic context of energy decision making in both systems; technological possibilities for resource exploitation; conservation options; and the operation of global energy markets.2 The objectives in this essay are more modest. However, by focusing on Chinese and American views of energy strategy and their effects on national-level decision making, I will seek to identify areas of overlapping interest, clarify prospective policy options, and highlight the potential implications should the United States and China prove unable to achieve a collaborative energy future.

China and the United States have undeniable shared interests in energy strategy, though these shared interests are often obscured or overlooked. These include the need to ensure the predictable availability of energy at reasonable cost; to protect against any potential disruption in the transport of energy resources; to diversify the sources of supply; to encourage enhanced energy exploration; and to prevent further environmental degradation, primarily by reducing reliance on hydrocarbons. The core question is whether either Washington or Beijing truly envisions collaborative pursuit of complementary energy policy objectives. The two countries presently consume close to 35% of global oil production and each relies greatly on the global oil market, but their respective **perceptions of the other’s energy strategies are often highly divergent**. These differences bear in particular on Chinese purchases of equity shares in various overseas energy markets, especially in the Persian Gulf, Africa, and Central Asia, which are frequently characterized in US assessments as a Chinese effort to ‘lock up’ energy resources and control sources of supply.3 These concerns also extend to worrisome characterizations of China’s longer-term maritime interests and naval modernization priorities.

Amidst a range of competing interests and policy agendas, an essential observation is often lost in the process: the United States and China are largely in the same energy boat. There is a clear need for Washington and Beijing to approach energy issues without excessive preconception; to forego where possible a measure of national autonomy for the sake of collective interests; and to undertake potentially wrenching domestic changes to advance larger policy goals. These are tall orders, and none will be advanced without a serious, sustained exchange between both governments on the full range of energy issues. There is a parallel need for heightened awareness among US and Chinese policy makers of their respective maritime futures, and how these futures could affect international security.

Moreover, energy security is a misnomer. Nearly all analysis dwells on energy insecurity. Governments, producers, and consumers seek predictability and assurance about energy availability and pricing precisely because there is very little certainty about either. The plethora of imagined horribles seems boundless, though many of these concerns reflect the instability inherent in the operation of energy markets. Prudence and self-interest often result in bureaucratic or company-specific solutions; there is also a growing tendency in both countries to view energy strategy as a **defense planning issue**.4 In addition, national and firm-level decisions can lock in subsequent policy choices. Energy availability and cost also impinge on consumer behavior and on environmental well being. Well-informed scientists and analysts in the United States and China are addressing longer-term options in energy strategy; the issue is whether **senior decision makers** will pay full heed to these judgments, and whether extant policy mechanisms allow for comprehensive policy solutions.5 I am not especially optimistic in this regard, though it is not too much to hope for a measure of common sense and enlightened self-interest. Pg. 229-231 //1ac – Energy war ILk

#### South China Sea dispute is ripe for miscalculation – The US must create a framework for cooperation or risk a great power confrontation

**Periyaswamy 11** - Research Analyst with the United States Programme in the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies @ Nanyang Technological University [Subathra R. Periyaswamy, “The South China Sea Dilemma: Options for the Main Actors,” RSIS Commentaries, No. 137/2011 dated 29 September 2011

CHINA RECENTLY objected to an Indian-Vietnamese joint venture to explore for oil and gas off the coast of Vietnam, on the ground that it infringed China’s sovereignty over the whole South China Sea. As China’s definition of its core interests expands into areas beyond territorial limits, Chinese assertion of de jure sovereignty over the sea is renewing tensions and exacerbating anxiety among its neighbours in East Asia. Geostrategic ambitions, historical claims and legal interpretations have led to overlapping claims by other key actors Philippines and Vietnam, as well as disputes with the United States and ASEAN over navigation rights.

