# Directions

The following is a (rather long) set of evidence that represents a debate from the 1AC through the 1NR. The flow for the debate has been printed out and provided to you. Your job is to prep a 1AR that does the following:

1. Extends 2AC arguments. Extend by number, tag, and cite. Provide the warrant of the argument you are extending.
2. Responds to the block answers to that argument. You should have indicts to the evidence that is read, answers to the warrants, etc.
3. You can only use a laptop to read more 1AR cards on an issue. You MUST use the flows to deliver the speech.

# Case

## Relations

### 1AC

#### Ending the embargo would expand credibility, US soft power, and improve US-Cuban relations.

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Conclusion

The two countries’ histories have long been intertwined, particularly after the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 gave rise to the American belief that it would become the hemisphere’s protector. Until the immediate aftermath of Fidel Castro’s revolution, Cuba provided a testing ground for the promotion of American ideals, social beliefs, and foreign policies.

In the context of Raúl shifting course in Cuba, the Obama administration has the opportunity to highlight the benefits of both the use of soft power and a foreign policy of engagement. As evidence mounts that the United States is ready to engage countries that enact domestic reforms, its legitimacy and influence will grow. Perhaps future political leaders, in Iran or North Korea for example, will be more willing to make concessions knowing that the United States will return in kind.

The United States should not wait for extensive democratization before further engaging Cuba, however. One legacy of the Cold War is that Communism has succeeded only where it grew out of its own, often nationalistic, revolutions. As it has with China and Vietnam, the United States should look closely at the high payoffs stemming from engagement. By improving relations, America can enhance its own influence on the island’s political structure and human rights policies.

At home, with the trade deficit and national debt rising, the economic costs of the embargo are amplified. Recent studies estimate that the US economy foregoes up to $4.84 billion a year and the Cuban economy up to $685 million a year.50 While US-Cuban economic interests align, political considerations inside America have shifted, as “commerce seems to be trumping anti-Communism and Florida ideologues.”51 Clearly, public opinion also favors a new Cuba policy, with 65 percent of Americans now ready for a shift in the country’s approach to its neighboring island.52

At this particular moment in the history of US-Cuban relations, there is tremendous promise for a breakthrough in relations. In a post-Cold War world, Cuba no longer presents a security threat to the united States, but instead provides it with economic potential. American leaders cannot forget the fact that an economic embargo, combined with diplomatic isolation, has failed to bring democracy to Cuba for over 50 years.

American policymakers should see Cuba as an opportunity to reap the political, economic, and strategic rewards of shifting its own policies toward engagement. By ending the economic embargo and normalizing diplomatic relations with the island, President Obama would indicate that he is truly willing to extend his hand once America’s traditional adversaries unclench their fists.

#### Cuba is the lynchpin to Latin American relations, goodwill, solving anti-americanism and successful soft power

Perez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]

Anti-Americanism has become the political chant de jour for leaders seeking long-term as well as short-term gains in Latin American elections. In Venezuela, the anti-American rhetoric spewed by Hugo Chavez masks his otherwise autocratic tendencies, while countries like Bolivia and Ecuador tilt further away from Washington, both rhetorically and substantively. The former expelled the U.S. Ambassador in October 2008, and the latter has refused to renew Washington's lease on an airbase traditionally used for counter-narcotics missions. The systemic neglect for eight years during the Bush Administration meant that political capital was never seriously spent dealing with issues affecting the region. Because of this, President Bush was unable to get much headway with his proposal to reform immigration, and his free trade agreement with Colombia encountered significant opposition in Congress. Recent examples of U.S. unilateralism, disregard for international law and norms, and a growing financial crisis, have all been seized by a new generation of populist Latin American leaders who stoke anti-American sentiment.

The region, however, is absolutely critical to our national interest and security. Over thirty percent of our oil comes from Latin America - more than the U.S. imports from the Middle East. Additionally, over half of the foreign-born population in the United States is Latin American, meaning that a significant portion of American society is intrinsically tied to the region. n1 These immigrants, as well as their sons and daughters, have already begun to take their place amongst America's social, cultural, and political elite.

Just south of America's borders, a deepening polarization is spreading throughout the entire region. In the last few years ideological allies in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela have written and approved new constitutions that have consolidated the power of the executive, while extending - or in Venezuela's case eliminating - presidential term limits. In Venezuela the polarization has been drawn along economic lines, whereby Chavez's base of support continues to be poor Venezuelans. In Bolivia the polarization has been drawn along racial lines: the preamble to the new Bolivian constitution, approved in January 2009, makes reference to the "disastrous colonial times," a moment in history that Bolivians of Andean-descent particularly lament. Those regions in Bolivia with the most people of European or mixed descent have consistently voted for increased provincial autonomy and against the constitutional changes proposed by President Morales. Perhaps due to its sweeping changes, the new Constitution was rejected by four of Bolivia's nine provinces. n2 Like Bolivia, Latin America is still searching for its identity.

[\*191] Traditionally the U.S. has projected its influence by using varying combinations of hard and soft power. It has been a long time since the United States last sponsored or supported military action in Latin America, and although highly context-dependent, it is very likely that Latin American citizens and their governments would view any overt display of American hard power in the region negatively. n3 One can only imagine the fodder an American military excursion into Latin America would provide for a leader like Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, or Evo Morales of Bolivia. Soft power, on the other hand, can win over people and governments without resorting to coercion, but is limited by other factors.

The key to soft power is not simply a strong military, though having one helps, but rather an enduring sense of legitimacy that can then be projected across the globe to advance particular policies. The key to this legitimacy is a good image and a reputation as a responsible actor on the global and regional stage. A good reputation and image can go a long way toward generating goodwill, which ultimately will help the U.S. when it tries to sell unpopular ideas and reforms in the region. n4

In order to effectively employ soft power in Latin America, the U.S. must repair its image by going on a diplomatic offensive and reminding, not just Latin America's leaders, but also the Latin American people, of the important relationship between the U.S. and Latin America. Many of the problems facing Latin America today cannot be addressed in the absence of U.S. leadership and cooperation. Working with other nations to address these challenges is the best way to shore up legitimacy, earn respect, and repair America's image. Although this proposal focuses heavily on Cuba, every country in Latin America is a potential friend. Washington will have to not only strengthen its existing relationships in the region, but also win over new allies, who look to us for "ideas and solutions, not lectures." n5

When analyzing ecosystems, environmental scientists seek out "keystone species." These are organisms that, despite their small size, function as lynchpins for, or barometers of, the entire system's stability. Cuba, despite its size and isolation, is a keystone nation in Latin America, having disproportionately dominated Washington's policy toward the region for decades. n6 As a result of its continuing tensions with Havana, America's reputation [\*192] in the region has suffered, as has its ability to deal with other countries. n7 For fifty years, Latin American governments that hoped to endear themselves to the U.S. had to pass the Cuba "litmus test." But now the tables have turned, and the Obama Administration, if it wants to repair America's image in the region, will have to pass a Cuba litmus test of its own. n8 In short, America must once again be admired if we are going to expect other countries to follow our example. To that end, warming relations with Cuba would have a reverberating effect throughout Latin America, and would go a long way toward creating goodwill.

#### It would provide immediate and substantial benefits to the US image globally

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From an image stand point repealing the sanctions and removing the embargo is symbolic. It shows Cuba and the world that although the United States is pro democracy, it does not wish to impose its values on other nations. The Cuba Democracy Act was an attempt to force democratic changes in Cuba.10 By repealing the act the United States, illustrates that it respects the sovereignty of nations. Considering that this Act did allow for the application of U.S. law in a foreign country11, repealing it not only sends the message about U.S. views on sovereignty but also shows that the administration is taking steps to ensure that sovereignty is actually respected.

Repealing the Helms-Burton Law will certainly stimulate foreign investment in Cuba as well. Many foreign countries were leery of investing in Cuba out of fear of being sued or losing property under the provisions established by the Helms-Burton Act.12 This return of foreign investment will further secure Cuba's place in the global marketplace. It also will help to silence skeptics who will question U.S. intentions. Since the sanctions against Cuba were unilateral U.S. actions, an unsolicited change in course will undoubtedly spark speculation. Allowing all countries to invest in Cuba again underscores the United States' position of desiring for all countries to participate in the global market place. It is difficult to imagine that the benefits of lifting the embargo will not be immediate and substantial in regards to the United States reputation in the world. Looking at the long-term benefits of removing the sanctions, the two benefits that stand out the most are trade and fuel.

#### Independently - Soft Power limits the size and frequency of conflicts around the world.

Nye 96 Professor of International Relations – Harvard University [Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 1995/1996, “Conflicts After the Cold War,” Washington Quarterly, 19:1, Winter]

Leadership by the United States, as the world's leading economy, its most powerful military force, and a leading democracy, is a key factor in limiting the frequency and destructiveness of great power, regional, and communal conflicts. The paradox of the post-cold war role of the United States is that it is the most powerful state in terms of both "hard" power resources (its economy and military forces) and "soft" ones (the appeal of its political system and culture), yet it is not so powerful that it can achieve all its international goals by acting alone. The United States lacks both the international and domestic prerequisites to resolve every conflict, and in each case its role must be proportionate to its interests at stake and the costs of pursuing them. Yet the United States can continue to enable and mobilize international coalitions to pursue shared security interests, whether or not the United States itself supplies large military forces. The U.S. role will thus not be that of a lone global policeman; rather, the United States can frequently serve as the sheriff of the posse, leading shifting coalitions of friends and allies to address shared security concerns within the legitimizing framework of international organizations. This requires sustained attention to the infrastructure and institutional mechanisms that make U.S. leadership effective and joint action possible: forward stationing and preventive deployments of U.S. and allied forces, prepositioning of U.S. and allied equipment, advance planning and joint training to ensure interoperability with allied forces, and steady improvement in the conflict resolution abilities of an interlocking set of bilateral alliances, regional security organizations and alliances, and global institutions.

#### Action now is key – removing the embargo would boost overall Latin relations and undermine the perception of US isolation globally

Perez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]

[\*193] One of the lasting legacies of America's Cuba policy is that it isolates the U.S. and represents stubbornness in the face of ineffectiveness. After the 2008 election the calls to change U.S. policy toward Cuba were echoed by both allies and non-allies, including Brazil, n9 Colombia, n10 and Mexico, as well as Venezuela n11 and Bolivia. n12 The European Union has also expressed its opposition to "the extraterritoriality extension of the United States embargo." n13 Each year the UN considers a resolution condemning America's economic embargo of Cuba, and each year the measure is overwhelmingly adopted. In 2008 the vote was 184-4, meaning the U.S. policy to isolate Cuba has had the ironic effect of isolating the United States. Additionally, the travel ban may violate multiple articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. n14 Fortunately, for three reasons, the opportunity is ripe for a fresh approach to this old problem.

First, leadership changes in both countries allow each to signal a new way forward without necessarily repudiating long-held positions. Both governments have signaled a willingness to talk, which is already a step in the right direction. Specifically, within the United States, demographic changes in the Cuban-American community have led to attitudinal changes toward U.S.-Cuban relations. Florida International University's yearly polls have shown a trend whereby an increasing number of Cuban-Americans are opposed to the current U.S. policy of economic and political isolation.

In 2008, those polls indicated that a majority of Cuban-Americans opposed the restrictions on family travel and remittances. n15 These polls also indicated that long-term demographic trends are breaking in the Democrats' favor: the divide is now between older Cuban Americans who still vote Republican, and the younger generation, increasingly more numerous, who lean Democrat. Not only did President Obama outpace Senator John Kerry's [\*194] 2004 performance by ten points, but he won the twenty-nine or younger Cuban-American vote with fifty-five percent. n16 This shift in public opinion, combined with the fact that President Obama won Florida's electoral votes during the 2008 election despite narrowly losing the Cuban vote, gives the Administration a freer hand to construct a new policy with relatively little political costs.

Moreover, migration from Cuba has picked up pace in recent years, suggesting that the aging hardliners will continue to lose clout relative to voting power. According to the Institute of Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami, over 131,000 Cubans have arrived and settled in South Florida since 2005. n17 In fact, a policy that eventually normalizes relations with Cuba would probably carry votes in Florida, and the rest of the south. n18 These domestic changes mean that the U.S. can more easily reorient its Latin American policy to encourage constructive engagement that inspires optimism and hope rather than fear and anger.

Second, reforms recently enacted in Cuba indicate that the post Fidel Castro leadership is more likely to embrace pragmatism. In recent years, and especially since Raul Castro took over the presidency from his brother Fidel, Cuba's leadership has slightly moderated its political repression. While Cuba still holds political prisoners in custody, the total number is down from 316 in July 2006, when Raul took the helm from his brother, to less than 170 today - the lowest total since Fidel Castro seized power in 1959. n19 However, these political changes have been small, and do not yet represent structural or fundamental reforms in the long term, especially since they are all easily reversible. Nevertheless, these political changes, combined with small economic liberalizations in the agricultural, technological, and tourist sectors, represent the first significant reforms under the new leadership of Raul Castro.

[\*195] Third, the Obama Administration ignores Latin America at its own peril. Latin America's importance to the United States is growing by the day, and cannot be overstated. While the issue of U.S.-Cuba relations is obviously of smaller import than many other issues currently affecting the world (i.e., the ailing economy, climate change, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction), addressing it would also involve correspondingly less effort than those issues, but could potentially lead to a disproportionately high return by making regional cooperation more likely. n20 In order to confront any of the major world issues facing the United States, Washington must find a way to cooperate with its neighbors, who generally view U.S. policy toward Cuba as the most glaring symbol of its historic inability to constructively engage the region. These three reasons combine for a perfect storm: to the extent that a healthy U.S.-Cuban relationship would mean a healthier U.S.-Latin America relationship, the former should be pursued with an unprecedented vigor, one that has been absent for the last fifty years.

#### U.S. Latin American relations are at a crossroads.

Shifter 12 President of Inter-American Dialogue [Michael Shifter, “Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” April, IAD Policy Report, http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf]

Simply addressing an unfinished agenda is not enough. Both the United States and Latin America need to do more to exploit the enormous untapped opportunities of their relationship in economics, trade, and energy. They need to work together to deal with global and regional problems. And they need to project common values, including peace, democracy, human rights, expansion of equal opportunity, and social mobility. They need to breathe new life and vigor into hemispheric relations.

If the United States and Latin America do not make the effort now, the chance may slip away. The most likely scenario then would be marked by a continued drift in their relationship, further deterioration of hemisphere-wide institutions, a reduced ability and willingness to deal with a range of common problems, and a spate of missed opportunities for more robust growth and greater social equity. The United States and Latin America would go their separate ways, manage their affairs independently of one another, and forego the opportunities that could be harvested by a more productive relationship.

There are risks of simply maintaining the status quo. Urgent problems will inevitably arise that require trust and effective collaboration to resolve. And there is a chance that tensions between the United States and Latin America could become much worse, adversely affecting everyone’s interests and wellbeing. It is time to seize the moment and overhaul hemispheric relations.

#### Latin American relations are vital to the US. Needed to combat global problems like proliferation, climate change, and insure economic growth. Only engagement solves

Zedillo et al 08 Commission Co-Chair for the Brookings Institute Report on the Partnership for the Americas and former President of Mexico [Ernesto Zedillo, Thomas R. Pickering, etc, Rethinking U.S.–Latin American Relations A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World. Report of the Partnership for the Americas Commission, The Brookings Institution, November 2008, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2008/11/24%20latin%20america%20partnership/1124_latin_america_partnership.PDF>]

The Need for a Hemispheric Partnership

Historically, the United States and Latin America have rarely developed a genuine and sustained partnership to address regional—let alone global—challenges. Mutual distrust is partly to blame. Also, the LAC countries were often not ready to make stable commitments. The United States had other preoccupations and did not make hemispheric partnership a priority. Problems and solutions were seen from Washington as country-specific and were managed mostly on a country-bycountry basis through bilateral channels. Meanwhile, multilateral forums—such as the Organization of American States and the summits of hemispheric leaders—ran out of steam, became mired in confrontation, or remained underresourced.

If a hemispheric partnership remains elusive, the costs to the United States and its neighbors will be high, in terms of both growing risks and missed opportunities. Without a partnership, the risk that criminal networks pose to the region’s people and institutions will continue to grow. Peaceful nuclear technology may be adopted more widely, but without proper safeguards, the risks of nuclear proliferation will increase. Adaptation to climate change will take place through isolated, improvised measures by individual countries, rather than through more effective efforts based on mutual learning and coordination. Illegal immigration to the United States will continue unabated and unregulated, adding to an ever-larger underclass that lives and works at the margins of the law. Finally, the countries around the hemisphere, including the United States, will lose valuable opportunities to tap new markets, make new investments, and access valuable resources.

