# Neoliberalism Wave II

### Economic Engagement Links

#### U.S. engagement with Latin America reinforces colonial control.

Young 11, (Kevin, Organization for a Free Society and a PhD in history at Stony Brook University, "Two, Three, Many Colombias: The Logic and Consequences of the US Vision for Latin America," 1/13/2011, http://www.zcommunications.org/two-three-many-colombias-by-kevin-young)

If the “war on drugs” is at best an inadequate explanation for the US militarization of Latin America, and at worst simply a pretext, what other ends does that militarization serve from the perspective of US interest groups? As an entry point into answering this question, it can hardly be doubted that the US has long sought to “[m]aintain the United States as the predominant foreign military influence in Latin America,” as a key 1962 State Department guidelines paper urged [22]. Maintaining military dominance in Latin America has been a central US aim for close to a century, and particularly since World War II. The public justification for militarization during the Cold War was the alleged threat of Soviet “penetration” of Latin America [23]. But in private, astute policymakers did not take that threat very literally. In 1958 a National Intelligence Estimate noted that Latin American Communist parties, let alone Soviet agents, “are not likely to come to dominate any government” in the region. Nonetheless, US officials emphasized the need for militarization, not to defend against the Soviet Union but instead in the name of “internal security.” The enemies were inside Latin America itself, not in the Soviet bloc, and the greatest danger was Latin American nationalism, not Soviet-style Communism. The 1959 Cuban Revolution, in which Soviet-allied Communists played only a very minor part, underscored this reality. US-sponsored “internal security” programs involving massive military and police aid thus appeared all over the continent starting with Eisenhower and accelerating under Kennedy [24]. Against what were these programs designed to defend? Declassified State Department correspondence provides clear answers. To take one example, officials worried that the 1952 Bolivian Revolution “might set off a chain reaction in Latin America” if not steered down a “moderate” path. Later, after the 1959 Cuban Revolution, US planners noted with alarm that the continent’s “poor and underprivileged, stimulated by the example of the Cuban revolution, are now demanding opportunities for a decent living.” The successful revolt in Cuba had convinced many onlookers “that the Latin American states can be masters of their own destinies” rather than remaining dependent on foreign masters. In 1961 a top Kennedy adviser, Arthur Schlesinger, expressed concern about “the spread of the Castro idea of taking matters into one’s own hand[s].” Rather than acting independently of the US, Latin Americans were supposed to let the US guide them down a constructive path toward a “middle-class revolution,” as opposed to a “workers-and-peasants” one [25]. The imperative of stifling independent nationalism and development, and punishing those who entertained such fantasies, goes far back in US imperial history; such imperatives were prominent, for example, in the correspondence of the nineteenth-century military commanders who sought to exterminate all Native Americans who refused to be confined on concentration-camp-style reservations [26]. The biggest problem with this defiance was the threat it posed to US elites’ control over strategic natural resources and labor and the maintenance of exploitative terms of trade. The dual threats of “statism and nationalism,” about which the 1958 Intelligence Estimate warned, derived from the desire of Latin Americans to have more control over their national economic resources. “Latin Americans,” according to State Department adviser Laurence Duggan, had become “convinced that the first beneficiaries of the development of a country’s resources should be the people of that country.” But that conviction was in conflict with certain US interests. As the US Ambassador to Bolivia, Philip Bonsal, wrote to his boss that same year, “This problem of maintaining the position of American oil companies in Bolivia and in other parts of South America is, as you are undoubtedly more aware than I am, one of the most important with which we are faced.” The problem, Bonsal said, resulted in large part from of Latin Americans’ distrust of foreign governments and corporations: “The fact is that it has been a tremendous task to overcome the belief of many people here that in the exploitation of Bolivia’s oil resources, Bolivian national interest would be neglected or, at least, be placed in a subordinate position.” Similar problems plagued US policymakers elsewhere, particularly in the Middle East [27]. Much of the need for militarization arose from these realities. The so-called internal security programs began popping up, including in Colombia, at about the same time that Ambassador Bonsal was writing in 1958 [28]. Leading Cold War architect George Kennan had articulated the problem a decade earlier: We have about 50% of the world’s wealth but only 6.3% of its population. This disparity is particularly great as between ourselves and the peoples of Asia. In this situation, we cannot fail to be the object of envy and resentment. Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity without positive detriment to our national security. [29] Later US officials were just as blunt about the need for militarization. According to General Maxwell Taylor, one of the prime perpetrators of the Vietnam War, “As the leading affluent ‘have’ power, we may expect to have to fight for our national valuables against envious ‘have-nots.’” And as Jimmy Carter’s Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, explained in 1980 while arguing for the increased use of “rapid deployment forces”: “Turbulence, the threat of violence and the use of force remain widespread. [These problems] have many and varied causes, [among which is the wealthier nations’ failure] to provide for the basic needs of people and narrow the explosive disparity between wealth and hunger” [30]. Recent discussion in US government circles contains echoes of these statements. Control over Latin American resources, particularly oil, remains a top priority today. In 2008 a Council on Foreign Relations Task Force argued that “Latin America has never mattered more for the United States.” Among a handful of reasons why, the first mentioned was that “[t]he region is the largest foreign supplier of oil to the United States” [31]. The promotion of “free trade”—understood in its technical sense, as policies that redirect public wealth into the hands of private corporations, sacrificing human and environmental welfare in the process—remains central to the US strategy. Yet this effort must overcome the usual obstacles, namely the resistance on the part of Latin American populations. A 2008 report by the US Director of National Intelligence (DNI) noted the threat posed by “a small group of radical populist governments” that “emphasize economic nationalism at the expense of market-based approaches,” thus “directly clash[ing] with US initiatives.” Unfortunately, the report said, this “competing vision” is quite popular in the region, where “high levels of poverty and striking income inequalities will continue to create a potentially receptive audience for radical populism’s message.” The 2010 DNI report from the Obama appointee repeats these basic concerns: governments in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador are “opposing US policies and interests in the region” by advancing “statist” alternatives to “market capitalism.” And as other establishment analysts have recently pointed out, “distrust of Washington’s motives still runs deep in the region” [32]. Hillary Clinton herself has been one of the most candid voices in the Obama administration with respect to US objectives in Latin America. This past March she blasted the Venezuelan government of Hugo Chávez, demanding that Venezuela “restore private property and return to a free market economy.” She has also advocated the easing of restrictions on travel to Cuba so that Cuban Americans would serve as “ambassadors…for a free market economy.” Clinton has contrasted the Venezuelan “dictator” with other regional governments, saying that “[w]e wish Venezuela were looking more to its south and looking at Brazil and looking at Chile” [33]. The promotion of “moderate” political alternatives to the current regimes in Venezuela and Bolivia has been a consistent focus of US policy in recent years. In Bolivia, for example, declassified US Embassy documents have revealed the work of USAID in funding opposition political parties in order to “serve as a counterweight to the radical MAS [the party of President Evo Morales] or its successors,” and “strengthening grassroots organizations in order to confront the MAS.” Recent revelations about the extent of US monetary assistance to opposition groups and media outlets in Venezuela—to the tune of $40 million per year—have further highlighted this strategy. State Department officials have also publicly advocated the strategy of dividing the “radical” from the “moderate” left, in order to form a “counterweight to governments like those currently in power in Venezuela and Bolivia which pursue policies which do not serve the interests of their people or the region.” Further confirmation of this strategy comes from the US diplomatic files recently released by Wikileaks, some of which offer evidence of US efforts to undermine or overthrow Hugo Chávez [34]. These statements and documents provide a fairly coherent picture of US priorities in Latin America: promote US-friendly political regimes while steering Latin American economies along an essentially neoliberal path (reducing or eliminating the social safety net, easing regulations on foreign corporations, prioritizing raw material exports, dismantling protections for national industry, etc.). The formulas of neoliberalism and the promotion of obedient client democracies are closely interlinked. And the more explicit statements of Clinton and others, rather than the more conciliatory speeches by Obama himself, seem to reflect the underlying logic behind the current administration’s policy in the region, which continues to reward regimes like those in Colombia, Peru, and Mexico that unabashedly favor corporate investors over human rights while seeking to undermine those in countries like Venezuela, Bolivia, and Cuba [35].

#### Engagement to reform Latin American economies promotes US imperial dominance.

Escobar 2010 (Arturo Escobar Colombian-American anthropologist primarily known for his contribution to postdevelopment theory and political ecology. interdisciplinary PhD at the University of California, Berkeley in Development Philosophy, Policy and Planning. He completed his PhD in 1987.) ( “LATIN AMERICA AT A CROSSROADS Alternative modernizations, post-liberalism, or post-development?” January 1, 2010, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09502380903424208#.UbspqJyL84o //BLOV)

The crisis of the neo-liberal model. Neo-liberalism in Latin America started with the brutal military regimes in Chile and Argentina of the 1970s; by the early 1990s it had encompassed all of the countries of the region (except Cuba). The global dimension of this hegemony began with Thatcherism in England and the Regan-Bush years, when neo-liberalism expanded to most corners of the world. The first decades of this period represented the apogee of financial capitalism, flexible accumulation, free-market ideology, the fall of the Berlin wall, the rise of the network society, and the so-called new world order. While this picture was complicated in the 1990s, neo-liberal globalization still held sway. Landmarks such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the creation of the World Trade Organization, Davos, Plan Puebla and Plan Colombia were indications of the changing but persistent implanta¬tion of this model of capitalist globalization. Signs of resistance appeared almost from the start. Indigenous politics — so crucial in the Latin America progressive scene today —took off in the 1980s; in 1992, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro) was an attempt to introduce an alternative imaginary to the rampant mercantilism then prevalent. From the food riots in various Latin American capitals in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the anti-GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) demonstrations in India in the early 1990s, and the Zapatista uprising since 1994 to the large-scale demonstrations in Seattle, Prague, Barcelona, Que´bec, Genoa and the like, the idea of a single, inevitable global order under the aegis of a capitalist modernity has been variously challenged. Beginning with the first Gulf War but particularly after September 11, 2002 and the invasion of Iraq in March, 2003, there was a renewed attempt on the part of the US elite to defend its military and economic hegemony, affecting world regions in particular ways.

Known as ‘market reforms’ in Latin America, neo-liberalism entailed a series of structural reforms intended to reduce the role of the state in the economy, assign a larger role to markets, and create macro-economic stability; among the most important measures were liberalization of trade and capital flows, privatization of state assets, deregulation and free markets, and labor reforms; some analysts believe that they have brought about a measure of success (e.g. greater dynamism of some export sectors, increased direct foreign investment, gains in competitiveness in some sectors, control of inflation, and the introduction of social policies such as those of decentraliza¬tion, gender equality and multiculturalism). Yet even the same analysts recognize the high costs of these alleged gains in terms of the growth of unemployment and informality, the weakening of the links between international trade and national production, greater structural unevenness among sectors of the economy (structural dualism), tremendous ecological impact (including the expansion of monocrops such as soy, oil palm, eucalyptus and sugar cane as agro-fuels), a sharp increase in inequality in most countries and an increase in poverty levels in many of them. By the middle of the current decade, one of the most knowledgeable Latin American economists could say, ‘there is possibly not a single country in the region where the levels of inequality were lower [then] than three decades ago; on the contrary, there are many countries in which inequality has increased’ (Ocampo 2004, p. 74). Infamous SAPs (Structural Adjustment Programs) and shock therapies brought with them a level of callousness and brutality by the ruling regimes that reached staggering proportions.5

#### Trade engagement promotes imperial resource extraction.

Gordon and Webber 8, (Todd and Jeffery, Third World Quarterly, " Imperialism and Resistance: Canadian mining companies in Latin America,", Vol. 29, No. 1, 2008, pp 63 – 87)

Capitalist imperialism is rooted in the logic of a socioeconomic system that is driven by the competitive pursuit of proﬁt based on the exploitation of labour, and which is subsequently prone to over-accumulation. In this respect it is an expression of the contradictory character of capitalist accumulation. In a context of over-accumulation, Harvey argues, ‘If system wide devaluations (and even destruction) of capital and of labour power are not to follow, then ways must be found to absorb these surpluses. Geographical expansion and spatial reorganization provide one such option.’4 Capital, facilitated by its respective state, whose aim is to ensure the expanded reproduction of capitalist social relations, pursues a spatial ﬁx to resolve the systematic crisis of over-accumulation. New geographical regions are sought to absorb the existing surpluses of capital and avoid their devaluation, while ﬂagging proﬁtability can be improved by accessing cheap labour and raw materials in these areas. In eﬀect, fresh spaces of accumulation are established as capitalism penetrates new territories, creating ‘a world after its own image’,5 or as older colonial spaces are radically transformed in the interests of a new accumulation strategy. But the creation of new spaces of accumulation is not an innocuous process; it inevitably involves the forceful and violent reorganization of people’s lives as they are subordinated to the whims of capital. This is in fact the process Marx refers to as ‘primitive accumulation’ in his description of the violent and bloody emergence of capitalist social relations in 17th and 18th century England in Capital. But, as Harvey emphasizes, all the features Marx describes in his chapter on primitive accumulation are still actually a central part of capitalist accumulation. Thus ‘[a] general reevaluation of the continuous role and persistence of the predatory practices of ‘‘primitive’’ or ‘‘original’’ accumulation within the long historical geography of capital accumulation is . . . very much in order’.6 This ‘primitive accumulation’—which Harvey more accurately refers to as accumulation by dispossession—is a key modus operandi of imperialism, and as such is ‘omnipresent in no matter what historical period and picks up strongly when crises of overaccumulation occur in expanded reproduction, when there seems to be no other exit except devaluation’.7 With the emergence of neoliberalism we are witnessing a new phase of imperialist accumulation by dispossession. Neoliberalism is the response of political and economic leaders to the crisis of over-accumulation in the advanced capitalist economies of the 1970s, and is aimed at the restoration of proﬁtability through the aggressive restructuring of social relations. But the proﬁtability crisis also spurred an intensiﬁcation of the geographical expansion of capital from the global North. The advanced capitalist states have successfully sought out new spaces of accumulation, or dramatically reorganized older colonial ones in their own interests, to absorb the North’s surpluses and boost ﬂagging proﬁtability. For instance, as is well reported, through their control of international organization’s such as the IMF and the World Bank, countries of the global North have been able to submit countries of the South to their global agenda of political and economic restructuring. With the debt crisis of the early 1980s as an initial springboard, the IMF and World Bank have managed to pry open the economies of, and impose drastic bouts of neoliberal restructuring on, developing nations through their debt management practices. The structural adjustment policies associated with these practices entail the removal of trade and investment barriers for capital from the North, cuts to public services and subsidies to local producers and consumers, and the privatization of formerly communal land, among other things. The Canadian government has been a big supporter of the Bretton Woods institutions’ adoption of structural adjustment measures. As part of an effort to facilitate the expansion of Canadian economic interests in the wake of the crisis of the 1970s, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the departments of Finance and Foreign (formerly External) Aﬀairs have been, and remain to this day, strong backers of structural adjustment.8 Corresponding to the emergence of structural adjustment as a strategy for gaining access to the economies of the South, furthermore, are free trade agreements, which are also aimed at codifying neoliberalism and investment rights of capital from the North in developing nations. Besides its free trade agreements with the USA and Mexico, Canada has agreements with Chile, Costa Rica and Israel. Canada has also been the most aggressive proponent of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), and has pursued subregional deals with Mercosur and the Andean countries.9 Canada has also signed Foreign Investment Protection Agreements (FIPAs) with nearly two dozen countries since 1994, most of which are in the South and eight of which are in Latin America. FIPAs signed since 1994 are modelled on chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which has been cited by critics for its establishment of a strong pro-corporation investment climate, including among other things guaranteeing foreign corporations whose states are party to the agreement the same treatment as domestic corporations, while also giving them the right to sue governments for perceived failures to meet their obligations under the investment agreements. FIPA and non- NAFTA free trade arbitrations are not always publicly disclosed, so they are hard to trace. We have found that Canadian companies have initiated at least four arbitrations under FIPA and non- NAFTA free trade agreements in the past few years, and are considering two others. Three of these are in the mining sector: Vanessa Ventures’ claims against Costa Rica (over the country’s 2002 law banning open pit mining) and Venezuela.10

#### US engagement structurally favors elite interests at the expense of the poor

Young 11, (Kevin, Organization for a Free Society and a PhD in history at Stony Brook University, "Two, Three, Many Colombias: The Logic and Consequences of the US Vision for Latin America," 1/13/2011, http://www.zcommunications.org/two-three-many-colombias-by-kevin-young)

The consequences of militarized neoliberalism are not debatable. While a few druglords, politicians, and corporate profiteers benefit, the unimportant people suffer from increased poverty, which in turn accelerates everything from social protest to migration to drug production, street crime, and violence—all of which are then used to justify more militarization. This cycle, with all its winners and losers, is likely to persist in Colombia, Mexico, and everywhere that the same basic model is applied.

Obama administration policy has shown a strong preference for the three basic ingredients of that model—neoliberal economic policies, political leaders obedient to the United States, and militarization—and has shown little desire to modify policy in a progressive direction (even along the lines of the exceedingly modest, pragmatic changes recommended by the Council on Foreign Relations in 2008). Since Obama took over, Mexico has displaced Colombia as the hemisphere’s leading recipient of US military and police aid as part of the effort that one US official has called “armoring NAFTA.” The incorporation of Central America into a US-sponsored “security corridor” stretching from the US-Mexico border down to Colombia proceeds apace [52]. If the Obama presidency has brought any “change,” it’s certainly not the sort of change that most ordinary people would find desirable. Much current debate within progressive circles revolves around the question of whether Obama is personally in favor of continuing his predecessors’ policies or is actually a progressive-at-heart who is handcuffed by entrenched elite interests. The latter notion seems unlikely, because if Obama were genuinely interested in a more humane and less imperialistic policy, he could set in motion some modest changes by, for example, ending the cynical US “democracy promotion” programs in countries like Venezuela or restoring the trade preferences for Bolivia that he revoked in 2009. But Obama’s inner motivations are in any case much less significant than the structural and institutional barriers to substantive change. The basic policy goals and strategies transcend party lines and electoral outcomes. Even if ultimately detrimental to certain long-term US interests, continued militarization delivers many short-term benefits to corporate and government stakeholders. Given the current constellations of power in the United States and Latin America, a substantial demilitarization of policy would simply incur too much elite resistance, and deliver too little of a political reward. Any major policy changes in a progressive direction, if they occur, will result from pressures emanating from Latin America and/or from non-governmental forces within the United States itself.