Emerging Regional Challenges

The fundamental challenge for the actors is striking a balance between growing Chinese assertiveness and greater regional cooperation, and most importantly avoiding a **miscalculation** in the process. While economic considerations take precedence, nevertheless the Chinese strategic perspective is crucial to prospects of regional stability. It is imperative that Washington exercise patience and caution to avoid any **great-power confrontation** and for regional institutions to bolster a unified response to China’s contentious claims. Beyond historical rights to adjacent seas, Beijing has a keen interest in securing South China Sea waters as a strategic frontier vis-à-vis the US bases in the Asia-Pacific. Beijing’s challenge hardens claimants’ refusal to relinquish their competing rights, while a disconnect between Chinese ambitions and regional needs has its limitations. Hence, it engages in a unique bilateral-multilateral foreign policy with regard to the South China Sea. Multilateralism is invoked as part of its charm offensive to engage with non-East Asian countries such as the US and India, while bilateral ties are employed to pursue interests with individual East Asian countries. The primacy of economic considerations has underpinned China’s success in pushing its political agenda and expanding its influence, thus placing regional stakeholders in an unfavourable bargaining position. Smaller stakeholders in the Philippines and Vietnam do not want to “lose face” by consenting to China’s every geostrategic move. Moreover, the Philippines and Vietnam have sought to cooperate in maritime and ocean ventures and are keen on having joint ventures in oil and gas exploration with other countries. Hence, they would like to work with China on the South China Sea given a cooperative platform.

But, Beijing’s uncooperativeness and assertiveness have left these countries with no choice but to balance diplomatic engagements with China with economic cooperation with the US or India and joining the US and ASEAN in calling for multilateral resolution of disputed claims.

Bridging the Gap

The US and ASEAN are now faced with the task of bridging the gap between a geopolitically assertive China and a region which sees the need for a multilaterally engaged China focused on a regional agenda rather than just its national interests. The US is increasingly finding itself treading the dangerous line between saying too much and doing too little. If Washington says too much at the behest of regional stakeholders, it will risk a power confrontation with Beijing which sees external interference as an infringement on its sovereignty. If the US does too little it runs the risk of China entrenching itself as the central power in the region.

While the former scenario has the potential to escalate to a **military stand-off**, the latter will establish new power dynamics ensuring the loss of Washington’s strategic front in Southeast Asia and the **erosion of US security and strategic agenda** in the Asia-Pacific region. Both these trajectories are unacceptable to the US and creates situations which it wants to eschew. However, ASEAN’s strategic position, political leverage and architecture have the potential to be a catalyst in resolving the South China Sea dilemma, but a lack of consensus among members stalls action.

The US-China relationship will shape global governance as seen in the US debt crisis, with China being the largest foreign holder of US treasuries. It will be unwise for the US to be aggressive in China-Taiwan relations and over the South China Sea. The US must understand China’s needs and challenges and adopt a nuanced policy position. The US should understand the predicament of a new rising power as it was in the same position as China is now, before World War 2. It is time for the **US to be gracious** in viewing the new rising power as a partner rather than a competitor. If managed carefully, the US can assist China to integrate fully into the evolving and stable international system. Pg. 1-3

# AT: China DA

#### Mexico-Chinese relations are terrible. Their generic ev doesn’t apply

**Peters 13** - Professor of economics @ National Autonomous University of Mexico. [Enrique Dussel Peters, “China Is Building Ties With Mexico,” NPR, June 09, 2013 8:00 AM, pg. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=190017843

ENRIQUE DUSSEL PETERS: In the last 10, 15 years, China has become a major investor in Latin America. Today, China is the second source of foreign direct investments for the full region but not in Mexico. No? So what we find today is there has been a lot of disengagement, a lot of misunderstandings, in particularly regarding trades. The business sector in Mexico and business organizations have been very critical of massive illegal imports coming from China. And, according to the business sectors and many analysts, in 2012 we reached the worst relationship among both countries in the last 40 years.