It is important to note at the outset that the term “partnership” as used in this report does not mean equal responsibility for all. The asymmetries between the United States and its neighbors are large and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Partnership here means a type of international cooperation whereby a group of countries identifies common interests, objectives, and solutions, and then each partner country undertakes responsibilities according to its own economic and political capacities to generate shared benefits.

Today, four changes in the region have made a hemispheric partnership both possible and necessary. First, the key challenges faced by the United States and the hemisphere’s other countries— such as securing sustainable energy supplies, combating and adapting to climate change, and combating organized crime and drug trafficking—have become so complex and deeply transnational that they cannot be managed or overcome by any single country. Washington needs partners in the LAC region with a shared sense of responsibility and a common stake in the future.

For example, drug trafficking and its associated criminal networks have now spread so widely across the hemisphere that they can no longer be regarded as a “U.S. problem,” a “Colombian problem,” or a “Mexican problem.” The threat posed by these networks can only be countered through coordinated efforts across producing, consuming, and transshipment countries, all of which have a shared interest in controlling the flow of arms, money, vehicles, and drugs. The process of combating and adapting to climate change also exemplifies the need for a hemispheric partnership. All carbon-emitting societies contribute to the problem to different degrees, and all will experience its consequences. The solutions—ranging from developing alternative fuels to adapting to ecological shocks—all require sustained cooperation among the hemisphere’s countries.

The second change is that the LAC countries are diversifying their international economic relations. Their range of trading and investment partners is expanding, with China in particular playing a prominent role in the region. Chinese imports from the LAC countries increased twentyfold between 1990 and 2005, while Chinese exports to the region grew even faster, from $620 million in 1990 to $37 billion in 2005. Latin America is also attracting significant foreign investment from nontraditional sources. Between just 2003 and 2005, the stock of Chinese foreign direct investment in the LAC region increased by 40 percent. China has become a key buyer of commodities, driving up prices and reversing the long-term decline in the region’s terms of trade. Meanwhile, the Caribbean countries have recently signed an Economic Partnership Agreement with the European Union, immediately opening all European markets and gradually opening Caribbean ones. With more valuable exports and less expensive manufactured imports, living standards in the LAC region have improved significantly.

At the same time, many LAC countries have moved beyond their traditional reliance on resources from the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank. Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Brazil now enjoy investment-grade status from credit-rating agencies and in recent years have been able to raise capital readily in international markets. The same is true of several other countries, including Colombia, El Salvador, Panama, and Uruguay, which until the recent financial crisis enjoyed ready access to private international capital. Regionally owned institutions, such as the Andean Development Corporation and the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, have also reduced the region’s dependence on traditional sources of capital.

Some Latin American countries are investing abroad on an unprecedented scale. In 2006, for example, Brazil invested more abroad ($28 billion) than it received in foreign direct investment ($19 billion). In Chile, private pension funds and the government have become active international investors. Surpluses have allowed Venezuela to inject billions of dollars into other countries, particularly through subsidized oil exports. Many Latin American multinationals—such as Brazil’s Vale, Gerdau, and Odebrecht; and Mexico’s CEMEX, America Movil, and Grupo FEMSA—have become global corporate giants. The current crisis may no doubt affect the relative magnitude of these investments, but economic relationships in the hemisphere will continue to diversify as the world economy recovers.

The third change is that the LAC countries are diversifying their political and diplomatic relations. The most notable example is Brazil, which has opened thirty-two new embassies in the past five years. Together with Venezuela, Brazil is playing a more active political role in the region through the Union of South American Nations, which is already active at the presidential level and is expected to become a key forum for the discussion of defense issues. Mexico and Brazil are also playing prominent roles in international forums and organizations, including the finance ministers’ Group of Twenty and the trade ministers’ Group of Twenty. Brazil has announced its intention to join the Organization of the Petroleum-Exporting Countries and the Paris Club. Chile and Brazil are expected to become members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in the not-too-distant future. Mexico, Peru, and Chile are active members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. In sum, this diversification of political and economic relations reflects many LAC countries’ new confidence in their capacity to chart their own course in the world.

Their enhanced confidence and autonomy will make many LAC countries much less responsive to U.S. policies that are perceived as patronizing, intrusive, or prescriptive, and they will be more responsive to policies that engage them as partners on issues of mutual concern. Also, the LAC countries’ diversification of economic and political relations means that Washington will have to compete with governments both outside and within the region for regional influence. In particular, Brasília and Caracas are both vying for leadership in South America; and though they may have different visions for regional integration and different ways to approach other governments, they agree that Washington should play a more limited role in their part of the world.

The fourth change is that, today, the LAC countries are better positioned to act as reliable partners. Despite remaining governance challenges, the vast majority of these countries are stable democracies for which competitive elections and peaceful transitions of power are the norm, not the exception. Throughout these countries, civil society groups now participate extensively in the policymaking process, and there is much less tolerance of violence as a means of political expression.

Economic progress has also made the LAC countries more reliable partners. Leaders, including some on the left, are committed to fiscal responsibility. Most central banks are now independent bodies focused on inflation control. Exchange rates largely reflect market forces. As a result, many LAC countries can now look beyond their borders and commit to sustained partnerships and responsibilities on regional and global issues.

In sum, the countries of the LAC region have made significant strides in economic and social development and will continue to prosper even if U.S. leaders remain disengaged. Washington must decide whether it wants to actively reengage and benefit from the region’s dynamism and resources or be sidelined as other economic and political actors fill the void left by its absence.

#### Proliferation risks nuclear conflict—inexperienced nations will be more likely to use their nukes

Horowitz 9­­—Professor of Political Science at University of Pennsylvania [Michael Horowitz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons and International Conflict: Does Experience Matter?” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Volume 53 Number 2, April 2009 pg. 234-257]

Learning as states gain experience with nuclear weapons is complicated. While to some extent nuclear acquisition might provide information about resolve or capabilities, it also generates uncertainty about the way an actual conflict would go – given the new risk of nuclear escalation – and uncertainty about relative capabilities. Rapid proliferation may especially heighten uncertainty given the potential for reasonable states to disagree at times about the quality of the capabilities each possesses. 3

What follows is an attempt to describe the implications of inexperience and incomplete information on the behavior of nuclear states and their potential opponents over time. Since it is impossible to detail all possible lines of argumentation and possible responses, the following discussion is necessarily incomplete. This is a first step. The acquisition of nuclear weapons increases the confidence of adopters in their ability to impose costs in the case of a conflict and the expectations of likely costs if war occurs by potential opponents. The key questions are whether nuclear states learn over time about how to leverage nuclear weapons and the implications of that learning, along with whether or not actions by nuclear states, over time, convey information that leads to changes in the expectations of their behavior – shifts in uncertainty – on the part of potential adversaries.

Learning to Leverage?

When a new state acquires nuclear weapons, how does it influence the way the state behaves and how might that change over time? Though nuclear acquisition might be orthogonal to a particular dispute, it might be related to a particular security challenge, might signal revisionist aims with regard to an enduring dispute, or might signal the desire to reinforce the status quo.

This section focuses on how acquiring nuclear weapons influences both the new nuclear state and potential adversaries. In theory, system-wide perceptions of nuclear danger could allow new nuclear states to partially skip the early Cold War learning process concerning the risks of nuclear war and enter a proliferated world more cognizant of nuclear brinksmanship and bargaining than their predecessors. However, each new nuclear state has to resolve its own particular civil-military issues surrounding operational control and plan its national strategy in light of its new capabilities. Empirical research by Sagan, Feaver, and Blair suggests that viewing the behavior of other states does not create the necessary tacit knowledge; there is no substitute for experience when it comes to handling a nuclear arsenal, even if experience itself cannot totally prevent accidents (Blair 1993; Feaver 1992; Sagan 1993). Sagan contends that civil-military instability in many likely new proliferators and pressures generated by the requirements to handle the responsibility of dealing with nuclear weapons will **skew decision-making towards more offensive strategies** (Sagan 1995). The questions surrounding Pakistan’s nuclear command and control suggest there is no magic bullet when it comes to new nuclear powers making control and delegation decisions (Bowen and Wolvén 1999).

Sagan and others focus on inexperience on the part of new nuclear states as a key behavioral driver. Inexperienced operators, and the bureaucratic desire to “justify” the costs spent developing nuclear weapons, combined with organizational biases that may favor escalation to avoid decapitation, the “use it or lose it” mindset, may cause new nuclear states to **adopt riskier launch postures**, like launch on warning, or at least be perceived that way by other states (Blair 1993; Feaver 1992; Sagan 1995). 4

Acquiring nuclear weapons could alter state preferences and make them more likely to escalate disputes once they start, given their new capabilities.5 But their general lack of experience at leveraging their nuclear arsenal and effectively communicating nuclear threats could mean new nuclear states will be more likely to select adversaries poorly and find themselves in disputes with resolved adversaries that will reciprocate militarized challenges.

The “nuclear experience” logic also suggests that more experienced nuclear states should gain knowledge over time from nuclearized interactions that helps leaders effectively identify the situations in which their nuclear arsenal is likely to make a difference. Experienced nuclear states learn to select into cases where their comparative advantage, nuclear weapons, is more likely to be effective, increasing the probability that an adversary will not reciprocate.

Coming from a slightly different perspective, uncertainty about the consequences of proliferation on the balance of power and the behavior of new nuclear states on the part of their potential adversaries could also shape behavior in similar ways (Schelling 1966; Blainey 1988). While a stable and credible nuclear arsenal communicates clear information about the likely costs of conflict, **in the short-term** nuclear proliferation is likely to increase **uncertainty** about the trajectory of a war, **the balance of power**, and the preferences of the adopter.

#### Loss of influence in Latin American undermines our overall primacy

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The Globalization of Latin America

The United States has long been wary of foreign powers meddling in the Western Hemisphere for reasons both real and imagined. In recent years, Latin America’s increasingly diverse international relations have stoked these fears anew, as the US has witnessed the region draw closer to global rivals just as American influence is facing unprecedented challenges. The warm embrace that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad received from Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez and, more recently, Brazil’s President Lula, provides the most dramatic example of a new trend that has seen Latin America and the Caribbean seek greater independence from the United States while deepening ties with such emerging powers outside the hemisphere as China, India and Russia. To be sure, many US policy makers intellectually understand that this increasingly complex mosaic of international relations is the product of a more globalized world. Still, there is an underlying current of unease that American primacy in the Western Hemisphere is being threatened in subtle but important ways.

Of course, there has long been a precept in US foreign policy that was developed to address precisely this problem. It is called the Monroe Doctrine, after its creator President James Monroe, and it represents the iconic assertion of the United States’ right to oppose foreign powers in the Western Hemisphere. Today, the realities that were the foundation for the Monroe Doctrine have fundamentally changed, but the United States has been slow to adjust its attitudes and mindset accordingly. In order to be effective in Latin America, the Obama administration recognizes that it must adapt to an increasingly globalized era in inter-American relations. As a result, the US has attempted to forge a middle path between counterproductive efforts to isolate countries with which it has difficult relations and efforts to engage Latin America’s rising powers that show little interest in reciprocating American goodwill. In May 2009, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, speaking at a public forum in Washington, D.C., was asked how the US should manage the challenges posed by Hugo Chávez, the Venezuelan leader who has positioned himself as the chief opponent of American power in Latin America. Secretary Clinton (2009) used the opportunity to rebut the George W. Bush administration’s record in dealing with leftist leaders in the hemisphere, saying that “the prior administration tried to isolate them . . . It didn’t work.” She continued, I have to say that I don’t think in today’s world, where it’s a multipolar world, where we are competing for attention and relationships with at least the Russians, the Chinese, the Iranians, that it’s in our interest to turn our backs on countries in our own hemisphere.

Clinton also stated that the new engagement between extra hemispheric actors and certain Latin American countries is “quite disturbing” (Clinton, 2009).

Secretary Clinton is hardly the first US public official to cast China’s growing presence in Latin America as a sign that the US should deepen its own engagement in the region. During the 2008 US presidential campaign, China’s growing influence in Latin America was portrayed as a symptom of the perceived neglect of the region by the Bush administration. In his first debate with Republican candidate John McCain, Obama highlighted China’s role as a potential challenge: We’ve got challenges, for example, with China, where we are borrowing billions of dollars. They now hold a trillion dollars’ worth of our debt. And they are active . . . in regions like Latin America, and Asia, and Africa. The conspicuousness of their presence is only matched by our absence, because we’ve been focused on Iraq. (New York Times, 2009).

To its credit, the Obama administration has adopted a more nuanced approach, with regard to China in Latin America. The US posture has continued in the largely clear-headed and restrained direction that was initiated by the second Bush administration. Indeed, in the fall of 2009, Frank Mora, the top official managing Western Hemisphere affairs at the Pentagon, suggested that China could usefully help Latin America to address the issues of ungoverned territories, lack of economic opportunity, and narcotics and arms trafficking in the region (Mora, 2009). Similarly, Russia’s renewed interest in Latin America has been met with relative equanimity, despite the fact that Russian arms sales to the region have surged in recent years to overtake those of the US. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Russian arms sales to Latin America in 2009 topped US$5.4 billion, principally to Venezuela, although Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru also made major purchases (UPI, 2010). It is the deepening engagement of Iran in Latin America that has provoked the greatest alarm in the Obama administration. In Congressional testimony in January 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned, “I’m more concerned about Iranian meddling in the region than I am the Russians,” adding,

I’m concerned about the level of frankly subversive activity that the Iranians are carrying on in a number of places in Latin America ... They’re opening a lot of offices and a lot of fronts behind which they interfere in what is going on in some of these countries. (Reuters, 2009)

Indeed, while the Obama administration has accepted — even embraced — the notion of a multipolar world, it continues to indicate that one of the potential poles, Latin America, should remain off-limits to those powers of which the US disapproves. These latent tensions were thrown into even sharper relief in November 2009, when Brazilian President Lula hosted a state visit by Iranian President Ahmadinejad, despite deep disapproval in Washington (see Sweig, 2010). The emergence of Iran as a worrisome new actor in the region has heightened the need to for the US to develop effective responses to the region’s increasing globalization.

#### That influence prevents global nuclear conflicts

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The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying — its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic.

It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War I and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible.

Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe’s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war.

People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that’s not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War II, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe.

The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world’s great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between **China and Taiwan** and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between **Russia and Georgia**, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between **India and Pakistan** remains possible, as does conflict between **Iran and Israel** or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States.

Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China ’s neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan.

In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene — even if it remained the world’s most powerful nation — could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe — if it adopted what some call a strategy of “offshore balancing” — this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances.

It is also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of a more passive, “offshore” role would lead to greater stability there. The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more “even-handed” policy toward Israel, which some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to come to Israel ’s aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and on the ground.

The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn’t change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. **The alternative to American predominance** in the region **is not balance and peace**. It is further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by both China and Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasn ’t changed that much. An American withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to “normal” or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again.

The alternative to American regional predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one should imagine that a reduction of American power or a retraction of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path.

### 1NC

#### 1. No relations solvency. GITMO and others Alt causes overwhelm

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What are the issues preventing normalization of U.S.-Cuba relations?

Experts say these issues include:

Human rights violations. In March 2003, the Cuban government arrested seventy-five dissidents and journalists, sentencing them to prison terms of up to twenty-eight years on charges of conspiring with the United States to overthrow the state. The Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation, a Havana-based nongovernmental group, reports that the government has in recent years resorted to other tactics besides prison --such as firings from state jobs and intimidation on the street-- to silence opposition figures. A 2005 UN Human Rights Commission vote condemned Cuba's human rights record, but the country was elected to the new UN Human Rights Council in 2006.

Guantanamo Bay. Cuba indicated after 9/11 that it would not object if the United States brought prisoners to Guantanamo Bay. However, experts such as Sweig say Cuban officials have since seized on the U.S. prison camp--where hundreds of terror suspects have been detained--as a "symbol of solidarity" with the rest of the world against the United States. Although Obama ordered Guantanamo to be closed by January 22, 2010, the facility remains open as of January 2013, and many analysts say it is likely to stay in operation for an extended period.

Cuban exile community. The Cuban-American community in southern Florida traditionally has heavily influenced U.S. policy with Cuba. Both political parties fear alienating a strong voting bloc in an important swing state in presidential elections.

#### 2. Not reverse causal – removing the embargo isn’t sufficient to normalize relations. Brazil and Venezuela oppose US manipulation of their markets, including agricultural subsidies. Hemisphere wide cooperation will never emerge.