#### **The global North controls the terms of economic engagement.**

Milios and Sotiropoulos 09, (John and Dimitris P., PhD from the National Technical University, school of economics, “Rethinking Imperialism: A Study of Capitalist Rule,” Palgrave Macmillan, 7/31/09, http://digamo.free.fr/milios12.pdf)

The theory of unequal exchange was developed in France by Arghiri Emmanuel (1972). Emmanuel maintains that in the context of the global market, developed and underdeveloped countries become differentiated from each other, forming two entirely separate groups, which are basically non-antagonistic towards each other because they are specialized in the manufacture of different products. Exchanges between these two groups of countries are unequal, that is to say, they involve a continuous transfer of resources from the underdeveloped countries to the group of developed countries. It is this inherently unequal exchange that sustains and reproduces the polarization between development and underdevelopment. Unequal exchanges, it is asserted, are attributable to a radically unequal level of wages as between the two groups of countries. Emannuel starts from three basic hypotheses. Firstly, in consequence of the international mobility of capital, an international average rate of profit is generated. At the same time international production prices are established on the global market. Secondly, wages at the national level, though different from country to country, have the tendency to polarize finally at two global levels: high wages in the countries of the centre and much lower wages at the periphery. This polarization stems from the ‘immobility of the labour factor’ on the global market (Emmanuel 1972: xxxv). Thirdly, in the system of international exchanges, the independent variable is wages, which are set not on the basis of some ‘economic laws’ but by historical and social factors (Emmanuel 1972: 64 ff.). The fact, then, that on the global market a single rate of profit is established, while polarization is perpetuated at the level of wages (which is ‘in the immediate sense, ethical’, ibid.: 120), results in unequal exchange, in the sense of an exchange of unequal quantities of labour, expended in the production of internationally traded commodities. So ‘wealth begets wealth’ and ‘poverty begets poverty’ (ibid.: 214–15) in a system, however, where ‘development is represented not as a cause but as a result of high wages’ (ibid.: 254). Accordingly, ‘if we suppose that for some reason, political, syndicalist or otherwise, wages in the Third World were suddenly made five or ten times higher and wages in the developed countries fell to the same level, the greater part of today’s international division of labour would be bankrupted, although no objective factor of production would have changed’ (ibid.: 131). Commencing from the thesis that wage differentials in the global economy are huge, in contrast to rates of profit, which fluctuate around comparable levels, Emmanuel pursues his train of thought within the framework of the (‘classical’, see Milios et al. 2002: 13 ff.) labour theory of value, to come to the conclusion that the process of equalizing rates of profit on a global scale will transfer profit continually from low-wage countries to high-wage countries. The basic presupposition of such a notion is that all countries have access to the same technology. It is thus assumed that both the low-paid and the high-paid workers produce almost the same amount of value per hour, whereas prices in the low-wage countries are lower because of the lower production costs. ‘Unequal exchange’ is thus defined as ‘the proportion between equilibrium prices that is established through the equalization of profits between regions in which the rate of surplus value is ‘institutionally’ different – the term ‘institutionally’ meaning that these rates are, for whatever reason, safeguarded from competitive equalization’ (Emmanuel 1972: 64).

### Human Rights Links

Human rights discourse expands the coercive scope of property.

Speed, 2005(Shannon- expert professor from the University of Texas at Austin on Latin America, Dangerous Discourses:¶ Human Rights and Multiculturalism in Neoliberal Mexico, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1525/pol.2005.28.1.29/pdf, 5/2005, PoLAR)

A number of analysts have suggested that we should approach the question of¶ human rights, and rights-based struggles more generally, with caution. Distinct¶ from the ubiquitous debates about universal rights as cultural imperialism,6¶ these¶ authors are concerned instead with the effects of the predominant focus on rights¶ and legality on social struggle.¶ John Gledhill (1997) ties the rise of liberal ideas such as human rights to the¶ spread of neoliberal capitalism. He cautions against “settling for the politics of¶ rights alone under liberal political institutions which embody various kinds of¶ regulatory power and which are tied in a fundamental way to capitalist property¶ relations” (1997:71). Similarly, Wendy Brown argues that “rights” “may become . . . a regulatory discourse, a means of obstructing or co-opting more radical political demands,” and she suggests that “rights converge with powers of¶ social stratification and lines of social demarcation in ways that extend as often¶ as attenuate these powers and lines” (1995:98). Both theorists emphasize the regulatory force of rights discourses in the current stage of capitalism. Importantly,¶ this regulation is not only by the state, which holds the power to grant and take¶ away rights, but also self-regulation on the part of those who seek to gain and or¶ retain them.¶ On a related point, identity—the basis of many rights claims, such as those of indigenous people—also emerged in tandem with the rise of the modern nationstate, liberal ideologies, and capitalist relations. Roger Rouse has suggested, for¶ example, that identity is an inherent part of capitalist discourse emphasizing private property (an individual owns his identity as the capitalist owns his property).¶ He argues that identity as a concept has been used by rulers to “fix” the identity¶ of their subjects as a means of social control (Rouse 1995).

#### Imperialists use human rights talk to mask raw political economic interest. Rights talk is paternalist and decreases faith in democratic government.

Kachur 08 Professor, Department of Educational Policy Studies, University of Alberta. ‘8 [ Jerrod L. Kachur: Educating for Human Rights and Global Citizenship, 2010, State University of New York Press, Albany]

Western powers intervened militarily in Yugoslavia (1999), Afghanistan (2000), and Iraq (2003) using “human rights” as a justification for transgressing the sovereign borders of three nation-states. These three recent imperialist assertions of power mark the rise of new international norms in considering interstate relations and the legitimate use of military force. With the end of the cold war, the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower, and the American focus on the War on Terror following 9/11, a more nuanced understanding of the positive and negative relationships among imperialism, education, and human rights is necessary for imagining and implementing progressive education policies and practices. Many eyes are turned on George W. Bush’s administration with its enunciation of The Bush Doctrine, a defiant superpower nationalism justifying the hegemon’s right to unilateral preemptive self-defense. The official document is called *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS 2000).* The doctrine immediately caused alarm at home and abroad because it dismissed deference to international law and cooperation. The “gunboat” imperialists use human rights talk to mask raw political economic interests when other justifications fail. However the chapter looks at “human rights imperialism” as humanitarian intervention” in the Third Way thinking of center-left liberalists who take human rights talk seriously yet find themselves constantly compromised (e.g., UK prime minister Tony Blair and U.S. president Bill Clinton). Third way thinking is problematic. It dangerously reduces public politics to personal morality. Following the work of Callinicos (2001, 2003), Chandler (2002), Teeple (2005), and Mandel (2004). I take a critical realist humanist stance and argue that while human rights discourse may provide an important normative resource, the problem with “ humanitarian interventionism” is not because human rights have not been fully applied or that the Great Powers manipulate or co-opt international agencies to do their building but because human rights discourse tends to undermine public politics, mistrust non-Western people’s capacity for self-governance, and breed cynicism among the Westerners about their democratically elected governments and international institutions.

#### **Human Rights discourse expands the power of the Global North to override sovereignty.**

Milios and Sotiropoulos 09, (John and Dimitris P., PhD from the National Technical University, school of economics, “Rethinking Imperialism: A Study of Capitalist Rule,” Palgrave Macmillan, 7/31/09, http://digamo.free.fr/milios12.pdf)

‘Human rights’ and ‘democracy’, the ideological motif for the exercising of international politics in the era of the ‘new order’ are precisely the same ‘universally human values’ as those by means of which the attempt was made to legitimate the anti-communist ‘deterrence’ policies of the epoch of the Cold War. The international standing of human rights was codified by the United Nations in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. 22 Did not the interventions in Korea and Vietnam, places so far from American territory or from Europe, take place in the name of these same ‘free world’ values (that is to say of ‘democracy’ and of ‘rights’)? Moreover, does not the two-year long occupation and administration of Germany by the Allied victors and the Rule international Nuremberg trials (instead of having Nazi criminals tried by the judicial mechanisms of an anti-Nazi post-war Germany) constitute the international-political precedent for the prosecution by ‘international courts’ of those committing ‘crimes against humanity’? It is of little significance for the purposes of the present analysis to mention the obvious, that the transgression of ‘universally human values’ is identified selectively, in conjunctures of crisis involving weak ‘anti-Western’ links in the chain, and that issues are blown up out of proportion by the controlled mass media, etc. What we seek to emphasize is that the mechanism for legitimating international initiatives and interventions by the West remains in its general features the same as that which was imposed at the end of the Second World War. In other words, there is little to justify the ‘new order’ appellation. Obviously with the end of the Cold War and the entry into the neoliberal phase of capitalism, grounded in a correlation of forces unfavourable for labour, the role of human rights is upgraded within the strategy being organized by the Western coalition. The new correlation of forces in the imperialist chain has ushered in a new consensus, in accordance with which ‘human rights’ sometimes gain priority over ‘national sovereignty’. This consensus reflects the narrower margins for initiative that are now at the disposal of states given the new correlation of forces and the emergence of the aggressively pro-capitalist policies of neoliberalism. These policies, of course, as we have seen, do not accord with the interests only of the big capitalist powers but contribute to reproduction of neoliberal capitalist hegemony at every point in the imperialist chain. In other words they encapsulate the new form of capitalist hegemony as expressed in neoliberal regulation, which is reproduced by collective capitalists at the national level, with the most powerful among them taking care of its reproduction internationally. Given that there is no armed international guarantor of human rights and no legal institutional structure, the general ideal implementation of human rights depends on the dominant nation-states and is, in essence, unrealizable: ‘one nation might be willing to violate the sovereignty of another in the name of human rights, but it will simultaneously insist on the principle of national sovereignty, especially its own!’ (Hardt and Negri 2004: 275). ‘The most powerful nation-states constantly maintain the power to negate any legal actions’, hence ‘we should not have illusions, then, about the effectiveness of these truth commissions, tribunals, and courts or about the justice we can expect from them. Sometimes they just leave us with the bitter taste of the ‘‘justice’’ imposed by the victors; and at other times they function merely to neutralize and pacify conflict rather than create justice. The pretence of justice too often serves merely to mask the machinations of power’ (ibid.: 275).

#### **Human Rights discourse justifies the expansion of the capitalist imperialist regime**

Sakellaropoulos 08 (Spyros, Professor in the Social Policy Department of the Panteion University, American Foreign Policy as Modern Imperialism: From Armed Humanitarianism to Preemptive War, NCE & SOCIETY, 2008, Vol. 72, No. 2, 208–235, <http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=4b56f022-1093-44d9-ab80-1ca34ec98b87%40sessionmgr115&vid=2&hid=121>

But there is also another important aspect in the way human rights have emerged as an important factor in international relations. The collapse of the Soviet Union meant that Cold War security provisions and anti-communism could no longer be used to justify military interventions. This created an ideological vacuum that had to be filled. Appealing only to traditional notions of security and national (that is imperialist) interest could not fill this vacuum, and risked appearing as a return to great-power cynicism. One should not forget that Cold War ideology, despite all its balance-of-force rhetoric, was based on a supposed systemic confrontation and used anti-communism and anti-totalitarianism as a justification beyond simple national interest. Human rights can be considered to offer a moral ground and an appeal to universal values. The ideological role played by this appeal to human rights does not limit itself to an ethical justification. We are dealing with a wider set of ideological transformations affecting capitalist societies in recent decades. First, the dominant discourse on human rights regards these as the rights of individuals. But this leaves out collective rights and collective struggles for them. From this point of view we are dealing with the reproduction of the very core of neoliberal capitalist ideology: classes and social groups have no rights; what remains is the individual right to be subjected to capitalist exploitation. Second, the fact that human rights are indispensable for the very definition of legitimate statehood implies that capitalist social relations and liberal democracy represent the only possible historical horizon for every society. Finally, the appeal to human rights is not incompatible with or antagonistic to the appeal to national security; rather, they are complementary. Security considerations, such as international terrorism and “rogue states,” can go hand-in-hand with human rights considerations, the emphasis depending upon the circumstances and the audience. This appeal to moral values is also a way to compensate for the non-correspondence between international law and modern forms of imperialist domination (Bitsakis and Belantis, 2005, 195). That is why we do not think that there is a gap dividing the 1990s stress on human rights and the current anti-terrorist rhetoric. Appeals to human rights — and “western values” — form a large part of the vocabulary of the Bush administrations. And indeed one might say since human rights and humanitarian considerations were more than instrumental in justifying the aggressive military interventions of the 1990s (especially the brutal aggression against Yugoslavia), they paved the way for current imperialist bellicosity.

### **Democracy Links**

#### Democracy promotion reinforces the inequalities of global capital.

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[Barry Gills and Joel Rocamora Third World Quarterly; Sep92, Vol. 13 Issue 3, p501-523

The struggle for meaning¶

Everyone applauds democracy, those who in practice oppose it applaud most loudly. As a slogan it is very effective, yet democracy is a contested term. Like so many terms employed in modern political discourse, its meaning varies with the context in which it is being used. It is difficult for any progressive person to oppose 'democracy', but 'actually existing democracy' should and indeed must be criticised. At this moment of world history, 'democracy' is extolled as the best of all possible worlds both by the holders of global power and by 'the people', not least by those struggling for social justice and self-determination in a world of inequality. Those invoking the Goddess of Democracy use the same language but do not convey the same meaning. As Noam Chomsky argues '… the guardians of world order have sought to establish democracy in one sense of the term, while blocking it in a different sense.'(n3)¶ Chomsky argues that now, as in the past, power holders use democracy as justification for their power and as an ideological instrument for keeping the public quiescent and out of decision-making processes.¶ Samir Amin points to another trend that has accompanied democratisation, '… a kind of generalized offensive for the liberation of "market forces", aimed at the ideological rehabilitation of the absolute superiority of private property, legitimation of social inequalities and anti-statism of all kinds … The coincidence of these two trends makes ours an era of intense confusion … The "market"--a euphemism for capitalism--is regarded as the central axis of any "development", and such development is seen as part of an "ineluctable worldwide expansion". The desirability of total openness to the forces governing worldwide evolution and simultaneous adoption of an internal system based on the "market" are taken to be self-evident. Democratisation is considered the necessary and natural product of submission to the rationality of the worldwide market. A simple equation is deduced from this logic: capitalism equals democracy, democracy equals capitalism.' (emphasis added).(n4) This is a compelling argument which points out a central characteristic, and perhaps even captures the real essence, of the ongoing democratisation process in the Third World.¶ In the recent past, and for most of this century, the principal dichotomy of meaning was between socialist democracy and capitalist democracy. The two meanings competed for legitimacy. Now one meaning, the capitalist, is emerging as globally hegemonic. The idea that this form of politics is universally valid and as applicable to the periphery as it is to the states of the core of the global political economy is as doubtful now as it was in the past, and for all the same good historical (as opposed to ahistorical) and 'structural' reasons

### US Leadership Links

#### **U.S. leadership protects the interests of dominant capitalist classes.**

Sakellaropoulos 08 (Spyros, Professor in the Social Policy Department of the Panteion University, American Foreign Policy as Modern Imperialism: From Armed Humanitarianism to Preemptive War, NCE & SOCIETY, 2008, Vol. 72, No. 2, 208–235

The interpretation of American foreign policy that we propose is to be distinguished from two other possible interpretations. First, we do not think that the main purpose of American foreign policy is military conquest of ever broader geographical regions; the USA is not returning to the logic of 19th-century territorial imperialism. Such an interpretation is refuted both by history — two world wars were not mainly about territorial gains — and by recent experience: the United States does not seek to annex Iraq or Afghanistan. The main purpose of U. S. foreign policy is to be able through successful military operations to retain a hegemonic position and safeguard the reproduction of capitalist relations. Second, we do not think that the United States today comprises the military arm of a supra-national bourgeoisie that has been brought into existence by the globalization process. This interpretation simply fails to see that expanded reproduction of the capitalist mode of production still requires the nation-state. The development of capitalism is an uneven process, subject to various determinations and different forms and rhythms in the class struggle. This leads to a fragmentation into different loci of reproduction of capitalist relations into different national territories (Sakellaropoulos and Sotiris, 2006; Sakellaropoulos, 2007). If there is no transnational bourgeoisie, then U. S. foreign policy still aims primarily to safeguard the dominant position of U. S. capital. It is in the process of maintaining such dominance that the United States must also take into consideration the collective interest of other bourgeoisies and the need to safeguard the expanded reproduction of capitalist accumulation on a global scale. Lowering labor costs, labor flexibility, privatization and the creation of new outlets for capitalist investment, lowering of barriers to exports and capital movement, unimpeded access to energy sources, aggression against possible rivals — all these are specific class strategies of U. S. capital, which at the same time create an international framework for the reproduction of capital around the globe.

### Softpower Links

#### Soft power upholds the White Man’s Burden imperialist mission.

Mooers in 6 (Colin, Department of Politics and School of Public Administration at Ryerson University, The New Imperialists, p 2-3, OneWorld Publications, http://ourrebellion.files.wordpress.com/2010/09/book-new\_imperialists1.pdf

Times have changed, but not nearly enough. The old colonial imperialism, of which Algeria was a remnant, had its roots in the nineteenth century. Its apologists could still employ a language redolent of the racial and cultural superiority of the time; the “civilizing mission” of the Christianized West was still thought by many to constitute the “white man’s burden” in the non-European world. Although a similar “civilizational” rhetoric exists today, it is no longer as easy to justify imperial conquest by resort to the overtly racist pieties of the past. If American generals still study French counter-insurgency methods in Algeria for pointers on how to combat the Iraqi insurgency,3 they have had to find new methods to vie for the hearts and minds of those they wish to subdue. This is largely an achievement of the anti-colonial struggles of the second half of the last century. One of the many advantages of living in a “postcolonial” world is that the collective memory of the anticolonial struggle is deeply ingrained in the consciousness of millions throughout the world. Because of this fact, contemporary imperialism has had to drape itself in new ideological clothes; its defenders must now speak the language of democracy and human rights; of freedom and dignity; of inclusiveness and respect for difference; of gender equality and the alleviation of poverty; of good governance and sustainable development. Alongside these decidedly modernist tropes, others have appealed to the timeless verities of human nature or culture to justify the inevitability of war and empire. Still others have touted the supposedly beneficent legacy of older imperialisms. Such juxtapositions are in keeping with “a deep and perplexing doubleness” of the new imperialism: a primal military atavism reminiscent of older forms of empire combined with the “spectacular” deployment of up-to-the-minute technologies of mass deception and distraction.4 Taken as a whole, the new ideologies of empire express the same contradictory combination of the retrogressive and the modern: of civilizational clashes and democratic ideals; of virulent racism and postmodern multiculturalism; of gender equality and religious oppression; of old-fashioned propaganda and newfangled forms of “soft power”; of torture and human rights Against this backdrop, it would be easy to lose sight of the difference between ideologies and lies. However, ideologies are different from lies even if they are sometimes (as in the case of Iraq) bolstered by lies. For ideologies to work, they must speak to some genuine longing on the part of those who believe in them, however distorted these desires have become by the realities of exploitation and domination. Hence the talk of democracy and freedom. But, like lies, ideologies often involve a good deal of self-delusion on the part of those who traffic in them – how else to explain the debacle of post-invasion Iraq? The systematic character of imperial self-delusion is perhaps best captured in U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s tortured explication of military ignorance: As we know, there are known knowns. There are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns. That is to say, we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also the unknown unknowns, the ones we don’t know we don’t know.5 As Slavoj Zizek observes, the one category that Rumsfeld failed to mention were the “unknown knowns”: beliefs or practices – like the horrors of Abu Ghraib – which must be quickly repressed since their knowledge is too much for consciousness to bear. Zizek contends that the real danger for the American empire lies not in the threats which lie undiscovered, but “in the disavowed beliefs, suppositions and obscene practices we pretend not to know about.”6 Be that as it may, a good deal of conscious effort has been expended to justify and normalize the “new imperialism.” It is a mark of the times in which we live that the discourse of empire and imperialism – not so long ago considered an antique preoccupation of the Left – has been embraced by mainstream intellectuals from across the political spectrum. But, before examining these apologias in detail in the essays that follow, we need to ask: what has prompted this sudden desire to reclaim the language of empire? What changes in the global balance of forces account for this momentous ideological shift?

