## 2AC A2 FTAA

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#### Perm do counterplan – the counterplan isn’t functionally competitive, if it includes the plan, then vote aff.

#### Perm do both – lifting the embargo is a pre-requisite to Latin American relations, it jumpstarts the agreement and solves the net benefit.

#### Solvency Deficit –

* 1. Human Rights – The embargo devastates human rights in Cuba, access to food, medical technology etc are all restricted. That’s Coll 7 and Amash 12.
  2. Relations – The embargo prevents hemisphere wide cooperation, it is the major irritant between the US and Latin America. That’s Perez 10.

#### 4. Agreement will fail –

A. Brazil

Erikson 10 (Daniel P. Erikson, Senior Associate for US policy and Director of Caribbean programs,

Inter-American Dialogue, The Centre for International Governance Innovation, “The Obama Administration and Latin America: Towards a New Partnership?,” Working Paper No. 46 April 2010)

Brazil, with the world’s fifth largest population and tenth largest economy, is similarly interested in a realignment of global power that recognizes its political and economic heft. Unlike Venezuela, however, it has been careful to ensure that its pursuit of this goal does not veer into open conflict with the US. Indeed, Brazilian President Lula enjoyed one of the warmest relationships with President Bush of any Latin American leader, and the personal rapport between Obama and Lula has been even warmer (see Marinis, 2010). Still, Brazilian opposition to the FTAA helped fuel its demise in 2005, and the country has clashed with the US in world trade talks as a leader of the G77 group of developing countries that includes China, India and South Africa. Brazil’s aggressive bid to win a permanent seat on the UN Security Council has led Lula on a global tour to garner support for the country’s global aspirations. Brazilian diplomacy has focused on positioning Brazil as a leader in world affairs ready to hold the US at arm’s length when necessary (see Simpson, 2010).

#### **B. Argentina will block the agreement**

Daremblum 11 (Jaime Daremblum, Senior Fellow and Director of Hudson's Center for Latin American Studies, Ambassador of Costa Rica to the United States, professor at the University of Costa Rica, “Has Argentina Joined the Chávez Bloc?,” March 2011 <http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/ArgentinaFinal.pdf>)

Néstor Kirchner took office at a precarious moment in Argentine history. The country was still recovering from a disastrous financial crisis and currency devaluation that had occurred in 2001 and 2002. Like other Argentine leftists, Kirchner blamed the economic implosion on “neoliberal,” free-market policies implemented during the 1990s. But this argument was totally unpersuasive. As journalist Michael Reid explained in his book Forgotten Continent, “What killed Argentina’s economy in 2001 was not ‘neoliberalism’ or the free-market reforms, but a fiscal policy incompatible with the exchange-rate regime, and a lack of policy flexibility.” Indeed, “Contrary to many claims, Argentina’s policy mix was in direct contravention of the Washington Consensus.” Moreover, the reforms that helped pull the country out of crisis were actually “neoliberal” initiatives championed by Roberto Lavagna, who served as Argentine economy minister from 2002 until 2005. The New York Times correctly described Lavagna as “the main architect” of the Argentine recovery. Nevertheless, Kirchner promoted a false storyline about the crisis, and he fired Lavagna in 2005. For Kirchner and his supporters, the Argentine default was attributable to U.S.style policies, and the solution was massive government spending and heavy-handed intervention in the economy. Kirchner borrowed heavily from the Chávez playbook, with its emphasis on populism, class warfare, and fierce denunciations of private enterprise. He nationalized the postal service, the largest water utility, telecommunications, and railways, among other things. Kirchner also took a somewhat authoritarian approach to Argentina’s legal institutions and independent media. Meanwhile, he pursued warmer relations with Caracas and remained cool toward Washington. The 2005 Summit of the Americas left no doubt about his hostility toward free-market economics and the United States, or about his willingness to indulge the antics of his Venezuelan counterpart. Held in the Argentine resort city of Mar del Plata, the summit became a carnival of violent anti-U.S. demonstrations and Chávez-led rallies. The Venezuelan radical addressed tens of thousands of supporters at a soccer stadium close to the summit. He brazenly declared that the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) would be buried in Mar del Plata. (“Each one of us brought a shovel, a gravedigger’s shovel,” Chávez said.) Celebrity protesters included the former Argentine soccer star Diego Maradona. As the Washington Post reported, “Hundreds of protesters had traveled through the night from Buenos Aires in a mass pilgrimage led by Maradona. Carrying signs comparing Bush to Adolf Hitler, the protesters chanted in unison as they filed into the stadium: ‘Bush, the fascist! Bush the terrorist!’” During the formal summit negotiations, Kirchner strongly opposed the FTAA and helped scuttle its adoption. His role in torpedoing the free-trade plan drew criticism from Mexican president Vicente Fox, a robust FTAA advocate. Kirchner responded to this criticism by suggesting that Fox was a U.S. lackey. Chávez also called him “a puppet of the empire.” Later that month, the Argentine and Venezuelan presidents held “unity” 3 talks and signed multiple energy pacts, with Kirchner agreeing to support Venezuela’s entry into Mercosur, the South American trade bloc. Kirchner and Chávez also discussed future energy projects and the creation of a Latin American investment fund.

