## \*\*\* 1NC Material

### 1NC Security Critique

#### The affirmative represents an inherently unstable world needing innovative solutions to constant problems, which entrenches insecurity logic. The impact is a circular apocalyptic impulse that makes violence inevitable

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Just as the outcome of World War I sowed the seeds of World War II, and the outcome of World War II the seeds of the cold war, so the outcome of the cold war sowed the seeds of the war on terrorism. And this newest war is already, quite visibly, sowing the seeds of insecurity to come. It may be most useful to view the whole period from the early cold war years through the present war as a single historical era: the era of the national insecurity state. Throughout that era, U.S. policy decisions made in the name of national security consistently breed a greater sense of vulnerability, frustration, and insecurity.

It is not hard to see why. Four decades of cold war enshrined two fundamental principles at the heart of our public life: there is a mortal threat to the very existence of our nation, and our own policies play no role in generating the threat. The belief structure of the national insecurity state flows logically from these premises. If our nation bears no responsibility, then we are powerless to eradicate the threat. If others threaten us through no fault of our own, what can we do? There is no hope for a truly better world, nor for ending the danger by mutual compromise with "the other side." The threat is effectively eternal. The best to hope for is to hold the threat forever at bay.

Yet the sense of powerlessness is oddly satisfying, because it preserves the conviction of innocence: if our policies are so ineffectual, the troubles of the world can hardly be our fault. And the vision of an endless status quo is equally satisfying, because it promises to prevent historical change. If peril is permanent, the world is an endless reservoir of potential enemies. Any fundamental change in the status quo portends only catastrophe.

The only path to security, it seems, is to prevent change by imposing control over others. When those others fight back, the national insecurity state protests its innocence: we act only in self-defense; we want only stability. The state sees no reason to re-evaluate its policies; that would risk the change it seeks, above all, to avoid. So it can only meet violence with more violence. Of course, the inevitable frustration is blamed on the enemy, reinforcing the sense of peril and the demand for absolute control through violence.

The goal of total control is self-defeating; each step toward security becomes a source of, and is taken as proof of, continuing insecurity. This makes the logic of the insecurity state viciously circular. Why are we always fighting? Because we always have enemies. How do we know we always have enemies? Because we are always fighting. And knowing that we have enemies, how can we afford to stop fighting? In the insecurity state, there is no way to talk about security without voicing fears of insecurity, no way to express optimism without expressing despair. On every front, it is a self-fulfilling prophecy; a self-confirming and self-perpetuating spiral of violence; a trap that seems to offer no way out.

It is not surprising, then, that the pattern of insecurity crystallized during the cold war survived that war. The "experts" insisted that now we were less secure. September 11 proved them indisputably right. Now they offer an official story that pretends to see an end to insecurity, but actually promises the endless insecurity of another cold war. And the policies based on that story virtually guarantee that the promise will be fulfilled.

But that is just what most Americans expect, in any event. Caged inside the logic of the insecurity state, they can see no other possibility. So the official story hardly seems to be one option among many. Its premises and conclusions seem so necessary, so inevitable, that no other story can be imagined. For huge numbers of Americans, the peace movement’s alternative story is not mistaken. It is simply incomprehensible, like a foreign language, for it assumes that we can take steps to address the very sources of insecurity. That denies the most basic foundations of the prevailing public discourse. Quite naturally, then, the majority embraces the only story it can understand. The story is persuasive because the alternative seems to be having no story at all.

The official story prevails by default, as the nation faces the prospect of further war around the world. Yet that is only half its power. The other half comes from the paradoxical consolation it provides as we look back to what happened here at home, on September 11, when four hijacked planes crashed headlong into the national insecurity state.

The cold war is long over, the Reds are long gone, and now the twin towers are gone, too. But the national insecurity state still stands. Indeed, it stands stronger and taller precisely because the towers are gone. Our sense of insecurity has grown. But it is not fundamentally different in kind. The attacks did not create a pervasive sense of insecurity. Rather, the insecurity that was already pervasive shaped the dominant interpretation of and response to the attacks.

The first response was the nearly universal cry: "Pearl Harbor." But "this was not Pearl Harbor," as National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice recognized. There is no rivalry between great nation states. No foreign nation has attacked the U.S. No long-standing diplomatic and economic maneuvering preceded the attacks of September 11, 2001. Why, then, did they so quickly evoke the imagery of December 7, 1941? The common thread was not a hope for redemption, but only a conviction that the nation’s very existence was threatened.

In 2001, that judgment is debatable, to say the least. Assuming that the attacks were indeed the work of a Muslim splinter group, such groups have been trying to attack U.S. interests for a quarter-century or more. One massive act of destruction, as horrendous as it was, hardly constitutes evidence of their overwhelming power. Nor is there any real evidence for Bush’s charge that these groups aim to impose their "radical beliefs on people everywhere¼ and end a way of life." Yet evidence is irrelevant in the national insecurity state. The fear comes first, before any evidence that it is warranted. How do we know that our existence is threatened? Because it is so obviously threatened! QED.

This circular argument seems to be confirmed by the expressions of fear that have filled the mass media since September 11. They are certainly sincere. Yet it has become almost obligatory to say, "Life will never be the same because now, for the first time, we feel vulnerable." Most who say this can still remember, if they care to, the long cold war years of living on the brink of nuclear annihilation. Many are old enough to recall the Cuban missile crisis. Even more can remember the Reagan administration’s serious plans to fight a nuclear war. Are we really more vulnerable now, or only vulnerable in a different way? Are we really less secure than the days when one push of the button could trigger a thousand September 11’s? True, the September 11 attack was actual rather than merely potential. Yet the scale of the potential attack we feared for so long was so much greater than the actual attack. Why should so many say that the actual attack marked a quantum leap in national anxiety?

The notoriously poor historical memory of Americans is only part of the answer. A larger part is the need to contain this new eruption of disorder within a familiar meaning structure. The study of human culture shows, over and over, that anxiety can be held in check, if not banished, by the way people talk about it. People can feel relatively secure amidst the most extraordinary disruption and anxiety, as long as they have familiar words that put the disruption into some larger, dependable, enduring order. The lifeline of security is a language that affirms the enduring truth of the prevailing discourse and worldview.

Today, the discourse of the national insecurity state is the nation’s most familiar structure. How natural, then, to reaffirm the fundamental truth of that discourse, especially when its truth seems to be so empirically proven. Certainly, there is a very real danger of more attacks on U.S. soil. But the magnitude of the danger is measured by cultural needs rather than empirical considerations. In the insecurity state, universal cries of alarm, massive preparations for future attack, and protestations that life is fundamentally changed all show how little has really changed. They serve to confirm the basic premise that danger is eternal and unavoidable.

The name of the danger changes from time to time; for now, its name is "terrorism." But the underlying reality remains the same. In the face of a massive shock to our cultural assumptions, that promise of continuity is immensely reassuring. This is the paradox that keeps so many millions trapped in the insecurity state. In order to feel culturally and psychologically secure, one must feel physically and politically insecure.

Thus the problem¾ the fear of terrorist attack¾ becomes the solution. The film of the towers bursting into flame is shown over and over again. The sheriffs stockpiling gas masks and anthrax vaccine are interviewed over and over again. "Experts" explain "the psychology of the terrorist" over and over again. All of this has a ritualistic quality, for it serves much the same function as every ritual. It acts out the basic worldview of the insecurity state, confirming that it endures in the face of a massive challenge.

The dominant response to the tragedy in the U.S. also confirms that our own policies play no role in evoking the danger. This message takes ritual form in prayer meetings, civic gatherings, charity drives, and the Bush administration’s humanitarian gestures for starving Afghans. All enact the essential goodness of Americans. Even the most benign and laudable responses to the tragedy¾ the national pride in heroic rescue efforts, the outpouring of generous contributions, the genuine concern for the welfare of Muslim- and Arab-Americans¾ are seized and twisted in the overpowering cultural grasp of the national insecurity state. As symbols of innocence, all reinforce the basic assumption that the U.S. is powerless to affect the sources of continuing insecurity.

Bush has often stated the logical corollary of innocence. if our policies are not relevant to the problem, there is nothing to negotiate. In other words, the U.S. will not contemplate policy changes that might lead to any fundamental change in political or economic power relationships. Therefore the only remaining course is to heighten the nation’s guard and use force to control the behavior of would-be attackers.

Much of the response to the tragedy reinforces these interlocked assumptions of powerlessness and innocence. The cries of alarm and defensive preparations create the impression that the nation is circling the wagons and hunkering down for a long siege, because there is nothing else to do. The ubiquitous American flag becomes a symbol, not of abolishing evil, but of banding together to withstand the assault of evil forever. Yet there is almost a palpable eagerness to feel vulnerable. The new sense of national unity comes less from a common commitment to victory than from a common conviction of victimization.

Powerful vestiges of the crusading spirit do remain. There is still a longing for unconditional triumph over the foreign foe. The constant allusions to Pearl Harbor, FDR, and World War II express these longings. More importantly, they create the illusion that genuine security is still possible. It is disconcerting to live amidst insecurity and even more disconcerting to acknowledge it openly. So the story of the "good war" is evoked endlessly, because it would be so reassuring to be able to wage another "good war." But the gestures of apocalyptic hope have a peculiarly forced, artificial quality, as if the public is trying to draw the last vestiges of living marrow out of an increasingly dead husk.

The symbols, rituals, and mantras of the redeemer nation serve a very different role when public culture no longer really believes in the redemption. The problem is defined in apocalyptic terms. But no apocalyptic solution is available, nor even suggested. Talk of hope for security still elicits powerful images of the peril we hope to be secure from. But talk of peril is simply talk of peril, not a prelude to hope. There are no safe homes we can return to, for we must assume that the enemy, in one form or another, will always be at our gates.

Political leaders and pundits offer only an endless horizon of unflagging efforts to maintain relative stability. In an inherently unstable world, made less stable by a superpower pursuing control, this is indeed "a task that does not end." All that once symbolized hope for the Kingdom of God on earth (whether in religious or secular form) now locks us into a future of inconclusive struggle and mounting anxiety. And the more we are convinced that insecurity is perpetual, the more we will resist fundamental change.

That, of course, is the ultimate point. The prospect of another long, twilight struggle returns our culture to the certitude of simplistic absolutes. It erases the uncertainties of the ‘90s. It reassures us that nothing has really changed and nothing need ever change. It offers the best reason to go on resisting change. All of the preparations for and acts of war, all the warnings of and protections against future attacks, all the patriotic singing and flag-waving, all the gestures of hope that things will be better in the future, indeed all the dominant cultural responses to the attacks¾ all are now representations of the overriding conviction that security is still an impossible dream, that the future will not be fundamentally different from the present.

In a society so fearful of change, where constant change provokes widespread despair, the conviction of unchanging insecurity engenders a strange kind of confidence. Millions now look ahead with more hope precisely because they can now believe that there is nothing really new to hope for. They cling to the insecurity that justifies their resistance to change. They take comfort in knowing that the explosions of September 11, which we are told changed everything, could not shake the foundations of the national insecurity state. The official story of the war on terrorism gives them that perverse comfort.

For years to come, we shall live in the shadow of the tragic deaths of September 11, 2001. As long as the official story prevails, death will be piled upon death, and suffering upon suffering. The national insecurity state affords no prospect beyond death and suffering. So this war pushes us further into the shadow of the most tragic death of all: the death of hope for a better, a more peaceful, a genuinely secure future.

#### This fantasy of control will only produce a “never-ending war” for security—blowback ensures efforts to create order out of disorder will fail and result in more violence.

Ritchie 11—Nick, PhD, Research Fellow at the Department of Peace Studies @ University of Bradford, Executive Committee of the British Pugwash Group and the Board of the Nuclear Information Service [“Rethinking security: a critical analysis of the Strategic Defence and Security Review” International Affairs Volume 87, Issue 2, Article first published online: 17 MAR 2011]

Third, the legitimating narrative of acting as a ‘force for good’ that emerged in the 1998 SDR to justify an expensive, expeditionary, war-fighting military doctrine in the name of ‘enlightened self-interest’ must be scrutinized. But the relationship between the rhetoric and the reality is highly questionable. From a critical perspective it can be argued that successive governments have framed interventionist policy choices as positive, progressive and ‘good’ to generate support for ‘risk transfer’ military operations of choice that are presented as essential to the security of UK citizens but in fact reproduce a state-centric construction of a particular ‘national role’. This reflects Hirshberg’s contention that ‘the maintenance of a positive national self-image is crucial to continued public acquiescence and support for government, and thus to the smooth, on-going functioning of the state’. 86 The notion that Afghanistan is a ‘noble cause’ for the British state reflects a state-centric concern with ideas of status and prestige and the legitimating moral gloss of the ‘force for good’ rhetoric. 87 Furthermore, the rhetoric of ‘enlightened self-interest’ implies that the exercise of UK military force as a ‘force for good’ will lessen security risks to the British state and citizenry by resolving current security threats and pre-empting future risks. But, returning again to Iraq and Afghanistan, we must ask whether sacrificing solders’ lives, killing over 100,000 Iraqi civilians including a disproportionate number of women and children, destroying the immediate human security of several million others through injury, displacement, persecution and trauma, and sparking long-term trends of rising crime rates, property destruction, economic disruption, and deterioration of health-care resources and food production and distribution capabilities, all while providing profits for largely western corporations through arms deals, service contracts and private military contractors, constitutes being a ‘force for good’ when the outcomes of these major military interventions have proven at best indeterminate. 88 The legitimacy of this question is reinforced by Curtis’s analysis of the deadly impact of British foreign policy since the 1950s. Curtis argues that ‘the history of British foreign policy is partly one of complicity in some of the world’s worst horrors … contrary to the extraordinary rhetoric of New Labour leaders and other elites, policies are continuing on this traditional course, systematically making the world more abusive of human rights as well as more unequal and less secure’. 89 Add to this the statistic that the UK was involved in more wars between 1946 and 2003 (21 in total) than any other state, and the ‘force for good’ rationale begins to unravel. 90 Furthermore, the militarized ‘force for good’ narrative encompasses the active defence of the ‘rules-based system’ as a global good. But it is clear that the current ‘rules-based system’ of western-dominated multilateral institutions and processes of global governance does not work for billions of people or for planetary ecological systems. The Human Development Reports produced by the United Nations Development Programme routinely highlight the global political and economic structures and systems that keep hundreds of millions of people poor, starving, jobless, diseased and repressed. 91 A stable ‘rules-based system’ is no doubt in the interests of UK citizens and the interests of global human society. With stability comes predictability, which can minimize uncertainty, risk and insecurity. But there is a growing consensus that long-term stability, particularly the reduction of violent conflict, will require far greater political, economic and environmental equity on a global scale, as advocated in the Department for International Development’s 2009 white paper on Eliminating world poverty. 92 An interventionist, military-oriented, state-centric, global risk management doctrine and the risks it can generate are unlikely to stabilize and transform the rules-based system into a more equitable form. A growing literature now argues that prevailing western approaches to understanding, managing and ameliorating global insecurity and its violent symptoms are inadequate and unsustainable. They are proving, and will continue to prove, increasingly incapable of providing security for both the world’s poor and immiserated, concentrated in the Global South, and the world’s elite of around one billion, mainly located in the North Atlantic community, Australasia and parts of East Asia, which will remain unable to insulate itself from violent responses to pervasive insecurity. 93 This is not to suggest that the UK should not exercise elements of national power to alleviate others’ suffering as a consequence of natural or man-made disasters. Indeed, the Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s 2001 ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine sets out clearly the principle of conditional sovereignty and the grounds for legitimate intervention when a state cannot or will not protect its citizens from pervasive and severe harm. 94 More broadly, if we accept that in an increasingly complex, interdependent world the human security of UK citizens enmeshed in global networks of risk and opportunity is intertwined with the human security of others, particularly in conflict-prone regions often characterized by poverty, weak governance and underdevelopment, then actions to improve others’ long-term human security does constitute a form of ‘enlightened self-interest’. But we must question the assumption that war-fighting interventionist missions of choice do, in fact, serve the long-term human security interests of UK citizens as opposed to the interests of the state based on prevailing conceptions of national role. Utility of force Connected to this critique is a reappraisal of the utility of force within the conception of national security as global risk management, on two counts. First, security risks are increasingly likely to arise from a complex mixture of interdependent factors. Environmental, economic, military and political sources of insecurity could include the effects of climate change, mass poverty and economic injustice, global pandemic disease, mass migration and refugee flows, poor governance, weak and failing states, international terrorism and asymmetric warfare, the spread of WMD and advanced conventional military technologies, ethnic and sectarian nationalism, and competition over access to key resources such as oil and water. Future conflicts are therefore likely to be complex and diverse. They are unlikely to be susceptible to purely military solutions, and the use of military force in regional crises will be messy, indeterminate and of limited value and effectiveness. 95 It is not obvious that the armed forces have a significant war-fighting role to play in mitigating these risks, as opposed to supporting police, intelligence and security forces in countering terrorist plots—and possibly launching a limited, precision strike against WMD capabilities in the event of the extreme scenario of robust intelligence that a WMD attack is imminent. In fact, the 2009 National Security Strategy limited the role of the armed forces to ‘defence against direct threats to the UK and its overseas territories’ (which one could qualify as ‘direct violent, or military, threats’) together with a contributory role in ‘tackling threats to our security overseas by helping to address conflict, instability and crises across the globe’. 96 This broad but essentially supportive remit for the military was reinforced in the 2010 National Security Strategy’s catalogue of priority risks. The three-tiered list enumerated 15 risks, which can be reduced to five: terrorism, civil emergencies, international crime, trade disputes and an attack by another state. 97 The role of military force is limited in all of these except the last, which remains by far the least likely. As Jenkins argues, almost none of the above is a threat. They are crimes, catastrophes, or, in the case of being ‘drawn in’ to a foreign conflict, a matter of political choice … as for the threat of conventional attack on the British Isles by another state, we can only ask who? The threat is so negligible as to be insignificant. It is like insuring one’s house for billions of pounds against an asteroid attack. 98 Bob Ainsworth, then Defence Secretary, seemed to grasp this in 2009, arguing that ‘our initial conclusions on the character of warfare should be first that international intervention will be more difficult not less. We will have to consider carefully how to apply military force in pursuit of national security. And second, and related to this, that the timely application of soft power and methods of conflict prevention will be a high priority.’ 99 Yet the government also insists on maintaining an interventionist, expeditionary military doctrine and corresponding capabilities based on a seemingly unquestioned national security role as a ‘force for good’ in global risk management operations. Second, risk management through military intervention in a complex international security environment characterized by asymmetric cultures, actors and distributions of power and knowledge, and interconnections on many levels, can generate significant negative feedback, or ‘blowback’, from unintended outcomes that create more risk. This challenges notions of effective risk management and control through linear change via the exercise of military power. 100 In fact, as Williams argues, the decision to act to mitigate a risk itself becomes risky: in the attempt to maintain control, negative feedback from the effects of a decision ‘inevitably leads to a loss of control’. 101 The danger is that military-based risk management becomes a cyclical process with no end in sight. 102 Rogers, for example, presciently envisaged a post-9/11 ‘never-ending war’ of military-led risk mitigation generating new and potentially more dangerous risks deemed susceptible to further military solutions, and so on. 103 This risk is not limited to distant theatres of conflict, but also applies to the very ‘way of life’ the current militarized risk management doctrine is meant to protect, through the erosion of civil liberties and the securitization of daily life. There is a powerful argument that the exercise of UK military force for optional expeditionary war-fighting operations will be an increasingly dangerous, expensive and ethically dubious doctrine that could generate more, and potentially more lethal, risks than it resolves or contains. Since absolute security cannot be achieved, the value of any potential, discretionary increment in UK security through the exercise of military force must take into account its political, economic and human cost. As Wolfers argues, ‘at a certain point, by something like the economic law of diminishing returns, the gain in security no longer compensates for the added costs of attaining it’, and the exercise of military force becomes ineffective or, worse, wholly counterproductive. 104 After following George W. Bush on a risky adventure into Iraq, the UK must question the effectiveness of a militarized ‘risk transfer’ strategy as the foundation for managing globalized security risks in relation to the long-term human security needs of British citizens.

#### Our alternative is to reject the affirmative in favor of a critical approach to security. This is crucial to open space for emancipatory perspectives—our critique is mutually exclusive with the affirmative.

Bilgin 5—Pinar Bilgin, Associate Professor of International Relations at Bilkent University (Turkey) [“Conclusion,” *Regional Security in the Middle East: A Critical Perspective*, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415325498, p. 205-207]

Emphasising the mutually interactive relationship between intellectuals and social movements should not be taken to suggest that the only way for intellectuals to make a change is to get directly involved in political action. They can also intervene by providing a critique of the existing situation, calling attention to what future outcomes may result if necessary action is not taken at present, and by pointing to potential for change immanent in regional politics. Students of security could help create the political space for alternative agents of security to take action by presenting appropriate critiques. It should be emphasised however that such thinking should be anchored in the potential immanent in world politics. The hope is that non-state actors (who may or may not be aware of their potential to make a change) may constitute themselves as agents of security when presented with an alternative reading of their situation.

Thinking about the future becomes even more crucial once theory is [end page 205] conceptualised as constitutive of the ‘reality’ it seeks to respond to. In other words, our ideas about the future—our conjectures and prognoses—have a self-constitutive potential. What the students of Cold War Security Studies consider as a more ‘realistic’ picture of the future becomes ‘real’ through practice, albeit under circumstances inherited from the past. Thinking about what a ‘desired’ future would look like is significant for the very same reason; that is, in order to be able to turn it into a ‘reality’ through adopting emancipatory practices. For, having a vision of a ‘desired’ future empowers people(s) in the present.

Presenting pictures of what a ‘desired’ future might look like, and pointing to the security community approach as the start of a path that could take us from an insecure past to a more secure future is not to suggest that the creation of a security community is the most likely outcome. On the contrary, the dynamics pointed to throughout the book indicate that there exists a potential for descent into chaos if no action is taken to prevent militarisation and fragmentation of societies, and the marginalisation of peoples as well as economies in an increasingly globalising world. However, these dynamics exist as ‘threats to the future’ to use Beck’s terminology; and only by thinking and writing about them that can one mobilise preventive action to be taken in the present. Viewed as such, critical approaches present not an ‘optimistic’, but a more ‘realistic’ picture of the future. Considering how the ‘realism’ of Cold War Security Studies failed not only when judged by its own standards, by failing to provide an adequate explanation of the world ‘out there’, but also when judged by the standards of critical approaches, as it was argued, it could be concluded that there is a need for more ‘realistic’ approaches to regional security in theory and practice.

The foregoing suggests three broad conclusions. First, Cold War Security Studies did not present the ‘realistic’ picture it purported to provide. On the contrary, the pro-status quo leanings of the Cold War security discourse failed to allow for (let alone foresee) changes such as the end of the Cold War, dissolution of some states and integration of some others. Second, notwithstanding the important inroads critical approaches to security made in the post-Cold War era, much traditionalist thinking remains and maintains its grip over the security practices of many actors. Third, critical approaches offer a fuller or more adequate picture of security in different parts of the world (including the Middle East). Cold War Security Studies is limited not only because of its narrow (military-focused), pro-status quo and state-centric (if not statist) approach to security in theory and practice, but also because of its objectivist conception of theory and the theory/practice relationship that obscured the mutually constitutive relationship between them. Students of critical approaches have sought to challenge Cold War Security Studies, its claim to knowledge and its hold over security practices by pointing to the mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice and revealing [end page 206] how the Cold War security discourse has been complicit in constituting (in)security in different parts of the world. The ways in which the Cold War security discourse helped constitute the ‘Middle East’ by way of representing it as a region, and contributed to regional insecurity in the Middle East by shaping security practices, is exemplary of the argument that ‘theories do not leave the world untouched’.

The implication of these conclusions for practice is that becoming aware of the ‘politics behind the geographical specification of politics’ and exploring the relationship between (inventing) regions and (conceptions and practices of) security helps reveal the role human agency has played in the past and could play in the future. An alternative approach to security, that of critical approaches to security, could inform alternative (emancipatory) practices thereby helping constitute a new region in the form of a security community. It should be noted, however, that to argue that ‘everything is socially constructed’ or that ‘all approaches have normative concerns embedded in them’ is a significant first step that does not by itself help one adopt emancipatory practices. As long as people rely on traditional practices shaped by the Cold War security discourse - which remains prevalent in the post-Cold War era - they help constitute a ‘reality’ in line with the tenets of ‘realist’ Cold War Security Studies. This is why seeking to address evolving crises through traditional practices whilst leaving a critical security perspective to be adopted for the long-term will not work. For, traditionalist thinking and practices, by helping shape the ‘reality’ ‘out there’, foreclose the political space necessary for emancipatory practices to be adopted by multiple actors at numerous levels. Hence the need for the adoption of a critical perspective that emphasises the roles human agency has played in the past and could play in the future in shaping what human beings choose to call ‘reality’. Generating such an awareness of the potentialities of human agency could enable one to begin thinking differently about regional security in different parts of the world whilst remaining sensitive to regional actors’ multiple and contending conceptions of security, what they view as referent(s) and how they think security should be sought in different parts of the world.

After decades of statist, military-focused and zero-sum thinking and practices that privileged the security of some whilst marginalising the security of others, the time has come for all those interested in security in the Middle East to decide whether they want to be agents of a world view that produces more of the same, thereby contributing towards a ‘threat to the future’, or of alternative futures that try to address the multiple dimensions of regional insecurity. The choice is not one between presenting a more ‘optimistic’ or ‘pessimistic’ vision of the future, but between stumbling into the future expecting more of the same, or stepping into a future equipped with a perspective that not only has a conception of a ‘desired’ future but is also cognisant of ‘threats to the future’.

### 1NC Reps First

#### Representations come before the policy effects of the plan—separating discursive and non-discursive practices is impossible. The representations used are vital to testing the truth claims of the affirmative. Even if fiat exists and policy is important, we could concede that because representations outweigh—they shape policy outcomes and ignoring them would prevent finding the best policy option.

Crawford 2 [Neta Crawford, PhD MA MIT, BA Brown, Political Science at Boston University, Argument and Change in World Politics, 2002, p. 19-21]

Coherent arguments are unlikely to take place unless and until actors, at least on some level, agree on what they are arguing about. The at least temporary resolution of meta-arguments- regarding the nature of the good (the content of prescriptive norms); what is out there, the way we know the world, how we decide between competing beliefs (ontology and epistemology); and the nature of the situation at hand( the proper frame or representation)- must occur before specific arguments that could lead to decision and action may take place. Meta-arguments over epistemology and ontology, relatively rare, occur in instances where there is a fundamental clash between belief systems and not simply a debate within a belief system. Such arguments over the nature of the world and how we come to know it are particularly rare in politics though they are more frequent in religion and science. Meta-arguments over the “good” are contests over what it is good and right to do, and even how we know the good and the right. They are about the nature of the good, specifically, defining the qualities of “good” so that we know good when we see it and do it. Ethical arguments are about how to do good in a particular situation. More common are meta-arguments over representations or frames- about how we out to understand a particular situation. Sometimes actors agree on how they see a situation. More often there are different possible interpretations. Thomas Homer-Dixon and Roger karapin suggest, “Argument and debate occur when people try to gain acceptance for their interpretation of the world”. For example, “is the war defensive or aggressive?”. Defining and controlling representations and images, or the frame, affects whether one thinks there is an issue at stake and whether a particular argument applies to the case. An actor fighting a defensive war is within international law; an aggressor may legitimately be subject to sanctions. Framing and reframing involve mimesis or putting forward representations of what is going on. In mimetic meta-arguments, actors who are struggling to characterize or frame the situation accomplish their ends by drawing vivid pictures of the “reality” through exaggeration, analogy, or differentiation. Representations of a situation do not re-produce accurately so much as they creatively re-present situations in a way that makes sense. “mimesis is a metaphoric or ‘iconic argumentation of the real.’ Imitating not the effectively of events but their logical structure and meaning.” Certain features are emphasized and others de-emphasized or completely ignored as their situation is recharacterized or reframed. Representation thus becomes a “constraint on reasoning in that it limits understanding to a specific organization of conceptual knowledge.” The dominant representation delimits which arguments will be considered legitimate, framing how actors see possibities. As Roxanne Doty argues, “the possibility of practices presupposes the ability of an agent to imagine certain courses of action. Certain background meanings, kinds of social actors and relationships, must already be in place.” If, as Donald Sylvan and Stuart Thorson argue, “politics involves the selective privileging of representations, “it may not matter whether one representation or another is true or not. Emphasizing whether frames articulate accurate or inaccurate perceptions misses the rhetorical import of representation- how frames affect what is seen or not seen, and subsequent choices. Meta-arguments over representation are thus crucial elements of political argument because an actor’s arguments about what to do will be more persuasive if their characterization or framing of the situation holds sway. But, as Rodger Payne suggests, “No frame is an omnipotent persuasive tool that can be decisively wielded by norm entrepreneurs without serious political wrangling.” Hence framing is a meta-argument.

### 1NC Link—Positive Peace

#### Traditional conflict management fails through symptom focus. Failure to explore the psychological roots of enemy creation makes the 1AC harms suspect.

Smoke and Harman 87 [Richard Smoke BA Harvard magna cum laude, PhD MIT, Professor at Brown, Winner Bancroft Prize in History, and Willis Harman M.S. in Physics and Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering from Stanford University, Paths To Peace, 1987, Entire Preface]

The existence of nuclear weapons has presented us with a requirement for 100 percent reliability that is found nowhere else in human affairs. Human civilization cannot survive even one global nuclear war. In this sense our endeavor to achieve lasting peace and common security must succeed. One might think that with this unprecedented challenge before us, there would be no effort spared in pursuit of the goal; that both governments and individual citizens would be unrelenting and single-minded in our common hour of need. Yet such is not the case. Our "national security" policies are confused and most certainly do not provide a feeling of security. Our stance toward peace is ambivalent and indecisive; in some circles the word "peace" has taken on connotations of weakness or of empathy with the Soviets. Much of the public seems disinterested, apathetic, and resigned or feels powerless to take effective action. Few people feel capable of thinking clearly about the issue; few have confidence in the ability of their leaders to guide them wisely toward a peaceful future. It is this situation that is addressed by this book. We who are alive today, and whose future world is so at risk, typically do not think clearly about peace. Even the definition of the word is not thought through when we speak or write about peace. That is why this book is written as a primer. It is sophisticated, but simple. The conviction that permeates the book is that peace and the general security of all are attainable goals. But to achieve them will require a whole system change: the combined efforts of vast numbers of people around the globe thinking clearly about the issues and committing themselves to achieving those critically important goals. Paradoxically, the need for a whole-system change does not necessarily make the goal appear less achievable—whole-system change has happened before and could happen again but rather indicates the kinds of actions that are likely to be effective. A brief summary will adequately serve to remind us of what is almost obvious: Peace is a whole-system issue. The production of weaponry was once carried on almost exclusively by governments for their own use; commerce in weapons between nations was considered highly unethical. The manufacture and sale of weapons now represents a significant segment of the U.S. economy, and the economic repercussions of a serious cutback in military production could be severe, at least temporarily. The continuing military buildup has a momentum all its own. Part of that momentum is the psychological inertia of conventional ways of thinking about international conflict. In the United States, the immediate point of conflict appears to center around the fear of communism and involves not just the NATO countries versus the Warsaw Pact countries; the rest of the world is part of the conflict as well. And the fear is not only that territory may be taken by force but also that noncapitalist ideas may gain hold in other parts of the world. (The wisest response to that threat would seem to be to make sure that the free enterprise system works so well for everybody that alternative systems have no appeal. Unfortunately, when we are fearful we do not always take the wisest course.) There is an implicit assumption in most discussions of peace that the Soviet Union is the "enemy" of permanent concern. But North-South tensions are likely to long outlast that particular temporary conflict. The rich capitalist countries require ever-increasing consumption for the well being of their economies, yet the planet would be hard-pressed to accommodate all five or six billion people in mass-consumption societies. On the other hand, it is hard to imagine a state of peace on the planet when the vast majority of people remain in a condition of relative privation while the minority strives to increase consumption to maintain flourishing economies. This issue of the relationship between the consuming minority in the rich nations and the far-poorer vast majority of the Earth’s population is likely to remain long after the Soviet Union and the United States have learned to coexist. These connections among the various pieces of the world’s complex macro problem become fairly obvious when we turn our attention to them. But we often overlook how completely our predicament is a direct consequence of a way of thinking that emerged in Western Europe only a few centuries ago. To quote Roger Walsh: Moreover, for the first time in millions of years of human evolution, all the major threats to our survival are human-caused. Problems such as nuclear weapons, pollution, and ecological imbalance stem directly from our own behavior and can therefore Preface xi be traced to psychological origins. This means that the current threats to human survival and well-being are actually symptoms, symptoms of our individual and shared mind-set.’ The problems, in other words, are not only connected, but have a common source in the underlying Western perspectives and tacit assumptions that have shaped not only science and technology, but practically all aspects of modern society. An analogy will help make the point. It is well known that many illnesses are related to an underlying condition of stress, which has among its effects the impairment of the body’s immune system. When these diseases (such as peptic ulcers, allergies, and cardiovascular disease) are considered as isolated problems, the attempts to heal often fail—or result in another symptom popping up somewhere else. The reason is that the underlying cause has not been dealt with. It might seem that dealing with the whole collection of possible illnesses and their underlying cause all at once would necessarily be far more complex than approaching one of them alone. But this is not so. Changing the attitudinal approach to life and eliminating stress is in principle quite simple. (It may appear hard because of the psychological resistance to deep inner change.) Treating the whole-system problem of stress is more successful than direct attacks on the separate medical problems. The analogy suggests that the nuclear weapons threat, global environmental problems, world poverty and hunger, and an assortment of other modern dilemmas relate to an underlying mind-set in such a way that none of them are solvable without a change in that mind-set. Yet with that change and the associated whole-system change they all become solvable. The analogy fits in one more way as well. Just as the executive with heart trouble may be more accepting of a diagnosis that leads to bypass surgery than of one that requires a change in his or her fundamental attitudes, so many people today will seek for a resolution of the peace issue almost anywhere except in a fundamental change of mind. But is whole-system change a plausible scenario? There are two points to be made. First, there is precedent: Whole-system change has happened before in history. Second, forces that might bring this change about are increasingly in evidence. Within the context of Western civilization alone there have been at least two whole-system changes: the end of the Greco-Roman world and the transition from the Middle Ages, through the Renaissance and Reformation periods, into the modern age. It might seem rash indeed to predict a similarly profound revolutionary transfiguration of society. Yet a substantial and growing number of writers and thinkers do predict it, and there are some signs that make such a scenario not so unreasonable an expectation. Having lived over forty years with nuclear weapons, we are increasingly aware of the awfulness of our situation. Slowly but surely people are building up opposition to continuing the same perilous trends. The facts of those trends are familiar but still staggering. The total number of nuclear weapons in the world is around 50,000, with a total explosive power about two million times that of the Hiroshima bomb and a total tonnage 7,000 times that of all the bombs dropped during World War II. The explosion of even one of these weapons would be likely to release radioactive fallout that would dwarf the impact of Chernobyl to insignificance. Global nuclear war would result in devastation and suffering on a scale totally unknown in human history. The biological consequences, immediate and long-range, have been estimated and would be severe. Even if nuclear weapons were never again to be exploded, the radioactive waste already generated by their manufacture remains as an unsolved problem. Thousands of tons of radioactive waste products contain substances that are likely to remain toxic for centuries; no way is known to render the waste harmless, and no leak-proof storage has been devised. Economically, the arms race is a drain on all nations, most especially on the two superpowers and many of the Third World countries. Global military expenditures currently run around a trillion dollars a year, which is nearly three billion dollars a day. A small fraction of this expenditure could provide the whole world with adequate nutrition and sanitary water supply, public health measures to reduce disease, and housing and education. Worldwide, military expenditures account for around 6 percent of the gross economic product. For the United States the figure is about 7 percent, for the Soviet Union around 14 percent, and for some of the Third World countries it is well above 20 percent. In some Third World countries more is being spent on armaments than on health care, education, and welfare all together. In addition to the tragic waste of resources and human effort, uncountable human deaths are resulting from malnutrition and disease, partly from the lack of preventive measures. Untold human misery in poverty-stricken countries directly results from the diversion of attention to arms. Faced with such evidence of the effects of military buildup, people are beginning to see the need for change. Chapter 5 discusses further reasons why it may not be implausible to suppose that another fundamental change is now in the offing. As awareness of the frightening dimensions of the nuclear dilemma has grown, people have banded together in a variety of peace organizations—and hoped that their efforts toward a nuclear freeze, or a peace academy, or a test ban treaty, might be successful. In recent years leaders in these peace-related movements have found common cause with leaders of other groups—ecological and environmental movements, "Green politics," women’s movements, human rights organizations, and so on. And all of them have become more sophisticated in their understanding of how deep are the roots of the problems they are attempting to ameliorate. At the same time a new vision has been forming: a vision of a world with nuclear disarmament and global security, appreciation of the diversity of Earth’s many cultures, wholesome relationships between humans and the planet, elimination of subtle and not-so-subtle oppression of minorities and women, fundamental rights that are guaranteed by universal agreement—a vision of a world at peace. If the forces with this vision continue to grow, they could bring about the sort of whole-system change spoken of earlier. This possibility is not without hazards. People can be very fearful of change, and their reactionary responses can also bring on social disruption and human misery. Thus there are two compelling reasons for thinking about peace in a lucid and fundamental way: (1) to be more effective in working toward peace; (2) to better understand the kind of societal trauma that we may experience during the transition period that probably lies ahead. This short book aspires to be of assistance in that task of learning to think about peace rationally, penetratingly, but still with passion. In past conflicts we have been able to convince ourselves that if we could once vanquish the German "Huns"—or the Axis Powers, or "Red China," or the Soviets—then peace would be assured. But this logic is not as satisfying now as it was in our more naive years. We suspect that the solution to the problem is more complex than subduing some particular "enemy." The solution also involves more than choosing the right arms control policies or the right alternative security strategies or than adopting the latest conflict resolution techniques. Yet peace and common security, for all the world and for generations to come, is a conceivable goal—and therefore an achievable goal. To achieve it we will need a lot of clear thinking about the problem; we hope this book will contribute to that. And as the book points out, the first step in achieving this goal, as with any other goal, is to believe it can be done.

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## \*\*\* K Prior

### 2NC/1NR K Prior

#### The critique is prior. Global instability, resource depletion, and environmental crises are all a product of a flawed epistemic approach to IR—investigating the aff’s approach is prior to solvency.

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The twenty-first century heralds the unprecedented acceleration and convergence of multiple, interconnected global crises – climate change, energy depletion, food scarcity, and economic instability. While the structure of global economic activity is driving the unsustainable depletion of hydrocarbon and other natural resources, this is simultaneously escalating greenhouse gas emissions resulting in global warming. Both global warming and energy shocks are impacting detrimentally on global industrial food production, as well as on global financial and economic instability. Conventional policy responses toward the intensification of these crises have been decidedly inadequate because scholars and practitioners largely view them as separate processes. Yet increasing evidence shows they are deeply interwoven manifestations of a global political economy that has breached the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which it is embedded. In this context, orthodox IR's flawed diagnoses of global crises lead inexorably to their ‘securitisation’, reifying the militarisation of policy responses, and naturalising the proliferation of violent conflicts. Global ecological, energy and economic crises are thus directly linked to the ‘Otherisation’ of social groups and problematisation of strategic regions considered pivotal for the global political economy. Yet this relationship between global crises and conflict is not necessary or essential, but a function of a wider epistemological failure to holistically interrogate their structural and systemic causes.

Introduction

Winning essay: the 2010 Routledge–GCP&S Essay Competition

In 2009, the UK government's chief scientific adviser Sir John Beddington warned that without mitigating and preventive action ‘drivers’ of global crisis like demographic expansion, environmental degradation and energy depletion could lead to a ‘perfect storm’ of simultaneous food, water and energy crises by around 2030.1 Yet, for the most part, conventional policy responses from national governments and international institutions have been decidedly inadequate. Part of the problem is the way in which these crises are conceptualised in relation to security. Traditional disciplinary divisions in the social and natural sciences, compounded by bureaucratic compartmentalisation in policy-planning and decision-making, has meant these crises are frequently approached as largely separate processes with their own internal dynamics.

While it is increasingly acknowledged that cross-disciplinary approaches are necessary, these have largely failed to recognise just how inherently interconnected these crises are. As Brauch points out, ‘most studies in the environmental security debate since 1990 have ignored or failed to integrate the contributions of the global environmental change community in the natural sciences. To a large extent the latter has also failed to integrate the results of this debate.’2 Underlying this problem is the lack of a holistic systems approach to thinking about not only global crises, but their causal origins in the social, political, economic, ideological and value structures of the contemporary international system. Indeed, it is often assumed that these contemporary structures are largely what need to be ‘secured’ and protected from the dangerous impacts of global crises, rather than transformed precisely to ameliorate these crises in the first place. Consequently, policy-makers frequently overlook existing systemic and structural obstacles to the implementation of desired reforms.

In a modest effort to contribute to the lacuna identified by Brauch, this paper begins with an empirically-oriented, interdisciplinary exploration of the best available data on four major global crises – climate change, energy depletion, food scarcity and global financial instability – illustrating the systemic interconnections between different crises, and revealing that their causal origins are not accidental but inherent to the structural failings and vulnerabilities of existing global political, economic and cultural institutions. This empirical evaluation leads to a critical appraisal of orthodox realist and liberal approaches to global crises in international theory and policy. This critique argues principally that orthodox IR reifies a highly fragmented, de-historicised ontology of the international system which underlies a reductionist, technocratic and compartmentalised conceptual and methodological approach to global crises. Consequently, rather than global crises being understood causally and holistically in the systemic context of the structure of the international system, they are ‘securitised’ as amplifiers of traditional security threats, requiring counter-productive militarised responses and/or futile inter-state negotiations. While the systemic causal context of global crisis convergence and acceleration is thus elided, this simultaneously exacerbates the danger of reactionary violence, the problematisation of populations in regions impacted by these crises and the naturalisation of the consequent proliferation of wars and humanitarian disasters. This moves us away from the debate over whether resource ‘shortages’ or ‘abundance’ causes conflicts, to the question of how either can generate crises which undermine conventional socio-political orders and confound conventional IR discourses, in turn radicalising the processes of social polarisation that can culminate in violent conflict.

#### Failure to critically interrogate the aff’s assumptions reifies the existing system—that undercuts their ability to form coherent policy responses and results in externalization of violence.

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While recommendations to shift our frame of orientation away from conventional state-centrism toward a ‘human security’ approach are valid, this cannot be achieved without confronting the deeper theoretical assumptions underlying conventional approaches to ‘non-traditional’ security issues.106 By occluding the structural origin and systemic dynamic of global ecological, energy and economic crises, orthodox approaches are incapable of transforming them. Coupled with their excessive state-centrism, this means they operate largely at the level of ‘surface’ impacts of global crises in terms of how they will affect quite traditional security issues relative to sustaining state integrity, such as international terrorism, violent conflict and population movements. Global crises end up fuelling the projection of risk onto social networks, groups and countries that cross the geopolitical fault-lines of these ‘surface’ impacts – which happen to intersect largely with Muslim communities. Hence, regions particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts, containing large repositories of hydrocarbon energy resources, or subject to demographic transformations in the context of rising population pressures, have become the focus of state security planning in the context of counter-terrorism operations abroad.

The intensifying problematisation and externalisation of Muslim-majority regions and populations by Western security agencies – as a discourse – is therefore not only interwoven with growing state perceptions of global crisis acceleration, but driven ultimately by an epistemological failure to interrogate the systemic causes of this acceleration in collective state policies (which themselves occur in the context of particular social, political and economic structures). This expansion of militarisation is thus coeval with the subliminal normative presumption that the social relations of the perpetrators, in this case Western states, must be protected and perpetuated at any cost – precisely because the efficacy of the prevailing geopolitical and economic order is ideologically beyond question.

As much as this analysis highlights a direct link between global systemic crises, social polarisation and state militarisation, it fundamentally undermines the idea of a symbiotic link between natural resources and conflict per se. Neither ‘resource shortages’ nor ‘resource abundance’ (in ecological, energy, food and monetary terms) necessitate conflict by themselves.

There are two key operative factors that determine whether either condition could lead to conflict. The first is the extent to which either condition can generate socio-political crises that challenge or undermine the prevailing order. The second is the way in which stakeholder actors choose to actually respond to the latter crises. To understand these factors accurately requires close attention to the political, economic and ideological strictures of resource exploitation, consumption and distribution between different social groups and classes. Overlooking the systematic causes of social crisis leads to a heightened tendency to problematise its symptoms, in the forms of challenges from particular social groups. This can lead to externalisation of those groups, and the legitimisation of violence towards them.

Ultimately, this systems approach to global crises strongly suggests that conventional policy ‘reform’ is woefully inadequate. Global warming and energy depletion are manifestations of a civilisation which is in overshoot. The current scale and organisation of human activities is breaching the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which industrial civilisation is embedded. This breach is now increasingly visible in the form of two interlinked crises in global food production and the global financial system. In short, industrial civilisation in its current form is unsustainable. This calls for a process of wholesale civilisational transition to adapt to the inevitable arrival of the post-carbon era through social, political and economic transformation.

Yet conventional theoretical and policy approaches fail to (1) fully engage with the gravity of research in the natural sciences and (2) translate the social science implications of this research in terms of the embeddedness of human social systems in natural systems. Hence, lacking capacity for epistemological self-reflection and inhibiting the transformative responses urgently required, they reify and normalise mass violence against diverse ‘Others’, newly constructed as traditional security threats enormously amplified by global crises – a process that guarantees the intensification and globalisation of insecurity on the road to ecological, energy and economic catastrophe. Such an outcome, of course, is not inevitable, but extensive new transdisciplinary research in IR and the wider social sciences – drawing on and integrating human and critical security studies, political ecology, historical sociology and historical materialism, while engaging directly with developments in the natural sciences – is urgently required to develop coherent conceptual frameworks which could inform more sober, effective, and joined-up policy-making on these issues.

#### Supremacy of policy-making crowds out critical questioning—causes serial policy failure

Biswas 7—Shampa Biswas, Politics at Whitman [“Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist” *Millennium* 36 (1) p. 117-125]

One of the profound effects of the war on terror initiated by the Bush administration has been a significant constriction of a democratic public sphere, which has included the active and aggressive curtailment of intellectual and political dissent and a sharp delineation of national boundaries along with concentration of state power. The academy in this context has become a particularly embattled site with some highly disturbing onslaughts on academic freedom. At the most obvious level, this has involved fairly well-calibrated neoconservative attacks on US higher education that have invoked the mantra of ‘liberal bias’ and demanded legislative regulation and reform10, an onslaught supported by a well-funded network of conservative think tanks, centres, institutes and ‘concerned citizen groups’ within and outside the higher education establishment11 and with considerable reach among sitting legislators, jurists and policy-makers as well as the media. But what has in part made possible the encroachment of such nationalist and statist agendas has been a larger history of the corporatisation of the university and the accompanying ‘professionalisation’ that goes with it. Expressing concern with ‘academic acquiescence in the decline of public discourse in the United States’, Herbert Reid has examined the ways in which the university is beginning to operate as another transnational corporation12, and critiqued the consolidation of a ‘culture of professionalism’ where academic bureaucrats engage in bureaucratic role-playing, minor academic turf battles mask the larger managerial power play on campuses and the increasing influence of a relatively autonomous administrative elite and the rise of insular ‘expert cultures’ have led to academics relinquishing their claims to public space and authority.13

While it is no surprise that the US academy should find itself too at that uneasy confluence of neoliberal globalising dynamics and exclusivist nationalist agendas that is the predicament of many contemporary institutions around the world, there is much reason for concern and an urgent need to rethink the role and place of intellectual labour in the democratic process. This is especially true for scholars of the global writing in this age of globalisation and empire. Edward Said has written extensively on the place of the academy as one of the few and increasingly precarious spaces for democratic deliberation and argued the necessity for public intellectuals immured from the seductions of power.14 Defending the US academy as one of the last remaining utopian spaces, ‘the one public space available to real alternative intellectual practices: no other institution like it on such a scale exists anywhere else in the world today’15, and lauding the remarkable critical theoretical and historical work of many academic intellectuals in a lot of his work, Said also complains that ‘the American University, with its munificence, utopian sanctuary, and remarkable diversity, has defanged (intellectuals)’16. The most serious threat to the ‘intellectual vocation’, he argues, is ‘professionalism’ and mounts a pointed attack on the proliferation of ‘specializations’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ with their focus on ‘relatively narrow areas of knowledge’, ‘technical formalism’, ‘impersonal theories and methodologies’, and most worrisome of all, their ability and willingness to be seduced by power.17 Said mentions in this context the funding of academic programmes and research which came out of the exigencies of the Cold War18, an area in which there was considerable traffic of political scientists (largely trained as IR and comparative politics scholars) with institutions of policy-making. Looking at various influential US academics as ‘organic intellectuals’ involved in a dialectical relationship with foreign policy-makers and examining the institutional relationships at and among numerous think tanks and universities that create convergent perspectives and interests, Christopher Clement has studied US intervention in the Third World both during and after the Cold War made possible and justified through various forms of ‘intellectual articulation’.19 This is not simply a matter of scholars working for the state, but indeed a larger question of intellectual orientation. It is not uncommon for IR scholars to feel the need to formulate their scholarly conclusions in terms of its relevance for global politics, where ‘relevance’ is measured entirely in terms of policy wisdom. Edward Said’s searing indictment of US intellectuals – policy-experts and Middle East experts - in the context of the first Gulf War20 is certainly even more resonant in the contemporary context preceding and following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The space for a critical appraisal of the motivations and conduct of this war has been considerably diminished by the expertise-framed national debate wherein certain kinds of ethical questions irreducible to formulaic ‘for or against’ and ‘costs and benefits’ analysis can simply not be raised. In effect, what Said argues for, and IR scholars need to pay particular heed to, is an understanding of ‘intellectual relevance’ that is larger and more worthwhile, that is about the posing of critical, historical, ethical and perhaps unanswerable questions rather than the offering of recipes and solutions, that is about politics (rather than techno-expertise) in the most fundamental and important senses of the vocation.21

#### Reject their interpretation—calls for ‘policy relevance’ only entrench dominant systems of thought—this tunnel vision prevents true education—their interpretation is tainted by the hegemonic discourse reason why all their claims are suspect.

Jones 9—Lee Jones, Lecturer in International Politics in the School of Politics and International Relations at Queen Mary, University of London, former Rose Research Fellow in International Relations at Lady Margaret Hall at Oxford University, holds an MPhil and DPhil from Oxford University, [“International Relations Scholarship and the Tyranny of Policy Relevance,” *Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies*, Volume 1, Issue 1, http://criticalglobalisation.com/Issue%201/125\_131\_JCGS1\_JONES\_TYRANNYPOLICYRELEVANCE.pdf, p. 127-130]

Having conceded where Nye has a point, let’s now consider the ways in which he may simply be wrong. His assumption is that the academic should be, needs to be, policy-relevant. As indicated above, this can be a very pernicious assumption. As an invitation to academics to contribute to discussions about the direction of society and policy, no one could reasonably object: those who wished to contribute could do so, while others could be left to investigate topics of perhaps dubious immediate ‘relevance’ that nonetheless enrich human understanding and thus contribute to the accumulation of knowledge and general social progress (and, quite probably, to those scholars’ research communities and their students). As an imperative, however, it creates all sorts of distortions that are injurious to academic freedom. It encourages academics to study certain things, in certain ways, with certain outcomes and certain ways of disseminating one’s findings. This ‘encouragement’ is [end page 127] more or less coercive, backed as it is by the allure of large research grants which advance one’s institution and personal career, versus the threat of a fate as an entirely marginal scholar incapable of attracting research funding—a nowadays a standard criteria for academic employment and promotion.

Furthermore, those funding ‘policy-relevant’ research already have predefined notions of what is ‘relevant’. This means both that academics risk being drawn into policy-based evidence-making, rather than its much-vaunted opposite, and that academics will tend to be selected by the policy world based on whether they will reflect, endorse and legitimise the overall interests and ideologies that underpin the prevailing order.

Consider the examples Nye gives as leading examples of policy-relevant scholars: Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, both of whom served as National Security Advisers (under Nixon and Carter respectively), while Kissinger also went on to become Secretary of State (under Nixon and Ford). Kissinger, as is now widely known, is a war criminal who does not travel very much outside the USA for fear of being arrested à la General Pinochet (Hitchens, 2001). Brzezinski has not yet been subject to the same scrutiny and even popped up to advise Obama recently, but can hardly be regarded as a particularly progressive individual. Under his watch, after Vietnam overthrew the genocidal Khmer Rouge in 1978, Washington sent tens of millions of dollars to help them regroup and rearm on Thai soil as a proxy force against Hanoi (Peou, 2000, p. 143). Clearly, a rejection of US imperialism was not part of whatever Kissinger and Brzezinski added to the policy mix.

In addition to them, Nye says that of the top twenty-five most influential scholars as identified by a recent survey, only three have served in policy circles (Jordan et al, 2009). This apparently referred to himself (ranked sixth), Samuel Huntington (eighth), and John Ikenberry (twenty-fourth).2 Huntington, despite his reputation for iconoclasm, never strayed far from reflecting elite concerns and prejudices (Jones, 2009). Nye and Ikenberry, despite their more ‘liberal’ credentials, have built their careers around the project of institutionalising, preserving and extending American hegemony. This concern in Nye’s work spans from After Hegemony (1984), his book co-authored with Robert Keohane (rated first most influential), which explicitly sought to maintain US power through institutional means, through cheer-leading post-Cold War US hegemony in Bound to Lead (1990), to his exhortations for Washington to regain its battered post-Iraq standing in Soft Power: The Means to Succeed in International Politics (2004). Ikenberry, who was a State Department advisor in 2003-04, has a very similar trajectory. He only criticised the Bush administration’s ‘imperial ambition’ on the pragmatic grounds that empire was not attainable, not that it was undesirable, and he is currently engaged in a Nye-esque project proposing ways to bolster the US-led ‘liberal’ order. [end page 128] These scholars’ commitment to the continued ‘benign’ dominance of US values, capital and power overrides any superficial dissimilarities occasioned by their personal ‘conservative’ or ‘liberal’ predilections. It is this that qualifies them to act as advisers to the modern-day ‘prince’; genuinely critical voices are unlikely to ever hear the call to serve. The idea of, say, Noam Chomsky as Assistant Secretary of State is simply absurd.

At stake here is the fundamental distinction between ‘problem-solving’ and ‘critical’ theory, which Robert Cox introduced in a famous article in 1981. Cox argued that theory, despite being presented as a neutral analytical tool, was ‘always for someone and for some purpose’. Problem-solving theories ultimately endorsed the prevailing system by generating suggestions as to how the system could be run more smoothly. Critical theories, by contrast, seek to explain why the system exists in the first place and what could be done to transform it. What unifies Nye, Ikenberry, Huntington, Brzezinski and Kissinger (along with the majority of IR scholars) is their problem-solving approach. Naturally, policy-makers want academics to be problem-solvers, since policies seek precisely to—well, solve problems. But this does not necessarily mean that this should be the function of the academy.

Indeed, the tyranny of ‘policy relevance’ achieves its most destructive form when it becomes so dominant that it imperils the space the academy is supposed to provide to allow scholars to think about the foundations of prevailing orders in a critical, even hostile, fashion. Taking clear inspiration from Marx, Cox produced pathbreaking work showing how different social orders, corresponding to different modes of production, generated different world orders, and looked for contradictions within the existing orders to see how the world might be changing.1 Marxist theories of world order are unlikely to be seen as very ‘policy relevant’ by capitalist elites (despite the fact that, where Marxist theory is good, it is not only ‘critical’ but also potentially ‘problem-solving’, a possibility that Cox overlooked). Does this mean that such inquiry should be replaced by government-funded policy wonkery? Absolutely not, especially when we consider the horrors that entails. At one recent conference, for instance, a Kings College London team which had won a gargantuan sum of money from the government to study civil contingency plans in the event of terrorist attacks presented their ‘research outputs’. They suggested a raft of measures to securitise everyday life, including developing clearly sign-posted escape routes from London to enable citizens to flee the capital. There are always plenty of academics who are willing to turn their hand to repressive, official agendas. There are some who produce fine problem-solving work who ought to disseminate their ideas much more widely, beyond the narrow confines of academia. There are far fewer who are genuinely [end page 129] critical. The political economy of research funding combines with the tyranny of ‘policy relevance’ to entrench a hierarchy topped by tame academics.

‘Policy relevance’, then, is a double-edged sword. No one would wish to describe their work as ‘irrelevant’, so the key question, as always, is ‘relevant to whom?’ Relevance to one’s research community, students, and so on, ought to be more than enough justification for academic freedom, provided that scholars shoulder their responsibilities to teach and to communicate their subjects to society at large, and thus repay something to the society that supports them. But beyond that, we also need to fully respect work that will never be ‘policy-relevant’, because it refuses to swallow fashionable concerns or toe the line on government agendas. Truly critical voices are worth more to the progress of human civilisation than ten thousand Deputy Undersecretaries of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology.

### 2NC Reps Key

#### Representations come first, that’s Crawford—

#### It’s impossible to make sense of a political reality absent an interrogation of representations. The AFF doesn’t get access to plan based offense prior to winning their worldview is productive—that’s Crawford—here’s more evidence

Jourde 6 [Cedric Jourde, Ph.D., Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, M.A., Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, B.Sc., Political Science, Université de Montréal, Hegemony or Empire?: The redefinition of US Power under George W Bush Ed. David and Grondin, p. 182-3]

Relations between states are, at least in part, constructed upon representations. Representations are interpretative prisms through which decision-makers make sense of a political reality, through which they define and assign a subjective value to the other states and non-state actors of the international system, and through which they determine what are significant international political issues.2 For instance, officials of a given state will represent other states as ‘allies’, ‘rivals’, or simply ‘insignificant’, thus assigning a subjective value to these states. Such subjective categorizations often derive from representations of these states’ domestic politics, which can for instance be perceived as ‘unstable\*, ‘prosperous’, or ‘ethnically divided’. It must be clear that representations are not objective or truthful depictions of reality; rather they are subjective and political ways of seeing the world, making certain things ‘seen’ by and significant for an actor while making other things ‘unseen’ and ‘insignificant’.3 In other words, they are founded on each actor’s and group of actors’ cognitive, cultural-social, and emotional standpoints. Being fundamentally political, representations are the object of tense struggles and tensions, as some actors or groups of actors can impose on others their own representations of the world, of what they consider to be appropriate political orders, or appropriate economic relations, while others may in turn accept, subvert or contest these representations. Representations of a foreign political reality influence how decision-making actors will act upon that reality. In other words, as subjective and politically infused interpretations of reality, representations constrain and enable the policies that decision-makers will adopt vis-a-vis other states; they limit the courses of action that are politically thinkable and imaginable, making certain policies conceivable while relegating other policies to the realm of the unthinkable.4 Accordingly, identifying how a state represents another state or non-state actor helps to understand how and why certain foreign policies have been adopted while other policies have been excluded. To take a now famous example, if a transnational organization is represented as a group of ‘freedom fighters’, such as the multi-national mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s, then military cooperation is conceivable with that organization; if on the other hand the same organization is represented as a ‘terrorist network’, such as Al-Qaida, then military cooperation as a policy is simply not an option. In sum, the way in which one sees, interprets and imagines the ‘other’ delineates the course of action one will adopt in order to deal with this ‘other’.

#### The dominant colonial representations that structure the aff’s understanding of international security are a prior ethical issue.