### Drug War/L.A. Terrorism Links

#### **Categorization of Latin American space in civilized and resistant drug-trafficking areas enables violent pacification.**

Coleman, 2007( Lara Coleman- Lecturer in International Security International Relations, Centre for Global Political Economy,The Gendered Violence of Development:¶ Imaginative Geographies of Exclusion in¶ the Imposition of Neo-liberal Capitalism <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-856X.2007.00288.x/abstract>, VOL 9, 204–219)

¶ Both Santos and Escobar have drawn on contemporary Colombia as a potent example¶ of the violent and exclusionary tendencies of this neo-liberal regime (Santos and¶ GarcíaVillegas2001;Escobar2003,2004aand2004b).Although Colombia is ofﬁcially¶ ‘the oldest democracy in Latin America’, the country is the site of a complex and¶ long-standing conﬂict involving an array of armed actors, including right-wing paramilitary death squads, the ofﬁcial state armed forces and left-wing guerrilla¶ groups, in which the institutionalised links between state forces and paramilitaries¶ havebeenextensivelydocumentedbynationalandinternationalhumanrightsbodies¶ (see, inter alia, Human Rights Watch 1996, 2001, 2002 and 2005; Amnesty International 2004). This military-paramilitary violence both reproduces and is reproduced¶ by a neo-liberal regime of inclusion for a minority of the population and exclusion for¶ the majority, which is so pronounced in Colombia that Santos and García Villegas¶ describe it as ‘the reverse of the social contract of modernity’, ‘a laboratory of fascist¶ sociabilities in democratic political surroundings, or of absent dictatorship’(Santosand¶ García Villegas 2001, 45).2¶ Within this neo-liberal regime, the majority exist in a precarious state characterised¶ by varying degrees and forms of exclusion, ranging from a partial ‘conﬁscation of¶ citizenship rights’ to complete denial of such rights (Santos 2002, 451). Despite the¶ symbolic use of discourses of law and constitutional rights to conceptualise social¶ issues (Santos and García Villegas 2001, 79–80), the majority are excluded from any¶ meaningful claim to citizenship rights by means of the privatisation of services and¶ the ﬂexibilisation of labour, through a regime of neo-liberal contractualisation by¶ which costly conditions are imposed on the weaker party by means of unstable¶ private contracts (Santos 2002, 451). For example, labour contracts have become¶ casualised by means of a policy of ‘strategic alliances’ between workers and corporations, under which ‘co-operatives’ of workers are forced to bid for contracts while¶ covering the costs of equipment, healthcare and so on. This has become a central¶ part of corporations’ strategies of cost reduction and is a policy promoted by the¶ Colombian government and paramilitaries with the support of the World Bank¶ and other international funders (Ó’Loingsigh 2004, 4 and 2006, 96; Mandinga,¶ speech, 7 June 2006). A vast proportion of the population—the urban unemployed,¶ many of Colombia’s three million internally displaced people and poor rural¶ communities—are completely excluded, comprising what Santos describes as the¶ ‘uncivil civil society’: despite being formally citizens they are thrown into a ‘new¶ state of nature’ consisting in permanent anxiety about the future because ‘in¶ practice they have no rights’ (Santos 2002, 451–452, 457). They exist in the ‘savage’¶ spaces, such as land occupations on the edge of cities, where they are continually¶ vulnerable to police, military and paramilitary violence, and rural areas where the¶ state’s presence is almost exclusively in the form of the military and paramilitaries.¶ Military-paramilitary violence reproduces and extends this neo-liberal regime of¶ exclusion over inclusion by creating the space, by means of displacement and the¶ social and cultural reconﬁguration of places, for the imposition of ‘development’¶ in territories where the inhabitants and their forms of life run contrary to or¶ actively resist neo-liberal capitalism (see, inter alia, Sarmiento 1996; Matta 2002;¶ Ó’Loingsigh 2004; Piccoli 2005; Cárdenas and Marín 2006). Carlos Castaño, one of¶ the leaders of Colombia’s largest paramilitary group, the Autodefensas Unidas de¶ Colombia (AUC), described a three-phase paramilitary model along these lines in¶ the country’s resource-rich Magdalena Medio region. The ﬁrst phase comprises the¶ ‘liberation’ of large zones from the insurgency and their supporters (anyone who¶ raises a voice in dissent being counted as a supporter), and imposing processes of¶ land concentration and an authoritarian social structure (Sarmiento 1996, 33).¶ Phase two involves ‘bringing wealth to the region’ through ‘development’ projects such as employment creation, building schools and health centres, technical assistance and loans for production, all ‘carried out with the knowledge and legalisation¶ of government bodies such as the Colombian Institute for Agrarian Reform’¶ (Sarmiento 1996, 33). The third phase is ‘legitimation and consolidation’: once¶ potentially subversive elements of the population have been eliminated and their¶ support bases destroyed, the paramilitaries believe they will cease to be a ‘loose cannon of the State’. There they will have put in place the necessary structures for the victorious expansion of national and multinational capitalism and the ‘modernising’ State will be able to install itself with the co-operation of the private sector, non-governmental organisations and the ‘organised’ communities (Sarmiento 1996, 33). At the same time, the neo-liberal regime also reproduces this violence through the structuring of space into a gendered cartography divided between ‘civilised’ and ‘savage’, creating the discursive conditions of possibility for and legitimation of military-paramilitary violence in the service of neo-liberal development. This, as I will discuss, can be seen particularly in the way in which neo-liberal development discourse is mediated within Colombia, devaluing the way of life of Colombia’s rural majorities, who are represented as a problematic and feminised domain that is ‘traditional’, ‘primitive’, lacking in entrepreneurial culture and so an obstacle to the modern need for ‘competitiveness’ in the fast-moving global economy. Meanwhile, other spaces are identified with hyper-masculine aggression and rebellion, also antithetical to development and prosperity. In this way, the Colombian state’s version of the development discourse generates a geographical imagination through which spaces are represented as savage or civilised. Even before the imposition of neo-liberalism has had the effect of displacing these populations and forcing them into the savage spaces within an urban topography divided by logics of hyperexclusion and hyper-inclusion, or forced those who remain to become paid labourers for corporations, these populations are already ‘non-includable’ within the neo-liberal development project: the imaginative geographies have been created which make possible the violent imposition of neo-liberal capitalism.

### Oil Links

#### Oil cooperation externalizes social and environmental costs on to the Global South.

Alvater 06(Elmar Altvater was Professor of Political Science at the Otto-Suhr-Institute of the Free University of Berlin) ("The social formation of capitalism, fossil energy, and oil-imperialism." Colloquium on the Economy, Society and Nature, Centre for Civil Society, University of KwaZulu Natal. 2006.)

4 Limits of Resources and their oligarchical distribution In capitalist calculation ecological limits of production and accumulation are recognised only when they increase the costs of economic processes and exert pressures on the rate of profit. Calculations of the German Institute for Economic Research have shown that the annual costs of climate change will be the equivalent of about $2000bn from the middle of the century on (Kemfert 2004). The hurricanes of autumn 2005 already caused damages of about 200 bn US$. “External effects” of production and consumption on society and nature are irrelevant for capitalist rational choices so long as they remain “external” to the calculations of single firms. But this is the case only so long as the “carrying capacity” and the capacities of recreation of nature and social systems are sufficient as to bear the polluting emissions of the economic process. Otherwise they become part of the “general conditions of production”, increase the costs of production, affect negatively profitability and accumulation up to a crisis of the capitalist system. (This is the theme of James O’Connor, David Harvey and others.) The attempts to internalize these costs, e.g. by emission trading, do not offer a real solution. As it is possible to substitute artificial paper money for natural gold2 it is not possible to substitute certificates and bonds to be traded on a special stock exchange for an increase of temperature of the atmosphere. On the input side, in the case of oil it also is impossible to neglect natural properties and boundaries of the resource; bits and bytes cannot substitute for oil. The stocks of oil are limited, and oil is running out over the next few decades. Although the supply of oil is limited, the demand for oil will increase in spite of the attempts to save energy, to increase the efficiency of its use, to improve the energy mix and to make more use of renewable resources. This is for two interconnected reasons. First, the crucial role of global financial markets with its high real interest rates and rates of return-claims, enforce high real growth rates of GNP. Under the prevailing patterns of technology deployment, growth only can be achieved by an intensive use of fossil energy. Thus the operation of global financial markets has an impact on the oil market. It only can be mentioned here that there are also two other pressures exerted by the financial system on quantities and prices of supply on world oil markets. One arises from speculation on futures markets; much of the increases of the oil price in the years after 2004 is due to financial speculation. The other is due to the fact that rich oil producers of the Gulf region have heavily invested their “petrodollars” into financial assets so that their income in the meanwhile is as dependent on returns on invested capitals and interest flows as on oil rents. The second reason stems from the globalization of Western production and consumption patterns which are extremely energy-intensive. Newly industrialising countries crowd into markets and add to the already insatiable demand of the OECD countries, above all of the USA. In all parts of the world, including huge countries like China and India, there is a continuing shift from agriculture (which is more dependent on renewable, solar energy than industrial systems) into industry, and a movement of population from the countryside to urban agglomerations. These trends are powerfully accelerated by the rules of the game as implemented by international organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank, with their structural adjustment plans, or the WTO which exerts pressure on all member countries to increase competitiveness in global competition. Economic mechanisms, supported by political pressures transplant the limits of energy supply into the working of the global accumulation process. The limits of resources on the background of increasing demand are responsible for higher conflictuality between political and economic actors. accumulation is ignoring natural boundaries and money is a social construct, the function of money has been de-coupled from the natural form of limited gold and ascribed to paper-money or electronic bits and bytes. Money in a nature-form nearly completely disappeared. Attempts to revive gold as the natural form of money, as Jaques Rueff tried to do under de Gaulle in the 1960s, is a ridiculous and anachronistic undertaking. Under “normal” conditions capitalist accumulation relied on the production of relative surplus value, on productivity increases, powered by fossil fuel. Under the conditions of energy shortage and increasing energy prices accumulation of capital more and more takes the form of a process of dispossession (Harvey; de Angelis) of the less powerful by the more powerful private corporations and national states. The “oil security” of different countries and alliances is competitive and conflict-prone. The transformation of natural riches (matter and energy) into the wealth of nations is not possible for all peoples in the world. The “wealth of nations” is a “positional”, an oligarchical or club-good for the minority belonging to the club of the global oligarchs. “The others” are poor nations and within nations the poor people who cannot afford to pay the oil-bill, fill the gas-tank or pay for electricity and therefore are enforced to switch to other heating energies, from wood by cutting the remaining forests until collected industrial waste from nearby factories. Many poor peoples in Latin America living from 1 to 2 US$ per day are cut off the normal energy supply. They have no alternative as to look for non-fossil energy provision. This is the situation of poor people in the USA which Hugo Chavez exploits by offering cheap Venezuelan oil for the peoples in need.

### Mexico Links

#### Economic integration between the U.S. and Mexico empowers capital at the expense of labor, social spending, and democratic engagement.

Soederberg ’10 (Susanne Soederberg Departments of Global Development Studies and Political Studies, Mackintosh-Corry Hall) (The Mexican competition state and the paradoxes of managed neo-liberal development, Policy Studies Vol. 31, No. 1, January 2010, 77—94, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01442870903368181#preview //BLOV)

The transition from interventionism to strategic targeting

The third feature of an AIC competition state is the transfer in focus of interventionism away from maintaining a range of ‘strategic’ or ‘basic’ economic activities aimed at retaining minimal economic self-sufficiency in key sectors, to a policy of flexible response to competitive conditions (Cerny 1997). There is an observable shift from comparative advantage based on natural resource endowments and factor proportions (i.e. capital—labour ratios) to competitive advantage based on so-called ‘brain-power’ industries, such as micro-electronics, biotechnology, the new materials industries, civilian aviation, telecommunications and so forth (Thurow 1992).

While the policies of the Mexican state have been oriented towards retaining minimal economic self-sufficiency in key sectors and thus allowing for the full participation of market actors, the underlying assumptions of equilibrium, technology transfer and comparative advantage have proven to be problematic (Fine 2006). To date, Mexico’s pro-competitive micro-industrial policy has simply meant further deregulation as opposed to any substantial investment in innovation-driven industry, which remains firmly rooted within core countries such as the USA. Thus, Mexico’s comparative advantage continues to rest on its great quantity of cheap and unskilled labour. Mexico’s abundant and majority less-skilled workforce has been experiencing worsening conditions of employment due to the weakening of union power and overall labour flexibilisation policies imposed by the competition state, as well as increasing competition, most notably from China (Taylor 2008). This has meant that trade liberalisation, especially in the form of NAFTA, has not altered Mexico’s technological dependence and reliance on of large amounts of FDI (Randall 2006).

Many authors have suggested that NAFTA is characterised by a tendency towards de-industrialisation (Cypher 2001, Soederberg 2001). As Kopinak (1994) notes, the new industries in the maquiladora sector, situated largely at the northern border, offer fewer jobs than the number lost from Mexican-owned industry and agriculture. Indeed, as maquiladoras expanded, manufacturing as a share of GDP stagnated, and the share of the labour force diminished (Cypher 2001, Jonakin 2006). Moreover, jobs in the maquiladoras are comparatively unskilled and poorly paid, which implies not only that workers have reduced purchasing power and thus increased economic inequality, but also that the internal domestic market has shrunk with the shift towards export production (Kopinak 1994). The overlap in the US and Mexican export markets carries a built-in time bomb. As exports to the USA have doubled, imports from the USA have at least tripled, which predictably leads to more debt and current accounts problems, particularly since Mexico is using borrowed funds to pay for its imports. Further, the excessive net transfer of resources abroad made the economy extremely vulnerable to external shocks, particularly any deterioration in the terms of trade. In 2003, Mexico lost its position as the second largest exporter to the USA to China (Randall 2006). It is quite telling that remittances to Mexico, not manufactured goods, have been the second-largest foreign income earner behind oil exports (Cypher 2001, Randall 2006).

In order to compete effectively against other emerging market economies, such as China, for desperately needed capital inflows, the Mexican competition state must constantly seek to provide an optimal investment environment for foreign investors and creditors, including low corporate taxes and ease of remittances of profits, as well as limits on social benefits, trade union laws and environmental regulations (Cypher 2001). The results of such competition have not been impressive. Capital investment remains inadequate vis-a`-vis the existing public expenditure in the economy. Moreover, the high interest rates needed to draw in foreign capital flows and deregulated financial-sector capital flows are often short-term and speculative in nature, much to the detriment of Mexico’s productive structure.

All of this seems to imply that the short-term thinking of immediate financial gain takes precedence over the long-term thinking of industrial development. To illustrate, while FDI in actual production facilities increased by 57.6% from 1989 to 1993, the more mobile portfolio investment rose by more than 8000%, or 86.8% of total foreign investment in Mexico (Pastor 1999). Speculative inflows render the economy vulnerable when these inflows suddenly reverse (as in the case of the 1994¬1995 peso crisis) (Soederberg 2004). More fundamentally, this insecurity increases the need for the state to assign high priority to maintaining a favourable investment environment, particularly political stability, so that it may sustain its persistent current account deficits (see Table 1). This situation becomes even more apparent when we consider that, within the framework of NAFTA, Mexico’s trump card was its cheap and well-disciplined labour force. Containing heightening class conflicts has become a linchpin in the overall strategy of attracting new foreign capital investment to maintain an over-extended line of credit upon which the viability of neo-liberal restructuring depends. This points to two contradictions. First, the competition state cannot assume a minimal role whilst attempting to achieve political stability, especially in the face of increasing levels of frustration and contestation against neo-liberal policies, which have resulted in growing socio-economic insecurity for the majority of Mexicans. Second, to circumvent the ill-effects of capital flight, such as the country experienced during the peso crisis, Mexico has built up an arsenal of FX reserves. Aside from providing limited protection against external shocks, such as the US-led global financial meltdown of 2008, foreign currency reserves serve to divert investment away from the social and physical infrastructure of the country (Ocampo et al. 2006).

#### Economic engagement with Mexico is neoliberal crisis management.

Soederberg ’10 (Susanne Soederberg Departments of Global Development Studies and Political Studies, Mackintosh-Corry Hall) (The Mexican competition state and the paradoxes of managed neo-liberal development, Policy Studies Vol. 31, No. 1, January 2010, 77—94, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01442870903368181#preview //BLOV)

Introduction

Given its status as a model of market liberalisation, Mexico provides an optimal case study of the extent to which the ‘competition state’ model (Cerny 1997) has taken hold in a developing country. This article examines the general contours of the economic and social policy direction of the Mexican state from the start of the debt crisis in 1982 to the end of the Vicente Fox administration in 2006. I argue that two observations can be made from this study. First, aside from a few exceptions, the policy direction of the Mexican state broadly corresponds to the main characteristics of Philip Cerny’s competition state. Furthermore, and despite the orthodoxy of neo-liberalism (Cerny 2008), the Mexican state has remained central in managing pro-competition and pro-market policy. Cerny refers to the contradiction of the centrality of state intervention in a policy direction aimed at minimal state involvement in the economy as ‘managed neo-liberalism’ (see Cerny in this issue). Second, and relatedly, the consequences of the Mexican competition state and its primary focus on economic growth have proven highly uneven, conflict-ridden, and contradictory. A basic paradox revealed in this study is the disconnect between the promises of the pro-growth orthodoxy tied to the ‘Washington Consensus’ of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) (e.g. improved standard of living) and the outcomes of neo-liberal reform in Mexico, including the continued lack of international competitiveness in terms of both export and capital markets, persistent current account deficits, problematic levels of public debt and higher socio-economic inequality —all of which have led to increased forms of social discontent and conflict geared towards the state. In contrast to the neo-liberal orthodoxy of minimal state involvement in the economy, I argue that these problems have necessitated ongoing and ever-changing forms of managed neo-liberalism to further embed the ethos of market rule.