#### 5. Conditionality is bad and a voting issue – Prefers breadth over depth, hurts topic education and research, prevents developing advocacy skills, devastates the strategic value of the 2AC because there is no incentive to read offense against counterplans.

#### 6. Links to Politics – Ag Lobby

Stencel 8 (John Stencel, Past President of Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, “Sutton Colloquium Article: Free Trade Versus Fair Trade,” Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, Summer / Fall 2008 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 36 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 349)

Farmers Union has always been a proponent of fair trade. As trade agreements have been negotiated, and as federal farm policy has shifted to the "free market" approach, Farmers Union has remained steadfast in its call for fairness, accountability, and benchmarks for success in trade negotiations. Farmers Union policy implies they support free trade, as long as it is fair trade. n3 National Farmers Union supports a fair trade system that protects the economic well-being, health and environmental concerns, working conditions and labor rights of our country's producers as well as producers in all other countries. n4 In the race to become the world's least-cost producer, individual farmers and ranchers are left to fend for themselves in global markets, while the processors and consumers enjoy the benefits of cheap commodities. [\*350] After the breakdown of the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations in 2003, n5 the United States' trade negotiators have instead tried to complete free trade agreements with many other countries and regions in bilateral and multilateral agreements, namely the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement, n6 the Australia Free Trade Agreement, n7 and the Free Trade Area of the Americas. n8 While each of these may seem to be minor in overall scope, collectively they could do great damage to our country's agricultural economy. Many times in recent years, Farmers Union has been a lone voice in the agriculture community, the only purveyor of reason and perspective when it came to agricultural trade. Yet, the influence of the free trade ideology continued to grow and pervade our public policy decisions.

#### 7. Process Counterplans Bad and a voting issue – hyper-generics distract from topic education, steal affirmative ground providing limited refutation options, there is no solvency advocate making debates unpredictable and poorly researched.

#### 8. Heg doesn’t prevent conflict

Crawford 3 (Timothy W., Professor of Political Science – Boston College, Pivotal Deterrence: Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 209-210)

*Forward Engagement, Global Leadership, and U.S. Pivotal Deterrence*

As the preponderant power in a globalized and interdependent world, the United States—so we are told—must embrace "forward engagement" and "global leadership." Depending on one's preferred partisan formula, it must either "address problems early before they become crises," or "shape circumstances before crises emerge."9 In these slogans there is a strong whiff of an enduring nostrum. As an early twentieth century writer put it, "the secret of foreign policy" is that "a nation cannot be merely pas­sive ... a nation should in every line take the most vigorous initiative."10 Or, as President George W. Bush put it in September 2002, "In the world that we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of ac­tion."11 Those who trumpet such an activist posture tend only to see peaceful consequences resulting from forward engagement. For them "American power is now the linchpin of stability in every region, from Europe to Asia to the Persian Gulf to Latin America."12 They rarely concede that the strong prospect of U.S. involvement in regional conflicts may not always cause sta­bility but instead cause instability. But the incentives (if not the underlying motives) that lead some to aggress will often be shaped by optimism about outside involvement.13 We should not assume that the forces of globaliza­tion that justify U.S. activism and incline the international community toward intervention do not also play into the strategies of regional adver­saries. It is naive to think that they, with survival at stake, do not gird for war keenly aware of the opportunities as well as dangers posed by inter­vention by the United States or other outside actors. There is thus no reason to assume that forward U.S. engagement will re­inforce regional stability and promote peaceful change. Because the United States may significantly influence the outcome of many conflicts, that po­tential must be seen for what it is; something that, by looming so large, may encourage as well discourage revisionism. If the massive risks of running afoul of U.S. power are a deterrent "shaping" the intentions of some re­gional antagonists, the potential windfall of securing U.S. support will shape the intentions of others. Because the benefits of enlisting U.S. support in a war may be enormous, even the slim chance of doing so may goad a party to act provocatively, become inflexible in negotiations, or otherwise do things that make war likely. In sum, forward U.S. engagement may fuel disintegrative as well as integrative tendencies in world politics and "jiggle loose" as many deadly conflicts as it knits back together.