#### 3. Soft power doesn’t solve—increases resentment for the “uncivilized”

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An inherent and unavoidable problem with a country’s soft power is that it is near certain to be misassessed by the politicians who attempt to govern soft power’s societal owners and carriers. Few thoroughly encultured Americans are likely to undervalue “the American way” in many of its aspects as a potent source of friendly self-co-option abroad. Often, this self-flattering appreciation will be well justified in reality. But as an already existing instrument of American policy, the soft power of ideas and practical example is fraught with the perils of self-delusion. If one adheres to an ideology that is a heady mixture of Christian ethics (“one nation, under God . . .”), democratic principles, and free market orthodoxy, and if one is an American, which is to say if one is a citizen of a somewhat hegemonic world power that undeniably has enjoyed a notably successful historical passage to date, then it is natural to confuse the national ideology with a universal creed. Such confusion is only partial, but nonetheless it is sufficiently damaging as to be a danger to national strategy. Since it is fallacious to assume that American values truly are universal, the domain of high relevance and scope for American soft power to be influential is distinctly limited. If one places major policy weight on the putative value for policy of American soft power, one needs to be acutely alert to the dangers of an under-recognized ethnocentrism born of cultural ignorance. This ignorance breeds an arrogant disdain for evidence of foreigners’ lack of interest in being coopted to join American civilization. The result of such arrogance predictably is political and even military strategic counterreaction. It is a case of good intentions gone bad when they are pursued with indifference toward the local cultural context. Some people have difficulty grasping the unpalatable fact that much of the world is not receptive to any American soft power that attempts to woo it to the side of American interests. Not all rivalries are resolvable by ideas, formulas, or “deals” that seem fair and equitable to us. There are conflicts wherein the struggle is the message, to misquote Marshal MacLuhan, with value in the eyes of local belligerents. Not all local conflicts around the world are amenable to the calming effect of American soft power. True militarists of left and right, secular and religious, find intrinsic value in struggle and warfare, as A. J. Coates has explained all too clearly. The self-fulfilment and self-satisfaction that war generates derive in part from the religious or ideological significance attributed to it and from the resultant sense of participating in some grand design. It may be, however, that the experience of war comes to be prized for its own sake and not just for the great ends that it serves or promotes. For many, the excitement unique to war makes pacific pursuits seem insipid by comparison. This understanding and experience of moral, psychological, and emotional self-fulfillment increase our tolerance for war and threaten its moral regulation. It transforms war from an instrumental into an expressive activity.49 It is foolish to believe that every conflict contains the seeds of its own resolution, merely awaiting suitable watering through co-option by soft power. To be fair, similarly unreasonable faith in the disciplinary value of (American) military force is also to be deplored.

#### 4. No spillover globally – Cuba is a regional actor. US drones policy in Pakistan is more important in South Asia, and our support of Taiwan destroys influence with China. The Middle East is divided, with little US influence on unstable actors such as Iran.

#### 5. No Prolif Impact – not widespread

Hymans 12—Jacques E. C. Hymans is Associate Professor of IR at USC [April 16, 2012, “North Korea's Lessons for (Not) Building an Atomic Bomb,” *Foreign Affairs*, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137408/jacques-e-c-hymans/north-koreas-lessons-for-not-building-an-atomic-bomb?page=show]

Washington's miscalculation is not just a product of the difficulties of seeing inside the Hermit Kingdom. It is also a result of the broader tendency to overestimate the pace of global proliferation. For decades, Very Serious People have predicted that strategic weapons are about to spread to every corner of the earth. Such warnings have routinely proved wrong -- for instance, the intelligence assessments that led to the 2003 invasion of Iraq -- but they continue to be issued. In reality, despite the diffusion of the relevant technology and the knowledge for building nuclear weapons, the world has been experiencing a great proliferation slowdown. Nuclear weapons programs around the world are taking much longer to get off the ground -- and their failure rate is much higher -- than they did during the first 25 years of the nuclear age.

As I explain in my article "Botching the Bomb" in the upcoming issue of Foreign Affairs, the key reason for the great proliferation slowdown is the absence of strong cultures of scientific professionalism in most of the recent crop of would-be nuclear states, which in turn is a consequence of their poorly built political institutions. In such dysfunctional states, the quality of technical workmanship is low, there is little coordination across different technical teams, and technical mistakes lead not to productive learning but instead to finger-pointing and recrimination. These problems are debilitating, and they cannot be fixed simply by bringing in more imported parts through illicit supply networks. In short, as a struggling proliferator, North Korea has a lot of company.

### 2NC

#### Relations are beyond gone—the US will still maintain diplomatic isolation

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What is the status of U.S.-Cuba relations?

They are virtually nonexistent. There is a U.S. mission in Havana, Cuba's capital, but it has minimal communication with the Cuban government. Since 1961, the official U.S. policy toward Cuba has been two-pronged: economic embargo and diplomatic isolation. The George W. Bush administration strongly enforced the embargo and increased travel restrictions. Americans with immediate family in Cuba could visit once every three years for a maximum of two weeks, while family remittances to Cuba were reduced from $3,000 to just $300 in 2004. However, in April 2009, President Obama eased some of these policies. He went further in 2011 to undo many of the restrictions imposed by the Bush administration, thus allowing U.S. citizens to send remittances to non-family members in Cuba and to travel to Cuba for educational or religious purposes.

Congress amended the trade embargo in 2000 to allow agricultural exports from the United States to Cuba. In 2008, U.S. companies exported roughly $710 million worth of food and agricultural products to the island nation, according to the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council. However, that number fell by about 50 percent in 2012. Total agricultural exports since 2001 reached $3.5 billion as of February 2012. Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Texas have all brokered agricultural deals with Cuba in recent years.

Tension between Cuba and the United States flared in December 2009 with Cuba's arrest of Alan Gross, a USAID subcontractor who traveled to the country to deliver communications equipment and arrange Internet access for its Jewish community. Cuban authorities alleged Gross was attempting to destabilize the Cuban regime through a USAID-sponsored "democracy promotion" program, and he was subsequently sentenced to fifteen years in prison.

Despite initial optimism over Obama's election, Cuban politicians and citizens are less hopeful of a positive relationship developing between the two countries. Raúl and Fidel Castro have both criticized the Obama administration. In a 2009 speech, Raúl Castro accused the United States of "giving new breath to open and undercover subversion against Cuba."

#### Multiple obstacles to relations

Hakim 11 President Emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue [Peter Hakim, The United States and Latin America: The Neighbourhood has Changed, The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, Volume 46, Issue 4, 2011]

The electoral triumph of Barack Obama was enthusiastically welcomed in Latin America and the Caribbean.15 The spirited reaction to Obama's election made it clear that Latin Americans wanted a good relationship with the United States, but that they also wanted the United States to pursue a different approach to the region and to foreign policy generally. Expectations for the new administration were high throughout the region.

In contrast to many of his predecessors, Obama did not present a grand vision or a broad strategy for US policy in the hemisphere. Instead, he saw his presidency as an opportunity to solve some long-standing problems, reduce discord and friction, and encourage greater cooperation. Most of all, he promised a change in style and emphasis—fundamentally a turn to multilateralism and partnership, and a closer alignment of the United States and Latin American policy agendas. This would be a time to reinvigorate US relations in the hemisphere and perhaps set the stage for a new approach to regional affairs, not to embark on major new initiatives.

Obama himself remains widely admired and extremely well liked in Latin America, but his administration has not managed to improve the quality of US–Latin American relations or develop more productive regional ties.

The new president's overcrowded agenda has left little room for Latin America. Foreign policy has generally taken a back seat to the US' economic problems, health reform and myriad other domestic challenges. Latin America has had no chance of competing successfully for Washington's limited foreign policy attention with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran's nuclear ambitions and China's expanding global muscle.

The intense and bitter partisanship of Washington has compounded the problem. Neither Democrats nor Republicans have been eager to take on the politically volatile challenge of immigration reform, which remains the highest priority issue for Mexico and most nations of Central America and the Caribbean.16 Though the US Congress finally ratified the long-stalled free trade agreements with Colombia and Panama, only one in six Democrats in the House voted for both pacts. A Republican majority in the lower house of Congress now blocks any further relaxation of Cuba policy.

Finally, an increasingly assertive and politically divided Latin America has also complicated US policymaking. Only a few countries are openly hostile to Washington, but across the region, governments have demonstrated a growing independence from the US. They have built diverse relations internationally, and increasingly resisted US approaches. These are natural trends for a region of middle income countries that is expanding economically, more confident of its ability to resolve its own problems, and developing a significant global presence. They do not necessarily represent a setback for the United States. Over time, they might well allow for more productive hemispheric partnerships. But, today they are a major source of friction in US–Latin American relations, which have been strained by disagreements over Honduras, regional efforts to restore Cuba to OAS membership, South American opposition to the US–Colombia defence pact, and Iran's ties to Brazil and other nations.

#### No impact to soft power—believers exaggerate benefits—hard power is comparatively more important

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Soft power is potentially a dangerous idea not because it is unsound, which it is not, but rather for the faulty inference that careless or unwary observers draw from it. Such inferences are a challenge to theorists because they are unable to control the ways in which their ideas will be interpreted and applied in practice by those unwary observers. Concepts can be tricky. They seem to make sense of what otherwise is intellectually undergoverned space, and thus potentially come to control pliable minds. Given that men behave as their minds suggest and command, it is easy to understand why Clausewitz identified the enemy’s will as the target for influence.37 Beliefs about soft power in turn have potentially negative implications for attitudes toward the hard power of military force and economic muscle. Thus, soft power does not lend itself to careful regulation, adjustment, and calibration. What does this mean? To begin with a vital contrast: whereas military force and economic pressure (negative or positive) can be applied by choice as to quantity and quality, soft power cannot. (Of course, the enemy/rival too has a vote on the outcome, regardless of the texture of the power applied.) But hard power allows us to decide how we will play in shaping and modulating the relevant narrative, even though the course of history must be an interactive one once the engagement is joined. In principle, we can turn the tap on or off at our discretion. The reality is apt to be somewhat different because, as noted above, the enemy, contingency, and friction will intervene. But still a noteworthy measure of initiative derives from the threat and use of military force and economic power. But soft power is very different indeed as an instrument of policy. In fact, I am tempted to challenge the proposition that soft power can even be regarded as one (or more) among the grand strategic instruments of policy. The seeming validity and attractiveness of soft power lead to easy exaggeration of its potency. Soft power is admitted by all to defy metric analysis, but this is not a fatal weakness. Indeed, the instruments of hard power that do lend themselves readily to metric assessment can also be unjustifiably seductive. But the metrics of tactical calculation need not be strategically revealing. It is important to win battles, but victory in war is a considerably different matter than the simple accumulation of tactical successes. Thus, the burden of proof remains on soft power: (1) What is this concept of soft power? (2) Where does it come from and who or what controls it? and (3) Prudently assessed and anticipated, what is the quantity and quality of its potential influence? Let us now consider answers to these questions. 7. Soft power lends itself too easily to mischaracterization as the (generally unavailable) alternative to military and economic power. The first of the three questions posed above all but invites a misleading answer. Nye plausibly offers the co-option of people rather than their coercion as the defining principle of soft power.38 The source of possible misunderstanding is the fact that merely by conjuring an alternative species of power, an obvious but unjustified sense of equivalence between the binary elements is produced. Moreover, such an elementary shortlist implies a fitness for comparison, an impression that the two options are like-for-like in their consequences, though not in their methods. By conceptually corralling a country’s potentially attractive co-optive assets under the umbrella of soft power, one is near certain to devalue the significance of an enabling context. Power of all kinds depends upon context for its value, but especially so for the soft variety. For power to be influential, those who are to be influenced have a decisive vote. But the effects of contemporary warfare do not allow recipients the luxury of a vote. They are coerced. On the other hand, the willingness to be coopted by American soft power varies hugely among recipients. In fact, there are many contexts wherein the total of American soft power would add up in the negative, not the positive. When soft power capabilities are strong in their values and cultural trappings, there is always the danger that they will incite resentment, hostility, and a potent “blowback.” In those cases, American soft power would indeed be strong, but in a counterproductive direction. These conclusions imply no criticism of American soft power per se. The problem would lie in the belief that soft power is a reliable instrument of policy that could complement or in some instances replace military force. 8. Soft power is perilously reliant on the calculations and feelings of frequently undermotivated foreigners. The second question above asked about the provenance and ownership of soft power. Nye correctly notes that “soft power does not belong to the government in the same degree that hard power does.” He proceeds sensibly to contrast the armed forces along with plainly national economic assets with the “soft power resources [that] are separate from American government and only partly responsive to its purposes.” 39 Nye cites as a prominent example of this disjunction in responsiveness the fact that “[i]n the Vietnam era . . . American government policy and popular culture worked at cross-purposes.”40 Although soft power can be employed purposefully as an instrument of national policy, such power is notably unpredictable in its potential influence, producing net benefit or harm. Bluntly stated, America is what it is, and there are many in the world who do not like what it is. The U.S. Government will have the ability to project American values in the hope, if not quite confident expectation, that “the American way” will be found attractive in alien parts of the world. Our hopes would seem to be achievement of the following: (1) love and respect of American ideals and artifacts (civilization); (2) love and respect of America; and (3) willingness to cooperate with American policy today and tomorrow. Admittedly, this agenda is reductionist, but the cause and desired effects are accurate enough. Culture is as culture does and speaks and produces. The soft power of values culturally expressed that others might find attractive is always at risk to negation by the evidence of national deeds that appear to contradict our cultural persona.

## Human Rights

### 1AC

#### Advantage Two is Human Rights

#### The embargo is destroying human rights in Cuba – denies people access to basic needs, services, and universally agreed upon rights.

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The Cuban embargo is not a limited set of economic sanctions affecting a few carefully targeted areas of Cuba's government and society. Instead, it is a comprehensive program that prohibits virtually all American trade, investment, travel, cultural and human contact with Cuba outside of a few narrow exceptions. Moreover, throughout the embargo's 47-year history, different U.S. administrations have worked aggressively to expand the embargo's extraterritorial reach in order to pressure as many countries as possible to reduce their contacts with Cuba. The embargo's extensive extraterritorial reach and power as well as its disproportionate nature are magnified by Cuba's weakness as a small Caribbean island of 11 million people, its peculiar geographical location only 90 miles from the United States, and the U.S.'s own international economic and financial preeminence. As currently structured, the embargo has comprehensive, widespread, and indiscriminate effects on the economic, social, and family conditions of the Cuban people that cause it to violate widely recognized human rights norms as well as the basic obligation of states to ensure that sanctions imposed for the sake of promoting human rights do not have the opposite effect of harming the human rights of innocent people. n259

Apologists for the embargo point out that the embargo has only a limited impact on the Cuban economy because Cuba is free to trade with virtually every other country in the world. n260 This argument overlooks two key [\*236] issues. First, the U.S. government has not contented itself with denying the benefits of trade and investment to Cuba. Instead, throughout most of the embargo's history, U.S. administrations have exerted enormous pressures on foreign governments and companies to discourage all economic contact with Cuba. A typical example occurred in the early 1990s when Cuba, then in the midst of a severe economic depression caused by the collapse of its ally, the Soviet Union, attempted to modernize its antiquated 40-year old telephone network. Grupos Domo, a Mexican-based conglomerate with substantial economic ties to the United States, began negotiations with Cuba over what would have been a multi-billion dollar deal but eventually withdrew from negotiations as a result of enormous pressure by the U.S. government. n261 Ultimately, Cuba found a group of willing international investor partners, most of whom insisted on anonymity in order to avoid possible American retaliation. Thus, the reach of the U.S. embargo extends significantly beyond U.S.-Cuba trade relations, and negatively impacts Cuba's relations with other countries as well.

Second, since Congress passed the Cuban Democracy Act in 1992 and the subsequent Helms-Burton Act of 1996, the embargo has sharply increased its extraterritorial reach. Thousands of foreign companies that could trade with Cuba before 1992 are no longer allowed to do so by virtue of being subsidiaries of U.S. corporations. Although the European Union and other U.S. allies responded to the Helms-Burton Act by enacting "blocking statutes" and "claw-back" provisions n262, Helms-Burton has nonetheless had a [\*237] chilling effect on trade and investment with Cuba. n263 Thus, the embargo's economic impact must be measured not only in terms of the way it has isolated Cuba from U.S. markets but also by its effect on the willingness of many private international entities to do business with Cuba.