## Neoliberalism Impacts

### Imperialism - Ethics

#### Worst forms of imperialist atrocity are always couched in the language of good intentions.

Nermeen **Shaikh**, @ Asia Source, **‘7** [*Development* 50, “Interrogating Charity and the Benevolence of Empire,” palgrave-journals]

It would probably be incorrect to assume that the principal impulse behind the imperial conquests of the 18th and 19th centuries was charity. Having conquered large parts of Africa and Asia for reasons other than goodwill, however, countries like England and France eventually did evince more benevolent aspirations; the civilizing mission itself was an act of goodwill. As Anatol Lieven (2007) points out, **even 'the most ghastly** European colonial project of all, King Leopold of Belgium's conquest of the Congo, professed benevolent goals: Belgian propaganda was all about bringing progress, railways and peace, and of course, ending slavery'. Whether or not there was a general agreement about what exactly it meant to be civilized, it is likely that there was a unanimous belief that being civilized was better than being uncivilized – morally, of course, but also in terms of what would enable the most in human life and potential. But what did the teaching of this civility entail, and what were some of the consequences of changes brought about by this benevolent intervention?

In the realm of education, the spread of reason and the hierarchies created between different ways of knowing had at least one (no doubt unintended) effect. As Thomas Macaulay (1935) wrote in his famous Minute on Indian Education, We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect. To that class we may leave it to refine the vernacular dialects of the country, to enrich those dialects with terms of science borrowed from the Western nomenclature, and to render them by degrees fit vehicles for conveying knowledge to the great mass of the population.

This meant, minimally, that English (and other colonial languages elsewhere) became the language of instruction, explicitly creating a hierarchy between the vernacular languages and the colonial one. More than that, it meant instructing an elite class to learn and internalize the culture – in the most expansive sense of the term – of the colonizing country, the methodical acculturation of the local population through education. As Macaulay makes it clear, not only did the hierarchy exist at the level of language, it also affected 'taste, opinions, morals and intellect' – all essential ingredients of the civilizing process. Although, as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak points out, colonialism can always be interpreted as an **'enabling violation'**, it remains a violation: **the systematic eradication** of ways of thinking, speaking, and being. Pursuing this line of thought, Spivak has elsewhere drawn a parallel to a healthy child born of rape. The child is born, the English language disseminated (the enablement), and yet the rape, colonialism (the violation), **remains** reprehensible. And, like the child, its effects linger. **The enablement cannot be advanced,** therefore, **as a justification of the violation.** Even as vernacular languages, and all habits of mind and being associated with them, were denigrated or eradicated, some of the native population was taught a hegemonic – and foreign – language (English) (Spivak, 1999). Is it important to consider whether we will ever be able to hear – whether we should not hear – from the peoples whose languages and cultures were lost?

The colonial legacy

At the political and administrative levels, the governing structures colonial imperialists established in the colonies, many of which survive more or less intact, continue, in numerous cases, to have devastating consequences – even if largely unintended (though by no means always, given the venerable place of divide et impera in the arcana imperii). Mahmood Mamdani cites the banalization of political violence (between native and settler) in colonial Rwanda, together with the consolidation of ethnic identities in the wake of decolonization with the institution and maintenance of colonial forms of law and government. Belgian colonial administrators created extensive political and juridical distinctions between the Hutu and the Tutsi, whom they divided and named as two separate ethnic groups. These distinctions had concrete economic and legal implications: at the most basic level, ethnicity was marked on the identity cards the colonial authorities introduced and was used to distribute state resources. The violence of colonialism, Mamdani suggests, thus operated on two levels: on the one hand, there was the violence (determined by race) between the colonizer and the colonized; then, with the introduction of ethnic distinctions among the colonized population, with one group being designated indigenous (Hutu) and the other alien (Tutsi), the violence between native and settler was institutionalized **within the colonized population itself**. The Rwandan genocide of 1994, which Mamdani suggests was a 'metaphor for postcolonial political violence' (2001: 11; 2007), needs therefore to be understood as a natives' genocide – akin to and enabled by colonial violence against the native, and by the new institutionalized forms of ethnic differentiation among the colonized population introduced by the colonial state.

It is not necessary to elaborate this point; for present purposes, it is sufficient to mark the significance (and **persistence) of the colonial** antecedents to **contemporary political violence.** The genocide in Rwanda need not exclusively have been the consequence of colonial identity formation, but does appear less opaque when presented in the historical context of colonial violence and administrative practices. Given the scale of the colonial intervention, good intentions should not become an excuse to overlook the **unintended consequences**. In this particular instance, rather than indulging fatuous theories about 'primordial' loyalties, the 'backwardness' of 'premodern' peoples, the African state as an aberration standing outside modernity, and so forth, it makes more sense to situate the Rwandan genocide within the logic of colonialism, which is of course not to advance reductive explanations but simply to historicize and contextualize contemporary events in the wake of such massive intervention. Comparable arguments have been made about the consolidation of Hindu and Muslim identities in colonial India, where the corresponding terms were 'native' Hindu and 'alien' Muslim (with particular focus on the nature and extent of the violence during the Partition) (Pandey, 1998), or the consolidation of Jewish and Arab identities in Palestine and the Mediterranean generally (Anidjar, 2003, 2007).

### Structural Violence

#### Neoliberal inherently unsustainable – it causes climate change, biodiversity loss, structural violence and war.

William **ROBINSON** Sociology @ UCSB **‘8** *Latin America and Global Capitalism: a critical globalization perspective* p. xii-xiii

Returning to the dual themes of crisis and critical globalization studies, there can be little doubt that we are living in troubling times in the "global village." The system of global capitalism that now engulfs the entire planet is in crisis. There is consensus among scientists that we are on the precipice of ecological holocaust, including the mass extinction of species; the impending collapse of agriculture in major producing areas; the meltdown of polar ice caps; the phenomenon of global warming; and the contamination of the oceans, food stock, water supply, and air. Social inequalities have spiraled out of control, and the gap between the global rich and the global poor has never been as acute as it is in the early twenty-first century. While absolute levels of poverty and misery expand around the world under a new global social apartheid, the richest 20 percent ofhumanity received in 2000 more than 85 percent of the world's wealth while the remaining 8o percent of humanity had to make do with less than 15 percent of the wealth, according to the United Nation's oft-cited annual Human Development Report (UNDP, 2000). Driven by the imperatives of over accumulation and transnational social control, global elites have increasingly turned to authoritarianism, militarization, and war to sustain the system. Many political economists concur that a global economic collapse is possible, even probable.

#### Neoliberalism systemically excludes the poor and disadvantaged.

Farmer, P. (2005). (Co-founder of international social justice and health organization [Partners in Health](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partners_In_Health)) Pathologies of power: health, human rights, and the new war on the poor: with a new preface by the author (Vol. 4). Univ of California Press.

The images and events we experienced during these twenty-four¶ hours—rummaging Mexican soldiers, a martyred teenager and a martyred bishop, the workshop of well-meaning elites from the capital, a mental health project involving exhumation, a cry against neoliberalism—encapsulate as well as anything can the heart of what I hope to write about¶ in these pages. But how are these images and themes related to health and¶ human rights? Take the term “neoliberalism,” which, like the related¶ word “liberal,” admits to many meanings, some of them contradictory.¶ Neoliberalism generally refers to the ideology that advocates the dominance of a competition-driven market model. Within this doctrine, individuals in a society are viewed, if viewed at all, as autonomous, rational producers and consumers whose decisions are motivated primarily by economic or material concerns. But this ideology has little to say about the social and economic inequalities that distort real economies.¶ In Latin America, neoliberal policies and ideologies have generally¶ called for the subjugation of political and social life to a set of processes¶ termed “market forces.”6¶ As a physician who has worked for much of¶ my adult life among the poor of Haiti and the United States, I know that the laws of supply and demand will rarely serve the interests of my¶ patients.7¶ And so they and others in their position—globally, this would¶ be hundreds of millions—have fought to construe as a basic human right¶ access to health care, education, and other social services. Indeed, many¶ would argue that most of Latin America’s conﬂicts have been fought over¶ neoliberalism; in the region today, far too many human rights abuses are committed in the name of protecting and promoting some variant of¶ “market” ideology. This interpretation is at odds, I know, with U.S. notions of liberalism. Aren’t “liberals” the great defenders of human rights? friends there ask, exasperated. They are defenders of my rights and yours, I respond, but people like us are in a distinct minority, as Immanuel Wallerstein reminds us: Liberals have always claimed that the liberal state—reformist, legalist, and somewhat libertarian—was the only state that could guarantee freedom. And for the relatively small group whose freedom it safeguarded this was perhaps true. But unfortunately that group always remained a minority perpetually en route to becoming everyone.9 The liberal political agenda has rarely included the powerless, the destitute, the truly disadvantaged. It has never concerned itself with those popularly classiﬁed as the “undeserving” poor: drug addicts, sex workers, illegal “aliens,” welfare recipients, or the homeless, to name a few. It is even less concerned with populations beyond national borders. And yet the poor in the countries with which I am most familiar are struggling, and often failing, to survive:

#### The production of wasted life is a political evil that must be rejected. The aff produces an ongoing atrocity that outweighs their case.

Patrick **HAYDEN** Senior Lecturer IR @ St. Andrews **‘7** “Superfluous Humanity: An Arendtian Perspective on the Political Evil of Global Poverty” *Millennium* 35 (2) p. 289-290

Much like Arendt, Bauman argues that modernity is characterised by instrumental rationality and a drive towards bureaucracy and technological order, with a resulting **emptying out of moral responsibility**. The era of neoliberal globalisation, Bauman contends, exposes how the project of modernity - or more accurately, of compulsive modernisation - necessarily produces ‘**human** **waste’**.52 Here three historical strands of modernisation converge: order-building, economic progress, and capitalist globalisation. For Bauman the modernisation process is defined by the drive to design, engineer and administer society, most fundamentally in terms of the ‘freedom’ to consume. The corollary of this process is that whatever cannot be assimilated into the model of modernisation (or ‘development’) as consumption must be treated as unfit, undesirable, redundant, **useless,** **and disposable**. Immigrants, refugees, and the impoverished are simply superfluous populations who, if they cannot be directly eliminated in the ‘post-totalitarian’ era, at least can be made to disappear from our consciousness. In Bauman’s words, we ‘dispose of leftovers in the most radical and effective way: we make them invisible by not looking and unthinkable by not thinking. They worry us only when the routine elementary defences are broken and the precautions fail.’53 The wasted lives of human refuse are stripped of dignity, driven to the furthest margins of society, and **eradicated from public space while hidden in plain sight**. Bauman’s argument, couched in language that evokes the parallels drawn by Arendt between totalitarian systems and the basic conditions of modern capitalist society, lends support to the central claim of this article: that global poverty ‘erases’ the global poor, excludes them from recognition as fellow human beings, and denies them standing as equals within a shared public world. Simply put, global poverty makes a vast portion of humanity superfluous. The global poor have become, to borrow Arendt’s phrase for those deprived of their human rights, ‘the scum of the earth’, because of who they are (or where they are born) rather than what they have done.54 As Dana Villa asserts, in today’s world ‘untold millions will have to suffer the crushing fate of being no use to the world economy’.55 Along these lines, Thomas Pogge has proposed that extreme global poverty may constitute ‘the largest crime against humanity ever committed, the death toll of which exceeds, every week, that of the recent tsunami and, **every three years, that of World War II, the concentration camps and gulags included’**.56

### Structural Violence Ext.

#### Neoliberal accumulation requires structural violence of dispossession.

Mooers in 6 (Colin, Department of Politics and School of Public Administration at Ryerson University, The New Imperialists, p 2-3, OneWorld Publications, http://ourrebellion.files.wordpress.com/2010/09/book-new\_imperialists1.pdf)

The neoliberal revolution that began in the 1980s represents an attempt to address a persistent problem for capitalism, namely its tendency toward overcapacity and overaccumulation – an issue which is particularly acute for the U.S. economy. Driving this process was the need to locate new sites of capital accumulation and new markets for commodities. In the 1990s the search for new sources of accumulation was highly uneven and regionally specific, hardly captured by the market utopianism of the term “globalization.” In the advanced Western and Asian economies, it involved an intensification of commodification as new areas of private and public life were colonized by market forces while parts of the Keynesian welfare state were privatized or downsized. In the former “communist” countries, the advent of the free market meant the wholesale privatization of state assets and the erection of a kind of gangster-capitalism often abetted by former “communist” apparatchiks and their new allies in Western financial institutions. In the global South, the imposition of neoliberalism combined the privatization of state-run enterprises left over from the dirigisme of the 1960s and 1970s with a virulent new process of primitive accumulation or “accumulation through dispossession.”9 For Marx, the “secret” of the primitive accumulation of capital lay in the fact that it was, above all, a social process through which the direct producers were (often forcibly) separated from access to the means of production and thus pushed into the ranks of wage labor. During the rise of English capitalism, this involved the enclosure of what had been formerly common lands accessible to peasant communities and their conversion into private property concentrated in the hands of a new class of capitalist farmers. “And this history,” Marx writes, “the history of their expropriation, is written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire.”10 David Harvey has shown that primitive accumulation is not a once and for all process restricted to the origins of capitalism, but an ongoing imperative made necessary by the need to find new sources and sites of capital accumulation. Accumulation through dispossession involves the colonization, expropriation, and enclosure of preexisting societal and cultural forms. Predation, fraud, and force are still commonly used to privatize such things as water resources or to enforce proletarianization. To these, over the past two decades, have been added an array of financial instruments of dispossession such as hedge funds, currency devaluations, asset stripping, and credit and stock manipulations. In conjunction with these changes, a new set of global institutions have been established to regulate and fortify market relations between states and regional trade blocs. Whatever the means, the outcome has been to unleash a new wave of “enclosing the commons.”11

#### Globalization facilitates massive transfers of wealth to capitalist states

Gordon and Webber 8, (Todd and Jeffery, Third World Quarterly, " Imperialism and Resistance: Canadian mining companies in Latin America,", Vol. 29, No. 1, 2008, pp 63 – 87, http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=0c7622f4-46a3-40da-b734-c98269bad642%40sessionmgr114&vid=2&hid=121)

Not only has neoliberal globalization led to a massive transfer of wealth from the South to the North via debt repayments that were compounded by the extremely high interest rates of the 1980s, but multinationals from the North have gained unprecedented access to the economies and natural resources of developing countries, dispossessing billions of people of these resources in the process. Despite the rhetoric of free trade heard from neoliberal globalization’s advocates, what really has ‘deﬁned the era of globalization’ is not trade at all, David McNally argues, but ‘large-scale foreign direct investment (FDI).’11 This trend is important to our understanding of the global economy, since FDI involves the long-term investment by corporations in foreign countries, and increasing inﬂuence over their economies. In the past two decades, FDI has increased at a phenomenal pace, growing by over 200% from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s alone, and in the age of neoliberal globalization FDI has increasingly involved ﬁxed investments in factories, mines, natural resources, communication systems and services, whereas previously foreign investment was more liquid in nature.12 According to McNally, ‘by 1998, total outward foreign direct investment hit a record level of $649 billion in a single year’ and some estimates suggest it reached the $1 trillion mark in 2000.13Further, while much of this investment takes place between rich nations, FDI from the global North into the South has grown signiﬁcantly since the 1990s and makes up an increasing percentage of international totals. It is this economic trend, McNally notes, that lies behind international economic pacts like the failed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (which is undergoing rebirth through a proposed WTO investment agreement), NAFTA and the proposed FTAA, and the structural adjustment policies pursued by the IMF and World Bank. New means of accumulation by dispossession are bound up with this new regime of investor rights. Entirely new areas of investment are being opened by corporations and their governments from the North in their insatiable drive for new ways to increase proﬁts: agreements on intellectual property rights, patenting of genetic resources and the commodiﬁcation of cultural forms are all examples of this trend in the game of capitalist adventure where practically everything— including water—can be privately owned.

#### **Neoliberalism requires war to police the dispossessed.**

Coleman, 2007( Lara Coleman- Lecturer in International Security International Relations, Centre for Global Political Economy,The Gendered Violence of Development:¶ Imaginative Geographies of Exclusion in¶ the Imposition of Neo-liberal Capitalism http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1467-856X.2007.00288.x/abstract, VOL 9, 204–219)

Violence, as Arturo Escobar has noted, is not merely a recurrent feature of development but constitutive of it, for ‘modernity and development are spatio-cultural¶ projects that require the continuous conquest of territories and peoples and their¶ ecological and cultural transformation along the lines of an allegedly rational order’¶ (Escobar 2004a, 16). The violence of development is more pronounced under what¶ Escobar calls the ‘new imperial order’, characterised by the contemporary neoliberal evolution of global capitalism (Escobar 2004a, 16–18). While neo-liberalism¶ is not monolithic and varies in its form across both space and time (Larner 2003;¶ Tickell and Peck 2003), the relentless processes of privatisation and commoditisation common to various forms of neo-liberalism have driven the logic of the market¶ into almost every aspect of social life and absorbed new spaces into the ambit of¶ capital. At the same time, as Boaventura de Sousa Santos argues, emancipatory¶ rationalities—those related to aspirations for a better order in society—have¶ increasingly been colonised by science and technology (Santos 2002, 7–8). While a¶ differentiation between spaces of exclusion and inclusion is typical of capitalist¶ modernity, neo-liberalism’s absorption of social space into the logics of the market¶ and technology has deepened the ‘structural predominance of exclusion over¶ inclusion’ (Escobar 2004a, 17). The result has been a global regime of selective¶ inclusion for the minority and hyper-exclusion for the majority, ‘operating through¶ spatial-military logics’, for when technology and the market alone are insufﬁcient for the administration of territories, peoples and resources in line with neo-liberal¶ capitalist order, this order is increasingly imposed ‘through the management of¶ asymmetrical and spatialised violence, territorial control, sub-contracted massacres¶ and “cruel little wars”’ (ibid., 16, 18).