Doty 96—Roxanne Doty, Poli Sci @ ASU [*Imperial Encounters* p. 168-171]

It follows that any meaningful discussion of agency must perforce be a discussion of representation. The representational practices that construct particular identities have serious ramifications for agency. While this study suggests that "race" historically has been a central marker of identity, it also suggests that identity construction takes place along several dimensions. Racial categories often have worked together with gendered categories as well as with analogies to parent/child oppositions and animal metaphors. Each of these dimensions has varying significance at different times and enables a wide variety of practices. In examining the construction of racialized identities, it is not enough to suggest that social identities are constructed on the basis of shared understandings within a community: shared understandings regarding institutional rules, social norms, and self- expectations of individuals in that community. It is not enough to examine the shared social criteria by which one identity is distinguished from another. Two additional elements must be considered: power and truth. "Race" has not just been about certain rules and resources facilitating the agency of some social groups and denying or placing severe limitations on the agency of other social groups. Though it has been about these things, this is only one aspect of what "race" has historically been about. "Race" has most fundamentally been about being human. Racist discourses historically have constructed different kinds and degrees of humanness through representational practices that have claimed to be and have been accepted as "true" and accurate representations of "reality." Racist discourses highlight, perhaps more than any other, the inextricable link between power and truth or power and knowledge. A theory of agency in international relations, if it is to incorporate issues such as "race," must address the relationship between power and truth. This realization in turn implies a reconceptualization of power and how it works that transcends those present in existing theories of international relations. The cases examined in this study attest to the importance of representational practices and the power that inheres in them. The infinity of traces that leave no inventory continue to play a significant part in contemporary constructions of "reality." This Is not to suggest that representations have been static. Static implies the possibility of fixedness, when what I mean to suggest is an inherent fragility and instability to the meanings and identities that have been constructed in the various discourses I examined. For example, to characterize the South as -uncivilized" or "unfit for self-governinent is no longer an acceptable representation. This is not, however, be.cause the meanings of these terms were at one time fixed and stable As I illustrated, what these signifiers signified was always deferred. Partial fixation was the result of their being anchored by some exemplary, mode of being that was itself constructed at the power/ knowledge nexus the white malt at the turn of the century, the United States after World War II. Bhabha stresses the wide range of the stereotype, from the loyal servant to Satan, from the loved to the hated; a shifting of subject positions in the circulation of colonial power" (1983: i. The shifting subject positions-from uncivilized native to quasi state to traditional -man" and society, for example -are all partial fixations that have enabled the exercise of various and multiple forms of power. Nor do previous oppositions entirely disappear. What remains is an infinity of traces from prior re-presentations that themselves have been founded not on pure presences but on differance. "The present becomes the sign of the sign, the trace of the trace," Derrida writes (x8z: 14). Diffcrance makes possible the chain of differing and deferring (the continuity as well as the endless substitution (the discontinuity of names that are in-scribed and reinscribed as pure presence, the center of the structure that itself escapes structurality. North-South relations have been constituted as a structure of deferral. The center of the structure (alternatively white man, modem man, the United States, the West, real states) has never been absolutely present outside \* system of differences. It has itself been constituted as trace-the simulacrum of a presence that dislocates itself, displaces itself, refers itself (ibid4. Because the center is not a fixed locus but a function in which an infinite number of sign sub- stitutions come into play, the domain and play of signification is extended indefinitely (Derrida 1978: iSo). This both opens up and limits possibilities, generates alternative sites of meanings and political resistances that give rise to practices of reinscription that seek to reaffirm identities and relationships. The inherently incomplete and open nature of discourse makes this reaffirmation an ongoing and never finally completed project. In this study I have sought, through an engagement with various discourses in which claims to truth have been staked, to challenge the validity of the structures of meaning and to make visible their complicity with practices of power and domination. By examining the ways in which structures of meaning have been associated with imperial practices, I have suggested that the construction of meaning and the construction of social political, and economic power arc inextricably linked, This suggests an ethical dimension to making meaning and an ethical imperative that is incumbent upon chose who toil in the construction of structures of meaning.. This is especially urgent in North-South relations today: one does not have to search very far to find a continuing complicity with colonial representations that ranges from a politics of silence and neglect to constructions of terrorism Islamic fundamentalism, international drug trafficking, and Southern immigration to the North as new threats to global stability and peace. The political stakes raised by this analysis revolve around the question of being able to -get beyond" the representations or speak outside of the discourses that historically have constructed the North and the South. I do not believe that there are any pure alternatives by which we can escape the infinity of traces to which Gramsci refers. Nor do I wish to suggest that we are always hopelessly imprisoned in a dominant and all-pervasive discourse. Before this question can be answered -indeed, before we can even proceed to attempt an answer-attention must be given to the politics of representation. The price that international relations scholarship pays for its inattention to the issue of representation is perpetuation of the dominant modes of making meaning and deferral of its responsibility and complicity in dominant representations.

### AT: Owen 2

#### Owen is wrong; we’ll straight turn his argument. Focus on theory doesn’t kill policy relevance. In fact, theoretical inquiry is a pre-requisite to policy relevant research—asking epistemological questions is key to avoid policy failure.

Reus-Smit 12—Christian Reus-Smit, Department of Political and Social Sciences, European University Institute, Italy [“International Relations, Irrelevant? Don’t Blame Theory,” *Millennium - Journal of International Studies*, June 2012, vol. 40 no. 3, pg. 525-540]

However widespread it might be, the notion that IR’s lack of practical relevance stems from excessive theorising rests more on vigorous assertion than weighty evidence. As noted above, we lack good data on the field’s practical relevance, and the difficulties establishing appropriate measures are all too apparent in the fraught attempts by several governments to quantify the impact of the humanities and social sciences more generally. Beyond this, though, we lack any credible evidence that any fluctuations in the field’s relevance are due to more or less high theory. We hear that policymakers complain of not being able to understand or apply much that appears in our leading journals, but it is unclear why we should be any more concerned about this than physicists or economists, who take theory, even high theory, to be the bedrock of advancement in knowledge. Moreover, there is now a wealth of research, inside and outside IR, that shows that policy communities are not open epistemic or cognitive realms, simply awaiting well-communicated, non-jargonistic knowledge – they are bureaucracies, deeply susceptible to groupthink, that filter information through their own intersubjective frames.10

Beyond this, however, there are good reasons to believe that precisely the reverse of the theory versus relevance thesis might be true; that theoretical inquiry may be a necessary prerequisite for the generation of practically relevant knowledge. I will focus here on the value of metatheory, as this attracts most contemporary criticism and would appear the most difficult of theoretical forms to defend.

Metatheories take other theories as their subject. Indeed, their precepts establish the conditions of possibility for second-order theories. In general, metatheories divide into three broad categories: epistemology, ontology and meta-ethics. The first concerns the nature, validity and acquisition of knowledge; the second, the nature of being (what can be said to exist, how things might be categorised and how they stand in relation to one another); and the third, the nature of right and wrong, what constitutes moral argument, and how moral arguments might be sustained. Second-order theories are constructed within, and on the basis of, assumptions formulated at the metatheoretical level. Epistemological assumptions about what constitutes legitimate knowledge and how it is legitimately acquired delimit the questions we ask and the kinds of information we can enlist in answering them.11 Can social scientists ask normative questions? Is literature a valid source of social-scientific knowledge? Ontological assumptions about the nature and distinctiveness of the social universe affect not only what we ‘see’ but also how we order what we see; how we relate the material to the ideational, agents to structures, interests to beliefs, and so on. If we assume, for example, that individuals are rational actors, engaged in the efficient pursuit of primarily material interests, then phenomena such as faith-motivated politics will remain at the far periphery of our vision.12 Lastly, meta-ethical assumptions about the nature of the good, and about what constitutes a valid moral argument, frame how we reason about concrete ethical problems. Both deontology and consequentialism are meta-ethical positions, operationalised, for example, in the differing arguments of Charles Beitz and Peter Singer on global distributive justice.13

Most scholars would acknowledge the background, structuring role that metatheory plays, but argue that we can take our metatheoretical assumptions off the shelf, get on with the serious business of research and leave explicit metatheoretical reflection and debate to the philosophers. If practical relevance is one of our concerns, however, there are several reasons why this is misguided.

Firstly, whether IR is practically relevant depends, in large measure, on the kinds of questions that animate our research. I am not referring here to the commonly held notion that we should be addressing questions that practitioners want answered. Indeed, our work will at times be most relevant when we pursue questions that policymakers and others would prefer left buried. My point is a different one, which I return to in greater detail below. It is sufficient to note here that being practically relevant involves asking questions of practice; not just retrospective questions about past practices – their nature, sources and consequences – but prospective questions about what human agents should do. As I have argued elsewhere, being practically relevant means asking questions of how we, ourselves, or some other actors (states, policymakers, citizens, NGOs, IOs, etc.) should act.14 Yet our ability, nay willingness, to ask such questions is determined by the metatheoretical assumptions that structure our research and arguments. This is partly an issue of ontology – what we see affects how we understand the conditions of action, rendering some practices possible or impossible, mandatory or beyond the pale. If, for example, we think that political change is driven by material forces, then we are unlikely to see communicative practices of argument and persuasion as potentially successful sources of change. More than this, though, it is also an issue of epistemology. If we assume that the proper domain of IR as a social science is the acquisition of empirically verifiable knowledge, then we will struggle to comprehend, let alone answer, normative questions of how we should act. We will either reduce ‘ought’ questions to ‘is’ questions, or place them off the agenda altogether.15 Our metatheoretical assumptions thus determine the macro-orientation of IR towards questions of practice, directly affecting the field’s practical relevance.

Secondly, metatheoretical revolutions license new second-order theoretical and analytical possibilities while foreclosing others, directly affecting those forms of scholarship widely considered most practically relevant. The rise of analytical eclecticism illustrates this. As noted above, Katzenstein and Sil’s call for a pragmatic approach to the study of world politics, one that addresses real-world problematics by combining insights from diverse research traditions, resonates with the mood of much of the field, especially within the American mainstream. Epistemological and ontological debates are widely considered irresolvable dead ends, grand theorising is unfashionable, and gladiatorial contests between rival paradigms appear, increasingly, as unimaginative rituals. Boredom and fatigue are partly responsible for this new mood, but something deeper is at work. Twenty-five years ago, Sil and Katzenstein’s call would have fallen on deaf ears; the neo-neo debate that preoccupied the American mainstream occurred within a metatheoretical consensus, one that combined a neo-positivist epistemology with a rationalist ontology. This singular metatheoretical framework defined the rules of the game; analytical eclecticism was unimaginable. The Third Debate of the 1980s and early 1990s destabilised all of this; not because American IR scholars converted in their droves to critical theory or poststructuralism (far from it), but because metatheoretical absolutism became less and less tenable. The anti-foundationalist critique of the idea that there is any single measure of truth did not produce a wave of relativism, but it did generate a widespread sense that battles on the terrain of epistemology were unwinnable. Similarly, the Third Debate emphasis on identity politics and cultural particularity, which later found expression in constructivism, did not vanquish rationalism. It did, however, establish a more pluralistic, if nevertheless heated, debate about ontology, a terrain on which many scholars felt more comfortable than that of epistemology. One can plausibly argue, therefore, that the metatheoretical struggles of the Third Debate created a space for – even made possible – the rise of analytical eclecticism and its aversion to metatheoretical absolutes, a principal benefit of which is said to be greater practical relevance.

Lastly, most of us would agree that for our research to be practically relevant, it has to be good – it has to be the product of sound inquiry, and our conclusions have to be plausible. The pluralists among us would also agree that different research questions require different methods of inquiry and strategies of argument. Yet across this diversity there are several practices widely recognised as essential to good research. Among these are clarity of purpose, logical coherence, engagement with alternative arguments and the provision of good reasons (empirical evidence, corroborating arguments textual interpretations, etc.). Less often noted, however, is the importance of metatheoretical reflexivity. If our epistemological assumptions affect the questions we ask, then being conscious of these assumptions is necessary to ensure that we are not fencing off questions of importance, and that if we are, we can justify our choices. Likewise, if our ontological assumptions affect how we see the social universe, determining what is in or outside our field of vision, then reflecting on these assumptions can prevent us being blind to things that matter. A similar argument applies to our meta-ethical assumptions. Indeed, if deontology and consequentialism are both meta-ethical positions, as I suggested earlier, then reflecting on our choice of one or other position is part and parcel of weighing rival ethical arguments (on issues as diverse as global poverty and human rights). Finally, our epistemological, ontological and meta-ethical assumptions are not metatheoretical silos; assumptions we make in one have a tendency to shape those we make in another. The oft-heard refrain that ‘if we can’t measure it, it doesn’t matter’ is an unfortunate example of epistemology supervening on ontology, something that metatheoretical reflexivity can help guard against. In sum, like clarity, coherence, consideration of alternative arguments and the provision of good reasons, metatheoretical reflexivity is part of keeping us honest, making it practically relevant despite its abstraction.

#### Owen concludes inevitable confusion in IR causes his ‘vicious cycle,’ not our critical interrogation

Owen 2 [David, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, *Millennium*, Vol 31, No 3, Sage]

It should be noted that I am not claiming that such a vicious circle has been established in IR by virtue of the philosophical turn, nor am I claiming that IR is alone in its current exposure to this threat; on the contrary, Shapiro’s remarks are directed at (primarily North American) political science. I am simply concerned to point out that the philosophical turn in IR increases its exposure to these dangers and, hence, its vulnerability to the kind of vicious circle that they can, collectively, generate. Having specified these dangers, however, I want to turn to a confusion within much of IR that has, I will argue, acted to encourage this philosophical turn and so increase its exposure to these risks. As a preface to this task, though, it is useful to sketch out two main lines of debate within the IR theory wars; these are not the only lines of debate, but they are important ones.

#### Owen concludes epistemology and ontology are ‘policy relevant’

Owen 2 [David, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, *Millennium*, Vol 31, No 3, Sage]

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn.

#### Owen concedes empistemological inquiry is a pre-requisite to policy analysis—you are a specific intellectual challenging the crude assumptions of the 1AC’s discourse.

Owen 94—David Owen, Professor of Social and Political Philosophy @ University of Southampton [*Maturity and Modernity*, pg. 209-210]

The ‘universal’ intellectual, on Foucault’s account, is that figure who maintains a commitment to critique as a legislative activity in which the pivotal positing of universal norms (or universal procedures for generating norms) grounds politics in the ‘truth’ of our being (e.g.. our ‘real’ interests). The problematic forms of this type of intellectual practice is the central concern of Foucault’s critique of humanist politics in so far as humanism simultaneously asserts and undermines autonomy. If, however, this is the case, what alternative conceptions of the role of the intellectual and the activity of critique can Foucault present to us? Foucault’s elaboration of the figure of the ‘specific’ intellectual provides the beginnings of an answer to this question: I dream of the intellectual who destroys evidence and generalities, the one who, in the inertias and constraints of the present time, locates and marks the weak points, the openings, the lines of force, who is incessantly on the move, doesn’t know exactly where he is heading nor what he will think tomorrow for he is too attentive to the present. (PPC p. 124) The historicity of thought, the impossibility of locating an Archimedean point outside of time, leads Foucault to locate intellectual activity as an ongoing attentiveness to the present in terms of what is singular and arbitrary in what we take to be universal and necessary. Following from this, the intellectual does not seek to offer grand theories but specific analyses, not global but local criticism. We should be clear on the latter point for it is necessary to acknowledge that Foucault’s position does entail the impossibility of ‘acceding to a point of view that could give us access to any complete and definitive knowledge of what may constitute our historical limits’ and, consequently, ‘we are always in the position of beginning again’ (FR p. 47). The upshot of this recognition of the partial character of criticism is not, however, to produce an ethos of fatal resignation but, in so far as it involves a recognition that everything is dangerous, ‘a hyper-and pessimistic activism’ (FR p. 343). In other words, it is the very historicity and partiality of criticisms which bestows on the activity of critique its dignity and urgency. What of this activity then? We can sketch the Foucault account of the activity of critique by coming to grips with the opposition he draws between ‘ideal’ critique and ‘real’ transformation. Foucault suggests that the activity of critique ‘is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are’ but rather ‘of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, uncontested modes of thought the practices we accept rest’ (PPC p. 154)This distinction is perhaps slightly disingenuous, yet Foucault’s points if intelligence if we recognize his concerns to disclose the epistemological grammar which informs our social practices as the starting point of critique. This emerges in his recognition that ‘criticism (and radical criticism) is absolutely indispensable for any transformation’: A transformation that remains within the same mode of thought, a transformation that is only a way of adjusting the same thought more closely to the reality of things can merely be a superficial transformation. (PPC p. 155) The genealogical thrust of this activity is ‘to show that things are not as self-evident as one believed, to see that what is accepted as self-evident as one believed to see that what is accepted as self-evident is no longer accepted as such’ for ‘as soon as one can no longer think things formerly thought them, transformation becomes both very urgent, very difficult, and quite possible’ (PPC p. 155). The urgency of transformation derives from the contestation of thought (and the social practices in which it is embedded) as the form of our autonomy, although this urgency is given its specific character for modern culture by the recognition that the humanist grammar of this thought ties us into the technical matrix of biopolitics. The ‘specificity’ of intellectual practice and this account of the activity of critique come together in the refusal to legislate a universal determination of ‘what is right’ in favour of the perpetual problematisation of the present. It is not a question, for Foucault, of invoking a determination of who we are as a basis for critique but of locating what we are now as the basis for reposting of the question ‘ who are we?’ The role of the intellectual is thus not to speak on the behalf of others (the dispossessed, the downtrodden) but to create the space within which their struggles become visible such that these others can speak for themselves. The question remains, however, as to the capacity of Foucault’s work to perform this critical activity through an entrenchment of the ethics of creativity as the structures of recognition through which we recognize our autonomy in the contestation of determinations of who we are.

### AT: Curriculum/Judge Choice

#### We should be analyzing the relationship between the plan and the advantages, not just the plan alone. *Policy stories*, like the 1ac institutionalize a particular understanding of both problems and solutions. Their advantage choices crowd out different policy practices and concepts.

Sending 4—Ole, Research Fellow @ Norweigan Inst. of Int’l Affairs [*Global Institutions & Development* eds. Morten Boas and Desmond McNeil p. 58-59]

Granted that the objectification and definition of a given phenomenon is open to a variety of normative and political considerations, it becomes interesting to explore how scientific knowledge constitutes a symbolic resource used by politically motivated actors. In order to justify and legitimize certain courses of action, and to render these possible and effective, scientific knowledge forms an important component both for efforts of persuading and mobilizing different groups, and for formulating and establishing policy practices. This can he grasped through the concept of poli1y stories. A policy story can be defined as follows: A set of factual, causal claims, normative principles and a desired objective, all of which are constructed as a more or less coherent argument a story which points to a problem to be addressed and the desirability and adequacy of adopting a specific policy approach to resolve it.

This conceptualization incorporates how politically motivated actors integrate scientifically produced imowledge in the form of facts, concepts or theories in order to i) convince others that a certain phenomenon is a problem, (ii) demonstrate that this problem is best understood in a certain way as shown by the facts presented, and (iii) link these factual claims to normative principles giving moral force to the argument that it should be resolved. This perspective thus subjects the factual dimensions of political processes to the interests and normative commitments of actors, in the sense that knowledge is used to justify and legitimize calls for adopting certain policies to resolve what is seen to be a problem that 'ought' to be resolved. The formulation is partly inspired by Rein and Schuss (1991. 265), who refer to problem-setting stories that 'link causal accounts of policy problems to particular proposals for action and facilitate the normative leap from "is" to 'ought"'. We depart from Rein and Schon's conception somewhat by emphasizing more strongly the factual claims (the characteristics of a phenomenon and normative principles (the morally' grounded principles used to legitimize the policy formulation invoked by actors as they define a problem and argue for a specific policy approach. The concept of policy stories seeks to capture how actors integrate knowledge claims into their politically charged arguments so as to 'frame' the issue under discussion. Because of the interlocking of the factual and normative dimension of policy making, a policy story, can be seen to create space for political agency. That is: a policy story serves by creating an argument grounded in a body of scientifically produced knowledge, to persuade and mobilize different groups as it represents a complete package: an authoritative problem-definition and a concomitant policy solution that is legitimized in both factual and normative terms. A policy story- that wins acceptance at the discursive level can be seen to define the terms of the debate for the establishment of policy and to de- legitimize competing conceptualizations and policy approaches. Through the political agency performed through a policy story it may come to dominate the policy field as it forms the central cognitive-normative organising device for specific formulation and establishment of policy within different organizations. In this way, the policy story' may over time attain a 'taken for granted' char- acter as it comes to structure, and reflect, policy practice. This process of stabilization is best described as a process of institutionalization. Following Scott, we can define institutionalization as a 'process by which a given set of units and a pattern of activities come so be normatively' and cognitively held in place, and practically taken for granted as lawful' Scott at al. 1994: 10). This latter feature is critical to the argument presented here. In the change from an argument for a specific policy approach to the establishment of that policy in practice, the policy story comes to define the cognitive-normative outlook of a policy regime. This can he defined as an interlock between the knowledge which underwrites the policy story, and the establishment in practice of the policy advocated in a policy story: That is: the knowledge that once formed part of an argument for a policy is now an integral part of the very rationality and identity' of the organization involved with managing this policy in practice. As such it becomes pact of the bundle of routines, rules, priorities and rationality of the organizations in the policy field see Douglas 1986; March and Olsen 1989: Scott and Meyer. 1994).

#### Policy analysis should include competing epistemologies, ontologies, and assumptions—they can’t sever out of the criticism.

Dixon and Dogan 4—John Dixon Public Management @ Plymouth and Rhys Dogan Politics @ Plymouth [“The Conduct of Policy Analysis: Philosophical Points of Reference” *Review of Policy Research* 21 (4)]

The proposed fifth methodology requires policy analysts to be philosophically reflective, and thus able not only to identify their own and others epistemological and ontological predispositions, but also to understand and accept the strengths and weaknesses of the contending methodologies for their performance as policy analysts. In essence, this requires them to embrace the following propositions. First, adept policy analysts would be epistemologically and ontologically sophisticated enough to accept that what constitutes “good” policy analysis is an essentially contested concept, clarifiable through constructive discourse. Thus, they would actively seek insights into what might work in particular policy situations by engaging with those who hold different philosophical dispositions. They therefore would see such constructive discourse as normal, even if it has the propensity to create conflict, and, most certainly, as necessary, in order to create creative opportunities for policy analysts to engage with those holding contending philosophical perspectives to find solutions to policy problems and issues. Second, adept policy analysts would be skeptical of any empirical generalizations about the causation and consequences of, and solutions to, policy problems and issues. These they would treat only as preliminary working hypotheses. They would thus seek to deepen their understanding by engaging in acts of ideation with those who hold different philosophical dispositions, which would allow the perspectives reciprocity needed for a reflexive interpretation to emerge that would ensure an appropriate contextualization of meaning. Third, adept policy analysts would learn how to comprehend and evaluate the intended meaning of the contending arguments based on a diversity of epistemological and ontological perspectives. They would settle in their own minds competing epistemological and ontological truth-claims with consistency and without recourse to intentional activities and motivated processes that enable self-deception or self-delusion. They would thereby confront unpleasant truths or issues rather than resort to the mental states of ignorance, false belief, unwarranted attitudes, and inappropriate emotions (Haight, 1980). They would accept that the best policy outcomes that can be expected from constructive discourses are sets of achievable policy aspirations, implementable strategies, and a tolerable level of policy conflict. They would see view good policy analysis as an iterative process that involves learning-by-doing and learning-from-experience about what is the right thing to do and how to do things right. Conclusion In a world characterized by profound diversity of opinion grounded in equally profound philosophical differences, the interrogation of the social world requires a series of conceptual and analytical tools. These relate not only to epistemology and ontology, but also to methodology, and thus theory and method of inquiry. Furthermore, these various tools are logically interconnected: epistemology shapes ontology, epistemology and ontology together shape methodology, and methodology shapes both theory and method. Adept policy analysts must be critically reflective before they seek to describe, explain, understand, judge, and address policy problems and issues by drawing upon theories and methods grounded in only one of these contending (fundamentally flawed) methodological families. The broad conclusion drawn, then, is that policy analysts need: • to avoid epistemological and ontological arrogance; • to seek out and engage with those who disagree with their philosophical dispositions; • to treat all truth-claims skeptically, accepting that there are multiple standards by which they could be justified, particularly if they come from any ascendant epistemic community (whether grounded in naturalism or hermeneutics); and • to settle competing epistemological and ontological asseverations with consistency and without recourse to the self-deception or self-delusion that permits them to avoid unpleasant truths about their informing intellectual discipline.

### AT: Problem-solve Theory

#### Focusing on constitutive theory instead of policy application generates social change—their framework is academically bankrupt.

Widmaier 4—an Assistant Professor of Political Science at St. Joseph's University, an Australian Research Council Future Fellow in the Centre for Governance and Public Policy and at the Griffith Asia Institute at Griffith University [Sep., 2004, Wesley W. Widmaier, “Theory as a Factor and the Theorist as an Actor: The "Pragmatist Constructivist" Lessons of John Dewey and John Kenneth Galbraith,” *International Studies Review*, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 427-445, accessed through JSTOR]

This realignment of debate also would contribute to a more engaged IR scholarship if it led scholars to recognize that they themselves act as agents in such communicative interactions. They might then become more inclined to acknowledge concerns, not only regarding explanation and research design, but also for policy relevance and constitutional design. Deliberate reflection on constitutional design- confronting and acknowledging the inevitable implications of any scholarly arguments for policy practices-is necessary because every theoretical and empirical argument offers a normative or policy lesson. For example, economists have recognized that classical theories "teach" students to behave in accord with their precepts. Robert Frank and his colleagues (1993) have argued that exposure to contemporary economic theory itself constitutes agents to act more selfishly; indeed, they found students enrolled in economics courses come to behave in an increasingly "self-help" manner. In the IR context, Wendt (1999:377) himself argues "that problem-solving theory has the practical effect in the real world of helping to reproduce the status quo" and suggests that "realism, despite its claim of objectivity" is best seen in this light as "a normative as well as scientific theory."

In recent decades, the "research design"-style structuring of questions and cases has come at the expense of such constitutional concerns. Certainly, scholarly efforts should not be evaluated exclusively in terms of the "correctness" of their policy views. Academia would not "work" if subjective political differences became legitimate grounds for dismissing arguments. However, scholars need to acknowledge that their views inevitably possess normative and policy implications rather than pretending that such implications do not exist. Consider again that despite their numerous differences, the constitutive lessons inherent in the analyses of Waltz, Cox, Ashley, and Campbell are quite similar: that state and societal agents must define their interests in competitive-as opposed to collective -fashion. One suspects that this is not the "moral" that Ashley or Campbell sought to advocate. Unfortunately, the absence of a broader focus on such constitutive "lessons," a neglect rooted in the structure of IR debate itself, limited their attention to such issues. In contrast, by more persistently asking questions about the constitutive effects of theoretical or empirical claims, scholars may enable a more relevant study of international relations. They might reclaim the public space to act as not simply "academics" in the narrow sense of the term-within elite epistemic communities or as participant-advisors in the policy process-but rather they might aid one another in functioning as public intellectuals, focusing larger public debates in a more constructive, pragmatic manner.

What are the potential benefits of such shifts? The resulting academic contribution to public policy learning might enable not simply materialist-rationalist styled Bayesian probability updating (Iverson 1984), but rather could promote a kind of "social learning." Such learning, as Albert Bandura (1962, viii) has argued "neither casts people into the role of powerless objects controlled by environmental forces nor free agents who can become whatever they choose," but rather recognizes that "both people and their environments are reciprocal determinants of each other." Such social learning requires an ability to "make sense" of intersubjective contexts through a broader dialogue among the public, scholars, and policy agents. International structures, from this vantage, offer no unambiguous lessons. Contrary to Kissinger's (1979:54-55) view (noted earlier) that "the convictions that leaders have formed before reaching high office are the intellectual capital they will consume as long as they continue in office," possibilities for intersubjective variation require a constant monitoring of the prevailing intersubjective "mood." Just as balance of power rules are learned in a social context, they can be unlearned if states come to expect cooperation instead of conflict. Kissinger-like claims regarding the irrelevance of ongoing reflection to policymaking seem misguided, as does the application of "balance of power" lessons in an inappropriate social context that may, in turn, contribute to new policy errors. Put simply, lessons that are applicable in one setting (for example, Europe in 1914) may be counterproductive in another (for example, Europe in 1992). Such variation might, perhaps, be more readily recognized by scholars engaged in a more pragmatic, ongoing social learning.

Conclusion

Theory constitutes social reality. This realization highlights the need for a pragmatist- constructivist approach to IR theory, one that involves an ongoing involvement in both scholarly and public debates. Unfortunately, the development of such a perspective in IR scholarship has often been impeded by the distinction between "long-term" critical theory and "short-run" problem-solving theory. The present essay has called this distinction into question by describing the ways in which John Dewey and John Kenneth Galbraith engaged in theoretical debates while also pursuing policy agendas. Both Dewey and Galbraith highlighted the importance of socially constructed understandings in the issue areas of education and economic policy. More broadly, their work itself provided a better sense of what it means to act as a public intellectual in both guiding and being immersed in public debates. In addressing the implications for IR scholarship, this essay has, therefore, urged a more explicit stress on both the role of agency in advancing change and a recognition of the constitutive effects of theory on social reality. In keeping with the tradition of pragmatist scholarship, let us conclude that distinctions between critical theory and problem-solving theory need to be relaxed considerably to highlight the potential roles of theory as a factor as well as of theorists themselves as actors in international politics (Edwards 1990).

## \*\*\* Links

### 2NC/1NR Link—Resource Wars/Security

#### Securitization of environmental and social crises risks genocide and mass violence.

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3.2 From theory to policy

Consequently, for the most part, the policy implications of orthodox IR approaches involve a redundant conceptualisation of global systemic crises purely as potential ‘threat-multipliers’ of traditional security issues such as ‘political instability around the world, the collapse of governments and the creation of terrorist safe havens’. Climate change will serve to amplify the threat of international terrorism, particularly in regions with large populations and scarce resources.94 The US Army, for instance, depicts climate change as a ‘stress-multiplier’ that will ‘exacerbate tensions’ and ‘complicate American foreign policy’; while the EU perceives it as a ‘threat-multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability’.95

In practice, this generates an excessive preoccupation not with the causes of global crisis acceleration and how to ameliorate them through structural transformation, but with their purportedly inevitable impacts, and how to prepare for them by controlling problematic populations. Paradoxically, this ‘securitisation’ of global crises does not render us safer. Instead, by necessitating more violence, while inhibiting preventive action, it guarantees greater insecurity. Thus, a recent US Department of Defense report explores the future of international conflict up to 2050. It warns of ‘resource competition induced by growing populations and expanding economies’, particularly due to a projected ‘youth bulge’ in the South, which ‘will consume ever increasing amounts of food, water and energy’. This will prompt a ‘return to traditional security threats posed by emerging near-peers as we compete globally for depleting natural resources and overseas markets’. Finally, climate change will ‘compound’ these stressors by generating humanitarian crises, population migrations and other complex emergencies.96

A similar study by the US Joint Forces Command draws attention to the danger of global energy depletion through to 2030. Warning of ‘the dangerous vulnerabilities the growing energy crisis presents’, the report concludes that ‘The implications for future conflict are ominous.’97 Once again, the subject turns to demographics: ‘In total, the world will add approximately 60 million people each year and reach a total of 8 billion by the 2030s’, 95 per cent accruing to developing countries, while populations in developed countries slow or decline. ‘Regions such as the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, where the youth bulge will reach over 50% of the population, will possess fewer inhibitions about engaging in conflict.’98 The assumption is that regions which happen to be both energy-rich and Muslim-majority will also be sites of violent conflict due to their rapidly growing populations.

A British Ministry of Defence report concurs with this assessment, highlighting an inevitable ‘youth bulge’ by 2035, with some 87 per cent of all people under the age of 25 inhabiting developing countries. In particular, the Middle East population will increase by 132 per cent and sub-Saharan Africa by 81 per cent. Growing resentment due to ‘endemic unemployment’ will be channelled through ‘political militancy, including radical political Islam whose concept of Umma, the global Islamic community, and resistance to capitalism may lie uneasily in an international system based on nation-states and global market forces’. More strangely, predicting an intensifying global divide between a super-rich elite, the middle classes and an urban under-class, the report warns: ‘The world's middle classes might unite, using access to knowledge, resources and skills to shape transnational processes in their own class interest.’99

3.3 Exclusionary logics of global crisis securitisation?

Thus, the securitisation of global crisis leads not only to the problematisation of particular religious and ethnic groups in foreign regions of geopolitical interest, but potentially extends this problematisation to any social group which might challenge prevailing global political economic structures across racial, national and class lines. The previous examples illustrate how securitisation paradoxically generates insecurity by reifying a process of militarisation against social groups that are constructed as external to the prevailing geopolitical and economic order. In other words, the internal reductionism, fragmentation and compartmentalisation that plagues orthodox theory and policy reproduces precisely these characteristics by externalising global crises from one another, externalising states from one another, externalising the inter-state system from its biophysical environment, and externalising new social groups as dangerous ‘outsiders’. Hence, a simple discursive analysis of state militarisation and the construction of new ‘outsider’ identities is insufficient to understand the causal dynamics driving the process of ‘Otherisation’. As Doug Stokes points out, the Western state preoccupation with the ongoing military struggle against international terrorism reveals an underlying ‘discursive complex’, where representations about terrorism and non-Western populations are premised on ‘the construction of stark boundaries’ that ‘operate to exclude and include’. Yet these exclusionary discourses are ‘intimately bound up with political and economic processes’, such as strategic interests in proliferating military bases in the Middle East, economic interests in control of oil, and the wider political goal of ‘maintaining American hegemony’ by dominating a resource-rich region critical for global capitalism.100

But even this does not go far enough, for arguably the construction of certain hegemonic discourses is mutually constituted by these geopolitical, strategic and economic interests – exclusionary discourses are politically constituted. New conceptual developments in genocide studies throw further light on this in terms of the concrete socio-political dynamics of securitisation processes. It is now widely recognised, for instance, that the distinguishing criterion of genocide is not the pre-existence of primordial groups, one of which destroys the other on the basis of a pre-eminence in bureaucratic military–political power. Rather, genocide is the intentional attempt to destroy a particular social group that has been socially constructed as different.101 As Hinton observes, genocides precisely constitute a process of ‘othering’ in which an imagined community becomes reshaped so that previously ‘included’ groups become ‘ideologically recast’ and dehumanised as threatening and dangerous outsiders, be it along ethnic, religious, political or economic lines – eventually legitimising their annihilation.102

In other words, genocidal violence is inherently rooted in a prior and ongoing ideological process, whereby exclusionary group categories are innovated, constructed and ‘Otherised’ in accordance with a specific socio-political programme. The very process of identifying and classifying particular groups as outside the boundaries of an imagined community of ‘inclusion’, justifying exculpatory violence toward them, is itself a political act without which genocide would be impossible.103 This recalls Lemkin's recognition that the intention to destroy a group is integrally connected with a wider socio-political project – or colonial project – designed to perpetuate the political, economic, cultural and ideological relations of the perpetrators in the place of that of the victims, by interrupting or eradicating their means of social reproduction. Only by interrogating the dynamic and origins of this programme to uncover the social relations from which that programme derives can the emergence of genocidal intent become explicable.104

Building on this insight, Semelin demonstrates that the process of exclusionary social group construction invariably derives from political processes emerging from deep-seated socio-political crises that undermine the prevailing framework of civil order and social norms; and which can, for one social group, be seemingly resolved by projecting anxieties onto a new ‘outsider’ group deemed to be somehow responsible for crisis conditions. It is in this context that various forms of mass violence, which may or may not eventually culminate in actual genocide, can become legitimised as contributing to the resolution of crises.105

This does not imply that the securitisation of global crises by Western defence agencies is genocidal. Rather, the same essential dynamics of social polarisation and exclusionary group identity formation evident in genocides are highly relevant in understanding the radicalisation processes behind mass violence. This highlights the fundamental connection between social crisis, the breakdown of prevailing norms, the formation of new exclusionary group identities, and the projection of blame for crisis onto a newly constructed ‘outsider’ group vindicating various forms of violence.

#### And this framing is a prerequisite to resource wars—relations of power configured by resource ownership cause conditions of ‘scarcity’ to escalate—only the alt can solve.

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As Rosenberg shows in his analysis of the dynamics of distinctive geopolitical orders from Rome to Spain – and Teschke in his exploration of the changing polities of continental Europe from the eighth to the eighteenth centuries – these orders have always been inseparably conjoined with their constitutive relations of production as structured in the context of prevailing social–property relations, illustrating the mutually-embedded nature of ‘economic’ and ‘extra-economic’ power.76 In contrast, orthodox IR axiomatically fragments the ‘economic’ and ‘extra-economic’ (and the latter further into ‘military’, ‘political’, ‘cultural’, etc.) into separate, autonomous spheres with no grasp of the scope of their interconnection.77

It also dislocates both the state, and human existence as such, from their fundamental material conditions of existence, in the form of their relationship to the biophysical environment, as mediated through relations of production, and the way these are governed and contested through social–property relations.78 By externalising the biophysical environment – and thus human metabolism with nature – from state praxis, orthodox IR simply lacks the conceptual categories necessary to recognise the extent to which socio-political organisational forms are mutually constituted by human embeddedness in the natural world.79 While further fragmenting the international into a multiplicity of disconnected state units whose behaviour can only be analysed through the limited lenses of anarchy or hierarchy, orthodox IR is incapable of situating these units in the holistic context of the global political economy, the role of transnational capitalist classes, and the structural pressures thereby exerted on human and state behaviour.80

Indeed, the mediating structure of the global political economy – along with the beliefs and behaviour of agents within it (through which this structure is constructed) – play a critical role in the transformation of ecological or resource-related events into concrete politically-defined conditions of ‘scarcity’ that lead to crisis or conflict. A powerful example is provided by Davis in his study of the impact of the El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO) – the vast oscillation in air mass and Pacific Ocean temperature. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, ENSO created large-scale droughts in many countries peripheral to the European empires, including those in Asia (India, China, Java, the Philippines and Korea), and in Brazil, southern Africa, Algeria and Morocco. Davis shows that British ‘free market’ imperial policy converted these droughts into foreseeable but preventable deadly famines, multiplying death tolls to gross proportions without any historical precedent.81

In 1874–76, northern harvests were more than sufficient to provide reserves for the 1878 autumn crops deficit. But most of the grain from north-western Indian subsistence farming was controlled by a captive export sector designed to stabilise British grain prices, which from 1876 to 1877 had increased due to poor harvests. This generated a British demand that absorbed almost the entirety of north-western India's wheat surplus. Meanwhile, profits from these grain exports were monopolised by wealthy property holders, moneylenders and grain merchants, as opposed to poor Indian farmers. India's newly-constructed modern railway system shipped grain from drought areas ‘to central depots for hoarding’, leading to exorbitant price hikes that were ‘co-ordinated in a thousand towns at once’. Food prices rocketed out of the reach of ‘outcaste labourers, displaced weavers, sharecroppers and poor peasants’. Consequently, ‘the poor began to starve to death even in well-watered districts “reputed to be immune to food shortages”’. Thus, between 1877 and 1878, grain merchants exported a record 6.4 million hundredweight of wheat to Europe while between 5.5 and 12 million Indians starved to death. This catastrophe occurred ‘not outside the modern world system, but in the very process of being forcibly incorporated into its economic and political structures’.82

As Dalby thus argues, ‘humans live in a complex interaction with environments that adapt and change in much more complex ways than is facilitated by linear thinking within the territorial boxes of contemporary administrative arrangements’. This suggests ‘that “global” markets and economic connections are essential to understanding the complex politics of “local” environments and struggles over access to specific resources in particular places’ – because the ‘geography of the domination of nature’ is precisely the continuing ‘history of colonisation and imperialism’.83 Hence, environmental and energy crises are generated in the context of historically-specific socio-political systems – and whether or not they lead to conflict depends on existing relations of power at local, national and transnational scales, and on how those relations are configured by structures of resource ownership, mediated by ideas and values, and supported by military power.

#### And symptom focus makes all aff impacts inevitable—self reflexivity is a prerequisite to solvency.

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2.4 The socio-historical evacuation of the political ecology of power

Global ecological, economic and energy crises thus expose a core contradiction at the heart of modernity – that the material progress delivered by scientific reason in the service of unlimited economic growth is destroying the very social and environmental conditions of modernity's very existence. This stark contradiction between official government recognition of the potentially devastating security implications of resource scarcity and the continued abject failure of government action to mitigate these security implications represents a fundamental lacuna that has been largely overlooked in IR theory and policy analysis. It reveals an analytical framework that has focused almost exclusively on potential symptoms of scarcity. But a truly complete picture of the international relations of resource scarcity would include not only a map of projected impacts, but would also seek to grasp their causes by confronting how the present structure of the international system itself has contributed to the acceleration of scarcity, while inhibiting effective national and international responses.

It could be suggested that the present risk-oriented preoccupation with symptoms is itself symptomatic of IR's insufficient self-reflection on its own role in this problem. Despite the normative emphasis on ensuring national and international security, the literature's overwhelming preoccupation with gauging the multiplicity of ways in which ecological, energy and economic crises might challenge security in coming decades provides very little opening in either theory or policy to develop more effective strategies to mitigate or prevent these heightened security challenges. On the contrary, for the most part, these approaches tend to highlight the necessity to maximise national political–military and international regimes' powers so that states might be able to respond more robustly in the event that new threats like resource wars and state failure do emerge. But the futility of this trajectory is obvious – a preoccupation with ‘security’ ends up becoming an unwitting accomplice in the intensification of insecurity.

### AT: Environmental Security Good

#### The aff is about environmental conflict, not environmental security– they privilege resource scarcity and national security. Only our alternative recognizes the role of consumption.

Detraz and Betsill 9—Nicole Detraz Poli Sci @ Memphis and Michele Betsill Poli Sci @ Colorado St. [“Climate Change and Environmental Security: For Whom the Discourse Shifts” *International Studies Perspectives* 10 p. 307-308]

From the environmental security perspective, policies should be targeted at both human behavior and natural processes, as each of these contribute to environmental insecurity for humans. Human behaviors that contribute to environmental insecurity include things such as high consumption patterns (Barnett 2001; Princen, Maniates, and Conca 2002) and high population levels9 (Pirages 1997; Worku 2007). Natural processes discussed in this discourse include natural disasters or biophysical alterations such as changes in precipitation levels, the growth or decline of species populations, or changes in levels of pathogenic microorganisms (Pirages and DeGeest 2004). It is important to note that many of these natural processes can also be worsened by human behaviors such as consumption and population growth. However, despite the potential contributions that humans make to processes that lead to environmental insecurity, there is a different degree of intentionality in the environmental security discourse when compared with the environmental conflict discourse. In the environmental conflict discourse, humans have a high degree of intentionality. This means that segments of society knowingly come into violent contact with each other because of the presence or absence of a resource. From an environmental security perspective, humans are rarely seen as intentionally contributing to the insecurity of others. Rather, they act in ways that are consistent with the practices of their societies. Scholars working within the environmental security discourse are likely to advocate policies that deal with not only the short-term instances of environmental insecurity but also the longer-term strategies for combating processes of environmental change. These policies must prioritize human security over national security, meaning that the security of humans must be the main concern of security policy. This is in contrast to policies advocated within the environmental conflict discourse, which tend to have direct links to the security of states themselves either over or in conjunction with the security of individuals. Environmental security policies will often involve direct action of states but will also have a role for other actors. According to this storyline, states have a responsibility to protect the security of their populations, but in some cases this will mean allocating authority to achieve this objective to other actors—either above or below the state.10 The environmental security discourse focuses on a wide variety of threats to humans due to environmental change. Policy making will be directed at vulnerable populations where vulnerability is seen to stem from both human behaviors and natural processes. This may require a portfolio of governance mechanisms at different scales, ranging from the local to the global, and involving both state and nonstate actors. It may include policies aimed at minimizing human activities that lead to environmental degradation as well as enhancing the ability of human populations to adapt to environmental change. In sum, the environmental security and environmental conflict discourses represent two distinct ways of conceptualizing the relationship between security and the environment. We contend that the environmental conflict discourse is more than simply a part of the broader environmental security discourse. As discussed above, each has its own storylines or narratives about these issues. Those who use an environmental security discourse introduce a broad range of threats and vulnerabilities into their analysis of environmental change, focus on the negative effects to human populations, and envision a broad array of policy solutions. In contrast, the environmental conflict discourse uses a narrower set of storylines to describe the link between security and the environment (emphasizing conflict), privileges the security of the state over human populations, and proposes a more limited set of policy solutions aimed at avoiding conflict over resources rather than eliminating the sources of resource scarcity in the first place.

#### Climate conflict framing focuses on narrow adaptation and militaristic preparation versus poor-states.

Detraz and Betsill 9—Nicole Detraz Poli Sci @ Memphis and Michele Betsill Poli Sci @ Colorado St. [“Climate Change and Environmental Security: For Whom the Discourse Shifts” *International Studies Perspectives* 10 p. 313-314]

A security dialog is an understandable choice for those who wish to raise the profile of climate change on the global agenda. As mentioned earlier, the inclusion of environmental concerns into security debates was designed to raise the environment into the area of ‘‘high politics.’’ Many scholars and policy makers view climate change as an issue worth all of the attention that is typically bestowed on traditional security issues. In fact, many are convinced of the security implications of climate change—although how security is defined varies. At the same time, there are others who question whether framing climate change as a security issue is beneficial. In a field that is marked by complexity, adding security to the debate may only serve to confuse matters. As discussed throughout this paper, discourses have implications for the way a problem like climate change is defined and the range of policy options that are considered. Ultimately, we believe that a discursive shift to the environmental conflict perspective, even if limited to the Security Council, would be counterproductive in the development of a global response to climate change. Our primary concern is that a shift to the environmental conflict discourse would result in a narrowing of policy options focused on a particular form of adaptation—avoiding conflict—and that other issues of human security as well as adaptation and mitigation strategies for addressing those issues could fall off the agenda. One of the problems of relying on the environmental conflict discourse to understand the security implications of climate change is that the climate issue is different than most other issues discussed in the literature that links conflict and the environment. Climate change is a more abstract phenomenon than many other environmental issues and will be experienced in different ways. While there is some variation in the time horizon expected for climate change, the pace will be relatively slow but the impacts will spread to a variety of environmental arenas, including water availability, food availability, and so on. (IPCC 2007). This means that climate change is more likely to act as a threat multiplier than as a primary source of insecurity. This presents different issues than those often tackled by the existing environmental conflict cases, which tend to be focused on only one ‘‘resource’’ at a time.17 According to Purvis and Busby (2004:68), ‘‘the connection between climate change and the outbreak of violence will unlikely be as strong as when natural resources can be exploited for quick financial reward.’’ None of this is to suggest that environmental conflict is unlikely to occur as a result of climate change. On the contrary, there is a possibility that groups in society will conflict over resources if climate change results in resource scarcity.18 Our point is that this is only one concern in the climate change debate and quite probably not the most pressing concern. Another issue with the environmental conflict discourse is the tendency to locate the authority for solutions and action in the military apparatus of states. Allenby (2000:13) claims that the national security community in most countries is conservative, insular, heavily focused on military threats and challenges, secretive, and powerful; it also tends to focus on short-term, obvious problems. Culturally, such security communities are among the least likely to embrace environmental considerations, and, when they do so, only in a mission-oriented context. Scholars have long questioned whether armed forces are capable of meeting the challenges posed by environmental change (Barnett 2003). Liotta and Shearer (2007:133) argue against the idea that climate change in particular should be met with a militarized response: ‘‘The problems are too broadly distributed and the consequences are too deeply penetrating for such an approach to be successful.’’ These positions point out the tendency of militarized solutions to be narrowly defined and potentially top-down. If climate change requires a behavioral shift to achieve lasting solutions, then narrowly defined militarized solutions are unlikely to be sufficient responses. These problems are in addition to the fact that militaries around the world are responsible for major environmental damage, both through wartime and peacetime activities (Paterson 2001; Liotta and Shearer 2007). It may be counterproductive to depend on the military apparatus of states as a potential solution to environmental problems when they are simultaneously contributing to those same problems. Lastly, a shift to the environmental conflict discourse may lead to the continuation of the status quo—meaning that those who are currently advantaged in society will suffer much less from the impacts of climate change as well as the strategies for mitigating climate change and vice versa. Norda°s and Gleditsch (2007:635) claim that the security scenarios may well be constructed with the benign intention of arousing the world to greater attention to a global issue. But they could also lead to greater emphasis on a national security response to whatever degree of climate change is seen as unavoidable. This would not be helpful to the primary victims of climate change. This is true both in terms of states and segments of society. IPCC reports have claimed that the negative impacts of climate change are expected to fall disproportionately on poor countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Biermann and Dingwerth 2004; Park 2005). Additionally, there are different levels of vulnerability to climate change. Those impacted most are likely to be those who depend on natural resources and ecosystem services for their livelihoods (Barnett and Adger 2007). This includes agricultural-based economies in particular. If climate change is understood as a security issue tied to potential for conflict, then these poor states are likely to be seen as a military threat first and foremost. This may result in military strategies, like ecological intervention, rather than more humanitarian strategies to help those suffering from environmental insecurity. A related concern is the potential for disadvantaged populations within states to be targeted differently for climate change solutions. Paterson (1996) suggests that as countries are hit by the negative impacts of climate change, existing ethnic, religious, or other divides may play a role in decision-making processes, and governments may favor dominant groups in decisions. Nondominant groups could be classified as the ‘‘aggressor’’ in an environmental conflict situation and therefore become targets of environmental conflict solutions implemented by the state.

#### Climate security discourse authorizes technocratic top-down politics.

Methmann and Rothe 12—Chris Methmann, Research Associate Poli Sci Inst. @ Hamburg and Delf Rothe IR PhD Candidate @ Hamburg [“Politics for the day after tomorrow: The logic of apocalypse in global climate politics” *Security Dialogue* 43 p. 334-337]

Security: The war of all against nothing The third case study involves the UN Security Council debate on climate change in 2007. This represents an extreme case, since here securitization is most likely to result in exceptional measures. At first sight, the discourse here follows the script of securitization in the Copenhagen School’s sense, articulating climate change as a source of conflict among states. However, our analysis, as illustrated in Figure 2, reveals a much more fine-grained picture. To be precise, it actually presents two different versions of securitization, drawing on two different antagonisms. On the one hand, there is an antagonism constructed between first-order threats—that is, the direct impacts of a changing climate—and all vulnerable regions, countries or communities. The security framing here is one of human security, as climate change threatens the livelihoods, food supplies, water security, etc. of the vulnerable. On the other hand, these hot spots or zones of crisis can become a source of danger themselves. The human insecurity in vulnerable regions, then, is articulated with what could be called a neo-Malthusian ‘climate-conflict discourse’ (Trombetta, 2008; Detraz and Betsill, 2009). This states, on the one hand, that vulnerable regions suffering from the impacts of climate change will be conflict-prone, as ‘they lack the knowledge, capacity and resources to deal with it’ (Heller in UN Security Council, 2007b: 19). Environmental degradation and the resulting scarcity of resources are understood as an additional and novel driver for conflicts (see Appendix). Taken together, these ideas constitute a security discourse in which ‘the vulnerable are becoming dangerous’ (Oels, 2012)—that is, a threat for national security in the Western world or even for international security. The vulnerable thus become the dangerous enemies in the sense of the logic of security. And this clearly implies the adoption of a preemptive logic and the exceptional measures of interstate conflict and military intervention. Yet, even in the security field, preemptive or other security measures, which can be found for example in disaster management (see Figure 2), only play a minor role. The reason for this is that the two articulations of climate change and security are heavily permeated by a different storyline, one that follows the logic of apocalypse (the fantasmatic dimension presented in Figure 2). Also in this case most articulations stress the universality of the threat, resulting in an antagonistic frontier between humanity and dangerous climate change that is characteristic for the apocalypse (see above). And this explains why an exceptional rhetoric in the case of climate change is not linked with the adoption of exceptional measures. While the climate/humanity antagonism is still most dominantly couched in metaphors of war (see Appendix), the unification of humanity implies that this particular war is fought against an entirely spectral enemy: ‘this is not a struggle against anyone’ (Weisleder in UN Security Council, 2007b: 32). And this war of all against nothing is the crucial point for the logic of apocalypse that connects security and risk in this particular case and thus excludes exceptional measures—because ‘our conflict is not being fought with guns and missiles but with weapons from everyday life—chimney stacks and exhaust pipes’ (Pita in UN Security Council, 2007b: 8). The antagonism created by a logic of apocalypse does not just replace or transform the other security articulations: it also links them in crucial ways. As Figure 2 shows, the most prominent demand articulated in the discourse is prevention. And as second-order threats like ‘uncontrollable migratory flows’ (see Figure 2) mainly evolve under conditions of an apocalyptic climate change, mitigation becomes the best measure of conflict prevention. Again, there is a dichotomization between a linear development (e.g. normal migratory patterns) and a state of chaos. Therefore, also the climate-security discourse heavily promotes the political machinery of the UN Framework Convention and its Kyoto Protocol (Churkin in UN Security Council, 2007b: 17)—just as ‘appropriate incentives, public–private partnerships, low-carbon emitting technologies and innovative solutions’ (Kryzhanivskyi in UN Security Council, 2007b: 4). At the same time, also adaptation becomes a form of conflict prevention, as it lessens the direct impacts of climate change on the vulnerable. The discourse thus articulates a risk-management approach similar to that in the field of adaptation, which revolves around the concepts of vulnerability, resilience and community (see, for example, Hill in UN Security Council, 2007b: 6; (Koenders in UN Security Council, 2007a: 22). The hegemonic discourse here takes up the calls for supporting the vulnerable with adaptation and constructs a responsibility on the part of the West (see Appendix and Figure 2). This responsibility is transformed into a pastoral relation, taking the form of government at a distance through empowerment, stakeholder participation and self responsibilization of local communities. Also in the field of global security governance we can see the impacts of the ‘banality of the apocalypse’ (De Goede and Randalls, 2009: 872). Even though climate change is commonly seen as one of the major threats to international peace and security, this does not result in the adoption of exceptional measures—not in preemptive geo-engineering, not in a global climate response force, not in military pre-warning systems, etc. Rather, the (political) machine of mitigation governance and the preparedness of the vulnerable become the cornerstones of a broadened security agenda. Conclusion The starting point of this article was the paradoxical simultaneity of the logic of risk and the logic of security in global discourses of climate change. Drawing on Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of hegemony, we have argued that risk and security have been articulated in a way that may be termed the logic of apocalypse: creating a universal threat for the entire planet, radically undermining the possibility of a future as such, mobilizing religious apocalyptic imageries and emphasizing an antiepistemology. Our empirical analysis in three cases—those of mitigation, adaptation and the security sector—reveals that this logic is deeply ingrained in global discourses of climate change. Yet, apocalypse is the hegemonic way of articulating climate change as a security problem. And, following our theoretical argument, this logic of apocalypse results coherently in practices of risk management: mitigation as precautionary risk management, adaptation as investing in preparedness, and security not as preemption but as a combination of the former two. In the face of the apocalypse, politicians seem to be too small and ‘human’ to resolve the dawning crisis—hence, responsibility is handed over to the arcane and obscure practices and rationalities of risk management. To conclude, we suggest that our study be read as outlining a contribution to critical security studies that might be termed the security paradox. It may indeed be a recurrent pattern that securitization, as the Copenhagen School holds, results in exceptional measures. However, there are definitely some cases in which securitization is so overwhelming that it prompts a counterintuitive result: the greater and more apocalyptic the perceived threat, the greater the resulting distrust in political actors and exceptional measures, and thus the smaller and technocratic the political measures; here, securitization is so exaggerated that it prompts the opposite: routine and micropractices of risk management. By contrast, for those working in the Foucauldian tradition, this piece could draw attention to the fact that even the most mundane practices of risk management are politically supported and discursively sustained by images of an overwhelming apocalyptic threat. In other words, our work supports the emerging insight that risk and security are two sides of the same coin—rather than two very different animals.

### 2NC/1NR Link—Symptom Focus

#### The aff’s method reduces global crises to their symptoms—that undercuts solvency and spurs conflict.

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‘Securitisation’ refers to a ‘speech act’ – an act of labelling – whereby political authorities identify particular issues or incidents as an existential threat which, because of their extreme nature, justify going beyond the normal security measures that are within the rule of law. It thus legitimises resort to special extra-legal powers. By labelling issues a matter of ‘security’, therefore, states are able to move them outside the remit of democratic decision-making and into the realm of emergency powers, all in the name of survival itself. Far from representing a mere aberration from democratic state practice, this discloses a deeper ‘dual’ structure of the state in its institutionalisation of the capacity to mobilise extraordinary extra-legal military–police measures in purported response to an existential danger.89

The problem in the context of global ecological, economic and energy crises is that such levels of emergency mobilisation and militarisation have no positive impact on the very global crises generating ‘new security challenges’, and are thus entirely disproportionate.90 All that remains to examine is on the ‘surface’ of the international system (geopolitical competition, the balance of power, international regimes, globalisation and so on), phenomena which are dislocated from their structural causes by way of being unable to recognise the biophysically-embedded and politically-constituted social relations of which they are comprised. The consequence is that orthodox IR has no means of responding to global systemic crises other than to reduce them to their symptoms.

Indeed, orthodox IR theory has largely responded to global systemic crises not with new theory, but with the expanded application of existing theory to ‘new security challenges’ such as ‘low-intensity’ intra-state conflicts; inequality and poverty; environmental degradation; international criminal activities including drugs and arms trafficking; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and international terrorism.91 Although the majority of such ‘new security challenges’ are non-military in origin – whether their referents are states or individuals – the inadequacy of systemic theoretical frameworks to diagnose them means they are primarily examined through the lenses of military-political power.92 In other words, the escalation of global ecological, energy and economic crises is recognised not as evidence that the current organisation of the global political economy is fundamentally unsustainable, requiring urgent transformation, but as vindicating the necessity for states to radicalise the exertion of their military–political capacities to maintain existing power structures, to keep the lid on.93

Global crises are thus viewed as amplifying factors that could mobilise the popular will in ways that challenge existing political and economic structures, which it is presumed (given that state power itself is constituted by these structures) deserve protection. This justifies the state's adoption of extra-legal measures outside the normal sphere of democratic politics. In the context of global crisis impacts, this counter-democratic trend-line can result in a growing propensity to problematise potentially recalcitrant populations – rationalising violence toward them as a control mechanism.

#### Symptom focus makes all aff impacts inevitable—self reflexivity is a prerequisite to solvency.

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2.4 The socio-historical evacuation of the political ecology of power

Global ecological, economic and energy crises thus expose a core contradiction at the heart of modernity – that the material progress delivered by scientific reason in the service of unlimited economic growth is destroying the very social and environmental conditions of modernity's very existence. This stark contradiction between official government recognition of the potentially devastating security implications of resource scarcity and the continued abject failure of government action to mitigate these security implications represents a fundamental lacuna that has been largely overlooked in IR theory and policy analysis. It reveals an analytical framework that has focused almost exclusively on potential symptoms of scarcity. But a truly complete picture of the international relations of resource scarcity would include not only a map of projected impacts, but would also seek to grasp their causes by confronting how the present structure of the international system itself has contributed to the acceleration of scarcity, while inhibiting effective national and international responses.

It could be suggested that the present risk-oriented preoccupation with symptoms is itself symptomatic of IR's insufficient self-reflection on its own role in this problem. Despite the normative emphasis on ensuring national and international security, the literature's overwhelming preoccupation with gauging the multiplicity of ways in which ecological, energy and economic crises might challenge security in coming decades provides very little opening in either theory or policy to develop more effective strategies to mitigate or prevent these heightened security challenges. On the contrary, for the most part, these approaches tend to highlight the necessity to maximise national political–military and international regimes' powers so that states might be able to respond more robustly in the event that new threats like resource wars and state failure do emerge. But the futility of this trajectory is obvious – a preoccupation with ‘security’ ends up becoming an unwitting accomplice in the intensification of insecurity.

### 2NC/1NR Link—Global Coop

#### Belief in global cooperation’s ability to solve obscures the causes of overexploitation and creates a utopian belief in technology’s ability to solve.

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2.3 Neoliberalism: mutual over-exploitation as normative

On the other hand, we have strategies of international cooperation to establish new global governance regimes by which states can develop treaties and agreements to encourage mitigating action. It is now clear that the massive proliferation of international legal treaties designed to regulate activities impacting detrimentally on the environment and thus limit environmental degradation simply cannot be explained under the realist theoretical framework. While this seemingly vindicates neoliberal theoretical approaches which underscore the scope for rational state strategies of mutual cooperation,62 the latter are still at a loss to explain the extent to which ethical norms and values, national cultures and environmental and scientific advocacy underpin wide-ranging environmental regimes which cannot be reduced purely to state interests.63

Much of the liberal literature also explores the regressive dynamic of the energy industry and its international dimensions, though failing to escape realist assumptions about anarchy. Kaldor and her co-authors, for instance, note that conflicts can erupt in regions containing abundant resources when neopatrimonial states collapse due to competition between different ethnic and tribal factions motivated by the desire to control revenues.64 Similarly, Collier argues that the most impoverished populations inhabit the most resource-wealthy countries which, however, lack robust governance, encouraging rampant internal resource predation and therefore civil wars.65 Lack of robust governance thus facilitates not only internal anarchy over resource control, but also the illicit and corrupt activities of foreign companies, particularly in the energy sector, in exploiting these countries.66 This sort of analysis then leads to a staple set of normative prescriptions concerned largely with ways of inculcating ‘good governance’, such as transparency measures to avoid excessive secrecy under which oil companies indulge in corruption; more robust international regulation; corporate social responsibility; and cosmopolitan principles such as democratisation, political equality and freedom of civil society.67

Yet such well-meaning recommendations often do not lead to sufficiently strong policy action by governments to rein in energy sector corruption.68 Furthermore, it is painfully clear from the examples of Kyoto, Copenhagen and Cancun that international cooperative state strategies continue to be ineffective, with states unable to agree on the scale of the crises concerned, let alone on the policies required to address them. Indeed, while some modest successes were apparent in the Cancun Accord, its proposed voluntary emissions regime would still likely guarantee – according to even mid-range climate models – a global average temperature rise of 4°C or more, which would in turn culminate in many of the IPCC's more catastrophic scenarios.69

This calls into question the efficacy of longstanding recommendations – such as Klare's – that the international community develop unprecedented international mechanisms to coordinate the peaceful distribution of natural resources in the era of scarcity and environmental degradation.70 While at face value such regulatory governance mechanisms would appear essential to avoid violent conflict over depleting resources, they are posited in a socio-political and theoretical vacuum. Why is it that such potentially effective international mechanisms continue to be ignored? What are the socio-political obstacles to their implementation? Ultimately, the problem is that they overlook the structural and systemic causes of resource depletion and environmental degradation.