Because the embargo has such far-reaching effects on foreign trade and investment with Cuba, its effects on human rights are similarly far-reaching, encompassing such areas as public health, nutrition, education, culture, and even fundamental family rights. In general, economic sanctions affect education in the sanctioned country by decreasing access to supplies, which ultimately leads to the deterioration of infrastructure. n264 The Cuban government estimates that the embargo has cost Cuba an estimated average of $ 2.19 billion a year since 1959, a figure that may be quite conservative in light of several factors. n265 First, the embargo is unusually comprehensive and affects every area of Cuba's economic life. Second, it deprives Cuba of the benefits from economies of scale and geographical advantages associated with the U.S. market. Third, the dollar's role as the international currency of choice, the preeminent role of U.S. banks in international trade especially in the western hemisphere, and the embargo's extraterritorial reach combine to [\*238] increase substantially the costs to Cuba of trading with many other countries.

The most recent United Nations report on human rights in Cuba referred to the U.S. embargo as one of the "factors hindering the realization of human rights in Cuba," and noted that:

The restrictions imposed by the embargo help to deprive Cuba of vital access to medicines, new scientific and medical technology, food, chemical water treatment and electricity. The disastrous effects of the embargo in terms of the economic, social and cultural rights of the Cuban people have been denounced by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations Children's Fund, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the World Health Organization ... . n266

Thus, though the embargo is now promoted as a means of improving human rights, the embargo has had the opposite effect of harming human rights.

#### The embargo’s attempts to boost human rights has backfired – removing the embargo would boost human rights, force the regime to stop abusing them, and provide the impetus to improve them through internal change.

Amash 12 International Relations at UC San Diego [Brandon Amash, Evaluating the Cuban Embargo, Prospect: Journal of International Affairs at UCSD, <http://prospectjournal.org/2012/07/23/evaluating-the-cuban-embargo/>]

Cuba has a long record of violating the fundamental human rights of freedom of opinion, thought, expression, and the right to dissent; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights clearly protects these rights in Articles 19 and 21. Article 19 states that “everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” Article 21 similarly states that “everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country […]” (UDHR). The purpose of this proposal is to provide the United States with an alternative foreign policy approach toward Cuba that will improve human rights conditions and foster democracy in the country. Namely, I argue that the embargo policy should be abandoned and replaced with a policy based on modeling appropriate behavior, providing support and resources to developing democratic systems and encouraging participation in multilateral institutions. In the following pages, I will describe the historical context of the situation, critique the embargo policy and advocate for the normalization of relations with Cuba as a stronger approach to improving human rights and espousing democracy.

It is essential to carefully consider this proposal as a viable policy alternative for promoting democracy and protecting human rights in Cuba because the current embargo policy has proven to be ineffective in advancing these goals. Developing more effective approaches to similar situations of democratization and promotion of ideals has been a foreign policy goal of the United States since before the Cold War. However, despite the vast shifts in the international climate following the end of the Cold War, U.S. policy towards Cuba has not adapted. As such, this proposal highlights the need for a fresh policy toward our neighbor and bitter rival.

§ 2. Historical Context of the Problem:

The United States and Cuba have been on unstable terms since the colonization of both countries by the British and Spanish Empires, respectively. Following Cuba’s independence from Spain and the ensuing Spanish-American War, Cuban-American relations began to deteriorate: Cubans resented American intervention in their independence, afraid of leaving one empire only to be conquered by another. However, the human rights violations in question did not become a problem until after the Cuban Revolution in the 1950s, following the rise of Fidel Castro’s communist regime. After the revolution, Cuban laws imposed limits on the freedoms of expression and association, effectively undermining the basic human rights of freedom of opinion and dissent. According to Clark, De Fana and Sanchez, “given the totalitarian nature of the country, in which all communications media are in the hands of the omnipotent State-Party, it is physically impossible to express any dissenting political opinion […]” (Clark 65). Threatened by these blatantly antidemocratic policies, America had to do something.

The United States placed trade embargoes, economic sanctions, and travel bans on Cuba in an attempt to combat the communist regime and human rights violations (Carter 334). Today, diplomatic relations with Cuba remain extremely strained, although America’s embargo policy has tightened and relaxed in concert with its domestic political climate. Most recently, President Obama has reversed “tighter restrictions on Cuban American family travel and remittances,” as well as announcing “that U.S. telecommunications companies may seek licenses to do business in Cuba” (Carter 336). However, despite the ever-evolving policy and the fluid international climate, little progress has been made in improving the human rights situation in Cuba, let alone the overall promotion of democratic ideals. The embargo policy is based on the idea “that economic denial will bring about continued economic failure in Cuba, thereby creating popular dissatisfaction with the government while simultaneously weakening the government’s ability to repress this popular dissent, leading to the destabilization of the regime and, ultimately, its collapse” (Seaman 39). In the following section, I will explain how these objectives have not been realized.

§ 3. Critique of Policy Options:

Ayubi, Bissell, Korsah and Lerner suggest that “the purpose of sanctions is to bring about behavior seen as in conformity with the goals and standards of a society and to prevent behavior that is inconsistent with these goals and standards” (Ayubi 1). These goals and standards, in the Cuban context, would be democracy and a vested interest in human rights. However, the sanctions that the United States has placed on Cuba in the past half century have done little to address the systematic violations of human rights in Cuba.

§ 3.1: The American embargo is not sufficient to democratize Cuba and improve human rights. Without the help and support of multilateral institutions, economic sanctions on Cuba have been ineffective. As other states trade and interact freely with Cuba, the lack of partnership with America is only a minor hindrance to Cuba’s economy. Moreover, the sanctions are detrimental to the United States economy, as Cuba could potentially be a geostrategic economic partner. More importantly, since economic sanctions are not directly related to the goal of improved human rights, the effect of these sanctions is also unrelated; continued economic sanctions against Cuba create no incentive for the Cuban government to promote better human rights, especially when the sanctions do not have international support. Empirically, it is clear that since its inception, the policy has not succeeded in promoting democratization or improving human rights. Something more must be done in order to improve the situation.

§ 3.2: American sanctions during the Cold War strengthened Castro’s ideological position and created opportunities for involvement by the Soviet Union, thereby decreasing the likelihood of democratization and improvement in human rights. Cuba’s revolution could not have come at a worse time for America. The emergence of a communist state in the western hemisphere allowed the Soviet Union to extend its influence, and the United States’ rejection of Cuba only widened the window of opportunity for Soviet involvement. The embargo also became a scapegoat for the Castro administration, which laid blame for poor human rights conditions on the embargo policy itself (Fontaine 18 – 22). Furthermore, as Ratliff and Fontaine suggest, isolating Cuba as an enemy of democracy during the Cold War essentially made the goals of democratization in the country unachievable (Fontaine 30). While the embargo may have been strategic during the Cold War as a bulwark against communism, the long-term effects of the policy have essentially precluded the possibility for democracy in Cuba. Even after the end of the Cold War, communism persists in Cuba and human rights violations are systemic; America’s policy has not achieved its goals and has become a relic of the Cold War era. The prospects for democracy and improvement in human rights seem as bleak as ever.

§ 3.3: The current policy may drag the United States into a military conflict with Cuba. Military conflict may be inevitable in the future if the embargo’s explicit goal — creating an insurrection in Cuba to overthrow the government — is achieved, and the United States may not be ready to step in. As Ratliff and Fontaine detail, “Americans are not prepared to commit the military resources […]” (Fontaine 57), especially after unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Much like America’s current situation with isolated rogue states such as Iran and North Korea, Cuba’s isolation may also lead to war for other reasons, like the American occupation of Guantanamo Bay. These consequences are inherently counterproductive for the democratization of Cuba and the improvement of human rights.

§ 4. Policy Recommendations:

Although America’s previous policies of intervention, use of force and economic sanctions have all failed at achieving democratization in Cuba, not all options have been exhausted. One policy alternative for promoting democracy and human rights in Cuba that the United States has not attempted is the exact opposite of the approach it has taken for the past half century. Namely, the United States should lift the embargo on Cuba and reopen diplomatic relations in order to work internationally on improving human rights in Cuba. Unless Cuba, as a rogue state, is isolated internationally, rather than merely by the United States, the human rights situation in Cuba may never improve. A fresh policy of engagement towards Cuba has been delayed long enough.

§ 4.1: Reopening diplomatic relations with Cuba will decrease the chances of conflict and will promote cooperation between the two countries economically, politically and socially. Diplomatic relations and negotiations have proven to be effective in the past in similar situations, such as the renewed relations between Egypt and Israel following the Camp David Accords. As Huddleston and Pascual state, “a great lesson of democracy is that it cannot be imposed; it must come from within. […] Our policy should therefore encompass the political, economic, and diplomatic tools to enable the Cuban people to engage in and direct the politics of their country” (Huddleston 14). The mobilization of the Cuban people on the issues of democratization, which are inherently linked to the human rights violations in Cuba, is a first step to producing changes in Cuba. American engagement with the Cuban people, currently lacking under the embargo policy, will provide the impetus in Cuban society to produce regime change. Furthermore, integrating U.S.-Cuba relations on a multilateral level will ease the burden on the United States in fostering democracy and a better human rights record in the country, as other states will be more involved in the process. In contrast to a policy of isolation, normalized relations will allow America to engage Cuba in new areas, opening the door for democratization and human rights improvements from within the Cuban state itself.

§ 4.2: With diplomatic relations in place, the United States may directly promote human rights in the country through negotiations, conferences, arbitration and mediation. Providing the support, resources, and infrastructure to promote democratic systems in Cuba could produce immense improvements to the human rights situation in the nation. Normalizing diplomatic relations with the state will also allow America to truly support freedom of opinion and expression in Cuba, which it cannot currently promote under the isolationist policy. Furthermore, through diplomatic relations and friendly support, Cuba will be more willing to participate in the international system, as well as directly with the United States, as an ally. As the United States, along with the international community as a whole, helps and supports Cuba’s economic growth, Cuban society will eventually push for greater protection of human rights.

§ 4.3: Lifting economic sanctions will improve economic growth in Cuba, which correlates to democratization. Empirical evidence shows that a strong economy is correlated to democracy. According to the Modernization Theory of democratization, this correlation is a causal link: economic growth directly leads to democratization. Lifting the current economic sanctions on Cuba and working together to improve economic situations in the state will allow their economy to grow, increasing the likelihood of democracy in the state, and thus promoting greater freedom of expression, opinion and dissent.

§ 4.4: A policy of engagement will be a long-term solution to promoting democracy and improving human rights in Cuba. This proposal, unique in that it is simply one of abandoning an antiquated policy and normalizing relations to be like those with any other country, does not present any large obstacles to implementation, either in the short run or the long run. The main challenge is in continuing to support such a policy and maintaining the normal diplomatic, economic and social relations with a country that has been isolated for such a long period of time. Although effects of such a policy may be difficult to determine in the short term, promoting democracy and improving human rights in Cuba are long-term solutions. As discussed above, engagement with the Cuban government and society, along with support from the international community, will provide the spark and guidance for the Cuban people to support and promote democracy, and thus give greater attention to human rights violations.

§ 5. Conclusions:

Instead of continued economic sanctions on Cuba, the United States should reopen diplomatic relations with Cuba, work multilaterally and use soft power to promote democracy and greater attention to human rights. This policy approach will decrease the hostility between the United States and Cuba, and cause Cuba to be more willing to participate internationally with attention to human rights violations. After the end of the Cold War, United States foreign policy has found new directions, and the embargo, as a relic of a different time, must be removed should the United States wish to gain any true ground in promoting human rights in Cuba.

#### The embargo itself is a human rights violation and failure

Hernandez-Truyol 09 Mabie, Levin & Mabie Professor of Law, University of Florida, Levin College of Law [Berta E. Hernandez-Truyol, Embargo or Blockade - The Legal and Moral Dimensions of the U.S. Economic Sanctions on Cuba, 4 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 53 (2009)]

V Conclusion: The Human (Rights) and Moral Dimension

This essay has presented the history of economic sanctions against Cuba, analyzed the questionable legality of the sanctions, and detailed the effects of the sanctions. In conclusion, I want to problematize further the legality of the sanctions under international law. To be sure, the U.S. commitment to the WTO limits its ability to refuse to trade absent a legitimate, allowed concern. To use the national security claim vis-a-vis Cuba simply does not pass the laugh test; although the recent talks with Venezuela and the Russian fleet might cause a reconsideration of that position. Moreover, save for the regulations, which in any case are limited in light of the entirety of the Toricelli and Helms Burton laws, the WTO is a "later in time" statement of the law which should then govern.

The other aspect of legality involves the human rights idea. Here, the real impact on real people of the embargo borders on unconscionable. As the essay has described, the actions have taken a human toll; they affect health, hunger, education, nutrition quite directly. They also affect the right to travel and the right to family life of Cubans in the U.S. who can no longer visit their relatives with regularity nor spend time with them in either times of joy or times of need - although this has been changed dramatically by President Obama' s policy shift.

Economic sanctions are valuable tools for protecting human rights. The U.S. has used sanctions to discourage human rights violations. Examples include the U.S. ban of South African gold Krugerrands in 1985 to protest apartheid148, the blockage of Nicaraguan imports to deter terrorist acts of the Sandinista regime,149 the prohibition of foreign aid to Burma to oppose the government's use of forced labor,'50 and the 1989 denial of MFN status against China to protest the killing of pro-democracy protestors in Tiananmen Square to name a few.' 51

The U.S. is not alone in this approach. In fact, human rights violations have resulted in states jointly taking economic sanctions through the UN Security Council. Examples include NATO states' 1986 sanctions against Libya as a result of Moammar Ghadafi's support for the terrorist killing of 279 passengers aboard a U.S. airline bombed over Lockerbie and 1990 Iraq sanctions for its invasion of Kuwait.

The Cuba sanctions, however, reflect another aspect of economic sanctions: their deleterious and harmful effects on civil society, the innocent citizenry of the targeted country. By depriving citizens of the benefits of trade, of travel, of family life; by creating circumstances in which people's health, nutrition, standard of living and overall welfare are negatively affected, sanctions have effected serious denials of human rights - a moral if not legal failure.

#### Applying sanctions is an act of human rights violation – the consequences are known

Marks 99 Frangois-Xavier Bagnoud Professor of Health and Human Rights, Harvard School of Public Health [Stephen P. Marks, Economic Sanctions as Human Rights Violations: Reconciling Political and Public Health Imperatives, American Journal of Public Health, October 1999, Vol. 89, No. 10]

It is tempting to consider that because (a) the rights to an adequate standard of living, to physical and mental health, to just remuneration, to education, to family life, and to other related rights are universally recognized and (b) serious studies by public health experts substantiate the claim that these rights have been violated as a result of economic sanctions, then (c) the "senders" of sanctions regimes-that is, the governmental and intergovernmental decision makers in Congress, the White House, the UN Security Council and the OAS-are perpetrators of human rights violations. The CESR and Gibbons in her book on sanctions in Haiti come close to succumbing to that temptation, the former stressing that "the [Security] Council remains accountable to human rights principles regardless of the conduct of the Iraqi government"30 and the latter claiming that states that enforce sanctions in Haiti "inadvertently participated in violating the rights of Haitian citizens."31

The identification of senders of sanctions with perpetrators of human rights violations is not so simple, for 2 reasons. First, as a matter of law, responsibility for a violation can only be attributed to a duty holder, in most cases a state that has ratified a treaty establishing the obligation in question, and neither the Security Council nor the UN in general is a party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), or any other relevant convention. Moreover, treaties impose obligations on states to take measures within their jurisdiction- that is, within the national territory and, for a limited range of matters, for its nationals outside the territory-but not for foreigners in their own countries. Thus, the members of the Security Council have no treaty-based duty to ensure treaty rights for the citizens of Haiti, Iraq, Serbia, or other targeted countries.