### Neoliberalism Impacts – Environment

#### Neoliberalism destroys the environment.

Liverman and Vilas 2006 Environmental Change Institute, Oxford University Center for the Environment

[Diana M. Liverman and Silvina Vilas June 23, 2006 , NEOLIBERALISM AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN LATIN AMERICA <http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.energy.29.102403.14072>]

Critics of neoliberal environmental management argue that free trade, deregulation, privatization, and commodiﬁcation are more likely to destroy the environment more than protect it. For example, the Environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis is rejected because it only works for a limited number of countries, for per capita not¶ ¶ absolute pollution data, and for only a few pollutants (e.g., SO2 but not CO2 or¶ ¶ water quality) (25). Critics of trade argue that liberal trade and investment rules¶ ¶ are likely to result in a race to the bottom in the search for pollution havens as¶ ¶ companies ﬂee tough environmental standards in the developed world for lower or¶ ¶ unenforced environmental regulations in developing regions (26). Forest transition¶ ¶ theory is criticized by Koop & Tole (27) who argue that the highly unequal distribution of income in developing countries means that, even when national economic¶ ¶ indicators improve poverty, inequality will continue to drive deforestation.¶ ¶ The privatization of environmental commons has been condemned from human¶ ¶ rights theory [e.g., that clean water or air are a common good that should not be¶ ¶ commodiﬁed (28)] and by those who argue that the state or common property¶ ¶ institutions are better able to protect nature than private interests. For example¶ ¶ Ostrom (18, 19) has documented commons systems that have worked for centuries to manage water and forests in cases where boundaries and members of the¶ ¶ commons community are well deﬁned and there are strong institutions for conﬂict¶ ¶ resolution and rule making.¶ ¶ Left theorists argue that neoliberal processes are a new form of imperial or¶ ¶ colonial control whereby new resources are identiﬁed, expropriated and assigned¶ ¶ to private property, commodiﬁed, and exported to support capital accumulation¶ ¶ by powerful interests (10). Political ecology provides a framework that identiﬁes¶ ¶ the changes in political and economic structures, power relations in markets and¶ ¶ property rights, as well as ideas and discourses that promote neoliberal policies¶ ¶ (29). Thus the selling of rights to prospect for biological material of use to the¶ ¶ pharmaceutical industry is seen as a slippery slope toward the wholesale privatization, patenting, and marketing of biodiversity that is not easily valued or separated from the livelihoods of indigenous groups

### **Neoliberalism Impacts – Labor Rights**

#### **Neoliberal policies structurally disadvantage labor.**

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[Robert N. Gwynne. 25 Aug 2010. “Views from the periphery: Futures of neoliberalism in

Latin America” Page-148 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01436590013279]

Labour markets transformed

In contrast, labour has suffered much more heavily than holders of capital during¶ economic restructuring. The adoption of an outward-orientated economic policy has normally been associated with large increases in unemployment in key industrial sectors, at the same time as the privatisation of state firms has been characterised by a significant loss of labour. Growth in export-orientated sectors has taken much longer to generate adequate employment opportunities. This has created the need to restructure labour markets radically in order to lower wage costs, to have a more flexible hiring and firing system for employers and to¶ lower employers’ non-wage costs (as in employers’ insurance contributions). Employers have further been able to reduce costs by adopting short-term contracts and more subcontracting for the supply of parts and services (Thomas, 1996). This has increased the importance of informal arrangements in productive¶ activities. The state has also tried to reduce the power of trade unions in order to reduce¶ worker protection and lower labour costs (as in Chile and Peru). Increased¶ employment of female labour (particularly in areas of agricultural exports and assembly industries) has been another feature. Labour has increasingly suffered¶ reduced bargaining power, with the acquiesence or indeed active support of the state. These processes have often been perceived as the necessary prerequisites¶ to produce a more flexible labour market and to create more competitive labour conditions for employers in the international market place. Overall, labour has become more vulnerable and insecure through the growth of short-term contracts, the shift to more competitive labour markets and the decline of social¶ security. Unless workers are skilled and/or possess a marketable knowledge, they become destined for either low wages or, even worse, underemployment and periods of unemployment.

#### Neoliberal reforms hurt labor.

Gwynne 2010 PhD, University of Liverpool

[Robert N. Gwynne. 25 Aug 2010. “Views from the periphery: Futures of neoliberalism in

Latin America” Page-148-149-150

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01436590013279]

Social impacts of reform

The transformations of labour markets introduces the wider theme that neoliberal¶ reform has been associated with negative effects in such social areas as income¶ distribution and poverty. These negative effects can be seen in the impact of¶ neoliberal reforms in at least five areas of the labour market (Bulmer-Thomas, 1996). (1) Unemployment rate: trade liberalisation, fiscal and labour market reform¶ have combined to substantially increase unemployment during the economic¶ crisis and the process of economic restructuring. Those companies unable to compete with foreign firms in the domestic market lay off workers, governments¶ drastically reduce the numbers of civil servants and short-term¶ contracts make temporary unemployment more common.(2) Real minimum wage: labour market and fiscal reforms have normally¶ operated to reduce the minimum wage in real terms- both to save government¶ spending on social provision and to maximise employment during¶ economic restructuring. Although the real minimum wage declines during¶ the economic crisis, it can subsequently increase once economic growth¶ becomes more sustained (as in Chile since the late 1980s).(3) Real wages: trade liberalisation, fiscal and labour market reform have all¶ tended to exert downward pressure on real wages- as companies face more competition from overseas firms, as governments increase wages and¶ salaries at lower rates than inflation and as greater flexibility enters the¶ labour market. Again a distinct sequencing can be found, with real wages¶ declining during the first phase of economic restructuring but with slight increases occurring once the labour market subsequently tightens. (4) Wealth effects: the impact of fiscal reform, the liberalisation of trade and¶ domestic capital markets and increased inflow of foreign capital has been to¶ substantially increase the wealth of the top two deciles of income earners- the capitalist class in general and entrepreneurs in particular. (5) The urban informal sector. This corresponds to that part of the urban¶ economy that is small-scale, avoids regulation and covers a wide variety of activities. During the phase of economic restructuring the informal sector¶ tends to expand as more enterprises wish to enter the unregulated sector. However, subsequently it can decline as it becomes easier for small-scale¶ enterprises to comply with the more limited regulations required of a deregulated formal sector. It has been argued (de Soto, 1989) that the urban market does offer opportunities for many (as in petty commerce). However,¶ as Thomas (1996) and Roberts (1995) point out, these are basically survival strategies and enterprises will normally remain with low levels of capital¶ accumulation and therefore income. It would be interesting to know the level¶ of support for the economic model from these sectors. Again support would¶ probably emerge when economic growth resumes. Increased subcontracting¶ from larger firms to small-scale informal enterprises would be one example of such trickle-down mechanisms operating. Thus the social impacts of neoliberal reform are both considerable and substantial,¶ although it is important to indicate a certain sequencing- normally a period of drastic change (increased unemployment, declining wages), followed once¶ economic growth picks up by a period of gradual improvement. Does this period of gradual improvement reduce inequalities as well? It is difficult to judge at¶ present. In the longest historical surveys of the relationship between neoliberal reform and inequality (Altimir, 1994; Scott, 1996), there is a tendency for¶ improvement after the crisis of economic restructuring- during which income distribution becomes considerably worse. Even so, it is the upper two deciles which have performed consistently well during economic reform, thanks to the¶ great advantages enjoyed by those owning capital and earning high salaries¶ because of their business skills. The middle four deciles tend to be relatively static or even declining, while the lower four deciles remain with low and¶ declining percentage proportions of national income. Within states that have shifted from authoritarian to democratic governance, there is greater evidence of integrating social policies into neoliberal reform¶ packages with the objective of achieving greater social equity- or neoliberalism with a human face as it has been called. The democratic transition in Chile after 1990 saw a significant shift in social priorities, as tax increases were directed to¶ pay for greater spending on social welfare, education and health. However, there¶ seems to be less commitment to social policies in other countries experiencing neoliberal reform.

#### Neoliberalist policies ensure inequality – corporate interests are placed above individuals.

Petras 97Bartle Professor of Sociology at Binghamton University“Alternatives to Neoliberalism in America” http://www.jstor.org/stable/2634237 .]

Since most voters do not have strong ties to any political organization, they become the objects of short-term electoral campaign propaganda in which the neoliberals' vast campaign funds and quasi-monopoly of the mass media play a decisive role. Thus elections are shaped by the legacy of the authoritarian past and the capacity of neoliberal politicians to concentrate organizational and financial resources in a limited time period to secure favorable electoral outcomes. In the postelection period, electoral propaganda is replaced by the concrete socioeconomic policies of the neoliberal regimes. These policies overwhelmingly reflect the interests of the economic elites. Privatization and deregulation provide for a massive transfer of lucrative public resources (e.g., the sale of state enterprises to big business), price increases, and wage reductions that favor employers. The social polarization absent during the electoral cam- paign comes sharply into focus when the newly elected president takes office. Using the so-called electoral mandate as a legitimating cover, the neoliberal president relies on the elitist authoritarian state institutions (military, courts, police) to impose regressive socioeconomic policies on the protesting majority. In contrast to the situation under the military regime, where force was applied both before and during the implementation of neoliberal policies, under the neoauthoritarian electoral regimes force follows elections. Clearly, there is a profound gap between the electoral processes and popular socioeconomic interest

### **Neoliberalism Impact - Health**

#### Neoliberalism decreases healthcare and education—history proves

**Mooney 12** Health economist, leading advocate of social justice in the provision of health care.[2012, “Neoliberalism is Bad For Our Health” http://baywood.metapress.com/media/gppnpkuvmjmhhym3hk91/contributions/r/v/2/2/rv2236t3338060u5.pdf]

**Aspects of globalization**, **such as trade liberalisation and market integration between countries,** have **brought major shifts in countries**’ national productive and distributive policies. “**Structural adjustment”**—a core global programmatic and policy influence from the 1970s onwards—**framed the emergence of a dominant** (sometimes **referred to as “neoliberal**”) **orthodoxy in global institutions. Designed to reduce inflation in indebted developing countries, decrease public spending, and promote growth—all strongly oriented towards supporting debt repayment—adjustment policies promoted trade liberalisation, privatisation, and a reduced role for the public sector**. **This had a severe adverse impact on key social determinants of health—including health care and education—across** most **participating countries.** Many countries, without doubt, stood to benefit from reducing runaway inflation and improving fiscal management. But it is not clear that **the harsh degree and policy straitjacket that structural adjustment imposed produced** the anticipated benefits, much lesswhether the **health and social costs** were warranted. This is a useful statement, but what is remarkable is that, in the wake of the Commission’s seeming recognition of the importance of neoliberalism, there is no follow-through on what to do about it**. Having identified the problem, why then back off from indicating how to deal with it?** The report lists what the Commission calls the **“structural drivers of health inequities**,” which **highlight that** “**the top fifth of the world’s people in the richest countries enjoy 82 percent of the expanding export trade”;** that “**the East Asian financial crisis was triggered by a reversal of capital flows of around US$105 billion** . . . **equivalent to 10 percent of the combined gross domestic product (GDP) of the region**”; that “s**ince 1990, conflicts have directly killed 3.6 million people** [and] **many countries spend more on the military than on health”; and that “each European cow attracts a subsidy of over US$2/day, greater than the daily income of half the world’s population.” There is, however, no attempt to address the issue of neoliberalism and the structural—and health— problems that this form of political economy has created.** One can only wonder what happened on the Commission when discussions turned to how to deal with neoliberalism. **Was there an attempt**—successful, it would seem—**by some Commission members to avoid chasing the elephant in the room?** **The structural analysis that would follow naturally from the statement quoted above is missing. That omission has to be deliberate. There is a gaping hole.**

### Neoliberalism – Unsustainable – No Legitimacy

#### Neoliberalism will be rejected by citizens and cause revolt

Petras [1997 “Alternatives to Neoliberalism in America”

http://www.jstor.org/stable/2634237 .]

In Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, and elsewhere, overtly neoliberal presidential candidates have been elected or reelected. This has led conservative commentators to argue that neoliberalism has become the hegemonic ideology-the accepted political discourse of the masses. To a considerable extent, center-left politicians and intellectuals have been influenced by this line of reasoning and have adapted to the so-called new realities and moved toward accepting the main outlines of neoliberal political economy. Some center-left coalitions accept the neoliberal stabilization plan (Argentina) and others at least part of the privatization agenda (Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico). With this shift in the political spectrum, neoliberalism would seem to have consolidated its position in Latin America. However, both conservative celebrants and center-left pragmatists over- look the second basic fact of the contemporary period: the mass popular revolts, social mobilizations, general strikes, land occupations, and provincial revolts that have almost immediately followed the neoliberal electoral victories. These mass social movements reject some or all of the neoliberal political agenda (privatizations, structural adjustments, wage constraints, increases in transport, etc.). In some cases-for example, the general strike in Bolivia in May 1995 and that in Paraguay in 1994-they have included the vast majority of the labor force. These large-scale social mobilizations explicitly rejecting part or all of the neoliberal agenda call into question the assumption of "consolidation." They open up the perspective of the decay of neoliberalism and the construction of a political alternative based on a different socioeconomic model.

### **K Prior – K of Consequentialism**

#### Consequentialist policy analysis presumes liberal political values.

Wedeen 07 (Lisa, Comparitive Politics Specialist, Liberalism and Empire: American Political Science in the Modern Middle East Social Science Research Council, 06/15/07, http://www.ssrc.org/workspace/images/crm/new\_publication\_3/%7B8a197abf-ed60-de11-bd80-001cc477ec70%7D.pdf)

In the wake of the poor performance of science in anticipating the demise of the Soviet Union and as versions of the “cultural turn” came to inspire other social sciences, an increasing focus on methodology operated to reinvigorate political science. As methodology became a field in its own right, and as formalized methods, in particular gained ground (“second only to quantification” in the APSR, according to Sigelman, and dominating the esteemed American Journal of Political Science),21 the circulation of formal methodologies and game theoretic arguments could have the indirect effect of working on behalf of an undertheorized elision between science and liberalism. By combining empirical research with nonempirical techniques of logic and pure mathematics, even abstract formal models required practitioners to hold assumptions (about the individual, cognition, and what democracy is) that were congenial to both projects. Terms like “trade-offs,” “cost-benefit analysis,” and “equilibria” could appear as neutral variables or consensually accepted standards rather than the product of a distinct political context. Sharing these assumptions has helped constitute a community that is epistemological (in the sense that it directs how we know what we know), methodological (in the sense that members adhere to the same sets of processes in producing and evaluating results), and ontological (members of the group self-identify as participants in a community of argument whose conditions make questioning basic assumptions seem irrelevant, if not silly or embarrassing). Agreement on the procedures for research seems to entail distinguishing between descriptive and causal inferences and according the latter greater prestige; treating the individual as the unit of analysis and identification; presupposing a world in which it is sufficient to depict agents as if they act only instrumentally; and taking initial interpretations as descriptive facts or raw data, rather than information mediated through the experience of a particular researcher. To conclude this section: Epistemological assumptions and liberal political commitments get constituted in and through the workings of political science.22 Dominant scholarly production in political science rests on particular views of science as the ultimate form of knowledge and liberalism as the desirable kind of politics. The positivist insistence on separating fact from value, moreover, obscures how science is itself an exalted value. Deciding what results political scientists want to explain (e.g., contested elections and procedures in place to ensure them, peace among democracies, conflict avoidance) can be seen in current texts as simultaneously politically relevant and devoid of value. As political science has become more scientific, liberal values have seemed to retreat into the background or been partially concealed by an emphasis on methods over content. Yet political science remains implicated in reproducing the liberal

#### Risk is political – Their impact calculus only makes sense from a dominant social position.

Rebecca **SAUNDERS** Comparative Lit @ Illinois St. **‘5** “Risky Business: Edward Said as Literary Critic” *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 25:3 p. 529-532

Risk-free ethics, like all protection from risk, are a class privilege. As Deborah Lupton puts it, “The disadvantaged have fewer opportunities to avoid risks because of their lack of resources compared with the advantaged”; “people’s social location and their access to material resources are integral to the ways in which they conceptualize and deal with risk.”22 Or, as Ulrich Beck argues, “Poverty attracts an unfortunate abundance of risks. By contrast, wealth (in income, power or education) can purchase safety and freedom from risk.”23 Thus when we endorse a risk-free ethics, we should bear in mind that members of social groups with less to lose and more to gain are more likely to engage in risky behaviors than are members of more secure and privileged social groups. Moreover, as Mary Douglas has argued at length, risk is a forensic resource and, much like the “danger” she elaborated in her early work, functions as a means of social control. “Anthropologists would generally agree,” she writes, “that dangers to the body, dangers to children, dangers to nature are available as so many weapons to use in the struggle for ideological domination.”24 These weapons are sharpened, she argues, **by Western societies’ association of risk assessment with scientific neutrality.** Along similar lines, Nick Fox contends that “risk analysis is a deeply political activity. The identification of hazards (and the consequent definition of what is a risk) can easily lead to “the **valorization of certain kinds of living over others.”**25 The identification of “risk groups” deemed to be threatening to the social order—the unemployed, criminal, insane, poor, foreign—are a common technology for establishing boundaries between self and other, the normal and the pathological, that is, for securing that “formidable battery of distinctions” Said analyzes between “ours and theirs, proper and improper,” higher and lower, colonial and native, Western and Eastern.26 In a fascinating article on debates over native title in Australia, Eva Mackey demonstrates both the way in which political actors deploy a rhetoric of risk, danger, and threat and the uses of risk management to imperial hegemony. Not only have newspaper headlines “presented native title as an issue that has brought the nation to the brink of a dangerous abyss, to the point of destruction,” but theHoward government “constructs native title as a danger and risk to the ‘national interest,’ particularly a risk to competitiveness, opportunities, and progress. The entire anti-native title lobby have all stated . . . that the uncertainty over native title is dangerous for investment and economic competitiveness.”27 As Mackey points out, these notions of danger imply “a normative, non-endangered state,” and it is through ideas of the normal and deviant that institutional power is maintained.28 A related argument articulated by governmentality theorists is that modern societies normalize risk avoidance and pathologize risk taking, represent the former as rational and mature, the latter as irrational and childish— oppositions that, again, are familiar to any student of colonial discourse.29 These oppositions are buttressed by an elaborate apparatus of expert knowledge produced by disciplines such as engineering, statistics, actuarialism, psychology, epidemiology, and economics, which attempt to regulate risk through calculations of probability and which view the social body as “requiring intervention, management and protection so as to maximize wealth, welfare and productivity.”30 Knowledge produced about probability is then deployed as counsel to individuals about how to conduct their lives. As Lupton contends: “In late modern societies, not to engage in risk avoiding behavior is considered ‘a failure of the self to take care of itself—a form of irrationality, or simply a lack of skillfulness’ (Greco 1993). Risk-avoiding behavior, therefore, becomes viewed as a moral enterprise relating to issues of self-control, self-knowledge and self-improvement.”31 This is a characteristic of neoliberal societies that Pat O’Malley, Franc¸ois Ewald, and others refer to as the “new prudentialism.”32 To recognize that risk is a form of social control, and that risk taking is more necessary to certain classes than to others, is also to recognize that risk is not an objective entity or preexisting fact but is produced by specific cultural, political, and institutional contexts, as well as through competing knowledges. “To call something a risk,” argues Douglas, “is to recognize its importance to our subjectivity and wellbeing.” 33 Anthony Giddens, similarly, contends that “there is no risk which can be described without reference to a value.”34 In a frequently cited passage, Ewald writes, “Nothing is a risk in itself; there is no risk in reality. But on the other hand, anything can be a risk; it all depends on how one analyses the danger, considers the event.”35 Indeed, this is precisely the unconscious of risk-management technologies, which assume both that risks are preexistent in nature and that individuals comport themselves in strict accordance with a “hedonic calculus.” 5 3 1 Also embedded within this insurantial unconscious is the fact that, as Fox puts it, “The welladvertised risk will turn out to be connected with legitimating moral principles.”36 If postcolonial studies, as I am arguing, should more rigorously interrogate risk-avoidance strategies (including those that repress or discipline the foreignness in language) on their political, class, and ideological investments, it should also recognize the degree to which risk management (no doubt among modernity’s most wildly optimistic formulations) indulges in a fantasy of mastery over uncertainty. In risk-management discourses, risk has taken on the technical meaning of a known or knowable probability estimate, contrasted with uncertainty, which designates conditions where probabilities are inestimable or unknown. This transformation of the unknown into a numerical figure, a quantification of nonknowledge that takes itself for knowledge, attempts to master whatever might be undesirable in the unknown (i.e., the future) by indemnifying it in advance—and thereby advertising its own failure. I believe it could be demonstrated, moreover, were we to trace the genealogy of this fantasy, that it coincides at crucial moments with the history of colonization. The notion of risk, first used in relation to maritime adventures, arises contemporaneously with modern imperialism, to describe the hazards of leaving home. With industrial modernity, and particularly the rise of the science of statistics in the nineteenth century, it took on themien of instrumental reason and the domination of nature, nuances that bear an unmistakable resemblance to the logics of concurrent colonial enterprises.37 This fantasy of mastery is also a suppression of possibility; in most instances, risk avoidance is an (implicit or explicit) **maintenance of dominant values**. Risk taking, by contrast, is the condition of possibility of possibility— that is, of change. It is perhaps no surprise that **one’s political position is the strongest predictor of his/her attitude toward risk**. Risk, as we have seen, is regularly formulated as that which threatens the dominant order (conceived on the level of a society, a colonial regime, or a global economic order). That threat, of course, is the “danger” of transformation, of reorganized social and ideological hierarchies, redistributed economic and cultural capital, renovated geopolitical relations—in short, precisely the kinds of transformation called for by much of postcolonial studies. Risk, including the risk of errors in meaning, may be necessary to any social change, that is, to engaging in the kind of oppositional criticism Said advocates: “Criticism must think of itself,” he writes, “as constitutively opposed to every form of tyranny, domination, and abuse.”38 The necessity of risk to change (and the craven conformism of risk avoidance) is a principle Friedrich Nietzsche elaborates in Beyond Good and Evil, where, critiquing the “timidity of morality,” he calls for a new species of philosophers, willing to risk untruth, uncertainty, even ignorance, thinkers willing to inhabit “the dangerous maybe.”39 Nietzsche was also prescient in recognizing that “howmuch or how little is dangerous to the community . . . now constitutes the moral perspective; here, too, fear is again themother ofmorals.”40 More recently, philosophers such as Derrida and John D. Caputo (explicitly taking up Nietzsche’s vocation) have argued that change, indeed social responsibility itself, inevitably demands a wager on uncertain possibilities (or, in Derridean terms, the “aporia”). “Let us not be blind,” writes Derrida, “to the aporia that all change must endure. It is the aporia of the perhaps, its historical and political aporia. Without the opening of an absolutely undetermined possible, without the radical abeyance and suspense marking a perhaps, there would never be either event or decision. . . . no decision (ethical, juridical, political) is possible without interrupting determination by engaging oneself in the perhaps.”41 On similar grounds, Caputo argues for “the suspension of the fine name of ethics in the name of obligation” and contends that “to speak of being against ethics and deconstructing ethics is to own up to the lack of safety by which judging is everywhere beset. . . . to admit that ‘obligation’ is not safe, that ethics cannot make it safe, that it is not nearly as safe as ethics would have us believe.”42