Although neoliberalism shares neorealism's assumptions about the centrality of the state as a unitary rational actor in the international system, it differs fundamentally in the notion that gains for one state do not automatically imply losses for another; therefore states are able to form cooperative, interdependent relationships conducive to mutual power gains, which do not necessarily generate tensions or conflict.71 While neoliberalism therefore encourages international negotiations and global governance mechanisms for the resolution of global crises, it implicitly accepts the contemporary social, political and economic organisation of the international system as an unquestionable ‘given’, itself not subject to debate or reform.72

The focus is on developing the most optimal ways of maximising exploitation of the biophysical environment. The role of global political economic structures (such as centralised private resource-ownership and deregulated markets) in both generating global systemic crises and inhibiting effective means for their amelioration is neglected. As such, neoliberalism is axiomatically unable to view the biophysical environment in anything other than a rationalist, instrumentalist fashion, legitimising the over-exploitation of natural resources without limits, and inadvertently subordinating the ‘global commons’ to the competitive pressures of private sector profit-maximisation and market-driven solutions, rather than institutional reform.73 Mutual maximisation of power gains translates into the legitimisation of the unlimited exploitation of the biophysical environment without recognition of the human costs of doing so, which are technocratically projected merely as fixable aberrations from an optimal system of cooperative progress.74 Consequently, neoliberalism is powerless to interrogate how global political economic structures consistently undermine the establishment of effective environmental regimes.

### 2NC/1NR Link—China Threat

#### The affirmative’s discourse of a China threat influences policy formulation at every stage. The only way to achieve a coherent China foreign policy is to interrogate the role of discourse in policy making. The K is prior to solvency

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The modern day China ‘threat’ to the United States is not an unproblematic, neutrally verifiable phenomenon. It is an imagined construction of American design and the product of societal representations which, to a significant extent, have established the truth that a ‘rising’ China endangers US security. This is an increasingly acknowledged, but still relatively under-developed, concept within the literature.121 The purpose of this article has been to expose how ‘threats’ from China towards the United States have always been contingent upon subjective interpretation. The three case studies chosen represent those moments across the lifetime of Sino-US relations at which China has been perceived as most threatening to American security. The ‘threats’ emerged in highly contrasting eras. The nature of each was very different and they emerged from varying sources (broadly speaking, from immigration in the nineteenth century and from ‘great power’ rivalry in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries). Yet in this way they most effectively demonstrate how China ‘threats’ have repeatedly existed as socially constructed phenomenon.

Collectively they reveal the consistent centrality of understandings about the United States in perceptions of external danger. They demonstrate that, regardless of China's ability to assert material force or of the manner in which it has been seen to impose itself upon the United States, the reality of danger can be manufactured and made real. China ‘threats’ have always been threats to American identity so that the individual sources of ‘danger’— whether a nuclear capability or an influx of (relatively few) foreign immigrants— have never been the sole determining factors. As James Der Derian notes, danger can be ascribed to otherness wherever it may be found.122 During the mid-to-late nineteenth century and throughout the early Cold War, perceptions of China ‘threats’ provoked crises of American identity. The twenty-first-century China ‘threat’ is yet to be understood in this way but it remains inexplicable in simple material terms. As ever, the physical realities of China are important but they are interpreted in such a way to make them threatening, regardless of Beijing's intentions.

Most importantly, this article has shown how processes of representation have been complicit at every stage of the formulation, enactment, and justification of US China policy. Their primary purpose has been to dislocate China's identity from that of the United States and introduce opportunities for action. Further, those policies themselves have reaffirmed the discourses of separation and difference which make China foreign from the United States, protecting American identity from the imagined threat. Ultimately, this analysis has sought to expose the inadequacy of approaches to the study of US China policy which privilege and centralise material forces to the extent that ideas are subordinated or even excluded.

Joseph Nye argues that the China Threat Theory has the potential to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Based upon a crude hypothetical assumption that there exists a 50 per cent chance of China becoming aggressive and a 50 per cent chance of it not, Nye explains, to treat China as an enemy now effectively discounts 50 per cent of the future.123 In such way he emphasises the ideational constitution of material forces and the power of discourse to create selected truths about the world so that certain courses of action are enabled while others are precluded. Assessments such as those of Director of National Intelligence James Clapper in March 2011 should therefore not only be considered misguided, but also potentially dangerous. For while they appear to represent authoritative statements of fact they actually rely upon subjective assumptions about China and the material capabilities he describes.

In late 2010 President Obama informed Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao that ‘the American people [want] to continue to build a growing friendship and strong relationship between the peoples of China and the United States’.124 The hope, of course, is that a peaceful and cooperative future can be secured. Following the announcement that the Asia Pacific is to constitute the primary focus of Washington's early twenty-first-century foreign policy strategy, American interpretations of China must be acknowledged as a central force within an increasingly pertinent relationship. The basis of their relations will always be fundamentally constituted by ideas and history informs us that particular American discourses of China have repeatedly served to construct vivid and sometimes regrettable realities about that country and its people. Crucially, it tells us that they have always been inextricable from the potentialities of US China policy. As Sino-US relations become increasingly consequential the intention must be for American representations of the PRC— and indeed Chinese representations of the United States— to become the focus of more concerted scholarly attention. Only in this way can the contours of those relations be more satisfactorily understood, so that the types of historical episodes explored in this analysis might somehow be avoided in the future.

### 2NC/1NR Link—Hegemony

#### Hegemony is a paranoid fantasy—the most powerful nation sees threats everywhere, legitimizing constant war.

McClintock 9—chaired prof of English and Women’s and Gender Studies at UW–Madison. MPhil from Cambridge; PhD from Columbia (Anne, Paranoid Empire: Specters from Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib, Small Axe Mar2009, Issue 28, p50-74)

By now it is fair to say that the United States has come to be dominated by two grand and dangerous hallucinations: the promise of benign US globalization and the permanent threat of the “war on terror.” I have come to feel that we cannot understand the extravagance of the violence to which the US government has committed itself after 9/11—two countries invaded, thousands of innocent people imprisoned, killed, and tortured—unless we grasp a defining feature of our moment, that is, a deep and disturbing doubleness with respect to power. Taking shape, as it now does, around fantasies of global omnipotence (Operation Infinite Justice, the War to End All Evil) coinciding with nightmares of impending attack, the United States has entered the domain of paranoia: dream world and catastrophe. For it is only in paranoia that one finds simultaneously and in such condensed form both deliriums of absolute power and forebodings of perpetual threat. Hence the spectral and nightmarish quality of the “war on terror,” a limitless war against a limitless threat, a war vaunted by the US administration to encompass all of space and persisting without end. But the war on terror is not a real war, for “terror” is not an identifiable enemy nor a strategic, real-world target. The war on terror is what William Gibson calls elsewhere “a consensual hallucination,” 4 and the US government can fling its military might against ghostly apparitions and hallucinate a victory over all evil only at the cost of catastrophic self-delusion and the infliction of great calamities elsewhere.

I have come to feel that we urgently need to make visible (the better politically to challenge) those established but concealed circuits of imperial violence that now animate the war on terror. We need, as urgently, to illuminate the continuities that connect those circuits of imperial violence abroad with the vast, internal shadowlands of prisons and supermaxes—the modern “slave-ships on the middle passage to nowhere”—that have come to characterize the United States as a super-carceral state. 5

Can we, the uneasy heirs of empire, now speak only of national things? If a long-established but primarily covert US imperialism has, since 9/11, manifested itself more aggressively as an overt empire, does the terrain and object of intellectual inquiry, as well as the claims of political responsibility, not also extend beyond that useful fiction of the “exceptional nation” to embrace the shadowlands of empire? If so, how can we theorize the phantasmagoric, imperial violence that has come so dreadfully to constitute our kinship with the ordinary, but which also at the same moment renders extraordinary the ordinary bodies of ordinary people, an imperial violence which in collusion with a complicit corporate media would render itself invisible, casting states of emergency into fitful shadow and fleshly bodies into specters? For imperialism is not something that happens elsewhere, an offshore fact to be deplored but as easily ignored. Rather, the force of empire comes to reconfigure, from within, the nature and violence of the nation-state itself, giving rise to perplexing questions: Who under an empire are “we,” the people? And who are the ghosted, ordinary people beyond the nation-state who, in turn, constitute “us”?

We now inhabit a crisis of violence and the visible. How do we insist on seeing the violence that the imperial state attempts to render invisible, while also seeing the ordinary people afflicted by that violence? For to allow the spectral, disfigured people (especially those under torture) obliged to inhabit the haunted no-places and penumbra of empire to be made visible as ordinary people is to forfeit the long-held US claim of moral and cultural exceptionalism, the traditional self-identity of the United States as the uniquely superior, universal standard-bearer of moral authority, a tenacious, national mythology of originary innocence now in tatters. The deeper question, however, is not only how to see but also how to theorize and oppose the violence without becoming beguiled by the seductions of spectacle alone. 6

Perhaps in the labyrinths of torture we must also find a way to speak with ghosts, for specters disturb the authority of vision and the hauntings of popular memory disrupt the great forgettings of official history.

Paranoia

Even the paranoid have enemies.

—Donald Rumsfeld

Why paranoia? Can we fully understand the proliferating circuits of imperial violence—the very eclipsing of which gives to our moment its uncanny, phantasmagoric cast—without understanding the pervasive presence of the paranoia that has come, quite violently, to manifest itself across the political and cultural spectrum as a defining feature of our time? By paranoia, I mean not simply Hofstadter’s famous identification of the US state’s tendency toward conspiracy theories. 7 Rather, I conceive of paranoia as an inherent contradiction with respect to power: a double-sided phantasm that oscillates precariously between deliriums of grandeur and nightmares of perpetual threat, a deep and dangerous doubleness with respect to power that is held in unstable tension, but which, if suddenly destabilized (as after 9/11), can produce pyrotechnic displays of violence. The pertinence of understanding paranoia, I argue, lies in its peculiarly intimate and peculiarly dangerous relation to violence. 8

Let me be clear: I do not see paranoia as a primary, structural cause of US imperialism nor as its structuring identity. Nor do I see the US war on terror as animated by some collective, psychic agency, submerged mind, or Hegelian “cunning of reason,” nor by what Susan Faludi calls a national “terror dream.” 9 Nor am I interested in evoking paranoia as a kind of psychological diagnosis of the imperial nation-state. Nations do not have “psyches” or an “unconscious”; only people do. Rather, a social entity such as an organization, state, or empire can be spoken of as “paranoid” if the dominant powers governing that entity cohere as a collective community around contradictory cultural narratives, self-mythologies, practices, and identities that oscillate between delusions of inherent superiority and omnipotence, and phantasms of threat and engulfment. The term paranoia is analytically useful here, then, not as a description of a collective national psyche, nor as a description of a universal pathology, but rather as an analytically strategic concept, a way of seeing and being attentive to contradictions within power, a way of making visible (the better politically to oppose) the contradictory flashpoints of violence that the state tries to conceal.

Paranoia is in this sense what I call a hinge phenomenon, articulated between the ordinary person and society, between psychodynamics and socio-political history. Paranoia is in that sense dialectical rather than binary, for its violence erupts from the force of its multiple, cascading contradictions: the intimate memories of wounds, defeats, and humiliations condensing with cultural fantasies of aggrandizement and revenge, in such a way as to be productive at times of unspeakable violence. For how else can we understand such debauches of cruelty?

A critical question still remains: does not something terrible have to happen to ordinary people (military police, soldiers, interrogators) to instill in them, as ordinary people, in the most intimate, fleshly ways, a paranoid cast that enables them to act compliantly with, and in obedience to, the paranoid visions of a paranoid state? Perhaps we need to take a long, hard look at the simultaneously humiliating and aggrandizing rituals of militarized institutions, whereby individuals are first broken down, then reintegrated (incorporated) into the larger corps as a unified, obedient fighting body, the methods by which schools, the military, training camps— not to mention the paranoid image-worlds of the corporate media—instill paranoia in ordinary people and fatally conjure up collective but unstable fantasies of omnipotence. 10 In what follows, I want to trace the flashpoints of imperial paranoia into the labyrinths of torture in order to illuminate three crises that animate our moment: the crisis of violence and the visible, the crisis of imperial legitimacy, and what I call “the enemy deficit.” I explore these flashpoints of imperial paranoia as they emerge in the torture at Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib. I argue that Guantánamo is the territorializing of paranoia and that torture itself is paranoia incarnate, in order to make visible, in keeping with Hazel Carby’s brilliant work, those contradictory sites where imperial racism, sexuality, and gender catastrophically collide. 11

The Enemy Deficit: Making the “Barbarians” Visible Because night is here but the barbarians have not come. Some people arrived from the frontiers, And they said that there are no longer any barbarians. And now what shall become of us without any barbarians? Those people were a kind of solution.

—C. P. Cavafy, “Waiting for the Barbarians”

The barbarians have declared war.

—President George W. Bush

C. P. Cavafy wrote “Waiting for the Barbarians” in 1927, but the poem haunts the aftermath of 9/11 with the force of an uncanny and prescient déjà vu. To what dilemma are the “barbarians” a kind of solution? Every modern empire faces an abiding crisis of legitimacy in that it flings its power over territories and peoples who have not consented to that power. Cavafy’s insight is that an imperial state claims legitimacy only by evoking the threat of the barbarians. It is only the threat of the barbarians that constitutes the silhouette of the empire’s borders in the first place. On the other hand, the hallucination of the barbarians disturbs the empire with perpetual nightmares of impending attack. The enemy is the abject of empire: the rejected from which we cannot part. And without the barbarians the legitimacy of empire vanishes like a disappearing phantom. Those people were a kind of solution.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the grand antagonism of the United States and the USSR evaporated like a quickly fading nightmare. The cold war rhetoric of totalitarianism, Finlandization, present danger, fifth columnist, and infiltration vanished. Where were the enemies now to justify the continuing escalation of the military colossus? “And now what shall become of us without any barbarians?” By rights, the thawing of the cold war should have prompted an immediate downsizing of the military; any plausible external threat had simply ceased to exist. Prior to 9/11, General Peter Schoomaker, head of the US Army, bemoaned the enemy deficit: “It’s no use having an army that did nothing but train,” he said. “There’s got to be a certain appetite for what the hell we exist for.” Dick Cheney likewise complained: “The threats have become so remote. So remote that they are difficult to ascertain.” Colin Powell agreed: “Though we can still plausibly identify specific threats—North Korea, Iran, Iraq, something like that—the real threat is the unknown, the uncertain.” Before becoming president, George W. Bush likewise fretted over the post–cold war dearth of a visible enemy: “We do not know who the enemy is, but we know they are out there.” It is now well established that the invasion of Iraq had been a long-standing goal of the US administration, but there was no clear rationale with which to sell such an invasion. In 1997 a group of neocons at the Project for the New American Century produced a remarkable report in which they stated that to make such an invasion palatable would require “a catastrophic and catalyzing event—like a new Pearl Harbor.” 12

#### The discourse of American leadership is rooted in the construction and demonization of dangerous others. Their advantage produces the threat that it names.

Campbell et al. 7—David Campbell, Geography @ Durham [“Performing Security: The Imaginative Geographies of current US strategy” *Political Geography* 26 (4) doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2006.12.002 (Other Authors: Luiza Bialasiewicz, Stuart Elden, Stephen Graham, Alex Jeffrey and Alison J. Williams)]

It is important to highlight the way performativity's idea of reiteration calls attention to changes in historically established imaginative geographies. While US foreign policy has been traditionally written in the context of identity/difference expressed in self/other relationships (Campbell, 1992), we detect in recent strategic performances a different articulation of America's relationship to the world. Signified by the notion of integration we identify elements in the formation of a new imaginative geography which enable the US to draw countries into its spheres of influence and control. We show how integration (and its coeval strategies of exclusion) has been enunciated over the last 15 years through popular-academic books, think-tank documents, policy programmes and security strategies, as well as popular geopolitical sources. This concept of integration, we argue, is enacted through a number of practices of representation and coercion that encourage countries to adopt a raft of US attitudes and ways of operating or else suffer the consequences. As such, we are witnessing the performance of a security problematic that requires critical perspectives to move beyond a simple ideal/material dichotomy in social analysis in order to account for more complex understandings of opposition, including the emergence of new, mobile geographies of exclusion.

Non-state scribes

To understand the power of the imaginative geographies guiding current US strategy it is important to look back at the recitation, reiteration and resignification of previous strategic formulations. During the Clinton years, a number of figures who had been involved in various guises in previous Republican administrations wrote widely on the geopolitical opportunities and threats of a post-Cold War era. From specifications of the threat posed by international terrorism, ‘failed states’ and ‘rogue regimes’, to the dangers posed by cultural/civilisational conflicts. The individuals and institutions we choose to examine in this section are those whose geographical imaginations have been central in laying the ground for some of the securitizing strategies of the current Bush administration and, specifically, whose work has been key in specifying the importance of “integrating” a chaotic world where conflict is inevitable.

The writers whose work we highlight here occupy a liminal position within policy circles. While not paid members of the administration, they have either occupied such positions in the past or were aspiring to them in the future. They do not, therefore, directly speak for the state (a position that grants them a veneer of “objectivity”), and they navigate in the interstices between academic and “policy-oriented” research: a location that, in turn, absolves them from the rigors of a scholarly discipline, including disciplinary critique. By the term ‘non-state scribes’ we wish to indicate those who occupy a liminal zone between academic and non-academic work, working in a range of governmental and private research centres, think-tanks and study groups. What we would like to highlight are some of the ways in which their influence problematises simple, secure understandings of the state and the constitution of ‘state-interest’. While these individuals appear as impartial commentators-cum-advisers-cum-analysts, their access to policy circles is open, if not privileged. To the extent that their geographical imaginations are invoked by state power, they are also today's consummate “intellectuals of statecraft”: those who “designate a world and ‘fill’ it with certain dramas, subjects, histories and dilemmas” (Ó Tuathail & Agnew, 1992: 192).

Certainly the most prominent self-styled ‘community of experts’ intersecting with the Bush administration is the Project for a New American Century (for critical analysis see Sparke, 2005). The PNAC, founded in the spring of 1997, defines itself as a “non-profit, educational organization whose goal is to promote American global leadership” (see PNAC, 2006). Putatively lying outside “formal” policy networks, the Project from its inception has aimed to provide the intellectual basis for continued US military dominance— and especially the willingness to use its military might.

As sole hegemon, PNAC argued, the US could not “avoid the responsibilities of global leadership”. But it should not simply “react” to threats as they present themselves: it should, rather, actively shape the global scenario before such threats emerge: “the history of the 20th century should have taught us that it is important to shape circumstances before crises emerge, and to meet threats before they become dire” (PNAC, 2000: i).

The resonance of these views with those of the Bush administration should come as no surprise: among the Project's founders were individuals who had held posts in previous Republican administrations and went on to serve in Bush's cabinet: Vice-President Dick Cheney, former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his deputy and now World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz, along with the former ambassador to Iraq (and soon to be US Ambassador to the UN) Zalmay Khalilzad, in addition to well known neoconservatives shaping policy debates in the US today, including Francis Fukuyama, Norman Podhoretz, and William Kristol (see Fukuyama, 2006 and Williams, 2005). Unsurprisingly, the most explicit formulation of what would become goals of the Bush administration can be found in the PNAC's manifesto Rebuilding America's Defenses, which appeared in the election year of 2000. Here and in subsequent documents, the PNAC envisages the US military's role to be fourfold: “Defend the American Homeland”; “fight and decisively win multiple, simultaneous major theatre wars”; “perform the ‘constabulary’ duties associated with shaping the security environment in critical regions”; and “transform U.S. forces to exploit the ‘revolution in military affairs’” (PNAC, 2000: iv, 5; cf. The White House, 2002b: 30).

It is telling just how spatialised some of these specifications become when worked through in detail. Already in 2000, PNAC argued that the major military mission is no longer to deter Soviet expansionism, but to “secure and expand zones of democratic peace; deter rise of new great-power competitor; defend key regions; exploit transformation of war” (PNAC, 2000: 2). They suggested that rather than the Cold War's “potential global war across many theatres”, the concern now is for several “potential theatre wars spread across the globe” fought against “separate and distinct adversaries pursuing separate and distinct goals” (2000: 2, 3). To counter such threats, the US needs to station its troops broadly, and their presence “in critical regions around the world is the visible expression of the extent of America's status as a superpower and as the guarantor of liberty, peace and stability” (2000: 14). They claimed that while US security interests have “expanded”, and that its forces “provide the first line of defense in what may be described as the ‘American security perimeter’”, at the same time “the worldwide archipelago of U.S. military installations has contracted” (2000: 14, 15). Because the security perimeter “has expanded slowly but inexorably” since the end of the Cold War, US forces— “the cavalry on the new American frontier”— “must be positioned to reflect the shifting strategic landscape” (2000: 14, 15). Equally, their use of the term ‘homeland’ drew strongly on its use in the Clinton administration— and prefigured the creation of the Office for Homeland Security under G.W. Bush, with the concept strengthened by both the PATRIOT acts and the establishment of U.S. Northern Command.Again, it is essential that we conceptualize these strategies as both containing and making imaginative geographies; specifying the ways “the world is” and, in so doing, actively (re)making that same world. This goes beyond merely the military action or aid programmes that governments follow, but indicates a wider concern with the production of ways of seeing the world, which percolate through media, popular imaginations as well as political strategy. These performative imaginative geographies are at the heart of this paper and will re-occur throughout it. Our concern lies specifically with the ways in which the US portrays— and over the past decade has portrayed— certain parts of the world as requiring involvement, as threats, as zones of instability, as rogue states, “states of concern”, as “global hotspots”, as well as the associated suggestion that by bringing these within the “integrated” zones of democratic peace, US security— both economically and militarily— can be preserved. Of course, the translation of such imaginations into actual practice (and certainly results) is never as simple as some might like to suggest. Nonetheless, what we wish to highlight here is how these strategies, in essence, produce the effect they name. This, again, is nothing new: the United States has long constituted its identity at least in part through discourses of danger that materialize others as a threat (see Campbell, 1992). Equally, much has been written about the new set of threats and enemies that emerged to fill the post-Soviet void— from radical Islam through the war on drugs to “rogue states” (for a critical analyses see, among others, Benjamin and Simon, 2003 and Stokes, 2005; on the genealogies of the idea of “rogue states” see Blum, 2002 and Litwak, 2000).

#### Their hegemonic approach to peace will produce error replication—the very discourse used to describe their advantages causes violence. We must open the framework of what constitutes peace to critical interrogation

Richmond 7 [Oliver P. Richmond, School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, Scotland, Alternatives 32 (2007), 247–274]

It is generally assumed by most theorists, most policymakers, and practitioners, that peace has an ontological stability enabling it to be understood, defined, and thus created. Indeed, the implication of the void of debate about peace indicates that it is generally thought that peace as a concept is so ontologically solid that no debate is required. There is clearly a resistance to examining the concept of peace as a subjective ontology, as well as a subjective political and ideological framework. Indeed, this might be said to be indicative of “orientalism,” in impeding a discussion of a positive peace or of alternative concepts and contexts of peace.18 Indeed, Said’s humanism indicates the dangers of assuming that peace is universal, a Platonic ideal form, or extremely limited. An emerging critical conceptualization of peace rests upon a genealogy that illustrates its contested discourses and multiple concepts. This allows for an understanding of the many actors, contexts, and dynamics of peace, and enables a reprioritization of what, for whom, and why, peace is valued. Peace from this perspective is a rich, varied, and fluid tapestry, which can be contextualized, rather than a sterile, extremely limited, and probably unobtainable product of a secular or nonsecular imagination. It represents a discursive framework in which the many problems that are replicated by the linear and rational project of a universal peace (effectively camouflaged by a lack of attention within IR) can be properly interrogated in order to prevent the discursive replication of violence.19 This allows for an understanding of how the multiple and competing versions of peace may even give rise to conflict, and also how this might be overcome. One area of consensus from within this more radical literature appears to be that peace is discussed, interpreted, and referred to in a way that nearly always disguises the fact that it is essentially contested. This is often an act of hegemony thinly disguised as benevolence, assertiveness, or wisdom. Indeed, many assertions about peace depend upon actors who know peace then creating it for those that do not, either through their acts or through the implicit peace discourses that are employed to describe conflict and war in opposition to peace. Where there should be research agendas there are often silences. Even contemporary approaches in conflict analysis and peace studies rarely stop to imagine the kind of peace they may actually create. IR has reproduced a science of peace based upon political, social, economic, cultural, and legal governance frameworks, by which conflict in the world is judged. This has led to the liberal peace framework, which masks a hegemonic collusion over the discourses of, and creation of, peace.20 A critical interrogation of peace indicates it should be qualified as a specific type among many.

#### The aff’s discourse of integration and leadership rehashes the geographies of exclusion and containment in nicer sounding terms. Construct of dangerous other versus stable and peaceful United States confirms the material and moral hierarchies of the dominant U.S. identity.

Campbell et al. 7—David Campbell, Geography @ Durham [“Performing Security: The Imaginative Geographies of current US strategy” *Political Geography* 26 (4) doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2006.12.002 (Other Authors: Luiza Bialasiewicz, Stuart Elden, Stephen Graham, Alex Jeffrey and Alison J. Williams)]

The concept of integration, invoked in different ways and in different measures by both Kagan and Barnett, is similarly at the heart of the current administration's foreign and domestic policies. The former Director of Policy at the US State Department, Richard Haass, articulated the central tenets of the concept when he wondered:

Is there a successor idea to containment? I think there is. It is the idea of integration. The goal of US foreign policy should be to persuade the other major powers to sign on to certain key ideas as to how the world should operate: opposition to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, support for free trade, democracy, markets. Integration is about locking them into these policies and then building institutions that lock them in even more (Haass in Lemann, 1 April 2002, emphasis added).

That the US is no longer prepared to tolerate regimes that do not mirror its own democratic values and practices, and that it will seek to persuade such major powers to change their policies and behaviours to fit the American modus operandi, is not without historical precedent (Ambrosius, 2006). Nor does the differently imagined geography of integration replace completely previous Manichean conceptions of the world so familiar to Cold War politics. Rather, the proliferation of new terms of antipathy such as ‘axis of evil’, ‘rogue states’, and ‘terror cities’ demonstrate how integration goes hand in hand with – and is mutually constitutive of – new forms of division. Barnett's divide between the globalised world and the non-integrating gap is reflected and complemented by Kagan's divide in ways of dealing with this state of affairs. Much of this imagined geography pivots on the idea of ‘the homeland’. Indeed, in the imaginations of the security analysts we highlight here, there is a direct relationship and tension between securing the homeland's borders and challenging the sanctity of borders elsewhere (see Kaplan, 2003: 87).

Appreciating this dynamic requires us to trace some of the recent articulations of US strategy. Since September 11th 2001 the US government and military have issued a number of documents outlining their security strategy. Each recites, reiterates and resignifies both earlier strategic statements as well each other, creating a sense of boundedness and fixity which naturalizes a specific view of the world. Initially there was The National Strategy for Homeland Security (Office of Homeland Security, 2002), and then the much broader scope National Security Strategy (The White House, 2002b; see Der Derian, 2003). These were followed by the “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism” and particular plans for Military Strategy, Defense Strategy and the “Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support” (Department of Defense, 2005a, Department of Defense, 2005b, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004 and The White House, 2002a). These are seen as an interlocking whole, where “the National Military Strategy (NMS) supports the aims of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and implements the National Defense Strategy (NDS)” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004: 1); and the “Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support” builds “upon the concept of an active, layered defense outlined in the National Defense Strategy” (Department of Defense, 2005b: iii; see also diagram on 6). The updated National Security Strategy (The White House, 2006) presents a further re-elaboration and re-stating of these principles.

As with the understandings we highlighted previously, it should be noted that key elements of these strategies pre-date September 11. Significant in this continuity is the link between the Bush administration's strategic view and the 1992 “Defense Planning Guidance” (DPG). Written for the administration of George H. W. Bush by Paul Wolfowitz and I. Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby, the DPG was the first neoconservative security manifesto for the post-Cold War; a blue print for a one-superpower world in which the US had to be prepared to combat new regional threats and prevent the rise of a hegemonic competitor (Tyler, 8 March 1992; see Mann, 2004: 198ff, 212).

Initial versions of the DPG were deemed too controversial and were rewritten with input from then Defense Secretary Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Colin Powell (Tyler, 24 May 1992). Nonetheless, Cheney's version still declared that, “we must maintain the mechanism for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role” (Cheney, 1993: 2).

What we find in this is the kernel of the policies implemented in the administration of George W. Bush, reworked through the Clinton period by such organizations as PNAC (discussed above). The assemblage of individuals and organizations – both inside and outside the formal state structures – running from the DPG, through PNAC to the plethora of Bush administration security texts cited above (all of which draw upon well-established US security dispositions in the post-World War II era) demonstrates the performative infrastructure through which certain ontological effects are established, and through which certain performances are made possible and can be understood.

As we argue throughout this paper, the distinctive thing about recent National Security Strategies is their deployment of integration as the principal foreign policy and security strategy. It is telling that Bush's claim of “either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” (Bush, 2001) relies not on a straightforward binary, as is sometimes suggested, but a process of incorporation. It is not simply us versus them, but with us, a mode of operating alongside, or, in the words of one of Bush's most enthusiastic supporters, “shoulder to shoulder” (Blair, 2001; see White & Wintour, 2001). This works more widely through a combination of threats and promises, as in this statement about the Palestinians: “If Palestinians embrace democracy and the rule of law, confront corruption, and firmly reject terror, they can count on American support for the creation of a Palestinian state” (The White House, 2002b: 9). Likewise, it can be found in some of remarks of the British Prime Minister Blair (2004) about the significance of democracy in Afghanistan, Africa and Iraq. Equally Bush's notorious ‘axis of evil’ speech did not simply name North Korea, Iran and Iraq as its members, but suggested that “states like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world” (Bush, 2002a, emphasis added). A comparison of the like, alongside the “with the terrorists” is actually a more complicated approach to the choosing of sides and the drawing of lines than is generally credited. Simple binary oppositions are less useful to an understanding here than the process of incorporation and the policy of integration.

These examples indicate the policy of integration or exclusion being adopted by the US and followed by certain allies. It warns those failing to adopt US values (principally liberal ‘representative’ democracy and market capitalism), that they will be excluded from an American-centric world. The place of US allies in these representations is not unimportant. Indeed, the strength of the US discourse relies also on its reflection and reiteration by other key allies, especially in Europe. Above and beyond the dismissive pronouncements of Rumsfeld about Europe's “Old” and “New” – a conception that was inchoately articulated as early as the 1992 DPG – the dissent of (even some) Europeans is a problem for the US in its world-making endeavours (see Bialasiewicz & Minca, 2005). It is not surprising, then, that following his re-election, George W. Bush and Condoleeza Rice embarked almost immediately on a “bridge-building” tour across Europe, noting not trans-Atlantic differences but “the great alliance of freedom” that unites the United States and Europe (Bush, 2005).

For although the United States may construct itself as the undisputed leader in the new global scenario, its “right” – and the right of its moral-political “mission” of spreading “freedom and justice” – relies on its amplification and support by allies. The construction of the United States' world role relies also on the selective placement and representation of other international actors who are “hailed” into specific subject positions (see Weldes, Laffey, Gusterson, & Duvall, 1999). Of course, different actors are granted different roles and different degrees of agency in the global script: the place of key European allies is different from that bestowed upon the peripheral and semi-peripheral states that make part of the “coalition of the willing”. Both, however, are vital in sustaining the representation of the US as the leader of a shared world of values and ideals. Indeed, the ‘lone superpower’ has little influence in the absence of support.

Another important dimension of integration as the key strategic concept is its dissolution of the inside/outside spatialization of security policy. The concluding lines of the “Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support” are particularly telling. It contends that the Department of Defense can “no longer think in terms of the ‘home’ game and the ‘away’ game. There is only one game” (Department of Defense, 2005b: 40). In part this is directed at the previous failure to anticipate an attack from within: indeed, the Strategy remarks that the September 11th 2001 attacks “originated in US airspace and highlighted weaknesses in domestic radar coverage and interagency air defense coordination” (2005b: 22). In other words, the US needs to ensure the security of its homeland from within as much as without, to treat home as away. In part, however, such rhetoric also reflects a continuity with and reiteration of broader understandings with a much longer history, promoted by a range of US “intellectuals of statecraft” since the end of the Cold War: understandings that specified increasingly hard territorialisations of security and identity both at home and abroad to counter the “geopolitical vertigo” (see Ó Tuathail, 1996) of the post-bipolar era.

It is important to note here, moreover, that the 2002 National Security Strategy's affirmation that “today, the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is diminishing” (The White House, 2002b: 30) also involves the US treating away as a home, or at least, as a concern. From this we can see how the pursuit of integration enables the territorial integrity of other sovereign states to be violated in its name, as specific places are targeted to either ensure or overcome their exclusion (see Elden, 2005). As an example, consider this statement, which recalls the late 1970s enunciation of an ‘arc of crisis’ stretching from the Horn of Africa through the Middle East to Afghanistan: “There exists an ‘arc of instability’ stretching from the Western Hemisphere, through Africa and the Middle East and extending to Asia. There are areas in this arc that serve as breeding grounds for threats to our interests. Within these areas rogue states provide sanctuary to terrorists, protecting them from surveillance and attack” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004: 5).

In his foreword to the 2002 National Security Strategy, Bush declared that “We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent” (Bush, 2002b: i). This notion of extension is crucial in understanding the explicitly spatial overtones of this strategy of integration: more than merely about values, democracy and capitalism, it is about a performative geopolitics. Put crudely, it is about specifying the geographies of world politics; it is about specifying “the ways the world (now) is” – a presumably descriptive “geopolitical exercise” but that, as all such exercises, also implicitly contains the prescription for putting the world “right”.

Imaginative geographies and popular geopolitics

As we have tried to argue, such elaborations of security rely upon the affirmation of certain understandings of the world within the context of which the strategies and understandings advanced by them are rendered believable. What is more, we have tried to highlight how such performances invoke earlier articulations, even as their reiteration changes them. More broadly, we stressed how such articulations provide the conditions of possibility for current – and future – action. Integration thus marks a new performative articulation in US security strategy, but it reworks rather than replaces earlier formulations. One of the ways in which this operates is that the ideal of integration, as we have seen, necessarily invokes the idea of exclusion. The imagined divide between the US ‘homeland’ and the threatening ‘frontier’ lands within the circle of Barnett's ‘Non-Integrating Gap’ thus recalls earlier iterations of ‘barbarism’ even if their identity and spatiality are produced by more than a simple self/other binary. In the final section of this essay, we will make some brief remarks regarding the disjuncture between the theory and the practice of the enactment of such imaginations. First, however, we would like to highlight some other ways in which these deployments of categories of inclusion and incorporation, on the one hand, and exclusion and targeting, on the other, are also performed in the popular geopolitical work done by a wide range of textual, visual, filmic and electronic media supportive of the ‘war on terror’ at home and abroad. These cultural practices resonate with the idea of fundamentally terrorist territories, whilst, at the same time rendering the ‘homeland’ zone of the continental US as a homogenous and virtuous ‘domestic’ community. Such wide-ranging and diffuse practices that are nonetheless imbricated with each other are further indications that we are dealing with performativity rather than construction in the production of imaginative geographies.

### 2NC/1NR Link—Human Rights

#### Depictions of human rights catastrophe legitimize realism

Dunne & Wheeler 4 [Tim Dunne, University of Exeter, UK, Nicholas J. Wheeler, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, UK, “‘We the Peoples’: Contending Discourses of Security in Human Rights Theory and Practice”, International Relations, Vol. 18, No. 1, 9-23, <http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/2160/1972/1/We%2520the%2520Peoples.pdf>]

Where do human rights fit into this realist picture of security? Realist proponents of national security do not deny the existence of human rights norms such as those embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But crucially, realism argues that they are norms which are not binding on states when they collide with other interests (such as trade or national security). Hans J. Morgenthau, the godfather of realism, argued that ‘the principle of the defense of human rights cannot be consistently applied in foreign policy because it can and must come in conflict with other interests that may be more important than the defense of human rights in a particular circumstance’.9 Realists also point to the centrality of states in implementing human rights standards and the weak or nonexistent enforcement machinery. As a leading representative of the US delegation at San Francisco made clear, ‘”We the peoples” means that the peoples of the world were speaking through their governments’.10 Amnesty International’s annual report is a constant reminder that realist thinking on human rights is part of the fabric of contemporary international society. A recent report summarized its findings against the backdrop of the war on terror as follows: ‘Governments have spent billions to strengthen national security and the “war on terror”. Yet for millions of people, the real sources of insecurity are corruption, repression, discrimination, extreme poverty and preventable diseases’.11 This is nothing new. Driven by expediency and self-interest, governments have long trampled on their citizens’ rights in order to maintain the power and privilege of an elite few. In the language of International Relations theory, what Amnesty is describing is the problem of statism, by which is meant the idea that the state should be the sole source of loyalty and values for its citizens.12 Amnesty claims that the majority of states routinely fail to deliver even basic rights to their citizens. Governments or agencies acting on their behalf routinely imprison without trial, torture and/or kill individuals who challenge the regime. The Westphalian practice of statism infects international bodies such as the United Nations. Amnesty International points to the ‘realpolitik’ in the General Assembly and the UN Commission on Human Rights that it charges as being ‘almost irrelevant to the protection of victims in Burundi, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo’.13 It is not unusual to find that no state has tabled a condemnatory resolution at the UN General Assembly even after it has been presented with evidence of gross human rights violations. Consistent with the charge of statism is the argument that the UN is merely an arena for raison d’état, a kind of global Westphalian system where the language for the conduct of international relations has changed but the interests remain the same. Human rights in this context have represented, in the words of Norman Lewis, ‘nothing more than an empty abstraction whose function was the legitimation and perpetuation of the given system of power relations, domestically and internationally’.14

#### The aff securitizes human rights—however government methods for solving it fail turning the case

Kardas 5 [Saban Kardas, Ph.D. Student University of Utah Department of Political Science, working paper no. 31, “Human Rights Policy and International Relations: Realist Foundations Reconsidered”, December 6, 2005, <http://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/working/2005/31-kardas-2005.pdf>]

The concern for and promotion of human rights has increasingly assumed an international dimension in the post-War period.2 The Westphalian principles are not the only values advanced by the UN Charter. To be sure, the Charter also mentions human rights among the purposes of the organization, along with the maintenance of international peace and security, and a growing body of human rights regime has accumulated since the enactment of the Charter. This trend is best reflected emerged a body of legal in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the two UN Covenants and other universal and regional Human Rights Conventions and mechanisms. As a result of the development of such a normative international order, and increasing pace of interdependence and globalization eroding the traditional distinctions between domestic and international affairs, coupled with the activities of powerful NGOs, the issues of human rights have found their way into international politics. Consequently, there norms and mechanisms as well as political instruments, ranging from human rights diplomacy to humanitarian intervention and international war crimes tribunals, which regulate the governments’ treatment of their citizens.3 Though very fragile, they provide a ground to put the domestic conduct of the governments under the scrutiny by individuals, domestic and international non-governmental organizations, other states and international organizations. Despite the tension to be discussed below, human rights—especially the violation of them- has become a legitimate concern to the international society, a process which has been provided with added impetus in the post-Cold War era.4 The end of the Cold War and the emerging international system were characterized by the increasing possibilities for international cooperation, especially at a time where destabilizing effects of the end of the Cold War have increased the need for international protection and promotion of human rights. Growing activities on the part of secessionist and nationalist movements created a growing need for the protection of human and particularly minority rights. Against this setting, the emerging multi-centric international system and a global wave of democratization have enabled human rights groups to mobilize liberal states and international organizations to incorporate the promotion of human rights into their agenda. This process was also reinforced and complemented by the expanding ideas in the post-Cold War era that the traditional norms of sovereignty and non-intervention cannot be interpreted in their absolute sense and therefore the international community may override these norms under certain conditions. The widely cited Vienna Declaration (1993) adapted by the UN World Conference on Human Rights, thus, stated that the protection and promotion of human rights is the primary responsibility of governments and a legitimate concern of the international community. Nonetheless, the reality remains there. Although respect for human rights is a stated concern of the international community and an international system for protection of human rights has been set up, its implementation and enforcement is far from being effective. Despite the attempts towards international standard setting, the violations of basic human rights are still the case on many parts of the globe. Similar to the weakness of other international regimes in general, this emerging body of international human rights regime still lacks effective and consistent enforcement mechanisms. In response to this picture, there is a growing belief that inclusion of human rights concerns into foreign policy making of individual states will contribute to the betterment of the status of human rights globally, especially to more effective implementation of the existing human rights regimes. Since progress toward fulfillment of human rights is to a large extent conditional upon the compliance of the states to the internationally agreed norms, in the absence of domestic dynamics for change, the external pressure put on the governments by the international community remains a suitable avenue available to advance human rights.

#### And this turns the case- security can never be achieved when ones’ rights are being threatened

Dunne and Wheeler 4 [Tim Dunne, University of Exeter, UK, Nicholas J. Wheeler, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, UK, “‘We the Peoples’: Contending Discourses of Security in Human Rights Theory and Practice”, International Relations, Vol. 18, No. 1, 9-23, <http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/2160/1972/1/We%2520the%2520Peoples.pdf>]

A critical security approach to human rights opens with a fundamental belief in the indivisibility of security and human rights. How does this ‘indivisibility’ play out in practice? The human security discourse would maintain, for example, that there can be no security for the individual if their right to life is being threatened by their government. Similarly, security is absent when an individual is denied the rights to subsistence, such as food, clothing and housing. If security is defined as protection from harm, then it is clear that the infringement of fundamental rights signifies the presence of insecurity.25 Just as its prescriptive orientation emphasizes indivisibility, the human security discourse recognizes the multidimensionality of the sources of harm. There are military and non-military producers of harm, national and transnational, private and public. Harm can be the outcome of intentional acts (employers using child labour) as well as unreflective acts (children in the West buying a football that has been manufactured by slave labour in India). Rights may be secured by one agent while simultaneously being threatened by another. For example, the citizens of a social democratic society may have all their human rights protected by the state, but that does not necessarily mean their community has security. It could, for example, have borders that are contiguous with a predatory state committed to an expansionist foreign policy. Another threat could be transnational and unintentional, such as that posed by high levels of radioactivity caused by an accident in a nuclear power station (for example, the disaster at Chernobyl). We would argue that the interdependence between security and human rights is at its strongest when the focus is upon what Henry Shue, and later R.J. Vincent, referred to as ‘basic rights’.26 ‘Security from violence’ and ‘subsistence’ were defined by Shue as the key basic rights. On the surface, this might seem to rely on a narrow definition of rights but we define subsistence as covering a range of economic and social rights (such as work, property, social security) while security from violence includes many civil and political rights (protection from torture, racial hatred, slavery and asylum).

### 2NC/1NR Link—Soft Power

#### Soft power is a realist tool used to justify transforming an unstable world to mirror our interests

Eschen 5 [Penny Von Eschen, Associate Prof of History at UMich, 2005, “Enduring Public Diplomacy,” American Quarterly 57.2 pg. 335-343. Muse]

Yet while public diplomacy has historically operated as a mystifying smoke screen, for all its absurdities and contradictions, we cannot wish the term away. As Kennedy and Lucas demonstrate, public diplomacy is emerging as "a crucial theater of strategic operations for the renewal of American hegemony within a transformed global order," arguably as prominent as it was during the cold war. If the resonances between the cold war and present-day public diplomacy are readily apparent, the differences are also striking. During the cold war, the government’s official disseminators of overseas propaganda, the United States Information Agency and the Voice of America, were for export only; it was illegal to distribute and broadcast their programs and bulletins within the United States. Yet today, Kennedy and Lucas argue, global media and technology have made public diplomacy an open communication forum. Any consideration of public diplomacy must take into account the greater difficulty of the U.S. government to separate the domestic public from overseas audiences for American propaganda. Moreover, if the state and civil society lines of cold war public diplomacy were often deliberately blurry, through technologies of the Internet and expanded corporate power, public diplomacy has taken on unprecedented shape-shifting characteristics. Halliburton, CNN, and Microsoft all circulate as "America" with more authority than state agencies. While the "fake news" of the Bush administration recently revealed by the New York Times has plenty of cold war precedents, such "public diplomacy," as the authors contend, is rendered at once "more global by communications technology but also more local by interventions in selected conflicts." For Kennedy and Lucas, these current efforts in public diplomacy, even more unaccountable and amorphous than their cold war predecessors, not only trace the contours of the new imperium, but they shape the conditions of knowledge production and the terrain on which American studies circulates. [End Page 337] The urgency of the authors’ questions about "the conditions of knowledge-formation and critical thinking…in the expanding networks of international and transnational political cultures" was impressed upon me when I recently spoke to a group of deans and directors of international study abroad programs. Most had worked in the field for nearly two decades. Many worked at underfunded institutions. As they contended with the retrenchment and possible collapse of their programs, two possible paths of salvation were presented to them. The first was partnership with countries entering the "competition" for the George W. Bush administration’s Millennium Challenge Corporation. The program, administered by the State Department, was established in 2003 ostensibly as a poverty reduction program through funding growth and development initiatives. Its funding priorities, as its critics have noted, are closely tied to U.S. security interests and do not favor the programs that would promote sustainability. Particularly jarring was the language of assessment used in the competitive application process. If "transparency" seems an ironic request from the secretive Bush administration, the standard of former adherence to World Bank and IMF dictates as a criterion of eligibility seemed an especially harsh case of tough love. The second possibility for funding dangled before the audience appeared even more sinister. The real money, a fund-raising expert told the gathering, is in the Gulf states. Don’t believe a thing you hear in the media, the educators were instructed, about how negatively people in the Middle East perceive Americans. Rest assured, the speaker continued, the moneyed elite from the Gulf states keenly desire degrees from American universities, and they can afford your tuition. At a moment when journalists and scholars are denied visas and entry into the country, making it impossible for many Middle Eastern scholars to attend the American Studies Association meeting (as occurred in 2004 to name just one example), knowledge production is indeed proceeding apace, as Kennedy and Lucas suggest, "by the new configurations of U.S. imperialism." Hence, one critical task for American studies scholars is to engage with the legacies of the institutional relationships between public diplomacy and American studies as a field, and the contemporary reshaping of these relationships in conditions not of our choosing. Kennedy and Lucas’s sobering portrait of the challenges faced by practitioners of American studies make all the more urgent their invocation of John Carlos Rowe’s call for the international field of American studies to devote its attention to the critical study of the circulation of America. Invoking Rowe, Kennedy and Lucas propose collaborations with related disciplines in a critical American studies. Such collaborations are crucial in the foregrounding and tracking of processes of U.S. empire, and offer an important alternative to [End Page 338] attempts to "internationalize" American studies that manifest themselves as a "distorted mirror of neoliberal enlargement." Following Kennedy and Lucas’s call for collaboration with other fields, I want to return to the story of Duke Ellington in Iraq as a means of decentering the "American" in critical American studies. I first want to emphasize the difficulty of constructing even the most rudimentary context for the story of Ellington in Iraq. Despite the fine work of such scholars as Douglas Little and Melani McAlister on the United States and the Middle East, along with excellent work by Iraqi specialists, it is an understatement to say that the story of Iraq has been very much on the periphery for Americanists interested in the global dimensions of U.S. power.6 Yet, when the Duke Ellington orchestra visited Iraq, the United States was already deeply implicated in the unfolding events in Iraq and the region. Not only had the Ellington band stumbled into the 1963 Iraqi crisis, but the experience reprised that of Dave Brubeck and his quartet, who had been in Iraq on the eve of the coup in 1958 that had brought Abd al-Karim Qassim to power. With surprising frequency, the State Department sent jazz musicians to tense situations in countries and regions that have been neglected by historians yet were constantly in the news as the U.S. went to war with Iraq in 2003. To mention only the examples from the Middle Eastern and adjoining states, in addition to Brubeck’s and Ellington’s Iraqi performances, Dizzy Gillespie toured Afghanistan and Pakistan in 1956; Dave Brubeck toured Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran in 1958; and Duke Ellington visited those same countries in 1963. The tumultuous history of U.S.–Iraqi relations simply vanishes in the still-dominant bipolar emphasis on U.S.–Soviet conflict. It drops out, as well, within the more neglected frame of anticolonialism. As Rashid Khalidi has pointed out, "there had never been a state, empire, or nation of Iraq before British statesmen created it in the wake of World War I."7 Yet if Iraq, along with other Gulf states, lacks the same history of colonization and decolonization shared by Asia and Africa, it remains a central terrain for contemporary struggles over who controls the resources of the formerly colonized world. If we, as Americanists, examine public diplomacy in this context of the consolidation of U.S. hegemony in its quest for control over resources, the work of specialists on Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, and Latin America as well, where U.S. imperialism had long beleaguered formally independent states, will be crucial for such an endeavor. An account of U.S. public diplomacy and empire in Iraq can be constructed only through engaging fields outside the sphere of American studies. Political scientist Mahmood Mamdani locates the roots of the current global crisis in [End Page 339] U.S. cold war policies. Focusing on the proxy wars of the later cold war that led to CIA support of Osama Bin Laden and drew Iraq and Saddam Hussein into the U.S. orbit as allies against the Iranians, Mamdani also reminds us of disrupted democratic projects and of the arming and destabilization of Africa and the Middle East by the superpowers, reaching back to the 1953 CIA-backed coup ousting Mussadeq in Iran and the tyrannical rule of Idi Amin in Uganda. For Mamdani, the roots of contemporary terrorism must be located in politics, not the "culture" of Islam. Along with the work of Tariq Ali and Rashid Khalidi, Mamdani’s account of the post–1945 world takes us through those places where U.S. policy has supported and armed military dictatorships, as in Pakistan and Iraq, or intervened clandestinely, from Iraq and throughout the Middle East to Afghanistan and the Congo. For these scholars, these events belong at the center of twentieth-century history, rather than on the periphery, with interventions and coups portrayed as unfortunate anomalies. These scholars provide a critical history for what otherwise is posed as an "Islamic threat," placing the current prominence of Pakistan in the context of its longtime support from the United States as a countervailing force against India.8 Stretching across multiple regions, but just as crucial for reading U.S. military practices in Iraq, Yoko Fukumura and Martha Matsuoka’s "Redefining Security: Okinawa Women’s Resistance to U.S. Militarism" reveals the human and environmental destruction wrought by U.S. military bases in Asia through the living archive of activists who are demanding redress of the toxic contamination and violence against women endemic to base communities.9 Attention to the development of exploitative and violent sex industries allows us to place such recent horrors as the abuse, torture, and debasement at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq in a history of military practices.10 Taken together, these works are exemplary, inviting us to revisit the imposition of U.S. power in East and South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, regions where the instrumental role of U.S. power in the creation of undemocratic military regimes has often been overlooked. That none of these works has been produced by scholars who were trained in American studies is perhaps not accidental, but rather symptomatic of a field still shaped by insularity despite increasing and trenchant critiques of this insularity by such American studies scholars as Amy Kaplan and John Carlos Rowe.11 In recommending that American studies scholars collaborate with those in other fields and areas of study and by articulating warnings about how easily attempts to "internationalize" can hurtle down the slippery slope of neoliberal expansion, Kennedy and Lucas join such scholars in furthering the project of viewing U.S. hegemony from the outside in. They [End Page 340] expose the insularity that has been an abiding feature of U.S. politics and public discourse.

#### We must be especially critical of couching hegemony in liberal terms. The hidden transcript of american security elites creates imperialist and devstating outcomes.

Pieterse 7—Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Sociology @ Illinois (Urbana) [“Political and Economic Brinkmanship,” *Review of International Political Economy* 14: 3 p 467-468]

The neoconservative case for American power, as set forth in the Project for a New American Century, is a straightforward geopolitical argument alongside a Wilsonian argument for ‘benevolent global hegemony’ to spread democracy. The former is relatively easy to deal with; since it does not claim legitimacy it is plain geopolitics. The latter dominates in policy speeches and is a harder nut to crack because it resonates with a wider constituency that shares the liberal case for hegemony. Many liberals (not only Americans) also endorse strong American power. According to Michael Ignatieff, it is the ‘lesser evil’ (2004). According to Paul Berman, in response to terrorism war is just (2003). It resonates with a long standing idea that spreading democracy is an ‘American mission’ (Smith, 1994).

At a recent meeting of the American Political Science Association, Joseph Nye said ‘the United States cannot win by hard power alone, but must pay more heed to soft power and global communications’. I asked him why should the United States win and he replied, ‘the United States must win because it is the world’s largest democracy and this is a dangerous world’. This is a quintessential liberal position and a tenet that runs the gamut of political positions. This may be a ‘dangerous and chaotic world’, but the question is does American hegemony and ‘preventive war’ make it less or more dangerous?

While much recent criticism targets the neoconservatives, criticism should rather focus on the liberal position because it claims a legitimacy that the neoconservative view lacks, is shared by many more than the neoconservative view, is used by neoconservatives to garner support for forward policies, and underpins bipartisan and public support for the defense industries. ‘Promoting democracy’ is controversial because exporting democracy and ‘democracy from the barrel of a gun’ are difficult propositions and inconsistent with policies of cooperating with authoritarian governments. Indeed, the liberal view should be examined not in terms of its declared intentions but in terms of its implementation. In the first part of this paper I discuss the views and methods of American security professionals and argue that these stand in contrast to the declared liberal aims of American policy. This is not merely a matter of unintentional messiness of action on the ground but is often intentional and, I argue, part of a posture of political brinkmanship, which goes back at least to the Kennedy administration. The Vietnam War, too, was part of Kennedy’s ‘global liberalism’. Entering hegemony through the service entrance reveals the tension between ends and means and exposes fundamental flaws in the liberal position.

The term brinkmanship was first used in relation to American policy during the Cuban missile crisis. ‘Brinkmanship refers to the policy or practice, especially in international politics and foreign policy, of pushing a dangerous situation to the brink of disaster (to the limits of safety) in order to achieve the most advantageous outcome by forcing the opposition to make concessions’ (Wikipedia). Brinkmanship was part of the American stance during the cold war and has since become part of the habitus of superpower.

During the Reagan administration American foreign policy shifted from containment to rollback, pushing back Soviet influence. Support for the Mujahideen in Afghanistan and the contras in Nicaragua and the Irancontra affair were part of this (Mamdani, 2004). Rollback means occupying offensive positions, war of maneuver and involves risk taking and brinkmanship. The unilateral policy which the United States increasingly adopted after the end of the cold war (Skidmore, 2005) may be considered a form of brinkmanship. ‘Prolonging the unipolar moment’ as advocated by Charles Krauthammer (2002/2003) and the grandiose defense policy guidance formulated by Paul Wolfowitz in 1992 to build American military preparedness beyond rival challenges represent brinkmanship elevated to strategic posture. The reigning theme of the 1990s, humanitarian intervention or the use of military force for humanitarian ends, merges military force and Wilsonian ideals as ‘an idea that Paul Wolfowitz and Kofi Annan can agree on’ (Rieff, 2005). The neoconservative approach and the Project for a New American Century is part of this series. It is a project for turning American cold war victory into lasting supremacy and the willingness to take bold risks to achieve this.

There is ample discussion of the outcomes of American policies, but this treatment focuses on the intentions driving policies. Brinkmanship is a strong interpretation because it assumes deliberate, calculated risk taking on the part of policy elites. It can be described as political ‘maximalism’ (Sestanovich, 2005). It may be difficult to demonstrate because the intentions of policymakers are often classified. At times they are implied in policy statements and conceded retroactively, in memoirs and biographies, though usually only in relation to policies that have proven successful. As a source I use the views of security professionals, which are less guarded than those of policymakers.

The cumulative effect of American economic policies are that exports become imports, the trade deficit deepens, the economic base shrinks, income inequality widens and external deficits rise to unsustainable levels. Could we view current American economic policies too as brinkmanship? Political brinkmanship, though difficult to validate, is reasonable in outline and familiar as a theme. Economic brinkmanship, which I explore in the second part, is a more difficult and unusual hypothesis. I argue that laissezfaire and neoliberal policies represent willed risk taking by policy elites. As a source I use the arguments of economists who argue that current trends and US debt are actually positive signs (e.g. Levey and Brown, 2005). These hypotheses may enable us to see larger patterns in American policies and raise new questions, in particular on the relationship between intentional and unintended, unanticipated risk. The risks accepted by policymakers and their adherents are often different from the public record and the unanticipated consequences that follow are different again. This means that three scenarios are in play: the public one, which is usually couched in terms of liberal hegemony and promoting democracy; the classified script held by policy and security insiders; and the script of actual processes as they unfold and the political and operational responses they elicit.

#### Liberal intention to use hegemony for awesome produces neoconservative results

Pieterse 7—Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Sociology @ Illinois (Urbana) [“Political and Economic Brinkmanship,” *Review of International Political Economy* 14: 3 p 474]

American military posture and action on the ground, then, do not merely fail to implement a well intentioned project because the real world is messy and chaotic, but are in fundamental respects designed to achieve the reverse of the liberal mission. Real time hegemonic operations are schizophrenic double acts: establishing order while following a ‘politics of tension’. The security institutions are layered in formal and informal cultures and overt and covert operations (Baer, 2003). Liberal hegemony is about bringing stability while security insiders may be concerned with producing instability as part of a strategy of tension.

#### Soft power and integration are just the flip side of the brutality of imperial containment and security.

Kennedy and Lucas 5—Liam Kennedy, American Studies @ University College (Dublin) and Scott Lucas, American Studies @ Birmingham [“Public Diplomacy and U.S. Foreign Policy,” *American Quarterly* 57.2 MUSE]

Members of the Bush Administration are fond of drawing analogies between the America of the early cold war and the America of the present, especially to emphasize the material preponderance of the United States at both historical moments and to underline the special responsibility that the nation bore and continues to bear in the execution of its power.65 Yet, even as the U.S. government promotes the assumption that "public diplomacy helped win the cold war, and it has the potential to win the war on terror," it has established a framework for the waging of the contemporary battle that is very different from that promoted fifty years ago.66 In both instances, a "war of ideas" is evoked to frame a bipolar clash of civilizations and promote a national ideal of liberal democracy, yet the combination of value and security in each instance is shaped by different geostrategic frameworks of "national security." During the cold war the (publicly stated) regulatory paradigm was that of "containment," which functioned to segment publics and information; in the war on terror the leading paradigm is "integration," which seeks to draw publics into an American designed "zone of peace." The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism states that "ridding the world of terrorism is essential to a broader purpose. We strive to build an international order where more countries and peoples are integrated into a world consistent with the interests and values we share with our partners."67 Both paradigms, however, conceal strategic tensions. For many inside and outside U.S. administrations in the 1950s, containment pointed toward coexistence with the Soviet bloc and its captive peoples, precluding the extension of freedom through "liberation." For many inside and outside the current administration, "integration" does not provide a solution for long-term war with rogue states and tyrants, a war that has to be waged by and for a U.S. "preponderance of power."

It is our contention that political warfare tries to bridge, if not resolve, these tensions. In 1950, NSC 68 concluded with the mandate not only to "strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the non-Soviet nations" but also "to encourage and promote the gradual retraction of undue Russian power and influence from the present perimeter areas around traditional Russian boundaries and the emergence of the satellite countries as entities independent of the USSR."68 A half-century later Richard Haass, Director of Policy Planning in the State Department (and far from an acolyte of the "neoconservative" movement), easily moved from describing the goal of post–cold [End Page 324]war U.S. foreign policy as "a process of integration in which the United States works with others to promote ends that benefit everyone" to acknowledging it is "an imperial foreign policy . . . a foreign policy that attempts to organize the world along certain principles affecting relations between states and conditions within them."69

The National Security Act of 2002 states: "The U.S. will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe. . . . We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world."70 As in the cold war, "freedom" is a prized trope of U.S. international affairs, but is now framed by a different set of ideological and policy aims. The cold war conflation of "national interest" and the "free world" was a rhetorical reflection of a realpolitik, state-centered approach to international affairs, often defined by struggles over territory and sovereignty. The goal of the war on terror is "not to defend the free world but, rather, freedom itself."71 This is to say that freedom is now more fully abstracted and deterritorialized, just as the empire is unbound in a perpetual war. "Freedom" is certainly the key trope of the war on terror, the integer of idea and value, as Henry Hyde has clearly articulated: "In addition to genuine altruism, our promotion of freedom can have another purpose, namely as an element in the U.S.'s geopolitical strategy."72 In this sense, freedom is an abstracted signifier of American imperialism; it is not a promise of negative liberty and social respect (the "empire of liberty" reflected in the Constitution), but rather a harbinger of the "empire for liberty," which combines the reinstantiation of the national security state with the pursuit of "virtuous war."73 This combination makes a "regulatory fiction" of the American mythology of freedom, transforming it into a master rationale for the neoliberal empire's symbolic dramas of emergency and extension.74 Actions against the "enemies of freedom" (as defined by President Bush) extend "national security" around the globe, producing spectacular military and media campaigns in the process. In the promotion of "freedom" to foreign audiences, public diplomacy is inextricably connected with the development and implementation of U.S. foreign policy, charged with the awkward task of reconciling interests and ideals. This reconciliation is always deferred, forever incomplete, yet it cannot be disavowed since it is the horizon of the imperial imaginary projected by the extension of the national security state.