One can hold states accountable, however, for actions that defeat the object and purpose of a treaty to which they are a party (or even that they have signed and not yet ratified, as is the case with the United States with respect to the ICESCR), and the aim of protecting the human rights set out in the ICESCR is part of that object and purpose. Such is the intention of the following provision of the Maastricht guidelines, adopted by a group of 30 human rights experts in January 1997:

19. The obligations of States to protect economic, social and cultural rights extend also to their participation in international organizations, where they act collectively. It is particularly important for States to use their influence to ensure that violations do not result from the programmes and policies of the organizations of which they are members.32

The language is not that of firm obligation, but it is designed to acknowledge the importance of states' using their influence to prevent violations-for example, through decisions of the Security Council or the OAS to impose sanctions. There is, moreover, a duty upon the Security Council to "act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations,"33 among which is the purpose of "promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all."34 Significantly, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which monitors the application of the ICESCR, requires the state or entity imposing sanctions to take these rights "fully into account" when designing the sanctions regime, to monitor effectively the situation in the targeted country with respect to these rights, and to take steps "to respond to any disproportionate suffering experienced by vulnerable groups within the targeted country."35 In the case of Haiti, the UN and the OAS did take human rights into account by creating the Human Rights Civilian Observation Mission (MICIVIH), which Gibbons describes as "a positive action ... that was quite different in nature from the negative action of sanctions."36 However, she also notes that its mandate excluded economic, social, and cultural rights, as a result of "pragmatic decisions" that "respect for Haitians' economic and social rights would be sacrificed for the sake of advancing their political and civil rights." This dilemma emerged in the functioning of MICIVIH's Medical Unit, an unprecedented addition to a human rights component of a peace operation, which ran into difficulty in trying to reconcile mission headquarters' efforts to restrict its role to documenting abuse of civil and political rights with the participating medical practitioners' duty to provide care when the situation called for medical assistance.37

The second problem with the senders as- perpetrators argument is both moral and legal: Senders of sanctions cannot be held responsible unless they intentionally seek to violate the rights in question or pursue policies that are so blatantly harmful to those rights that they fail to meet a minimum standard of compliance. The humanitarian exemptions that have been voted with sanctions in almost every case, and the supplemental humanitarian assistance programs funded by the "senders," as well as their public statements of concern for the plight of civilian populations, make it difficult to find willful intent on the senders' part. Gibbons' reference to states "inadvertently" participating in violations,38 and the use she and Garfield make of "unintentionally" in their article in this issue of the Journal, are indicative of the problems of accountability.

Nevertheless, the moral outrage of those who would like to hold senders of sanctions accountable as perpetrators of violations is justified, and passing blame to Saddam Hussein, Lt Gen Cedras, or Slobodan Milosevic is not enough. As a study commissioned by the UN concluded, "the amount of information available today on the devastating economic, social, and humanitarian impact of sanctions no longer permits [policymakers] to entertain the notion of 'unintended effects."'39 A member of the Security Council has declared that "it is disingenuous to talk of 'unintended side effects' when everybody knows that the sector most affected by sanctions, as presently applied, are precisely civilian populations. There is nothing surprising or unintended about it."40 His statement was in reaction to a "non-paper" (an informal document used as a flexible tool for negotiation) by the 5 permanent members of the Security Council (P-5) that insisted that sanctions regimes should "minimize unintended adverse side-effects of sanctions on the most vulnerable segments oftargeted countries."4l

#### Human Rights are an absolute good – must act to protect them in all instances

Human Rights Watch 97 [An Introduction to the Human Rights Movement, <http://www.hrweb.org/intro.html>]

Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of [hu]mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,

Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law...

These are the second and third paragraphs of the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948 without a dissenting vote. It is the first multinational declaration mentioning human rights by name, and the human rights movement has largely adopted it as a charter. I'm quoting them here because it states as well or better than anything I've read what human rights are and why they are important.

The United Nations Charter, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and UN Human Rights convenants were written and implemented in the aftermath of the Holocaust, revelations coming from the Nuremberg war crimes trials, the Bataan Death March, the atomic bomb, and other horrors smaller in magnitude but not in impact on the individuals they affected. A whole lot of people in a number of countries had a crisis of conscience and found they could no longer look the other way while tyrants jailed, tortured, and killed their neighbors.

In Germany, the Nazis first came for the communists, and I did not speak up, because I was not a Communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak up, because I was not a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I did not speak up, because I was not a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics, and I did not speak up, because I was not a Catholic. Then they came for me... and by that time, there was no one to speak up for anyone.

-- Martin Niemoeller, Pastor,

German Evangelical (Lutheran) Church

Many also realized that advances in technology and changes in social structures had rendered war a threat to the continued existence of the human race. Large numbers of people in many countries lived under the control of tyrants, having no recourse but war to relieve often intolerable living conditions. Unless some way was found to relieve the lot of these people, they could revolt and become the catalyst for another wide-scale and possibly nuclear war. For perhaps the first time, representatives from the majority of governments in the world came to the conclusion that basic human rights must be protected, not only for the sake of the individuals and countries involved, but to preserve the human race.

Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed. This world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children. This is not a way of life at all in any true sense. Under the clouds of war, it is humanity hanging on a cross of iron.

-- Dwight D. Eisenhower

President of the United States

"I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones."

-- Albert Einstein

#### Survival of the species is only possible by respecting Human Rights

Annas et al 02 Edward R. Utley Prof. and Chair Health Law @ Boston U. School of Public Health and Prof. SocioMedical Sciences and Community Science @ Boston U. School of Medicine and Prof. Law @ Boston U. School of Law [George, Lori Andrews, (Distinguished Prof. Law @ Chicago-Kent College of Law and Dir. Institute for Science, Law, and Technology @ Illinois Institute Tech), and Rosario M. Isasa, (Health Law and Biotethics Fellow @ Health Law Dept. of Boston U. School of Public Health), American Journal of Law & Medicine, “THE GENETICS REVOLUTION: CONFLICTS, CHALLENGES AND CONUNDRA: ARTICLE: Protecting the Endangered Human: Toward an International Treaty Prohibiting Cloning and Inheritable Alterations”, 28 Am. J. L. and Med. 151, L/N]

The development of the atomic bomb not only presented to the world for the first time the prospect of total annihilation, but also, paradoxically, led to a renewed emphasis on the "nuclear family," complete with its personal bomb shelter. The conclusion of World War II (with the dropping of the only two atomic bombs ever used in war) led to the recognition that world wars were now suicidal to the entire species and to the formation of the United Nations with the primary goal of preventing such wars. n2 Prevention, of course, must be based on the recognition that all humans are fundamentally the same, rather than on an emphasis on our differences. In the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, the closest the world has ever come to nuclear war, President John F. Kennedy, in an address to the former Soviet Union, underscored the necessity for recognizing similarities for our survival:

[L]et us not be blind to our differences, but let us also direct attention to our common interests and the means by which those differences can be resolved . . . . For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal. n3

That we are all fundamentally the same, all human, all with the same dignity and rights, is at the core of the most important document to come out of World War II, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the two treaties that followed it (together known as the "International Bill of Rights"). n4 The recognition of universal human rights, based on human dignity and equality as well as the principle of nondiscrimination, is fundamental to the development of a species consciousness. As Daniel Lev of Human Rights Watch/Asia said in 1993, shortly before the Vienna Human Rights Conference:

Whatever else may separate them, human beings belong to a single biological species, the simplest and most fundamental commonality before which the significance of human differences quickly fades. . . . We are all capable, in exactly the same ways, of feeling pain, hunger, [\*153] and a hundred kinds of deprivation. Consequently, people nowhere routinely concede that those with enough power to do so ought to be able to kill, torture, imprison, and generally abuse others. . . . The idea of universal human rights shares the recognition of one common humanity, and provides a minimum solution to deal with its miseries. n5

Membership in the human species is central to the meaning and enforcement of human rights, and respect for basic human rights is essential for the survival of the human species. The development of the concept of "crimes against humanity" was a milestone for universalizing human rights in that it recognized that there were certain actions, such as slavery and genocide, that implicated the welfare of the entire species and therefore merited universal condemnation. n6 Nuclear weapons were immediately seen as a technology that required international control, as extreme genetic manipulations like cloning and inheritable genetic alterations have come to be seen today. In fact, cloning and inheritable genetic alterations can be seen as crimes against humanity of a unique sort: they are techniques that can alter the essence of humanity itself (and thus threaten to change the foundation of human rights) by taking human evolution into our own hands and directing it toward the development of a new species, sometimes termed the "posthuman." n7 It may be that species-altering techniques, like cloning and inheritable genetic modifications, could provide benefits to the human species in extraordinary circumstances. For example, asexual genetic replication could potentially save humans from extinction if all humans were rendered sterile by some catastrophic event. But no such necessity currently exists or is on the horizon.

### 1NC

#### 1. Too much too fast causes instability—going too fast risks civil war

Perez 10 J.D. Yale Law School. Working with Koh former Dean of Yale Law and Legal Advisor to the State Department [David A. Perez, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review, 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187]

Policymakers in Washington must realize that Cubans will not wake up the day after Fidel Castro dies and experience broad-based attitudinal changes. Therefore, while economic reform is sure to preface political reform, the Cuban government will have to move slowly on the former so as not to alienate the population, which would truncate the latter. At first, a successor regime may think that choosing between Castroism and economic liberalization is a Faustian choice: economic doldrums with continuity versus economic revitalization with instability. Indeed, continuing Castroism embraces the history and normative values attached to the Revolution, but would forestall any economic recovery. On the other hand, liberalizing the economy by adopting market reforms would promote economic growth, but could also alienate large segments of the population still enamored by Castro's revolutionary zeal. For example, one possible market reform would be to lay off the excess workforce that has cluttered the state-controlled enterprises and rendered them inefficient and virtually useless. Embracing deep cuts in the public employment might be efficient, but it certainly will not be popular. For decades Cubans have enjoyed job security, universal education, and universal healthcare. If market reforms are interpreted as a wholesale rejection of the normative and ideological underpinnings that have dominated Cuban discourse for the last fifty years, they will no doubt alienate influential ideologues in the Communist Party, the military, the Ministry of the Interior, and many others in the general population.

When a state takes control of the economy, it also takes responsibility for it when it performs poorly. A strong state could surely implement these reforms and survive the ensuing backlash; but to do so would require deft political maneuvering, and a careful patience to not try to change everything all at once. A poorly managed state-led economic opening can quickly become unmanageable, and create instability. Given these concerns, a slow and methodical economic transition, rather than an overnight toppling of the [\*210] state-sector, would be a far more pragmatic approach for the Cuban government.

China and Vietnam have both introduced market reforms that dwarf any that the Cuban regime has introduced so far. Given that China has been on the path of liberalization for over thirty years yet the state still controls wide swaths of the economy, one might expect Cuba's economic transformation to also move lethargically—especially at first. The stronger the parallel with Asia becomes, the more methodical Cuba's opening will be. Expectations that assume a quick economic turnaround should be correspondingly adjusted. Thus, the United States should recognize that the Cuban government has little choice but to move at a relatively glacial speed, and instead work assiduously to make the economic transition as smooth as possible. To that end, it is absolutely crucial that our policies not be used as a way to settle political grudges. For example, if America moves to regain the properties taken by the Cuban government fifty years ago as a way to "encourage" market reforms, the entire effort will be short-circuited before it takes off the ground.

Some will argue that focusing on market liberalization, while putting political reforms to the side, endangers Cuba's long-term prospects for liberty and freedom. This is a valid concern. Nevertheless, in normative terms, market reforms will vastly improve the lives of the Cuban people. The improved living conditions will give fringe groups with few resources the ability to focus their own efforts on political reform from within. Improved economic conditions, if used as a prerequisite to political reform, may also prevent a costly civil war during the inevitably painful transition.

#### 2. Embargo is good—close to causing a democratic revolution

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Conclusion

Since its inception, the Cuban embargo has ebbed and flowed in severity and support. While the measure seems to be increasingly unpopular, it takes legitimate aim at a Cuban regime characterized by intolerance and oppression. Though the Castros utilize the embargo as a scapegoat upon which to blame Cuba’s failures,94 recent changes suggest the embargo is indeed close to accomplishing its goals.95 Despite this, critics, including U.S. oil producers, want the embargo dropped. Regardless of criticism, the embargo must remain in place until its goals are met. Environmental fears can be effectively countered through bilateral response and preparation agreements with Cuba. Also, economic and energy needs are more properly addressed through drilling U.S. resources. Ultimately, with the aid of legislation such as Buchanan’s bill, the United States should exercise its political and economic power to pressure foreign companies to avoid offshore drilling in Cuba. The United States can dissuade foreign investment without compromising the embargo. It appears an end to oppressive communist rule in Cuba is nearing. Now is the time for the United States to both reject offshore drilling in Cuba and demonstrate resolve in meeting the goals of the economic embargo.

#### 3. Alt causes to human rights abuses—war on terror and cyber war policies—plan can’t solve

Greenwald 12—Glenn Greenwald is an American political journalist, lawyer, columnist, blogger, and author [June 25, 2012, “Collapsing U.S. credibility,” http://www.salon.com/2012/06/25/collapsing\_u\_s\_credibility/]

Two Op-Eds in The New York Times this morning both warn of the precipitous decline of American credibility on matters of human rights and peace ushered in by the Obama presidency. Taken together, they explain much of why I’ve been writing what I’ve been writing over the last three years. The first is from Columbia Professor and cyber expert Misha Glenny, who explains the significance of the first ever deployment of cyberwarfare — by the U.S. (first under Bush and accelerated under Obama), along with Israel, against Iran:

THE decision by the United States and Israel to develop and then deploy the Stuxnet computer worm against an Iranian nuclear facility late in George W. Bush’s presidency marked a significant and dangerous turning point in the gradual militarization of the Internet. Washington has begun to cross the Rubicon. If it continues, contemporary warfare will change fundamentally as we move into hazardous and uncharted territory.

It is one thing to write viruses and lock them away safely for future use should circumstances dictate it. It is quite another to deploy them in peacetime. Stuxnet has effectively fired the starting gun in a new arms race that is very likely to lead to the spread of similar and still more powerful offensive cyberweaponry across the Internet. Unlike nuclear or chemical weapons, however, countries are developing cyberweapons outside any regulatory framework. . . .

Stuxnet was originally deployed with the specific aim of infecting the Natanz uranium enrichment facility in Iran. This required sneaking a memory stick into the plant to introduce the virus to its private and secure “offline” network. But despite Natanz’s isolation, Stuxnet somehow escaped into the cyberwild, eventually affecting hundreds of thousands of systems worldwide.

This is one of the frightening dangers of an uncontrolled arms race in cyberspace; once released, virus developers generally lose control of their inventions, which will inevitably seek out and attack the networks of innocent parties. Moreover, all countries that possess an offensive cyber capability will be tempted to use it now that the first shot has been fired. . . .

The United States has long been a commendable leader in combating the spread of malicious computer code, known as malware, that pranksters, criminals, intelligence services and terrorist organizations have been using to further their own ends. But by introducing such pernicious viruses as Stuxnet and Flame, America has severely undermined its moral and political credibility.

He also explains that the Obama administration opposes any treaties to regulate all of this in part because it “might undermine its presumed superiority in the field of cyberweaponry and robotics,” and because it claims Russia and China (but not, of course, the U.S.) would attempt to exploit such treaties to control the Internet.

In case anyone thinks he’s being melodramatic in his warnings, the original New York Times article by David Sanger that confirmed U.S. responsibility for the cyber attack included this passage: “Mr. Obama, according to participants in the many Situation Room meetings on Olympic Games, was acutely aware that with every attack he was pushing the United States into new territory, much as his predecessors had with the first use of atomic weapons in the 1940s, of intercontinental missiles in the 1950s and of drones in the past decade.” It also explained that America’s maiden use of this new form of warfare “could enable other countries, terrorists or hackers to justify their own attacks.”

The second is from former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, an actually meritorious Nobel Peace Prize winner, who describes the record of his fellow Nobel laureate, the current President, in an Op-Ed entitled “A Cruel and Unusual Record“:

Revelations that top officials are targeting people to be assassinated abroad, including American citizens, are only the most recent, disturbing proof of how far our nation’s violation of human rights has extended. This development began after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, and has been sanctioned and escalated by bipartisan executive and legislative actions, without dissent from the general public. As a result, our country can no longer speak with moral authority on these critical issues. . . . .

It is disturbing that, instead of strengthening these principles, our government’s counterterrorism policies are now clearly violating at least 10 of the [Declaration on Human Rights'] 30 articles, including the prohibition against “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

Recent legislation has made legal the president’s right to detain a person indefinitely on suspicion of affiliation with terrorist organizations or “associated forces,” a broad, vague power that can be abused without meaningful oversight from the courts or Congress (the law is currently being blocked by a federal judge). This law violates the right to freedom of expression and to be presumed innocent until proved guilty, two other rights enshrined in the declaration.

In addition to American citizens’ being targeted for assassination or indefinite detention, recent laws have canceled the restraints in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to allow unprecedented violations of our rights to privacy through warrantless wiretapping and government mining of our electronic communications. . . .

Despite an arbitrary rule that any man killed by drones is declared an enemy terrorist, the death of nearby innocent women and children is accepted as inevitable. After more than 30 airstrikes on civilian homes this year in Afghanistan, President Hamid Karzai has demanded that such attacks end, but the practice continues in areas of Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen that are not in any war zone. We don’t know how many hundreds of innocent civilians have been killed in these attacks, each one approved by the highest authorities in Washington. This would have been unthinkable in previous times.