## 2AC

### 2AC: Brazil Says No

#### Brazil will tank the agreement

Erikson 10 (Daniel P. Erikson, Senior Associate for US policy and Director of Caribbean programs,

Inter-American Dialogue, The Centre for International Governance Innovation, “The Obama Administration and Latin America: Towards a New Partnership?,” Working Paper No. 46 April 2010)

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### 2AC: Argentina Says No

#### **Argentina will block the agreement**

Daremblum 11 (Jaime Daremblum, Senior Fellow and Director of Hudson's Center for Latin American Studies, Ambassador of Costa Rica to the United States, professor at the University of Costa Rica, “Has Argentina Joined the Chávez Bloc?,” March 2011 <http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/ArgentinaFinal.pdf>)

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### 2AC: FTAA Doesn’t Solve

#### Counterplan results in coercive negotiating and fails to help Latin American economies

Carranza 4 (Dr. Mario E. Carranza, Associate Professor of Political Science, Texas A & M University-Kingsville; Ph.D., University of Chicago; a specialist in regional integration in the Western hemisphere and nuclear proliferation in South Asia, “Latin American Perspective: MERCOSUR, The Free Trade Area Of The Americas, And The Future Of U.S. Hegemony In Latin America,” Fordham International Law Journal, February 2004, 27 Fordham Int'l L.J. 1029)

[\*1038] The novelty of hegemonic stability theory is the claim that smaller States gain even more than the international hegemon when the latter provides the public good of leadership for the emergence of a stable international regime of free trade. n27 This claim is clearly unwarranted in the U.S./Latin American context. Several studies have shown that if a NAFTA-style Free Trade Area of the Americas comes into existence, the United States will obtain greater benefits than its Latin American counterparts will. "It is highly doubtful that Latin American countries stand to gain much from entering into an arrangement which gives their rich counterparts -- the USA and Canada -- a much greater preferential market access than the latter are able to offer in return... . Discriminatory liberalization with the United States under these circumstances is unlikely to confer major gains and will, very likely, lower welfare." n28 If Mexico's experience with NAFTA is of any guide, the Latin American countries are not likely to benefit from the FTAA, unless the United States truly opens its large market to Latin American agricultural and industrial exports. In 1995, the Salinas miracle collapsed together with the Mexican peso crisis. As a result, employment in manufacturing fell, the poorly paid informal sector of the economy grew, and assets became more concentrated. Average wages for most of Mexico's industrial workers dropped 10% since the early 1990s... . Relative social spending has declined since the late 1980s. The North American Development Bank has yet to have a major impact on cleaning up the U.S.-Mexican border... . Many Mexicans have not yet supped at the table of free trade prosperity. n29 According to two World Bank experts, "overall, full Free Trade Agreement preferences would raise Latin American exports only 8 or 9[%] ... U.S. trade gains, particularly for highly protected transport and machinery products, are likely to be considerably greater than those for Latin America are in the U.S. market." n30 [\*1039] Opposition to the FTAA in Latin America is widespread, because it is perceived as a narrow, free-market oriented agreement, "a brainchild of big business, whose interests it would serve from start to finish." n31 On the other hand, the United States presents itself as a benevolent hegemon, attempting to debunk the myths of the FTAA as an instrument of U.S. predatory hegemony. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative has produced a series of fact sheets on the FTAA trying to prove that (a) NAFTA has been a huge success for the United States and its NAFTA partners, n32 (b) far from spreading poverty, "free trade and open markets are among the most powerful tools available to fight poverty," n33 and (c) the FTAA would not provide excessive privileges to U.S. corporations, such as the right to sue governments to overturn laws. n34 Despite the U.S. rhetoric on the benefits of free trade in the Americas, after the Cancun debacle in September 2003 the United States has deployed a coercive, rather than benevolent, diplomacy. According to hegemonic stability theory, n355 "when power is distributed asymmetrically but hegemony is exercised in ways that do not benefit all states, subordinate states will chafe under the (coercive) leadership." n36 After Cancun, the United States used its structural power, attempting to destroy the Group of twenty-two developing nations that stood their ground in the WTO negotiations. Economic threats and reprisals were delivered against the Latin American nations that had stood with Brazil at Cancun: The impoverished island nations of the Caribbean were told they could forget about their newly negotiated US trade agreement. They folded. Central American countries were threatened with loss of the modest trade preferences... already granted to their products. Costa Rica...was hammered [\*1040] - privatize your energy and telecommunications sectors or be left in the cold - and gave in. Peru and Colombia both resigned from Lula's group... . Within a few weeks, Lula's G-22 coalition had shrunk to the G-12. n37