### 2NC/1NR Link—Multilateralism

#### Benign imperialism—faith in moderate multilateralism prevents questioning imperial domination.

Shaikh 7—Nermeen Shaikh, @ Asia Source [*Development* 50, “Interrogating Charity and the Benevolence of Empire,” palgrave-journals]

And where, again, does this power for benevolent goodwill reside? In the post-war period, and especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, it is the United States that sees itself increasingly as the vanguard of human emancipation, John Winthrop's 'city upon a hill'. This is also its rightful place, having emerged from a unique tradition (political, social, cultural and religious), which has brought it to its current position of freedom and leadership. And so it is the US, sometimes in the guise of multilateralism, most recently not as much, that exercises the most power globally. The liberal, democratic-capitalist political system is triumphant. How, then, does one interrogate American intervention in the world according to its own standards? How does one hold the US accountable precisely for the goodwill it professes? Can the US hold itself accountable in any meaningful sense?

Collateral damage One clue as to the possibility of such an auto-critique lies in a phrase that has become part of the popular political imaginary: collateral damage. This term, inaugurated during the Cold War, is perhaps the euphemism par excellence: it contains within it the cleansing, indeed the impossibility, of culpability; it must be assumed that the US is always acting with good intentions, and if events unfold in such a way as to suggest otherwise, then each instance is simply a betrayal of the original intent, which is itself beyond reproach – or at the very least, absolved of the worst offences. In certain readings, the various forms of oppression and exclusion that make up the collateral damage of imperial power might also be interpreted as constitutive of the order in which they occur. In the economic realm, Joseph Stiglitz, for instance, argues that the West has used its disproportionate share of economic power to maintain its position, most notably when it comes to determining the terms of trade as well as the limits of free trade (an essential ingredient of the present liberal-capitalist dispensation) (Stiglitz, 2002). This often, and perhaps unsurprisingly, results in a distinct advantage for richer countries. In other readings, intentions may be harder to determine, but given that the term collateral damage includes within it the possibility of its own exoneration, what can be said about the likelihood of justice in such a system? If every inequality, every abuse, every infraction is seen as an aberration, as a demonstration of the fact that the order has not yet reached its full potential, are we to hope that this same order will eventually be equal to its own avowed aspirations?

The response to the latter question is of course widely affirmative. The problem is that it is predicated on the claims of the dispensers of benevolent intervention themselves. But it is necessary to interrogate these very claims to bring out the more egregious and systematic forms of collateral damage and thereby question the very possibility of justice within this order. On the one hand, as Stiglitz also points out, there is some hope: whereas previously only the radical left was critical of the World Bank and IMF, now these critiques are far more widespread. On the other hand, the possibility of a global, socialist revolution is scarcely found anywhere. Attempting to speak from the perspective of the recipients of goodwill immediately, then, begs the question: is radical structural change necessary before the possibility of justice in the realm of collateral damage can be born?

### 2NC/1NR Link—Terrorism

#### Aff terror claims are neither objective or true—dominant experts rely on politicized research, policymakers exclude critique for political motives and limit the sources of knowledge experts use

Raphael 9 [Sam, IR, Kingston University, Critical terrorism studies, ed. Richard Jackson, 50-51] ellipses in original

The close relationship between the academic field of terrorism studies and the US slate means that it is critically important to analyse the research output from key experts within the community. This is particularly the case because of the aura of objectivity surrounding the terrorism ‘knowledge’ generated by academic experts. Running throughout the core literature is a positivist assumption, explicitly slated or otherwise, that the research conducted is apolitical and objective (see for example, Hoffman. 1992: 27; Wilkinson. 2003). There is little to no reflexivity on behalf of the scholars, who see themselves as wholly dissociated from the politics surrounding the subject of terrorism. This relocation of academic knowledge about terrorism is reinforced by those in positions of power in the US who tend to distinguish the experts from other kinds of overtly political actors. For example, academics are introduced to Congressional hearings in a manner which privileges their nonpartisan input: Good morning. The Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism meets in open session to receive testimony and discuss the present and future course of terrorism in the Middle East…It has been the Terrorism Panel’s practice, in the interests of objectivity and gathering all the facts, to pair classified briefings and open briefings…This way we garner the best that the classified world of intelligence has to offer and the best from independent scholars working in universities, think tanks, and other institutions... (Saxton, 2000, emphasis added) The representation of terrorism expertise as ‘independent’ and as providing ‘objectivity’ and ‘facts’ has significance for its contribution to the policymaking process in the US. This is particularly the case given that, as we will see, core experts lend to insulate the broad direction of US policy from critique. Indeed, as Alexander George noted, it is precisely because ‘they are trained to clothe their work in the trappings of objectivity, independence and scholarship’ that expert research is ‘particularly effective in securing influence and respect for’ the claims made by US policymakers (George, 1991b: 77). Given this, it becomes vital to subject the content of terrorism studies to close scrutiny. Based upon a wider, systematic study of the research output of key figures within the field (Raphael, forthcoming), and building upon previous critiques of terrorism expertise (see Chomsky and Herman, 1979; Herman, 1982; Herman and O’Sullivan, 1989; Chomsky, 1991; George, 1991b; Jackson, 2007g), this chapter aims to provide a critical analysis of some of the major claims made by these experts and to reveal the ideological functions served by much of the research. Rather than doing so across the board, this chapter focuses on research on the subject of terrorism from the global South which is seen to challenge US interests. Examining this aspect of research is important, given that the ‘threat’ from this form of terrorism has led the US and its allies to intervene throughout the South on behalf of their national security, with profound consequences for the human security of people in the region. Specifically, this chapter examines two major problematic features which characterise much of the field’s research. First, in the context of anti-US terrorism in the South, many important claims made by key terrorism experts simply replicate official US government analyses. This replication is facilitated primarily through a sustained and uncritical reliance on selective US government sources, combined with the frequent use of unsubstantiated assertion. This is significant, not least because official analyses have often been revealed as presenting a politically-motivated account of the subject. Second, and partially as a result of this mirroring of government claims, the field tends to insulate from critique those ‘counterterrorism’ policies justified as a response to the terrorist threat. In particular, the experts overwhelmingly ‘silence’ the way terrorism is itself often used as a central strategy within US-led counterterrorist interventions in the South. That is. ‘counterterrorism’ campaigns executed or supported by Washington often deploy terrorism as a mode of controlling violence (Crelinsten, 2002: 83; Stohl, 2006: 18-19). These two features of the literature are hugely significant. Overall, the core figures in terrorism studies have, wittingly or otherwise, produced a body of work plagued by substantive problems which together shatter the illusion of ‘objectivity’. Moreover, the research output can be seen to serve a very particular ideological function for US foreign policy. Across the past thirty years, it has largely served the interests of US state power, primarily through legitimising an extensive set of coercive interventions in the global South undertaken under the rubric of various ‘war(s) on terror’. After setting out the method by which key experts within the field have been identified, this chapter will outline the two main problematic features which characterise much of the research output by these scholars. It will then discuss the function that this research serves for the US slate.

#### Terror discourse constructs dominant knowledge projects that shape policy—this excludes alternate forms of knowledge—terror discourse has broader political currency which must be interrogated

Jackson 8 [Richard Jackson, IR, Aberystwyth University PhD, University of Canterbury, “The Ghosts of State Terror,” 2008, http://users.aber.ac.uk/mys/csrv/ghost%20of%20state%20terror-richard%205.pdf]

Employing a discourse analytic approach, this paper examines the silence on state terrorism within the mainstream terrorism studies literature. An analysis of more than a hundred academic texts on terrorism, many by established ‘terrorism experts’, reveals that state terrorism is noticeable mainly for its absence. In some cases, state terrorism is simply defined out of the analysis by the employment of an actor-based definition: terrorism, it is argued, is a kind of violence performed solely by non-state actors. In other cases, the possibility of state terrorism is acknowledged but is then given a cursory treatment or simply ignored as a serious subject of research. Following this textual analysis, the main finding—the silence on state terrorism within terrorism studies—is subjected to both a first and second order critique. A first order or immanent critique uses a discourse’s internal contradictions, mistakes and misconceptions to criticise it on its own terms and expose the events and perspectives that the discourse fails to acknowledge or address. In this case, the absence of state terrorism is criticized for its illogical actor-based definition of terrorism, its politically biased research focus and its failure to acknowledge the empirical evidence of the extent and nature of state terrorism, particularly that practiced by Western liberal states and their allies. A second order critique entails reflecting on the broader political and ethical consequences—the ideological effects—of the representations enabled by the discourse, and the ways in which the discourse functions as a political technology. It is argued that the absence of state terrorism from academic discourse functions to promote particular kinds of state hegemonic projects, construct a legitimizing public discourse for foreign and domestic policy, and deflect attention from the terroristic practices by Western states and their allies. Importantly, the exposure and destabilisation of this dominant terrorism knowledge opens up critical space for the articulation of alternative and potentially emancipatory forms of knowledge and practice. Introduction Terrorism studies, once a fairly minor sub-field of security studies, has now expanded to become a stand-alone field with its own dedicated journals, research centres, leading scholars and experts, research funding opportunities, conferences, seminars, and study programmes. It is in fact, one of the fastest expanding areas of research in the English-speaking academic world, with literally thousands of new books and articles published over the past few years,1 significant investment in terrorism-related research projects, and increasing numbers of postgraduate dissertations and undergraduate students.2 A perennial criticism of this voluminous output however, has been the neglect of ‘state terrorism’ as a subject for systematic and sustained research, a problem noted during the Cold War but which seems to have become even more acute since September, 2001.3 To many observers this neglect is somewhat puzzling given that the genealogy of the term ‘terrorism’ has its earliest roots in the deployment of violence by states to terrify and intimidate civilian populations, states have employed terrorism far more extensively than non-state actors over the past two centuries, state terrorism is far more lethal and destructive than non-state terrorism and the employment of terror against civilians by states continues unabated in a great many countries today. The purpose of this paper is to explore this puzzle through the prism of discourse analysis, a form of critical theorising aimed in part at understanding and describing the relationship between knowledge, power, and politics. Taking as its starting point that knowledge and its production is never a purely neutral exercise but always works for someone and for something, this paper seeks to excavate the ideological effects of the discourse on state terrorism (or, more accurately, the silence within the discourse) in the terrorism studies field. It argues that the way in which state terrorism is constructed as a (non)subject both distorts the field as an area of scholarly research, and more importantly, reifies dominant structures of power and enables particular kinds of elite and state hegemonic projects. The argument proceeds in three sections. In the first section, I briefly outline the methodological approach employed in the analysis. This is followed by a discussion of the main findings of the discourse analysis—a description of the ways in which the subject of state terrorism is (and is not) discursively constructed and deployed within the broader terrorism studies literature. The third section subjects these findings to a first and second order critique as a means of exploring the effects of the discourse on knowledge, power and politics. Specifically, I deconstruct and dismiss the most common arguments for not including state terrorism as a valid object of study within the field of study, as well as illuminate and describe the political and ideological effects of its non-inclusion. Finally, in the conclusion to the paper, I argue that there are important analytical and normative reasons for taking state terrorism seriously and incorporating its systematic analysis into existing research programmes. Analysing the Discourse of State Terrorism As stated above, the analytical approach employed in this study falls broadly under the mantle of discourse analysis.4 A form of critical theorising, discourse analysis aims primarily to illustrate and describe the relationship between textual and social and political processes. In particular, it is concerned with the politics of representation—the manifest political or ideological consequences of adopting one mode of representation over another. In this case, I am concerned with the ways in which state terrorism is represented—or not represented, which is itself a kind of representation—as a subject within the field of terrorism studies. Although discourse theorising is employed within a range of different epistemological paradigms—poststructuralist, postmodernist, feminist, and social constructivist—it is predicated on a shared set of theoretical commitments. Broadly speaking, these include:5 an understanding of language as constitutive or productive of meaning; an understanding of discourse as structures of signification which construct social realities, particularly in terms of defining subjects and establishing their relational positions within a system of signification;6 an understanding of discourse as being productive of subjects authorised to speak and act, legitimate forms of knowledge and political practices and importantly, common sense within particular social groups and historical settings; an understanding of discourse as necessarily exclusionary and silencing of other modes of representation; and an understanding of discourse as historically and culturally contingent, inter-textual, open-ended, requiring continuous articulation and re-articulation and therefore, open to destabilisation and counter-hegemonic struggle. On this epistemological foundation and adopting an interpretive logic rather than a causal logic, the discourse analytic technique employed in this paper proceeded in two main stages. The first stage entailed an examination of a large number of texts from within the terrorism studies field.7 As such, the primary units of analysis or ‘data’ for this research were more than 100 mainstream academic books, articles in the main terrorism studies and international relations journals, conference papers presented at ISA and APSA, and reports and websites from think-tanks and research institutions. Each text was examined initially to see if it contained the terms ‘state terrorism’ or ‘state terror’. Texts that did contain these terms were then examined to see how they were constructed as a discursive formation and subject of knowledge, how they were deployed within broader narratives, and how state terrorism was positioned as a subject in relation to non-state terrorism. Employing a ‘grounded theory’ approach, the analysis was considered complete when the addition of new texts did not yield any new insights or categories. The second stage of the research involved subjecting the findings of the textual analysis to both a first and second order critique. A first order or immanent critique uses a discourse’s internal contradictions, mistakes, misconceptions, and omissions to criticise it on its own terms and expose the events and perspectives that the discourse fails to acknowledge or address. The point of this form of internal critique is not necessarily to establish the ‘correct’ or ‘real truth’ of the subject beyond doubt, but rather to destabilise dominant interpretations and demonstrate the inherently contested and political nature of the discourse. A second order critique entails reflecting on the broader political and ethical consequences—the ideological effects—of the representations and more importantly in this case, the silences, enabled by the discourse. Specifically, it involves an exploration of the ways in which the discourse functions as a ‘symbolic technology’8 that can be wielded by particular elites and institutions, to: structure the primary subject positions, accepted knowledge, commonsense and legitimate policy responses to the actors and events being described; exclude and de-legitimise alternative knowledge and practice; naturalise a particular political and social order; and construct and sustain a hegemonic regime of truth. A range of specific discourse analytic techniques are useful in second order critique: genealogical analysis, predicate analysis, narrative analysis, and deconstructive analysis.9 It is crucial to recognise that discourses are significant not just for what they say but also for what they do not say; the silences in a discourse can be as important, or even more important at times, than what is openly stated. This is because silence can function ideologically in any number of ways. For example, silence can be a deliberate means of distraction or misdirection from uncomfortable subjects or contrasting viewpoints, the suppression or de-legitimisation of alternative forms of knowledge or values, the tacit endorsement of particular kinds of practices, setting the boundaries of legitimate knowledge, or as a kind of disciplining process directed against certain actors—among others. In other words, the silences within a text often function as an exercise in power; revealing and interrogating those silences therefore, is an important part of first and second order critique. Lastly, it is important to note that when we examine a discourse as a broad form of knowledge and practice, it is never completely uniform, coherent, or consistent; it always has porous borders and often contains multiple exceptions, inconsistencies, and contradictions by different speakers and texts. Many of the terrorism scholars discussed in this paper for example, upon a close reading of their individual texts, often express more nuanced arguments than are necessarily presented here. The important point is not that each text or scholar can be characterised in the same uniform way, or even that these scholars agree on a broad set of knowledge claims. It is rather, that taken together as a broader discourse and a body of work that has political and cultural currency, the narratives and forms of the discourse function to construct and maintain a specific understanding of, and approach to, ‘terrorism’ and ‘state terrorism’ and that this knowledge has certain political and social effects.

#### Discourse of terrorism in IR constructs the world in absolute dichotomies between legitimate state violence and illegitimate political violence. The problem-solving policy approach of this type of knowledge reproduces the issues that drive the violence responsible for the aff impacts.

Gunning 7—Joroen Gunning, Deputy Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence @ Aberystywh (Wales) [“Government and Opposition”, Blackwell Publishing, Vol.42, No. 3, p. 369-375]

Each of these critiques goes some way to explain the shortcomings in ‘terrorism research’, although the argument that funding is not available for projects critical of the status quo is perhaps overstated.30 It will always be difficult to obtain reliable data on clandestine violence, so that scholars will inevitably be tempted to draw heavily on secondary sources or build elaborate theories on very little, and often dubious, information.31 Equally, given prevailing power structures, the embeddednes of researchers within them, and the shock that terroristic tactics typically seek to induce, it will arguably always be tempting to demonize the ‘terrorist other’. However, what most of the critiques overlook is the crucial fact that, beyond these inherent difficulties, many of the observed shortcomings can be traced back to the dominance in ‘terrorism research’ of what Robert Cox famously called a ‘problem-solving’ approach: one that ‘takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action’.32 This is not to say that ‘terrorism research’ has been devoid of ‘critical’ voices, if ‘critical’ is defined, with Cox, as ‘not tak[ing] institutions and social and power relations for granted but call[ing] them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing’,33 and, significantly, exploring the extent to which the status quo contributes to the ‘problem of terrorism’. Crelinsten, who takes an explicitly ‘critical’ approach,34 is a long-standing member of the editorial board of the journal Terrorism and Political Violence, as are Weinberg and Crenshaw, who are ‘critical’ in the (loose) sense of problematizing existing dichotomies, historicizing political violence and moving beyond a state-centric security approach.35 Silke, Horgan, Schmid and Jongman can also be considered ‘critical’ in that they are explicitly self-reflexive about assumptions, methodologies and the shortcomings of ‘terrorism research’.36 However, if we consider the typical characteristics of a ‘problemsolving’ or ‘traditional’ approach,37 we find that many of these both dominate ‘terrorism research’ (including many of the contributions of Silke’s ‘one-timers’)38 and can be directly linked to the shortcomings witnessed in this research. In its most ‘uncritical’ manifestation – and it must be emphasised that few scholars are wholly uncritical in a Coxian sense – a ‘problem-solving’ approach does not question its framework of reference, its categories, its origins or the power relations that enable the production of these categories.39 It is statecentric, takes security to mean the security of the state rather than that of human beings, on the assumption that the former implies the latter, and sees security in narrow military or law-and-order terms, as opposed to the wider conception of human security, as for instance developed by critical security studies.40 It is ahistorical and ignores social and historical contexts; if it did not, it would have to account for the historical trajectory of the state, which would undermine the state’s claim to being uniquely legitimate. The problem-solving approach is positivist and objectivist, and seeks to explain the ‘terrorist other’ from within state-centric paradigms rather than to understand the ‘other’ inter-subjectively using interpretative or ethnographic methods. It divides the world sharply into dichotomies (for instance, between the legitimate and ‘good’ state, and the illegitimate and ‘evil’ ‘terrorists’). It posits assumptions based on these dichotomies, often without adequately exploring whether these assumptions are borne out in practice. It sees interests as fixed, and it regards those opposed to the status quo as the problem, without considering whether the status quo is part of the problem and transformation of both sides is necessary for its solution. Not only can many of these characteristics be found in more or less diluted form in ‘terrorism research’41 – a legacy of the field’s origins as a sub-field within ‘traditional’ security and strategic studies – but these ‘problem-solving’ characteristics can also be shown to contribute directly to its observed shortcomings. The reported lack of primary data, the dearth of interviews with ‘terrorists’ and the field’s typical unwillingness to ‘engage subjectively with [the terrorist’s] motives’,42 is in part fuelled by the field’s over-identification with the state, and by the adoption of dichotomies that depict ‘terrorism’ as ‘an unredeemable atrocity like no other’, that can only be approached ‘with a heavy dose of moral indignation’, although other factors, such as security concerns, play a role too.43 Talking with ‘terrorists’ thus becomes taboo, unless it is done in the context of interrogation.44 Such a framework also makes it difficult to enquire whether the state has used ‘terroristic’ methods. If the state is the primary referent, securing its security the main focus and its hegemonic ideology the accepted framework of analysis, ‘terrorism’, particularly if defined in sharp dichotomies between legitimate and illegitimate, can only be logically perpetrated by insurgents against the state, not by state actors themselves. State actors are engaged in counterterrorism, which is logically depicted as legitimate, or at least, ‘justifiable’ given the ‘terrorist threat’ and the field’s focus on shortterm ‘problem-solving’. Where ‘traditional terrorism studies’ do focus on state terrorism, it is in the context of the ‘other’: the authoritarian or totalitarian state that is the nemesis if not the actual ‘enemy’ of the liberal democratic state.45 The observed disregard for historical context and wider sociopolitical dynamics46 can similarly be traced to the ahistorical propensity of ‘problem-solving’ approaches and their state-centric understanding of security. The typical focus is thus on violent acts against the state, and the immediate ‘terrorist’ campaign, not on how these acts relate to a wider constituency and its perception of human security, history and the state, or what role the evolution of the state has played in creating the conditions for oppositional violence.47 The lack of critical and theoretical reflection48 can be linked to the ‘problem-solving’ tendency to be short-termist and practical, and to deal in fixed categories and dichotomies that privilege the state and its dominant ideological values. From such a standpoint, scholars would not readily explore how ‘terrorism’ discourse is produced and how it is used to marginalize alternative conceptions, discredit oppositional groups, and legitimize counter-terrorism policies that transgress international law.49 Nor would they be particularly likely to consider how the development of the modern state or the international system might have contributed to the evolution of ‘terrorism’, or how theories of the state and the international system can help illuminate the ‘terrorism’ phenomenon. Drawing on cognate theories more broadly is similarly discouraged since ‘terrorism’ is framed as an exceptional threat, unique and in urgent need of a practical solution.50 The state-centricity, inflexibility and dichotomous nature of such a framework also makes it easier to recycle unproven assumptions, such as the notion that ‘religious terrorism’ is not concerned with constituencies and knows no tactical constraints against killing ‘infidels’, 51 without having to test these assumptions empirically across different samples. It thus becomes possible to argue, for instance, that negotiating with ‘terrorists’ encourages further ‘terrorism’ without need for empirical proof – a point already observed by Martha Crenshaw in 198352 – or to insist that ‘terrorists’ inherently lack legitimacy without reflection on whether the state lacks legitimacy in the experience of those who support the ‘terrorists’.53 The combined result of these tendencies is often a less than critical support (whether tacit or explicit) for coercive counterterrorism policy without adequate analysis of how this policy contributes to the reproduction of the very terrorist threat it seeks to eradicate.

### 2NC/1NR Link—Middle East Crisis

#### The discourse of Middle Eastern instability upholds orientalist hierarchies. They construct a peaceful west versus an irrational and unstable east.

Valbjørn 4—Morten Valbjørn, PhD in the Department of Political Science @ Aarhus [*Middle East and Palestine: Global Politics and Regional Conflict,* “Culture Blind and Culture Blinded: Images of Middle Eastern Conflicts in International Relations,” p. 63-4]

From this perspective, it is irrelevant to discuss whether the Middle East should be regarded as a region like all the others, as it is the case in the IR mainstream, or as a region like no other, as the essentialists would claim. Rather, regions should be seen as social constructions that are produced through specific discursive practices just like the international system and its various actors. Instead of discussing what the Middle East is, the relational conception of culture regards the Middle East as an imaginary region, where, first and foremost, it is important to focus on how the Middle East has been constructed through discursive practices and how this has extensive consequences on its international relations.

This focus characterizes Edward Said's Orientalism (1995), one of the principal works dealing with the Middle East in applying a relational conception of culture. Despite his principle recognition of the mere existence of societies with a location southeast of the Mediterranean, Said almost completely refrains from dealing with what characterizes these societies (1995: 5). Instead, he focuses on how European and American contexts have described and imagined the Middle East and how a particular "orientalist" way of thinking has functioned as a filter through which the Middle East is constructed as a unique oriental cultural entity. Even though the orientalist representations of the Middle East should have less to do with the Middle East than with the orientalists' own context (1995: 12), this does not mean that these representations are innocent or ineffectual. The European and American identity and way of performing power are thus closely interwoven with the conception of the Middle East as oriental and alien.

The orientalist conception of the Middle East functions as a constituting counterimage of European and American identity, of a so-called occidental culture whose supposedly democratic, rational, and enlightened character is contrasted by the depictions of a despotic, irrational, arid barbaric Orient. According to Said, "the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image" (Said, 1995: 1-2). But orientalism also formed a central element of "a western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient" (Said, 1995: 3). The French and British colonial representation of Middle Eastern societies as passive, backward, and inferior justified and subsequently legitimized their colonization. This close connection between orientalist descriptions of the Middle East and different kinds of performance of power allegedly does not belong only to the past. According to Said, the situation of today bears a lot of resemblance to the time of British and French colonialism. He points to how U.S. military interventions, the Carter Doctrine, and the establishment of Rapid Deployment Forces often have been preceded by popular and academic discussions on the threat from "political Islam" and the like (Said, 1997: 28; see also Farmanfarrnaian, 1992; Sidaway, 1998; McAlister, 2001).

As a consequence of this very different approach to international relations in the Middle East, subscribers to a relational conception of culture, instead of asking what makes the Middle Eastern international relations conflict-ridden, will ask how representations of the Middle East as an unstable "Arc of Crises"-to phrase Zbigniew Brezezinski, President Carter's National Security Advisor-have made "the West" appear impressively peaceful, and made Western military engagement in this part of the world possible, necessary, and for the benefit of the people of the Middle East themselves.

#### Crisis representations of the Middle East naturalize imperialist orientalism. They depict the West as a rational source of security and oriental others as irrational, dangerous, and in need of intervention.

Teffelen 95—Toine van Teffelen, Prof. in Discourse Analysis @ Birzeit Univ [*The Decolonization of imagination: Culture, Knowledge, and Power*, p. 113-8]

A major methodological problem in the study of Western images of the non-Western other is how precisely such images surface in discourse. Much post-structuralist theorizing, preeminently concerned with texts and self--other contrasts, pays scant attention to the concrete manifestations of images as they are evoked, negotiated, and adapted in talk and in writing. In the modern media, self-other divides cannot be taken for granted. Powerful as they are, such divides are not immune to interrogation and challenge; in fact, their viability partially depends on their adaptive capacity in the face of new arguments and new developments. Critical discourse analysis is an approach intended to reveal the subtle linguistic re-creation and negotiation of self-other oppositions against a background of commonsense reasonings. In following one strand of this tradition, I will inquire here into the workings of a set of metaphors commonly brought into association with the Arab-Islamic world. Since the 1970S regular media hypes about the dangers of terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism and (nuclear) war have suggested the Middle East to be a 'powder keg' where problems are 'explosive', or a 'volcano' where crises reach a 'boiling point'. In associating the domains of physics and nature with a political situation, these crisis metaphors give expression to a fear of a Middle East out of control.

A political issue in the Middle East that has long been regarded as defying control is the Palestine question, and of all the various events and places related to this conflict those pertaining to the West Bank and especially to the Gaza Strip have obtained special metaphoric treatment. During the Intifada, soldiers petitioned for withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, feeling they were 'sinking' in an 'ocean' of hostility, 'engulfed' by crowds. In a reversal of the image, Israeli prime minister Rabin wished the Gaza Strip, in an offstage remark made in 1993, 'to sink into the se-a'. An article headline such as 'West Bank explodes' or 'Gaza explodes' has for a long time been routine in the Israeli media in the same way as similar metaphors dominated the coverage of violence in Soweto during apartheid. In the case of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip some Israeli lournalists have in fact become aware of the cliché:

Expression like 'pressure cooker', 'powder keg', 'playing with fire', and a 'match liable at any moment to ignite a terrible conflagration here' sounded especially true this time. (Gid'on Levi, 'The Gaza Strip: 'A dog in Tel Aviv lives a more normal life than we do", Haaretz weekly supplement, 12 June I992.

In its turn the Western press took over crisis discourse on the Occupied Palestinian Territories. It is quite likely that this discourse has contributed to the political viewpoint, gradually endorsed by a dominant current of Israeli society, that Israel should abandon Gaza; not as a matter of principle, out of concern for Palestinian political rights, but rather to protect Israeli lives and interests, and to realize control by other means. This viewpoint became reality after the Gaza-.Jericho agreement between Israel and the PLO made in I993-94.

Here I consider a number of articles on the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and especially Gaza, written in the 59805 by Israeli and Western Dutch journalists, in order to show the ideological implications of the above-mentioned metaphors; how they shaped attitudes and definitions of reality within an argumentative context not without ambiguity.

The explosion metaphor

Recently communication studies, psychology and social anthropology have paid a great deal of attention to metaphors. As has been argued by Lakoff and Johnson (1980), metaphors should not be treated as simply rhetorical decorations or convenlions of figurative language but rather as keys to people's imagining and reasoning about the world. Some cognitive studies regard metaphors as economic devices - frames or schemas suitable to grasp quickly divergent or new situations where a non-metaphoric, literal approach would render understanding and reasoning laborious. More socially or culturally inclined authors (for instance, Quinn 1987, and contributions in Fernandez 1991) regard metaphors as linguistic cues to widely shared cultural models, Whereas metaphors can be applied in a deliberate way, as handy devices to think through dilemmas or to shed light on new realities, most of the time they are employed routinely and unconsciously to express commonsense notions.

Although such approaches have helped to give metaphor a more prominent status in cognitive and cultural studies they run the risk of losing sight of the constructive as well as ideological potential of metaphor. Metaphors are not mere windows on or tools to understand a pre-existing reality, but rather they take part in a situated practice of defining reality (see Haste 1993 and Lupton 5994 for recent case studies on the political use of metaphors). In conveying authority to a particular reasoning about reality they discredit or de-emphasize rival interpretations They thus have a bearing upon social and political reality, including relations of domination and control.

In much crisis discourse about the Gaza Strip we see the elaborate use of a metaphoric construction of politics in which increasing tension or pressure is said to culminate in an explosion. Consider an example from David Grossman's preface to the Dutch translation of his Yellow Wind (1988). In this book Grossman, a widely known Israeli journalist and an acclaimed writer, relays his experiences during his journeys in the Occupied Palestinian Territories just before the Intifada began.

[The first stone was thrown in Gaza, ... Emotions and forces which were repressed for twenty years erupted in an explosion of violence. (p. 8, translation TvT) In December 1987 the Palestinian uprising started. It was not planned: it was the fruit of prolonged dissatisfaction. The violence suddenly erupted, nourished by years of bitterness and hatred. Not only were the Israelis surprised. For the Arab countries and the PLO the uprising was a surprise as well. Indeed, the Palestinians themselves were surprised. Until that moment they had never dared to make use of the energy which they had bottled up for twenty years without action. (p. io, translation Tv1)

The main metaphors suggest the situation at hand, the beginning of the Intifada, is to he understood through the consecutive stages of built-up 'energy'/'tension' followed by 'eruption'/'explosion'. In the commonsense schema presented here, three conditions seem to influence the explosion's intensity: the repression of tension, the 'prolonged' duration of this repression as emphasized by the repeated mentioning of the occupation's length, and the lack of an opportunity to release the 'bottled-up' tension. The level of tension apparently determines the size of the explosion. Concepts of energy arid tension refer to the emotions and unspecified 'forces' of the refugees; concepts of eruption and explosion refer to the resulting violent behaviour.

This reasoning seems primarily based upon ordinary metaphoric thinking about the psychology of anger. Lakoff and Kovecses (1987) have demonstrated how Western discourse tends to understand anger in terms of a central metaphoric construction: 'the heat of a fluid in a container'. Examples are when somebody 'boils over', 'seethes with rage' or 'makes your blood boil'.

Their analysis indirectly suggests why anger metaphors can be effective devices for constructing self-other relations. The metaphor tension/explosion suggests a breakdown of self control and a loss of rationality that violate a broadly shared set of Western values. Ideally speaking, the expression of anger should be guided by reason, which means that it must be based on a legitimate grief; that other ways should be tried to redress the grief; that when anger is allowed to come out, it should happen in a controlled way, and that it should be directed towards the wrongdoer, and retributive in proportion to the grief (Lakoff and Koveeses 1987).

Apparently, all this does not apply here: the Palestinians simply release their tension, they are even 'surprised' by their own anger. The intifada appears to lack planning or a meaningful target.

Both literary criticism and the social sciences provide authoritative sources for the reasoning associated with the deviant anger model that is imposed upon the Palestinians. The literary prototype of ressentimeni, extensively theorized by Nietzsche, has been a common device in Western novels to discredit forms of resistance of the working class or the nonWestern Other as being reactive and based on griefs and feelings of envy and hate that can be easily manipulated to suit exterior ends (Jameson 1980). In the social sciences the 'volcanic' model of rebellion or revolution equates collective violence with the 'periodic eruption of social-psychological tensions that boil up in human groups like lava under the earth's crust' (Aya 1979: 14, quoted in Farsoun and Landis 1991: I-f). In this model, society is epitomized by the 'mass', the fearful phenomenon which, according to popular psychologies, is not only a threat to the social order but in fact its very negation. In mass society there is 'lurking ... the undefined mass, the anonymous crowd, a formless aggregation of little entities, each isolated from the others' (Moscovici 1990: 70). The individual is nothing but 'a molecule in an expanding gas'. Such a society is prone to explosion.

Social reasoning here easily ties in with the above-mentioned conception of the individual being overpowered by emotions. When society is nothing more than a sum of individuals, it can only reflect the laws of individual behaviour. According to this line of thinking, discontent, if not put into constructive action, transforms itself into madness and hysteria which in their turn are prime sources of criminal individual behaviour or destabilizing mass action when people mindlessly imitate each other's behaviour (a process that Gustave Le Bon, a writer who was particularly instrumental in popularizing mass psychology, called 'contagion'). Isolated from their political context, oppositional violence or resistance can thus he easily dismissed as destructive, senseless and dangerous from a functional point of view.

More generally, these reasonings are informed by the reason-versus emotion dichotomy that permeates Western discourse. Emotion points to a fearful threat to order: to wildness, chaos, nature, femininity, alternatively, rationality points to control, order, predictability, culture, masculinity. Both person and society are viewed as being physically divided into spheres of rationality and spheres of emotion. This division, and the wish to keep it intact, also seem to inform the metaphors under discussion here. By evoking two domains separated by a physical border vulnerable to penetration - when the tension explodes, the lava erupts, or the hot water flows over - the metaphors graphically construct a fragile boundary in need of protection (van Teeffelcn ii).

By naturalizing 'Others' and making them the object of uncontrollable forces, the energy-tension and eruption-explosion metaphors also down play human agency. Although it is impossible to discuss linguistic elements other than metaphor in detail here, it should be noted that the example above contains syntactic devices that serve to reinforce the draining of discourse from human agency (Kress and Hodge 1979), especially intransitives ('the violence ... erupted'; 'emotions and forces which were repressed.') and nominalizations (when processes or actions are represented by nouns, as in the clause 'bitterness and hatred'). They make it easier to suggest that human properties are part of a quasi-physical rather than a moral realm.

Let us move from the linguistic construction of a self-other divide to the ideological implications for the situation described, the Israeli control over the Gaza Strip. In describing a border situation that defies control, the discourse of fear is said to accomplish a double purpose: the justification of suppression and the mobilization of support for the colonizing power (AbuLughod and Lutz 1990: 14). It is pertinent here to reflect upon the question of to what extent Grossman, in creating a self-other boundary by emphasizing the Other's deviant expression of anger, in fact exploits such a discourse of fear for ideological ends.

To begin with, those familiar with the journalistic and literary work of Grossman will remark that the example above should be considered in relation to the remainder of the book, and also in the context of the public climate in Israel, Grossman is a journalist who was courageous enough to present the Israeli public with the harsh reality of Palestinian daily life in the Occupied Palestinian Territories before the Intifada started. In the Introduction to the book he asserts that his account of the Occupied Palestinian Territories delivered all the facts needed to understand the emergence of the Intifada. The crisis metaphors served to urge Israel to realize that long-term control over Gaza is untenable,

It may seem paradoxical that Grossman constructs a self-other contrast while at the same time opting for a liberal politics of changing the political status quo. Here we arrive at a point of supreme importance for understanding the politics of metaphor, namely, its employment to lend authority to a particular definition of reality as opposed to rival definitions. In other words, political metaphors attain their rhetorical effect within what Billig (1987) calls 'a context of controversy'.

Like many other Israeli liberal writers, Grossman pursues two polemics. He objects to the normalizing discourse practised by the Israeli right, which pretended that the army was in control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and that the occupation was benevolent in nature. Yet he also warns against a definition of Palestinian reality in terms of curtailed political rights, a definition supported in many liberal Western circles. In addressing a Dutch public Grossman explicitly states that his descriptions of the occupation must not be misunderstood as evidence of support for the Palestinian cause.

The use of the tension and explosion metaphors in crisis discourse serves to effectuate this dual demarcation vis-ã-vis normalizing discourse and political rights discourse. On the one hand, the metaphors negate the idea of a normal situation; they ring the bell warning that something may happen. On the other hand, they maintain and even reinforce a self-other divide by casting the reasoning in a mechanistic form. This device creates distance and prevents identification with the victims of the occupation. It does not matter what emotions they have: grief, anger, hatred, or whatever. All emotions are lumped together as potential sources of violence. It is difficult to sympathize with undifferentiated emotions or with people who function in a mechanistic way and are controlled by outside forces; the more so when they internally 'build up tension' and 'explode' at an unpredictable time, You had better get out of their way.

In the Grossman example, the interaction with the other discourses remains implicit. I now turn to other examples to show how the metaphors function when conflict between the rival discourses surfaces in the text, and how the metaphors are used to reframe a definition of the problem from one based on a denial of political rights to one created by a loss of control. At the same time, the new examples render it possible to illustrate some other theoretical issues that inform the politics of metaphor.

### 2NC/1NR Link—Failed State

#### Failed state discourse frames the Global South as the source of violence. This colonizes our understanding of international society with demonized stereotypes that justify oppression.

Cooper 5—Neil Cooper, Peace Studies @ Bradford [“Picking out the Pieces of the Liberal Peaces: Representations of Conflict Economies and the Implications for Policy” *Security Dialogue* 36 (4) p. 471]

The political economies of contemporary conflicts have also been the object of analyses influenced by critical theory and post-structuralism. Mark Duffield, in particular, has identified shadow trade in the developed world as a form of really existing development taking place outside the formal structures of the global economy, from which large parts remain excluded. Much of this literature has also emphasized the need to distinguish between different kinds of economies that exist in the same environment, for instance the combat economy of the warlords, the shadow economy of the mafiosi and the coping economy of ordinary citizens (Pugh, Cooper & Goodhand, 2004). A key feature in this work, however, has been a concern with the way in which weak and failed states have been incorporated into a discourse that has re-inscribed underdevelopment as the source of multiple instabilities for the developed world – what Luke & Ó Tuathail (1997) term ‘the virus of disorder’. Duffield’s work, in particular, has identified the processes by which the securitization of underdevelopment has underpinned the new ‘liberal peace’ aid paradigm, centred around the restoration of order through the application of neoliberalism and the formal accoutrements of democracy and civil (but not economic) rights (Duffield, 2001). Indeed, for Duffield, development has become a form of biopolitics concerned with addressing the putative threats posed to effective states by transborder migratory flows, shadow economies, illicit networks and the global insurgent networks of ineffective states (Duffield, 2005). And, in contrast to the Cold War, the geopolitics of effective states is concerned less with arming Third World allies and more with transforming the populations inside ineffective states. In this view, development represents a ‘security mechanism that attempts through poverty reduction, conditional debt cancellation and selective funding to insulate [developed] mass society from the permanent crisis on its borders’ (Duffield, 2005: 157).

While Duffield’s analysis arguably understates the continuities between the Cold War and the post-Cold War era, these insights are nevertheless of particular relevance when examining both shifts in discourse and policy on development and security in general and the political economy of conflict in particular, and it is to these that we will now turn.

Towards a Synthesis of Difference or a Difference in Synthesis?

In the aftermath of 9/11, weak and failed states have become the object of a heightened discourse of threat that represents them as actual or potential nodal points in global terrorist networks. In this conception, the absence of state authority and the persistence of disorder creates local societies relatively immune to technologies of surveillance, making them ideal breeding grounds for terrorist recruitment, training, money-laundering and armstrafficking, as well as organized crime more generally. As Collier et al. (2003: 41) note, civil war generates territories outside the control of governments that have become ‘epicentres of crime and disease’ and that export ‘global evils’ such as drugs, AIDS and terrorism.

This has produced an element of synthesis between new-right critiques of the current aid paradigm and at least some critics from the liberal left. In particular, the idea that the neoliberal project has been taken too far and has had the counterproductive effect of eroding state capacity and legitimacy – a traditional refrain of the left – has now been taken up by realists. Thus, Fukuyama’s State Building signs up to earlier analyses that have emphasized the way in which neopatrimonial regimes used external conditionality as an excuse for cutting back on modern state sectors while expanding the scope of the neopatrimonial state (Fukuyama, 2004: 22). Fukuyama has also become a belated convert to the idea that, under the Washington Consensus, the state-building agenda was given insufficient emphasis (Fukuyama, 2004: 7). Thus, the new-right analysis is one that emphasizes strong states and local empowerment. Even (especially) the Bush administration concluded in its National Security Strategy of 2002 that ‘America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing states’ (White House, 2002: 1).

However, this apparent consensus between the new-right analysis and the liberal critique raises a number of concerns. First, the new-right analysis is situated as a response to the apparently new global dangers unleashed by 9/11. As Fukuyama (2004: 126) notes, ‘the failed state problem . . . was seen previously as largely a humanitarian or human rights issue’, whereas now it has been constructed as a problem of Western security. This dichotomy between the situation preceding and that after 9/11 is most certainly an exaggeration. Underdevelopment has always been securitized, just in different ways; and even its post-Cold War manifestation was firmly in place well before 9/11. Indeed, this historical amnesia can be understood as an intrinsic element of a securitizing discourse that justifies regulatory interventions as a response to a specific global emergency rather than as part of longer-term trends.

Nevertheless, it is also the case that the securitization of underdevelopment highlighted by Duffield has become acutely heightened post-9/11, and it is in this context that current debates about the need to eradicate debt, increase aid and reform trading structures are taking place. Thus, the cosmopolitan emphasis on responding to the plight of other global citizens has been merged with the security imperatives of the war on terror to create something of a monolithic discourse across left and right that justifies intervention, regulation and monitoring as about securing both the poor and the developed world.

Consequently, what structures the debate about addressing abuse or underdevelopment in this perspective is not the abuse or underdevelopment per se but its links with multiple threats posed to the developed world. A continuum is thus created for external intervention, entailing not merely the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq but also structuring debate about Somalia or the need to address shadow trade. Moreover, this discourse is by no means unique to new-right perspectives. Thus, the recent Barcelona Report on a Human Security Doctrine for Europe deploys much the same kind of language, despite being situated in an explicitly cosmopolitanist analysis that emphasizes the importance of human security. For the authors, regional conflicts and failed states are ‘the source of new global threats including terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and organised crime’ and consequently ‘no citizens of the world are any longer safely ensconced behind their national border’ (Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, 2004: 6–7).

Interventionary strategies, whether designed to address weapons of mass destruction, AIDS or the shadow trade emanating from civil conflict, are thus explicitly framed as prophylactic strategies designed to protect the West from terror, disease, refugees, crime and disorder. In the words of an IISS (2002: 2) report on Somalia, the concern is with ‘inoculating failed or failing states against occupation by al-Qaeda’.

This is not to suggest there is now complete synthesis between new-right analyses and liberal critiques. As already noted, analyses such as the Barcelona Report are located in a cosmopolitanist perspective that still emphasizes the importance of providing human security to the citizens of weak states and stresses the need for a bottom-up approach that empowers locals. In contrast, for Fukuyama (2004: 115), state-building and local ownership somehow manage to encompass approval for the idea that, on key areas such as central banking, ‘ten bright technocrats can be air-dropped into a developing country and bring about massive changes for the better in public policy’. The emphasis is also on state capacity for enforcement, ‘the ability to send someone with a uniform and a gun to force people to comply with the state’s laws’ (Fukuyama, 2004: 8) and to maintain the integrity of borders too easily traversed by networked crime and terror.

However, the promise inherent in this monolithic discourse is of a potential synthesis between solidarism and security – one in which welfare, representation and security (for both rich and poor) can really be combined. The risk, though, is that security will delimit solidarism in terms of both the breadth of its reach and the depth of its implementation. For example, following US allegations of support for terrorism, the operations of a Saudi charity operating in Somalia were suspended, throwing over 2,600 orphans onto the streets (ICG, 2005a: 15). Similarly, while the USA has increased aid, much of the direction of this aid has been determined by the priorities of the war on terror, while bilateral trade arrangements have been used to reward key allies in the war on terror, such as Pakistan (Tujan, Gaughran & Mollett, 2004). A further notable feature of the post-9/11 environment is that while the ‘war on terror’ framing has colonized the representation of a wide variety of topics, including discussion of conflict trade and shadow war economies, insights from this literature have not always travelled in the reverse direction. Thus, even the most basis lessons from the literature on the economic challenges of peacebuilding were ignored in Iraq. What was notable here was the failure of imagination to conceive pre-invasion Iraq as an entity that exhibited many features of a war economy – for example, high levels of corruption, weak infrastructure, a shadow trade in oil and other forms of sanctions-busting, and a militarized society. Similarly, concern at the way porous borders and informal economies may have been exploited by terror networks in the Sahel has led the USA to develop a Pan-Sahel Initiative focused on reinforcing borders and enhancing surveillance. In other words, cutting off networks that have ‘become the economic lifeblood of Saharan peoples’ (ICG, 2005b: i) has been prioritized rather than dealing with the underlying dynamics driving such networks.

Conclusion

In some respects, then, there has been a degree of convergence in at least the mainstream discourse and language deployed to discuss weak states and their various features, including shadow economies. The current emphasis is on reversing the excesses of neoliberal reforms that are deemed to have undermined the state in the 1980s and 1990s. The consensus is on the need for strong states and local empowerment (see the contribution by Rolf Schwarz in this edition of Security Dialogue). However, while the discourse and terminology are the same, the meaning applied to them is often very different. How these commonalities and differences will play themselves out in the development of policy remains to be seen. What is nonetheless clear is that much of the discussion of civil war economies has become infected by the virus that is the language of the war on terror. A key concern that this gives rise to is that such framings will structure all or much policy on inconflict and post-conflict societies as being about providing hermetic protection for the West, rather than really addressing the lessons about the local economic dynamics driving shadow economies. The risk is that post-9/11 post-conflict reconstruction may fuse the liberal peace aid paradigm (a continued emphasis on the rigours of neoliberalism, albeit mitigated by a nod towards poverty reduction) with elements of more traditional Cold War interventions that emphasized formal state strength: powerful militaries and intelligence services (albeit mitigated by a nod to civil society). The ways in which this synthesis between the security imperatives of the developed world, cosmopolitanist concerns with the poor and the current reworking of the neoliberal model play themselves out will only really become clear with the test of time. However, what seems to be emerging is a variable-geometry approach to weak states. Some, like Iraq and Afghanistan, may become the object of heightened discourses of threat, producing highly militarized intervention strategies that prioritize order and security issues while failing to address other factors such as the nature of shadow economies and their relationship to occupation and regulation. Indeed, at their extreme, as in Iraq, rather than witnessing the modification of discredited neoliberal models, such objects of intervention may experience even more virulent versions (Klein, 2005). Others, such as Sudan, may find themselves subject to a post-9/11 variant of the new barbarism thesis, in which the anarchy and extremes of violence they are deemed to exhibit are simultaneously presented not only as a rationale for intervention but also as a reason for severely delimiting intervention in the absence of acute imperatives for action provided by the logic of the war on terror. In between, there may be a broad swathe of states, from Sierra Leone to Angola to Liberia, where specific intervention policies may be less strongly influenced by the logic of war on terror and the more general securitization of underdevelopment, but where broader policies that influence such interventions are mediated via the dictates of both solidarism and the security and economic interests of the developed world. Thus, it is perhaps more appropriate to refer not to the imposition of the liberal peace on post-conflict societies but to the imposition of a variety of liberal peaces (Richmond, 2005), albeit ones still imposed within the broad constraints of neoliberalism and within the context of profoundly unequal global trading structures that contribute to underdevelopment.

### 2NC/1NR Link—Iran Prolif

#### Rhetoric of Iranian hostility and proliferation is deployed within a neoconservative regime of truth to legitimize war with Iran. Paying attention to how Iran is represented is the first obligation of nuclear policymakers.

Adib-Moghaddam 7 (Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, 4/1/2007, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, “Manufacturing war: Iran in the neo-conservative Imagination” *Third World Quarterly*, 28:3, EBSCOhost)