#### Methods of defending engagement construct the world according to a civilized-barbaric dichotomy.

Wedeen 07 (Lisa, Comparitive Politics Specialist, Liberalism and Empire: American Political Science in the Modern Middle East Social Science Research Council, 06/15/07, http://www.ssrc.org/workspace/images/crm/new\_publication\_3/%7B8a197abf-ed60-de11-bd80-001cc477ec70%7D.pdf)

The discipline’s increasing concerns with methodological rigor may have changed the language and tenor of current political science writings, and permitted political commitments to appear less obvious than they used to be in the early years of the discipline or in the “good society” days of behaviorism. But an enduring emphasis on political order provides the substance for the reproduction of norms that blend scientific certainties with normative endorsements of liberal democracy. At times cultural difference is used to explain challenges to liberalism, U.S. interests, or to the stability important to both. At other times support for liberal democracy finds expression in the ways scholars embed assumptions about human subjectivity, motivation, “interests,” and desirable institutions into their models. Studies of democracy arguably dramatize this commitment to liberalism and science best—and link the two to current imperial projects. Democracy studies offer normative benchmarks of progress while simultaneously inciting scientific inquiry into causes of success and failure As David Scott writes: Democracy has become a new normative standard taking over the conceptual-ideological work hitherto performed by civilization in governing the conduct of international order, and disciplining, where necessary, and by diverse technologies (largely military and economic), its recalcitrant or otherwise uncooperative members. Or, perhaps, put slightly differently, democracy is the contemporary political name of an old civilizing project: it is now a regulative principle in the political rationality of international order by which the political prospects of (especially, if not only) the Third World are governed.35 This civilizing project has taken on various forms in the discipline of political science historically, instantiated previously in versions of modernization theory,36 in theories of “underdevelopment,” and for the last two decades, as Scott notes, most prominently in debates about “democratization.”37 Such civilizing impulses, importantly, are often concealed by taken-for-granted assumptions about the good life. As the French philosopher Alain Badiou (2005: 78) points out provocatively, these days “it is forbidden not to be a democrat.” Scott’s analogy of democratization projects to earlier civilizing missions is helpful in thinking about how discourses that “other” colonial or occupied subjects work to shore up institutions of administrative rule, or to make possible and justify political action. In considering the nature of power in the post-colonial world, and in focusing on what seems to be a resurgent empire in the form of U.S. domination in the Middle East, the differences between current imperial projects and their antecedents are also illustrative, hinting at political science’s complex contemporary entanglement.

### K Prior – Class

#### We need a theory of global capitalism to understand any significant processes in Latin America.

William **ROBINSON** Sociology @ UCSB **‘8** *Latin America and Global Capitalism: a critical globalization perspective* p. xi

The rise of globalization studies has served to reassert not only the centrality of historical analysis and the ongoing reconfiguration of time and space but also the importance of a holistic approach to any understanding of human affairs. In my view, globalization is the underlying dynamic that drives social, political, economic, cultural, and ideological processes around world in the twenty'first century. New economic, political, and social structures have emerged-in Latin America and elsewhere-as each nation and region becomes integrated into emergent transnational structures and processes. There is a new configuration of global power that becomes manifest in each nation and the tentacles of whieh .reach all the way down to the community level. Each individual, each nation, and each region is being drawn into transnational processes that have undermined the earlier autonomies and provincialisms. This makes it impossible to address local issues-if not indeed any issue of social, political, or intellectual importance-removed from the global context. I will argue in what follows, moreover, that crisis and transformation in Latin America are part of a deeper crisis of global capitalism.

#### Structural analysis of class inequality is a pre-requisite for economic assessment.

Portes 10, (Alejandro, Cuban-American sociologist. He received his Ph.D. in sociology from the University of Wisconsin, “LATIN AMERICAN CLASS STRUCTURES:¶ Their Composition and Change during the Neoliberal Era,” Economic Sociology: A Systematic Inquiry, 2010, http://worldroom.tamu.edu/Workshops/K-12LatinAmerica07/El%20Salvador/Class%20Struggle.pdf

The concept of social class refers to discrete and durable categories of the population characterized by differential access to power-conferring resources and related life chances. In capitalist societies, such class defining resources are explicitly tied to markets and the ability of individuals to compete effectively in them (Weber [1922] 1965; Veblen [1899] 1998; Mills 1959). While orthodox Marxist theories commonly constrained class resources to the possession of capital and the means of production versus ownership of raw labor, recent theories have adopted a more flexible approach encompassing other power-conferring resources such as control over the labor of others and possession of scarce occupational skills (Grusky and Sorenson 1998; Wright 1985; Carchedi 1977; Poulantzas 1975). The common advantage of class analysis, both classic and contemporary, is its focus on the causes of inequality and poverty and not just its surface manifestations, as commonly done in standard official publications. Classes are also central for understanding the long-term strategic relations of power and conflict among social groups and the forms in which these struggles shape the relative life chances of its members (Dahrendorf 1959; Hout, Brooks, and Manza 1993; Portes 2000). In exploring the class structure of particular societies, the analyst seeks to uncover not only those key social aggregates defined by common life chances, but also the ways in which some groups consciously attempt to stabilize the social order in defense of their privileges and in which other groups seek to subvert it in order to improve their lot. This focus leads directly into the analysis of politics and political mobilization (Hall 1997).

#### **Neoliberalism relies on manufactured consent – the connections between North American intellectuals, policymakers and their Latin American allies.**

Kellogg, 2007(Paul Assistant Professor at Athabasca University, Regional Integration in Latin America: Dawn of an Alternative to Neoliberalism? New Political Science Volume 29, Number 2, June 2007)

Latin America has been at the center of the neoliberal “revolution.” David Harvey¶ reminds us “the ﬁrst great experiment with neoliberal state formation was Chile¶ after Pinochet’s coup on the ‘little September 11th’ of 1973.” This brutal¶ introduction to neoliberalism began with the repression of the left, the workers’¶ movements and popular organizations, creating an ideal Petri dish for the late¶ Milton Friedman and economists associated with the University of Chicago to¶ “reconstruct the Chilean economy ... along free-market lines, privatizing public¶ assets, opening up natural resources to private exploitation and facilitating¶ foreign direct investment and free trade.”2¶ For most of Latin America, however,¶ the neoliberal turn was carried out not through coercion, but through a complex¶ interrelationship between national governments won to a neoliberal perspective,¶ transnational corporations, and intellectuals (usually economists) aggressively promoting the new neoliberal orthodoxy. Together, they manufactured a¶ “consent” to neoliberalism, which was to dominate most countries for more¶ than a generation. Characteristic of this manufacturing of consent was (1) the¶ supersession of national development strategies.

### K Prior – Hegemony

#### We should try to see the consequences of hegemony from the outside in—incredible destruction, further instability, and tyranny. Their impacts are constructed by our refusal to see beyond insular American IR.

Penny **VON ESCHEN** History @ Michigan **‘5** “Enduring Public Diplomacy” *American Quarterly* 57.2 MUSE

An account of U.S. public diplomacy and empire in Iraq can be constructed only through engaging fields outside the sphere of American studies. Political scientist Mahmood Mamdani locates the roots of the current global crisis in [End Page 339] U.S. cold war policies. Focusing on the proxy wars of the later cold war that led to CIA support of Osama Bin Laden and drew Iraq and Saddam Hussein into the U.S. orbit as allies against the Iranians, Mamdani also reminds us of disrupted democratic projects and of the arming and destabilization of Africa and the Middle East by the superpowers, reaching back to the 1953 CIA-backed coup ousting Mussadeq in Iran and the tyrannical rule of Idi Amin in Uganda. For Mamdani, the roots of contemporary terrorism must be located in politics, not the "culture" of Islam. Along with the work of Tariq Ali and Rashid Khalidi, Mamdani's account of the post–1945 world takes us through those places where U.S. policy has supported and armed military dictatorships, as in Pakistan and Iraq, or intervened clandestinely, from Iraq and throughout the Middle East to Afghanistan and the Congo. For these scholars, these events belong at the **center** of twentieth-century history, rather than on the periphery, with interventions and coups **portrayed as unfortunate anomalies**. These scholars provide a critical history for what otherwise is posed as an "Islamic threat," placing the current prominence of Pakistan in the context of its longtime support from the United States as a countervailing force against India.8

Stretching across multiple regions, but just as crucial for reading U.S. military practices in Iraq, Yoko Fukumura and Martha Matsuoka's "Redefining Security: Okinawa Women's Resistance to U.S. Militarism" reveals the human and environmental destruction wrought by U.S. military bases in Asia through the living archive of activists who are demanding redress of the toxic contamination and violence against women endemic to base communities.9 Attention to the development of exploitative and violent sex industries allows us to place such recent horrors as the abuse, torture, and debasement at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq in a history of military practices.10 Taken together, these works are exemplary, inviting us to revisit the imposition of U.S. power in East and South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, regions where the instrumental role of U.S. power in the creation of undemocratic military regimes has often been overlooked. That none of these works has been produced by scholars who were trained in American studies is perhaps not accidental, but rather symptomatic of a field still shaped by insularity despite increasing and trenchant critiques of this insularity by such American studies scholars as Amy Kaplan and John Carlos Rowe.11 In recommending that American studies scholars collaborate with those in other fields and areas of study and by articulating warnings about how easily attempts to "internationalize" can hurtle down the **slippery slope** of neoliberal expansion, Kennedy and Lucas join such scholars in furthering the project of viewing U.S. hegemony **from the outside in**. They [End Page 340] expose the insularity that has been an abiding feature of U.S. politics and public discourse.

### **Alternative – Solidarity**

#### Our intellectual labor of critique undermines the ideological conditions that maintain neoliberalism.

William **ROBINSON** Sociology @ UCSB **‘8** *Latin America and Global Capitalism: a critical globalization perspective* p. xiii

In times such as these intellectuals are called upon to engage in a critical analytical and theoretical understanding of global society: to contribute to an understanding of history and social change that may elucidate the inner workings of the prevailing order and the causal processes at work in that order that generate crisis. They are also called upon to expose the vested interests bound up with the global social order, the discourses through which those interests are articulated, and the distinct alternatives to the extant order that counterhegemonic agents put forward. Intellectual production . is always a collective process. Let us not lose sight of the social and historical character of intellectual labor. All those scholars who engage in such labor or make knowledge claims are organic intellectuals in the sense that studying the world is itself a social act, committed by agents with a definite relationship to the social order. Intellectual labor is social labor; its practitioners are social actors; and the products of its labor are not neutral or disinterested. In recent years I have proposed a rationale and minimal guidelines for critical globalization studies and have called on intellectuals to "exercise a preferential option for the majority in global society" (Robinson, 2oo6c). Globalization is not a neutral process. It involves winners and losers and new relations of power and domination. We need organic intellectuals capable of theorizing the changes that have taken place in the system of capitalism, in this epoch of globalization, and of providing to popular majorities these theoretical insights as inputs for their real-world struggles to develop alternative social relationships and an alternative social logic-the logic of majorities-to that of the market and of transnational capital. In other words, critical globalization studies has to be capable of inspiring emancipatory action, of bringing together multiple pub. lies in developing programs that integrate theory and practice.

#### Latin America is a key starting point to challenge neoliberalism.

Escobar 2010 (Arturo Escobar Colombian-American anthropologist primarily known for his contribution to postdevelopment theory and political ecology. interdisciplinary PhD at the University of California, Berkeley in Development Philosophy, Policy and Planning. He completed his PhD in 1987.) ( “LATIN AMERICA AT A CROSSROADS Alternative modernizations, post-liberalism, or post-development?” January 1, 2010, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09502380903424208#.UbspqJyL84o //BLOV)

Introduction: the ‘turn to the left’ and the current conjuncture

Latin America is the only region in the world where some counter-hegemonic processes of importance might be taking place at the level of the State at present. Some argue that these processes might lead to a re-invention of socialism; for others, what is at stake is the dismantling of the neo-liberal policies of the past three decades —the end the ‘the long neo-liberal night,’ as the period is known in progressive circles in the region — or the formation of a South American (and anti-American) bloc. Others point at the potential for un nuevo comienzo (a new beginning) which might bring about a reinvention of democracy and development or, more radically still, the end of the predominance of liberal society of the past 200 years founded on private property and representative democracy. Socialismo del siglo XXI, pluri-nationality, interculturality, direct and substantive democracy, revolucion ciudadana, endogenous development centered on the buen vivir of the people, territorial and cultural autonomy, and decolonial projects towards post-liberal societies are some of the concepts that seek to name the ongoing transforma­tions. The Peruvian sociologist Anı´bal Quijano perhaps put it best: ‘It is a time of luchas (struggles) and of options. Latin America was the original space of the emergence of modern/colonial capitalism; it marked its founding moment. Today it is, at last, the very center of world resistance against this pattern of power and of the production of alternatives to it’ (2008, p. 3).

Despite the contradictory and diverse forms it has taken in the present decade, the so-called ‘turn to the Left’ in Latin America suggests that the urge for a re-orientation of the course followed over the past three to four decades is strongly felt by many governments. This is most clear in the cases of Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador; to a greater or lesser extent, Argentina, Paraguay, Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador; and in the cases of Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, which make up what some observers have called the ‘pragmatic reformers.’ Why is this happening in Latin America more clearly than in any other world region at present is a question I cannot tackle fully here, but it is related to the fact that Latin America was the region that most earnestly embraced neo-liberal reforms, where the model was applied most thoroughly, and where the results are most ambiguous at best. It was on the basis of the early Latin American experiences that the Washington Consensus was crafted. The fact that many of the reforms of the most recent years are referred to as ‘anti-neoliberal’ seems particularly apposite. Whether these countries are entering a post-neoliberal —let alone, post-liberal —social order remains a matter of debate. This specificity also has to do with the multiplicity of long-term histories and trajectories that underlie the cultural and political projects at play. It can plausibly be argued that the region could be moving at the very least beyond the idea of a single, universal modernity and towards a more plural set of modernities. Whether it is also moving beyond the dominance of one set of modernities (Euro-modernities), or not, remains to be seen. Although moving to a post-liberal society does not seem to be the project of the progressive governments, some social movements could be seen as pointing in this direction. A third layer to which attention needs to be paid is, of course, the reactions by, and projects from, the right. State, social movements, and the right appear as three inter-related but distinct spheres of cultural-political intervention. Said differently, this paper seeks to understand the current conjuncture, in the sense of ‘a description of a social formation as fractured and conflictual, along multiple axes, planes and scales, constantly in search of temporary balances or structural stabilities through a variety of practices and processes of struggle and negotiation’ (Grossberg 2006, p. 4). Latin America can be fruitfully seen as a crossroads: a regional formation where critical theories arising from many trajectories (from Marxist political economy and post-structuralism to ‘decolonial thought’), a multiplicity of histories and futures, and very diverse cultural and political projects all find a convergence space. As we shall see, the current conjuncture can be said to be defined by two processes: the crisis of the neo-liberal model of the past three decades; and the crisis of the project of bringing about modernity in the continent since the Conquest.