These policies clearly affect American foreign policy. Top intelligence and military officials, as well as rights defenders in targeted areas, affirm that the great escalation in drone attacks has turned aggrieved families toward terrorist organizations, aroused civilian populations against us and permitted repressive governments to cite such actions to justify their own despotic behavior. . . .

At a time when popular revolutions are sweeping the globe, the United States should be strengthening, not weakening, basic rules of law and principles of justice enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But instead of making the world safer, America’s violation of international human rights abets our enemies and alienates our friends.

One can reasonably object to Carter’s Op-Ed on the ground that it romanticizes a non-existent American past (systematic human rights abuses are hardly a new development in the post-9/11 world), but what cannot be reasonably disputed is the trend he denounces. Note that the most egregious examples he cites — assassinating U.S. citizens without due process, civilian-killing drone attacks, the indefinite detention provisions of the NDAA — had some genesis under Bush but are hallmarks of Obama policy (his other example, the rapid erosion of constraints on government domestic surveillance, took place under both, with the full support of Obama). It’s a remarkably scathing denunciation of the record of his own political party and its current leader.

#### 4. Sanctions aren’t inherently human rights violations

Marks 99 Frangois-Xavier Bagnoud Professor of Health and Human Rights, Harvard School of Public Health [Stephen P. Marks, Economic Sanctions as Human Rights Violations: Reconciling Political and Public Health Imperatives, American Journal of Public Health, October 1999, Vol. 89, No. 10]

This tension between the sound conclusions of public health surveys of countries targeted by sanctions and the uncertain attribution of responsibility for human rights violations underscores the need for more reflection on the relationship between health and human rights. There can be no doubt that the civilian populations in targeted countries are victims of human rights violations. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights authoritatively declared that "the inhabitants of a given country do not forfeit their basic economic, social and cultural rights by virtue of any determination that their leaders have violated norms relating to international peace and security."42 While it is necessarily true that violations are committed by perpetrators, the principles of accountability for the human rights violations resulting from sanctions do not clearly identify the perpetrators or the consequences they should bear. Therefore, a more fruitful avenue is reform of sanctions to avoid such violations.

### 2NC

#### Unconditionally lifting the embargo will help the regime more than the people.

Jorge A. Sanguinetty, April 2013. Former economic planner in Cuba with first-hand knowledge of centrally planned economies and how they can transition to more open, market-based systems. Born in Cuba in 1937, Sanguinetty worked as an economist in the tourist and sugar industries before emigrating to the United States in 1967 and obtaining a Ph.D. in economics at the City University of New York. One of the founding members of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy (ASCE), Sanguinetty is the author of Cuba: Realidad y Destino. “Who benefits and loses if the US-Cuba embargo is lifted?” http://devresearchcenter.org/2013/04/08/who-benefits-and-loses-if-the-us-cuba-embargo-is-lifted-by-jorge-a-sanguinetty/.

The answer depends on the conditions under which the embargo is lifted. I focus on the expected distribution of benefits (and costs) between the government and the Cuban population. A unilateral move by the US Government, without any quid pro quo by the Cuban government can be expected to yield significant benefits to the official establishment with benefits of an unknown magnitude to the population at large. I posit that the magnitude of the latter depends on the degree of internal liberalization of the Cuban economy. Until Raul Castro took over, the centralized command of the Cuban economy was subject to a set or constraints arguably more restrictive than the US embargo. What I have called the internal embargo consisted in the Cuban government outright prohibition for Cubans to own enterprises, freely employ workers or trade domestically and internationally. To many Cubans, probably a majority, such constraints were the main cause of the country ´s secular economic crisis.

Lifting the US embargo under such circumstances was reasonably expected to yield most of the economic and political benefits to the Cuban government and limited economic and no political benefits to the population. With the recent partial economic (not political) liberalization policies implemented by Raul Castro, we can expect that the distribution of economic benefits would be more favorable to the Cuban people. Such new economic freedoms carry a dose of informal political freedoms as Cubans are able to develop relationships among themselves that were tightly constrained until recently, like freedom of assembly, to communicate, and to make transactions and agreements without the tutelage of the government. To wit, as the private sector develops because the government is forced to reduce the inflated payrolls of its enterprises, the authorities lose control on those newly liberated workers.

Nonetheless, the system might have reached a point of equilibrium under which an unconditional lifting of the US embargo might still accrue enough economic benefit to the Cuban government that it leads to a roll back of some recent reforms in order to cut loses in the political, albeit informal, arena. This will be a strong reason to oppose an unconditional lifting on the embargo for those who care about the wishes for freedom and welfare of the Cuban people. Many international observers oppose the US embargo on the basis of several debatable assumptions. One is the belief that the embargo has served the Castro government as an excuse for its economic failures, and once lifted the excuse will disappear. Another assumption is that Cubans don´t know that the embargo might have constrained their economy, but not as much as the restrictions of virtually all economic activity by the Cuban government. There are also many Cubans that believe that the US embargo is the only leverage left to pressure the Cuban government to lift internal restrictions in both the economic and the political fronts. It is doubtful that, under the current conditions, a non-negotiated lifting of the US embargo is likely to bring about democracy in Cuba.

#### US actions won’t spur pro-democracy changes—blowback is likely

Weeks & Fiorey 12 a. associate professor of political science and director of Latin American Studies at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte & b. M.A. candidate [Gregory Weeks & Erin Fiorey, Policy Options for a Cuban Spring, May-June 2012, MILITARY REVIEW http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview\_20120630\_art014.pdf

U.S. Money Won’t Cause Change in Cuba What would a Cuban transition look like? Why would it start? No one predicted the Arab Spring, and for Cuba the many possible permutations are well beyond the scope of this article. Cuban opposition blogger Yoani Sánchez writes that Cubans view transition as similar to a dilapidated building in Havana: “The hurricanes don’t bring it down and the rains don’t bring it down, but one day someone tries to change the lock on the front door and the whole edifice collapses.”15 In any event, given the hermetic nature of the regime and its successful resistance to U.S. influence, it is very unlikely that the United States will have much influence over its initiation.

As the prominent Cuban dissident Oswaldo Payá argues, “One talks about the United States’ money for civil society . . . . The United States’ money won’t cause change in Cuba.”16 It is a point he has made repeatedly. If there is a Cuban Spring, then its emergence and ultimate success will hinge on its domestic wellsprings. In fact, this echoes the policy position of the administration of Barack Obama. As Secretary of State Hillary Clinton put it in 2011, “These revolutions are not ours. They are not by us, for us, or against us, but we do have a role. We have the resources, capabilities, and expertise to support those who seek peaceful, meaningful, democratic reform.”17 Even the Catholic Cardinal in Cuba, Jaime Ortega, has cautioned against “a type of U.S. subculture which invades everything.”18 He was referring not only to culture, but also to politics.

What the wariness entails is an increased risk of backlash if the United States injects itself too forcefully. The United States faced a similar dilemma in the Arab Spring Middle Eastern transitions. Widespread perception that the United States is attempting to direct events fosters distrust and provides leverage to pro-regime forces or at the very least puts leaders on the defensive who might otherwise welcome assistance from the United States. This is commonly referred to as “blowback,” and over the long term, it could greatly reduce U.S. influence.

# FTAA CP

## 1NC

#### Text: The United States Federal Government should affirm its commitment to a comprehensive, balanced and hemisphere-wide Free Trade Areas of the Americas agreement, emphasizing its support for opening all areas to negotiation, including those which had previously been taken off of the negotiating table.

#### The counterplan is necessary to jumpstart the FTAA and create a solid foundation for long-term US-Latin American relations and economic development

Luxner 9 (Larry Luxner is news editor of The Washington Diplomat, “What the World Wants From Barack Obama,”

The Washington Diplomat February 2009, <http://washdiplomat.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6304:what-the-world-wants-from-barack-obama&catid=974:february-2009&Itemid=259>)

Jaime Daremblum, director of the Center for Latin American Studies at the Washington-based Hudson Institute, says it’s important for Obama to capitalize on the unprecedented enthusiasm he’s generated throughout the region, where Bush has been deeply unpopular for years. “The incoming administration can do very positive things for Latin America,” said Daremblum, Costa Rica’s former ambassador to the United States. “The first is to support initiatives in countries that have been successful in strengthening democracy, education, transparency in elections and the rule of law. The other area is free trade — which is key for many of our countries because that’s the only way of offering real opportunities to a more educated population.” Daremblum disagrees with those who say Washington’s concept of a hemisphere-wide FTAA is dead. “Quite the contrary,” he said. “All this financial turmoil in the world has opened up the eyes of Latin America that they need export markets, and they need to increase mechanisms to access those markets. The protective little niches of Mercosur here and ALBA there are not going to work. That’s why we need to look toward an FTAA.”

#### Bi-lateral initiatives like the plan undermine the possibility of regional integration

Bayer 2 (The Center for Latin American Issues and Bayer Consulting, LLC, “Prospects for a Free Trade Area of the Americas,” 11-21-02, <http://www.gwu.edu/~clai/recent_events/Events2002/Ftaa/Ftaa_synopsis.htm>)

Much of the current discussion surrounding the FTAA focuses on whether an agreement will be reached by the current deadline, January 1, 2005. The individual interests of nations vary widely, and a number of economic and political issues are potential roadblocks for a final agreement. First, the logistics of having 34 nations agree to anything is a huge task. Mary Ryckman pointed out that, as opposed to the previous round of negotiations, the recent talks in Quito produced a consolidated draft text for an FTAA. Every nation involved seems to be committed to the process at this point, and most nations are comfortable publicizing many of their negotiating points. Some contend, however, that too many bilateral agreements and regional trading blocs, particularly those involving the U.S., will take away the economic impetus and the political will that are driving the FTAA negotiations. Ryckman argues that bilateral negotiations are actually helpful to the goals of the FTAA, because they help the negotiating parties articulate and prioritize issues. This process is especially important for the small nations with little negotiating experience. Hector Marquez from the Mexican Embassy pointed out that Mexico has aggressively pursued free trade agreements with many nations even after the passage of NAFTA. Although Mexico has secured an agreement giving it access to the world’s largest economy, it still sees measurable benefits from engaging in free trade with other nations. Marquez believes that other nations will follow Mexico’s lead.

#### FTAA is crucial to Latin American trade, growth and stops regional trading blocs and Chinese encroachment

Hornbeck 11 (J. F. Hornbeck, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, “U.S.-Latin America Trade: Recent Trends and Policy Issues,” 2-8-11, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/98-840.pdf)

The United States and Latin America have pursued trade liberalization through multilateral, regional, and bilateral negotiations, with mixed results. In part this reflects divergent priorities that have been difficult to fully reconcile. For many Latin American countries, reducing barriers to agricultural trade is top of the list for a successful agreement. This goal includes reducing market access barriers (peak tariffs and tariff rate quotas—TRQs), domestic U.S. subsidies, and nontariff barriers (administrative rules, antidumping provisions). Although there are many other issues, agriculture policy has played a big part in slowing progress in the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Development Round and halting the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).7 The United States has made clear its unwillingness to address most agricultural and antidumping issues in a regional agreement like the FTAA to preserve its bargaining leverage in the WTO against other subsidizing countries such as the European Union and Japan. Latin American counties have their own sensitive issues and a particular concern in some countries for easing its subsistence agricultural sectors slowly toward trade liberalization. In addition to market access, the United States has focused its trade negotiating goals on areas where it is most competitive such as services trade (e.g., financial, tourism, technology, professional); intellectual property rights (IPR); government procurement; and investment. Not surprisingly, these are areas where many Latin American countries are more reluctant to negotiate. Hence, there is a near reversal of priorities that has slowed the progress of comprehensive agreements at the multilateral and regional levels, reflecting inherent differences between many developed and developing countries. The result in the Western Hemisphere has been the proliferation of reciprocal bilateral and plurilateral agreements. The United States has implemented FTAs with Mexico, Central America, the Dominican Republic, Chile, and Peru, but Congress has not acted on the proposed FTAs with Panama or Colombia, despite changes agreed to even after the formal negotiations concluded. Currently, congressional reticence awaits further commitments in areas that fall outside the negotiated text of the FTAs, such as tax law in Panama and human rights improvements in Colombia, raising questions for some over the ability of the United States to consummate trade negotiations.8 The prospects are limited at best for exploring reciprocal FTAs with Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela. Brazil, as the major regional economy not in a unilateral preferential arrangement with the United States, has abandoned the FTAA model and moved ahead separately by adding associate members to Mercosur, supporting Venezuela’s accession to Mercosur as a full member, and leading in the formation of broader economic and political integration pacts in South America. Venezuela’s President Hugo Chávez has taken a decidedly more confrontational approach in establishing the Bolivarian Alternative to the Americas (ALBA), enticing Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Dominica, and Honduras to join with subsidized oil trade.9 Although these are neither deep nor comprehensive trade arrangements, they do signal a political will to consolidate regional bargaining interests in juxtaposition to the U.S.-designed FTAA. Three clear challenges emerge from this picture. First, Brazil and the United States have demonstrated a prolonged reluctance to move off their respective positions, which bodes poorly for resurrecting the FTAA.10 The addition of Venezuela and possibly other countries with less than sympathetic attitudes toward the United States as full Mercosur members could solidify this standoff. Nationalizations of key industries and other efforts to increase the role of the state in managing the economies of Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador also do not augur well for broadening support for market-based trade solutions. Second, multiple FTAs, by definition, promote an inefficient and cumbersome trading system with each FTA having its own rules of origin (to deter non-member transshipment of goods) and related customs administration and enforcement requirements that can complicate trade and investment decisions. It is not without reason, therefore, that many interest groups wish to find a way to rationalize such a convoluted system. Third, Latin America is expanding its trade to other countries in the world. China, in particular, has increased its trade and investment relationship with the region. From 2000 to 2009, total trade has grown by a factor of ten, and investment has poured into the region. In both cases, China is in search of long-term, reliable sources of basic commodities. In 2009, over 70% of Latin American exports to China were in basic ores, copper, grains, and mineral fuels. While this trade structure is currently lucrative, it does nothing to diversify Latin America’s exports into more value added goods, and leaves the fortunes of these countries to the often volatile commodities markets. Reconciling the disparate trade arrangements in the Western Hemisphere will be difficult and perhaps impossible in the absence of a complementary multilateral solution. For example, conventional wisdom argues that without advancement in agricultural issues at the WTO, action on a comprehensive FTAA (or something like it) is unlikely. Further, a less comprehensive FTAA has so far been rejected and offers a far less compelling alternative to a multilateral agreement on economic grounds. Therefore, the FTAA may not emerge in the near future, despite the logical solution that a hemispheric-wide agreement presents to improving the flow of trade (and investment) over existing arrangements.

#### Chinese challenge in Latin America devastates US hegemony

Hilton 13 (Isabel, formerly Latin America editor of The Independent newspaper, “China in Latin America: Hegemonic challenge?,” February 2013, NOREF – Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, <http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afbc054aad9.pdf>)

The United States is Latin America’s traditional hegemonic power, but China’s influence in the region is large and growing. How far does China’s presence in the U.S. backyard represent a hegemonic challenge? China is important in the region as a buyer of Latin American resources, primarily from four countries, an important investor and an exporter of manufactured goods. The impact of China’s activities varies in degree from country to country. In several countries local manufacturing has suffered from cheaper Chinese imports; several countries have benefited from Chinese demand for resources, others from large investments, and China is having an important impact on the region’s infrastructure. The risks to the region include resource curse, distorted development and environmental degradation due to a lowering of environmental and social standards. Despite its significant economic presence, China has been careful to keep a low political and diplomatic profile to avoid antagonising the U.S. and to maintain a benign environment for its economic activities. Chinese support, however, has been important for partners, such as Cuba and Venezuela, that do not enjoy good relations with the U.S. So far the two powers have sought cooperation rather than confrontation, but rising tensions with U.S. allies Japan and Vietnam could have repercussions in Latin America if China feels the U.S. is becoming too assertive in its own East Asian backyard.

#### Collapse of hegemony causes global nuclear war

Müller 8 (Harold, Director – Peace Research Institute and Professor of International Relations – Frankfurt University, “The Future of Nuclear Weapons in an Interdependent World”, Washington Quarterly, Spring, Lexis)

A power transition creates dangerous times. **[9](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=bdd54216370e15df8fa26bde1111b584&docnum=8&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVtz-zSkAz&_md5=f6b9321740b257920320c7efec57cfcf&focBudTerms=china%20or%20chinese%21%20or%20beijing%20w/35%20aggress%21%20or%20conflict%21%20or%20war%20or%20creeping%20occupation%20w/20%20south%20china%20sea&focBudSel=all" \l "fnote9" \t "_self)** Most challenges to a hegemon in world history, whether successful or not, have precipitated war or a series of wars. Today's interdependence will surely serve to make great powers cautious about armed conflict, but it cannot completely guarantee such a conflict will not occur. Bones of contention exist, notably between the United States and China: Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the competition for Persian Gulf and Central Asian energy resources. Although there exists a naive belief that great-power war has been eliminated as a possibility in world politics, exaggerated complacency could become extremely dangerous. Interdependence itself and advanced weaponry, nuclear weapons included, would mean that a violent contest among the big powers would be an unmitigated catastrophe. The relationships among those powers must be carefully managed if a clash is to be avoided, and nuclear weapons reductions are an essential contribution to this management.