### 2AC: Links to Politics

#### The Counterplan makes the ag lobby really angry

Stencel 8 (John Stencel, Past President of Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, “Sutton Colloquium Article: Free Trade Versus Fair Trade,” Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, Summer / Fall 2008 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 36 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 349)

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### 2AC: Trade Now Solves Impact

#### US-Latin America Trade Vibrant Now – solves the net benefit

Llobet 10 (Gabriela Llobet, law degree from the University of Costa Rica, a Master of Law in international trade from Georgetown University and a Master of Law in Environmental Law from George Washington University,

Harvard Latino Law and Policy Conference: “Building Bridges: Connecting the US and Latin America: April 23-25, 2009: The 2009 Summit of the Americas and What it Means for Latin America,”

So why do I think that trade is important to be dealt with in the region? Because we do have a significant portion of trade amongst our countries. Twenty percent of total U.S. exports in 2008 went to Latin America. Latin [\*130] American and the Caribbean is the third trade partner behind Asia and the E.U to the U.S. and fifty-eight percent of total Latin American and the Caribbean exports just last year went to the U.S. Obviously, also the trade of goods has been growing ever since 2000. We think this tendency will continue so if we do have this amount of trade, this significant amount of trade, why don't we have a regional basis or a regional set of rules to address this trade? Interestingly enough is to see the type of exports and the type of products that come from Latin America and the Caribbean to the U.S. or that are also imported into Latin America from the U.S. I think here just to highlight that yes, a lot, as was mentioned yesterday by Insulza, a lot of the trade goes into mineral fuel oils of some of the countries. See Peru, Bolivia, Colombia and Ecuador, obviously Venezuela as well. Ninety-five percent of its exports to the U.S. are fuel oil or comes into that category. See some of the other products that are coming from Paraguay, Uruguay, Chile - copper, Panama - fish. And interestingly enough this is something just to think further on how trade capacity building and trade promotion, trade diversification strategies within the region can help countries start exporting other things apart from raw materials which is what we are seeing right now, which is happening right now and seeing how we can help countries diversify their exports and move into other areas as what seems to be the case of Costa Rica, definitely if you see the percentages, and Mexico as well. As regards in investment, FDI from foreign direct investment from the U.S. in Latin America has grown one percent every year since 2004. So yes, there is an important U.S. investor presence in the Latin American region. Global FDI has reached very significant numbers and foreign direct investment coming from the U.S. to the region has represented more than half percent of the total FDI that has been received in the region. So again, I think that this data shows that we have very close ties both in trade and investment and that a set of rules to address this and to protect investors on the one hand and to continue to promote this tendency and protect this tendency is needed and is something that can be of ideal to the countries. As regards the type of flows of investment flows that we have Brazil and Chile have the largest foreign direct investment growth rates in the last for years of the whole Latin American region. Brazil received 35 Billion dollars in total foreign direct investment. Twenty-four percent of that comes from the U.S. In the case of Chile, we are talking about 15 Billion U.S. dollars. Fifteen percent of that comes from the U.S. and the significant increases in both countries were related to natural resource manufacturing. That's what accounts currently for a large proportion of FDI. And just because I'm of Costa Rica with of course much less numbers, we definitely have much less numbers as regards FDI but fifty percent of that comes from the U.S. and that has been the tendency over the years. Not related to natural resource manufacturing but mostly related to multi-national or U.S. based companies that are seeking to produce in an efficient way in Costa Rica in the area of high-tech manufacturing. Thirty-seven percent of that fifty percent [\*131] is related to that [high-tech manufacturing]. ICT, which is information or communication technology services: nine percent. Or real estate infrastructure: thirty-four percent.