Abu Nasr Farabi expressed a comparably sceptical view of scientific determinism when he argued that ‘every demonstration is . . . the cause of the scientific knowledge acquired thereby, but not all demonstration conveys the knowledge of the cause of the thing’s existence’.4 Although I am oversimplifying, it is probably correct to say that the ultimate argument of both men is that one must not presume that there exists a sphere of human relations that is somehow detached from a manufactured context—historical, economic, philosophical, traditional, ideational, political or other. All human facts, Gadamer and Farabi agree, are invented, objectified, internalised and ultimately introjected.5 Although this brief sketch may make the ideas of both thinkers appear commonsensical enough to accept, we too often continue to assume that facts are somehow detached from a manufactured context, that they exist on their own without a historical background and ontological present signifying them.6 Notions of unchangeable laws of nature or a-historical continuity constrain our capacity for understanding that facts are socially engineered, that they are elastic, relative, differentiated.7 To some ‘postmodern’ and ‘critical theorists’, this may seem unchallengeable. But if we switch our focus away from these approaches to the reality of contemporary international relations studies in general, and to analyses of West Asia in particular, we see that the majority of scholars take ‘facts’ for granted, that they fail to focus on the social engineering of world politics.8 One serious consequence of the absence of critical approaches in my empirical field of study is that the image of Iran as a country in the grip of enigmatic, hostile revolutionaries led by intransigent, retroactive Mullahs is surprisingly salient. Part of the problem, I will argue in the following paragraphs, is that the Islamic Republic has occupied a prominent place in the imagination of influential neo-conservative strategists with direct links to the decision-making process in Washington and immense resources to influence the public discourse in the USA.9 Together with their allies in the Likud party in Israel (some of them are now members of Kadima), that neo-conservative coterie has manufactured an image of Iran which has made the country’s ‘irrational nature’ an established fact among influential strata of international society.10 The missing link in that cause–effect relationship is the role of a specific context (in our case neo-conservatism) in the production of reality (in our case the image of Iran as an international pariah governed by irrational religious zealots), a dialectic which both Farabi and Gadamer well understood. It would be a mistake to underestimate that dialectic, especially with regard to Iran’s nuclear file. For is the ideological representation of Iran not governed by the strategy to expel from competing realities the notion of a Third World country that is attempting to exercise its right to national development; to contain the view that Iranians are as rational as the Japanese, Germans or other nations who have developed a nuclear energy programme? The answer is yes, in my opinion, which explains my focus on the neo-conservative habitat of producing the image of Iran as an ‘international pariah’ in the following paragraphs. I am not so much interested in quantifying the proliferation of anti-Iranian discourses in neoconservative circles. It is rather more central, I think, to account for the way Iran is spoken about, to analyse who does the speaking, to explore the institutions which codify people to speak about the country, and to understand the political culture that signifies and legitimates the things that are said. What is at issue in this article, in short, is the overall discursive representation of Iran by neo-conservative ideology, the way in which Iran is ‘translated’ to us by an exalted, cumbersome, coterie of activists with an overtly and self-consciously anti-Iranian agenda.11 No manufacturing of consent, no engineering of facts, no ideological effort to ‘produce’ reality, no campaign to transform a specific political consciousness can function if, through a pattern of institutions, functionaries and media outlets, it does not constitute an overall strategy. And, inversely, no such strategy can achieve lasting effects if it is not based on a consensus serving, not as a headquarters, conspiracy or a predetermined, static outcome, but as the smallest common denominator among its adherents. With regard to Iran that consensus is constituted by influential, idea-producing conglomerates established by neo-conservative functionaries and activists with close links to Jewish lobbying organisations and likeminded parties in Israel. These all adhere to a common interest: to subvert the Iranian state and, by extension, to recode Iranian behaviour in accordance with US and Israeli interests in West Asia and beyond.12 Let me start exploring some of the strategies pursued to that end from a comparative perspective by sketching the involvement of neo-conservative functionaries in the build-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003.13 It is no secret that there are strong ideological and institutional links between the neo-conservative coterie surrounding the White House and various parties in Israel.15 ‘No lobby has managed to divert US foreign policy as far from what the American national interest would otherwise suggest’, write John J Mearsheimer, Professor at the University of Chicago, and Stephen Walt, dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, ‘while simultaneously convincing Americans that US and Israeli interests are essentially the same’.16 One oft-cited example of this nexus is a paper authored by Douglas Feith (among others), who was US Undersecretary of Defense for Policy from July 2001 until August 2005. The paper bears the curious title, ‘A clean break: a new strategy for securing the realm’. Produced in July 1996 by the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, a think-tank based in Washington, DC and Jerusalem, the paper urges Israel to reconsider its strategic posture. The report advocates the ‘principle of pre-emption, rather than retaliation alone’. It suggests that Israel work with ‘moderate’ regimes such as Jordan and Turkey in order to ‘contain, destabilise, and roll back some of its most dangerous threats’. In addition, it recommends that Israel ‘focus on removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq—an important Israeli strategic objective in its own right—as a means of foiling Syria’s regional ambitions’. Historically valuable, if viewed within the context of the current situation in Iraq, the paper also suggests that Israel support Jordan in advocating restoration of the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq.17 The list of functionaries involved in the production of the paper reads like a who’s who of the neo-conservative cabal (it will become clear later that the same people are involved in the campaign against Iran). Apart from Douglas Feith, the list includes Richard Perle, one of the central advocates of the Iraq war and until recently chairman of the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board; Charles Fairbanks Jr, a personal friend of Paul Wolfowitz; David Wurmser formerly of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and ex-special assistant to John Bolton at the State Department; and his wife Meyrav Wurmser, who runs the Hudson Institute and directed the Washington office of the Middle East Media Research Institute. (Memri is an invention of Col Yigal Carmon, who spent 22 years in Israeli intelligence and later served as counter-terrorism advisor to former Israeli prime ministers Yitzak Shamir and Yitzak Rabin.)18 In July 1996 the then prime minister of Israel, Binyamin Netanyahu, presented the central strategic tenets of the ‘Clean Break’ paper to the US Congress. The case for an invasion of Iraq was followed up by the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) and the Project for a New American Century. JINSA’s board of advisors included Vice President Dick Cheney, former US ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton, and Douglas Feith before they entered the Bush administration. Leading neoconservatives such as Richard Perle, Michael Ledeen, Stephen Bryen, Joshua Muravchik and former CIA director James Woolsey continue to be members of the board at the time of writing. The Project for a New American Century’s declared goal is ‘to promote American global leadership’.19 It is chaired by William Kristol, editor of the rightwing Weekly Standard. Already by January 1998 the Project had sent a letter to then US president Bill Clinton advocating a ‘strategy for removing Saddam’s regime from power’ and demanding a ‘full complement of diplomatic, political and military efforts’ to that end. This appeal was followed by a letter to congressional leaders Newt Gingrich and Trent Lott in May 1998, urging that ‘US policy should have as its explicit goal removing Saddam Hussein’s regime from power and establishing a peaceful and democratic Iraq in its place’. Out of the 17 signatories to the two letters, 11 have held posts in the Bush administration since the invasion of Iraq was launched in March 2003. Elliot Abrams, who had orchestrated the Iran— Contra operation, when the Reagan administration scandalously used the proceeds of arms sales to Iran (despite its own embargo) to circumvent a congressional prohibition on funding Nicaraguan rebels, was recruited as Senior Director for Near East, Southwest Asian and North African Affairs on the National Security Council advancing Bush’s strategy of advancing democracy abroad.20 Richard Armitage was named Deputy Secretary of State; John Bolton, Under Secretary, Arms Control and International Security (promoted to US Ambassador to the UN); Paula Dobriansky, Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs; Zalmay Khalilzad, Special Presidential envoy to Afghanistan and ‘Ambassador-at-large for Free Iraqis’ (promoted to US Ambassador to Iraq); Richard Perle, chairman of the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board; Peter W Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs; Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defence; William Schneider, Jr, chairman of the Pentagon’s Defense Science Board; Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense (promoted to Director of the World Bank); and Robert B Zoellick, the US Trade Representative (promoted to US Deputy Secretary of State).21 It would be naı¨ve to assume that the institutionalisation of the neoconservative nexus in a myriad of think-tanks and lobbying organisations did not create the structural platform to advocate the case for war against Iraq. Let me put forward a general hypothesis here. Neo-conservatism does not refuse aggression. On the contrary, it habituates us to accept war as rational; it puts into operation an entire machinery for producing ‘true’ facts in order to legitimate militaristic foreign policies. Not only do neo-conservatives speak of war and urge everyone to do so; they also present an ‘aestheticised’ version of war. Via neo-conservatism then, justice, patriotism, morality, even chivalry, find an opportunity to deploy themselves in the discourse of war. Not, however, by reason of some naturally positive property immanent to war itself, but by virtue of the properties neo-conservatism and other militaristic ideologies ascribe to it. Let me turn to explaining how a comparable ‘Kriegskontext’ with the same ‘eponymous heroes’ is manufactured with regard to Iran.22 One newly established link in the chain of neo-conservative think-tanks tied to Jewish lobbying organisations advocating confrontation with Iran is the Coalition for Democracy in Iran (CDI). Founded in 2002 by Michael Ledeen and Morris Amitay, who used to be executive director of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the organisation aims to foster political support for regime change in the Islamic Republic. Members include Raymond Tanter of the Washington Institute for Near East Affairs (WINEA), itself an invention of AIPAC, Frank Gaffney, president of the Center for Security Policy (CSP) and Rob Sobhani, who has close personal and political links to the son of the deposed Shah of Iran, Reza Pahlavi. Ledeen, Amitay and Sobhani joined forces at the AEI in May 2003 in a seminar entitled ‘The Future of Iran: Mullahcracy, Democracy, and the War on Terror’, co-sponsored by the Hudson Institute and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies . All three have connections with the media agency Benador Associates, which manages both their op-ed placements and television appearances. Eleana Benador represents Richard Perle, James Woolsey, Charles Krauthammer, Martin Kramer and other neo-conservative advocates. The Foundation for Defense of Democracies also supports the Alliance for Democracy in Iran (ADI), which is backed by prominent political strategists such as Jerome Corsi. Whereas the CDI and ADI support the restoration of the monarchy in Iran, the Iran Policy Committee (IPC) acts as a lobbying organisation for the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), which is listed as a terrorist organisation by the US State Department and the European Union. Those readers who are familiar with Fox News and its propensity for readymade, formulaic analysis by former members of the US armed forces will recognise some of the supporters of the IPC: Lt Col Bill Cowan, US Marine Corps (ret); Lt Gen Thomas McInerney USAF (ret); Maj Gen Paul E Valley, US Army (ret); Capt Charles T Nash, US Navy (ret); and Lt Gen Edward Rowny, US Army (ret). Other IPC members are also familiar faces: the aforementioned Raymond Tanter; Clare Lopez, a former CIA analyst; and Jim Atkins, US ambassador to Saudi Arabia during the presidency of Richard Nixon. Creating more and more interlinked foundations, think-tanks, and other institutional platforms tied to the neo-conservative cabal has served its political purpose. In the US Congress the Iranian government has been targeted by several bills, including the Iran Freedom and Support Act, sponsored by Senators Rick Santorum (R-Penn.) and John Cornyn (R-Texas), and a comparable bill proposed by Rep Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Florida Republican and strident anti-Castro campaigner. Funding of $3 million for Iranian opposition activities was inserted by Congress in the 2005 budget on the initiative of Sen Sam Brownback, a Kansas Republican and a member of the Institute on Religion and Public Policy which has recently launched its in-house ‘Iran Project’. This is aimed at enhancing ‘the understanding of Iran’s policy-making process and politico-Islamist system’.24 The aforementioned Santorum, moreover, advocated regime change in an address to the National Press Club concerning ‘Islamic fascism’ in July 2006, stating that ‘every major Islamic leader has openly identified the US as its enemy’.25 Influence on the levers of power in Washington is not only secured through lobbying efforts. There is also persuasive evidence for covert activity. In August 2004 it was revealed that classified documents, including a draft National Security Presidential Directive devised in the office of then Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith was shared with AIPAC and Israeli officials. The document set a rather more aggressive US policy towards Iran and was leaked by Lawrence Franklin, an ‘expert’ on Iran who was recruited to Feith’s office from the Defense Intelligence Agency.26 An FBI counter-intelligence operation revealed that the same Franklin had repeated meetings with Naor Gilon, the head of the political department at the Israeli embassy in Washington, and with other officials and activists tied to the Israeli state and Jewish lobbying organisations. Franklin was sentenced to 12 years and seven months in jail in January 2006 for disclosing classified information to Steven Rosen and Keith Weissman. Both were members of AIPAC.27 Douglas Feith himself has longstanding links to Zionist pressure groups. The Zionist Organisation for America (ZOA), for instance, honoured him and his father for their service to Israel and the Jewish people in 1997. He is also cofounder of One Jerusalem, a Jerusalem-based organisation whose ultimate goal is securing ‘a united Jerusalem as the undivided capital of Israel’.28 A second co-founder of this organisation is David Steinmann, who is chairman of JINSA (see above). He is also a board member of the Center for Security Policy (CSP) and chairman of the executive committee of the Middle East Forum. Two other co-founders of One Jerusalem are directly tied to the Likud Party: Dore Gold was a top advisor to former prime minister Ariel Sharon and Natan Sharansky was Israel’s minister of diaspora affairs from March 2003 until May 2005 (he resigned from the cabinet in April 2005 to protest against plans to withdraw Israeli settlers from the Gaza Strip). Let me sketch now how the neo-conservative machinery works within a specific political context, namely Iran’s ninth presidential elections in June 2005. Here, the strategy to inject the public discourse with false facts and predictions was evident before, during and after the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. ‘Any normal person familiar with the Islamic republic knows that these are not elections at all’, wrote Michael Ledeen of the AEI in an article entitled ‘ When is an election not an election’. ‘They are a mise en sce`ne, an entertainment, a comic opera staged for our benefit. The purpose of the charade’, Ledeen claimed, ‘is to deter us from supporting the forces of democratic revolution in Iran’.29 Kenneth Timmerman reiterated the neoconservative message in an article for the National Review Online entitled ‘Fake election, real threats’, which was reprinted by the Washington Times. Citing Abolhassan Banisadr, the first president of the Islamic Republic, who fled into exile and has not been in Iran for nearly 30 years, Timmerman predicted that no more than 27% of eligible voters in Iran would participate in the elections (his estimate missed the real turnout by over 34%).30 Danielle Pletka, vice president for foreign and defence policy studies at the AEI, made a similarly misleading prophecy. In ‘Not our man in Iran’, she argued that Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani was handpicked by the ‘machinations of the mullahs’ to win the election. (Rafsanjani lost, of course, having received seven million votes fewer than Ahmadinejad.31) Other articles by Nir Boms, vice president of the Center for Freedom in the Middle East and former academic liaison at the Israeli embassy in Washington, DC; by Elliot Chodoff, a major in the reserves of the Israeli army; and by Abbas Milani and Michael McFaul, who direct the Project on Iranian Democracy at the conservative Hoover Institution in California, were similarly misleading. The campaign to trivialise the democratic process in Iran before and during the elections served a dual, interdependent purpose: rendering the ninth presidiency of the Islamic Republic illegitimate a priori and, by extension, representing Iran as an irrational actor, as a country where there is no regulatory context in which decision makers and others operate. Such manipulation helps produce the image of Iran as a ‘rogue’ country which, in turn, serves the important function of legitimating diplomatic and, potentially, military aggression. The strategy has appeared to be at least partially successful. After the election leading journalists, including John Simpson of the BBC, alleged that Ahmadinejad had been one of the students responsible for holding US diplomatic staff captive between 1979 and 1980.32 This rather apocryphal claim was rejected by the CIA only after it had its impact on global public opinion. Crucially it minimised the diplomatic power of the Ahmadinejad administration before its first serious engagement with the international community at the United Nations in September 2005. (All this happened before Ahmadinejad’s excessive tirades against Zionism in general and the Israeli state in particular.) Let me add in parenthesis that tracing the impact of neo-conservatism on the way Iran is portrayed is not, of course, to defend the political process in Iran. The Islamic Republic has not constituted a representative democracy at this stage of its development,33 and I don’t think that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s raucous and bellicose posture in general and his abominably limited understanding of the history of the holocaust is representative of the political culture of the country. Yet it should also be added emphatically here that neo-conservative activists favour this type of West Asian politician. ‘There are benefits to having an enemy that openly bares its teeth’, suggests Daniel Pipes in this regard, ‘for Westerners, it clarifies the hostility of the regime much more than if it subtly spun webs of deceit’.34 ‘Let us state the obvious’, writes Reuel Marc Gerecht of the AEI in a similarly congratulatory mood: ‘The new president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, is a godsend.’35 Ilan Berman, the author of Tehran Rising: Iran’s Challenge to the United States agrees: ‘Thank goodness for Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.’36 The Muslim democrat, I am in no doubt, is anathema to the neo-conservative Weltanschauung. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad unconsciously serves neoconservative interests because he has made it that much easier to portray Iran as a monolithically irrational, even fascist country.37 In another parallel to the way Iraq was portrayed before the invasion,38 likening Iran to absolute evil—in contemporary world politics always epitomised by Nazi Germany—has become a central pillar of the neo-conservative campaign to discredit the country. Ahmadinejad ‘has cast himself as Adolf Hitler reincarnated’ writes George Melloan in a column for the Wall Street Journal representatively.39 Moreover, by adopting a retroactive political discourse permeated by a static notion of Shia-millenial symbolism and imagery as a means to appeal to the (neo)conservative factions of Iranian society and especially the orthodox clergy, Ahmadinejad has further inhibited Iran’s bargaining power with regard to the nuclear issue. It should not come as a surprise that the neoconservative apparatus feeeds on Ahmadinejad’s anachronistic rhetoric, knitting his abominations closely together in one thoroughly anti-Iranian episteme: ‘So a Holocaust-denying, virulently anti-Semitic, aspiring genocidist, on the verge of acquiring weapons of the apocalypse’, writes Charles Krauthammer, ‘believes that the end is not only near but nearer than the next American presidential election . . . This kind of man, ‘Krauthammer continues, ‘would have, to put it gently, less inhibition about starting Armageddon than a normal person’.40 ‘There is a radical difference between the Islamic Republic of Iran and other governments with nuclear weapons [sic]’, Princeton emeritus Professor Bernard Lewis agrees. ‘This difference is expressed in what can only be described as the apocalyptic worldview of Iran’s present rulers . . .Mr Ahmadinejad and his followers clearly believe’, Lewis emphasises, ‘that the terminal struggle has already begun . . . It may even have a date, indicated by several references by the Iranian president to giving his final answer to the US about nuclear development by Aug 22 [2006]’. ‘This year’, we are told, ‘Aug 22 corresponds, in the Islamic calendar, to the 27th day of the month of Rajab of the year 1427. This, by tradition, is the night when many Muslims commemorate the night flight of the prophet Muhammad on the winged horse Buraq, first to the ‘‘farthest mosque,’’ usually identified with Jerusalem, and then to heaven and back (cf Koran XVII.1).’ Lewis delves even deeper into the realms of ideological mythology when he tells us that ‘it would be wise to bear the possibility in mind’ that 22 of August ‘might well be deemed an appropriate date for the apocalyptic ending of Israel and if necessary of the world’.41 The same theme was picked up by Kenneth Timmerman: ‘As the world prepares to confront an Iranian regime that continues to defy the International Atomic Energy Agency over its nuclear programs . . .we must listen to what Iran’s leaders say as we watch what they do. A religious zealot with nuclear weapons is a dangerous combination the world cannot afford to tolerate.’42 Timmerman heads the so called Foundation for Democracy in Iran (FDI) and is a member of the Committee on the Present Danger.43 The latter organisation issued a policy paper in January 2006 calling for more sanctions against Iran and lobbys the Bush administration to ‘energetically assist’ dissidents to bring about the downfall of the Iranian state.44 Much too occasionally the neo-conservative campaign to present Iran as an irrational polity receives setbacks.45 In May 2006 bloggers and investigative journalists exposed as wholly invented a story by Amir Taheri, whose opinion pieces are managed by Benador Associates (see above).46 In an article for the National Post of Canada (founded by the media mogul Conrad Black and now owned by the Asper family), Taheri had claimed that a new law would require Iranian Jews to ‘be marked out with a yellow strip of cloth sewn in front of their clothes while Christians will be assigned the colour red. Zoroastrians end up with Persian blue as the colour of their zonnar.’47 Accordind to Taheri ‘the new codes would enable Muslims to easily recognise non-Muslims so that they can avoid shaking hands with them by mistake and thus becoming najis (unclean)’.48 To reiterate the message, the article ran alongside a 1935 photograph of a Jewish businessman in Berlin with a yellow, six-pointed star sewn on his overcoat. The National Post was forced to retract the bogus piece and apologise publicly. But by then the New York Post, part of the media empire controlled by Rupert Murdoch, the Jerusalem Post, which also featured a photo of a yellow star from the Nazi era over a photo of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and the New York Sun had picked up the story.49 In another New York Post column in 2005 Taheri claimed that Iran’s ambassador to the UN, Javad Zarif, was one of the students involved in the capture of US diplomats in Tehran between 1979 and 1980. The story was retracted after Dwight Simpson, a professor at San Francisco State University, wrote to the newspaper explaining that the allegation was ‘false’. On the day of the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran Zarif was a ‘graduate student in the Department of International Relations of San Francisco State University. He was my student’, Simpson told the editors, ‘and he served also as my teaching assistant’.50 Worringly Amir Taheri was among a group of ‘experts’ on Iran and the region invited to the White House for a meeting with Tony Blair and George W Bush in May 2006.51 <<Not surprisingly AIPAC has made fears about Iran’s nuclear energy programme a central pillar of its congressional agenda. At its largest ever policy conference in May 2005 AIPAC presented a Disney-inspired multimedia tour aimed at fostering the argument that Iran is developing nuclear weapons. Similarly the American Jewish Committee (AJC) has taken out fullpage advertisements in influential US newspapers since April 2006 entitled ‘A nuclear Iran threatens all’, depicting radiating circles on an Iran-centred map to show the potential reach of the missiles. ‘Suppose Iran one day gives nuclear devices to terrorists’ the ad reads. ‘Could anyone anywhere feel safe?’.52 The same message is reiterated by ‘native informants’; old ones like Manuchehr Ghorbanifar, arms dealer and a central player in the Iran— Contra scandal who recently met envoys from the Pentagon in Rome;53 and new ones like Amir Abbas Fakhravar, who advocated the policy of ‘regime change’ in his testimony to a Senate Homeland Security Committee in July 2006.54 In an interview with the Sunday Telegraph in the same month, Fakhravar reverted to the other neo-conservative themes explored above, stating that the ‘world has to do something—whatever it takes—so that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad does not become another Hitler’.55 Sitting safely in his office at the Foundation for the Defence of Democracies, Fakhravar even promotes military action against Iran: ‘Whatever the world does against the Iranian regime’, he assures us, much in the same way Iraqi exiles did in the build-up to the Iraq war, ‘the Iranian people will be supportive’.56 The theme to equate Iran with Nazi Germany, which is central to the neoconservative propaganda against the country, has already entered the political consciousness of decision makers in western Europe and the USA. The prolific investigative journalist of the Inter Press Service, Jim Lobe, recently reported that Senator John McCain had likened the nuclear standoff with Iran to the situation in Europe in the 1930s.57 Angela Merkel, leader of the ‘Grosse Koalition’ between the conservative Christian Democratic Union and the centre-left Social Democratic Party in Germany appears to adhere to a similar view: ‘Looking back to German history in the early 1930s when National Socialism was on the rise, there were many outside Germany who said ‘‘It’s only rhetoric—don’t get excited’’’, Merkel told policy makers at the 2006 Munich security conference.58 ‘There were times when people could have reacted differently and, in my view, Germany is obliged to do something at the early stages . . .We want to, we must prevent Iran from developing its nuclear programme.’59 Another prominent policy maker to employ that threat scenario is Newt Gingrich, who argued that Iran could be planning for a pre-emptive nuclear electromagnetic pulse attack on the USA that would turn one third of the country ‘back to a 19th century level of development’.60 Gingrich, it should be added, is a member of the Senior Advisory Board of the United States Commission on National Security/21 Century. The Commission has produced a series of policy recommendations that discuss US national security challenges up to 2025. Questioned at the theoretical level, neo-conservatism is not ordered in accordance with a unifying headquarters or conspiracy.61 Contemporary neoconservatism should be understood rather as an ideological space open in three dimensions. In one of these we have already situated the neo-conservative functionary, for whom writing the script, the speech, the terminology of a specific political discourse is central (eg the ‘axis of evil’ invented by David Frum). In a second dimension we may situate the decision maker, neoconservatism’s public face, who proceeds by relating diversified but consensual discourses in such a way that they are then able to claim causal validity and strategic value (eg Richard Perle, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, etc). These two dimensions are largely empirical in that they are part of the day-to-day affairs of politics in Washington, DC (and in the ‘think-tank belt’ scattered around Dupont Circle for that matter). The third dimension, in my opinion, is that of strategic value, which develops as a long-term state interest out of the latter; it forms a salient grand strategy and is hence not easily discarded or altered. It is here that we meet the legitimation of war; its translation from the empirical realms of day-to-day politics into theorised reality; it is this realm that is least transparent, causal, ontological. What evidence is available to us today if we seek to explore Iran’s position in that third dimension? Let me frame this question with two political realities that define Iran’s place in the strategic imagination of contemporary neo-conservatives. First, the ‘global war on terror’ and the Bush doctrine of pre-emption have emerged as the primary institutions of US foreign policy, advocating military intervention against potential adversaries even if they are not considered an immediate threat to US national security.62 According to Norman Podhoretz, who was editor-in-chief of the influential neo-conservative magazine Commentary between 1960 and 1995, the ‘global war on terror’ is instrumental in producing a ‘new species of imperial mission for America, whose purpose would be to oversee the emergence of successor governments in the [West Asian] region more amenable to reform and modernisation than the despotisms now in place.’ ‘After taking Baghdad’, Podhoretz prophesied, ‘we may willy-nilly find ourselves forced by the same political and military logic to topple five or six or seven more tyrannies in the Islamic world’.63 The pre-emptive strategic doctrine, which was announced in June 2002 by President Bush at the military academy at West Point, provides the political legitimacy for such an agenda. Setting out an interventionist framework for US foreign policy, Bush declared that the country will confront ‘evil and lawless regimes’, if necessary, by military force.64 The US National Security Strategy published three months later institutionalised the ‘Bush doctrine’. According to its authors, the USA ‘has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat . . . The greater the threat . . . the greater is the risk of inaction and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.’65 There is enough evidence to conclude that Iran is on that target list. First, there is the circumstantial evidence, eg the repeated warnings by Seymour Hersh, Scott Ritter, Robert Fisk and others that the war on Iran is already on its way, or the reports leaked to the Sunday Times that ‘under the American plans Britain would be expected to play a supporting role, perhaps by sending surveillance aircraft or ships and submarines to the Gulf or by allowing the Americans to fly from Diego Garcia’.66 Second, there is the ‘factual’ evidence exemplified by the classified version of the National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 17 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 4,67 leaked to the Washington Post. This broke with 50 years of US counter-proliferation efforts by authorising pre-emptive strikes on states and terrorist groups that are close to acquiring weapons of mass destruction or the long-range missile capable of delivering them. In a leaked, top-secret appendix the directive named Iran, Syria, North Korea (and Libya) among the countries that are the central focus of the policy.68 Moreover, NSPD 17 also sets out to respond to a WMD threat with nuclear weapons. This nuclear ‘first strike’ policy is reiterated in presidential directive NSPD 35 (Nuclear Weapons Deployment Authorisation), issued in May 2004, the Nuclear Posture Review in January 2002 and the Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations published in March 2005. In addition, US Senate Joint Resolution 23 (‘Authorisation for Use of Military Force’) empowers the president ‘to take action to deter and prevent acts of terrorism against the United States’ without consulting Congress.69 There are even calls to change international law to legitimate the policy of pre-emption. In another similarity to the Iraq war, when scholars such as Fouad Ajami covered the invasion with an ‘academic canopy’, Harvard Law professor Alan Dershowitz argues that ‘by deliberately placing nuclear facilities in the midst of civilian population centres, the Iranian government has made the decision to expose its civilians to attacks . . . if all else fails . . . Israel, or the United States, must be allowed under international law to take out the Iranian nuclear threat before it is capable of the genocide for which it is being built.’70 Second, Iran was mentioned 16 times in the new National Security Strategy (NSS) of the USA, a ‘wartime document’ that uses such emotionally charged phrases as ‘tyrannical regime’, ‘ally of terror’, which ‘harbor[s] terrorists,’ and is an ‘enemy of freedom, justice, and peace’ to describe the Islamic Republic.71 Moreover, despite a 1981 treaty of non-interference in domestic Iranian affairs, the NSS spells out a policy of subversion against the Iranian state, as a means to ‘protect our national and economic security against the adverse effects of their bad conduct’.72 To that end, the US State Department has established an in-house ‘Iran Desk’ and ‘Iran watch units’ in Dubai as well as in US embassies in the vicinity of Iran, and a $75 million programme aimed at ‘expanding broadcasting into the country, funding nongovernmental organisations and promoting cultural exchanges’.73 This policy of subversion is further diversified by a parallel process probing tensions between Iran’s ethnic minorities and the central government in Tehran. A research project to this end was implemented by the Marine Corps Intelligence, which focuses on ‘crises and predeployment support to expeditionary warfare’.74 This strand of current US policies vis-a`-vis Iran, unsurprisingly, is overwhelmingly endorsed by neo-conservative functionaries and is exemplified by an AEI conference in October 2005 entitled ‘Another case for Federalism’ and chaired by Michael Ledeen. ‘The ‘‘Iranian’’ people have no connection to a glorious past’, we are told much in that same spirit, ‘and thus no foundation for a flourishing future’.75 Michael Rubin agrees: ‘Iran is more an empire than a nation . . .When the Islamic Republic collapses’, we are reassured, ‘a strong unified Iran will be a force for stability and a regional bulwark against the Islamism under which the Iranian people now chafe’.76 ‘To the extent that the different nationalities each have their own identities and oppose the essentially Persian regime’, Edward Luttwak joins the chorus, ‘they are likely to applaud external attacks on the nuclear installations rather than rally to the defense of their rulers’.77 Luttwak ignores, of course, that both President Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei are ‘Iranian-Azeri’, that is, members of the largest minority community populating the country. In conclusion, I would like to discuss at least three central concerns with regard to the preceding analysis. First, is a military attack on Iran imminent? I doubt that the political establishment in Washington has been won over on this one yet. The Democrats’ resurgence in the mid-term elections in November 2006, Donald Rumsfeld’s and John Bolton’s departure from the Pentagon and the UN, respectively, the continuing disaster in Iraq and the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan indicate that Republican neoconservatism represented by the Bush administration is facing profound challenges. Moreover, the USA is facing a legitimacy crisis in the international arena, and in the geostrategic modifications engendered by an increasingly ‘multipolar’ world order. Hence Russia’s efforts to reassert its role in Central Asia and the Northern Caucasus exemplified by joint military exercises with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan under the Collective Security Treaty Organisation in August 2006 and the coercive ‘energy politics’ pursued by Gazprom. Hence China’s increasingly assertive role in East Asia and its recent multibillion-dollar investments in Africa. Hence Iran’s successful strategy to mobilise support in Asia, Latin America and Africa which has been recently re-emphasised by President Ahmadinejad’s calls for ‘Asian Unity’ in his speech to the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, which comprises Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. negotiate in good faith? It would be easier to act sooner rather than later. Yes, there would be repercussions—and they would be healthy ones, showing a strong America that has rejected further appeasement.87 Hence also his repeated calls for a strategic partnership with leftist governments, most prominently those of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Fidel Castro in Cuba and Evo Morales in Bolivia, and Iran’s diplomatic initiatives in Africa. Moreover, containing Iran or marginalising the country from the ‘international community’ appears to be futile because, parallel to Iran’s involvement in prominent international institutions such as the Organisation of the Islamic Conference and the UN, the country is also a vocal member of a range of other, lesser known intergovernmental organisations: the Developing Eight (D-8) comprising Egypt, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey, the Economic Co-operation Organisation, including Pakistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Afghanistan and the G-77, which was founded in 1964 to lobby the UN on behalf of developing nations and has grown to include 133 countries. Iran’s diplomatic manoeuvring space is significantly enhanced by involvement in these organisations because they create effective outlets to counter the communicative power of the US state, dissecting its efforts to mobilise political and public opinion against the country—especially with regard to the nuclear issue. In the light of these currents of contemporary world politics, legitimating another military aggression in West Asia internationally will be difficult indeed. These constraining international factors do not mean, of course, that neoconservatives will not continue to work towards military aggression against Iran. This brings us to a second question: are there no competing narratives in the USA? Let there be no misunderstanding in this regard. I do not claim that neo-conservatism has a total grip on the political culture in the USA. This is quite impossible in a pluralistic democracy. But there is no escaping the fact that neo-conservatives have a strong influence on the levers of power in Washington. This has been repeatedly lamented by former high-ranking officials. For example, Graham Fuller, a former Vice-Chairman of the National Intelligence Council for long-range forecasting at the CIA, concedes that ‘Efforts to portray Iran with some analytical balance have grown more difficult, crowded out by inflamed rhetoric and intense pro-Israeli lobbying against Tehran in Congress’.78 Stephen Walt and John J Mearsheimer are equally critical. In an emphatic article published by the London Review of Books they argue that ‘the thrust of US policy in the region derives almost entirely from domestic politics, and especially the activities of the ‘Israel Lobby’. Walt and Mearsheimer define that lobby as ‘the loose coalition of individuals and organisations who actively work to steer US foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction’.79 I agree with Walt and Mearsheimer that there is no such thing as a neo-conservative headquarters, manifesto, conspiracy or even party. There are Republican and Democrat sympathisers, Jewish and non-Jewish functionaries, Christian fundamentalists and Muslim collaborators (and ‘entertainers’ such as Glenn Beck, whose primetime show on CNN is openly anti-Islamic, and anti-Iranian for that matter).80 But the empirical evidence suggests that the pervasive concentration of neo-conservative think-tanks and activists—the neoconservative apparatus—constitutes a consensus providing an image of Iran as an international ‘pariah’. Along with this image goes a ‘macro-culture’. This is the overarching habitat I have explored at the beginning of this article in relation to the ideas of Gadamer and Farabi; the place where the image of Iran as an international threat is implanted. For what gives the country its negative image in the ‘West’ is not its own ontological content but the act of institution, an installation, a consecration that gives significance to what has, in itself, a neutral content.81 It is within that very tight-knit, ubiquitous neo-conservative habitat that the invasion of Iraq was made possible and it is within a similarly pervasive Kriegskontext that the idea of military intervention against Iran is cultivated. What is at stake in revealing neo-conservative propaganda is not to undifferentiate US foreign policies. I am not suggesting a monocausal link between neo-conservatism and hostiltity towards Iran, no automatism, no inevitable political outcome. What I have hoped to explore in this article, rather, is the nihilistic international agenda that neo-conservatism promotes: the social engineering of a militaristic ideology which has secured a place in that ferosciously contested space we may call ‘international political culture’. Consider the comments of Patrick Clawson at a symposium organised by the militant FrontPageMag.com in July 2005. Clawson, deputy director of the Washington Institute for Near East policy, bluntly advocated covert operations in order to sabotage nuclear facilities in Iran: ‘Accidents are known to happen (remember Three Mile Island or Chernobyl). If there were to be a series of crippling accidents at Iranian nuclear facilities . . . that would set back the Iranian program.’82 Consider also neo-conservative writings during Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in summer 2006.83 ‘No one should have any lingering doubts about what’s going on in the Middle East’ Michael Ledeen proclaimed. ‘It’s war [and] there is a common prime mover, and that is the Iranian mullahcracy, the revolutionary Islamic fascist state that declared war on us 27 years ago and has yet to be held accountable’.84 ‘All of us in the free world owe Israel an enormous thank-you for defending freedom, democracy and security against the Iranian cat’s-paw wholly-owned terrorist subsidiaries Hezbollah and Hamas’, echoed Larry Kudlow.85 ‘They are defending their own homeland and very existence, but they are also defending America’s homeland as our frontline democratic ally in the Middle East’.86 William Kristol strengthened the plot: What’s happening in the Middle East isn’t just another chapter in the Arab— Israeli conflict. What’s happening is an Islamist— Israeli war . . . Better to say that what’s under attack is liberal democratic civilization, whose leading representative right now happens to be the United States . . . Communism became really dangerous when it seized control of Russia. National socialism became really dangerous when it seized control of Germany. Islamism became really dangerous when it seized control of Iran . . . The right response is renewed strength—in supporting the governments of Iraq and Afghanistan, in standing with Israel, and in pursuing regime change in Syria and Iran. For that matter, we might consider countering this act of Iranian aggression with a military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. Why wait? Does anyone think a nuclear Iran can be contained? That the current regime will Ultimately, then, neoconservative functionaries inscribe the narrative of war in international relations; they inscribe it in institutions (eg the Committee on the Present Danger), language (eg the ‘axis of evil), mindsets (eg ‘Why do they hate us?’), and policies (eg the doctrine of pre-emption). This strategy transforms other countries into replaceable variables. To be more precise, pre-emption and the ‘war on terror’ are made into versatile ideological agents that can be employed to legitimate military aggression globally—not only in the Iraqi, Iranian, Venezuelan or Syrian context, but also with regard to other conflict scenarios (China-Taiwan, Russia-Chechnya, etc.). Thus, from the neo-coservative perspective, Lebanon, Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran and others are just episodes in the same neo-conservative project, namely the ‘Fourth World War’ invented by Eliot Cohen and popularised by ex-CIA director James Woolsey. Even if we sucessfully avert one crisis, neoconservatives are always busy planning the next. In essence that political strategy is reassuringly mimetic: once a specific war project has bedded in, its supposed chivalry is loudly trumpeted, bundled up in a morally righteous and infallible narrative—in essence the legitimation of US neo-imperialism—and stitched into the political fabric of contemporary America. It is in this sense that neo-conservatism reveals itself as war—a war continued by other means. The perverse irony of this malicious ideology is that it makes us think that it serves the liberation of mankind.

#### The threat of Iranian nuclear acquisition is rooted in a racist description of the world that seeks to universalize the American vision of control—this ensures genocide and unending war

Batur 7 [Pinar, PhD @ UT-Austin— Prof. of Sociology @ Vassar, *The Heart of Violence: Global Racism, War, and Genocide*, Handbook of The Sociology of Racial and Ethnic Relations, eds. Vera and Feagin, p. 447-9]

In 1993, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Samuel P. Huntington racialized the future of global conflict by declaring that “the clash of civilizations will dominate global politics” (Huntington 1993:22). He declared that the fault line will be drawn by crisis and bloodshed. Huntington’s end of ideology meant the West is now expected to confront the Confucian-Islamic “other.” Huntington intoned “Islam has bloody borders,” and he expected the West to develop cooperation among Christian brethren, while limiting the military strength of the “Confucian-Islamic” civilizations, by exploiting the conflicts within them. When the walls of communism fell, a new enemy was found in Islam, and loathing and fear of Islam exploded with September 11. The new color line means “we hate them not because of what they do, but because of who they are and what they believe in.” The vehement denial of racism, and the fervent assertion of democratic equality in the West, are matched by detestation and anger toward Muslims, who are not European, not Western, and therefore not civilized. Since the context of “different” and “inferior” has become not just a function of race or gender, but of culture and ideology, it has become another instrument of belief and the selfrighteous racism of American expansionism and “new imperialism.” The assumed superiority of the West has become the new “White Man’s Burden,” to expand and to recreate the world in an American image. The rationalization of this expansion, albeit to “protect our freedoms and our way of life” or “to combat terrorism,” is fueled by racist ideology, obscured in the darkness behind the façade of inalienable rights of the West to defend civilization against enemies in global culture wars. At the turn of the 20th century, the “Terrible Turk” was the image that summarized the enemy of Europe and the antagonism toward the hegemony of the Ottoman Empire, stretching from Europe to the Middle East, and across North Africa. Perpetuation of this imagery in American foreign policy exhibited how capitalism met with Orientalist constructs in the white racial frame of the western mind (VanderLippe 1999). Orientalism is based on the conceptualization of the “Oriental” other—Eastern, Islamic societies as static, irrational, savage, fanatical, and inferior to the peaceful, rational, scientific “Occidental” Europe and the West (Said 1978). This is as an elastic construct, proving useful to describe whatever is considered as the latest threat to Western economic expansion, political and cultural hegemony, and global domination for exploitation and absorption. Post-Enlightenment Europe and later America used this iconography to define basic racist assumptions regarding their uncontestable right to impose political and economic dominance globally. When the Soviet Union existed as an opposing power, the Orientalist vision of the 20th century shifted from the image of the “Terrible Turk” to that of the “Barbaric Russian Bear.” In this context, Orientalist thought then, as now, set the terms of exclusion. It racialized exclusion to define the terms of racial privilege and superiority. By focusing on ideology, Orientalism recreated the superior race, even though there was no “race.” It equated the hegemony of Western civilization with the “right ideological and cultural framework.” It segued into war and annihilation and genocide and continued to foster and aid the recreation of racial hatred of others with the collapse of the Soviet “other.” Orientalism’s global racist ideology reformed in the 1990s with Muslims and Islamic culture as to the “inferior other.” Seeing Muslims as opponents of Christian civilization is not new, going back to the Crusades, but the elasticity and reframing of this exclusion is evident in recent debates regarding Islam in the West, one raised by the Pope and the other by the President of the United States. Against the background of the latest Iraq war, attacks in the name of Islam, racist attacks on Muslims in Europe and in the United States, and detention of Muslims without trial in secret prisons, Pope Benedict XVI gave a speech in September 2006 at Regensburg University in Germany. He quoted a 14th-century Byzantine emperor who said, “show me just what Muhammad brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached.” In addition, the Pope discussed the concept of Jihad, which he defined as Islamic “holy war,” and said, “violence in the name of religion was contrary to God’s nature and to reason.” He also called for dialogue between cultures and religions (Fisher 2006b). While some Muslims found the Pope’s speech “regrettable,” it also caused a spark of angry protests against the Pope’s “ill informed and bigoted” comments, and voices raised to demand an apology (Fisher 2006a). Some argue that the Pope was ordering a new crusade, for Christian civilization to conquer terrible and savage Islam. When Benedict apologized, organizations and parliaments demanded a retraction and apology from the Pope and the Vatican (Lee 2006). Yet, when the Pope apologized, it came as a second insult, because in his apology he said, “I’m deeply sorry for the reaction in some countries to a few passages of my address at the University of Regensburg, which were considered offensive to the sensibilities of Muslims” (Reuters 2006). In other words, he is sorry that Muslims are intolerant to the point of fanaticism. In the racialized world, the Pope’s apology came as an effort to show justification for his speech—he was not apologizing for being insulting, but rather saying that he was sorry that “Muslim” violence had proved his point. Through orientalist and the white racial frame, those who are subject to racial hatred and exclusion themselves become agents of racist legitimization. Like Huntington, Bernard Lewis was looking for Armageddon in his Wall Street Journal article warning that August 22, 2006, was the 27th day of the month of Rajab in the Islamic calendar and is considered a holy day, when Muhammad was taken to heaven and returned. For Muslims this day is a day of rejoic-ing and celebration. But for Lewis, Professor Emeritus at Princeton, “this might well be deemed an appropriate date for the apocalyptic ending of Israel and, if necessary, of the world” (Lewis 2006). He cautions that “it is far from certain that [the President of Iran] Mr. Ahmadinejad plans any such cataclysmic events for August 22, but it would be wise to bear the possibility in mind.” Lewis argues that Muslims, unlike others, seek self-destruction in order to reach heaven faster. For Lewis, Muslims in this mindset don’t see the idea of Mutually Assured Destruction as a constraint but rather as “an inducement” (Lewis 2006). In 1993, Huntington pleaded that “in a world of different civilizations, each...will have to learn to coexist with the others” (Huntington 1993:49). Lewis, like Pope Benedict, views Islam as the apocalyptic destroyer of civilization and claims that reactions against orientalist, racist visions such as his actually prove the validity of his position. Lewis’s assertions run parallel with George Bush’s claims. In response to the alleged plot to blow up British airliners, Bush claimed, “This nation is at war with Islamic fascists who will use any means to destroy those of us who love freedom, to hurt our nation” (TurkishPress.com. 2006; Beck 2006). Bush argued that “the fight against terrorism is the ideological struggle of the 21st century” and he compared it to the 20th century’s fight against fascism, Nazism, and communism. Even though “Islamo-fascist” has for some time been a buzzword for Bill O’Reilly, Rush Limbaugh, and Sean Hannity on the talk-show circuit, for the president of the United States it drew reactions worldwide. Muslim Americans found this phrase “contributing to the rising level of hostility to Islam and the American Muslim com-munity” (Raum 2006). Considering that since 2001, Bush has had a tendency to equate “war on terrorism” with “crusade,” this new rhetoric equates ideology with religion and reinforces the worldview of a war of civilizations. As Bush said, “...we still aren’t completely safe, because there are people that still plot and people who want to harm us for what we believe in” (CNN 2006). Exclusion in physical space is only matched by exclusion in the imagination, and racialized exclusion has an internal logic leading to the annihilation of the excluded. Annihilation, in this sense, is not only designed to maintain the terms of racial inequality, both ideologically and physically, but is institutionalized with the vocabulary of self-protection. Even though the terms of exclusion are never complete, genocide is the definitive point in the exclusionary racial ideology, and such is the logic of the outcome of the exclusionary process, that it can conclude only in ultimate domination. War and genocide take place with compliant efficiency to serve the global racist ideology with dizzying frequency. The 21st century opened up with genocide, in Darfur.

### 2NC/1NR Link—Prolif Discourse

#### The aff’s prolif discourse is racist and legitimates US militarism.

Gusterson 99—Hugh Gusterson is a professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason University. [“Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination,” *Cultural Anthropology*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Feb., 1999), pp. 111-143, accessed through JSTOR]

Nuclear Orientalism

According to the literature on risk in anthropology, shared fears often reveal as much about the identities and solidarities of the fearful as about the actual dangers that are feared (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Lindenbaum 1974). The immoderate reactions in the West to the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan, and to Iraq's nuclear weapons program earlier, are examples of an entrenched discourse on nuclear proliferation that has played an important role in structuring the Third World, and our relation to it, in the Western imagination. This discourse, dividing the world into nations that can be trusted with nuclear weapons and those that cannot, dates back, at least, to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty embodied a bargain between the five countries that had nuclear weapons in 1970 and those countries that did not. According to the bargain, the five official nuclear states (the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China)3 promised to assist other signatories to the treaty in acquiring nuclear energy technology as long as they did not use that technology to produce nuclear weapons, submitting to international inspections when necessary to prove their compliance. Further, in Article 6 of the treaty, the five nuclear powers agreed to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" (Blacker and Duffy 1976:395). One hundred eighty-seven countries have signed the treaty, but Israel, India, and Pakistan have refused, saying it enshrines a system of global "nuclear apartheid." Although the Non-Proliferation Treaty divided the countries of the world into nuclear and nonnuclear by means of a purely temporal metric4-designating only those who had tested nuclear weapons by 1970 as nuclear powers-the treaty has become the legal anchor for a global nuclear regime that is increasingly legitimated in Western public discourse in racialized terms. In view of recent developments in global politics-the collapse of the Soviet threat and the recent war against Iraq, a nuclear-threshold nation in the Third World-the importance of this discourse in organizing Western geopolitical understandings is only growing. It has become an increasingly important way of legitimating U.S. military programs in the post-Cold War world since the early 1990s, when U.S. military leaders introduced the term rogue states into the American lexicon of fear, identifying a new source of danger just as the Soviet threat was declining (Klare 1995).

Thus in Western discourse nuclear weapons are represented so that "theirs" are a problem whereas "ours" are not. During the Cold War the Western discourse on the dangers of "nuclear proliferation" defined the term in such a way as to sever the two senses of the word proliferation. This usage split off the "vertical" proliferation of the superpower arsenals (the development of new and improved weapons designs and the numerical expansion of the stockpiles) from the "horizontal" proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries, presenting only the latter as the "proliferation problem." Following the end of the Cold War, the American and Russian arsenals are being cut to a few thousand weapons on each side.5 However, the United States and Russia have turned back appeals from various nonaligned nations, especially India, for the nuclear powers to open discussions on a global convention abolishing nuclear weapons. Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty notwithstanding, the Clinton administration has declared that nuclear weapons will play a role in the defense of the United States for the indefinite future. Meanwhile, in a controversial move, the Clinton administration has broken with the policy of previous administrations in basically formalizing a policy of using nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states to deter chemical and biological weapons (Panofsky 1998; Sloyan 1998).

The dominant discourse that stabilizes this system of nuclear apartheid in Western ideology is a specialized variant within a broader system of colonial and postcolonial discourse that takes as its essentialist premise a profound Otherness separating Third World from Western countries.6 This inscription of Third World (especially Asian and Middle Eastern) nations as ineradicably different from our own has, in a different context, been labeled "Orientalism" by Edward Said (1978). Said argues that orientalist discourse constructs the world in terms of a series of binary oppositions that produce the Orient as the mirror image of the West: where "we" are rational and disciplined, "they" are impulsive and emotional; where "we" are modem and flexible, "they" are slaves to ancient passions and routines; where "we" are honest and compassionate, "they" are treacherous and uncultivated. While the blatantly racist orientalism of the high colonial period has softened, more subtle orientalist ideologies endure in contemporary politics. They can be found, as Akhil Gupta (1998) has argued, in discourses of economic development that represent Third World nations as child nations lagging behind Western nations in a uniform cycle of development or, as Lutz and Collins (1993) suggest, in the imagery of popular magazines, such as National Geographic. I want to suggest here that another variant of contemporary orientalist ideology is also to be found in U.S. national security discourse.

#### The affirmative’s proliferation discourse is part of broader orientalist rhetoric to construct a hierarchy of nations.

Gusterson 99—Hugh Gusterson is a professor of anthropology and sociology at George Mason University. [“Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination,” *Cultural Anthropology*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Feb., 1999), pp. 111-143, accessed through JSTOR]

The Orientalist Underworld: A Tour of Images

These falsely obvious arguments about the political unreliability of Third World nuclear powers are, I have been arguing, part of a broader orientalist rhetoric that seeks to bury disturbing similarities between "us" and "them" in a discourse that systematically produces the Third World as Other. In the process of producing the Third World, we also produce ourselves, for the Orient, one of the West's "deepest and most recurring images of the other," is essential in defining the West "as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience" (Said 1978:1-2).

The particular images and metaphors that recur in the discourse on proliferation represent Third World nations as criminals, women, and children. But these recurrent images and metaphors, all of which pertain in some way to disorder, can also be read as telling hints about the facets of our own psychology and culture which we find especially troubling in regard to our custodianship over nuclear weapons. The metaphors and images are part of the ideological armor the West wears in the nuclear age, but they are also clues that suggest buried, denied, and troubling parts of ourselves that have mysteriously surfaced in our distorted representations of the Other. As Akhil Gupta has argued in his analysis of a different orientalist discourse, the discourse on development, "within development discourse ... lies its shadowy double ... a virtual presence, inappropriate objects that serve to open up the 'developed world' itself as an inappropriate object" (1998:4).

In the era of so-called rogue states, one recurrent theme in this system of representations is that of the thief, liar, and criminal: the very attempt to come into possession of nuclear weapons is often cast in terms of racketeering and crime. After the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, one newspaper headline read, "G-8 Nations Move to Punish Nuclear Outlaws" (Reid 1998: 1), thereby characterizing the two countries as criminals even though neither had signed-and hence violated-either the Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. When British customs officers intercepted a shipment of krytrons destined for Iraq's nuclear weapons program, one newspaper account said that Saddam Hussein was "caught red-handed trying to steal atomic detonators" (Perlmutter 1990, emphasis added)-a curious choice of words given that Iraq had paid good money to buy the krytrons from the company EG&G. (In fact, if any nation can be accused of theft here, surely it is the United States, which took $650 million from Pakistan for a shipment of F-16s, cancelled the shipment when the Bush administration determined that Pakistan was seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, but never refunded the money.) According to an article in the New York Times, "it required more than three decades, a global network of theft and espionage, and uncounted millions for Pakistan, one of the world's poorest countries, to explode that bomb" (Weiner 1998:6). Meanwhile the same paper's editorial page lamented that "for years Pakistan has lied to the U.S. about not having a nuclear weapons program" and insisted that the United States "punish Pakistan's perfidy on the Bomb" (New York Times 1987a:A34, 1987b:A34). And Representative Stephen Solarz (Democrat, New York) warns that the bomb will give Pakistan "the nuclear equivalent of a Saturday Night Special" (Smith 1988:38). The image of the Saturday night special assimilates Pakistan symbolically to the disorderly underworld of ghetto hoodlums who rob comer stores and fight gang wars. U.S. nuclear weapons are, presumably, more like the "legitimate" weapons carried by the police to maintain order and keep the peace.18

Reacting angrily to this system of representations, the scientist in charge of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, said, "Anything which we do is claimed by the West as stolen and we are never given credit except for the things like heroin.... You think that we people who also got education are stupid, ignorant. Things which you could do fifty years ago, don't you think that we cannot do them now" (NNI-News 1998).

Third World nations acquiring nuclear weapons are also described in terms of passions escaping control. In Western discourse the passionate, or instinctual, has long been identified with women and animals and implicitly contrasted with male human rationality (Haraway 1990; Merchant 1980; Rosaldo 1974). Thus certain recurrent figures of speech in the Western discourse on proliferation cast proliferant nations in the Third World in imagery that carries a subtle feminine or subhuman connotation. Whereas the United States is spoken of as having "vital interests" and "legitimate security needs," Third World nations have "passions," "longings," and "yearnings" for nuclear weapons which must be controlled and contained by the strong male and adult hand of America. Pakistan has "an evident ardor for the Bomb," says a New York Times editorial (1987a:A34). Peter Rosenfeld, writing in the Washington Post, worries that the United States cannot forever "stifle [Pakistan's] nuclear longings" (1987:A27). Representative Ed Markey (Democrat, Massachusetts), agreeing, warns in a letter to the Washington Post that America's weakness in its relationship with Pakistan means that the Pakistanis "can feed nuclear passions at home and still receive massive military aid from America" (1987:A22). The image is of the unfaithful wife sponging off her cuckolded husband.

But throwing the woman out may cause even more disorder: the Washington Post editorial page, having described Pakistan's nuclear weapons program-in an allusion to the ultimate symbol of Muslim femininity-as concealed "behind a veil of secrecy," goes on to warn that there are "advantages to ... having Pakistan stay in a close and constraining security relationship with the United States rather than be cast out by an aid cutoff into a loneliness in which its passion could only grow" (1987:A22). Thus, even though American intelligence had by 1986 concluded that the Pakistani uranium-enrichment plant at Kahuta "had gone all the way" (Smith 1988: 104), and even though the president can no longer, as he is required by law, "certify Pakistan's nuclear purity" (Molander 1986), the disobedient, emotive femininity of Pakistan is likely to be less disruptive if it is kept within the bounds of its uneasy relationship with the United States.

Third World nations are also often portrayed as children, and the United States, as a parental figure. The message is succinctly conveyed by one newspaper headline: "India, Pakistan Told to Put Weapons Away" (Marshall 1998a). Ben Sanders praises the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a means to "protect the atomically innocent" (1990:25). But what about when innocence is lost? Steve Chapman, speaking of India and Pakistan, argues that "it's fine to counsel teenagers against having sex. But once they have produced a baby, another approach is in order" (1998:21). New York Times editorials speak of U.S. "scoldings" of Pakistan and "U.S. demands for good Pakistani behavior from now on" (1987a:A34). Some commentators fear that the U.S. parental style is too permissive and will encourage misbehavior by Pakistan's naughty siblings: "those who advocated an aid cutoff said the time had come for the United States to set an example for other would-be nuclear nations" (Smith 1988: 106). Warning that American parental credibility is on the line, the New York Times says that "all manner of reason and arguments have been tried with Pakistani leaders. It's time for stronger steps" (1987a:A34).

These metaphorical representations of threshold nuclear nations as criminals, women, and children assimilate the relationship between the West and the Third World to other hierarchies of dominance within Western culture. They use the symbolic force of domestic hierarchies-police over criminals, men over women, and adults over children-to buttress and construct the global hierarchy of nations, telling us that, like women, children, and criminals, Third World nations have their proper place. The sense in the West that Third World nations have their proper place at the bottom of a global order in which nuclear weapons are the status symbols of the powerful alone-that nuclear proliferation is transgressing important symbolic hierarchies-is nicely conveyed by the condescending reactions in the Western media to India's and Pakistan's nuclear tests of 1998. Here many commentators sounded like secretaries of exclusive members- only clubs blackballing applications from the nouveau riche. "With scant regard for the admonitions of other members of the [nuclear] group, India has abruptly and loudly elbowed itself from the bottom into the top tier of this privileged elite," said one commentator (Smith 1998:A 12). Putting the upstarts back in their place, U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright said that it was "clear that what the Indians and Pakistanis did was unacceptable and that they are not now members of the nuclear club" (Marshall 1998b:A12). The same sentiment was expressed in stronger terms on the op-ed page of the New York Times by former National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane, whose characterization of India draws on classic orientalist imagery to make its point that the Indians are not "our" kind of people: "We must make clear to the Indian government that it is today what it was two weeks ago, an arrogant, overreaching cabal that, by its devotion to the caste system, the political and economic disenfranchisement of its people and its religious intolerance, is unworthy of membership in any club" (1998:13). Mary McGrory, an alleged liberal, writing for the Washington Post op-ed page, expressed the same reaction against people rising above their proper station in life. In a comment extraordinary for its simple erasure of the great literary and cultural achievements made by persons of the Indian subcontinent over many centuries, she said, "People who cannot read, write or feed their children are forgetting these lamentable circumstances in the ghastly glory of being able to burn the planet or their enemies to a crisp" (1998b:C1).

## \*\*\* Impact

### 2NC/1NR Impact—Root Cause

#### Enframing of national security is a pre-requisite to macropolitical violence

Burke 7—Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney [“Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason,” Theory and Event, 10.2, Muse]

My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87

What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic.

The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing' and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy. They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force.

But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more.

When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined (sometimes quite wilfully) within the overarching strategic and security paradigms. Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political. But this cannot be done without seizing alternatives from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action.90

This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning' as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable?91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?

### AT: Case Outweighs

#### Claiming impacts of policy outcome outweigh theoretical assumptions produces policy failure—their impact calculus reproduces the concerns of dominant actors.

Zalewski 96—Marysia Zalewski, Women’s Studies @ Queens (Belfast) [*International Theory: Postivism and Beyond* eds. Smith, Booth and Zalewksi p. 351-352]

All these theories yet the bodies keep piling up5 The 'real worlders' use a variety of tactics to delegitimise those forms of theorising which they see as either useless or downright dangerous to international politics. These range from ridicule, attempts at incor­poration, scare-mongering and claiming that such theories are the product of 'juvenile' whims, fads and fashions. The charitable interpret­ation of these manoeuvrings is that they are instigated by a sense of fear, with the 'real worlders' insisting that the 'theorists' and the plethora of theories do not relate to what is 'really' going on in the world and thus the 'bodies keep piling up' while the 'theorists' make nice points. Conversely, the 'theorists' accuse the 'real worlders' of being complicit in the construction of a world in which the 'bodies keep piling up' and the resistance to criticism simply reflects their institutional and, sometimes, public power as well as their intellectual weaknesses. Perhaps it is not surprising that we are having these debates about theory as 'the practice of theory has been deeply affected by the debate about modernism versus postmodernism and the attendant questions of a social theory which can foster human autonomy and emancipation' (Marshall, 1994, p. 1). But what is the future for the discipline and practice of inter­national politics if such a debate has the effect of bringing out the worst in people and which is often conducted within a spirit of 'jousting' verging on the hostile? Richard Ashley's contribution to this volume attests somewhat to the futility of and angst felt by many who are party to and witness to these debates with his comments that there is little point in offering arguments to a community 'who have repeatedly shown themselves so proficient at doing what it takes not to hear'. In a paradigmatically masculinist discipline such as international relations perhaps the sport of intellectual jousting and parodies of bar room brawling is functionally inevitable. Maybe the concentration on wars, foreign policy, practices of diplomacy and the imageries of 'us' and 'them' that goes along with all of that fosters a 'winners' and 'losers' mentality. So the 'theorists' do battle with the 'real worlders' and the 'modernists' do battle with the 'post- modernists'. So who wins? Perhaps nobody wins with the possible exception of the publishers, especially in the context of contemporary academic life, where an academic's value is measured by the quantity of publications. If research produced in International Relations departments is to be of use besides advancing careers and increasing departmental budgets then it surely has something to do with making sense of events in the world, at the very least. In that endeavour it will be of supreme importance what counts as an appropriate event to pay attention to and who counts as a 'relevant' theorist, which in turn fundamentally depends on what we think theory is and how it relates to the so-called 'real world'. Inter­national politics is what we make it to be, the contents of the 'what' and the group that is the 'we' are questions of vital theoretical and therefore political importance. We need to re-think the discipline in ways that will disturb the existing boundaries of both what we claim to be relevant in international politics and what we assume to be legitimate ways of constructing knowledge about the world. The bodies do keep piling up but I would suggest that having a plethora of theories is not the problem. My fear is that statements such as 'all these theories yet the bodies keep piling up' might be used to foster a 'back to basics' mentality, which, in the context of international relations, implies a retreat to the comfort of theories and understanding of theory which offers relatively immediate gratification, simplistic solutions to complex problems and reifies and reflects the interests of the already powerful.

#### Short term impact focus distorts the information and impacts we consider relevant. We should aim to resolve structural inequalities.

Bilgin and Morton 4—Pinar Bilgin, IR @ Bilikent and Adam David Morton, Senior Lecturer and Fellow of the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice IR @ Nottingham [“From ‘Rogue’ to ‘Failed’ States? The Fallacy of Short-termism” *Politics* 24 (3) p. 176-178]

Conclusion: the fallacy of short-termism

Calls for alternative approaches to the phenomenon of state failure are often met with the criticism that such alternatives could only work in the long term whereas ‘something’ needs to be done here and now. Whilst recognising the need for immediate action, it is the role of the political scientist to point to the fallacy of ‘short- termism’ in the conduct of current policy. Short-termism is defined by Ken Booth (1999, p. 4) as ‘approaching security issues within the time frame of the next election, not the next generation’. Viewed as such, short-termism is the enemy of true strategic thinking. The latter requires policymakers to rethink their long-term goals and take small steps towards achieving them. It also requires heeding against taking steps that might eventually become self-defeating.

The United States has presently fought three wars against two of its Cold War allies in the post-Cold War era, namely, the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Both were supported in an attempt to preserve the delicate balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Cold War policy of supporting client regimes has eventually backfired in that US policymakers now have to face the instability they have caused. Hence the need for a comprehensive understanding of state failure and the role Western states have played in failing them through varied forms of intervention. Although some commentators may judge that the road to the existing situation is paved with good intentions, a truly strategic approach to the problem of international terrorism requires a more sensitive consideration of the medium-to-long-term implications of state building in different parts of the world whilst also addressing the root causes of the problem of state ‘failure’.Developing this line of argument further, reflection on different socially relevant meanings of ‘state failure’ in relation to different time increments shaping policymaking might convey alternative considerations. In line with John Ruggie (1998, pp. 167–170), divergent issues might then come to the fore when viewed through the different lenses of particular time increments. Firstly, viewed through the lenses of an incremental time frame, more immediate concerns to policymakers usually become apparent when linked to precocious assumptions about terrorist networks, banditry and the breakdown of social order within failed states. Hence relevant players and events are readily identified (al-Qa’eda), their attributes assessed (axis of evil, ‘strong’/’weak’ states) and judgements made about their long-term significance (war on terrorism). The key analytical problem for policymaking in this narrow and blinkered domain is the one of choice given the constraints of time and energy devoted to a particular decision. These factors lead policymakers to bring conceptual baggage to bear on an issue that simplifies but also distorts information. Taking a second temporal form, that of a conjunctural time frame, policy responses are subject to more fundamental epistemological concerns. Factors assumed to be constant within an incremental time frame are more variable and it is more difficult to produce an intended effect on ongoing processes than it is on actors and discrete events. For instance, how long should the ‘war on terror’ be waged for? Areas of policy in this realm can therefore begin to become more concerned with the underlying forces that shape current trajectories.

Shifting attention to a third temporal form draws attention to still different dimensions. Within an epochal time frame an agenda still in the making appears that requires a shift in decision-making, away from a conventional problem-solving mode ‘wherein doing nothing is favoured on burden-of-proof grounds’, towards a risk-averting mode, characterised by prudent contingency measures. To conclude, in relation to ‘failed states’, the latter time frame entails reflecting on the very structural conditions shaping the problems of ‘failure’ raised throughout the present discussion, which will demand lasting and delicate attention from practitioners across the academy and policymaking communities alike.

### 2NC/1NR—Epistemology

#### Their obsession with scientific quantification of IR is narcissism in the face of inevitable uncertainty—their studies are not neutral, but rather are deeply political—variables are cherry picked to support theories that conform to pre-conceived cultural notions.

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Modes of Social Inquiry

In a positivist mode of inquiry, social knowledge emerges from emulating the procedures of natural sciences. There is a clear distinction between facts and values. Efforts for new theoretical departures remain valid only if concrete empirical research programs are developed. A theory needs to be verified by the process of operationalizing and testing hypotheses. Research should be freed from non-empirical claims of individual conviction and conscience. In dealing with the complexity of empirical phenomena, theory ought to explain and predict the trend of events

Contrary to that, hermeneutics is based on the analysis of the meanings which human beings attach to their actions. The study of mind is different from that of nature. Analysis should reveal social constraints and promote cultural understanding. The goal of research is enlightenment and emancipation. The values and priorities of goals tend to be diverse across social groups and classes. What is rational changes across time and space. Rationalities are intersubjective in the sense that they can only be really examined from within the experiences of social groups which are the object of research.

Critical theory methodology identifies forms of conflict and patterns of development which could lead to the transformation of a world order. There is no over-arching ahistorical structure. Explanation of the prospects for change requires analysis of the connections between modes of production and hierarchical political structures (Cox, 1996). The scope of the inquiry also focuses on a distorted ideological account of social relations by a hegemonic class.

In a postmodern vein, problems in different social locations and histories are interpreted by multiple minds and knowledge rather than meta-narratives (Seidman, 1994:5). Speculation is the most open form of inquiry. Humanity cannot be studied through a legislative reason which is helpful in producing general theories. The social world is fragmented into a multitude of communities and cultural traditions. The role of a social analyst is to mediate between different social worlds and to interpret unfamiliar cultures (Sediman, 1994:14). Resolving major theoretical differences is not desirable nor feasible.

Scientific Approaches to Peace Research

The early endeavor to establish a peace science originates in mathematical modelling of dynamics of arms races (Richardson, 1960). Quantitative studies of conflict behavior in the 1960s was affected by the revolution of behavioral sciences. Theoretical development was believed to be promoted by the collection of raw data, highly deductive propositions, and empirical verification. Formal models supported by statistical analysis were expected to explain both behavioral and structural characteristics of violent conflict.

The motivation behind scientific research was that ideas for creating a peaceful world would emerge from theories on human behavior and institutions verified by empirical methods. Hypothesis building would help researchers observe cooperative and conflictual patterns of behavior under different circumstances. Order in international relations could be analyzed in terms of such variables as distribution of power and patterns of interaction between political units (Kaplan, 1957; Modelski, 1978). Perceptions and cognition of decision makers and group processes are important variables in scientific approaches to research on war decision making. Regularities in human behavior were conceptualized and generalized in the studies of the Korean War decision making and the Cuban Missile Crisis.(Allison, 1971; Paige, 1968)

Scientific orientation has paid a great deal of attention to data collection and representation of the data through a modelling process. Simulation, gaming techniques have been utilized in developing a causal model of violent conflict (Guetzkow and Alger, 1963; Singer and Small, 1972). Later the interaction of economic, social, political and environmental systems was studied by world modelling approaches (Bremer, 1987). Methodological rigor and precision were sought in systematic observation of the problems of violence and other types of human sufferings.

The Critique of Behavioral Sciences

The behavioralist traditions of peace research have been criticized for being too empiricist.(Galtung, 1975) Quantitative analysis is not able to reveal intentional aspects of behavior in a specific context. Developing peace research requires a framework for synthesis in integrating different sets of issues. While collecting data on manifest violence, arms races and military coups is critical to the development of empirical theories (SIPRI, 1996), research design has to be guided by appropriate theoretical frameworks. The ability to think about and discuss key research questions stems from conceptual development of issues to be studied.

Ignoring normative questions would not help find alternative visions. Conditions for building peace are not dealt with in behavioral research traditions. Statistical data and empirical findings are themselves do not offer strategies for creating a peaceful world. The uncertainty of politics would not be removed by pure scientific analysis of human behavior. According to some observers in peace studies, the efforts to find regularities have been pursued "to the point of eliminating individual creativity and responsibility may well mire us in cyclic determinism."(Forcey, 1989:13) Critics of the positivist paradigm attribute the reductionist character of contemporary thought to the drive for control of nature.

The critique of behavioral sciences coincides with a "critique of conscience" in the academic community. Conscience dictates feelings, moral stances, and a concern for truth and justice. The desire for value explicit inquiry stems from the fact that human behavior would not be investigated without references to social collectivity in historical contexts. Overall, the normative starting point of peace research has to be anchored in the agreement that peace is the object of the quest.(Broadhead, 1997:2) The utility of any research methods could be evaluated in terms of the way they are compatible with the general goal of a disciplinary focus.

Holistic Approaches

Some researchers suggest that peace studies should start from holism as the framework.(Smoker and Groff, 1996) Knowledge about general human experiences of conflict helps interpret specific events. Given their abstract nature, however, theories may not correspond with the facts and events which they seek to explain. The meanings of events are set up within a context of wholes. The intellectual transformation is necessary for developing a paradigm of peace. The achievement of peace should be a holistic goal of research.

Holistic versions of theories project the flow of alternative images of reality. There are different theoretical explanations about how and why to go to war. The plurality of theories ought not to be regarded as a preliminary stage of knowledge which will eventually lead to one true grand theory. Universally applicable knowledge is not produced by piecemeal theory building efforts. There seems to be consensus that peace research must not be limited to conventional empirical methods. Extended historical perspectives illustrate what is important in understanding conditions for peace. The evaluation of research findings needs a yardstick for examining their relevance. The incorporation of emancipatory cognitive interest would help suggest theories for a peaceful world. More holistic approaches can be encouraged by hermeneutic philosophy of science.

Reasoning needs to be combined with experiences in understanding the holistic pictures of social relations. The outcome in the real world is not easily deduced from abstractly modeled relationships. In considering difficulties for justification of inducing wholes from parts, the ultimate validity of the big pictures is elusive. Theories which can be positively verifiable does not necessarily mean that they are true. Realities in peace and conflict do not last long enough to be subject to comprehensive, systematic and effective empirical assaults on them. Explanation can be based on intuitive understanding of long and varied experiences. There are various ways to observe the world, including historical interpretations.Different perceptions of social relationships result from the process of formation and transformation of images and symbols.

Peace studies may belong to the same category as history and critical sociology in terms of its methods to study an object. In contrast with economics, many factors related to structural violence such as political repression and economic exploitation cannot be easily understood without socio-historical contexts. Distinctions between independent and dependent variables are artificial. Understanding the outcome of an event would be enhanced by clarifying the specific goals of actors.

Emancipatory Projects

Direct criticism of sovereign state power may be based on questioning the mode of analysis to construct linear histories. Social and political boundaries cannot be imposed especially when truth and meanings are in doubt. Sovereign claims are used to shape human loyalties, but the forms of identities are not any more certain. Resolving differences of opinion about the legitimacy of state institutions is not possible within clearly defined and demarcated areas of research. Thus emancipatory projects oppose intellectual and social closure which does not tolerate diversity.

In a poststructural approach, language and discourse shape politics and social institutions.(Bannet, 1993) A normative social space is located in the process of assigning meanings to opposing phenomena. Binary opposition have contributed to the creation of linguistic and social hierarchies.(Seidman, 1994:18) Poststructuralism aims to disturb the dominant binary meanings that function to perpetuate social and political hierarchies. Deconstructionism is the method to be deployed. This involves unsettling and displacing the binary hierarchies. The goal of a deconstructionist strategy is to create a social space which favors autonomy. This process is tolerant of difference and ambiguity.(Seidman, 1994:19) The historically contingent origin and political role of binary hierarchies are uncovered by deconstructionism.

Instead of being instruments of bureaucratic social control, human studies should serve emancipatory aims. Society is imagined less as a material structure, organic order, or social system than as a construction rooted in historically specific discursive practices. Communities serve as texts whose symbols and meanings need to be translated. Interpretative knowledge promotes diversity, expands tolerance, and legitimates difference as well as fosters understanding and communication (Seidman, 1994:14-5)

People's perceptions about the world rely on their social and cultural milieu. The goal of emancipation has nothing to do with science. Legitimation arises from their own linguistic practice and communicational interaction. As long as social science serves as the instrument of a disciplined society, truth is produced by power. (Foucault, 1967) All knowledge claims are moves in a power game. Social science can contribute to emancipation by widening and deepening our sense of community. If meanings rest with communities, knowledge can have a specific role in promoting human solidarity.(Waever, Ole, 1996:171)

Value Issues

Even in a conventional mode of inquiry, values are not always considered separate from analysis. The accumulation of more data and testing hypotheses may reveal a trend in the arms race. However, the ultimate analytical goal should be not only explanatory but also prescriptive. The goals of peace research are defined in terms of broad human interests which are not dealt with by a state-centric paradigm. Human dimensions of security can be more easily understood in value paradigms. This paradigm shift requires a more focus on non-state centric actors, ranging from individuals to supranational institutions. The bias toward a more inclusive concept of global society as opposed to the exclusionary state can be justified in terms of a goal oriented research.