## 2AC

#### Perm do counterplan – the counterplan isn’t functionally competitive, if it includes the plan, then vote aff.

#### Perm do both – lifting the embargo is a pre-requisite to Latin American relations, it jumpstarts the agreement and solves the net benefit.

#### Solvency Deficit –

* 1. Human Rights – The embargo devastates human rights in Cuba, access to food, medical technology etc are all restricted. That’s Coll 7 and Amash 12.
  2. Relations – The embargo prevents hemisphere wide cooperation, it is the major irritant between the US and Latin America. That’s Perez 10.

#### 4. Agreement will fail –

A. Brazil

Erikson 10 (Daniel P. Erikson, Senior Associate for US policy and Director of Caribbean programs,

Inter-American Dialogue, The Centre for International Governance Innovation, “The Obama Administration and Latin America: Towards a New Partnership?,” Working Paper No. 46 April 2010)

Brazil, with the world’s fifth largest population and tenth largest economy, is similarly interested in a realignment of global power that recognizes its political and economic heft. Unlike Venezuela, however, it has been careful to ensure that its pursuit of this goal does not veer into open conflict with the US. Indeed, Brazilian President Lula enjoyed one of the warmest relationships with President Bush of any Latin American leader, and the personal rapport between Obama and Lula has been even warmer (see Marinis, 2010). Still, Brazilian opposition to the FTAA helped fuel its demise in 2005, and the country has clashed with the US in world trade talks as a leader of the G77 group of developing countries that includes China, India and South Africa. Brazil’s aggressive bid to win a permanent seat on the UN Security Council has led Lula on a global tour to garner support for the country’s global aspirations. Brazilian diplomacy has focused on positioning Brazil as a leader in world affairs ready to hold the US at arm’s length when necessary (see Simpson, 2010).

#### **B. Argentina will block the agreement**

Daremblum 11 (Jaime Daremblum, Senior Fellow and Director of Hudson's Center for Latin American Studies, Ambassador of Costa Rica to the United States, professor at the University of Costa Rica, “Has Argentina Joined the Chávez Bloc?,” March 2011 <http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/ArgentinaFinal.pdf>)

Néstor Kirchner took office at a precarious moment in Argentine history. The country was still recovering from a disastrous financial crisis and currency devaluation that had occurred in 2001 and 2002. Like other Argentine leftists, Kirchner blamed the economic implosion on “neoliberal,” free-market policies implemented during the 1990s. But this argument was totally unpersuasive. As journalist Michael Reid explained in his book Forgotten Continent, “What killed Argentina’s economy in 2001 was not ‘neoliberalism’ or the free-market reforms, but a fiscal policy incompatible with the exchange-rate regime, and a lack of policy flexibility.” Indeed, “Contrary to many claims, Argentina’s policy mix was in direct contravention of the Washington Consensus.” Moreover, the reforms that helped pull the country out of crisis were actually “neoliberal” initiatives championed by Roberto Lavagna, who served as Argentine economy minister from 2002 until 2005. The New York Times correctly described Lavagna as “the main architect” of the Argentine recovery. Nevertheless, Kirchner promoted a false storyline about the crisis, and he fired Lavagna in 2005. For Kirchner and his supporters, the Argentine default was attributable to U.S.style policies, and the solution was massive government spending and heavy-handed intervention in the economy. Kirchner borrowed heavily from the Chávez playbook, with its emphasis on populism, class warfare, and fierce denunciations of private enterprise. He nationalized the postal service, the largest water utility, telecommunications, and railways, among other things. Kirchner also took a somewhat authoritarian approach to Argentina’s legal institutions and independent media. Meanwhile, he pursued warmer relations with Caracas and remained cool toward Washington. The 2005 Summit of the Americas left no doubt about his hostility toward free-market economics and the United States, or about his willingness to indulge the antics of his Venezuelan counterpart. Held in the Argentine resort city of Mar del Plata, the summit became a carnival of violent anti-U.S. demonstrations and Chávez-led rallies. The Venezuelan radical addressed tens of thousands of supporters at a soccer stadium close to the summit. He brazenly declared that the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) would be buried in Mar del Plata. (“Each one of us brought a shovel, a gravedigger’s shovel,” Chávez said.) Celebrity protesters included the former Argentine soccer star Diego Maradona. As the Washington Post reported, “Hundreds of protesters had traveled through the night from Buenos Aires in a mass pilgrimage led by Maradona. Carrying signs comparing Bush to Adolf Hitler, the protesters chanted in unison as they filed into the stadium: ‘Bush, the fascist! Bush the terrorist!’” During the formal summit negotiations, Kirchner strongly opposed the FTAA and helped scuttle its adoption. His role in torpedoing the free-trade plan drew criticism from Mexican president Vicente Fox, a robust FTAA advocate. Kirchner responded to this criticism by suggesting that Fox was a U.S. lackey. Chávez also called him “a puppet of the empire.” Later that month, the Argentine and Venezuelan presidents held “unity” 3 talks and signed multiple energy pacts, with Kirchner agreeing to support Venezuela’s entry into Mercosur, the South American trade bloc. Kirchner and Chávez also discussed future energy projects and the creation of a Latin American investment fund.

#### 5. Conditionality is bad and a voting issue – Prefers breadth over depth, hurts topic education and research, prevents developing advocacy skills, devastates the strategic value of the 2AC because there is no incentive to read offense against counterplans.

#### 6. Links to Politics – Ag Lobby

Stencel 8 (John Stencel, Past President of Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, “Sutton Colloquium Article: Free Trade Versus Fair Trade,” Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, Summer / Fall 2008 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 36 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 349)

Farmers Union has always been a proponent of fair trade. As trade agreements have been negotiated, and as federal farm policy has shifted to the "free market" approach, Farmers Union has remained steadfast in its call for fairness, accountability, and benchmarks for success in trade negotiations. Farmers Union policy implies they support free trade, as long as it is fair trade. n3 National Farmers Union supports a fair trade system that protects the economic well-being, health and environmental concerns, working conditions and labor rights of our country's producers as well as producers in all other countries. n4 In the race to become the world's least-cost producer, individual farmers and ranchers are left to fend for themselves in global markets, while the processors and consumers enjoy the benefits of cheap commodities. [\*350] After the breakdown of the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations in 2003, n5 the United States' trade negotiators have instead tried to complete free trade agreements with many other countries and regions in bilateral and multilateral agreements, namely the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement, n6 the Australia Free Trade Agreement, n7 and the Free Trade Area of the Americas. n8 While each of these may seem to be minor in overall scope, collectively they could do great damage to our country's agricultural economy. Many times in recent years, Farmers Union has been a lone voice in the agriculture community, the only purveyor of reason and perspective when it came to agricultural trade. Yet, the influence of the free trade ideology continued to grow and pervade our public policy decisions.

#### 7. Process Counterplans Bad and a voting issue – hyper-generics distract from topic education, steal affirmative ground providing limited refutation options, there is no solvency advocate making debates unpredictable and poorly researched.

#### 8. Heg doesn’t prevent conflict

Crawford 3 (Timothy W., Professor of Political Science – Boston College, Pivotal Deterrence: Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 209-210)

*Forward Engagement, Global Leadership, and U.S. Pivotal Deterrence*

As the preponderant power in a globalized and interdependent world, the United States—so we are told—must embrace "forward engagement" and "global leadership." Depending on one's preferred partisan formula, it must either "address problems early before they become crises," or "shape circumstances before crises emerge."9 In these slogans there is a strong whiff of an enduring nostrum. As an early twentieth century writer put it, "the secret of foreign policy" is that "a nation cannot be merely pas­sive ... a nation should in every line take the most vigorous initiative."10 Or, as President George W. Bush put it in September 2002, "In the world that we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of ac­tion."11 Those who trumpet such an activist posture tend only to see peaceful consequences resulting from forward engagement. For them "American power is now the linchpin of stability in every region, from Europe to Asia to the Persian Gulf to Latin America."12 They rarely concede that the strong prospect of U.S. involvement in regional conflicts may not always cause sta­bility but instead cause instability. But the incentives (if not the underlying motives) that lead some to aggress will often be shaped by optimism about outside involvement.13 We should not assume that the forces of globaliza­tion that justify U.S. activism and incline the international community toward intervention do not also play into the strategies of regional adver­saries. It is naive to think that they, with survival at stake, do not gird for war keenly aware of the opportunities as well as dangers posed by inter­vention by the United States or other outside actors. There is thus no reason to assume that forward U.S. engagement will re­inforce regional stability and promote peaceful change. Because the United States may significantly influence the outcome of many conflicts, that po­tential must be seen for what it is; something that, by looming so large, may encourage as well discourage revisionism. If the massive risks of running afoul of U.S. power are a deterrent "shaping" the intentions of some re­gional antagonists, the potential windfall of securing U.S. support will shape the intentions of others. Because the benefits of enlisting U.S. support in a war may be enormous, even the slim chance of doing so may goad a party to act provocatively, become inflexible in negotiations, or otherwise do things that make war likely. In sum, forward U.S. engagement may fuel disintegrative as well as integrative tendencies in world politics and "jiggle loose" as many deadly conflicts as it knits back together.

## 2NC/1NR

**Perm: 2NC**

**Permutation gives up a key source of leverage – Cuba would pocket the concession**

**Perez 10** (David A. Perez, J.D. 2010, Yale Law School, “America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department,” Spring 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review 13 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 187)

Use the Embargo as a Bargaining Chip After conducting some initial discussions, both countries can then move on to the embargo. No one argues that the embargo is an effective foreign policy, because it has clearly failed to bring about real reform on the island; the only argument for maintaining the embargo is that it can be used as a **bargaining chip** for more dialogue - not that in its current state it can lead to a better situation. Put differently, the embargo is only valuable to the extent that its removal can be part of a quid pro quo strategy - not that its maintenance will lead to fundamental reform on the island. n82 This reveals a bifurcated myopia that affects both sides of the debate. On the one hand those who support the embargo as a negotiating chip often gloss over the fact that its continuation will not lead to regime change. On the other hand, those who focus on the embargo's inability to topple the regime and instead support lifting the embargo unconditionally, generally give too little weight to the embargo's value during diplomatic negotiations. The Helms-Burton legislation lays out the rather onerous conditions that must be met on Cuba's end before the U.S. can begin restoring diplomatic relations. n83 The significance of Helms-Burton's restraints cannot be overstated: while a particular president's rhetoric or a particular resolution's wording might chill diplomatic relations between two countries, Helms-Burton's arduous provisions freeze relations. The onus to thaw that freeze is properly placed upon Washington, rather than Havana. It is therefore incumbent upon the United States to change its own laws before any rapprochement with Cuba can begin. Invariably the debate surrounding America's embargo revolves around its solvency: has it worked? The question should instead be reworded to ask: will current U.S. policy work from here on out to achieve certain definable interests? The United States sold the island over $ 700 million in goods in 2008, accounting for 40% of the island's agricultural imports. n84 That number seems to indicate that Cuba's trading relationship with the U.S. is not of [\*217] trivial importance to the island's leadership. However, the strength of this relationship may steadily diminish relative to other trading partners in the next few years. For example, over the next five to seven years Cuba will have an increased energy productivity stemming from its coastal drilling operations that will bring it closer to Spain, Canada, Norway, Brazil, and India. n85 With these relatively stable flows of capital, Cuba will increasingly become insulated from U.S. economic pressure. The moment to decisively influence Cuba's government through economic pressure may have never existed, but if it did, it has surely passed. The notion that the U.S. can intricately craft Cuba's governmental and domestic policies by applying a combination of economic and political pressure must be rejected either as categorically false, or as an anachronism of the early 1990s. During her confirmation hearings, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said "that it is not time to lift the embargo on Cuba, especially since it provides an important **source of leverage** for further change on the island." n86 Secretary Clinton is correct: the embargo definitely provides a valuable bargaining chip during negotiations, and should not be lifted unconditionally. But given this evidence, the Obama Administration should be suspect of claims that the embargo gives the U.S. decisive leverage over Cuba.

**Process Alone Solves**

**Negotiating the FTAA results in broader cooperation – solves human rights, democracy, etc.**

**Dannenmaier 9** (Eric Dannenmaier, Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Indiana University--Indianapolis. M.St., Oxford University; LLM, Columbia University; J.D., Boston University. Charles B. Bretzfelder International Law Fellow, Columbia University, 2006-07, “Lawmaking On The Road To International Summits,” Fall 2009, 59 DePaul L. Rev. 1)

The summits are institutionally tied to the OAS, and this connection has become stronger over time. The OAS serves as the summit secretariat and has seen its own agenda increasingly shaped by summit commitments. Yet summit agenda setting and implementation are still technically independent of the OAS. **The process of negotiating** and shaping summit agendas is managed by the Summit Implementation and Review Group (SIRG), which is chaired by the upcoming summit's designated host country and steered by past summit host countries. n95 An institutional tripartite committee, which includes the OAS, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), helps to oversee summit implementation. n96 The inter-American summits have typically featured one to three days of presidential plenary sessions and side meetings among heads of state and their delegations. Official documents have traditionally been signed by participating heads of state. n97 These include "declarations," which are essentially a broad statement of principles, and "plans of action," which are more detailed lists of commitments that state leaders will pursue in order to advance the principles on which they have agreed. n98 The action plans are often general and vague, but [\*20] in some cases they include more **concrete commitments** to work toward social goals. n99 The declarations and action plans are negotiated through the SIRG in a relatively transparent process that offers both formal and informal opportunities for non-state actors to offer advice, including advice about specific language, and to comment on elements of the documents. Non-state actors also work informally with the tripartite committee institutions, especially the technical units of the OAS, to conduct research and develop reports and recommendations that inform the preparation of summit documents. n100 The subject matter of inter-American summits has varied widely to cover a range of security, economic, and social interests in the region. A commitment to negotiate a **Free Trade Area of the Americas** (FTAA) emerged at the First Summit in Miami, n101 and greater economic integration remained a subject of many subsequent summit commitments **until an impasse** over the creation of a new regional free trade zone emerged in Quebec, which has hardened in subsequent summits. n102 In addition to serving as a platform for the discussion of [\*21] competing trade agendas, summits have addressed concerns over education, labor rights, gender discrimination, **human rights,** the environment, **democracy**, transparency, health, and urban development, among others.

**Human Rights: 2NC**

**Undermining Cuba-China alliance is key to global human rights**

Hawkins 12 (Awr, “China, Cuba Block U.N Human Rights Council From Condemning Syria,” 7-14-12,

<http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Peace/2012/07/13/U-N-Human-Rights-Council-Fails-to-Address-Human-Rights-Violations>)

The U.N. has long been viewed as a questionable authority in the world because it issues edicts and condemnations in a whimsical, often baseless fashion. In particular, the U.N. often condemns those it shouldn't because of ideological differences while turning a blind eye to true violators of the law because of ideological agreements. Case in point: the U.N. Human Rights Council just ended its yearly meeting and patted itself on the back for a job well done, although their meetings witnessed a delegate from Cuba standing again and again to defend human rights violations in Syria and other countries. Think about it: not only did the Human Rights Council fail to address the human rights violations of the Cuban government, where Communism comes first, period. But they also allowed **Cuba to stand in solidarity with China**, "opposing the condemnation of Syria's atrocities." What are they going to do next, allow Iran to oversee an international gun control treaty that will usurp the 2nd Amendment? To make matters worse, according to the Miami Herald, Cuba put a number of proposals before the Human Rights Council that basically provided cover for "Sudan, Belarus, China, Sri Lanka, Iran, and North Korea." In other words, Cuba spent their time during the annual council meeting making sure human rights weren't addressed.

**Relations: 2NC**

**Trade is key to overall relations**

**Hornbeck 11** (J. F. Hornbeck, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, “U.S.-Latin America Trade: Recent Trends and Policy Issues,” 2-8-11, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/98-840.pdf)

It is uncertain if any of these alternatives will lead to a new chapter in **trade relations** between the United States and Latin America. For one, they may be difficult to implement and monitor, but nonetheless could provide marginal **benefits** in light of the apparent hiatus in moving toward a broad and comprehensive hemispheric trade agreement. In the meantime, **trade remains foundational to good U.S.-Latin America relations**, an important consideration in the contemplation of future U.S. trade policy.