#### Ideological critique undermines the legitimacy of neoliberalism.

Montúfar,2011 (César, César Montúfar is a representative in the National Assembly of Ecuador and ¶ professor at the Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar in Quito, Ecuador, Two Generations of Social Movements ¶ and Democracy in Latin Americahttp://www.offnews.info/downloads/IAD30thAnniversaryBookmarked.pdf#page=185,)

While raising opposition to a global model of international capitalism development and liberal democratization, several social movements presented alternatives ¶ for a collective appropriation of the social space as well as production of autonomous systems of productive self-management and autonomous self-government. This ¶ trend can clearly be seen in proposals made by the Zapatistas, the Brazilian MST, ¶ the Ecuadorian indigenous movement, the Bolivian Coordinadora, among others ¶ (Seoane, Taddei, and Algranati, 2006: 242). In that sense, several second generation ¶ social movements confronted neoliberalism not only at a level of discourse but by ¶ producing new models of social, economic, and political organization. That was a ¶ response to the weakening of the state produced by neoliberal policies, problems of ¶ bureaucratization, and manipulation of the state apparatus. These experiences of ¶ self-organization of society developed through the implementation of assembly-type ¶ mechanisms of political participation and collective decision-making. At this level, ¶ second generation social movements claim that direct or semi-direct mechanisms of ¶ political participation are much more democratic than representative institutions ¶ and, therefore, should be extended beyond the local realm to national processes of ¶ decision making (Seoane, Taddei, and Algranati, 2006: 243).¶ Indeed, the use of referenda, public consultations, and other mechanisms of ¶ direct participatory democracy had been systematically proposed by second generation social movements. Civil society groups in Uruguay, Costa Rica, Bolivia, and ¶ Ecuador used national referendums to block the implementation of market reforms ¶ and structural adjustment policies. They argued for a model of political participation that presents a direct challenge to representative institutions and representative ¶ democracy in general. Furthermore, the civil society groups tend to promote the ¶ creation and development of direct arrangements of participative democracy, both ¶ within their own organizations and at the level of national politics.¶ Linked to this point is the direct connection of social actors with political and ¶ state actors. In contrast to previous notions of autonomy and differentiation of state ¶ and society, second generation social movements accept the fusion of social and political dynamics in ways that do not resemble either previous corporatist or clientele ¶ arrangements. There are good examples: the Zapatistas caracoles, Brazilian Workers ¶ Party (PT) participatory budgeting in local governments, Bolivian MAS multicultural democracy.7¶ With all of them, direct democracy arrangements were established ¶ 7 The Zapatistas proposed creation of autonomous municipal governments, self ruled and based upon principles of ¶ solidarity and community resistance. Those experiences were called caracoles and were detailed by Pablo González ¶ Casanova, “Los “Caracoles” Zapatistas: Redes de Resistencia y Autonomía” in Observatorio Social de América ¶ Latina, (Buenos Aires: CLACSO, 2003), 16-17.193¶ to transcend representative institutions so as to address substantive issues linked to ¶ redistribution of state resources. These movements contend that social and political struggles need not be isolated; they put into practice a new vision of political ¶ participation not circumscribed by elections or representative politics but directed ¶ toward the construction of hegemonic political projects that serve as alternatives to ¶ the neoliberal project (Sader, 2006: 96).¶ Brazil’s participatory experience led by the PT government in Porto Alegre and ¶ Belo Horizonte is viewed a paradigmatic model of such synergy among a social ¶ organization, a political party (the PT), and a state bureaucracy (Sader, 2006: 96). ¶ Portuguese sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos regards the PT experience of ¶ participatory budgeting as an effective example of social co-administration of public ¶ resources and, moreover, as a process of democratic reinvention that institutionalized open public decision processes in a way that allowed citizens and social movements to achieve substantive gains (Sousa Santos, 2004: 25, 82-83). Avritzer contends that participatory budgeting in Brazil contradicts conventional assumptions ¶ in democratic theory, in particular the notion that there is an unavoidable contradiction between social mobilization and democratic institutionalization. According ¶ to this author, the story of social participation in Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte ¶ shows that participation and institutionalization can produce a better democracy if ¶ the former comes from collective action in the public sphere. It is a Latin American ¶ democratic innovation that should not be undervalued (Avritzer, 2002: 515-516). ¶ What seems significant in the Brazilian experience of participatory budgeting is the ¶ unity between the social actors’ quest to acquire access to decision-making processes ¶ within the state and the PT political party’s platform. This unity occurs because both ¶ the social and the political organizations in control of the local government share a ¶ political and ideological agenda. In this context, the differentiation and autonomy ¶ among state, political, and social actors seems no longer valid.¶ Indeed, the idea of constructing anti-hegemonic models, as second generation ¶ social movements proclaim, requires a non-liberal notion of civil society, one not ¶ opposed to the state but aimed at sharing with political and state actors a common ¶ agenda of social, economic, and political transformation. If the aim is to transform ¶ the political, economic, social, and cultural basis of neoliberalism, then social and ¶ political movements should act together and change state policies and social, cultural, and economic relations. The Bolivian political experience, expressed in the MAS ¶ government led by Morales, is probably the clearer expression of the radical differentiation of state, party, and social movements in contemporary Latin America. For ¶ that purpose, previous institutions have to collapse before new institutions can be ¶ born and that does not happen without enormous unrest and conflict. Nonetheless, ¶ what seems at stake is the attempt to reconstruct the institutional basis of democracy ¶ from below, from the very influx of a multiple net of social movements, in ways that 194¶ transcend the parameters of representative democracy in the monocultural and liberal state (Tapia, 2006: 71-98). For Theotonio Dos Santos, the appearance in Latin America of this new wave ¶ of social mobilization has implied a shift from defensive social movements concerned ¶ with particular demands in the national context to a much more offensive cycle of ¶ social protest carrying not only national but global demands (Dos Santos, 2004: ¶ 74). Offensive social movements have included new forms of mobilization strategies, ¶ leading to the generation of broad processes of consensus building and, even, the ¶ creation of electoral majorities. That has been the case with resistance movements ¶ that, in different urban contexts, generated impressive street demonstrations that ¶ first contributed to the end of several elected governments and, later, promoted the ¶ election of anti-neoliberal governments. Examples are found not only in Ecuador, ¶ Bolivia, and Argentina, countries where “street politics” became an important component of social struggles, but also in Brazil, where the social mobilization of urban ¶ and rural workers was decisive in the presidential triumph of Luiz Inácio Lula da ¶ Silva. Over the last years, social mobilization and protest against neoliberalism have ¶ transformed the political scenario and public opinion in Latin America. Several governments that have taken office in the region have emerged either from conditions ¶ created by social movements or from within social movement themselves (Zibechi, ¶ 2006: 226). In different ways, the decline of neoliberal policies throughout the region and the triumph of left-oriented governments have been the products of this ¶ wave of social protest.¶ This has been possible due to a general de-legitimization of neoliberal policies, ¶ free trade, financial liberalization and, even, representative democracy institutions. ¶ The political and ideological impact of social protests has been enormous in terms ¶ of redirecting state policies and the ideological landscape of the region toward an ¶ emerging anti-capitalist globalization consensus. One can argue that, to a great extent, the Washington Consensus put forth by national and international elites in the ¶ 1980s and 1990s, is now leaving its space to a new common sense brought about by ¶ a wave of social protest opposed to neoliberal policies and capitalist globalization ¶ trends. Never before in contemporary Latin America have political systems been so ¶ profoundly altered by the action of social actors. Social movements have been solidly established as a determinant force in Latin American politics.¶ Since the late 1990s and the early 2000s, there has been in Latin America a convergent trend of social mobilization, different from the past because of its extension ¶ and its radical agenda in opposition to the perceived global project of economic and ¶ political domination by the industrialized world (Seoane and Taddei, 2001: 119). ¶ The issue of sovereignty and the defense of natural resources constituted one of ¶ the critical fuels mobilizing trade unions, peasant organizations, urban actors, and 195¶ new social organizations. A radical opposition to U.S. military policies in the region ¶ helped extend the social mobilization front.¶ Second generation social movements represent a new internationalism emerging from a process of national and international convergence (Seoane and Taddei, ¶ 2001: 123). This process has promoted formation of a huge alliance of multiple actors, both social and political, not only Latin American but from periphery regions ¶ and developed countries. In fact, Porto Alegre’s First Social Forum saw an important representation of developed countries’ organizations. The convergence of Third ¶ World and First World social movements was part of the trend begun in Seattle in ¶ 1999 when people from different parts of the world came together with a common ¶ view of the miseries created by global capitalism and proclaimed that a “new world ¶ is possible.”¶ Second generation social movements present an anti-elitist claim, a critique to ¶ representative democracy, and an argument in favor of direct democracy. For Atilio ¶ Boron, social movements are presenting a new political agenda directed at a postliberal society ruled by subaltern classes. What really is at stake is a radical project ¶ that reinvents democracy away from the parameters of liberal politics and its elitist ¶ prejudices, in a moment when the contradiction between capitalism and democracy ¶ cannot be overcome by timid expressions of electoral democracy (Boron, 2006, 301, ¶ 290, 296).¶ Second generation movements generally proclaim a left-oriented politico-ideological standpoint from which they construct their social and political interventions. ¶ Their political projection is based upon an ideological radicalization that transcends ¶ the liberal institutional and citizenship discourse. According to Sader, the very notion of differentiation between state and society is part of the liberal ideology that ¶ needs to be overcome. This vision, dominant since civil society actors struggled ¶ against Southern Cone dictatorships in the late 1970s and early 1980s, is viewed ¶ as presenting a Manichean notion of a negative state and a virtuous civil society ¶ in which all social groups and market actors are seen alike (Sader, 2006: 95-96). ¶ Second generation social movements reject any sharp separation and autonomy of ¶ state and civil society actors. In their vision, such a liberal standpoint needs to be ¶ eliminated in order to produce social and political actors capable of transforming the ¶ social, political, and economic life far beyond the limited scope of traditional parties ¶ and social organizations.

#### Align yourself with Latin American resistance to Neoliberalism.

Montúfar,2011 (César, César Montúfar is a representative in the National Assembly of Ecuador and ¶ professor at the Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar in Quito, Ecuador, Two Generations of Social Movements ¶ and Democracy in Latin Americahttp://www.offnews.info/downloads/IAD30thAnniversaryBookmarked.pdf#page=185,)

A second generation of social movements emerged in Latin America linked to the ¶ worldwide anti-globalization movement that drew international attention in the ¶ context of the Seattle protest against free trade in November 1999 and, later, in the ¶ appearances of networks of social actors opposed to financial liberalization, global ¶ investments, U.S. hegemony, and multilateral institutions like the World Bank, the ¶ International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, the Organization for ¶ Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the Davos Economic Forum. Coinciding with this international trend, the end of the 1990s saw a significant ¶ rise in the cycle of social protest in all of Latin America. According to CLACSO’s ¶ OSAL (Observatorio Social de América Latina), which produced a database of social ¶ conflict in nineteen countries regionwide between 2000 and 2002, social conflicts in ¶ the region increased 180 percent (Seoane, Taddei, and Algranati: 2006: 228-229). ¶ This continued for the next few years, indicating a trend of social conflict markedly ¶ different from the patterns of social mobilization that prevailed in previous decades. ¶ In short, a new wave of social mobilization appeared in Latin America in the late ¶ 1990s. It came in opposition to the Washington Consensus and just as neoliberal 189¶ reforms were exhausted. This new cycle of protest and conflict was linked to the ¶ emergence of the worldwide anti-globalization movements and proclaimed a role ¶ for international social actors in the reconfiguration of national and transnational ¶ public policies.¶ Different from the national or sub-national scope of first generation social ¶ movements, the issues raised by this new wave of social protest addressed global ¶ issues, including world capitalism and free trade, global public goods, and U.S. hegemony and military power around the world. Under the umbrella of a global agenda, ¶ second generation social movements promoted an international convergence of social actors from both the North and the South. They included labor movements in ¶ developed countries and human rights, indigenous, and gender rights organizations ¶ from the periphery. While global political and economic elites discussed the “end of ¶ history” and the undisputable triumph of liberal democracy and free trade, a myriad ¶ of social actors, through the establishment of global networks of ideas and coordinated initiatives, questioned capitalism, liberal democracy, and U.S. global power. ¶ They proclaimed that the dominance of neoliberal ideology precludes a comprehensive vision of history and social change in which “another World could be possible.” ¶ Neoliberal ideology, according to Emir Sader, had triumphed throughout the world ¶ thanks to a huge propaganda apparatus. The appearance of anti-globalization social ¶ movements implied a global struggle against neoliberalism and, thus, the building of ¶ anti-hegemonic alternatives from below (Sader, 2006: 93).¶ The conceptualization of second generation social movements was part of a ¶ huge academic project led in the late 1990s by CLACSO, which went on to establish ¶ OSAL to monitor social conflicts and social movement initiatives throughout the ¶ region. At the same time, CLACSO sponsored research projects, conferences, international study groups, books, online courses, and publications to promote the study ¶ and dissemination of social movements’ ideas and proposals in connection with the ¶ worldwide anti-globalization movement born in Seattle. This academic effort set ¶ the theoretical framework for future studies of civil society and social movements ¶ throughout the region. CLACSO succeeded in establishing the framework of the ¶ academic debate on social movements in Latin America, eclipsing all other interpretation frameworks of social mobilization. It created the theoretical links between ¶ global mobilizations against neoliberalism and the dynamics of Latin American social movements. CLACSO ignited an academic and political project that sought to ¶ provide an intellectual and political direction to social mobilization in Latin America. In comparison with previous academic efforts aimed at studying Latin American ¶ social movements, the intellectual and material resources invested by CLACSO were ¶ overwhelmingly superior. Since the late 1990s, its approach has outdistanced any ¶ other attempt at interpreting social movements in the region.190¶ According to this theoretical framework, a new wave of social mobilization ¶ started in Mexico with the irruption of the Zapatista movement in the mid-1990s. ¶ More precisely, in 1996, the EZLN (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional) ¶ convened an International Conference for Humanity and Against Neoliberalism ¶ in Chiapas. The aim was to denounce “neoliberal globalization.” The Zapatista¶ discourse was built upon a simple polarization: humanity versus neoliberalism. Its ¶ program demanded the construction of a new global social order, different from the ¶ one neoliberalism has imposed in which “all the worlds can fit in.” The Zapatistas¶ see democracy and democratization as central to their political project, but do not ¶ interpret it as rule of the majority. Rather, they view it as the construction of a broad ¶ social and inclusive consensus. They proclaim a new democracy based on equality ¶ for all; their aim is not the acquisition of state power but the transformation of society and power relations. The Zapatistas conceive of their mobilization as the world’s ¶ first anti-neoliberal revolution. The revolution they propose, therefore, is global, not ¶ local. Its scope transcends Chiapas or the south of Mexico and projects itself on the ¶ whole world (Ceceña, 2002: 13).¶ Another breaking point in the new trend of social mobilization was the socalled Water War in Cochabamba, Bolivia, in April 2000. This event was not only a ¶ local protest in defense of a natural resource for a community, but it addressed a conflict with global implications in the sense that it proposed a different approach to the ¶ distribution of wealth and natural resources in opposition to privatization policies. ¶ It put into question the very premise of capitalism and market-based globalization ¶ as the Bolivia social organization, Coordinadora de Defensa del Agua y de la Vida, ¶ succeeded in blocking the privatization of a water company in Cochabamba. Later, ¶ the Coordinadora evolved into a powerful nationwide social movement that articulated several initiatives in opposition to the U.S.-backed coca eradication policy. In ¶ 2003, it played a crucial role in the so-called Gas War protesting the privatization of ¶ gas (Lewis, 2004: 162-170). The Coordinadora was also a central actor in the social ¶ protest that numerous Bolivian actors developed to oust President Gonzalo Sánchez ¶ de Lozada and his neoliberal policies. It also developed close personal and political ¶ links with political parties, especially Movement toward Socialism (MAS). In 2005, ¶ MAS won the presidency of Bolivia with Evo Morales, leader of the cocalero movement, which was also part of the Coordinadora.¶ The Bolivian experience shows the power and unprecedented influence of social mobilization in Latin America against neoliberalism and global capitalism. In ¶ fact, Bolivian social movements claim that their protest stopped neoliberalism at the ¶ national level and that their actions represent a victory of people’s mobilization over ¶ the grand interests of corporate globalization (Shiva: 2004: xi).¶ The Bolivian experience of mobilization and protest offered a renewed vision ¶ of democracy and democratization in the Latin American context. In a book that 191¶ narrates his experience as activist, Oscar Olivera, leader and spokesperson of the ¶ Coordinadora, details electoral democracy’s limitations in representing the interest ¶ of the poor. “How, then, are ordinary working people represented politically in the ¶ age of neoliberal privatization?” he asks, clearly accepting that Bolivian question as, ¶ obviously, valid for the rest of Latin America. His answer is that politics for ordinary working people should transcend the electoral market and become a process ¶ of “collective discussion, decision making, and implementation of solutions for our ¶ common problems” (Olivera, 2002: 20-21). In that sense, political participation at ¶ the national level should not be reduced to the act of voting in a ballot box but, ¶ rather, expanded to the day-to-day struggle against oppression and exploitation. In ¶ the Bolivian perspective, the privatization of water and gas were common problems ¶ that merited direct social intervention by the people in order to recuperate for them ¶ the nation’s natural resources (Olivera, 2002: 8-15).¶ The initiative of the Zapatistas and the Bolivian social movements like the Coordinadora influenced multiple social movements in Latin America. In that way, ¶ a vigorous anti-globalization movement consolidated in Latin America in the late ¶ 1990s. This movement crystallized at the First Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil, ¶ in January 2001. The forum was considered a significant step toward developing a ¶ regional social response to free trade, privatization of state-owned companies, private exploitation of natural resources, and militarization of international relations. ¶ Apart from proclaiming that human beings and life are not commodities, the Porto ¶ Alegre Declaration called for active participation by multiple social actors from the ¶ North and the South, from social and political arenas, in future anti-capitalist globalization mobilizations (First Social Forum, 2001: 202-204).¶ Despite their diversity and previous fragmentation, from Porto Alegre on, the ¶ region’s political organizations and social movements voiced a unified anti-neoliberal agenda. In that new regional context, many first generation social movements, like ¶ those involving women’s rights, the environment, indigenous rights, etc., converged ¶ with second generation movements to present a unique posture toward future mobilizations. The First Social Forum was expression of a wide social convergence, ¶ regional and global. In a common line, peasant and indigenous movements like the ¶ Landless Movement of Brazil (MST), the Ecuadorian indigenous movement, the Chapare coca producers in Bolivia, the Chilean Mapuches, and other indigenous peasant ¶ initiatives in Colombia and Central America mobilized against transnational capitalism’s impact on rural areas and demanded a collective appropriation of natural resources such as land, water, oil, minerals. Likewise, there was an important surge of ¶ urban movements demanding rights for workers, the unemployed, and urban poor. ¶ The Piqueteros in Argentina are an example of a social actor—in this case, unemployed workers—who sought to transform power relations and reverse neoliberal ¶ hegemony in Argentine society. Something similar can be said of the public workers’ 192¶ organizations that became critical agents of opposition to privatization initiatives in ¶ several countries and, in general, to the application of structural adjustment policies. ¶ Public workers, in that sense, presented within the state a strong opposition to neoliberalism and its agenda of deregulation and decreased state intervention.¶

### AT: Inevitable

#### There are alternatives to neoliberalism in Latin America.

Munck, Ronaldo. 2003. Neoliberalism, necessitarianism and alternatives in Latin America: there is no alternative (TINA)?. Third World Quarterly, 24(3), 495-511.