# Politics Link – NADBank Specific

#### Plan will go through Congress and it will be politically contentious

**Reed & Kelly 00** - Project Director & Executive Director @ Texas Center for Policy Studies [Cyrus Reed & Mary Kelly, “Expanding the Mandate: Should the Border Environment Cooperation Commission and North American Development Bank go beyond Water, Wastewater and Solid Waste Management Projects and How Do They Get There?,” Texas Center for Policy Studies, July, 2000,

We believe that a specific list of the types of projects that would be considered in these categories—at¶ least over the next few years—is essential for a policy, political and efficiency reasons. If this is not done, BECC and NADBank risk giving border communities the idea that any project might make it through and that would lead to a lot of wasted time and effort on both the part of the institutions and border communities. Moreover, Congress and the public are going to want to know what priorities the institutions have for certifying and financing projects and why those priorities are appropriate for the border’s conditions at this point. That was clearly the point of the GAO’s recommendation that the BECC approach the infrastructure issues with a clear “Border Infrastructure Strategic Plan.”14

Even if it were to be argued that the Agreement gives the Parties authority to modify the Agreement beyond the four specific areas laid out, without Congressional approval, it would seem politically unwise to pursue such a course of action. Congressional discussions surrounding the BECC and NADBank focused on two things: environmental infrastructure needs at the border and the need for¶ adjustment aid in communities adversely affected by NAFTA. Extending the functions to such areas¶ as housing mortgages would seem to go far beyond what was contemplated in Congressional¶ discussion and authorization of the Agreement and its allocation of funds to NADBank and BECC. It is our position that certification and financing of “other infrastructure” projects cannot be done until the Parties formally agree to modify the Agreement. From a political perspective in the U.S., that would seem to require at least Congressional discussion, if not Congressional approval. And, for that to occur, it seems to us that the BECC and NADBank will have to be specific about exactly which “other” infrastructure projects they want to consider certifying and financing. Pg. 9

# Politics DA – Turns case

#### Immigration reform solves the case

**STRATFOR 13** [“Evolving U.S.-Mexico Relations and Obama's Visit,” May 2, 2013 | pg. http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/evolving-us-mexico-relations-and-obamas-visit

While Mexico reorients its internal focus to structural changes that its leaders hope will lay foundations for economic development, the country could also be affected by domestic issues under debate in the United States. For years, Mexico has been pressing the United States to enact stricter gun laws. Though a prominent gun control bill failed in the U.S. Senate on April 17, the issue will likely re-emerge later in 2013, and at least some gun control measures currently enjoy broad popular support. Meanwhile, demographic changes in the United States are driving a debate about immigration reform that, if implemented, [would require collaboration with Mexico,](http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/strategic-implications-immigration-reform) many of whose citizens would seek to legalize their residential status in the United States.

Though the passage of these reforms will similarly be determined solely by U.S. domestic political factors, their success would be a significant boon for bilateral relations with Mexico. Indeed, for Obama and Pena Nieto, the effects each feel of the other's policy decisions will be magnified by the unique demographic, geographic and economic ties binding their countries. Yet, the domestic environment and political calculations in each country will ultimately shape the effects of this period of political change.

#### Politics turns the case – Lack of CIR destroys relations

**Hakim 13** [Peter Hakim, “Which Mexico for Obama?,” Reuters, May 1, 2013, pg. http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3296

The partnership will be far stronger if — as now appears likely — Congress passes sensible and humane immigration reforms. The Mexican government seems most encouraged by the prospect of U.S. legislation that would include an expanded temporary worker program and would provide immediate legal status and a path to citizenship for most currently undocumented immigrants ? about half of whom are Mexican nationals.  
These changes could substantially eliminate a persistent tension in U.S.-Mexican relations. Mexicans have long been angered and insulted by U.S. debates on immigration, including insistent demands that the border be walled up; the spread of anti-immigration (and often anti-Latino) legislation in many states and communities, and absurd and offensive proposals like GOP presidential nominee Mitt Romney’s call for migrants to “self-deport.” Equally important, immigration reform will offer an array of economic benefits to both nations.