### 2AC: No Impact

#### Heg doesn’t prevent conflict

Crawford 3 (Timothy W., Professor of Political Science – Boston College, Pivotal Deterrence: Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 209-210)

*Forward Engagement, Global Leadership, and U.S. Pivotal Deterrence*

As the preponderant power in a globalized and interdependent world, the United States—so we are told—must embrace "forward engagement" and "global leadership." Depending on one's preferred partisan formula, it must either "address problems early before they become crises," or "shape circumstances before crises emerge."9 In these slogans there is a strong whiff of an enduring nostrum. As an early twentieth century writer put it, "the secret of foreign policy" is that "a nation cannot be merely pas­sive ... a nation should in every line take the most vigorous initiative."10 Or, as President George W. Bush put it in September 2002, "In the world that we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of ac­tion."11 Those who trumpet such an activist posture tend only to see peaceful consequences resulting from forward engagement. For them "American power is now the linchpin of stability in every region, from Europe to Asia to the Persian Gulf to Latin America."12 They rarely concede that the strong prospect of U.S. involvement in regional conflicts may not always cause sta­bility but instead cause instability. But the incentives (if not the underlying motives) that lead some to aggress will often be shaped by optimism about outside involvement.13 We should not assume that the forces of globaliza­tion that justify U.S. activism and incline the international community toward intervention do not also play into the strategies of regional adver­saries. It is naive to think that they, with survival at stake, do not gird for war keenly aware of the opportunities as well as dangers posed by inter­vention by the United States or other outside actors. There is thus no reason to assume that forward U.S. engagement will re­inforce regional stability and promote peaceful change. Because the United States may significantly influence the outcome of many conflicts, that po­tential must be seen for what it is; something that, by looming so large, may encourage as well discourage revisionism. If the massive risks of running afoul of U.S. power are a deterrent "shaping" the intentions of some re­gional antagonists, the potential windfall of securing U.S. support will shape the intentions of others. Because the benefits of enlisting U.S. support in a war may be enormous, even the slim chance of doing so may goad a party to act provocatively, become inflexible in negotiations, or otherwise do things that make war likely. In sum, forward U.S. engagement may fuel disintegrative as well as integrative tendencies in world politics and "jiggle loose" as many deadly conflicts as it knits back together.

#### Hegemony isn’t true – data’s on our side

Fettweis, 11 (Christopher J., Department of Political Science, Tulane University, “Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy”, 9/26, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, Ebsco)

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. **Evidently the rest of the world can** operate quite effectively **without the presence of a global policeman**. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

#### Historically true

Layne 97 (Christopher, Visiting Professor – Naval Postgraduate School, From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing)

Two critical objections could be lodged against an offshore balancing grand strategy: an offshore balancing strategy would increase—not lower—the risk of U.S. involvement in a major war, and the strategy of preponderance should not be abandoned because its benefits exceed its costs. Advocates of preponderance believe it is ifiusory to think that the United States can disengage from international commitments, because it inevitably would be drawn into major wars even if initially it tried to remain aloof. The example of Europe is frequently invoked: whenever a major European war breaks out, it is said, the United States invariably is compelled to intervene. Preponderance’s advocates also claim that U.S. security commitments in Europe and East Asia are a form of insurance: it is cheaper and safer for the United States to retain its security commitments and thereby deter wars from happening than to stand on the sidelines only to be compelled to intervene later under what presumably would be more dangerous conditions. Yet this argument is unsupported by the historical record, and it is not evident that the strategy of preponderance will in fact minimize the risk of U.S. involvement in future wars.

How to convert a Harrigan era file:

Any files you produced in 3.2 already have a macro written to go to

4.0 - it is included in the 4.0 beta template.

I am sending you both the 4.0 beta and the macros for converting UGA

backfiles in one file. I just added a macro module called "UGA" that

houses your macros.

Steps to try this out:

1) Download the attached UGA.dotm

2) Change name to Debate.dotm and install in your templates folder

3) Open the backfile you want to convert

4) Select All and Copy

5) Open a new blank doc based on the Debate.dotm template

6) In the blank doc, go to the "Home" tab on the Ribbon. Click the

drop-down menu for "Paste" and select the "Merge Formatting" button -

It's the second clipboard from the left, with the blue arrow on it.

This step is vital - if you paste any other way, the macro won't work.

7) Click the "Macros" button on the Debate tab of the ribbon

8) Select uga\_Convert and press Run.

9) When the macro is done, save the document and you should be set.

How to convert a SWon or 3.2 file:

Debate>>>Macros>>>View Macros>>>ConvertFromV3