Each discipline is governed by certain sets of assumptions and rules that determine its approaches to knowledge and acceptable methods (Forcey, 1989:11). Peace and conflict studies have been developed by value-guided research paradigms. Multidimensional concepts of security explain the importance of economic equity and ecological protection. Core theories have been established around negative and positive peace. Peace has become a more inclusive concept. The underlying assumptions of positive peace have value implications for the satisfaction of basic needs. Peaceful conditions include freedom from oppression and social justice beyond the absence of violence. The impact of poverty and economic exploitation on conflict can be empirically understood. However, their major form of inquiry ought to be dialectic. While peace and conflict studies need to be as objective as possible, it cannot succumb to the academic prejudice of total dissociation from the object of study. The starting point for peace research may be found in the ideals of social transformation through knowledge.

### Aff Ev. Suspect

#### Prefer our evidence—the Aff is epistemologically bankrupt. Their evidence is manufactured and distorted by the threat industry.

Pieterse 7—Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Sociology @ Illinois (Urbana) [“Political and Economic Brinkmanship,” *Review of International Political Economy* 14: 3 p 473]

Brinkmanship and producing instability carry several meanings. The American military spends 48% of world military spending (2005) and represents a vast, virtually continuously growing establishment that is a world in itself with its own lingo, its own reasons, internecine battles and projects. That this large security establishment is a bipartisan project makes it politically relatively immune. That for security reasons it is an insular world shelters it from scrutiny. For reasons of ‘deniability’ the president is insulated from certain operations (Risen, 2006). That it is a completely hierarchical world onto itself makes it relatively unaccountable. Hence, to quote Rumsfeld, ‘stuff happens’. In part this is the familiar theme of the Praetorian Guard and the shadow state (Stockwell, 1991). It includes a military on the go, a military that seeks career advancement through role expansion, seeks expansion through threat inflation, and in inflated threats finds rationales for ruthless action and is thus subject to feedback from its own echo chambers. Misinformation broadcast by part of the intelligence apparatus blows back to other security circles where it may be taken for real (Johnson, 2000). Inhabiting a hall of mirrors this apparatus operates in a perpetual state of self hypnosis with, since it concerns classified information and covert ops, limited checks on its functioning.

#### Military empirically hypes threats

Zenko 2/26—Micah Zenko is a Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations [February 26, 2013, “Most. Dangerous. World. Ever.” Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/26/most\_dangerous\_world\_ever?wp\_login\_redirect=0]

In fact, the military is actually pretty good at developing worst-case contingency response plans for any number of foreseeable or crazy crises, using the operations -- or "3" -- planning staffs at combatant commands and in the Joint Staff. But the Pentagon's budgetary and programmatic managers did not plan in advance of sequestration, and now they find themselves scrambling to finish the job. In September, Defense Department comptroller Robert Hale said, "We will wait as long as we can to begin this process." Last week, he defended the lack of planning: "If we'd done this six months ago, we would have caused the degradation in productivity and morale that we're seeing now among our civilians." History will judge whether or not the Pentagon gambled correctly, if the already once-delayed sequestration is triggered as scheduled this Friday.

Instead of planning, Pentagon officials seemed to all reach for their thesauri after the Budget Control Act was passed in August 2011. Civilian and military officials have used a range of colorful terms to decry the joint-White House-Congress manufactured crisis of sequestration: "doomsday mechanism," "fiscal castration," "peanut butter," "stupid," "gun to their heads," "nuts," "irrational," "an indiscriminate formula," "worst possible outcome," "legislative madness," "devastating," "shameful," "reckless," and "absolutely disastrous." During what was supposed to be his final overseas trip -- before Senate Republicans delayed Chuck Hagel's confirmation process -- Panetta's staff appropriately gifted him a plastic meat axe, his favorite metaphor for graphically describing how sequestration would be applied across defense budget.

Besides applying these metaphors while simultaneously defending the necessity and relevance of their service or agency, national security officials have also seized the opportunity to paint the world as increasingly dangerous, unstable, and unpredictable. This casual threat inflation -- unquestioned by congressional members and the vast majority of punditry and media outlets -- has serious consequences for America's future foreign policy agenda. Consider these comments from over the past two weeks:

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Martin Dempsey informed the Senate Armed Service Committee (SASC), "I will personally attest to the fact that [the world is] more dangerous than it has ever been." The next day, he warned the HASC: "There is no foreseeable peace dividend. The security environment is more dangerous and more uncertain." Similarly, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ray Odierno professed to the SASC, "The global environment is the most uncertain I've seen in my thirty-six years of service." Director of National Intelligence James Clapper also concluded in an interview: "In almost 50 years in intelligence, I don't remember when we've had a more diverse array of threats and crisis situations around the world to deal with."

I will not repeat Gen. Dempsey's questionable threat calculus again in this column. However, it is worth noting that Dempsey has claimed for over a year: "We are living in the most dangerous time in my lifetime." Now, Dempsey argues that we are not merely living in the most dangerous moment since his birth in 1952, but since the earth was formed 4.54 billion years ago.

Also appearing before the HASC, Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James Amos predicted: "The world we live in right now is very dangerous, and it's going to be that way for the next two decades." Referring to the relatively responsive capabilities of the Marine Expeditionary Units, Amos added: "I'm not trying to scare everybody, but you have to have a hedge force...to buy time for our national leaders." Given the U.S. military's terrible track record of predicting future conflicts, we should be skeptical of Amos's contention of being able to accurately forecast the global security environment through 2029.

### AT: We Solve

#### There is no status Quo—our evidence indicates their 1AC harms and solvency claims are just random factoids politically constructed to make the plan appear to be a good idea. They take a snapshot of a dynamic status quo and attempt to portray it as a static universality. This is analogous to the way status quo politicians use the absence of declared conflict to promote a FALSE image of peace.

Dillon and Reid 2K [Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency, By: Michael Dillon, Julian Reid, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 03043754, Jan-Mar 2000, Vol. 25, Issue 1]

More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations. Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem. Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations. Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet serial policy failure--the fate and the fuel of all policy--compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[ 35] Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it. In consequence, thinking and acting politically is displaced by the institutional and epistemic rivalries that infuse its power/ knowledge networks, and by the local conditions of application that govern the introduction of their policies. These now threaten to exhaust what “politics,” locally as well as globally, is about. It is here that the “emergence” characteristic of governance begins to make its appearance. For it is increasingly recognized that there are no definitive policy solutions to objective, neat, discrete policy problems. The “subjects” of policy increasingly also become a matter of definition as well, since the concept population does not have a stable referent either and has itself also evolved in biophilosophical and biomolecular as well as Foucauldian “biopower” ways.

### 2NC Genocide Impact

#### Securitization is a precondition to genocide- their advantage descriptions will be used to justify massive violence

Friis 2K [Karsten Friis, UN Sector at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Peace and Conflict Studies 7.2, “From Liminars to Others: Securitization Through Myths,” 2000, <http://shss.nova.edu/pcs/journalsPDF/V7N2.pdf#page=2>]

The problem with societal securitization is one of representation. It is rarely clear in advance who it is that speaks for a community. There is no system of representation as in a state. Since literately anyone can stand up as representatives, there is room for entrepreneurs. It is not surprising if we experience a struggle between different representatives and also their different representations of the society. What they do share, however, is a conviction that they are best at providing (a new) order. If they can do this convincingly, they gain legitimacy. What must be done is to make the uncertain certain and make the unknown an object of knowledge. To present a discernable Other is a way of doing this. The Other is represented as an Other -- as an unified single actor with a similar unquestionable set of core values (i.e. the capital “O”). They are objectified, made into an object of knowledge, by re-presentation of their identity and values. In other words, the representation of the Other is depoliticized in the sense that its inner qualities are treated as given and non-negotiable. In Jef Huysmans (1998:241) words, there is both a need for a mediation of chaos as well as of threat. A mediation of chaos is more basic than a mediation of threat, as it implies making chaos into a meaningful order by a convincing representation of the Self and its surroundings. It is a mediation of “ontological security”, which means “...a strategy of managing the limits of reflexivity ... by fixing social relations into a symbolic and institutional order” (Huysmans 1998:242). As he and others (like Hansen 1998:240) have pointed out, the importance of a threat construction for political identification, is often overstated. The mediation of chaos, of being the provider of order in general, is just as important. This may imply naming an Other but not necessarily as a threat. Such a dichotomization implies a necessity to get rid of all the liminars (what Huysmans calls “strangers”). This is because they “...connote a challenge to categorizing practices through the impossibility of being categorized”, and does not threaten the community, “...but the possibility of ordering itself” (Huysmans 1998:241). They are a challenge to the entrepreneur by their very existence. They confuse the dichotomy of Self and Other and thereby the entrepreneur’s mediation of chaos. As mentioned, a liminar can for instance be people of mixed ethnical ancestry but also representations of competing world-pictures. As Eide (1998:76) notes: “Over and over again we see that the “liberals” within a group undergoing a mobilisation process for group conflict are the first ones to go”. The liminars threaten the ontological order of the entrepreneur by challenging his representation of Self and Other and his mediation of chaos, which ultimately undermines the legitimacy of his policy. The liminars may be securitized by some sort of disciplination, from suppression of cultural symbols to ethnic cleansing and expatriation. This is a threat to the ontological order of the entrepreneur, stemming from inside and thus repoliticizing the inside/outside dichotomy. Therefore the liminar must disappear. It must be made into a Self, as several minority groups throughout the world have experienced, or it must be forced out of the territory. A liminar may also become an Other, as its connection to the Self is cut and their former common culture is renounced and made insignificant. In Anne Norton’s (1988:55) words, “The presence of difference in the ambiguous other leads to its classification as wholly unlike and identifies it unqualifiedly with the archetypal other, denying the resemblance to the self.” Then the liminar is no longer an ontological danger (chaos), but what Huysmans (1998:242) calls a mediation of “daily security”. This is not challenging the order or the system as such but has become a visible, clear-cut Other. In places like Bosnia, this naming and replacement of an Other, has been regarded by the securitizing actors as the solution to the ontological problem they have posed. Securitization was not considered a political move, in the sense that there were any choices. It was a necessity: Securitization was a solution based on a depoliticized ontology.10 This way the world-picture of the securitizing actor is not only a representation but also made into reality. The mythical second-order language is made into first-order language, and its “innocent” reality is forced upon the world. To the entrepreneurs and other actors involved it has become a “natural” necessity with a need to make order, even if it implies making the world match the map. Maybe that is why war against liminars are so often total; it attempts a total expatriation or a total “solution” (like the Holocaust) and not only a victory on the battlefield. If the enemy is not even considered a legitimate Other, the door may be more open to a kind of violence that is way beyond any war conventions, any jus in bello. This way, securitizing is legitimized: The entrepreneur has succeeded both in launching his world-view and in prescribing the necessary measures taken against it. This is possible by using the myths, by speaking on behalf of the natural and eternal, where truth is never questioned.

### AT: Nuke War O/W

#### Structural violence outweighs—focus on nuclear impacts destroys peace movements and causes paralysis and oppression—nuke war won’t cause extinction—their authors are biased hacks trying to preserve their power through a politics of extinction

Martin 84 [Dr Brian Martin is a physicist whose research interests include stratospheric modeling. He is a research associate in the Dept. of Mathematics, Faculty of Science, Australian National University, and a member of SANA 5-16-84 <http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/84sana1.html>]

By the 1950s, a large number of people had come to believe that the killing of much or all of the world’s population would result from global nuclear war. This idea was promoted by the peace movement, among which the idea of ‘overkill’ - in the sense that nuclear arsenals could kill everyone on earth several times over - became an article of faith. Yet in spite of the widespread belief in nuclear extinction, there was almost no scientific support for such a possibility. The scenario of the book and movie On the Beach,[[2]](http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/84sana1.html" \l "n2#n2) with fallout clouds gradually enveloping the earth and wiping out all life, was and is fiction. The scientific evidence is that fallout would only kill people who are immediately downwind of surface nuclear explosions and who are heavily exposed during the first few days. Global fallout has no potential for causing massive immediate death (though it could cause up to millions of cancers worldwide over many decades).[[3]](http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/84sana1.html#n3#n3) In spite of the lack of evidence, large sections of the peace movement have left unaddressed the question of whether nuclear war inevitably means global extinction. The next effect to which beliefs in nuclear extinction were attached was ozone depletion. Beginning in the mid-1970s, scares about stratospheric ozone developed, culminating in 1982 in the release of Jonathan Schell’s book The Fate of the Earth.[[4]](http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/84sana1.html#n4#n4) Schell painted a picture of human annihilation from nuclear war based almost entirely on effects from increased ultraviolet light at the earth’s surface due to ozone reductions caused by nuclear explosions. Schell’s book was greeted with adulation rarely observed in any field. Yet by the time the book was published, the scientific basis for ozone-based nuclear extinction had almost entirely evaporated. The ongoing switch by the military forces of the United States and the Soviet Union from multi-megatonne nuclear weapons to larger numbers of smaller weapons means that the effect on ozone from even the largest nuclear war is unlikely to lead to any major effect on human population levels, and extinction from ozone reductions is virtually out of the question.[[3]](http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/84sana1.html#n3#n3) The latest stimulus for doomsday beliefs is ‘nuclear winter’: the blocking of sunlight from dust raised by nuclear explosions and smoke from fires ignited by nuclear attacks. This would result in a few months of darkness and lowered temperatures, mainly in the northern mid-latitudes.[[5]](http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/84sana1.html#n5#n5) The effects could be quite significant, perhaps causing the deaths of up to several hundred million more people than would die from the immediate effects of blast, heat and radiation. But the evidence, so far, seems to provide little basis for beliefs in nuclear extinction. The impact of nuclear winter on populations nearer the equator, such as in India, does not seem likely to be significant. The most serious possibilities would result from major ecological destruction, but this remains speculative at present. As in the previous doomsday scenarios, antiwar scientists and peace movements have taken up the crusading torch of extinction politics. Few doubts have been voiced about the evidence about nuclear winter or the politics of promoting beliefs in nuclear extinction. Opponents of war, including scientists, have often exaggerated the effects of nuclear war and emphasized worst cases. Schell continually bends evidence to give the worst impression. For example, he implies that a nuclear attack is inevitably followed by a firestorm or conflagration. He invariably gives the maximum time for people having to remain in shelters from fallout. And he takes a pessimistic view of the potential for ecological resilience to radiation exposure and for human resourcefulness in a crisis. Similarly, in several of the scientific studies of nuclear winter, I have noticed a strong tendency to focus on worst cases and to avoid examination of ways to overcome the effects. For example, no one seems to have looked at possibilities for migration to coastal areas away from the freezing continental temperatures or looked at people changing their diets away from grain-fed beef to direct consumption of the grain, thereby greatly extending reserves of food. Nuclear doomsdayism should be of concern because of its effect on the political strategy and effectiveness of the peace movement. While beliefs in nuclear extinction may stimulate some people into antiwar action, it may discourage others by fostering resignation. Furthermore, some peace movement activities may be inhibited because they allegedly threaten the delicate balance of state terror. The irony here is that there should be no need to exaggerate the effects of nuclear war, since, even well short of extinction, the consequences would be sufficiently devastating to justify the greatest efforts against it. The effect of extinction politics is apparent in responses to the concept of limited nuclear war. Antiwar activists, quite justifiably, have attacked military planning and apologetics for limited nuclear war in which the effects are minimized in order to make them more acceptable. But opposition to military planning often has led antiwar activists to refuse to acknowledge the possibility that nuclear war could be ‘limited’ in the sense that less than total annihilation could result. A ‘limited’ nuclear war with 100 million deaths is certainly possible, but the peace movement has not seriously examined the political implications of such a war. Yet even the smallest of nuclear wars could have enormous political consequences, for which the peace movement is totally unprepared.[[6]](http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/84sana1.html#n6#n6) The peace movement also has denigrated the value of civil defence, apparently, in part, because a realistic examination of civil defence would undermine beliefs about total annihilation. The many ways in which the effects of nuclear war are exaggerated and worst cases emphasized can be explained as the result of a presupposition by antiwar scientists and activists that their political aims will be fulfilled when people are convinced that there is a good chance of total disaster from nuclear war.[[7]](http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/84sana1.html#n7#n7) There are quite a number of reasons why people may find a belief in extinction from nuclear war to be attractive.[[8]](http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/84sana1.html#n8#n8) Here I will only briefly comment on a few factors. The first is an implicit Western chauvinism The effects of global nuclear war would mainly hit the population of the United States, Europe and the Soviet Union. This is quite unlike the pattern of other major ongoing human disasters of starvation, disease, poverty and political repression which mainly affect the poor, nonwhite populations of the Third World. The gospel of nuclear extinction can be seen as a way by which a problem for the rich white Western societies is claimed to be a problem for all the world. Symptomatic of this orientation is the belief that, without Western aid and trade, the economies and populations of the Third World would face disaster. But this is only Western self-centredness. Actually, Third World populations would in many ways be better off without the West: the pressure to grow cash crops of sugar, tobacco and so on would be reduced, and we would no longer witness fresh fish being airfreighted from Bangladesh to Europe. A related factor linked with nuclear extinctionism is a belief that nuclear war is the most pressing issue facing humans. I disagree, both morally and politically, with the stance that preventing nuclear war has become the most important social issue for all humans. Surely, in the Third World, concern over the actuality of massive suffering and millions of deaths resulting from poverty and exploitation can justifiably take precedence over the possibility of a similar death toll from nuclear war. Nuclear war may be the greatest threat to the collective lives of those in the rich, white Western societies but, for the poor, nonwhite Third World peoples, other issues are more pressing. In political terms, to give precedence to nuclear war as an issue is to assume that nuclear war can be overcome in isolation from changes in major social institutions, including the state, capitalism, state socialism and patriarchy. If war is deeply embedded in such structures - as I would argue[[9]](http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/84sana1.html" \l "n9#n9) - then to try to prevent war without making common cause with other social movements will not be successful politically. This means that the antiwar movement needs to link its strategy and practice with other movements such as the feminist movement, the workers’ control movement and the environmental movement. A focus on nuclear extinction also encourages a focus on appealing to elites as the means to stop nuclear war, since there seems no other means for quickly overcoming the danger. For example, Carl Sagan, at the end of an article about nuclear winter in a popular magazine, advocates writing letters to the presidents of the United States and of the Soviet Union.[[10]](http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/84sana1.html#n10#n10) But if war has deep institutional roots, then appealing to elites has no chance of success. This has been amply illustrated by the continual failure of disarmament negotiations and appeals to elites over the past several decades.

#### Failure to challenge the systems of thought that produce violent militarism means reducing nukes only results in weapons a million times more deadly

Sethi 89 [JD Sethi, Gandhian critique of western peace movements, 1989. p. 173-174 (the poor English in this card is from the original)]

The strategic doctrines discussed in the preceding pages and others which have not been discussed have to be recognized both as provocations and potentials for war as well as preservers of peace. There can be no denial that in a system based on nation states where size and resources, development of technologies are of critical importance, expansionism is inherent in the system. Therefore, the threat perception arises from security problems which are the products of nation states system. The balance of power realm of new weapon system, ideological passions and miscalculations and misperceptions along with other factors determine the nature of international climate for war and peace, and the nuclear weapons have been the pyramidical culmination of the progression of all the determinants of war and peace which are euphemistically called defense and security. The real difference between the past and the present is that the nuclear weapons can destroy the whole humanity in a short time. This was not the position before, no matter how big and long wars were fought. But it is also a fact that nuclear powers have not fought a single war since 1945. Suppose for a moment all the nuclear weapons by some magic disappeared. How much would the whole world be saved from wars and large scale annihilation? The second World War took a toll of 50 million people. A third world war without nuclear weapons may not take less than 100 million people at the least. A world free from nuclear weapons while other things remaining the same is likely to produce some other kinds of weapons because the global system of inequalities, insecurity of nations, pressure of technologies etc. will inevitably lead to the discovery of weapons probably million times deadlier than the nuclear weapons. The world would never be safe even without the nuclear weapons. The peace movements have been making this mistake of not linking issues of elimination of nuclear weapons with the causes which in the first instance culminated in the production of nuclear weapons.

### AT: Predictions

#### Worst case predictions cause worst case policy making—recognition of our ignorance makes us more secure than their fatalistic scenario planning

Schneier 10 [Bruce Schneier is an internationally renowned security technologist and author, MA CS American University, 3/13/10, http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/05/worst-case\_thin.html]

At a security conference recently, the moderator asked the panel of distinguished cybersecurity leaders what their nightmare scenario was. The answers were the predictable array of large-scale attacks: against our communications infrastructure, against the power grid, against the financial system, in combination with a physical attack. I didn’t get to give my answer until the afternoon, which was: "My nightmare scenario is that people keep talking about their nightmare scenarios." There’s a certain blindness that comes from worst-case thinking. An extension of the precautionary principle, it involves imagining the worst possible outcome and then acting as if it were a certainty. It substitutes imagination for thinking, speculation for risk analysis, and fear for reason. It fosters powerlessness and vulnerability and magnifies social paralysis. And it makes us more vulnerable to the effects of terrorism. Worst-case thinking means generally bad decision making for several reasons. First, it’s only half of the cost-benefit equation. Every decision has costs and benefits, risks and rewards. By speculating about what can possibly go wrong, and then acting as if that is likely to happen, worst-case thinking focuses only on the extreme but improbable risks and does a poor job at assessing outcomes. Second, it’s based on flawed logic. It begs the question by assuming that a proponent of an action must prove that the nightmare scenario is impossible. Third, it can be used to support any position or its opposite. If we build a nuclear power plant, it could melt down. If we don’t build it, we will run short of power and society will collapse into anarchy. If we allow flights near Iceland’s volcanic ash, planes will crash and people will die. If we don’t, organs won’t arrive in time for transplant operations and people will die. If we don’t invade Iraq, Saddam Hussein might use the nuclear weapons he might have. If we do, we might destabilize the Middle East, leading to widespread violence and death. Of course, not all fears are equal. Those that we tend to exaggerate are more easily justified by worst-case thinking. So terrorism fears trump privacy fears, and almost everything else; technology is hard to understand and therefore scary; nuclear weapons are worse than conventional weapons; our children need to be protected at all costs; and annihilating the planet is bad. Basically, any fear that would make a good movie plot is amenable to worst-case thinking. Fourth and finally, worst-case thinking validates ignorance. Instead of focusing on what we know, it focuses on what we don’t know -- and what we can imagine. Remember Defense Secretary Rumsfeld’s quote? "Reports that say that something hasn’t happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns -- the ones we don’t know we don’t know." And this: "the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence." Ignorance isn’t a cause for doubt; when you can fill that ignorance with imagination, it can be a call to action. Even worse, it can lead to hasty and dangerous acts. You can’t wait for a smoking gun, so you act as if the gun is about to go off. Rather than making us safer, worst-case thinking has the potential to cause dangerous escalation. The new undercurrent in this is that our society no longer has the ability to calculate probabilities. Risk assessment is devalued. Probabilistic thinking is repudiated in favor of "possibilistic thinking": Since we can’t know what’s likely to go wrong, let’s speculate about what can possibly go wrong. Worst-case thinking leads to bad decisions, bad systems design, and bad security. And we all have direct experience with its effects: airline security and the TSA, which we make fun of when we’re not appalled that they’re harassing 93-year-old women or keeping first graders off airplanes. You can’t be too careful! Actually, you can. You can refuse to fly because of the possibility of plane crashes. You can lock your children in the house because of the possibility of child predators. You can eschew all contact with people because of the possibility of hurt. Steven Hawking wants to avoid trying to communicate with aliens because they might be hostile; does he want to turn off all the planet’s television broadcasts because they’re radiating into space? It isn’t hard to parody worst-case thinking, and at its extreme it’s a psychological condition. Frank Furedi, a sociology professor at the University of Kent, writes: "Worst-case thinking encourages society to adopt fear as one of the dominant principles around which the public, the government and institutions should organize their life. It institutionalizes insecurity and fosters a mood of confusion and powerlessness. Through popularizing the belief that worst cases are normal, it incites people to feel defenseless and vulnerable to a wide range of future threats." Even worse, it plays directly into the hands of terrorists, creating a population that is easily terrorized -- even by failed terrorist attacks like the Christmas Day underwear bomber and the Times Square SUV bomber. When someone is proposing a change, the onus should be on them to justify it over the status quo. But worst-case thinking is a way of looking at the world that exaggerates the rare and unusual and gives the rare much more credence than it deserves. It isn’t really a principle; it’s a cheap trick to justify what you already believe. It lets lazy or biased people make what seem to be cogent arguments without understanding the whole issue. And when people don’t need to refute counterarguments, there’s no point in listening to them.

### AT: Threats Real

#### The most recent psychological evidence confirms our K- the affirmatives enemy creation is not based on objective reality, but a paranoid need for certainty. Rejecting their media doomsaying in favor of acceptance of uncertainty solves better

Jacobs 10 [Tom Jacobs, Professional Journalist for 20 years, 3-8-10 <http://www.miller-mccune.com/politics/the-comforting-notion-of-an-all-powerful-enemy-10429/>]

We have seen the enemy, and he is powerful. That’s a recurring motif of contemporary political discourse, as generalized fear mutates for many into a fixation on a ferocious foe. Partisan rhetoric has turned increasingly alarmist. President Obama has difficulty getting even watered-down legislation passed, yet he is supposedly establishing a socialist state. The Tea Party is viewed as a terrifying new phenomenon, rather than the latest embodiment of a recurring paranoid streak in American politics. Osama bin Laden is likely confined to a cave, but he’s perceived as a threat large enough to justify engaging in torture. According to one school of thought, this tendency to exaggerate the strength of our adversaries serves a specific psychological function. It is less scary to place all our fears on a single, strong enemy than to accept the fact our well-being is largely based on factors beyond our control. An enemy, after all, can be defined, analyzed and perhaps even defeated. The notion that focusing our anger on a purportedly powerful foe helps mitigate our fears was first articulated by cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker in his 1969 book Angel in Armor. It has now been confirmed in a timely paper titled “An Existential Function of Enemyship,” just published in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. A research team led by social psychologist Daniel Sullivan of the University of Kansas reports on four studies that suggest people are “motivated to create and/or perpetually maintain clear enemies to avoid psychological confrontations with an even more threatening chaotic environment.” When you place their findings in the context of the many threats (economic and otherwise) people face in today’s world, the propensity to turn ideological opponents into mighty monsters starts to make sense. In one of Sullivan’s studies, conducted during the 2008 presidential campaign, a group of University of Kansas undergraduates were asked whether they believed enemies of their favored candidate (Obama or John McCain) were manipulating voting machines in an attempt to steal the election. Prior to considering such conspiracy theories, half were asked to consider the truth of statements such as “I have control over whether I am exposed to a disease,” and “I have control over how my job prospects fare in the economy.” The other half were asked to assess similar statements on relatively unimportant subjects, such as “I have control over how much TV I watch.” Those who were forced to contemplate their lack of control over significant life events “reported a stronger belief in opponent-led conspiracies,” the researchers report. In another study, the student participants were randomly assigned to read one of two essays. The first stated that the U.S. government is well-equipped to handle the economic downturn, and that crime rates are declining due to improved law enforcement. The second reported the government is not at all competent to cope with the recession, and crime rates are going up in spite of the authorities’ best efforts. They were then presented with a list of hypothetical events and asked to pick the most likely cause of each: A friend, an enemy, or neither (that is, the event happened randomly). Those “informed” that the government was not in control were more likely to view a personal enemy as responsible for negative events in their lives. In contrast, those told things are running smoothly “seemed to defensively downplay the extent to which enemies negatively influence their lives,” the researchers report. These studies suggest it’s oddly comforting to have someone, or something, you can point to as the source of your sorrows. This helps explain why Americans inevitably find an outside enemy to focus on, be it the Soviets, the Muslims or the Chinese. Given that society pays an obvious price for such illusions, how might we go about reducing the need for “enemyship?” “If you can somehow raise people’s sense that they have control over their lives and negative hazards in the world, their need to ‘enemize’ others should be reduced,” Sullivan said in an e-mail interview. “In our first study, for instance, we showed that people who feel dispositionally high levels of control over their lives did not respond to a reminder of external hazards by attributing more influence to an enemy. Any social structure or implementation that makes people feel more control over their lives should thus generally reduce (though perhaps not completely eliminate) the ‘need’ or tendency to create or attribute more influence to enemy figures. “In our third study, we showed that if people perceived the broader social system as ordered, they were more likely to respond to a threat to personal control by boosting their faith in the government, rather than by attributing more influence to an enemy. So, again, we see that the need to perceive enemies is reduced when people are made to feel that they are in control of their lives, or that there is a reliable, efficient social order that protects them from the threat of random hazards. “One could imagine, then, that circumstances which allow all citizens to be medically insured, or to have a clear sense of police protection, could reduce the tendency to seek out enemy figures to distill or focalize concerns with random, imminent threats.” Sullivan also offers two more personal potential solutions. “If people have such inherent needs for control and certainty in their lives, they should try to channel those needs as best they can into socially beneficial pursuits,” he says. “Lots of people pursue science, art and religion —just to give a few examples —as means of boiling down uncertainty about the world into clear systems of rules and engagement with reality, creating small domains for themselves in which they can exert a sense of mastery. Insofar as these pursuits don’t harm anyone, but still provide a sense of control, they can reduce the need for enemyship. “A final solution would be to encourage people to simply accept uncertainty and lack of control in their lives,” he adds. “Some meaning systems —Taoism for example —are rooted in this idea, that people can eventually accept a certain lack of control and eventually become resigned to this idea to the extent that they no longer react defensively against it.” So there, at least, is a practical place to begin: Less MSNBC and more meditation.

#### The “facts” they base their world view on are tainted by hostile cognitive filters—if it’s true empirical social science methodology works, vote negative

Smoke and Harman 87 [Richard Smoke BA Harvard magna cum laude, PhD MIT, Prof. @ Brown, Winner Bancroft Prize in History, and Willis Harman M.S. in Physics and Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering from Stanford University, Paths To Peace, 1987 p.82-3]

The class involving social and cognitive psychology has its roots in the empirical, experimental tradition. The insights especially relevant to peace arise from research on perception and attribution. How do we perceive the outer world, especially other persons, and why do our perceptions sometimes differ from those of others—and from reality? What do we attribute to others—that is, what motivations do we assume in them, and what explanations do we come up with for their behavior? How does cognitive functioning restrict people’s abilities to comprehend complexity and to achieve what is in their own best interests? There is an enormous body of research on these kinds of questions, some of which is highly applicable to peace. In important respects the behavior of nations resembles the behavior of individuals, and research on the latter sheds light on the former. A few elementary examples will illustrate the applicability: • In complex situations involving two parties, each of which perceives the other’s overall goals to be threatening or illegitimate, each party is likely to interpret ambiguous behavior by the other as hostile. Behavior suggesting aggressiveness is more noticeable than behavior suggesting peaceableness, and once noticed, the former is likely to be interpreted in the most hostile terms that the evidence can reasonably sustain; • In situations of mutual antagonism, each hostile act by one party tends to reinforce the other’s perception of hostility. As a consequence of repeated reinforcement, a strong expectation of hostility may be built up. Peaceful initiatives then must overcome entrenched attitudes, which can often be done only with great difficulty; • Cognitive limitations on information processing tend to produce images of the other party that are considerably oversimplified versions of the reality. In an emotional context of anxiety, the simplifications made will be those consistent with fear; • Costly or difficult actions that one takes in the name of defense tend to reinforce one’s presumption that the other party is hostile because it becomes too emotionally difficult to admit to oneself that one’s assumptions might have been wrong and that all that cost may have been unnecessary; • Aggressive individuals who have climbed to the top in highly competitive government hierarchies are likely to attribute aggressive characteristics to their counterparts in other government hierarchies; • Entrenched perceptions and attitudes become part of national leaders’ and whole populations’ definitions of reality. Perceptions become so interwoven with the entire "inner map" of the•way-things-are that they become very difficult to change. Such ideas arising from empirical research (presented here in simplified form) shed much light on international behavior. Although they do not lead to easy answers for creating peace, their accumulated power can add up to an enormously potent diagnosis of situations where peace is threatened. An accurate diagnosis can tell us in which directions work to change the situation can be most effective and should be pursued, as well as which directions are likely to be least effective. In some cases, the converse of the ideas are equally true and can help sustain peace. For example, two nations in a long-standing state of stable peace remain so in part because peaceful expectations have become interwoven into leaders’ and populations’ definitions of reality.

### AT: Democracy Prevents Genocide

#### Democracy makes genocide *possible*, it doesn’t prevent it.

Mann 99 — Michael Mann, Professor of Sociology at the University of California-Los Angeles, holds a D.Phil. in Sociology from Oxford University, 1999 (“The Dark Side of Democracy: The Modern Tradition of Ethnic and Political Cleansing,” *New Left Review*, Issue 235, May-June, Available Online at http://www.upf.edu/materials/fhuma/genocidis/docs/mann2.pdf, Accessed 11-10-2011, p. 18-21)

The twentieth century’s death-toll through genocide is somewhere over sixty million and still rising.\* Yet most scholars and laypersons alike have preferred to focus on more salubrious topics. If they think about genocide at all, they view it as an unfortunate interruption of the real structural tendencies of the twentieth century—economic, social and political progress. Murderous ethnic and political cleansing is seen as a regression to the primitive—essentially anti-modern—and is committed by backward or marginal groups manipulated by clever and dangerous politicians. Blame the politicians, the sadists, the terrible Serbs (or Croats) or the primitive Hutus (or Tutsis)—for their actions have little to do with us. An alternative view—often derived from a religious perspective—sees the capacity for evil as a universal attribute of human beings, whether ‘civilized’ or not. This is true, yet capacity for evil only becomes actualized in certain circumstances, and, in the case of genocide, these seem less primitive than distinctly modern. [end page 18] In fact, most of the small group of scholars studying the most notorious twentieth-century cases of genocide and mass killing—Armenia, the Nazi ‘Final Solution’, Stalinism, Cambodia, Rwanda— have emphasized the modernity of the horror. Leo Kuper essentially founded genocide studies by noting that the modern state’s monopoly of sovereignty over a territory that was, in reality, culturally plural and economically stratified created both the desire and the power to commit genocide.1 Roger Smith has stressed that genocide has usually been a deliberate instrument of modern state policy.2 Some emphasize the technology available to the perpetrators: modern weapons, transport and administration have escalated the efficiency of mass, bureaucratic, depersonalized killing.3 However, Helen Fein detects modern ideological goals, as well as technological means, for ‘The victims of twentieth century premeditated genocide . . . were murdered in order to fulfil the state’s design for a new order.’4 She stresses the genocidal potential of modern ‘myths’ or ‘political formulae’—ideologies of nation, race and class.

In the Name of the People

But let us remark a quality they all share. They have justified themselves—and their genocides—‘in the name of the people’. In this respect, they are no different from more moderate twentieth-century ideologies, for this has been the age of the masses. In all the varied German law courts of the last eighty years—from Weimar to Nazi to communist DDR to the Bundesrepublik—the judges have used the same opening formula: ‘In Namen des Volkes’, ‘In the Name of the People’. American courts prefer the formula ‘The Case of X versus the People’. By claiming legitimacy in the name of ‘the people’, genocidal régimes claim kinship to movements which are usually recognized as the bearers of true modernity, like liberalism or social democracy. Indeed, I argue here that modern genocide can be regarded as ‘the dark side of democracy’.

This is an unconventional view, however. The now dominant ‘democratic peace’ school has declared that democracies are essentially pacific, rarely fighting wars, and almost never against each other. They are the absolute antithesis of genocide. The school’s main representative in genocide studies is Rudolph Rummel.5 He claims [end page 19] that the more authoritarian a state, the more likely it is to commit genocide. Wielding many twentieth-century statistics of genocide, Rummel concludes that democracies commit virtually no genocide. He concedes a few cases where they do, but argues that these have been in wartime, where mass murder has been perpetrated secretively and without a democratic mandate. They are, therefore, exceptions that prove the rule. This is not an unreasonable argument in the case of small-scale atrocities like My Lai, during the Vietnam War—which, when exposed, was indeed prosecuted and condemned by American democracy. But Rummel fails to distinguish the more important cases of ‘democratic mass killings’, like the fire-bombing of Dresden or Tokyo, the dropping of the atomic bombs or the napalming of the Vietnamese countryside—whose casualties he also minimizes. Though some degree of military secrecy was obviously maintained in these cases, nonetheless, the American and British governments took these decisions according to due democratic constitutional process. Moreover, authoritarian genocides are also committed in wartime and with an attempt at secrecy. Hitler committed almost all his murders during the war, and he did not dare make them public—indeed, nor did Stalin. But there are larger exceptions to Rummel’s ‘law’: the frequent genocidal outbursts committed by seventeenth- to early twentieth-century European settlers living under constitutional governments. Rummel mentions these briefly, absurdly minimizes the numbers killed, vaguely suggests that ‘governments’ may have been responsible, and fails to explain them. In fact, Rummel never makes clear why a régime would want to murder vast numbers of people. After all, almost all historical régimes were authoritarian yet did not commit mass murder. As I will argue below, there is a relationship between democracy and genocide, but it is more complex and double-edged than Rummel acknowledges.

Robert Melson attempts to explain genocide in terms of wars following hard upon a revolution. He says revolutions undermine the institutional and moral restraints of the old régime, creating a potential moral vacuum.6 They also throw up revolutionaries seeking a wholesale transformation of society in the name of a mythical ‘people’. That ‘people’ then needs defining and delimiting, which may result in the exclusion of opponents, perhaps by violent means. And war, he says, aggravates régimes’ feelings of vulnerability and/or invincibility, permits states to become more autonomous, allows them the option of more ‘radical’ policy alternatives and increases the vulnerability of the victims. The combination of revolution and war may thus persuade a régime that domestic opponents are in league with deadly foreign enemies, to be legitimately killed. But Melson is careful to say that this is not a necessary outcome. In Cuba, for example, the revolution/war cycle was followed only by the expulsion of the bourgeoisie, not by its murder. He also concedes that earlier [end page 20] revolution/war combinations—for example, the English, American and French revolutions—were less likely to produce genocide than later ones, though he offers no good explanation of this. Finally, he does not note that the growth of the ideologies of nation, race and class, which were used to legitimate genocide, all surged in modern times with or without the accompaniment of revolution or war.

Rummel and especially Melson offer us genuine insights, but they do not go far enough. If we want to understand the growth of ideologically-legitimated and state-perpetrated genocide, we must realize that this has been the perverted product of the most sacred institution of Western modernity: democracy. For genocide can be seen in two distinct ways as ‘the dark side of democracy’—the most undesirable consequence of the modern practice of vesting political legitimacy in ‘the people’.

#### The discourse of democratic exceptionalism relies on false binaries that intensify conflicts.

Geis and Wagner 11 — Anna Geis, Senior Researcher at the Goethe University Frankfurt, holds a Ph.D. from the University of Hamburg, and Wolfgang Wagner, Professor of International Security in the Department of Political Science at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, holds an M.A. from the University of Tübingen and a Ph.D. from Goethe University Frankfurt, 2011 (“How far is it from Königsberg to Kandahar? Democratic peace and democratic violence in International Relations,” *Review of International Studies*, Volume 37, Issue 4, October, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Cambridge Journals Online)

Whatever the explicit position on forcible democratisation Democratic Peace scholars take, Democratic Peace research has nevertheless contributed to pave the intellectual ground for democratic ‘triumphalism’.106 Though scholarship has produced a wide array of complex studies, debating context conditions, modifications and flaws of Democratic Peace (research), interested political actors only take up the ‘good news’, simplify and instrumentalise these for political purposes. In search for an adequate response to such instrumentalisation, it is an important step that public reflexion upon scholarly responsibility in this field has recently been growing.107

Third, as indicated above (section 3.2), the democratic turn in institutional peace research in particular lends legitimacy to a worldview that divides the population of states along the binary lines of democracies and non-democracies and ascribes higher morality and credibility as well as institutional privileges to the group of democracies. Such considerations have not only been proposed by liberal international legal scholars but are an important topic in political philosophy as well.108 For example, Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane have justified the privileging of democracies in international law on the following grounds: they find democracies to meet their ‘standard for comparative moral reliability’ and believe that ‘when democracies violate cosmopolitan principles, they are more likely to be criticised by their citizens for doing so, and will be more likely to rectify their behaviour in response.’109 While such deliberations on the higher or lower legitimacy of regimes are certainly not out of bounds, the political consequences in international politics are apt to damage the very interests of democracies since they intensify conflicts between democracies and non-democracies on the allocation or denial of entitlements. The propagation of a liberal international law in recent years which allots more (interventionist) rights to democracies and the institutional reform proposals for a ‘Concert of Democracies’ as a new counter-part to an ‘ineffective’ UN Security Council are more than troubling developments, reinforcing the classification into first— and second-class regimes.110

The large bipartisan ‘Princeton Project on National Security’ pleads for such a ‘Concert of Democracies’ as the ‘institutional embodiment and ratification of the “democratic peace”’.111 In the same vein, Robert Kagan explicitly votes for such a ‘Concert of Democracies’ as a complement to the UN: ‘If successful, it could help bestow legitimacy on actions that democratic nations deem necessary but autocratic nations refuse to countenance— as NATO conferred legitimacy on the intervention in Kosovo. In a world increasingly divided along democratic and autocratic lines, the world's democrats will have to stick together.’112 Remarkably enough, the very same people who pretend to regret that the world is increasingly divided along the regime type line, contribute actively to constructing such a division and even reinforcing it. And once again, such ideas have travelled from academia into politics. For example, the Republican presidential candidate John McCain voiced the idea of a ‘League of Democracies’ in the last US presidential election campaign.113

### AT: Democracy Solves War

#### Liberal theorists no longer claim democracy creates peace—post 9/11 democracies have defended their right to wage war against aggressors

Dunne 9 [Tim, International Relations Prof-Oxford, “Liberalism, International Terrorism, and Democratic Wars,” International Relations, March, http://ire.sagepub.com/cgi/pdf\_extract/23/1/107?rss=1]

It is commonplace to draw distinctions between the various strands of liberal thought. This made a great deal of sense during the 1980s when neo-liberal institutionalists sought to make liberalism compatible with social scientific methods of inquiry.6 In so doing, a space was opened up for normative liberals to re-assert a values based version of liberalism which centred on the claim that democratic states were more peace-prone. I would argue that this distinction is no longer relevant. Post- 9/11, many former liberal regime theorists (such as Robert Keohane and Ann-Marie Slaughter) have grafted onto their once positivist approach a strong normative distinction between liberal and illiberal regimes.7 In place of the distinction between positivist and normative conceptions of liberalism, the main fault-line in relation to the war on terror has been between defensive and offensive variants.8 Pre-9/11, the dominant narrative inside liberalism was about the pacific character of liberal states. Post-9/11, a significant number of influential liberals have defended the right of Western states to wage war on terrorist groups and those that allegedly harbour them. The legal basis for such action has been contested in institutions as varied as the UN Security Council, parliaments, and domestic courts where the validity of the use of force against Iraq has been vigorously debated. Such as tendency for legal discourse to be at its most universalist at the hour when statecraft is at its most brutal was one that Martin Wight identified over four decades ago.

#### Post-Cold War democracies have worked side-by-side with authoritarian regimes to invade countries

Dunne 9 [Tim, International Relations Prof-Oxford, “Liberalism, International Terrorism, and Democratic Wars,” International Relations, March, http://ire.sagepub.com/cgi/pdf\_extract/23/1/107?rss=1]

The blurring of several post-9/11 interventions with the ‘war on terror’ has highlighted an important tension in the liberal understanding of international order. On the one hand, international institutions are designed to be procedurally liberal, meaning that membership is not restricted to democratic states, and collective action requires the consent of legitimate institutions (however imperfectly expressed). The expectation of a liberal order defined by pluralist principles is that all states have an interest in, and an obligation to obey, the rules. There is empirical evidence that liberal publics strongly buy into the importance of procedural correctness. One of the striking features of the polling data acquired in the UK prior to the 2003 Iraq War was the astonishing ‘bounce’ in favour of military action if it was backed by a UN Security Council resolution. In one poll, 76 per cent preferred multilateral action, as against 32 per cent who favoured war in circumstances when the US launched a war but the Security Council did not authorize it.19 The unipolar moment coincided with a shift towards substantive liberal norms to do with democratic entitlement, good governance and the responsibility of states for ensuring terrorist groups acting inside their borders were either contained or eradicated. These emergent substantive norms can be invoked to justify military interventions – against tyrannical states committing human rights violations (Kosovo 1999) or failing states unable to control terrorist networks (Afghanistan 2001 to the present). In the absence of the UN being able to act militarily, as was envisaged by the framers of the Charter, the consequence of this shift towards substantive liberal norms in international society is to place significant power in the hands of those states and alliances who have the capacity to act militarily. Such inequities are thrown into even sharper relief when, in the case of Iraq, the US and the UK brazenly circumvented the will of the very institution tasked with legitimating forcible action. The flexibility with which democratic wars are conducted by coalitions of powerful liberal states operating alongside military forces from authoritarian regimes adds weight to those who are sceptical about how far democratic ideals animate foreign policy behaviour. It is uncertain why democracies should be so sensitive to regime type when engaged in long-run institution building (such as NATO or the EU), yet so indifferent to regime type when constructing war-fighting coalitions. How can it be defensible to fight unjust enemies while standing shoulder to shoulder with unjust friends?

#### Democratic peace theory incorrect-- democracies are more likely to go to war than authoritarian states-- post Cold war proves

Dunne 9 [Tim, International Relations Prof-Oxford, “Liberalism, International Terrorism, and Democratic Wars,” International Relations, March, http://ire.sagepub.com/cgi/pdf\_extract/23/1/107?rss=1]

An engagement with the question of liberalism and violence must include consideration of the democratic peace thesis, famously described by Jack Levy as ‘the closest thing we have to an empirical law in international politics’.13 The strong version of the theory claims that democracies are more peaceful in general: in other words, there are checks on the executive which diminish the war-proneness of the state. Democracies are defensive in character ‘all the way down’ to the level of rational citizens, who oppose war because it endangers their lives and is a waste of economic resources. This rational aversion to war becomes embedded in the political order of the liberal state such that democracies are ‘least prone’ to war. The puzzle with this monadic democratic peace theory is that it does not account for why strong democracies do not go to war against weak democracies when the anticipated benefi ts are high and the costs very low. To address these weaknesses, advocates of the general hypothesis that democracies are peace-prone have emphasized cultural factors inherent in open societies, such as the emphasis upon mediation, dialogue and compromise. The logic of this position is that war is still possible, though the likelihood is significantly reduced because of domestic institutions and characteristics. The potential pacifying role of public opinion plays a key role here; a liberal public will constrain the illiberal temptation of ‘executive power’ during periods when there is an alleged threat to the security of the state. What is unclear about this monadic cultural explanation is under what circumstances liberal states can engage in wars of self-defence or wars against what Kant called ‘unjust enemies’. How do we know when a breach of the general peace prone status quo is acceptable and when it is a betrayal of democratic principles? In answering this question it is useful to engage with advocates of the democratic peace who believe that democracies are only peace-prone in relation to other democracies, the weaker version of the thesis (the so-called dyadic explanation). In relation to illiberal states, democracies are as war-prone as any other regime type. While war might have become unthinkable between democracies, the dyadic explanation allows for the fact that war remains an instrument of statecraft in relation to authoritarian regimes that are unpredictable, unjust and dangerous. The most convincing account of the dyadic theory comes from constructivism. Inter-democratic peace emerges because democracies project the same preferences and intentions onto other democratic regimes. Without the fear of aggression, cooperation becomes possible across a range of issue areas, from the technical to the substantive. In structural theoretical terms, proponents of dyadic theory believe that the logic of anarchy does not apply to those who have contracted a separate peace.15 This variant of the literature is particularly germane for considering the relationship between liberalism and terrorism. No liberal theorist believes there is a duty to include authoritarian enemies – be they states or terrorist networks – in the pacific union: they do not share ‘our values’ and their states are illegitimate because they lack the consent of the governed. Yet, beyond the exclusion of non-democracies, there is no agreement on how liberal states should engage with ideological enemies. Democratic peace theory provides powerful openings into the relationship between domestic institutions and values, and foreign-policy outcomes. From the vantage point of international history after the Cold War, however, both variants of the theory are in need of revision. The monadic variant cannot explain the war-like interventions on the part of liberal states in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Looked at from a vantage point outside the liberal zone, the monadic claim to peace-proneness appears to be illusory. The dyadic account has greater immunity to the several post-Cold War cases in which liberal states have resorted to war. As we have seen, there is no particular claim to peace-proneness in relations between democracies and authoritarian regimes. That said, the dyadic variant is challenged by two factors. First, in the period since 1990, the incidence of initiating inter-state war has been lower among authoritarian states than among democracies, casting doubt on Risse’s claim that democratic states are ‘defensively motivated’. Second, given the centrality of regime type to the democratic peace thesis, there remains the puzzle how and why democracies have varied so significantly in their response to ‘new threats’ such as international terrorism. In short, why do anti-militaristic norms of ‘civilian power’ frame the response by certain liberal states to foreign policy threats, while others are quick to resort to force and demonstrate effective war-fighting capability? To begin to address these questions requires a rethinking of the relationship between liberalism and international terrorism – specifically, the institutional and social processes by which war is produced and legitimated

## \*\*\* Alternative

### 2NC/1NR Alt Solves

#### Spillover from criticism is empirically proven. The role of the judge should be an intellectual whose goal is to destabilize the security regimes through critical interrogation of the status quo.

Jones 99 [Richard Wyn Jones, Professor International Politics at Aberystwyth University, Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, 1999, p. 155-163]

The central political task of the intellectuals is to aid in the construction of a counterhegemony and thus undermine the prevailing patterns of discourse and interaction that make up the currently dominant hegemony. This task is accomplished through educational activity, because, as Gramsci argues, “every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily a pedagogic relationship” (Gramsci 1971: 350). Discussing the relationship of the “philosophy of praxis” to political practice, Gramsci claims: It [the theory] does not tend to leave the “simple” in their primitive philosophy of common sense, but rather to lead them to a higher conception of life. If it affirms the need for contact between intellectuals and “simple” it is not in order to restrict scientific activity and preserve unity at the low level of the masses, but precisely in order to construct an intellectual-moral bloc which can make politically possible the intellectual progress of the mass and not only of small intellectual groups. (Gramsci 1971: 332-333). According to Gramsci, this attempt to construct an alternative “intellectual-moral bloc” should take place under the auspices of the Communist Party—a body he described as the “modern prince.” Just as Niccolo Machiavelli hoped to see a prince unite Italy, rid the country of foreign barbarians, and create a virtu-ous state, Gramsci believed that the modern price could lead the working class on its journey toward its revolutionary destiny of an emancipated society (Gramsci 1971: 125-205). Gramsci’s relative optimism about the possibility of progressive theorists playing a constructive role in emancipatory political practice was predicated on his belief in the existence of a universal class (a class whose emancipation would inevitably presage the emancipation of humanity itself) with revolutionary potential. It was a gradual loss of faith in this axiom that led Horkheimer and Adorno to their extremely pessimistic prognosis about the possibilities of progressive social change. But does a loss of faith in the revolutionary vocation of the proletariat necessarily lead to the kind of quietism ultimately embraced by the first generation of the Frankfurt School? The conflict that erupted in the 1960s between them and their more radical students suggests not. Indeed, contemporary critical theorists claim that the deprivileging of the role of the proletariat in the struggle for emancipation is actually a positive move. Class remains a very important axis of domination in society, but it is not the only such axis (Fraser 1995). Nor is it valid to reduce all other forms of domination—for example, in the case of gender—to class relations, as orthodox Marxists tend to do. To recognize these points is not only a first step toward the development of an analysis of forms of exploitation and exclusion within society that is more attuned to social reality; it is also a realization that there are other forms of emancipatory politics than those associated with class conflict.1 This in turn suggests new possibilities and problems for emancipatory theory. Furthermore, the abandonment of faith in revolutionary parties is also a positive development. The history of the European left during the twentieth century provides myriad examples of the ways in which the fetishization of party organizations has led to bureaucratic immobility and the confusion of means with ends (see, for example, Salvadori 1990). The failure of the Bolshevik experiment illustrates how disciplined, vanguard parties are an ideal vehicle for totalitarian domination (Serge 1984). Faith in the “infallible party” has obviously been the source of strength and comfort to many in this period and, as the experience of the southern Wales coalfield demonstrates, has inspired brave and progressive behavior (see, for example, the account of support for the Spanish Republic in Francis 1984). But such parties have so often been the enemies of emancipation that they should be treated with the utmost caution. Parties are necessary, but their fetishization is potentially disastrous. History furnishes examples of progressive developments that have been positively influenced by organic intellectuals operating outside the bounds of a particular party structure (G. Williams 1984). Some of these developments have occurred in the particularly intractable realm of security. These examples may be considered as “resources of hope” for critical security studies (R. Williams 1989). They illustrate that ideas are important or, more correctly, that change is the product of the dialectical interaction of ideas and material reality. One clear security-related example of the role of critical thinking and critical thinkers in aiding and abetting progressive social change is the experience of the peace movement of the 1980s. At that time the ideas of dissident defense intellectuals (the “alternative defense” school) encouraged and drew strength from peace activism. Together they had an effect not only on short-term policy but on the dominant discourses of strategy and security, a far more important result in the long run. The synergy between critical security intellectuals and critical social movements and the potential influence of both working in tandem can be witnessed particularly clearly in the fate of common security. As Thomas Risse-Kappen points out, the term “common security” originated in the contribution of peace researchers to the German security debate of the 1970s (Risse-Kappen 1994: 186ff.); it was subsequently popularized by the Palme Commission report (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues 1982). Initially, mainstream defense intellectuals dismissed the concept as hopelessly idealistic; it certainly had no place in their allegedly hardheaded and realist view of the world. However, notions of common security were taken up by a number of different intellectuals communities, including the liberal arms control community in the United States, Western European peace researchers, security specialists in the center-left political parties of Western Europe, and Soviet “institutchiks”—members of the influential policy institutes in the Soviet Union such as the United States of America and Canada Institute (Landau 1996: 52-54; Risse-Kappen 1994: 196-200; Kaldor 1995; Spencer 1995). These communities were subsequently able to take advantage of public pressure exerted through social movements in order to gain broader acceptance for common security. In Germany, for example, “in response to social movement pressure, German social organizations such as churches and trade unions quickly supported the ideas promoted by peace researchers and the SPD” (Risse-Kappen 1994: 207). Similar pressures even had an effect on the Reagan administration. As Risse-Kappen notes: When the Reagan administration brought hard-liners into power, the US arms control community was removed from policy influence. It was the American peace movement and what became known as the “freeze campaign” that revived the arms control process together with pressure from the European allies. (Risse-Kappen 1994: 205; also Cortright 1993: 90-110). Although it would be difficult to sustain a claim that the combination of critical movements and intellectuals persuaded the Reagan government to adopt the rhetoric and substance of common security in its entirety, it is clear that it did at least have a substantial impact on ameliorating U.S. behavior. The most dramatic and certainly the most unexpected impact of alternative defense ideas was felt in the Soviet Union. Through various East-West links, which included arms control institutions, Pugwash conferences, interparty contacts, and even direct personal links, a coterie of Soviet policy analysts and advisers were drawn toward common security and such attendant notions as “nonoffensive defense” (these links are detailed in Evangelista 1995; Kaldor 1995; Checkel 1993; Risse-Kappen 1994; Landau 1996 and Spencer 1995 concentrate on the role of the Pugwash conferences). This group, including Palme Commission member Georgii Arbatov, Pugwash attendee Andrei Kokoshin , and Sergei Karaganov, a senior adviser who was in regular contact with the Western peace researchers Anders Boserup and Lutz Unterseher (Risse-Kappen 1994: 203), then influenced Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev’s subsequent championing of common security may be attributed to several factors. It is clear, for example, that new Soviet leadership had a strong interest in alleviating tensions in East-West relations in order to facilitate much-needed domestic reforms (“the interaction of ideas and material reality”). But what is significant is that the Soviets’ commitment to common security led to significant changes in force sizes and postures. These in turn aided in the winding down of the Cold War, the end of Soviet domination over Eastern Europe, and even the collapse of Russian control over much of the territory of the former Soviet Union. At the present time, in marked contrast to the situation in the early 1980s, common security is part of the common sense of security discourse. As MccGwire points out, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (a common defense pact) is using the rhetoric of common security in order to justify its expansion into Eastern Europe (MccGwire 1997). This points to an interesting and potentially important aspect of the impact of ideas on politics. As concepts such as common security, and collective security before it (Claude 1984: 223-260), are adopted by governments and military services, they inevitably become somewhat debased. The hope is that enough of the residual meaning can survive to shift the parameters of the debate in a potentially progressive direction. Moreover, the adoption of the concept of common security by official circles provides critics with a useful tool for (immanently) critiquing aspects of security policy (as MccGwire 1997 demonsrates in relation to NATO expansion). The example of common security is highly instructive. First, it indicates that critical intellectuals can be politically engaged and play a role—a significant one at that—in making the world a better and safer place. Second, it points to potential future addressees for critical international theory in general, and critical security studies in particular. Third, it also underlines the role of ideas in the evolution in society. CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES AND THE THEORY-PRACTICE NEXUS Although most proponents of critical security studies reject aspects of Gramsci’s theory of organic intellectuals, in particular his exclusive concentration on class and his emphasis on the guiding role of the party, the desire for engagement and relevance must remain at the heart of their project. The example of the peace movement suggests that critical theorists can still play the role of organic intellectuals and that this organic relationship need not confine itself to a single class; it can involve alignment with different coalitions of social movements that campaign on an issue or a series of issues pertinent to the struggle for emancipation (Shaw 1994b; R. Walker 1994). Edward Said captures this broader orientation when he suggests that critical intellectuals “are always tied to and ought to remain an organic part of an ongoing experience in society: of the poor, the disadvantaged, the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless” (Said 1994: 84). In the specific case of critical security studies, this means placing the experience of those men and women and communities for whom the present world order is a cause of insecurity rather than security at the center of the agenda and making suffering humanity rather than raison d’etat the prism through which problems are viewed. Here the project stands full-square within the critical theory tradition. If “all theory is for someone and for some purpose,” then critical security studies is for “the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless,” and its purpose is their emancipation. The theoretical implications of this orientation have already been discussed in the previous chapters. They involve a fundamental reconceptualization of security with a shift in referent object and a broadening of the range of issues considered as a legitimate part of the discourse. They also involve a reconceptualization of strategy within this expanded notion of security. But the question remains at the conceptual level of how these alternative types of theorizing—even if they are self-consciously aligned to the practices of critical or new social movements, such as peace activism, the struggle for human rights, and the survival of minority cultures—can become “a force for the direction of action.” Again, Gramsci’s work is insightful. In the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci advances a sophisticated analysis of how dominant discourses play a vital role in upholding particular political and economic orders, or, in Gramsci’s terminology, “historic blocs” (Gramsci 1971: 323-377). Gramsci adopted Machiavelli’s view of power as a centaur, ahlf man, half beast: a mixture of consent and coercion. Consent is produced and reproduced by a ruling hegemony that holds sway through civil society and takes on the status of common sense; it becomes subconsciously accepted and even regarded as beyond question. Obviously, for Gramsci, there is nothing immutable about the values that permeate society; they can and do change. In the social realm, ideas and institutions that were once seen as natural and beyond question (i.e., commonsensical) in the West, such as feudalism and slavery, are now seen as anachronistic, unjust, and unacceptable. In Marx’s well-worn phrase, “All that is solid melts into the air.” Gramsci’s intention is to harness this potential for change and ensure that it moves in the direction of emancipation. To do this he suggests a strategy of a “war of position” (Gramsci 1971: 229-239). Gramsci argues that in states with developed civil societies, such as those in Western liberal democracies, any successful attempt at progressive social change requires a slow, incremental, even molecular, struggle to break down the prevailing hegemony and construct an alternative counterhegemony to take its place. Organic intellectuals have a crucial role to play in this process by helping to undermine the “natural,” “commonsense,” internalized nature of the status quo. This in turn helps create political space within which alternative conceptions of politics can be developed and new historic blocs created. I contend that Gramsci’s strategy of a war of position suggests an appropriate model for proponents of critical security studies to adopt in relating their theorizing to political practice. THE TASKS OF CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES If the project of critical security studies is conceived in terms of war of position, then the main task of those intellectuals who align themselves with the enterprise is to attempt to undermine the prevailing hegemonic security discourse. This may be accomplished by utilizing specialist information and expertise to engage in an immanent critique of the prevailing security regimes, that is, comparing the justifications of those regimes with actual outcomes. When this is attempted in the security field, the prevailing structures and regimes are found to fail grievously on their own terms. Such an approach also involves challenging the pronouncements of those intellectuals, traditional or organic, whose views serve to legitimate, and hence reproduce, the prevailing world order. This challenge entails teasing out the often subconscious and certainly unexamined assumptions that underlie their arguments while drawing attention to the normative viewpoints that are smuggled into mainstream thinking about security behind its positivist façade. In this sense, proponents of critical security studies approximate to Foucault’s notion of “specific intellectuals” who use their expert knowledge to challenge the prevailing “regime of truth” (Foucault 1980: 132). However, critical theorists might wish to reformulate this sentiment along more familiar Quaker lines of “speaking truth to power” (this sentiment is also central to Said 1994) or even along the eisteddfod lines of speaking “truth against the world.” Of course, traditional strategists can, and indeed do, sometimes claim a similar role. Colin S. Gray, for example, states that “strategists must be prepared to ‘speak truth to power’” (Gray 1982a: 193). But the difference between Gray and proponents of critical security studies is that, whereas the former seeks to influence policymakers in particular directions without questioning the basis of their power, the latter aim at a thoroughgoing critique of all that traditional security studies has taken for granted. Furthermore, critical theorists base their critique on the presupposition, elegantly stated by Adorno, that “the need to lend suffering a voice is the precondition of all truth” (cited in Jameson 1990: 66). The aim of critical security studies in attempting to undermine the prevailing orthodoxy is ultimately educational. As Gramsci notes, “every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily a pedagogic relationship” (Gramsci 1971: 350; see also the discussion of critical pedagogy in Neufeld 1995: 116-121). Thus, by criticizing the hegemonic discourse and advancing alternative conceptions of security based on different understandings of human potentialities, the approach is simultaneously playing apart in eroding the legitimacy of the ruling historic bloc and contributing to the development of a counterhegemonic position. There are a number of avenues of avenues open to critical security specialists in pursuing this educational strategy. As teachers, they can try to foster and encourage skepticism toward accepted wisdom and open minds to other possibilities. They can also take advantage of the seemingly unquenchable thirst of the media for instant pundistry to forward alternative views onto a broader stage. Nancy Fraser argues: “As teachers, we try to foster an emergent pedagogical counterculture …. As critical public intellectuals we try to inject our perspectives into whatever cultural or political public spheres we have access to” (Fraser 1989: 11). Perhaps significantly, support for this type of emancipatory strategy can even be found in the work of the ultrapessimistic Adorno, who argues: In the history of civilization there have been not a few instances when delusions were healed not by focused propaganda, but, in the final analysis, because scholars, with their unobtrusive yet insistent work habits, studied what lay at the root of the delusion. (cited in Kellner 1992: vii) Such “unobtrusive yet insistent work” does not in itself create the social change to which Adorno alludes. The conceptual and the practical dangers of collapsing practice into theory must be guarded against. Rather, through their educational activities, proponent of critical security studies should aim to provide support for those social movements that promote emancipatory social change. By providing a critique of the prevailing order and legitimating alternative views, critical theorists can perform a valuable role in supporting the struggles of social movements. That said, the role of theorists is not to direct and instruct those movements with which they are aligned; instead, the relationship is reciprocal. The experience of the European, North American, and Antipodean peace movements of the 1980s shows how influential social movements can become when their efforts are harnessed to the intellectual and educational activity of critical thinkers. For example, in his account of New Zealand’s antinuclear stance in the 1980s, Michael C. Pugh cites the importance of the visits of critical intellectuals such as Helen Caldicott and Richard Falk in changing the country’s political climate and encouraging the growth of the antinuclear movement (Pugh 1989: 108; see also COrtright 1993: 5-13). In the 1980s peace movements and critical intellectuals interested in issues of security and strategy drew strength and succor from each other’s efforts. If such critical social movements do not exist, then this creates obvious difficulties for the critical theorist. But even under these circumstances, the theorist need not abandon all hope of an eventual orientation toward practice. Once again, the peace movement of the 1980s provides evidence of the possibilities. At that time, the movement benefited from the intellectual work undertaken in the lean years of the peace movement in the late 1970s. Some of the theories and concepts developed then, such as common security and nonoffensive defense, were eventually taken up even in the Kremlin and played a significant role in defusing the second Cold War. Those ideas developed in the 1970s can be seen in Adornian terms of the a “message in a bottle,” but in this case, contra Adorno’s expectations, they were picked up and used to support a program of emancipatory political practice. Obviously, one would be naïve to understate the difficulties facing those attempting to develop alternative critical approaches within academia. Some of these problems have been alluded to already and involve the structural constraints of academic life itself. Said argues that many problems are caused by what he describes as the growing “professionalisation” of academic life (Said 1994: 49-62). Academics are now so constrained by the requirements of job security and marketability that they are extremely risk-averse. It pays—in all senses—to stick with the crowd and avoid the exposed limb by following the prevalent disciplinary preoccupations, publish in certain prescribed journals, and so on. The result is the navel gazing so prevalent in the study of international relations and the seeming inability of security specialists to deal with the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War (Kristensen 1997 highlights the search of U.S. nuclear planners for “new targets for old weapons”). And, of course, the pressures for conformism are heightened in the field of security studies when governments have a very real interest in marginalizing dissent. Nevertheless, opportunities for critical thinking do exist, and this thinking can connect with the practices of social movements and become a “force for the direction of action.” The experience of the 1980s, when, in the depths of the second Cold War, critical thinkers risked demonization and in some countries far worse in order to challenge received wisdom, thus arguably playing a crucial role in the very survival of the human race, should act as both an inspiration and a challenge to critical security studies.