# AT: Politics – 2ac lkouts

#### No link - Bipartisan support for the plan

**Perez 11** [Emma Perez, “Bill would give boost to NAD Bank for border development,” Brownsville Herald, Posted: Saturday, June 18, 2011 12:00 am pg. http://www.brownsvilleherald.com/news/valley/article\_99fbbf75-cdb6-58f5-b20a-d68ee9795314.html

U.S. Rep. Rubén Hinojosa, D-Mercedes, whose district includes a portion of Cameron County, announced that he introduced bipartisan legislation with 19 original co-sponsors to enhance the North Ameri-can Development Bank (NADBank) and increase economic devel-opment in the U.S.–Mexico border areas.

HR 2216, the “NADBank Enhancement Act of 2011,” allows NAD-Bank to work on infrastructure projects that in turn will increase economic development in the border areas while complying with existing environmental laws and regulations.

“We must continue our efforts to improve economic development and safety in the border areas of both the United States and Mexico,” Hinojosa said. “My legislation, co-sponsored by 19 of my colleagues in the U.S. House of Representatives, both Republicans and Demo-crats, will allow NADBank to work on infrastructure projects that adhere to environmental law while increasing economic develop-ment in the border areas. We should continue to build on our record of success, bringing jobs and infrastructure improvements to border communities in Mexico and the United States. My legislation will do just that.”

#### No link - Industry will win the lobbying game

**Mackinder 10** [[Evan Mackinder](http://www.opensecrets.org/about/staff.php), “Pro-Environment Groups Outmatched, Outspent in Battle Over Climate Change Legislation,” OpenSecrets.org, August 23, 2010 12:45 PM, pg. http://www.opensecrets.org/about/staff.php

Joe Smyth, a spokesperson for [Greenpeace](http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?lname=Greenpeace&year=2009), said environmental groups need to pressure Congress from the bottom-up, rather than relying on buying a seat at a committee room through federal lobbying.

"We as a community are not going to be able to out-lobby [oil and gas], or other industries," he said. "We need to take our fight elsewhere. There needs to be grassroots pressure on members of Congress."

# AT: Politics Turns Case

#### Mexico will not get involved in US immigration debate – Lack of passage will not impact relations

**Dwoskin 13** [[Elizabeth Dwoskin](http://www.businessweek.com/authors/2889-elizabeth-dwoskin), “Why Immigration Reform Is Good for Mexico,” Bloomberg Businessweek, May 02, 2013, pg. http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-05-02/why-immigration-reform-is-good-for-mexico

President Obama is in Mexico, where he’ll try to sell President Enrique Peña Nieto on the mutual [economic benefits](http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-02/obama-s-mexico-trip-ties-immigration-debate-to-economy.html) of the immigration reform overhaul Congress is tackling. But don’t expect Peña Nieto to get too involved in America’s immigration debate. While the Mexican government supports immigration reform—Peña Nieto said as much on a visit to the U.S. in November—he’s mostly staying on the sidelines.

#### Border surge is a poison pill. No increase in relations

**Miroff 13** [Nick Miroff, “In Mexico, dismay for the border ‘surge’ proposed in U.S. Senate immigration bill,” Washington Post, June 27, 2013, pg. http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-27/world/40226919\_1\_immigration-bill-busy-border-crossing-border-surge

MEXICO CITY — When Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.) said this week that the Senate immigration bill would transform the U.S.-Mexico boundary into “the most militarized border since the fall of the Berlin Wall,” it sounded to many here like a sensible statement of criticism.

Then they realized he meant it as a selling point.

Mexicans have reacted sorely to proposals for a border security “surge” that would put 18,000 additional federal agents and hundreds of miles of new fencing between the two neighbors, measures that were included in a package of [immigration legislation](http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-poised-to-approve-massive-immigration-bill/2013/06/27/87168096-df32-11e2-b2d4-ea6d8f477a01_story.html) approved by the Senate on Thursday.

# Trusted Traveler CP – 1nc

#### United States federal government should expand its Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection to all ports between the United States and Mexico. United States federal government should advertise and provide application fee waivers to SENTRI applicants until 50% of northbound traffic from Mexico to the US is participating in the trusted traveler program.