There is no alternative (TINA) was an oft-repeated expression of Margaret¶ Thatcher’s, used to dismiss any plausible alternatives to her brand of hard-nosed neoliberalism. One imagines that her friend General Pinochet, with whom she¶ shared tea during his enforced stay in London, would agree with her. What is more surprising is the influence the TINA philosophy has had on social science analysis of neoliberalism in Latin America since Pinochet. What I propose is a radically anti-necessitarian approach to neoliberalism, inspired by the work of¶ Roberto Mangabeira Unger. Things are not always how they are because they have to be so. There is life beyond neoliberalism. There are alternatives taking shape all the time at all levels of society in Latin America. The so-called Washington Consensus is no longer so consensual even in Washington and there is growing recognition that globalisation requires global governance. We therefore need to return to the rise of neoliberalism and globalisation in a nonnecessitarian spirit and examine the whole horizon of possibilities that is now opening up in Latin America as elsewhere. If the virtual collapse of Argentina in 2001–02 shows that ‘actually existing’ neoliberalism simply does not work even on its own terms, the exciting but also challenging prospects now opening up¶ in Brazil under Lula underline the urgency of developing a credible and viable¶ alternative to its policies.

#### Existing economic alternatives in Latin America prove neoliberalism isn’t inevitable.

Escobar 2010 (Arturo Escobar Colombian-American anthropologist primarily known for his contribution to postdevelopment theory and political ecology. interdisciplinary PhD at the University of California, Berkeley in Development Philosophy, Policy and Planning. He completed his PhD in 1987.) ( “LATIN AMERICA AT A CROSSROADS Alternative modernizations, post-liberalism, or post-development?” January 1, 2010, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09502380903424208#.UbspqJyL84o //BLOV)

Generally speaking, then, the main tension emphasized by independent observers is that between the need to foster autonomous organizations and the tendency, especially after 2006, to re/concentrate power in the State and, particularly, in the presidency (e.g. Cha´vez’ authoritarian tendencies, most controversially staged in areas such as communications, in ways that many see as reducing freedom of expression). Will community councils and other popular organizations, such as the well-known technical water and land committees, be able to maintain their independence from a single-party political movement led by the State? The struggle is seen as between tendencies to strengthening statism and those for greater transparency, participation, and popular sector autonomy. Only the latter path ‘could consolidate the Venezuelan experience as a genuine and novel post-capitalist democratic alternative’ (Lander 2007a, p. 31, emphasis added). One of the issues most highlighted by critics is the need for a broad debate on the actual conditions and limitations of the Bolivarian process; this involves discussions about the possibilities of deepening democracy, and the risks of not doing so. Additional aspects of the debate concern concrete problems, such as the deficiencies of public management, insecurity, and corruption.

Most conclusions emphasize both achievements and a sense of incomplete¬ness, conflict, and, above all, partial closure of the process. Coronil summarized it well: ‘No matter where one stands or how one views Cha´vez’s Venezuela, few would dispute that under Cha´vez the nation is different’; for him, ‘the Cha´vez regime has sought a different modernity by rejecting capitalism within a class-divided society and promoting collective welfare through social solidarity within a yet to be defined socialist society of the 21st century’ (Coronil 2008, p. 4). For Lander, while the first few years constituted a form of social democracy, the post-2006 period has entailed a further radicalization, yet one that exhibits a constant tension in the Bolivarian process between the government’s neo-developmentalism —with its mixture of State and private capitalism (referred to in Bolivia as ‘Andean-Amazonian capitalism’ by this country’s vice-president Garcı´a Linera) —and the will of certain political sectors (inside and outside Chavismo) and social movements to radicalize, from the base, forms of popular power towards a socialist alternative ... the main challenge is how to imagine a different society; what would constitute a post-capitalist society?(Coronil 2008, p. 4, emphasis added)

For this author, the path to this question lies in imagining an alternative civilizational model capable of radically transforming how the economy and politics are understood, so as to insure the survival of life on the planet. But the debate on the environmental sustainability of the Bolivarian model has hardly begun, which constitutes a big gap in the process, to say the least.

The Venezuelan process takes us in the direction envisaged by Lander only up to a limited extent. While it has transformed the development model to some degree, it is still mired in neo-developmentalism and oil rents. With its anti-neoliberal stances it could be said to be moving on a post-capitalist path (particularly considering the social and popular economies), but it stalls frequently along the way because of its contradictory political economy. A main question remains pending: Is the State an effective vehicle for the transformation of society towards post-capitalism and post-development? There are serious doubts that this is the case. However, it might well be the case that all of the pillars of the process —endogenous development, popular economy, and the new geometry of power anchored in the community councils and other forms of popular power —should be understood as horizons guiding a different path rather than as fully worked-out alternative models. This has been said of endogenous development in particular (Parker 2007b). As Parker argues, ‘To speak of an endogenous development based on a popular economy means to discuss a process that is in its infancy’ (p. 76); and he continues, ‘endogenous development implies the search for a unique path in that it places at the heart of the project the augmented role of the people as its main protagonist.... It is an audacious proposal whose results are incomprehensible to those who have not assumed consciously the need for a radical rupture with the premises of a society that showed its exhaustion in 1998’ (p. 79).

Finally, whereas post-liberalism is not on the radar of the State, there are two important developments that erode cherished liberal principles (at least in its ‘really existing’ forms); the first is the introduction of more direct forms of democracy. The second is the transformation of what could be called

the spatiality of liberalism, that is, the commonly held political division of the territory into regions, departments, municipalities, and the like, and which the ‘new geometry of power’ seeks to unsettle in principle. It should be added that post-liberalism seems far from the scope of most popular organizations, partly a consequence of the strength of the developmentalist oil imaginary with its individualistic and consumerist undertones; in other words, the society defined by the Bolivarian revolution and twenty-first century socialism still functions largely within the framework of the liberal order; for post-liberalism to emerge the autonomy of the popular sector would have to be released to a greater degree than the current government is willing to do. As we will suggest with the Bolivian case, only a veritable society in movement, where autonomous social movements get to play an important cultural-political role, might move the socio-natural formation towards the elusive goal of post-liberalism.

### AT: Homogenizing

#### Latin America is a useful unit of analysis – we’re not homogenizing.

William **ROBINSON** Sociology @ UCSB **‘8** *Latin America and Global Capitalism: a critical globalization perspective* p. xii

The truth, as Hegel said, is in the whole. That said, if there is any one caveat to highlight here, it is that in a slim volume such as this simplification is unavoidable. I can only shine a spotlight on a select few of the trees that make up the forest and must inevitably omit entirely a look at other trees, no matter how much they may be integral to the forest. In the end, any intellectual endeavor is open-ended: a work in progress. My approach-to look at Latin America as a whole-inevitably understates complexity and divergence and overstates the extent to which general statements can be made. There is no single, homogenous Latin America. Nonetheless, the exercise remains valid-indeed, useful and vital-insofar as there are underlying structural shifts that have produced clear region-wide patterns of change. There is a general pattern across all of Latin America of transition to global capitalism, even if each country and region has experienced this transition on the basis of its own particular constellation of social forces, historical circumstances, and contingent variables. I am concerned in the present study with identifying this underlying unity among varied patterns of change, with extrapolating from divergent experiences to uncover these general patterns and categories of events-such as the spread of nontraditional exports, the rise of transnational capitalists from among the region's dominant groups, the debt crisis and the preponderance of global financial markets, and the upsurge of new resistance movements across the region. These general patterns point to underlying causal processes of capitalist globalization.

# Neolib Aff Wave II

### AT: K of Hegemony

#### Blanket kritik of hegemonic economic power is ethically unjustifiable. Reigning in worst aspect of bush administrations’ use of military threats solves their offense, but preserves ethical good of avoiding conflict.

Christian **REUS-SMIT** IR @ Australian Nat’l **‘4** *American Power and World Order* p. 109-115

The final ethical position — the polar opposite of the first — holds that the exercise of hegemonic power is never ethically justifiable. One source of such a position might be pacifist thought, which abhors the use of violence even in unambiguous cases of self-defence. This would not, however, provide a comprehensive critique of the exercise of hegemonic power, which takes forms other than overt violence, such as economic diplomacy or the manipulation of international institutions. A more likely source of such critique would be the multifarious literature that equates all power with domination. Postmodernists (and anarch­ists, for that matter) might argue that behind all power lies self-interest and a will to control, both of which are antithetical to genuine human freedom and diversity. Rad­ical liberals might contend that the exercise of power by one human over another transforms the latter from a moral agent into a moral subject, thus violating their in­tegrity as self-governing individuals. Whatever the source, these ideas lead to radical scepticism about all institutions of power, of which hegemony is one form. The idea that the state is a source of individual security is replaced here with the idea of the state as a tyranny; the idea of hegem­ony as essential to the provision of global public goods is A framework for judgement Which of the above ideas help us to evaluate the ethics of the Bush Administration's revisionist hegemonic project? There is a strong temptation in international relations scholarship to mount trenchant defences of favoured para­digms, to show that the core assumptions of one's pre­ferred theory can be adapted to answer an ever widening set of big and important questions. There is a certain discipline of mind that this cultivates, and it certainly brings some order to theoretical debates, but it can lead to the 'Cinderella syndrome', the squeezing of an un­gainly, over-complicated world into an undersized theor­etical glass slipper. The study of international ethics is not immune this syndrome, with a long line of scholars seeking master normative principles of universal applic­ability. My approach here is a less ambitious, more prag­matic one. With the exceptions of the first and last positions, each of the above ethical perspectives contains kernels of wisdom. The challenge is to identify those of value for evaluating the ethics of Bush's revisionist grand strategy, and to consider how they might stand in order of priority. The following discussion takes up this challenge and arrives at a position that I tentatively term 'procedural solidarism'. The first and last of our five ethical positions can be dismissed as unhelpful to our task. The idea that might is right resonates with the cynical attitude we often feel to­wards the darker aspects of international relations, but it does not constitute an ethical standpoint from which to judge the exercise of hegemonic power. First of all, it places the right of moral judgement in the hands of the hegemon, and leaves all of those subject to its actions with no grounds for ethical critique. What the hegemon dictates as ethical is ethical. More than this, though, the principle that might is right is undiscriminating. It gives us no resources to determine ethical from unethical hegemonic conduct. The idea that might is never right is **equally unsatisfying**. It is a principle implied in many critiques of imperial power, including of American power. But like its polar opposite, it is **utterly undiscriminating**. No matter what the hegemon does we are left with one blanket assessment. No procedure, no selfless goal is worthy of ethical endorsement. This is a **deeply impoverished ethical posture**, as it **raises the critique of power above all other human values**. It is also completely counter-intuitive. Had the United States intervened militarily to prevent the Rwandan genocide, would this not have been ethically justifiable? If one answers no, then one faces the difficult task of explaining why the exercise of hegemonic power would have been a greater evil than allowing almost a million people to be massacred. If one answers yes, then one is admitting that a more discriminating set of ethical principles is needed than the simple yet enticing propos­ition that might is never right.

#### Turn: total rejection of u.s. leadership would increase imperialism and colonialism. We should pragmatically reform leadership.

Christian **REUS-SMIT** IR @ Australian Nat’l **‘4** *American Power and World Order* p. 121-123

My preference here is to advocate a forward-leaning, prudential strategy of institutionally governed change. By `forward-leaning', I mean that the progressive realization of cosmopolitan values should be the measure of success­ful politics in international society. As long as gross viola­tions of basic human rights mar global social life, we, as individuals, and the states that purport to represent us, have obligations to direct what political influence we have to the improvement of the human condition, both at home and abroad. I recommend, however, that our approach be prudent rather than imprudent. Historically, the violence of inter-state warfare and the oppression of imperial rule have been deeply corrosive of basic human rights across the globe. The institutions of international society, along with their constitutive norms, such as **sover­eignty,** non-intervention, self-determination and limits on the use of force, have helped to reduce these corrosive forces dramatically. The incidence of inter-state wars has declined markedly, even though the number of states has multiplied, and imperialism and colonialism have moved from being core institutions of international society to practices beyond the pale. Prudence dictates, therefore, that we lean forward without losing our footing on valu­able institutions and norms. This means, in effect, giving priority to **institutionally governed change**, working with the rules and procedures of international society rather than against them. What does this mean in practice? In general, I take it to mean two things. First, it means recognizing the principal rules of international society, and accepting the obligations they impose on actors, including oneself. These rules fall into two broad categories: procedural and substantive. The most specific procedural rules are embodied in insti­tutions such as the United Nations Security Council, which is empowered to 'determine the existence of any threat to peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression' and the measures that will be taken 'to maintain or restore international peace and security'.28 More general, yet equally crucial, procedural rules include the cardinal principle that states are only bound by rules to which they have consented. Even customary international law, which binds states without their express consent, is based in part on the assumption of their tacit consent. The substantive rules of international society are legion, but perhaps the most important are the rules governing the use of force, both when force is permitted (jus ad bellum) and how it may be used (jus in bello). Second, working with the rules and procedures of international society also means recognizing that the principal modality of in­novation and change must be communicative. That is, establishing new rules and mechanisms for achieving cosmopolitan ends and international public goods, or modifying existing ones, should be done through persua­sion and negotiation, not ultimatum and coercion. A pre­mium must be placed, therefore, on articulating the case for change, on recognizing the concerns and interests of others as legitimate, on building upon existing rules, and on seeing genuine communication as a process of give and take, not demand and take. Giving priority to institutionally governed change may seem an overly conservative strategy, but it need not be. As explained above, the established procedural and substantive rules of international society have de­livered international public goods that actually further cosmopolitan ends, albeit in a partial and inadequate fash­ion. **Eroding these rules would only lead to increases in inter-state violence and imperialism**, and this would almost certainly produce a radical deterioration in the protection of basic human rights across the globe. Saying that we ought to preserve these rules is prudent, not con­servative. More than this, though, we have learnt that the institutions of international society have transformative potential, even if this is only now being creatively exploited.

### **No Alternative**

#### **Neoliberal reforms improved Latin American political and economic stability.**

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Contrary to the received wisdom, neoliberalism did not destroy democracy in Latin America; the available evidence suggests that it actually ¶ helped to guarantee the maintenance of democracy. Why did competi- ¶ tive civilian rule in most cases survive the enactment of drastic, costly, ¶ and risky market reforms? Perhaps the most crucial reason for democracy's surprising resilience was that most Latin American countries ¶ enacted neoliberalism only when they faced dramatic crises, and the ¶ population was therefore prepared to swallow the bitter pill of tough ¶ stabilization. In particular, structural adjustment often was a last-ditch response to hyperinflation-that is, to price rises above 50 percent per ¶ month. ¶ The tremendous costs of exploding inflation commonly induce ¶ large segments of the population to support tough, risky stabilization ¶ plans that hold the uncertain prospect of overcoming the crisis. When ¶ facing the danger of a catastrophe, many people are willing to shoulder ¶ considerable short-term losses in the hope of receiving payoffs from ¶ restored stability and renewed growth in the medium and long run. ¶ Thus, in crisis situations, people do not dig in their heels and strenuously defend their immediate material well-being; instead, they are willing to make sacrifices and trust their leaders' plans for straightening out the economy. They are willing to accept substantial risks by supporting ¶ adjustment plans that promise to turn the country around, but that-for ¶ economic and, especially, political reasons-have uncertain prospects ¶ of success. Thus, people's economic calculations are much more com- ¶ plicated and sophisticated-and more susceptible to persuasion and ¶ leadership-than the literature used to assume (see Stokes 2001b; ¶ Graham and Pettinato 2002; Weyland 2002). As a result, governments ¶ that combated profound crises often managed to muster sufficient polit- ¶ ical backing to enact bold, painful market reforms under democracy ¶ (Armijo and Faucher 2002). ¶ Democracy therefore survived neoliberalism in many Latin American countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, and Bolivia, that had unstable civil- ¶ ian regimes when they initiated market reform. Even in Peru, where Pres- ¶ ident Alberto Fujimori governed in an autocratic fashion, these deviations ¶ from democratic norms and principles were not directly caused by or ¶ 'required for" the enactment of neoliberalism (McClintock 1994). Instead, ¶ the longstanding postponement of determined adjustment, combined ¶ with large-scale guerrilla insurgencies and terrorism, had discredited the ¶ country's "political class," and Fujimori took advantage of this opportunity ¶ to concentrate power and disrespect liberal-democratic safeguards. Thus, ¶ market reform as such did not destroy democracy in Latin America.

#### No alternative to neoliberalism in Latin America – capital flight prevents radical change.

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On several occasions, the region's large-scale poverty and tremendous inequalities of income and wealth triggered calls for redistribution ¶ and other deep-reaching social reforms. These problems also allowed ¶ for the rise of radical populists, who used fiery rhetoric to win backing ¶ from masses of discontented citizens, left-wing parties, and trade unions ¶ and thereby to advance their political ambitions. The variegated ¶ demands and proposals for profound socioeconomic and political ¶ change led to mobilization and countermobilization; as a result, polarization intensified. All this conflict and turmoil further diminished the ¶ capacity of governments to solve problems and maintain economic and ¶ political stability. The growing disorder, in turn, frightened established ¶ political and economic elites, leading them to ask the military to inter- ¶ vene. In many cases, important groups inside the armed forces felt that social polarization and political conflict threatened the military's own ¶ institutional interests. Therefore, they eventually used force to restore ¶ order, thereby interrupting or abolishing democracy.5 ¶ Across most of Latin America, wherever neoliberalism has firmly ¶ taken hold, it has largely blocked this dynamic by sealing the political ¶ defeat of radical populists and socialists and by hindering the emergence of mass movements that socioeconomic and political elites perceive as serious threats. What the enactment of market reform means, ¶ essentially-above and beyond all its specific reforms-is that capital- ¶ ism and the market economy are here to stay. Communism, socialism, ¶ and radical populism are dead or greatly weakened wherever the new ¶ development model is in place.6 International economic integration has ¶ made challenges to the established economic and social order much less ¶ feasible. Even advancing such demands now has a prohibitive cost by ¶ scaring away domestic and foreign investors, who have more "exit" ¶ options as a result of market reform, especially the easing or elimination of capital controls. ¶ Neoliberalism has also changed the balance of power between ¶ domestic socioeconomic and political forces. Leading business sectors ¶ have gained greater clout; they now have better access to international ¶ capital markets; they have stronger links to transnational corporations; ¶ they have bought up many public enterprises, often at rock-bottom ¶ prices; and therefore they own a greater share of the economy. At the ¶ same time, thoroughgoing market reform has weakened the sociopolitical forces that used to support radicalism. As a result of trade liberalization, labor market deregulation, privatization, and the shrinking of ¶ the public administration, unions have lost members in most countries, ¶ are often internally divided, and have generally reduced their militancy. ¶ Because of the fall of communism and the worldwide victory of capitalism, most of Latin America's socialist and Marxist parties are on the ¶ defensive. A number of them have given up socialist programs and rad- ¶ ical-populist rhetoric, and many have accepted the basic outlines of the ¶ market model. Furthermore, several political leaders of the neoliberal ¶ era have used populist political tactics not to attack neoliberalism but to ¶ promote, enact, and preserve it (Roberts 1995; Weyland 1996).