#### Excluding discursive framing questions from security policy makes their framework arbitrary and less effective for policymaking. Limiting decisions to explicit policy options impoverishes analysis.

Cheeseman and Bruce 96—Graeme Cheeseman, Snr. Lecturer @ New South Wales, and Robert Bruce [Discourses of Danger & Dread Frontiers, p. 5-9]

This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of professional security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its ‘knowledge form as reality’ in debates on defence and security. Indeed, they believe that debate will be furthered only through a long overdue critical re-evaluation of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australia’s identity are both required and essential if Australia’s thinking on defence and security is to be invigorated.

This is not a conventional policy book; nor should it be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems they pose. This expectation is in itself a considerable part of the problem to be analysed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. It challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defence and security exist independently of their ‘context in the world’, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom or remain outside the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the ‘rightness’ of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it. Before engaging in the policy debate the critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference. This book, then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Said’s ‘critical intellectuals’.15

The demand, tacit or otherwise, that the policy-maker’s frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand year old tradition commonly associated with Socrates and purportedly integral to the Western tradition of democratic dialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies which, during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because there were institutional checks and balances upon power.

In short, one of the major differences between ‘open societies’ and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it meant that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australia’s security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defence and security.

This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that inform conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how theory is integral to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defence and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognise, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is not the ability to identify a replacement for failed models, but a realisation that terms and concepts – state sovereignty, balance of power, security, and so on – are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always becoming what is written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical presumptions can effectively exclude vital areas of political life from analysis has direct practical implications for policy-makers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years.

There is also much of interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find no single, fully formed panacea for the world’s ills in general, or Australia’s security in particular. There are none. Every chapter, however, in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defence and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defence practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) seek to alert policy-makers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities which might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier, attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought processes of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt (in place of confident certainty) is a necessary prelude to a genuine search for alternative policies. First comes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, then specific policies may follow.

As Jim George argues in the following chapter, we need to look not so much at contending policies as they are made for us but at challenging ‘the discursive process which gives [favoured interpretations of “reality”] their meaning and which direct [Australia’s] policy/analytical/military responses’. This process is not restricted to the small, official defence and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australia’s academic defence and security community located primarily though not exclusively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australia’s security community. They also question the discourse of ‘regional security’, ‘security cooperation’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘alliance politics’ that are central to Australia’s official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important task especially when, as is revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defence and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australia’s public policies on defence and security are informed, underpinned and legitimised by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australia’s policy-makers and their academic advisors are unaware of broader intellectual debates, or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why?

#### Critical intellectual distance to security discourse repoliticizes the objectives of security discourse. Your ballot interrogates who and what are deemed as worthy objects of security discourse.

C.A.S.E. Collective 6 [Security Dialogues 37.4, “Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto,” Sage Political Science, p. 464]

To take this discussion one step further, we need to ask ourselves, as researchers and as a collective, what the claim of being ‘critical’ and representing a ‘collective intellectual’ entails for our engagement with the political. This question naturally can be extended to all CASE scholars. First, what do we mean by ‘critical’? Are not all theories by definition critical (of other theories)? In virtue of which principle, as a networked collective, would we allow ourselves to be self-labelled as critical? What is so critical about the general perspective we are collectively trying to defend here? From the Kantian perspective to the post-Marxist Adornian emancipatory ideal, from Hockheimer’s project to the Foucaldian stance toward regimes of truth, being critical has meant to adopt a particular stance towards taken-for-granted assumptions and unquestioned categorizations of social reality. Many of these critical lines of thought have directly or indirectly inspired this critical approach to security in Europe. Being critical means adhering to a rigorous form of sceptical questioning, rather than being suspicious or distrustful in the vernacular sense of those terms. But, it is also to recognize one-self as being partially framed by those regimes of truth, concepts, theories and ways of thinking that enable the critique. To be critical is thus also to be reflexive, developing abilities to locate the self in a broader heterogeneous context through abstraction and thinking. A reflexive perspective must offer tools for gauging how political orders are constituted. This effort to break away from naturalized correspondences between things and words, between processes framed as problems and ready-made solutions, permits us to bring back social and political issues to the realm of the political. Being critical therefore means, among other things, to disrupt depoliticizing practices and discourses of security in the name of exceptionality, urgency or bureaucratic expertise, and bring them back to political discussions and struggles. This goal can partly be achieved through a continuous confrontation of our theoretical considerations with the social practices they account for in two directions: constantly remodelling theoretical considerations on the basis of research and critical practice, and creating the possibilities for the use of our research in political debate and action. This raises questions about the willingness and modalities of personal engagement. While critical theories can find concrete expressions in multiple fields of practice, their role is particularly important in the field of security. Since engaging security issues necessarily implies a normative dilemma of speaking security (Huysmans, 1998a), being critical appears as a necessary moment in the research. The goal of a critical intellectual is not only to observe, but also to actively open spaces of discussion and political action, as well as to provide the analytical tools, concepts and categories for possible alternative discourses and practices. However, there are no clear guidelines for the critical researcher and no assessment of the impact of scholarship on practice – or vice versa. Critical approaches to security have remained relatively silent about the role and the place of the researcher in the political process, too often confining their position to a series of general statements about the impossibility of objectivist science.19 The networked c.a.s.e. collective and the manifesto in which it found a first actualization may be a first step toward a more precisely defined modality of political commitment while working as a researcher. Writing collectively means assembling different types of knowledge and different forms of thinking. It means articulating different horizons of the unknown. It is looking at this limit at which one cannot necessarily believe in institutionalized forms of knowledge any longer, nor in the regimes of truth that are too often taken for granted. It is in this sense that being critical is a question of limits and necessities, and writing collectively can therefore help to critically define a modality for a more appropriate engagement with politics.

### 2NC We Make Security Better

#### Our alternative expands the notion of security to include positive elements like concern for structural violence. This re-framing of security is essential to human survival and solves any aff offense

Barnett 97 [Jon Barnett postgraduate student at the Centre for Resource & Environmental Studies, Australian National University, now has a PhD and teaches at the Univ. of Melbourne, Peace Review, Sep 1997.Vol.9, Iss. 3; pg. 405-411]

Dalby understands "dissident security discourses" as having different geographical frameworks that look, with equal measure, both within and beyond the state. These critical approaches erode state-centered parochialism. Once overcome, people and cultures-united by common concern-can take priority over states and borders. To this we can add a more sociological perspective. Kevin Clements, for example, claims that: "Linking security explicitly to community building and the enlargement of safe spaces provides individuals, social movements, and political leaders with important criteria for determining whether or not behavior is likely to enhance or diminish net security." Addressing the problem of inequity, Clements asks if there can be "any real security for anyone in a world that is so radically divided into rich and poor?" Likewise, Ken Booth claims that "the trouble with privileging power and order is that they are at somebody else’s expense (and are therefore potentially unstable)." According to Booth, "emancipation, not power or order, produces true security. Emancipation, theoretically, is security." This emancipatory vision introduces security theorizing to a new philosophical domain that poses questions of ethics, reciprocal rights, individual responsibility, and universal ideals. New security interpretations change the "what" question. Rather than limiting security to orthodox questions of armed conflict, it instead expands to include social, economic, environmental, political, and even health issues. Likewise, new interpretations alter the "who" question. The state no longer dominates; it becomes only one of several referents for security. These changes also help us shift from negative (reactive) approaches to positive (proactive) approaches for real security. Security has moved towards a more universal understanding. Expanding the security agenda makes human collectives more interdependent around a host of indivisible issues that threaten well being. Decoupling security from the state helps legitimize alternative social groupings. Identifiable common interests emerge when we reclaim security from militarism and attach it instead to basic needs and survival. Increasing interdependence has now become the fundamental organizing principle of the increasingly "dense" international system, eroding sovereignty and state authority in both domestic and international affairs. Thus, reclaiming security creates a normative framework for connecting people on issues common to human well being. It endorses an ecologically sustainable approach to meeting the basic needs of all people. (Continued)The process of reclaiming security undermines the dominant discourse. But expanding security’s meaning holds value only if it actually alters practice. We should beware of the danger that new concepts of security might be coopted by the dominant paradigm, and thus do more to legitimize than to challenge the status quo. This has already happened to notions of economic security; environmental security could well be next. Thus, we need practical strategies to make the reclamation of security into a concrete reality.

## \*\*\* AT: AFF Answers

### AT: Perm

#### Including their mainstream liberal option *ward offs kritik* of the discourses that ground u.s. foreign policy.

Burke 7—Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer @ School of Politics & IR @ Univ. of New South Wales [*Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence*, p. 3-4]

These frameworks are interrogated at the level both of their theoretical conceptualisation and their practice: in their influence and implementation in specific policy contexts and conflicts in East and Central Asia, the Middle East and the 'war on tei-ror', where their meaning and impact take on greater clarity. This approach is based on a conviction that the meaning of powerful political concepts cannot be abstract or easily universalised: they all have histories, often complex and conflictual; their forms and meanings change over time; and they are developed, refined and deployed in concrete struggles over power, wealth and societal form. While this should not preclude normative debate over how political or ethical concepts should be defined and used, and thus be beneficial or destructive to humanity, it embodies a caution that the meaning of concepts can never be stabilised or unproblematic in practice. Their normative potential must always be considered in relation to their utilisation in systems of political, social and economic power and their consequent worldly effects. Hence this book embodies a caution by Michel Foucault, who warned us about the 'politics of truth . . the battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays', and it is inspired by his call to 'detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time'.1

It is clear that traditionally coercive and violent approaches to security and strategy are both still culturally dominant, and politically and ethically suspect. However, the reasons for pursuing a critical analysis relate not only to the most destructive or controversial approaches, such as the war in Iraq, but also to their available (and generally preferable) alternatives. There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions such as the Bush doctrine, Indonesian militarism or Israeli expansionism, but also their mainstream critiques - whether they take the form of liberal policy approaches in international relations (IR), just war theory, US realism, optimistic accounts of globalisation, rhetorics of sensitivity to cultural difference, or centrist Israeli security discourses based on territorial compromise with the Palestinians. The surface appearance of lively (and often significant) debate masks a deeper agreement about major concepts, forms of political identity and the imperative to secure them. Debates about when and how it may be effective and legitimate to use military force in tandem with other policy options, for example, mask a more fundamental discursive consensus about the meaning of security, the effectiveness of strategic power, the nature of progress, the value of freedom or the promises of national and cultural identity. As a result, political and intellectual debate about insecurity, violent conflict and global injustice can become hostage to a claustrophic structure of political and ethical possibility that systematically wards off critique.

#### Reconstructing security discourse fails. They change the content but maintain the imperialist form. identifying current policy as a threat to stability strengthens the exlusionary constructions of security.

Burke 7—Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer @ School of Politics & IR @ Univ. of New South Wales [*Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence*, p. 30-1]

However, these differences should not be quickly effaced. While the common metaphysical assumption presents a problem, the critiques of Tickner, Walker and others have been of enormous political value, and implicitly contested both their own and realist assumptions that security was universal. This occurred in two ways. First, in arguments for human security there was a radical shift in the nature of the subject to be protected:

from the highly abstract imaginary of the nation-state to the immediate, corporeal distress of the human; a human which, in that distress, activates a call for difference that simultaneously undermines the illusory unity of a body-politic that would subsume all differences beneath a common imagination of home.

Second, the force of such critiques shattered Realism's claim to be a founding and comprehensive account of security: scattering its objects, methods, and normative aims into an often contradictory and antithetical dispersal. What was revealed here was not a universality but a field of conflict - as much social as conceptual. This creates some serious problems for a more radical and inclusive language of security, however important its desire for justice. This was recognised later by Walker, who argued in 1997 that 'demands for broader accounts of security risk inducing epistemological overload'." Indeed Simon Dalby argues that security, as a concept, may no longer be viable. He thinks that radical reformulations suggest that: 'the political structures of modernity, patriarchy and capitalism are the sources [rather than the vulnerable objects] of insecurity ... [are] so different as to call into question whether the term itself can be stretched to accommodate such reinterpretations. Inescapably, it puts into question the utility of the term in political discourse after the Cold War."'

Thus humanist critiques of security uncover an aporia within the concept of security. An aporia is an event that prevents a metaphysical discourse from fulfilling its promised unity: not a contradiction which can be brought into the dialectic, smoothed over and resolved into the unity of the concept, but an untotalisable problem at the heart of the concept, disrupting its trajectory, emptying out its fullness, opening out its closure. Jacques Derrida writes of aporia being an 'impasse', a path that cannot be travelled; an 'interminable experience' that, however, 'must remain if one wants to think, to make come or to let come any event of decision or responsibility' 14

As an event, Derrida sees the aporia as something like a stranger crossing the threshold of a foreign land: yet the aporetic stranger 'does not simply cross a given threshold' but 'affects the very experience of the threshold to the point of annihilating or rendering indeterminate all the distinctive signs of a prior identity, beginning with the very border that delineated a legitimate home and assured lineage, names and language •'•1 With this in mind, we can begin to imagine how a critical discourse (the 'stranger' in the security state) can challenge and open up the self-evidence of security, its self- and boundary-drawing nature, its imbrication with borders, sovereignty, identity and violence. Hence it is important to open up and focus on aporias: they bring possibility, the hope of breaking down the hegemony and assumptions of powerful political concepts, to think and create new social, ethical and economic relationships outside their oppressive structures of political and epistemological order - in short, they help us to think new paths. Aporias mark not merely the failure of concepts but a new potential to experience and imagine the impossible. This is where the critical and life-affirming potential of genealogy can come into play.

My particular concern with humanist discourses of security is that, whatever their critical value, they leave in place (and possibly strengthen) a key structural feature of the elite strategy they oppose: its claim to embody truth and to fix the contours of the real. In particular, the ontology of security/threat or security/insecurity which forms the basic condition of the real for mainstream discourses of international policy - remains powerfully in place, and security's broader function as a defining condition of human experience and modern political life remains invisible and unexamined. This is to abjure a powerful critical approach that is able to question the very categories in which our thinking, our experience and actions remain confined.

This chapter remains focused on the aporias that lie at the heart of security, rather than pushing into the spaces that potentially lie beyond. This is another project, one whose contours are already becoming clearer and which I address in detail in Chapters 2 and 3•16 What this chapter builds is a genealogical account of security's origins and cultural power, its ability to provide what Walker calls a 'constitutive account of the political' - as he says, 'claims about common security, collective security, or world security do little more than fudge the contradictions written into the heart of modem politics: we can only become humans, or anything else, after we have given up our humanity, or any other attachments, to the greater good of citizenship' .17 Before we can rewrite security we have to properly understand how security has written us how it has shaped and limited our very possibility, the possibilities for our selves, our relationships and our available images of political, social and economic order. This, as Walker intriguingly hints, is also to explore the aporetic distance that modernity establishes between our 'humanity' and a secure identity defined and limited by the state. In short, security needs to be placed alongside a range of other economic, political, technological, philosophic and scientific developments as one of the central constitutive events of our modernity, and it remains one of its essential underpinnings.

#### Even if their intent is to demilitarize via arms control—their discourse of national security depoliticizes the structural-representational questions that generate violence.

C.A.S.E. Collective 6 [*Security Dialogues* 37.4, “Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto,” Sage Political Science, p. 460]

Nowadays, matters of ‘peace and security’, as well as ‘security and develop- ment’, are considered closely related. These nexuses have been referred to as ‘mergings’.11 Such mergings lie at the core of new research agendas in security studies. Indeed, by extending the field of security to new social fields, such as peace and development, they allow for new research agendas within security studies. However, before exploring the possibility of com- mon research directions between critical peace research, development studies and CASE, we need to critically engage the notion of ‘merging’ that participates in the widening of the contemporary security agenda. The question of the ‘widening of the field of security’ has given rise to fierce debates. The implicit argument of many of the ‘wideners’ is that by securitiz- ing new issues such as peace and development, one encourages politicians to deal with them in a positive way. However, such an approach might be problematic. The widening of the security agenda, when justified by a concern to free people from fear and threat, might run into what we have called the ‘security trap’. Talking about a ‘security trap’ refers both to the non- intentional dimension of the consequences of widening and to the fact that these consequences might conflict with the underlying intention. It refers to the fact that one cannot necessarily establish a feeling of security, understood as a feeling of freedom from threat, simply by securitizing more issues or by securitizing them more.

The process of securitization is a specific form of politicization that appeals to the professionals of security. It points not only to the fact that ‘one has to deal with the problem’, but also to how ‘one has to deal with it in a coercive way’. As many critical scholars have warned, when transforming a societal issue into a security issue, one risks having the issue securitized for oneself by more established security professionals (Bigo, 1996; Wæver, 1995). In other words, even when widening the security agenda with the explicit intention of ‘demilitarizing’ international security, the signifier ‘security’ might on the contrary subordinate these issues to governmental security agencies, thus foreclosing the range of political options available to deal with the issues. Even if securitization is a political process, it might legitimate practices that depoliticize the approach to the securitized issues (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998; Olsson, 2006a,b) by giving preference to coercive approaches. This can be seen as a first aspect of the security trap. The precise mechanisms through which the process of securitization might lead to the involvement of coercive state agencies have, however, to be further analysed. Drawing on the work of French historian Jean Delumeau (1986), Bigo has shown that the securitization of societal issues raises the issue of protection by insecuritizing the audience the security discourses are addressing. This insecuritization will translate into a social demand for the intervention of coercive state agencies through reassurance discourses and protection techniques. In other words, the processes of securitization and of insecuritization are inseparable. This leads him to speak of the process of (in)securitization (Bigo, 1995). This means that one is confronted with a security dilemma: the more one tries to securitize social phenomena in order to ensure ‘security’, the more one creates (intentionally or non-intentionally) a feeling of insecurity. This happens, for example, when the military is called in to patrol streets in order to prevent terrorist attacks. Even if the underlying idea is to reassure the population, it might also create a feeling of panic (Guittet, 2006). As a logical consequence, the politics of maximal security are also politics of maximal anxiety. This is the second aspect of the security trap. The irony is that even the most careful and critical scholar aiming at avoid- ing the first and second traps might unwillingly participate in the securitiztion of new issues when analysing how these issues are de facto framed in terms of security. When analysing the securitization of a phenomenon, how can one avoid playing into the hands of the ‘deep structures’ of the security discourse and thus participating in its discursive securitization? This question of the ‘normative dilemma of security studies’ is the third aspect of the security trap. Highlighting the non-intentional and adverse effects of analysing the widening of security, it remains the most difficult to handle (Huysmans, 1998a).

### AT: Realism Inevitable

#### Realism is self-constitutive—states create the rules of the international system, if they act differently, the system adapts.

Wendt 99—Associate Professor of Political Science at Yale [1999, Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, p. 331-2]

The underlying logic here is the self-fulfilling prophecy: by treating the Other as if he is supposed to respond a certain way Alter and Ego will eventually learn shared ideas that generate those responses, and then by taking those ideas as their starting point they will tend to reproduce them in subsequent interactions. Identities and interests are not only learned in interaction, in other words, but sustained by it. The mass of relatively stable interactions known as “society” depends on the success of such self-fulfilling prophecies in ever day life.’ Although he does not distinguish between the behavioral and construction effects of interaction, this idea is nicely captured by what Morton Deutsch calls “the crude law of social relations”: “[t]he characteristic processes and effects elicited by any given type of social relation tend also to induce that type of social relation,”44 to which we might add “mediated by power relations.” From the “Crude Law” can be drawn the conclusion that the most important thing in social life is how actors represent Self and Other. These representations are the starting point for interaction, and the medium by which they determine who they are, what they want, and how they should behave. Society, in short, is “what people make of it,” and as corporate “people” this should be no less true of states in anarchical society. Which brings us to the question of how states might learn the egoistic conceptions of security that underpin Hobbesian cultures. We have already shown how states might become egoists through natural selection and imitation. They might also do so through learning. The key is how Alter and Ego represent themselves in the beginning of their encounter, since this will determine the logic of the ensuing interaction. If Ego casts Alter in the role of an object to be manipulated for the gratification of his own needs (or, equivalently, takes the role of egoist for himself), then he will engage in behavior that does not take Alter’s security needs into account in anything but a purely instrumental sense. If Alter correctly reads Ego’s “perspective” he will “reflect” Ego’s “appraisal” back on himself, and conclude that he has no standing or rights in this relationship. This will threaten Alter’s basic needs, and as such rather than simply accept this positioning Alter will adopt an egoistic identity himself (egoism being a response to the belief that others will not meet one’s needs), and act accordingly toward Ego. Eventually, by repeatedly engaging in practices that ignore each other’s needs, or practices of power politics, Alter and Ego will create and internalize the shared knowledge that they are enemies, locking in a Hobbesian structure. The self-fulfilling prophecy here, in other words, is “Realism” [sic] itself.50 If states start out thinking like “Realists” then that is what they will teach each other to be, and the kind of anarchy they will make.

#### Realism can’t be inevitable—there is no constitutive rule to explain how states became realist. Just because they act realist now doesn’t make it inevitable.

Ruggie 98—Dean of the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University [Autumn 1998, John Gerard Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge,” *International Organization* 52.4, Ebsco]

Perhaps the most consequential difference between neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, on the one hand, and social constructivism, on the other, has to do with the distinction between constitutive and regulative rules. The distinction goes back to a seminal article by John Rawls.(n93) Searle offers an easier point of entry. Let us begin with a simple illustration. We can readily imagine the act of driving a car existing prior to the rule that specified "drive on the right(left)-hand side of the road." In an account perfectly consistent with neo-utilitarianism, the rule would have been instituted as a function of increased traffic and growing numbers of fender-benders. Specifying which side of the road to drive on is an example of a regulative rule; as the term implies, it regulates an antecedently existing activity. To this rule were soon added others, such as those requiring licenses, yielding at intersections, imposing speed limits, and forbidding driving while under the influence of alcohol. Now imagine a quite different situation: playing the game of chess. "It is not the case," Searle notes sardonically, "that there were a lot of people pushing bits of wood around on boards, and in order to prevent them from bumping into each other all the time and creating traffic jams, we had to regulate the activity. Rather, the rules of chess create the very possibility of playing chess. The rules are constitutive of chess in the sense that playing chess is constituted in part by acting in accord with the rules."(n94) Regulative rules are intended to have causal effects--getting people to approximate the speed limit, for example. Constitutive rules define the set of practices that make up a particular class of consciously organized social activity--that is to say, they specify what counts as that activity. This basic distinction permits us to identify an utterly profound gap in neoutilitarianism: it lacks any concept of constitutive rules. Its universe of discourse consists entirely of antecedently existing actors and their behavior, and its project is to explain the character and efficacy of regulative rules in coordinating them. This gap accounts for the fact that, within their theoretical terms, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism are capable of explaining the origins of virtually nothing that is constitutive of the very possibility of international relations: not territorial states, not systems of states, not any concrete international order, nor the whole host of institutional forms that states use, ranging from the concept of contracts and treaties to multilateral organizing principles. All are assumed to exist already or are misspecified. Why is this the case, and is it inherent to the enterprise? The reason is not difficult to decipher: neo-utilitarian models of international relations are imported from economics. It is universally acknowledged that the economy is embedded in broader social, political, and legal institutional frameworks that make it possible to conduct economic relations--which are constitutive of economic relations. Modern economic theory does not explain the origins of markets; it takes their existence for granted. The problem arises because, when neo-utilitarian models are imported into other fields, they leave those constitutive frameworks behind. This problem appears not to matter for some (as yet unspecified) range of political phenomena, domestic and international, which has been explored by means of microeconomic models and the microfoundations of which are now far better understood than before. But there are certain things that these models are incapable of doing. Accounting for constitutive roles--which they were not responsible for in economics--is among the most important.(n95) Nor can this defect be remedied within the neo-utilitarian apparatus. Alexander James Field has demonstrated from within the neoclassical tradition, and Robert Brenner the neo-Marxist, that marginal utility analysis cannot account for the constitutive rules that are required to generate market rationality and markets(n96)--an insight that Weber had already established at the turn of the century(n97) and Polanyi demonstrated powerfully a half century ago.(n98) The terms of a theory cannot explain the conditions necessary for that theory to function, because no theory can explain anything until its necessary preconditions hold. So it is with modern economic theory.

#### Purported objectivity and inevitability of realism sanctions mass violence—human history disproves this kind of determinism.

Kraig 2 [Robert Alexander Kraig is Wisconsin state political director for Service Employees International Union (SEIU). He is also an instructor in the Communication Department at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. Rhetoric & Public Affairs 5.1 (2002) 1-30]

Given the claimed inevitability of realism’s description of international politics, one might think that nations need not look to expert guidance because power interests will inevitably determine governmental policy. But the realists, while embracing determinism, simultaneously argue that human nature is repeatedly violated. One traditional claim has been that America, because of its unique history, has been ever in danger of ignoring the dictates of the foreign policy scene. This argument is offered by Henry Kissinger in his avowedly Morgenthauian work Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. 21 Realists also argue that there are idealists in all human societies who refuse to see the reality of power. As Richard W. Cottam, a trenchant critic of orthodox realism, explained the argument: "Every era has its incorrigible idealists who persist in seeing evil man as good. When they somehow gain power and seek to put their ideas into effect, Machiavellians who understand man’s true nature appear and are more than willing and more than capable of exploiting this eternal naivete." 22 Cottam was referring to one of the central ideological constructs of international relations theory—the realist/idealist dichotomy. First explicated in detail by Morgenthau in his Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, 23 this dichotomy is used to discredit leaders who dare to consider transcending or transforming established patterns of global competition. This construct is enriched by the narratives of failed idealists—most prominently Tsar Alexander the First, Woodrow Wilson, Neville Chamberlain, and Jimmy Carter—men who, despite and in fact because of their good intentions, caused untold human suffering. After World War II, realists built their conception of leadership on a negative caricature of Woodrow Wilson. 24 As George Kennan, one of the primary architects of Cold War policy, warned in 1945: "If we insist at this moment in our history in wandering about with our heads in the clouds of Wilsonean idealism . . . we run the risk of losing even that bare minimum of security which would be assured to us by the maintenance of humane, stable, and cooperative forms of society on the immediate European shores of the Atlantic." 25 Wilson’s supposed idealism was said by the emerging realist scholars to have led to the unstable international political structure that caused World War II [End Page 6] and now threatened the postwar balance of forces. Despite convincing refutations by the leading historians of Wilson’s presidency, most recently John Milton Cooper Jr. in his definitive study of the League of Nations controversy, realists continue to caricature Wilson as a fuzzy-headed idealist. 26 Idealists, in realist writings, all share a fatal flaw: an inability to comprehend the realities of power. They live in a world of unreality, responding to nonexistent scenes. As Riker put it, "Unquestionably, there are guilt-ridden and shame-conscious men who do not desire to win, who in fact desire to lose. These are irrational ones in politics." 27 It is here that the realist expert comes in. It is assumed that strategic doctrine can be rationally and objectively established. According to Kissinger, a theorist who later became a leading practitioner, "it is the task of strategic doctrine to translate power into policy." The science of international relations claims the capacity to chart the foreign policy scene and then establish the ends and means of national policy. This objective order can only be revealed by rational and dispassionate investigators who are well-schooled in the constraints and possibilities of power politics. Realism’s scenic character makes it a radically empirical science. As Morgenthau put it, the political realist "believes in the possibility of distinguishing in politics between truth and opinion—between what is true objectively and rationally supported by evidence and illuminated by reason, and what is only subjective judgement." Avowedly modernist in orientation, realism claims to be rooted not in a theory of how international relations ought to work, but in a privileged reading of a necessary and predetermined foreign policy environment. 28 In its orthodox form political realism assumes that international politics are and must be dominated by the will to power. Moral aspirations in the international arena are merely protective coloration and propaganda or the illusions that move hopeless idealists. What is most revealing about this assessment of human nature is not its negativity but its fatalism. There is little if any place for human moral evolution or perfectibility. Like environmental determinism—most notably the social darwinism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—political realism presumes that human social nature, even if ethically deplorable, cannot be significantly improved upon. From the stationary perspective of social scientific realism in its pure form, the fatal environment of human social interaction can be navigated but not conquered. Description, in other words, is fate. All who dare to challenge the order—Carter’s transgression—will do much more damage than good. The idealist makes a bad situation much worse by imagining a better world in the face of immutable realities. As one popular saying among foreign policy practitioners goes: "Without vision, men die. With it, more men die." 70 (continued) The implications of this social philosophy are stark. Tremendous human suffering can be rationalized away as the inevitable product of the impersonal international system of power relations. World leaders are actively encouraged by the realists to put aside moral pangs of doubt and play the game of international politics according to the established rules of political engagement. This deliberate limitation of interest excuses leaders from making hard moral choices. While a moralist Protestant like Jimmy Carter sees history as a progressive moral struggle to realize abstract ideals in the world, the realist believes that it is dangerous to struggle against the inexorable. The moral ambiguities of political and social ethics that have dogged philosophy and statesmanship time out of mind are simply written out of the equation. Since ideals cannot be valid in a social scientific sense, they cannot be objectively true. The greatest barrier to engaging the realists in serious dialogue about their premises is that they deny that these questions can be seriously debated. First, realists teach a moral philosophy that denies itself. There is exceedingly narrow ground, particularly in the technical vocabulary of the social sciences, for discussing the moral potential of humanity or the limitations of human action. Yet, as we have seen in the tragedy of Jimmy Carter, a philosophical perspective on these very questions is imparted through the back door. It is very hard to argue with prescription under the guise of description. The purveyors of this philosophical outlook will not admit this to themselves, let alone to potential interlocutors. [End Page 21] Second, and most importantly, alternative perspectives are not admitted as possibilities—realism is a perspective that as a matter of first principles denies all others. There is, as we have seen in the Carter narrative, alleged to be an immutable reality that we must accept to avoid disastrous consequences. Those who do not see this underlying order of things are idealists or amateurs. Such people have no standing in debate because they do not see the intractable scene that dominates human action. Dialogue is permissible within the parameters of the presumed order, but those who question the existence or universality of this controlling scene are beyond debate. Third, the environmental determinism of political realism, even though it is grounded in human social nature, is antihumanist. Much of the democratic thought of the last 200 years is grounded on the idea that humanity is in some sense socially self-determining. Society as social contract is a joint project which, over time, is subject to dialectical improvement. Foreign policy realism, as we have seen, presupposes that there is an order to human relations that is beyond the power of humans to mediate. 71 When you add to this the moral imperative to be faithful to the order (the moral of the Carter narrative), then democratic forms lose a great deal of their value. Indeed, there has been a great deal of hand wringing in international relations literature about how the masses are inexorably drawn to idealists like Carter and Wilson. Morgenthau states this much more frankly than most of his intellectual descendants: [the] thinking required for the successful conduct of foreign policy can be diametrically opposed to the rhetoric and action by which the masses and their representatives are likely to be moved. . . . The statesman must think in terms of the national interest, conceived as power among other powers. The popular mind, unaware of the fine distinctions of the statesman’s thinking, reasons more often than not in the simple moralistic and legalistic terms of absolute good and absolute evil. 72 Some realists, based on this empirical observation, openly propose that a realist foreign policy be cloaked in a moral facade so that it will be publicly palatable. Kissinger’s mistake, they say, was that he was too honest. Morgenthau concludes that "the simple philosophy and techniques of the moral crusade are useful and even indispensable for the domestic task of marshaling public opinion behind a given policy; they are but blunt weapons in the struggle of nations for dominance over the minds of men." If one believes that social scientists have unique access to an inexorable social reality which is beyond the control of humanity—and which it is social suicide to ignore—it is easy to see how democratic notions of consent and self-determination can give way to the reign of manipulative propaganda. 73 There is another lesson that can be drawn from the savaging of Carter in international relations scholarship for those who seek to broaden the terms of American foreign policy thought and practice. Those who would challenge the realist orthodoxy [End Page 22] face a powerful rhetorical arsenal that will be used to deflect any serious dialogue on the fundamental ethical and strategic assumptions of realism. Careful and balanced academic critiques, although indispensable, are unlikely to be a match for such formidable symbolic ammunition. Post-realism, if it is to make any advance against the realist battlements, must marshal equally powerful symbolic resources. What is needed, in addition to academic critiques aimed at other scholars, is a full-blooded antirealist rhetoric. It must be said, in the strongest possible terms, that realism engenders an attitude of cynicism and fatalism in those who would otherwise engage the great moral and political questions of our age. 74 History is replete with ideals that, after much time and effort, matured into new social realities. In the not-so-distant past, republican governance on a mass scale and socially active government were empirical impossibilities. However halting and imperfect these historical innovations may be, they suggest the power of ideals and the possibility of human social transformation. On the other hand, fatalism fulfills itself. The surest way to make a situation impossible is to imagine it so. This is a tragic irony we should strive to avoid, no matter how aesthetically fitting it may be.

### AT: Realism Inevitable [Empiricism]

#### Realism can’t explain numerous actions—empirical evidence proves identity and culture influenced decisions.

Macdonald 2k—Associate Professor of Political Science at Colgate University [2000, Douglas J. Macdonald, “Making Realism Face the Facts,” SAIS Review 20.2, Project Muse]

With the end of the Cold War, neither Classical Realism nor Neorealism proved useful in explaining the behavior of the major states, especially that of the former Soviet Union. According to the predictions inferred from the theories, states are not supposed to contract their international power position voluntarily, as did the Soviets. Realists had a great deal of difficulty explaining Gorbachev’s "new thinking" on foreign affairs--Classical Realists because they assumed states wanted to expand their power as a constant, and Neorealists because there had been no structural changes that could [End Page 232] explain the collapse of the Soviet empire. Ideas, it seemed, were more important than either of the Realisms had recognized. The new information emerging from the archives of the former communist countries, although incomplete to say the least, directly challenged the idea that ideology was not important in decision-making in those countries. For example, Stalin, long described by many as the supremely cautious power realist, appears to have given North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung permission to strike south in 1950 as part of a regional plan to spread communist ideology in the midst of the "crisis of capitalism." The move was not, as Realists had assumed, merely to gain territorial control for security reasons. If one consults the new documentation, Stalin was genuinely interested in spreading communist revolution. In response to these failures of Realist theory, new works appeared that moved away from the rationalist, structuralist paradigm of Neorealism. They brought back factors such as culture, ideology, and human agency more generally in ways that had been downplayed or ignored by both Classical and Neorealist theory for years. 1 Although the new Culturalists have made some creative theoretical critiques of Realism, their efforts have been criticized for a paucity of detailed empirical work. Stephen Morris chimes into this debate with his recent book, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia: Political Culture and the Causes of War. With the skills of an historian and the social science perspective of a political scientist, Morris has written one of the first Culturalist theoretical studies that includes impressive empirical detail, especially that obtained from the archives of the former Soviet Union. Drawing threads from secondary sources, public materials, and newly available archival information, Morris weaves a complicated tale of relations among the communist states of the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam, and Cambodia. He believes the primary challenge for Neorealists is to explain explaining why the weaker states in the Sino-Soviet, Sino-Vietnamese, and Viet-Cambodian relationships acted in ways that ran against their basic security interests when the contradictions were obvious. Why, for example, did the Cambodians disregard their huge military disparity vis-à-vis the Vietnamese? His sensible answer is that rationalist or structuralist assumptions do not capture the complicated mixture of received political cultures; the simultaneously fanatical and paranoid fervor of newly victorious and highly ideological regimes; and the historical rivalries and hatreds that even [End Page 233] communist internationalism could never completely overcome. These qualities, which characterized the regimes in Phnom Penh and Hanoi in the 1970s, and Beijing in an earlier period, do not fit easily into Realist theory. In other words, highly ideological, revolutionary regimes do not always act in the rationalist ways ascribed to them by the Realists. Morris then offers a broad definition of political culture as an alternative approach to understanding these phenomena. Clearly in the new Culturalist camp, Morris does not believe that Classical Realism and Neorealism are wrong, but rather that they are incomplete. Cultural and ideological factors must also be considered to explain state behavior.

### 2NC AT: Murray/Guzini

#### The alternative enriches and sustains realism—recognizing the social and psychological basis of enemy discourse is crucial to overcome security dilemmas and ameliorate realism’s blind spots—ensures a more authentic engagement with realism

Niarguinen 1 [Dmitri Niarguinen, Rubikon, E-journal, ISSN 1505-1161, December, 2001, <http://venus.ci.uw.edu.pl/~rubikon/forum.htm>]

Morgenthau’s state-centric theory is clearly set, but it is not to say he envisages it as being pre-destined and unchangeable. The political, cultural and strategic environment will largely determine the forms of power a state chooses to exercise, just as the types of power which feature in human relationships change over time. In addition, Realists should not be wedded to a perennial connection between interest and the nation-state which is ‘a product of history, and therefore bound to disappear’[19]. Later (in 1970) Morgenthau anticipated that the forces of globalization would render the nation-state no longer valid: “the sovereign nation-state is in the process of becoming obsolete”[20]. He stresses that a final task that a theory of international relations can and must perform is to prepare the ground for a new international order radically different from that which preceded it[21]. Kenneth Waltz’s neo-realism is both a critique of traditional realism and a substantial intellectual extension of a theoretical tradition which was in danger of being outflanked by rapid changes in the contours of global politics[22]. The international system (anarchy) is treated as a separate domain which conditions the behavior of all states within it. Paradoxically, with the advent of neo-realism, the scope and flexibility of Realism have significantly diminished. The theory has become deterministic, linear, and culturally poor. For neo-realists, culture and identity are (at best) derivative of the distribution of capabilities and have no independent explanatory power. Actors deploy culture and identity strategically, to further their own self-interests[23]. Nevertheless, it is wrong to assert that neo-realist perspectives do not acknowledge the importance of social facts. Gilpin has developed a compelling argument about war and change[24]. While his book is built on (micro)economic premises, he does not neglect sociological insights as necessary for understanding the context of rational behavior. "Specific interests or objectives that individuals pursue and the appropriateness of the means they employ are dependent on prevailing social norms and material environment…In short, the economic and sociological approaches must be integrated to explain political change"[25]. Waltz was implicitly talking about identity when he argued that anarchic structures tend to produce “like units”[26]. He allows for what he calls ‘socialization’ and ‘imitation’ processes. Stephen Krasner suggested that regimes could change state interests[27]. Regimes are an area where knowledge should be taken seriously. If regimes matter, then cognitive understanding can matter as well[28]. Realism is not necessarily about conflict; material forces may as well lead to cooperation. However, the minimalist treatment of culture and social phenomena increasingly proved neo-realism as losing ground empirically and theoretically. It was the suspicion that the international system is transforming itself culturally faster than would have been predictable from changes in military and economic capabilities that triggered the interest in problems of identity[29]. Reconstruction of the theory was vital in order to save Realism from becoming obsolete. The realization of this fact has triggered a shift in Realist thinking and gave way to the emergence of a ‘constructivist’ re-incarnation of Realism. Friedrich Kratochwil has once observed that no theory of culture can substitute for a theory of politics[30]. At least, nobody has ventured to accomplish such an enterprise so far. To disregard culture in politics, it seems obvious today, is inappropriate, not to say foolish. There remain opportunity costs incurred by Realism in its asymmetric engagement with cultural phenomena. Thus, Realism, notwithstanding its concern with parsimony, should make a serious commitment to building analytical bridges which link identity- and culture-related phenomena to its explanatory apparatus (like anarchy, sovereignty, the security dilemma, self-help, and balancing)[31]. Alexander Wendt in his seminal article “Anarchy Is What States Make of It” has masterfully shown how power politics is socially constructed[32]. Salus populi supreme lex. This classical metalegal doctrine of necessity is associated with raison d’etat, the right of preservation, and self-help. Wendt is convinced that the self-help corollary to anarchy does enormous work in Realism, generating the inherently competitive dynamics of the security dilemma and collective action problem[33]. What misses the point, however, is that self-help and power politics follow either logically or causally from anarchy. They do not; rather, they are just among other institutions (albeit significant ones) possible under anarchy. Consequently, provided there is relatively stable practice, international institutions can transform state identities and interests. Let me focus on two concrete security issues - the security dilemma and nuclear deterrence - to illustrate the point. A central tenet of Realism, the security dilemma[34], arises for the situation when “one actor’s quest for security through power accumulation ... exacerbates the feelings of insecurity of another actor, who in turn will respond by accumulating power”[35]. As a result of this behavior, a vicious circle or spiral of security develops, with fear and misperception exacerbating the situation[36]. Nevertheless, security dilemmas, as Wendt stresses, are not given by anarchy or nature[37]. Security dilemmas are constructed because identities and interests are constituted by collective meanings which are always in process. This is why concepts of security may differ in the extent to which and the manner in which the self is identified cognitively with the other. Because deterrence is based on ideas about threat systems and conditional commitments to carry out punishment, it has proved particularly congenial to the strategic studies scholarship within the Realist tradition[38]. Deterrence is a conditional commitment to retaliate, or to exact retribution if another party fails to behave in a desired, compliant manner. Thus defined, deterrence has been invoked as the primary explanation for the non-use of nuclear weapons. The nuclear case, in contrast to chemical weapons, for example, is definitely problematic for challenging traditional deterrence theory because it is widely felt that the tremendous destructive power of thermonuclear weapons does render them qualitatively different from other weapons. Yet, the patterns of the non-use of nuclear weapons cannot be fully understood without taking into account the development of norms that shaped these weapons as unacceptable. By applying social constructivist approach, it is possible to emphasize the relationship between norms, identities, and interests and try to provide a causal explanation of how the norms affect outcomes[39]. Norms shape conceptualizations of interests through the social construction of identities. In other words, a constructivist account is necessary to get at ‘what deters,’ and how and why deterrence ‘works’ [40]. International relations theory cannot afford to ignore norms. Demonstrating the impact of norms on the interests, beliefs, and behavior of actors in international politics does not and must not invalidate Realism. Rather, it points to analytical blind spots and gaps in traditional accounts. In so doing, it not only casts light into the shadows of existing theory but raises new questions as well.[41] However, with all the ‘constructivist’ adjustments made (which are absolutely credible), it is important to keep in mind ‘pure rationalist’ tools as well. Krasner points out that whenever the cost-benefit ratio indicates that breaking its rules will bring a net benefit that is what states will do[42]. Wendt introduces a correction that instrumentalism may be the attitude when states first settle on norms, and "continue(s) to be for poorly organized states down the road"[43]. States obey the law initially because they are forced to or calculate that it is in their self-interest. Some states never get beyond this point. Some do, and then obey the law because they accept its claims on them as legitimate[44]. This is truly an excellent observation. The problem here, however, could be that even when states remove the option of breaking the law from their agenda, this already implies that benefits overweight costs. And even if this is not the case, how can we know where exactly this point is, beyond which states respect law for law’s sake? Furthermore, states that supposedly have stepped over this point might break the law, when it has become least expected, if they consider this of their prime interest. Powerful illustration of this is France, which resumed its nuclear testing to the great surprise of the world[45]. Another interesting example is the case of NATO. Traditional alliance theories based on Realist thinking provide insufficient explanations of the origins, the interaction patterns, and the persistence of NATO. The ‘brand new’ interpretation is that the Alliance represents an institutionalized pluralistic community of liberal democracies. Democracies not only do not fight each other, they are likely to develop a collective identity facilitating the emergence of cooperative institutions for specific purposes[46]. Thus presented, old questions get revitalized. Why is NATO the strongest among the other post-Cold War security institutions—as compared to, the WEU, not even to mention the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy? Why is not the OSCE given a chance to turn into a truly pluralistic European ‘Security Architecture’? Why was NATO so eager to bomb Kosovo, which was a clear breach of international law? Because it is ‘an institutionalized pluralistic community of liberal democracies’? Or yet because it is a predominantly military organization? Why do public opinion polls in Russia[47] repeatedly show that NATO is an aggressive organization (and which can also be observed in official rhetoric, as in the national security conception and the military doctrine[48])? All these questions suggest that to claim that Realist explanation of NATO existence can be thrown into a dustbin is at minimum inappropriate. Social sciences do not evolve via scientific revolutions, as Thomas Kuhn argues is the case for the natural sciences. Not paradigm shifts but rather style and fashion changes are what characterize social science[49]. Thus posed, paradigm development promises Realism a bright future. In this respect, recent success of constructivism has, metaphorically speaking, breathed in a new life into Realism. Realism is in much debt to constructivism for being revitalized. Yet, paying full credit to the contribution of constructivism, it should be noted that to a large extent constructivists take off from the Realist positions.

#### Realism is only as inevitable as they make it—their overly reductive and inflexible use of realism shuts off critical reflection

Niarguinen 1 [Dmitri Niarguinen, Rubikon, E-journal, ISSN 1505-1161, December, 2001, <http://venus.ci.uw.edu.pl/~rubikon/forum.htm>]

Thus, it can be argued that what we observe is the continuity of the process rather than a radical change. Put bluntly, if Realism is constructed and then is being analyzed in sociological and psychological terms, it does not cease being Realism. Constructivists have just built another layer (of culture and ideas) onto the material base of Realism. This is why constructivism has enriched rather than overthrown Realist theory. For the genuine link between constructivism and Realism to be taken seriously, certain elaborations are in order. It is tempting, and, indeed, has been common practice to polarize and dichotomize two grand standpoints: positivism and reflectivism. While positivism has been a dominant notion for at least two centuries now, reflectivism seems to be increasingly gaining momentum and may, over time, switch the pendulum to the other extreme. The tendency is out there: under the banner of reflectivism, scholars receive an opportunity to criticize everything which has a grain of rationality. This might lead to either ‘Sokal-hoax’ type incidents[50] or to a new dogma. In the light of strict positivist/reflectivist dichotomy, hard-core rigid Realism is rightly accused of being blind and stumble. To the same degree may hyper-reflectivism be accused of being chaotic, utopian and irrelevant[51]. Instead of this black-and-white division, we are much more flexible to view things in the shades of gray. To operate on the rationalist/reflectivist continuum then would rather be a virtue than a vice. It is thus important to move from instrumental rationality (Zweckrationalitaet) to value-rationality (Wertrationalitaet).[52] Equally is it important to stay away from pure ideas of reflectivism, which like Sirens in Homer’s Odyssey are luring scholars onto the rocks. As Alexander Wendt has indicated, ideas, after all, are not all the way down. To counter an argument that reflectivism and positivism are epistemologically incompatible, it is plausible to say that much cooperation is possible on the ontological basis alone. Indeed, neither positivism, nor reflectivism tells us about the structure and dynamics of international life. The state of the social sciences of international relations is such that epistemological prescriptions and conclusions are at best premature[53]. With all my attachment to Realism, there are certain pitfalls to be aware of and to avoid. What I do not argue about is Realism being an all-encompassing thought trespassing all possible borders and conquering both terra incognita and terra cognita. In a world full of anomalies, Realism is neither sufficiently established nor sufficiently precise to be treated as a sacrosanct paradigm to which other lines of argumentation must defer[54]. Moreover, it is a matter of attitude. Neoliberalists could claim with the same success that constructivism, for example, is doing a great job on their behalf[55]. Also, there is scholarship working on the extreme polar of reflectivism. Being appealing and powerful, it is unbridgeable epistemologically with Realism not only at the extreme positivist polar but even on the ‘gray territory’. To disregard or downplay this school would be, to say the least, inadequate. Having acknowledged this, however, it is tempting to illustrate on the example of the English School of Realism how indeed far Realism can stretch[56]. For the English School, international system is a ‘society’ in which states, as a condition of their participation in the system, adhere to shared norms and rules in a variety of issue areas. Material power matters, but within a framework of normative expectations embedded in conventional and customary international law. Sociological imaginary is strong in the English School: it is not a great leap from arguing that adherence to norms is a condition of participation in a society to arguing that states are constructed, partly or substantially, by these norms[57]. The English School thinkers encourage us to think about international relations as a social arena whose members—sovereign states—relate to each other not only as competitors for power and wealth, but also as holders of particular rights, entitlements, and obligations. In terms of method, they emphasize the importance of a historical approach. Michael Walzer and John Vincent are particularly concerned with the relationship between human rights and the rights of sovereign states[58]. They seek ways in which to reconcile the society of states with cosmopolitan values. Terry Nardin, building his theory on the ideas of political philosopher Michael Oakenshott, argues that international society is best seen as a practical association made up of states each devoted to its own ends and its own conception of the good. The common good of this inclusive community resides not in the ends that some, or at times most, of its members may wish collectively to pursue but in the values of justice, peace, security, and co-existence, which can only be enjoyed through participation in a common body of authoritative practices.[59] Martin Wight’s triptych of international thought is extremely eclectic, not simply because of his refusal to delineate these ‘traditions’ with any philosophical or analytic precision, but also because of his personal reluctance either to transcend them or to locate his own views consistently with the parameters of any single one[60]. Wight has written widely about the cultural and moral dimensions of international relations, and his work is a constant reminder that what may appear to be new disputes in the field about contemporary issues are in fact extensions and manifestations of very old arguments, although couched in a different idiom. It is now acknowledged that the English School is an underutilized research resource and deserves a prominent role in international relations because of its distinctive elements: methodological pluralism, historicism, and its inter-linkage of three key concepts: international system, international society, and world community.[61] International system, thus, is associated with recurrent patterns of behavior that can be identified using positivist tools of analysis. By contrast, international society needs to be explored using hermeneutic methods that focus on the language that lies behind the rules, institutions, interests, and values that constitute any society. Finally, world community can only meaningfully be discussed by drawing on critical theory. To refigure the value of Realism in a period of rapid systemic change means to interpret it as an ongoing discursive struggle that cuts across the traditional theory-practice, and other synchronic and scholastic antinomies of world politics. It gives notice of how Realism in its universalistic philosophical form and particularistic state application has figuratively and literally helped to constitute the discordant world it purports to describe[62]. This is an attempt to open up the hermeneutic circle, to enlarge the interpretive community, “to break out of the prison-house of a reductive vocabulary that has so attenuated the ethico-political dimension of realism”[63]. Thus, it is important to consider the paradox that the power of Realism lies not in its immanence but in its distance from reality, from realities of contingency, ambiguity, and indeterminacy that Realism tries to keep at bay. \*\*\* It is often argued that globalization - the growth of transnational economic forces, combined with a growing irrelevance of territorial control to economic growth and the international division of labor - rendered Realism obsolete, with the end of the Cold war as a fatal blow for the theory. Has, indeed, Realism become anachronistic? If it were a monolithic rigid theory, the answer would probably be ‘yes.’ I have argued, however, that Realism is not homogeneous; rather, it has an irreducible core which is able to create flexible incarnations. At minimum, Realism offers an orienting framework of analysis that gives the field of security studies much of its intellectual coherence and commonality of outlook[64]. This is true even if Realism stays on the extreme polar of positivism. However, positivism/rationalism in a pure form is of little value. In the words of the Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, “the approach of ‘rational behavior,’ as it is typically interpreted, leads to a remarkably mute theory…”[65]. Realism needs not be predestined to remain stagnant[66]. At maximum, thus, when Realism operates in the shades of gray between positivism and reflectivism, its strength is paramount. Consequently, there are good reasons for thinking that the twenty-first century will be a Realist century[67]. Once again I want to stress that Realism should not be perceived as dogmatic. And this is why we do need reflectivist approaches to problematize what is self-evident, and thus to counterbalance naive Realism[68]. In doing so, however, we are more flexible in keeping the ‘middle ground’ and not in sliding to the other extreme. As Wendt believes, in the medium run, sovereign states will remain the dominant political actors in the international system[69]. While this contention is arguable, it is hardly possible to challenge his psychological observation, …Realist theory of state interests in fact naturalizes or reifies a particular culture and in so doing helps reproduce it. Since the social practices is how we get structure—structure is carried in the heads of agents and is instantiated in their practices—the more that states think like “Realist” the more that egoism, and its systemic corollary of self-help, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy[70]. Even strong constructivists admit that we cannot do away with Realism simply because it is “a still necessary hermeneutical bridge to the understanding of world politics”[71]. Ergo, ita est.

### 2NC AT: Guzinni

#### Guzinni’s conclusions are based on a warped understanding of IR that overemphasizes realism

Makinda 99 [Samuel M. Makinda, School of Politics and International Studies Murdoch University Australian Journal of International Affairs, Nov 1999, Vol. 53, Issue 3 p.334]

Guzzini observes that realism cannot offer a proper understanding of world politics. He argues that attempts ‘to save realism as the discipline’s identity defining theory’ have failed because currently there is no work that provides a meta-theoretically coherent realism. Guzzini therefore posits that realist scholars face a fundamental dilemma. They can update the practical knowledge of a diplomatic culture, rather than science, and thereby risk losing scientific credibility. Alternatively, they can cast realist rules and culture into a scientific mould, but this will distort the realist tradition. Guzzini concludes that ‘despite realism’s several deaths as a general causal theory, it can still powerfully enframe action’. Guzzini presents a powerful and illuminating argument, but his analysis raises some questions. First, Guzzini’s argument is basically another distortion of the evolution of IR. While Guzzini claims that IR dates back to the 1940s and attributes its establishment to Morgenthau, there is evidence that the discipline is much older and emerged as part of political science long before the US became a superpower. Second, Guzzini has placed too much emphasis on a symbiotic relationship between the American foreign policy establishment and the evolution of IR. Even Morgenthau, the so-called ‘founding father’ of IR, was opposed to the US involvement in Vietnam. Third, Guzzini has overemphasised the identification of IR with realism. His attempt to identify realism with IR has made it difficult for him to consider the works of theorists like Michael Doyle and Bruce Russett on the ‘democratic peace’ thesis. Indeed, what Guzzini has done is provide a reconstructed and partially distorted history of IR, which can be denigrated and maligned much more easily by post-structuralists, post-modernists, feminists and critical theorists.

#### Guzinni incorrectly credits realism as an unchallenged theory

Rologas 2K [Mitchell Rologas, University of St Andrews International Affairs, Jan 2K, Vol. 76, Issue 1 p. 141]

This is a stimulating work which, for all the excellence of some of its individual components, nevertheless does not add up to a convincing whole. Guzzini’s interpretation of realism as ‘the attempt to translate the rules of the diplomatic practice of the nineteenth century into scientific rules of social science which developed mainly in the US’ (p. 11) is plausible enough but his treatment of the historical assimilation is questionable. He repeats the tired old myth that there was an interwar ‘debate’ between idealism and realism (p. 32). Not only do scholars investigating the period find little evidence for such a debate, but they also have considerable difficulty in separating the idealists from the realists (see for example the essays in David Long and Peter Wilson, eds., Thinker of the twenty-year crisis: inter-war realism reassessed, 1995). Was Chamberlain an idealist or a realist? E. H. Carr, as Guzzini is aware, gave different answers to this question in consecutive editions of his Twenty-year crisis. Certainly, if we accept Guzzini’s summary that ‘in short, idealism holds that through reason alone mankind can overcome the state of nature in inter-state relations’ (p. 17) we will be hard pressed to identify very many idealists at all. This is important because Guzzini wishes to resurrect the Kuhnian notion of ‘paradigms’ in suggesting that there was a paradigmatic shift from idealism to realism as the dominant paradigm after the Second World War. I doubt whether realism has ever enjoyed quite the unchallenged status that Guzzini ascribes to it, certainly nothing that would approach the Kuhnian state of ‘normal science.’ Hans Morgenthau--whose Politics among nations is described by Guzzini as ‘the paradigmatic text of the emerging US social science’ (p. 16)--had numerous detrators both within academe and in the broader policy-shaping networks. Guzzini sees the academic community as the ‘binding link’ between ‘the internal conceptual debates and the external context of realist thought’, describing this approach as ‘a historical sociology of a fairly limited kind’ (p. 2). It is, indeed, so limited as to hardly warrant the description at all. Guzzini has very little to tell us about the links between academe and government. Chapter two introduces Morgenthau and E. H. Carr as ‘the fouding fathers of the new descipline’ (p. 16) but in chapter four where Guzzini explores the formation of US foreign policy it is George Kennan who emerges as the most significant figure. To say merely that ‘realist thought developed in parallel with US foreign policy formulations’ (p. 49) is to side-step too many important questions. Guzzini acknowledges that the growth of hegemonic stability theory ‘epitomized again the close link between US foreign policy concerns and the research interests of the academia in international relations’ (p. 142) but if this ‘close link’ amounts to little more than trailing in the wake of the twists and turns of US foreign policy the discipline can hardly be worthy of its grandiose title. The absence of any attempt to explore these linakages helps to explain the self-contained feel of the individual chapters.