#### Expanding Trusted Traveler decrease wait times and increase border security

**Wilson 13** - Associate with the Mexico Institute @ the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars [Christopher E. Wilson (Former Mexico Analyst for the U.S. Military and Researcher @ American University’s Center for North American Studies), “Trusted Traveler Programs Are a No Brainer – The Expert Take,” Wilson Center, May 01, 2013, pg. http://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/trusted-traveler-programs-are-no-brainer-%E2%80%93-the-expert-take

Unfortunately, long lineups to cross the border currently cost the economies of the United States and Mexico billions of dollars each year in lost economic growth and eat away at the competitiveness of manufacturers working in the region. To eliminate the border bottleneck, investments in border infrastructure and staffing are important and necessary, but they are not cheap. One tried and true solution, however, is especially cost effective.

Trusted traveler and trusted shipper programs (SENTRI for individuals, FAST for shippers) facilitate vetted, safe individuals and shipments while strengthening border security. By voluntarily submitting to a vetting process, applicants provide Customs and Border Protection (CBP) with the intelligence needed to more accurately assess the risk presented by someone seeking entry to the United States. In return, crossers are offered expedited processing at the borders, which saves them time and money.

By speeding the passage of low-risk individuals and shipments, CBP officers are able to focus more time and energy on higher-risk or unknown traffic. That is, by making the proverbial haystack that officers must sift through smaller, CBP increases its chances of finding the needle. These programs are a win-win-win. They decrease wait times, minimize the need for additional staffing and lanes, and increase border security. While the programs have generally been successful, they also have a huge amount of untapped potential.

The SENTRI program, for example, expedites the passage of 18 percent of all northbound traffic. This is a significantly larger percentage than in previous years, but since the majority of traffic is made up of frequent crossers that live in border communities, the governments of the United States and Mexico should set a higher goal. Why not aim to have at least half of all individuals crossing the border go through SENTRI lanes by 2016? A similar goal could be set for the FAST program for commercial shippers. Achieving such goals would change the nature of border management and would cut border wait-times in a major way.

To reach such lofty targets, U.S. and Mexican officials from the federal and local levels and from the various competent agencies would have to work together. They would need to extend dedicated lanes as far back into Mexico as traffic backs up, so that program members do not have to wait in traffic before reaching their express lane. As a San Diego survey found, trusted traveler programs also suffer from a lack of adequate publicity.2 Creative approaches, such as application fee discount coupons being handed to frequent crossers, might also help. Finally, simply expanding the programs reach by increasing the number of ports of entry with SENTRI lanes would also move us closer to the goal.

The FAST program for commercial trucks appears to need particular attention. After seeing significant growth since its implementation in 2002, enrollment has actually declined since 2008. The full causes of this decline should be studied and addressed given the potential value to security and the competitiveness of regional manufacturing that the FAST program represents. Since FAST lanes can only be used when FAST drivers are carrying goods from a CTPAT supplier, special attention must be paid to developing an incentive structure to encourage participation in both programs.

The exact strategies to increase use of trusted traveler and trusted shipper programs along the U.S.-Mexico border may need some refining, but deciding to focus greater attention on the programs is a no brainer. They save money, speed up traffic and increase security. As Presidents Obama and Peña Nieto meet this week, they should consider directing their teams to set, and then reach, a much higher goal for SENTRI and FAST.

# Trusted Traveler CP – Ext

#### Solves congestions

**Lee & Wilson 12** - Associate Director @ North American Center for Transborder Studies (NACTS), Arizona State University & Associate @ Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars [Erik Lee & Christopher E. Wilson, “The State of Trade, Competitiveness and Economic Well-being in the U.S.-Mexico Border Region,” Working Paper Series on the State of the U.S.-Mexico Border, June 2012

Moderate investments to update infrastructure and to fully staff the ports of entry are certainly needed, as long lines and overworked staff promote neither efficiency nor security. But in a time of tight federal budgets, asking for more resources cannot be the only answer. Strategic efforts that do more with less, improving efficiency and reducing congestion, are also needed. Trusted traveler and shipper programs (i.e. the Global Entry programs, which includes programs such as SENTRI, FAST, C-TPAT) allow vetted, low-risk individuals and shipments expedited passage across the border. Improving these programs and significantly expanding enrollment could increase throughput with minimal investments in infrastructure and staffing—all while strengthening security by giving border officials more time to focus on unknown and potentially dangerous individuals and shipments.