### AT: Human Nature is Self-Interested

#### This is a link—the assumption that humans are self-interested guarantees extinction and is disproven by recent scientific evidence—the communications revolution enables the creation of a cosmopolitan identity.

Rifkin 10—a senior lecturer at the Wharton School’s Executive Education Program at the University of Pennsylvania—the world’s #1 ranked business school, author, an advisor to the European Union since 2002, the founder and chairperson of the Third Industrial Revolution Global CEO Business Roundtable [January 11, 2010, Jeremy Rifkin, “‘The Empathic Civilization’: Rethinking Human Nature in the Biosphere Era,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeremy-rifkin/the-empathic-civilization\_b\_416589.html]

The problem runs deeper than the issue of finding new ways to regulate the market or imposing legally binding global green house gas emission reduction targets. The real crisis lies in the set of assumptions about human nature that governs the behavior of world leaders--assumptions that were spawned during the Enlightenment more than 200 years ago at the dawn of the modern market economy and the emergence of the nation state era.

The Enlightenment thinkers--John Locke, Adam Smith, Marquis de Condorcet et. al.--took umbrage with the Medieval Christian world view that saw human nature as fallen and depraved and that looked to salvation in the next world through God’s grace. They preferred to cast their lot with the idea that human beings’ essential nature is rational, detached, autonomous, acquisitive and utilitarian and argued that individual salvation lies in unlimited material progress here on Earth.

The Enlightenment notions about human nature were reflected in the newly minted nation-state whose raison d’être was to protect private property relations and stimulate market forces as well as act as a surrogate of the collective self-interest of the citizenry in the international arena. Like individuals, nation-states were considered to be autonomous agents embroiled in a relentless battle with other sovereign nations in the pursuit of material gains.

It was these very assumptions that provided the philosophical underpinnings for a geopolitical frame of reference that accompanied the first and second industrial revolutions in the 19th and 20th centuries. These beliefs about human nature came to the fore in the aftermath of the global economic meltdown and in the boisterous and acrimonious confrontations in the meeting rooms in Copenhagen, with potentially disastrous consequences for the future of humanity and the planet.

If human nature is as the Enlightenment philosophers claimed, then we are likely doomed. It is impossible to imagine how we might create a sustainable global economy and restore the biosphere to health if each and every one of us is, at the core of our biology, an autonomous agent and a self-centered and materialistic being.

Recent discoveries in brain science and child development, however, are forcing us to rethink these long-held shibboleths about human nature. Biologists and cognitive neuroscientists are discovering mirror-neurons--the so-called empathy neurons--that allow human beings and other species to feel and experience another’s situation as if it were one’s own. We are, it appears, the most social of animals and seek intimate participation and companionship with our fellows.

Social scientists, in turn, are beginning to reexamine human history from an empathic lens and, in the process, discovering previously hidden strands of the human narrative which suggests that human evolution is measured not only by the expansion of power over nature, but also by the intensification and extension of empathy to more diverse others across broader temporal and spatial domains. The growing scientific evidence that we are a fundamentally empathic species has profound and far-reaching consequences for society, and may well determine our fate as a species.

What is required now is nothing less than a leap to global empathic consciousness and in less than a generation if we are to resurrect the global economy and revitalize the biosphere. The question becomes this: what is the mechanism that allows empathic sensitivity to mature and consciousness to expand through history?

The pivotal turning points in human consciousness occur when new energy regimes converge with new communications revolutions, creating new economic eras. The new communications revolutions become the command and control mechanisms for structuring, organizing and managing more complex civilizations that the new energy regimes make possible. For example, in the early modern age, print communication became the means to organize and manage the technologies, organizations, and infrastructure of the coal, steam, and rail revolution. It would have been impossible to administer the first industrial revolution using script and codex.

Communication revolutions not only manage new, more complex energy regimes, but also change human consciousness in the process. Forager/hunter societies relied on oral communications and their consciousness was mythologically constructed. The great hydraulic agricultural civilizations were, for the most part, organized around script communication and steeped in theological consciousness. The first industrial revolution of the 19th century was managed by print communication and ushered in ideological consciousness. Electronic communication became the command and control mechanism for arranging the second industrial revolution in the 20th century and spawned psychological consciousness.

Each more sophisticated communication revolution brings together more diverse people in increasingly more expansive and varied social networks. Oral communication has only limited temporal and spatial reach while script, print and electronic communications each extend the range and depth of human social interaction.

By extending the central nervous system of each individual and the society as a whole, communication revolutions provide an evermore inclusive playing field for empathy to mature and consciousness to expand. For example, during the period of the great hydraulic agricultural civilizations characterized by script and theological consciousness, empathic sensitivity broadened from tribal blood ties to associational ties based on common religious affiliation. Jews came to empathize with Jews, Christians with Christians, Muslims with Muslims, etc. In the first industrial revolution characterized by print and ideological consciousness, empathic sensibility extended to national borders, with Americans empathizing with Americans, Germans with Germans, Japanese with Japanese and so on. In the second industrial revolution, characterized by electronic communication and psychological consciousness, individuals began to identify with like-minded others.

Today, we are on the cusp of another historic convergence of energy and communication--a third industrial revolution--that could extend empathic sensibility to the biosphere itself and all of life on Earth. The distributed Internet revolution is coming together with distributed renewable energies, making possible a sustainable, post-carbon economy that is both globally connected and locally managed.

In the 21st century, hundreds of millions--and eventually billions--of human beings will transform their buildings into power plants to harvest renewable energies on site, store those energies in the form of hydrogen and share electricity, peer-to-peer, across local, regional, national and continental inter-grids that act much like the Internet. The open source sharing of energy, like open source sharing of information, will give rise to collaborative energy spaces--not unlike the collaborative social spaces that currently exist on the Internet.

When every family and business comes to take responsibility for its own small swath of the biosphere by harnessing renewable energy and sharing it with millions of others on smart power grids that stretch across continents, we become intimately interconnected at the most basic level of earthly existence by jointly stewarding the energy that bathes the planet and sustains all of life.

The new distributed communication revolution not only organizes distributed renewable energies, but also changes human consciousness. The information communication technologies (ICT) revolution is quickly extending the central nervous system of billions of human beings and connecting the human race across time and space, allowing empathy to flourish on a global scale, for the first time in history.

Whether in fact we will begin to empathize as a species will depend on how we use the new distributed communication medium. While distributed communications technologies-and, soon, distributed renewable energies - are connecting the human race, what is so shocking is that no one has offered much of a reason as to why we ought to be connected. We talk breathlessly about access and inclusion in a global communications network but speak little of exactly why we want to communicate with one another on such a planetary scale. What’s sorely missing is an overarching reason that billions of human beings should be increasingly connected. Toward what end? The only feeble explanations thus far offered are to share information, be entertained, advance commercial exchange and speed the globalization of the economy. All the above, while relevant, nonetheless seem insufficient to justify why nearly seven billion human beings should be connected and mutually embedded in a globalized society. The idea of even billion individual connections, absent any overall unifying purpose, seems a colossal waste of human energy. More important, making global connections without any real transcendent purpose risks a narrowing rather than an expanding of human consciousness. But what if our distributed global communication networks were put to the task of helping us re-participate in deep communion with the common biosphere that sustains all of our lives?

The biosphere is the narrow band that extends some forty miles from the ocean floor to outer space where living creatures and the Earth’s geochemical processes interact to sustain each other. We are learning that the biosphere functions like an indivisible organism. It is the continuous symbiotic relationships between every living creature and between living creatures and the geochemical processes that ensure the survival of the planetary organism and the individual species that live within its biospheric envelope. If every human life, the species as a whole, and all other life-forms are entwined with one another and with the geochemistry of the planet in a rich and complex choreography that sustains life itself, then we are all dependent on and responsible for the health of the whole organism. Carrying out that responsibility means living out our individual lives in our neighborhoods and communities in ways that promote the general well-being of the larger biosphere within which we dwell. The Third Industrial Revolution offers just such an opportunity.

If we can harness our empathic sensibility to establish a new global ethic that recognizes and acts to harmonize the many relationships that make up the life-sustaining forces of the planet, we will have moved beyond the detached, self-interested and utilitarian philosophical assumptions that accompanied national markets and nation state governance and into a new era of biosphere consciousness. We leave the old world of geopolitics behind and enter into a new world of biosphere politics, with new forms of governance emerging to accompany our new biosphere awareness.

The Third Industrial Revolution and the new era of distributed capitalism allow us to sculpt a new approach to globalization, this time emphasizing continentalization from the bottom up. Because renewable energies are more or less equally distributed around the world, every region is potentially amply endowed with the power it needs to be relatively self-sufficient and sustainable in its lifestyle, while at the same time interconnected via smart grids to other regions across countries and continents.

When every community is locally empowered, both figuratively and literally, it can engage directly in regional, transnational, continental, and limited global trade without the severe restrictions that are imposed by the geopolitics that oversee elite fossil fuels and uranium energy distribution.

Continentalization is already bringing with it a new form of governance. The nation-state, which grew up alongside the First and Second Industrial Revolutions, and provided the regulatory mechanism for managing an energy regime whose reach was the geosphere, is ill suited for a Third Industrial Revolution whose domain is the biosphere. Distributed renewable energies generated locally and regionally and shared openly--peer to peer--across vast contiguous land masses connected by intelligent utility networks and smart logistics and supply chains favor a seamless network of governing institutions that span entire continents.

The European Union is the first continental governing institution of the Third Industrial Revolution era. The EU is already beginning to put in place the infrastructure for a European-wide energy regime, along with the codes, regulations, and standards to effectively operate a seamless transport, communications, and energy grid that will stretch from the Irish Sea to the doorsteps of Russia by midcentury. Asian, African, and Latin American continental political unions are also in the making and will likely be the premier governing institutions on their respective continents by 2050.

In this new era of distributed energy, governing institutions will more resemble the workings of the ecosystems they manage. Just as habitats function within ecosystems, and ecosystems within the biosphere in a web of interrelationships, governing institutions will similarly function in a collaborative network of relationships with localities, regions, and nations all embedded within the continent as a whole. This new complex political organism operates like the biosphere it attends, synergistically and reciprocally. This is biosphere politics.

The new biosphere politics transcends traditional right/left distinctions so characteristic of the geopolitics of the modern market economy and nation-state era. The new divide is generational and contrasts the traditional top-down model of structuring family life, education, commerce, and governance with a younger generation whose thinking is more relational and distributed, whose nature is more collaborative and cosmopolitan, and whose work and social spaces favor open-source commons. For the Internet generation, "quality of life" becomes as important as individual opportunity in fashioning a new dream for the 21st century.

The transition to biosphere consciousness has already begun. All over the world, a younger generation is beginning to realize that one’s daily consumption of energy and other resources ultimately affects the lives of every other human being and every other creature that inhabits the Earth.

The Empathic Civilization is emerging. A younger generation is fast extending its empathic embrace beyond religious affiliations and national identification to include the whole of humanity and the vast project of life that envelops the Earth. But our rush to universal empathic connectivity is running up against a rapidly accelerating entropic juggernaut in the form of climate change. Can we reach biosphere consciousness and global empathy in time to avert planetary collapse?

### AT: Security Inevitable

#### Conflicts appear inevitable because we allow security to constitute our world.

Burke 7—Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer @ School of Politics & IR @ Univ. of New South Wales [*Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence*, p. 68-9]

This chapter is thus an exercise in thinking, which challenges the continuing power of political ontologies (forms of truth and being) that connect security, sovereignty, belonging, othemess and violence in ways that for many appear like enduring political facts, inevitable and irrefutable. Conflict, violence and alienation then arise not merely from individual or collective acts whose conditions might be understood and policed; they condition politics as such, forming a permanent ground, a dark substrata underpinning the very possibility of the present. Conflict and alienation seem inevitable because of the way in which the modem political imagination has conceived and thought security, sovereignty and ethics. Israel/ Palestine is chosen here as a particularly urgent and complex example of this problem, but it is a problem with much wider significance.

While I hold out the hope that security can be re-visioned away from a permanent dependence on insecurity, exclusion and violence, and I believe it retains normative promise, this analysis takes a deliberate step backward to examine the very real barriers faced by such a project. Security cannot properly be rethought without a deeper understanding of, and challenge to, the political forms and structures it claims to enable and protect. If Ken Booth argues that the state should be a means rather than an end of security, my objective here is to place the continuing power and depth of its status as an end of security, and a fundamental source for political identity, under critical interrogation.' If the state is to become a means of security (one among many) it will have to be fundamentally transformed.

The chapter pursues this inquiry in two stages. The first outlines the historic strength and effective redundancy of such an exciusivist vision of security in Israel, wherein Israel not only confronts military and political antagonists with an 'iron wall' of armed force but maps this onto a profound clash of existential narratives, a problem with resonances in the West's confrontation with radical Islamism in the war on terror. The second, taking up the remainder of the chapter, then explores a series of potential resources in continental philosophy and political theory that might help us to think our way out of a security grounded in violence and alienation. Through a critical engagement with this thought, I aim to construct a political ethics based not in relations between insecure and separated identities mapped solely onto nation-states, but in relations of responsibility and interconnection that can negotiate and recognise both distinct and intertwined histories, identities and needs; an ethics that might underpin a vision of interdependent (national and non-national) existence proper to an integrated world traversed by endless flows of people, commerce, ideas, violence and future potential.

### AT: Schmitt/Emnity

#### Enmity creates absolute foes that drive unlimited conflict.

Scheuerman 4 [William Scheuerman, Political Science at Indiana, “International Law as Historical Myth,” *Constellations*, 11 (4) p. 546-547]

Second, Schmitt’s odd periodization obscures the fundamental changes to traditional European interstate relations generated by the emergence of the modern nation-state. As Bobbitt has succinctly observed, the appearance of the nation-state was accompanied by the strategic style of total war. If the nation governed the state, and the nation’s welfare provided the state’s reason for being, then the enemy’s nation must be destroyed—indeed, that was the way to destroy the state. . . . [F]or the nation-state it was necessary to annihilate the vast resources of men and material that a nation could throw into the field . . . . 36 It was the idea of a “nation in arms” that not only posed a direct threat to earlier absolutist images of “king’s wars,” but also opened the door to many pathologies of modern warfare: the full-scale mobilization of the “nation” and subsequent militarization of society, and killing of “enemy” civilians. The European nation-state and total war may represent two sides of the same coin.37 Of course, for Schmitt’s purposes it is useful that the idea of the “nation in arms” first takes the historical stage in the context of the French Revolution and its commitment to universalistic ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity.38 Nation-state-based democracy is indeed a normatively ambivalent creature, resting on an uneasy synthesis of universalistic liberal democratic ideals with historically contingent notions of shared cultural identity, language, history, and ethnos.39 Although Schmitt and his followers predictably try to link the horrors of modern warfare to the growing significance of universalistic liberal-democratic ideals, a more persuasive empirical case can be made that those horrors can be traced to highly particularistic and exclusionary ideas of national identity, according to which the “other”—in this case, outsiders to the “national community”—came to be perceived as representing life-and-death foes in the context of crisis-ridden industrial capitalism and the increasingly unstable interstate system of the nineteenth century. Such ideas of national identity ultimately took the disastrous form of the “inflamed nationalism and ethnic truculence” that dominated European politics by the late nineteenth century and ultimately culminated in World War I.40 Nationalism and ethnic truculence played a key role in the destruction of the traditional European balance of power system since they required a fundamental reshuffling of state borders in accordance with “national identity”; of course, this question had been of marginal significance in the absolutist interstate system. In this context as well, one of Schmitt’s heroes, Bismarck, in reality played a role very different from that described by Schmitt in Nomos der Erde: “the last statesman” of the jus publicum europaeum not only helped forge a unified German nation-state, but in order to do relied on total warfare while undermining the traditional European system of states, in part because it rested on state forms (e.g., the diverse, polyglot Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires) fundamentally distinct from the modern nation-state.41 On this matter as well, Schmitt’s analysis is either openly misleading or revealingly silent. Perhaps his own unabashed enthusiasm for rabid ethnonationalism in the context of National Socialism helps explain this silence.42

#### Emnity creates more destructive wars than liberal humanitarianism.

Scheuerman 4 [William Scheuerman, Political Science at Indiana, “International Law as Historical Myth,” *Constellations*, 11 (4) p. 542-544]

According to the concluding chapters of the Nomos der Erde, it is the United States that inherits the imperial mantle of the British “sea-power” by combining universalistic liberalism with dreams of global economic domination. In altogether unambiguous terms, Schmitt makes the rise of the US from a regional to global power primarily responsible for the re-moralization of warfare that occurred in the twentieth century and allegedly prepared the way for its innumerable wartime atrocities. It is the Americans, he repeatedly underscores in the work’s final chapters, who have initiated a series of moralistic regressions in international law that fall behind the great intellectual accomplishments of Thomas Hobbes and the jus publicum europaeum. They fail to acknowledge the dangers of crude moralistic conceptions of warfare and embrace a discriminatory conception of war. Consequently, they plunge international relations back into civil war, in which the carefully constructed civilizing achievements of the jus publicum europaeum are irresponsibly discarded. Just as significant, the United States discards the European preference for regionalism in international law—in Schmitt’s terminology, a sufficiently homogeneous Raum-based system of interstate relations—for the liberalistic fiction of a heterogeneous universal global system of legality that represents a cloak for US world domination. Schmitt offers a fascinating and oftentimes perceptive account of why the idiosyncrasies of American political development rendered the US susceptible to such intellectual mistakes, but his real focus, of course, is more than the messianic excesses of US political and legal thinking. In the final analysis, it is the busybody interventionist liberalism of the United States Schmitt considers culpable for the destruction of the basically pacific European system of jus publicum europaeum. At times offering little more than a warmed-over version of his Nazi era claim that Hitler was waging a defensive war against the universalistic (and thereby for Schmitt necessarily imperialistic) United States,20 a central theme of Nomos der Erde is that the United States—and not, of course, Germany—posed the greatest threat to world peace in the twentieth century. II. Separating the Wheat from the Chaff Schmitt’s apology for Germany’s troubled role in mid-century international politics might legitimately lead a politically and historically sensible reader to recoil in disgust from Nomos der Erde. Nonetheless, Schmitt’s stylized vision of the jus publicum europaeum initially appears to rest on solid historical evidence. As Theodore Rabb has noted, “there is general scholarly agreement that war become ‘milder’ and ‘more civilized’ in the late seventeenth century, and that particular credit must go to the improvement of discipline, military academies, and the creation of standing armies.”21 As Schmitt argues in Nomos der Erde, the rationalization of the modern state apparatus went hand-in-hand with a relative domestication of warfare, and the “decline of religion as a stimulus to violence,” 22 widely noted by historians of this period, might be taken as empirical support for Schmitt’s claim that only a “de-moralized” concept of war can minimize its potential horrors. In the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, European states typically engaged in “delimited warfare, fought with limited means for limited objects,” resulting in a substantial improvement in the military treatment of civilians during wartime.23 “More and more, then, soldiers were now hemmed in by clearly defined official criteria and requirements against which their actions could be judged.”24 A common European aristocratic ethos in the officer corps facilitated the movement away from the horrors of earlier religiously based political conflict, as wars increasingly became akin to aristocratic duels.25 Of course, as Schmitt himself concedes, the relative civility of European interstate relations operated alongside terrible acts of violence committed against non- European peoples. In addition, the development of the modern state apparatus, improvement of military discipline, and rise of professionalized standing armies ultimately helped bring about unprecedented capacities for organized state violence, even if such violence was no longer typically unleashed against fellow Europeans in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.26 This is by no means the only oversight in Schmitt’s account, however. He conveniently downplays inconvenient historical events that mesh poorly with his nostalgic gloss. For example, in the Seven Years War (1756–63), one of Schmitt’s own paradigmatic examples of an absolutist “land-power,” Prussia, lost 180,000 soldiers and one-ninth of the country’s entire population; Frederick himself conceded that his subjects “had nothing left except the miserable rags which covered their nakedness.”27 Armies still spread terrible diseases: in 1771, soldiers returning from battles with Turks on the south Russian steppe spread a plague that killed 60,000 in Moscow, 14,000 in Kiev, and 10,000 in the Ukraine.28 A closer look at the jus publicum europaeum quickly suggests that this “golden age” not only permitted and perhaps even required the exploitation, enslavement, and slaughter of non-Europeans around the globe, but that it still engendered significant misery for those living on the European continent itself.

#### Their impact is circular. Our explicit use of liberal standards is better than their implicit use.

Scheuerman 4 [William Scheuerman, Political Science at Indiana, “International Law as Historical Myth,” *Constellations*, 11 (4) p. 537-538]

Schmitt holds the universalistic aspirations of liberal international law responsible for the brutalities of total war: universalism engenders a self-righteous brand of pseudo-humanitarianism blind to the terrible dangers of state violence waged under the banner of a (fictional) singular humanity. Blurring any meaningful distinction between legality and morality, those who dare to oppose the liberal international community are demonized and accordingly subjected to fire bombings (e.g., Dresden) and even atomic bombs (e.g., Hiroshima and Nagasaki). Liberal international law rests on a false universalism not only because self-interested great powers (e.g., Great Britain and the United States) typically interpret and enforce it, but also because its humanitarian rhetoric masks their pursuit of global economic domination: Schmitt shares with orthodox Marxist critics of international law the idea of a necessary kinship between universalistic international law and global free-market capitalism.1 The apex of liberal self-righteousness is the assertion that liberal wars no longer even deserve to be described as such. Although their technological superiority permits them to kill civilians in any corner of the globe, liberal states purportedly undertake “police action” (or, in present-day parlance, humanitarian intervention) for the sake of enforcing international law, whereas only outcast states who dare to challenge liberal hegemony allegedly continue to engage in barbaric wars. The exclusionary character of liberal universalism is thereby taken to its logical conclusion: liberal international law requires what Schmitt describes as a discriminatory concept of war. Only a short step beyond this conceptual move is the widespread real-life liberal tendency to ignore or at least downplay civilian casualties in humanitarian interventions undertaken against pariah states. Little imagination is required to understand the potential appeal of this diagnosis at an historical juncture when the world’s most well-armed liberal state, the United States, self-righteously claims the right to intervene unilaterally in accordance with its own idiosyncratic interpretation of both international law and the interests of humanity—despite the opposition of both the United Nations and global civil society to President Bush and his radical right-wing foreign policy.2 Indeed, anyone familiar with Schmitt’s work on international law occasionally finds herself wondering whether the White House playbook for foreign policy might not have been written by Schmitt or at least by one of his followers.3 Nor should it come as a surprise that a sophisticated body of unabashedly liberal political thought—I am thinking of realism à la Hans Morgenthau and his followers—has tried to build on some of Schmitt’s more perceptive insights about the special dangers of an international system dominated by great powers like the United States.4 Readers of this journal, however, hardly need a reminder of the normative flaws of Schmitt’s assault on liberal international law. Notwithstanding the seeming plausibility of Schmitt’s diagnosis, its basic conceptual weaknesses are no less self-evident. What is the normative standpoint of Schmitt’s critique? Much of the surprising pathos of his attack on liberal international law derives from the fact that he implicitly contrasts its self-understanding to less-than-attractive legal and political realities: despite its purported humanitarianism, liberal international law engenders unparalleled brutality. Even though his hostility to modern universalism prevents him from admitting as much, Schmitt’s apparent outrage against the murderousness of recent international politics5 implicitly presupposes characteristically modern norms of universal equality and reciprocity. Of course, Schmitt is no closet universalist. Yet why are brutal air warfare and the discriminatory concept of war problems in the first place unless Schmitt’s argument rests at least implicitly on some (implicitly humanitarian) concern about the basic equality and value of all human life?6 Pace Schmitt, the universalistic core of liberal international law can be plausibly interpreted as an immanent normative motor which allows us to criticize and subsequently reform the sad realities of the existing international system according to its own internal normative criteria. However accurate Schmitt’s description of those realities, what his account obscures is the core normative achievement of universalistic international law, namely the fact that it offers internal standards for critically diagnosing and ultimately obliterating the political and legal pathologies described by him.

#### Non-universalist and illiberal states fight total wars. Their alternative can’t solve.

Scheuerman 4 [William Scheuerman, Political Science at Indiana, “International Law as Historical Myth,” *Constellations*, 11 (4) p. 544-546]

The most revealing divergence between Schmitt’s Nomos der Erde and recent research on the history of international relations lies elsewhere, however. As noted, Schmitt argues that the golden age of the jus publicum europaeum only came to a conclusion at the outset of the twentieth century, as the United States exploded onto the world scene and unleashed its deadly brand of messianic universalism on unsuspecting European victims. At the end of the eighteenth century, French revolutionary armies posed a major challenge to the traditional state system, Schmitt concedes, but far-sighted nineteenth-century European statesmen (e.g., political reactionaries like Metternich and Bismarck) were ultimately able to counter the French revolutionary challenge and stabilize the traditional jus publicum europaeum. In the twentieth century, however, the political leaders of a weakened European order failed to accomplish the same task, and sound continental European ideals of international law were not only consequently discarded, but Europe itself was soon rendered subservient to American power. Schmitt’s historical periodization of the rise and fall of the jus publicum europaeum constitutes a key building block for his book’s deeply rooted anti-Americanism, according to which the United States—as that world power which systematically synthesizes awesome military power with liberal universalism—not only played a decisive role in destroying a sound Hobbesian system of European interstate relations, but now menaces humanity to a greater degree than recent totalitarian dictatorships. The anti-American thrust of the overall argument probably only works if Schmitt can plausibly link the emergence of the United States as a global power to the decline of the jus publicum europaeum: situating both events at the outset of the twentieth century allows him to do so. Not surprisingly, this periodization is the most idiosyncratic feature of Schmitt’s account. Most historians of international relations suggest that key features of the traditional European state system were in shambles long before the appearance of the United States as a major player in global politics. They also interpret the resurgence of total warfare, where civilians are subjected to horrible state violence, as occurring before World War I. This is a complicated and by no means uncontroversial historical question, but two issues in the recent literature are particularly revealing in the context of Schmitt’s argument. First, much of this historical literature works to underline the highly selective and crudely partisan character of Schmitt’s analysis of the resurgence of total war. The standard interpretation is that the trend towards total warfare—characterized in this context by a full-scale mobilization of society for warfare, as well as the blurring of the distinction between combatants and non-combatants—occurred in quite different political contexts in the nineteenth century. Thus, it is tendentious to see the roots of total warfare in liberal international law let alone a specifically messianic American version of liberalism. According to Schmitt, for example, Bismarck represented the “last statesman of European international law,” a lonely heroic fighter who struggled to ward off dangerous non-European threats to traditional European great power politics.32 Yet some of the recent literature describes Bismarck as a far more complex figure, and arguably a destabilizing one in relation to the European state system, in part because of his pivotal role in the emergence of a distinct style of warfare that revolutionized European political affairs. In fact, one of the forerunners to the terrible world wars of the twentieth century was the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71, in which Prussia reaped the benefits of mass mobilization and lightning-fire technologies, stunning its military rivals on the continent and spurring them to imitate Prussian military innovations. As Philip Bobbitt has pointed out, Prussia led the way in Europe in militarizing every aspect of society while exploiting technological innovations—the railways, telegraphs, and the standardization of machine tools—in order to bring about “dizzying increases in the speed and mobility of military dispositions.” 33 Schmitt is right to see a foreshadowing of more recent forms of warfare in the US Civil War.34 However, he ignores the fact that recent total war builds at least as clearly on the militarization of Prussian society that accompanied Germany’s role as a late modernizer. As a prominent military history notes, “[a]fter 1871 the Prussian institutions—conscription, strategic railways, mobilization techniques, above all the General Staff—were copied by every state in continental Europe. Thirty years later, after disastrous experiences in South Africa and Cuba, Britain and the United States adapted the model to their own needs.”35 Schmitt’s book is remarkably silent about this decisive feature of recent military development. The reason for this oversight is obvious enough: it allows him to underplay the existence of a potential link between modern dictatorship and total war. After all, it was dictatorships, at least as commonly as liberal democracies, which perfected the horrible techniques of total war in the twentieth-century: recall the Japanese invasion of China, or Nazi Germany’s aerial bombings against the Spanish Republic and, subsequently, slaughter of innocent civilians in World War II. It is telling that in Schmitt’s own account (at least in its Nazi-era rendition), the Axis powers represented paradigmatic cases of political entities that had broken decisively with the “decadent” legacy of liberal universalism.

## \*\*\* AFF Answers

### 2AC—Reps Not Prior

#### Reps don't shape reality

Balzacq 5—Thierry, Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Namur University [“The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context” *European Journal of International Relations*, London: Jun 2005, Volume 11, Issue 2]

However, despite important insights, this position remains highly disputable. The reason behind this qualification is not hard to understand. With great trepidation my contention is that one of the main distinctions we need to take into account while examining securitization is that between 'institutional' and 'brute' threats. In its attempts to follow a more radical approach to security problems wherein threats are institutional, that is, mere products of communicative relations between agents, the CS has neglected the importance of 'external or brute threats', that is, threats that do not depend on language mediation to be what they are - hazards for human life. In methodological terms, however, any framework over-emphasizing either institutional or brute threat risks losing sight of important aspects of a multifaceted phenomenon. Indeed, securitization, as suggested earlier, is successful when the securitizing agent and the audience reach a common structured perception of an ominous development. In this scheme, there is no security problem except through the language game. Therefore, how problems are 'out there' is exclusively contingent upon how we linguistically depict them. This is not always true. For one, language does not construct reality; at best, it shapes our perception of it. Moreover, it is not theoretically useful nor is it empirically credible to hold that what we say about a problem would determine its essence. For instance, what I say about a typhoon would not change its essence. The consequence of this position, which would require a deeper articulation, is that some security problems are the attribute of the development itself. In short, threats are not only institutional; some of them can actually wreck entire political communities regardless of the use of language. Analyzing security problems then becomes a matter of understanding how external contexts, including external objective developments, affect securitization. Thus, far from being a departure from constructivist approaches to security, external developments are central to it.

### AT: Representations Prior

#### Representations and framework aren’t a prior issue—arguments for better policy should draw from different frameworks when appropriate.

Light 5—Andrew Light, Environmental Philosophy @ NYU [“What is Pragmatic Philosophy,” <http://faculty.washington.edu/alight/papers/Light.What%20Pragmatic.pdf>. P. 349-351]

I have no easy answer to this question of how practical or “do-able” reform proposals made by philosophers should be. As suggested above, it is a question that has obvious important implications for the application of philosophical principles to environmental policy. My intuition though is that the pragmatist ought to have a long-term end in view while at the same time she must have at the ready viable alternatives which assume current political or economic systems and structures whenever possible. This is not to say that the pragmatic philosopher gives up on the tasks of defending alternatives to current structures, and the pursuit of those alternatives in democratic debates on the reallocation of resources. It only means that our position may require, for consistency sake to our pragmatic intentions at least, that we not rely exclusively on such changes in articulating our preferred ends for better public policies. In this context, there are at least two senses in which one could understand the meaning of “pragmatic” philosophy as discussed so far. (1) Philosophy that has practical intent, anchored to practical problems, and (2) Philosophy which aids in the development of policy solutions that can actually achieve support and consensus. While Young’s approach certainly encompasses (1) the question is whether she also does (2). My own pragmatist approach assumes that there is a connection between (1) and (2) (indeed, that (1) implies (2)). Assuming a successful argument that (1) and (2) are related in this way (for some this may take some argument, for others it will be obvious) then a question remains concerning how to go about achieving (2). Let me make just one suggestion for how the pragmatist could go about reconciling her desire to change systems with the need to make achievable policy recommendations. As is suggested by my approach, my view is that if a pragmatic philosophy in the end is in the service of an argument to create better polices, then in our democratic society it must be prepared to argue its case before the public, and perhaps sometimes only before policy makers. As Said puts it, the public intellectual not only wants to express her beliefs but also wants to persuade others—meaning the public at large—of her views (1994, p. 12). This raises the critical issue of how such appeals to the public are to be made. It raises the issue of how important persuasion is to the creation of pragmatic arguments. All philosophy is in some sense about persuasion, though to differentiate ourselves from rhetoricians (if we are interested in making such distinctions, which I still am) we must restrict ourselves to persuasion through some form of argument given more or less agreed upon (and revisable) standards for what counts as a good argument. But the pragmatic philosopher is not simply concerned with per- suading other philosophers. She is also interested in persuading the public either directly (in hopes that they will in turn influence policy makers) or indirectly, by appealling to policy makers who in turn help to shape public opinion. The work of a public philosophy is not solely for intramural philosophical discussion; it is aimed at larger forums. But as I suggested before, such a task requires some attention to the question of what motivates either the public, policy makers, or both to act. Our bar is set higher than traditional philosophical standards of validity and abstractly conceived soundness. For if we are to direct our philosophy at policies in a context other than a hypothetical philosophical framework, we must also make arguments which will motivate our audiences to act. Since we are dealing in ethi- cal and political matters, the question for pragmatic philosophers like Young and myself is how much we must attend to the issue of moral motivation in forming our pragmatic arguments. If we agree that the issue of moral motivation is always crucial for a pragmatic philosophy then at least two issues arise. First, as I suggested before, we must be prepared to embrace a theoretical or conceptual pluralism which allows us to pick and choose from a range of conceptual frameworks in making our arguments without committing to the theoretical monism which may be assumed in some versions of these frameworks. The reason is that we need to be able to make arguments that will appeal to the conceptual frameworks of our audiences while recognizing that these frameworks can change from audience to audience. So, if we think a utilitarian argument will be useful for talking to economists in decision making positions, then we should be allowed to engage such a framework without completely committing ourselves to utilitarianism.

### 2AC Threat Con Good

#### Threat con isn’t a link—the alternative results in war.

Liotta 5—Prof of Humanities at Salve Regina University, Professor of Humanities at Salve Regina University, Newport, RI, and Executive Director of the Pell Center for International Relations and Public Policy [P. H. “Through the Looking Glass” Sage Publications]

Although it seems attractive to focus on exclusionary concepts that insist on desecuritization, privileged referent objects, and the ‘belief’ that threats and vulnerabilities are little more than social constructions (Grayson, 2003), all these concepts work in theory but fail in practice. While it may be true that national security paradigms can, and likely will, continue to dominate issues that involve human security vulnerabilities – and even in some instances mistakenly confuse ‘vulnerabilities’ as ‘threats’ – there are distinct linkages between these security concepts and applications. With regard to environmental security, for example, Myers (1986: 251) recognized these linkages nearly two decades ago: National security is not just about fighting forces and weaponry. It relates to watersheds, croplands, forests, genetic resources, climate and other factors that rarely figure in the minds of military experts and political leaders, but increasingly deserve, in their collectivity, to rank alongside military approaches as crucial in a nation’s security. Ultimately, we are far from what O’Hanlon & Singer (2004) term a global intervention capability on behalf of ‘humanitarian transformation’. Granted, we now have the threat of mass casualty terrorism anytime, anywhere – and states and regions are responding differently to this challenge. Yet, the global community today also faces many of the same problems of the 1990s: civil wars, faltering states, humanitarian crises. We are nowhere closer toaddressing how best to solve these challenges, even as they affect issues of environmental, human, national (and even ‘embedded’) security. Recently, there have been a number of voices that have spoken out on what the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty has termed the ‘responsibility to protect’:10 the responsibility of some agency or state (whether it be a superpower such as the United States or an institution such as the United Nations) to enforce the principle of security that sovereign states owe to their citizens. Yet, the creation of a sense of urgency to act – even on some issues that may not have some impact for years or even decades to come – is perhaps the only appropriate first response. The real cost of not investing in the right way and early enough in the places where trends and effects are accelerating in the wrong direction is likely to be decades and decades of economic and political frustration – and, potentially, military engagement. Rather than justifying intervention (especially military), we ought to be justifying investment. Simply addressing the immensities of these challenges is not enough. Radical improvements in public infrastructure and support for better governance, particularly in states and municipalities (especially along the Lagos–Cairo–Karachi–Jakarta arc), will both improve security and create the conditions for shrinking the gap between expectations and opportunity. A real debate ought to be taking place today. Rather than dismissing ‘alternative’ security foci outright, a larger examination of what forms of security are relevant and right among communities, states, and regions, and which even might apply to a global rule-set – as well as what types of security are not relevant – seems appropriate and necessary. If this occurs, a truly remarkable tectonic shift might take place in the conduct of international relations and human affairs. Perhaps, in the failure of states and the international community to respond to such approaches, what is needed is the equivalent of the 1972 Stockholm conference that launched the global environmental movement and established the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), designed to be the environmental conscience of the United Nations. Similarly, the UN Habitat II Conference in Istanbul in 1996 focused on the themes of finding adequate shelter for all and sustaining human development in an increasingly urbanized world. Whether or not these programs have the ability to influence the future’s direction (or receive wide international support) is a matter of some debate. Yet, given that the most powerful states in the world are not currently focusing on these issues to a degree sufficient to produce viable implementation plans or development strategies, there may well need to be a ‘groundswell’ of bottom-up pressure, perhaps in the form of a global citizenry petition to push the elusive world community toward collective action.Recent history suggests that military intervention as the first line of response to human security conditions underscores a seriously flawed approach. Moreover, those who advocate that a state’s disconnectedness from globalization is inversely proportional to the likelihood of military (read: US) intervention fail to recognize unfolding realities (Barnett, 2003, 2004). Both middle-power and major-power states, as well as the international community, must increasingly focus on long-term creeping vulnerabilities in order to avoid crisis responses to conditions of extreme vulnerability. Admittedly, some human security proponents have recently soured on the viability of the concept in the face of recent ‘either with us or against us’ power politics (Suhrke, 2004). At the same time, and in a bit more positive light, some have clearly recognized the sheer impossibility of international power politics continuing to feign indifference in the face of moral categories. As Burgess (2004: 278) notes, ‘for all its evils, one of the promises of globalization is the unmasking of the intertwined nature of ethics and politics in the complex landscape of social, economic, political and environmental security’. While it is still not feasible to establish a threshold definition for human security that neatly fits all concerns and arguments (as suggested by Owen, 2004: 383), it would be a tragic mistake to assume that national, human, and environmental security are mutually harmonious constructs rather than more often locked in conflictual and contested opposition with each other. Moreover, aspects of security resident in each concept are indeed themselves embedded with extraordinary contradictions. Human security, in particular, is not now, nor should likely ever be, the mirror image of national security. Yet, these contradictions are not the crucial recognition here. On the contrary, rather than focusing on the security issues themselves, we should be focusing on the best multi-dimensional approaches to confronting and solving them. One approach, which might avoid the massive tidal impact of creeping vulnerabilities, is to sharply make a rudder shift from constant crisis intervention toward strategic planning, strategic investment, and strategic attention. Clearly, the time is now to reorder our entire approach to how we address – or fail to address – security.

### 2AC Alt Fails

#### Alt fails – no acceptable solution or empirical evaluation

Walt 99—Professor of International Affairs at Harvard [Stephen Walt, “Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies,” International Security, 23(4)]

Taken together, these characteristics help explain why recent formal work has had relatively little to say about important real-world security issues. Although formal techniques produce precise, logically consistent arguments, they often rest on unrealistic assumptions and the results are rarely translated into clear and accessible conclusions. And because many formal conjectures are often untested, policymakers and concerned citizens have no way of knowing if the arguments are valid. In this sense, much of the recent formal work in security studies reflects the "cult of irrelevance" that pervades much of contemporary social science. Instead of using their expertise to address important real-world problems, academics often focus on narrow and trivial problems that may impress their colleagues but are of little practical value. If formal theory were to dominate security studies as it has other areas of political science, much of the scholarship in the field would likely be produced by people with impressive technical skills but little or no substantive knowledge of history, politics, or strategy.[111] Such fields are prone to become "method-driven" rather than "problem-driven," as research topics are chosen not because they are important but because they are amenable to analysis by the reigning methode du jour.[112] Instead of being a source of independent criticism and creative, socially useful ideas, the academic world becomes an isolated community engaged solely in dialogue with itself.[113] Throughout most of the postwar period, the field of security studies managed to avoid this danger. It has been theoretically and methodologically diverse, but its agenda has been shaped more by real-world problems than by methodological fads. New theoretical or methodological innovations have been brought to bear on particular research puzzles, but the field as a whole has retained considerable real-world relevance. By contrast, recent formal work in security studies has little to say about contemporary security issues. Formal rational choice theorists have been largely absent from the major international security debates of the past decade (such as the nature of the post-Cold War world; the character, causes, and strength of the democratic peace; the potential contribution of security institutions; the causes of ethnic conflict; the future role of nuclear weapons; or the impact of ideas and culture on strategy and conflict). These debates have been launched and driven primarily by scholars using nonformal methods, and formal theorists have joined in only after the central parameters were established by others.[114] Thus one of the main strengths of the subfield of security studies--namely, its close connection to real-world issues--could be lost if the narrow tendencies of the modeling community took control of its research agenda.

### AT: Genocide

#### No impact—democracy checks.

O’Kane 97 [“Modernity, the Holocaust, and politics”, Economy and Society, February, ebsco]

Chosen policies cannot be relegated to the position of immediate condition (Nazis in power) in the explanation of the Holocaust. Modern bureaucracy is not ‘intrinsically capable of genocidal action’ (Bauman 1989: 106). Centralized state coercion has no natural move to terror. In the explanation of modern genocides it is chosen policies which play the greatest part, whether in effecting bureaucratic secrecy, organizing forced labour, implementing a system of terror, harnessing science and technology or introducing extermination policies, as means and as ends. As Nazi Germany and Stalin’s USSR have shown, furthermore, those chosen policies of genocidal government turned away from and not towards modernity. The choosing of policies, however, is not independent of circumstances. An analysis of the history of each case plays an important part in explaining where and how genocidal governments come to power and analysis of political institutions and structures also helps towards an understanding of the factors which act as obstacles to modern genocide. But it is not just political factors which stand in the way of another Holocaust in modern society. Modern societies have not only pluralist democratic political systems but also economic pluralism where workers are free to change jobs and bargain wages and where independent firms, each with their own independent bureaucracies, exist in competition with state-controlled enterprises. In modern societies this economic pluralism both promotes and is served by the open scientific method. By ignoring competition and the capacity for people to move between organizations whether economic, political, scientific or social, Bauman overlooks crucial but also very ‘ordinary and common’ attributes of truly modern societies. It is these very ordinary and common attributes of modernity which stand in the way of modern genocides.

### 2AC Consequentialism

#### Looking at consequences is the only way to evaluate policy

Dan W. Brock, Professor of Philosophy and Biomedical Ethics at Brown University, 1987 (“Truth or Consequences: The Role of Philosophers in Policy-Making," *Ethics*, Volume 97, July, Available Online via JSTOR, p. 787)

When philosophers become more or less direct participants in the policy-making process and so are no longer academics just hoping that an occasional policymaker might read their scholarly journal articles, this scholarly virtue of the unconstrained search for the truth—all assumptions open to question and follow the arguments wherever they lead—comes under a variety of related pressures. What arises is an intellectual variant of the political problem of "dirty hands" that those who hold political power often face. I emphasize that I do not conceive of the problem as one of pure, untainted philosophers being corrupted by the dirty business of politics. My point is rather that the different goals of academic scholarship and public policy call in turn for **different virtues and behavior** in their practitioners. Philosophers who steadfastly maintain their academic ways in the public policy setting are not to be admired as islands of integrity in a sea of messy political compromise and corruption. Instead, I believe that if philosophers maintain the academic virtues there they will not only find themselves often **ineffective** but will as well often **fail in their responsibilities** and **act wrongly**. Why is this so? The central point of conflict is that the first concern of those responsible for public policy **is**, **and ought to be**, the **consequences** of their actions for public policy and the persons that those policies affect. This is not to say that they should not be concerned with the moral evaluation of those consequences—they should; nor that they must be moral consequentialists in the evaluation of the policy, and in turn human, consequences of their actions—whether some form of consequentialism is an adequate moral theory is another matter. But it is to say that persons who directly participate in the formation of public policy would be **irresponsible** if they did not focus their concern on how their actions will **affect policy** and how that policy will in turn **affect people**. The virtues of academic research and scholarship that consist in an unconstrained search for truth, whatever the consequences, reflect not only the different goals of scholarly work but also the fact that the effects of the scholarly endeavor on the public are less direct, and are mediated more by other institutions and events, than are those of the public policy process. It is in part the very impotence in terms of major, direct effects on people's lives of most academic scholarship that makes it morally acceptable not to worry much about the social consequences of that scholarship. When philosophers move into the policy domain, they must **shift their primary commitment** from knowledge and truth to the **policy consequences** of what they do. And if they are not prepared to do this, why did they enter the public domain? What are they doing there?

### 2AC Realism

#### Perm – do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative —it’s structurally possible and net beneficial

Murray 97 – Professor of Politics at the University of Wales (Alastair J.H., “Reconstructing Realism: Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics”, p. 193-196)

For realism, man remains, in the final analysis, limited by himself. As such, it emphasizes caution, and focuses not merely upon the achievement of long-term objectives, but also upon the resolution of more immediate difficulties. Given that, in the absence of a resolution of such difficulties, longer-term objectives are liable to be unachievable, realism would seem to offer a more effective strategy of transition than reflectivism itself. Whereas, in constructivism, such strategies are divorced from the current realities of international politics altogether, realism’s emphasis on first addressing the immediate obstacles to development ensures that it at least generates strategies which offer us a tangible path to follow. If these strategies perhaps lack the visionary appeal of reflectivist proposals, emphasizing simply the necessity of a restrained, moderate diplomacy in order to ameliorate conflicts between states, to foster a degree of mutual understanding in international relations, and, ultimately, to develop a sense of community which might underlie a more comprehensive international society, they at least seek to take advantage of the possibilities of reform in the current international system without jeopardizing the possibilities of order. Realism’s gradualist reformism, the careful tending of what it regards as an essentially organic process, ultimately suggests the basis for a more sustainable strategy for reform than reflectivist perspectives, however dramatic, can offer. For the realist, then, if rationalist theories prove so conservative as to make their adoption problematic, critical theories prove so progressive as to make their adoption unattractive. If the former can justifiably be criticized for seeking to make a far from ideal order work more efficiently, thus perpetuating its existence and legitimating its errors, reflectivist theory can equally be criticized for searching for a tomorrow which may never exist, thereby endangering the possibility of establishing any form of stable order in the here and now. Realism’s distinctive contribution thus lies in its attempt to drive a path between the two, a path which, in the process, suggests the basis on which some form of synthesis between rationalism and reflectivism might be achieved. Oriented in its genesis towards addressing the shortcomings in an idealist transformatory project, it is centrally motivated by concern to reconcile vision with practicality, to relate utopia and reality. Unifying technical and a practical stance, it combines aspects of the positivist methodology employed by problem-solving theory with the interpretative stance adopted by critical theory, avoiding the monism of perspective which leads to the self-destructive conflict between the two. Ultimately, it can simultaneously acknowledge the possibility of change in the structure of the international system and the need to probe the limits of the possible, and yet also question the proximity of any international transformation, emphasize the persistence of problems after such a transformation, and serve as a reminder of the need to grasp whatever semblance of order can be obtained in the mean time. Indeed, it is possible to say that realism is uniquely suited to serve as such an orientation. Simultaneously to critique contemporary resolutions of the problem of political authority as unsatisfactory and yet to support them as an attainable measure of order in an unstable world involves one in a contradiction which is difficult to accept. Yet, because it grasps the essential ambiguity of the political, and adopts imperfectionism as its dominant motif, realism can relate these two tasks in a way which allows neither to predominate, achieving, if not a reconciliation, that is at least a viable synthesis. Perhaps the most famous realist refrain is that all politics are power politics. It is the all that is important here. Realism lays claim to a relevance across systems, and because it relies on a conception of human nature, rather than a historically specific structure of world politics, it can make good on this claim. If its observations about human nature are even remotely accurate, the problems that it addresses will transcend contingent formulations of the problem of political order. Even in a genuine cosmopolis, conflict might become technical, but it would not be eliminated altogether.67 The primary manifestations of power might become more economic or institutional rather than (para) military but, where disagreements occur and power exists, the employment of the one to ensure the satisfactory resolution of the other is inevitable short of a wholesale transformation of human behaviour. Power is ultimately of the essence of politics; it is not something which can be banished, only tamed and restrained. As a result, realism achieves a universal relevance to the problem of political action which allows it to relate the reformist zeal of critical theory, without which advance would be impossible, with the problem-solver’s sensible caution that, before reform is attempted, whatever measure of security is possible under contemporary conditions must first be ensured.

### 1AR Realism Perm

#### Perm – do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alternative

#### The perm solves best — realism is a necessary short-term strategy because it focuses on actual problems with the international system. Even if the long-term vision of the critique is desirable, its outright rejection of IR will fail – only a combination of criticism and pragmatic politics can effectively sustain a reform strategy—more evidence.

Murray 97—Alastair J. H. Murray, Professor of Politics at the University of Wales Swansea, 1997 [“Part II: Rearticulating and Re-Evaluating Realism,” Reconstructing Realism: Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics, Keele University Press, ISBN 1853311960, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Net-Library, p. 195]

For the realist, then, if rationalist theories prove so conservative as to make their adoption problematic, critical theories prove so progressive as to make their adoption unattractive. If the former can justifiably be criticised for seeking to make a far from ideal order work more efficiently, thus perpetuating its existence and legitimating its errors, reflectivist theory can equally be criticised for searching for a tomorrow which may never exist, thereby endangering the possibility of establishing any form of stable order in the here and now. Realism's distinctive contribution thus lies in its attempt to drive a path between the two, a path which, in the process, suggests the basis on which some form of synthesis between rationalism and reflectivism might be achieved. Oriented in its genesis towards addressing the shortcomings in an idealist transformatory project, it is centrally motivated by a concern to reconcile vision with practicality, to relate utopia and reality. Unifying a technical and a practical stance, it combines aspects of the positivist methodology employed by problem-solving theory with the interpretative stance adopted by critical theory, avoiding the monism of perspective which leads to the self-destructive conflict between the two. Ultimately, it can simultaneously acknowledge the possibility of change in the structure of the international system and the need to probe the limits of the possible, and yet also question the proximity of any international transformation, emphasise the persistence of problems after such a transformation, and serve as a reminder of the need to grasp whatever semblance of order can be obtained in the mean time. Indeed, it is possible to say that realism is uniquely suited to serve as such an orientation. Simultaneously to critique contemporary resolutions of the problem of political authority as unsatisfactory and yet to support them as an attainable measure of order in an unstable world involves one in a contradiction which is difficult to accept. Yet, because it grasps the essential ambiguity of the political, and adopts imperfectionism as its dominant motif, realism can relate these two tasks in a way which allows neither to predominate, achieving, if not a reconciliation, then at least a viable synthesis. 66

#### Realism has critical potential—only the perm solves

Cozette 8 [Murielle Cozette\* BA (Hons) (Sciences Po Paris), MA (King's College London), MA (Sciences Po Paris), PhD (LSE) is a John Vincent Postdoctoral fellow in the Department of International Relations. Review of International Studies (2008), 34, 5–27]

This article concentrates on Morgenthau’s views on the ethics of scholarship and argues that all his works must be read in the light of his central goal: speaking truth to power. Morgenthau wrote at length, and held very specific views about, the role and function of scholars in society. It is therefore legitimate to claim that, as a scholar himself, Morgenthau attempted to live up to his very demanding definition of scholarly activity, and his assertion that scholars have the moral responsibility to speak truth to power informed all his major works. While Morgenthau’s conception of the ethics of scholarship is generally ignored or neglected, it is, however, indispensable to take it into account when approaching his writings. Indeed, it demonstrates that for Morgenthau, a realist theory of international politics always includes two dimensions, which are intrinsically linked: it is supposed to explain international relations, but it is also, **fundamentally,** a normative and critical project which **questions the existing status quo.** While the explanatory dimension of realism is usually discussed at great length, its critical side is consistently – and conveniently – forgotten or underestimated by the more recent, self-named ‘critical’ approaches. However diverse these recent approaches may be in their arguments, what unites them all is what they are supposedly critical of: the realist tradition. The interpretation they provide of realism is well known, and rarely questioned. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to review it at length, it is worth stressing some of the main features which are constantly emphasised. First then, realism is a state-centric approach, by which is meant that it stresses the importance of anarchy and the struggle for power among states. From this, most critical approaches jump to the conclusion that realism is therefore strikingly ill-equipped to deal with the contemporary era where the state is increasingly regarded as outdated and/or dangerous, because it stands in the path of different, more emancipatory modes of political organisation. Realism, it is also argued, pretends to be objective and to depict ‘things as they are’: but this cannot obscure the fact that theories are never value-neutral and constitute the very ‘reality’ they pretend to ‘describe’. This leads to the idea that realism is in fact nothing but conservatism: it is portrayed as the voice of (great) powers, with the effect of reifying (and therefore legitimising) the existing international order. This explains why Rothstein can confidently argue that realism ‘is . . . implicitly a conservative doctrine attractive to men concerned with protecting the status quo’, and that it is a ‘deceptive and dangerous’ theory, not least because it ‘has provided the necessary psychological and intellectual support to resist criticism, to persevere in the face of doubt, and to use any means to outwit or to dupe domestic dissenters’.2 Such views represent a **fundamental misunderstanding** of the realist project, but are nonetheless widely accepted as commonsense in the discipline. A typical example of this is the success of Cox’s famous **distinction between ‘problem solving’ and ‘critical’ theory**. Unsurprisingly, realism is the archetypal example of a problem-solving theory for Cox. His account of the realist tradition sweepingly equates Morgenthau and Waltz, who are described as ‘American scholars who transformed realism into a form of problem-solving theory’.3 Thereafter in his famous article ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders’, Cox refers to the works of both scholars by using the term ‘neo-realism’. Problem solving theory (and therefore realism) ‘takes the world as it finds it . . . as the given framework for action’, while by contrast, the distinctive trait of ‘critical theory’ is to ‘stand apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about’.4 Problem-solving theory, says Cox, ‘serves particular national sectional or class interests, which are comfortable within the given order’, which therefore means that its purpose is ‘conservative’.5 Problem-solving theory also pretends to be ‘value free’, while Cox is keen to remind his reader that it contains some ‘latent normative elements’, and that its ‘non normative quality is however, only superficial’.6 By contrast to what Cox presents as a problem-solving theory, being ‘critical’ in IR means being openly normative, challenging the status quo, and seeking to advance human emancipation( s), however this concept is to be defined.7 The picture Cox proposes is therefore simple: critical theory is named as such because of its commitment to ‘bringing about an alternative order’ and because of its openly normative stance, while realism, by contrast, is presented as a theory which in effect reproduces and ‘sustain[s] the existing order’.8 To be fair, not all critical theorists promote such a simplistic vision of what realism stands for – Cox himself, in some of his later works, recognised that classical realism possesses an undeniable critical dimension. In 1992, providing a more nuanced analysis of the school, he thus accepted that ‘classical realism is to be seen as a means of empowerment of the less powerful, a means of demystification of the manipulative instruments of power’.9 He did not, however, investigate the critical dimension of realism in much depth, and failed to identify its emancipatory dimension. Other critical theorists demonstrate an awareness of the richness and subtlety of Morgenthau’s ideas. The best example remains Ashley’s famous piece on the poverty of neorealism, where he justly argues that the triumph of the latter has obscured the insights provided by classical realism. Ashley’s analysis remains, however, problematic as his interpretation of Morgenthau does not identify all the critical dimensions of his writings, and ultimately continues to present classical realism as the ‘ideological apparatus’ of one particular ruling group, that of statesmen, which remains essentially incapable of realising its own limitations. As he writes: It is a tradition whose silences and omissions, and failures of self critical nerve join it in secret complicity with an order of domination that reproduces the expectation of inequality as a motivating force, and insecurity as an integrating principle. As the ‘organic intellectuality of the world wide public sphere of bourgeois society, classical realism honors the silences of the tradition it interprets and participates in exempting the ‘private sphere’ from public responsibility.10 (emphasis added) The ‘picture’ of classical realism which is provided by Ashley therefore does not adequately capture its inherent critical dimension, as it ultimately presents it as reproducing the existing order and silencing dissent. Cox’s distinction clearly echoes the now classic one between ‘orthodox’ and ‘critical’ approaches (a label broad enough to include the self-named Critical Theory, Feminism, Normative theory, Constructivism and Post-Structuralism). The diversity of critical approaches should not obscure the fact that crucially, what allows them to think of themselves as critical is not simply a set of epistemological (usually ‘post-positivist’) or ontological assumptions they may share. It is also, fundamentally, the **image they think lies in the mirror** when they turn it to realism. In most cases then, it seems to be enough to oppose a **simplistic picture** of realism like that provided by Cox to deserve the much coveted label ‘critical’. This leads to the idea that it is impossible to be at the same time a **realist scholar and critica**l, as the two adjectives are implicitly presented as antithetical. This clearly amounts to an **insidious high-jacking** of the very adjective ‘critical’, which more often than not merely signals that one does not adopt a realist approach. The meaning of the adjective is therefore presented as self-evident, and realism is denied any critical dimension. This is highly **problematic** as this reinforces a typical ‘self-righteousness’ from these ‘critical’ approaches, which tend to rely on a **truncated and misleading** picture of what realism stands for and conveniently never properly engage with realists’ arguments. The fact that Waltz is always the primary target of these approaches is no coincidence: this article demonstrates that realism as expressed by Morgenthau is at its very core a critical project. In order to challenge the use of the adjective ‘critical’ by some who tend to think of themselves as such simply by virtue of opposing what they mistakenly present as a conservative theoretical project, the article highlights the central normative and critical dimensions underlying Morgenthau’s works. It does so by assessing his views about the ethics of scholarship. The article is divided into two parts. First, it investigates Morgenthau’s ideal of the scholarly activity, which rests upon a specific understanding of the relationship between truth and power. Second, it focuses on some features which, for Morgenthau, constitute a ‘betrayal’ of this ideal (a term he borrowed from Julien Benda). The article demonstrates that contrary to the common interpretation of realism as a theoretical outlook that holds an implicit and hidden normative commitment to the preservation of the existing order, Morgenthau’s formulation of realism is rooted in his claim that political science is a **subversive force, which should ‘stir up the conscience of society’, and in doing so, challenge the status quo**. For Morgenthau, IR scholars have the responsibility to seek truth, against power if needed, and then to speak this truth to power even though power may try to silence or distort the scholar’s voice.11 Giving up this responsibility leads to ideology and blind support for power, which is something that Morgenthau always saw as dangerous, and consistently opposed. His commitment to truth in turn explains why, according to him, political science is always, by definition, a revolutionary force whose main purpose is to bring about ‘change through action’. In complete contrast to what ‘critical approaches’ consistently claim, the realist project is therefore best understood as a critique of the powers-that-be

### AT: Kappeler

#### Turn—Kappeler’s critique crushes individual agency

Gelber 95 [Kath Gelber, Lecturer in Australian Politics and Human Rights at the University of New South Wales, 1995, “The Will To Oversimplify,” *Green Left Weekly*, Issue 198, August 16, Available Online at http://www.greenleft.org.au/back/1995/198/198p26b.htm]

The Will to Violence presents a powerful and one-sided critique of the forces which enable violence between individuals to occur. Violence between individuals is taken in this context to mean all forms of violence, from personal experiences of assault to war. Kappeler's thesis is that violence in all these cases is caused in the final instance by one overriding factor -- the individual choice to commit a violent act. Of course, in one sense that is true. Acknowledging alternative models of human behaviour and analyses of the social causes of violence, Kappeler dismisses these as outside her subject matter and exhorts her readers not to ignore the “agent's decision to act as he [sic] did”, but to explore “the personal decision in favour of violence”. Having established this framework, she goes on to explore various aspects of personal decisions to commit violence. Ensuing chapters cover topics such as love of the “other”, psychotherapy, ego-philosophy and the legitimation of dominance. However, it is the introduction which is most interesting. Already on the third page, Kappeler is **dismissive of social or structural analyses** of **the multiple causes of alienation, violence and war**. She dismisses such analyses for their inability to deal with the personal decision to commit violence. For example, “some left groups have tried to explain men's sexual violence as the result of class oppression, while some Black theoreticians have explained the violence of Black men as a result of racist oppression”. She continues, “The ostensible aim of these arguments may be to draw attention to the pervasive and structural violence of classism and racism, yet they not only fail to combat such inequality, they actively contribute to it” [my emphasis]. Kappeler goes on to argue that, “although such oppression is a very real part of an agent's life context, these `explanations' ignore the fact that not everyone experiencing the same oppression uses violence”, i.e. the perpetrator has decided to violate. Kappeler's aim of course was to establish a framework for her particular project: a focus on the individual and the psychological to “find” a cause for violence. However, her rejection of alternative analyses not only as of little use, but as actively contributing to the problem, frames her own thesis **extremely narrowly**. Her argument suffers from both her **inability**, or **unwillingness**, to discuss the bigger picture and a **wilful distortion** of what she sees as her opponents' views. The result is less than satisfactory. Kappeler's book reads more as a **passionate plea** than a **coherent argument**. Her overwhelming focus on the individual, rather than providing a means with which to combat violence, in the end leaves the reader feeling **disempowered**. After all, there must be huge numbers of screwed up and vengeful people in the world to have chosen to litter history with war, environmental destruction and rape. Where do we go from here? Those lucky enough to have read Kappeler's book are supposed to “decide not to use violence ourselves”. A worthy endeavour, but **hardly sufficient to change the world**.