#### Trusted Traveler solves. It decreases wait times

**Lee & Wilson 12** - Associate Director @ North American Center for Transborder Studies (NACTS), Arizona State University & Associate @ Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars [Erik Lee & Christopher E. Wilson, “The State of Trade, Competitiveness and Economic Well-being in the U.S.-Mexico Border Region,” Working Paper Series on the State of the U.S.-Mexico Border, June 2012

Trusted traveler and shipper programs are a win-win-win. They decrease wait times, minimize the need for additional staffing and lanes, and increase border security. While the programs have generally been successful, they also have a huge amount of untapped potential. The SENTRI trusted traveler program, for example, expedites the passage of 18 percent of all northbound traffic. This is a significantly larger percentage than in previous years, but since the majority of traffic is made up of frequent crossers that live in border communities, CBP might consider setting a goal as high as forty to fifty percent within the next several years. To reach such a lofty goal, CBP would need to work with Mexican local and federal authorities to extend the reach of dedicated lanes so that program members do not have to wait in traffic before reaching their express lane. The use of trusted traveler and shipper programs might also be increased through outreach (perhaps application fee discount coupons being handed to frequent crossers) and the expansion of the program to additional POEs. Pg. 13

# AT: Trusted Traveler CP

#### Trusted traveler will not solve – Infrastructure investments are key

**Uribe 12** [[Mónica Ortiz Uribe](http://www.fronterasdesk.org/staff/%2099), “NAFTA Traffic, Security Creates Long Lines At Border Bridges,” Fronteras, October 01, 2012, pg. http://www.fronterasdesk.org/content/nafta-traffic-security-creates-long-lines-border-bridges

Infrastructure at the border also affects wait times. The biggest obstacle to updating the current ports of entry and building new ones is insufficient federal funding. It’s especially tough now when the country is recovering from an economic recession and Congress has failed to approve a new budget.

Chris Wilson researches binational trade for the [Woodrow Wilson Center](http://www.wilsoncenter.org/) in Washington D.C.

“Customs and Border Protection has identified a $6 billion deficit between where we are now and where we need to be to keep up with all the people and goods that are flowing across the border everyday,” Wilson said.

There has been some progress. There’s a new commercial port of entry in Arizona and another under construction in West Texas. Other ports have added additional lanes and Trusted Traveler Programs have helped speed up inspection times. But it’s not enough. In the past two years [binational trade has grown](http://www.fronterasdesk.org/news/2012/jun/05/trade-between-us-mexico-nears-500-billion/) by a record 23 percent. Without the infrastructure to support that amount of trade, both countries lose out.

“It cuts into the competitiveness of manufacturing in North America," Wilson said. "It means that we have less jobs, less trade, less exports and those are things that are really important right now to our economy.”

#### Lack of agency cooperation prevent them from solving

**Wilson 13** - Associate with the Mexico Institute @ the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars [Christopher E. Wilson (Former Mexico Analyst for the U.S. Military and Researcher @ American University’s Center for North American Studies), “Trusted Traveler Programs Are a No Brainer – The Expert Take,” Wilson Center, May 01, 2013, pg. http://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/trusted-traveler-programs-are-no-brainer-%E2%80%93-the-expert-take

To reach such lofty targets, U.S. and Mexican officials from the federal and local levels and from the various competent agencies would have to work together. They would need to extend dedicated lanes as far back into Mexico as traffic backs up, so that program members do not have to wait in traffic before reaching their express lane. As a San Diego survey found, trusted traveler programs also suffer from a lack of adequate publicity.2 Creative approaches, such as application fee discount coupons being handed to frequent crossers, might also help. Finally, simply expanding the programs reach by increasing the number of ports of entry with SENTRI lanes would also move us closer to the goal.