**A2 Brazil**

#### Counterplan jumpstarts negotiations with Brazil and other countries, solves agreement and integration

**Schott 5** (Jeffrey J., Senior Fellow at the Institute for International Economics, “Does the FTAA have a Future?,” <http://www.piie.com/publications/papers/schott1105.pdf>)

Bluntly put, the FTAA negotiations have been stuck in the mud since the Miami ministerial meeting of November 2003. At that time, soon after the failed World Trade Organization (WTO) meeting in Cancun in September 2003 that had led to a breakdown in the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, trade officials were under intense pressure "not to fail." Moreover, trade ministers didn't want their leaders to have to address the ensuing mess when they convened in Monterrey, Mexico, two months later for a special Summit on Development. So the political imperative was to cut a deal in Miami and go home quickly. Accordingly, the co-chairs of the FTAA process—the United States and Brazil—produced a procedural compromise that allowed them to shake hands and promise to resume negotiating in early 2004. Despite infrequent bilateral meetings of ministers and chief negotiators, the US-Brazil rapprochement never advanced beyond a handshake to an abrazo. The outcome of the Miami ministerial prevented the collapse of the trade negotiations but made it **more difficult** to **achieve an agreement** that balanced the interests of the participating countries. What went wrong? At the Miami meeting, ministers "affirmed their commitment to a comprehensive and balanced FTAA" [paragraph 5), which includes "provisions in each of the [FTAA] negotiating areas" (paragraph 10). However, countries were permitted to take specific issues or products off the table, and some "countries may assume different levels of commitments" (paragraph 7). If other countries want to do more, say on investment, they could enter into "plurilateral" agreements that only obligate those countries that sign the specific pact. In other words, the Miami compromise accommodated two levels of negotiation: a core FTAA in which countries could **exclude sensitive issues** and supplementary accords by a subset of FTAA participants that covered "FTAA-plus" commitments. The plurilateral option was introduced to accommodate the incremental development of an FTAA through a series of iterative negotiations. In so doing, however.it seemed to walk away from the comprehensive trade accord that hemispheric leaders promised at the Summit of the Americas in 1994 and had reiterated at their subsequent reunion in Santiago (1998) and Quebec City (2001). Some countries took the Miami mandate as license to try to **remove entire areas** from the talks—leading some observers to derisively label the potential outcome "FTAA-lite." The Brazilians certainly thought that they had pared down the negotiating agenda to core issues that need not include subjects sensitive to them—particularly, investment and intellectual property rights (IPRs)—but such a result is not viable since the United States could not agree to liberalize its own border harriers to trade in the absence of reciprocal benefits for US traders and investors. If action on key trade and investment issues is deferred, will US or Brazilian officials be able to garner political support to reform long-standing barriers protecting farmers, manufacturers, and service providers? In essence, the Miami declaration presaged a "**hollow core" agreement** in which individual countries could avoid committing to reforms in politically sensitive areas (hence "FTAA-lite"). Thus, if Brazil and others did not want to negotiate on investment and IPRs they could opt out of a hemispheric accord in those areas while the United States and others could adopt a more comprehensive accord among a subset of FTAA participants (probably the same countries that already have signed FTAs with the United States). The value of this plurilateral approach is unclear, since there is little "additionally" if the plurilateral pacts only involve existing US FTA partners. At best, plurilateral pacts would seek to harmonize the terms of existing FTAs. However, such harmonization would require inter alia augmenting Canadian obligations in NAFTA and unraveling politically sensitive compromises on FTA origin rules for textiles, clothing, and agricultural products. Such a result is highly unlikely. While it is conceivable that a more limited outcome could balance US and LAC interests, the trade benefits resulting from such a modest undertaking would not seem sufficient to justify the political cost/risk of going back to Congress for another vote on these pacts. For Congress to approve changes in existing US trade barriers of interest to Brazil and other Latin American countries, US negotiators need to receive concrete commitments that open access to those markets for US exporters and investors. In short, the FTAA has to be a big deal, or the deal won't fly. In sum, the Miami declaration complicated the task of crafting a balanced package of concessions that negotiators can sell to their respective legislatures. It took **pressure off the Brazilian negotiators** by giving them an excuse for their minimalist position on so-called WTO-plus issues—i.e., those that go beyond the scope of existing WTO rights and obligations. For Brazil, the Miami decision seemed to condone an FTAA that simply removed traditional border barriers and did not require commitments on new issues like investment and competition policy. At the same time, it allowed US officials to defend inaction on US farm barriers because of lack of reciprocity from their Brazilian counterparts. In short, the talks have devolved into a caricature of the "Alphonse and Gaston" routine, with neither side willing (and possibly not politically able) to advance first.

**Avoids Politics: 2NC**

#### The Counterplan creates positive momentum at the highest levels of government

**USTR 2** (Office of the United States Trade Representative, “Zoellick Tells Congress It's Crucial We Move Forward on FTAA,” October 2002, <http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/archives/2002/october/zoellick-tells-congress-its-crucial-we-mo>)

WASHINGTON - United States Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick yesterday formally notified **Congressional leaders** of U.S. objectives and goals for the ongoing negotiations in the Free Trade Area of the Americas (**FTAA**), saying it was "crucial that we move forward on hemispheric trade negotiations." Zoellick's letter fulfills the requirements of the recently enacted Trade Act of 2002 and highlights the strong intent of the United States to continue its leadership role in the hemispheric trade negotiations. "The FTAA negotiations offer the United States an opportunity to lead the Americas toward stable and continuing economic growth, improved living standards, and higher paying jobs in all FTAA countries. By reducing and then eliminating hemispheric trade barriers, the FTAA will provide substantial and growing foreign markets for U.S. goods and services," wrote Zoellick. "The FTAA agreement will also strengthen the rule-of-law, solidify economic reform throughout the hemisphere, and reinforce the democratic principles that unite FTAA countries." On October 1, Zoellick provided Congress with the formal notification for the Administration's intent to enter into free trade negotiations with Morocco and five nations of Central America. In addition, Zoellick also notified Congress of the U.S. goals and objectives for completing the final stages of ongoing free trade negotiations with Singapore and Chile. Zoellick's letter was sent to the **Speaker of the House**, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, and Congressional trade leaders.

**A2 No Impact: 2NC**

**Prefer our evidence- unipolarity is the only check on conflicts**

**Wohlforth 9 (**William Wohlforth, professor of government at Dartmouth College, 2009 “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” *World Politics*, Volume 61, Number 1, January 2009, pp. 28-57)

The evidence suggests that narrow and asymmetrical capabilities gaps foster status competition even among states relatively confident of their basic territorial security for the reasons identified in social identity theory and theories of status competition. Broad patterns of evidence are consistent with this expectation, suggesting that unipolarity shapes strategies of identity maintenance in ways that dampen status conflict. The implication is that unipolarity helps explain low levels of military competition and conflict among major powers after 1991 and that a return to bipolarity or multipolarity would increase the likelihood of such conflict. This has been a preliminary exercise. The evidence for the hypotheses explored here is hardly conclusive, but it is sufficiently suggestive to warrant further refinement and testing, all the more so given [End Page 56] the importance of the question at stake. If status matters in the way the theory discussed here suggests, then the widespread view that the rise of a peer competitor and the shift back to a bipolar or multipolar structure present readily surmountable policy challenges is suspect. Most scholars agree with Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke’s argument: “[S]hould a satisfied state undergo a power transition and catch up with dominant power, there is little or no expectation of war.” 81 Given that today’s rising powers have every material reason to like the status quo, many observers are optimistic that the rise of peer competitors can be readily managed by fashioning an order that accommodates their material interests. Yet it is far harder to manage competition for status than for most material things. While diplomatic efforts to manage status competition seem easy under unipolarity, theory and evidence suggest that it could present much greater challenges as the system moves back to bipolarity or multipolarity. When status is seen as a positional good, efforts to craft negotiated bargains about status contests face long odds. And this positionality problem is particularly acute concerning the very issue unipolarity solves: primacy. The route back to bipolarity or multipolarity is thus fraught with danger. With two or more plausible claimants to primacy, positional competition and the potential for major power war could once again form the backdrop of world politics. [End Page 57]

**Specifically true in deterring China in Latin America**

**Hilton 13** (Isabel, formerly Latin America editor of The Independent newspaper, “China in Latin America: Hegemonic challenge?,” February 2013, NOREF – Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, <http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afbc054aad9.pdf>)

China’s presence in Latin America is unlikely to diminish and will continue to affect its regional partners for the foreseeable future. Although this undoubtedly entails a loss of U.S. influence in the region, both China and the U.S. have so far sought cooperation rather than confrontation. In the context of the Obama administration’s “**pivot**” to Asia, however, and the latent, **long-term strategic competition** between **China and the U**nited **S**tates, there is potential for increasing competition for influence in the future. An escalation of tensions between China and U.S. allies in the South China or East China Sea could prompt China to raise **retaliatory tensions** in the U.S. backyard. At that point, the traditional Latin American allies of the U.S. could face some uncomfortable choices.

**Impact 2NC**

**US Hegemony solves Latin American instability**

**Santiba** (Francisco de, PHd candidate at Professor War Studies at King’s College and Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Relations Johns Hopkins University, An End to U.S. Hegemony? The Strategic Implications of China's Growing Presence in Latin America, [Comparative Strategy](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title%7Econtent=t713769613%7Edb=all), Volume [28](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title%7Econtent=t713769613%7Edb=all%7Etab=issueslist%7Ebranches=28#v28), Issue [1](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title%7Econtent=g908609091%7Edb=all) January 2009 , pages 17 – 36)

However, the most significant sign of U.S. lack of influence in the Western Hemisphere has been the growing number of disputes among Latin American states. And maybe the most dangerous development in this trend took place on March 2008 when the Colombian air force attacked a position held by a terrorist organization, call FARC, inside Ecuadorian territory. After this action, both the governments of Ecuador and Venezuela decided to send troops to the frontiers with Colombia, accusing this country of acting as a proxy for the United States and warning about the possibility of a war. After numerous accusations between these states, a deacutetente was finally reached, but the possibility of a military conflict is still present. To this dispute we have to add, among others, the recent conflict between Argentina and Uruguay. These two nations have been discussing, in acrimonious terms, the environmental effects that the construction of two paper mills in Uruguay might have on a river that is shared by both nations.[53](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a908604855&fulltext=713240928#EN0053) A more serious conflict is the one that confronts Bolivia and Chile. The Bolivian government has demanded from Chile the exit to the Pacific Ocean that it took, together with large amounts of land, during a nineteenth-century war.[54](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a908604855&fulltext=713240928#EN0054)

**US Re-intervention turns the case and causes global war**

**Rochlin 94** (James Francis, Prof. Pol. Sci. @ Okanagan University College, “Discovering the Americas: the evolution of Canadian foreign policy towards Latin America”, p. 130-131)

While there were economic motivations for Canadian policy in Central America, security considerations were perhaps more important. Canada possessed an interest in promoting stability in the face of a potential decline of U.S. hegemony in the Americas. Perceptions of declining U.S. influence in the region – which had some credibility in 1979-1984 due to the wildly inequitable divisions of wealth in some U.S. client states in Latin America, in addition to political repression, under-development, mounting external debt, anti-American sentiment produced by decades of subjugation to U.S. strategic and economic interests, and so on – were linked to the prospect of explosive events occurring in the hemisphere. Hence, the Central American imbroglio was viewed as a fuse which could ignite a cataclysmic process throughout the region. Analysts at the time worried that in a worst-case scenario, instability created by a regional war, beginning in Central America and spreading elsewhere in Latin America, might preoccupy Washington to the extent that the United States would be unable to perform adequately its important hegemonic role in the international arena – a concern expressed by the director of research for Canada’s Standing Committee Report on Central America. It was feared that such a predicament could generate increased global instability and perhaps even a hegemonic war. This is one of the motivations which led Canada to become involved in efforts at regional conflict resolution, such as Contadora, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

# PTX

## 1NC

#### Immigration Reform will pass in the House and Senate now – there will be heated debates. Obama is actively lobbying to get it done.

Werner 6 – 11 – 13 AP Staff [Erica Werner, House Speaker John Boehner: Congress can do immigration this year, <http://www.news-sentinel.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20130611/NEWS/130619933/1006>]

With the Senate ready to cast the first floor votes on a landmark immigration bill, House Speaker John Boehner said Tuesday he thinks there's a good chance the legislation can be signed into law "by the end of the year."

Ahead of Tuesday afternoon's procedural votes to officially allow debate to move forward, senators were readying amendments on contentious issues including border security, back taxes and health care coverage. Some Republicans said they were seeking to strengthen enforcement provisions so that they could be comfortable voting for the bill.

Other GOP measures were already being dismissed by Democrats as attempts to kill the bill by striking at the fragile compromises at its core.

Boehner said in a nationally broadcast interview he still has concerns about aspects of the bill pertaining to border security. But the Ohio Republican also said he has sought to create an environment in the House where both parties can work together on the measure, which could eventually lead to full citizenship for millions of people currently living in the United States illegally.

"I think, no question, by the end of the year we could have a bill. No question," the speaker said in an interview on ABC's "Good Morning America."

In the Senate, the bill's supporters were working to determine which measures they could accept to lock down more "yes" votes from the GOP side without losing Democratic backing. They are aiming for a resounding show of support from the Democratic-led Senate that could pressure the Republican-led House to act.

President Barack Obama, who's made overhauling immigration laws a top second-term priority, was to speak at a midmorning event with advocates at the White House to praise the Senate's efforts and renew his calls for reform.

The two votes scheduled for Tuesday afternoon were on procedural measures to officially allow debate to move forward on the far-reaching bill. Both votes were expected to succeed by comfortable margins, because even some senators with deep misgivings about the immigration bill said the issue deserved a Senate debate.

The real fights will come in the following days and weeks as Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev., aims to push the bill to final Senate passage before July 4.

Even if that happens, the outlook in the House remains unsettled. Boehner indicated earlier that he'd like to see a bill through his chamber before August.

The Senate bill would stiffen border security and require all employers to check their workers' legal status, as well as initiate new or expanded visa programs for high-skilled and lower-skilled workers and the agriculture sector. At its core is its most contentious element, a 13-year path to citizenship for some 11 million immigrants now here illegally.

"Given the impact the broken system has on our economy and our families, we cannot afford delay," Senate Judiciary Chairman Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., said Monday on the Senate floor. "This is a measure the Senate should come together to consider and pass."

"Unfortunately the bill before us repeats our past mistakes," said the Judiciary Committee's top Republican, Sen. Chuck Grassley of Iowa. "Nobody disputes this is a bill that legalizes first and enforces later."

Heated debate is anticipated on the border security elements of the bill. The bill sets up a system wherein immigrants may only begin taking steps toward citizenship once certain border security requirements are met. But opponents say those "triggers" aren't strong enough, and one of the bill's authors, Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Fla., has argued that the border security elements of the bill must be strengthened if it's to make it through Congress.

#### Obama’s political capital and avoiding controversial actions will be vital to insuring final passage of the bill.

Bloomberg 5 – 23 – 13 [Obama Probes Create Immigration Magic as Bill Advances, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-23/obama-probes-create-immigration-magic-as-bill-advances.html]

The measure’s critics are still pressing to prevent that from happening, and seeking to use the negative attention focused on Obama’s administration as a means of doing so.

Tea Party Opposition

A coalition of Republican-aligned commentators and small-government Tea Party groups released a letter on May 21 urging opposition to the bill, writing that it suffers from “fundamental design flaws that make it unsalvageable,” including that it “cedes excessive control over immigration law to an administration that has repeatedly proven itself to be untrustworthy, even duplicitous.”

Should the measure pass the Democratic-controlled Senate, its initial reception will be chilly in the House, where Republicans hold the majority.

The bill won’t accomplish the goal of ending “illegal immigration for once and for all,” said House Judiciary Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte, a Virginia Republican who will be a key player in determining its fate.

“The Senate bill is unlikely to secure the border,” Goodlatte said at a hearing he convened yesterday in Washington to examine the legislation.

In other criticisms, he said the measure takes too long -- as much as seven years -- to implement an electronic employment verification system, known as e-verify.

Credibility Issue

His comments underscore the congressional hurdles that loom for revising immigration laws -- obstacles that Republican strategist Ron Bonjean said will be harder for Obama to surmount if the scandals continue to undercut his credibility.

“It may help them now that people aren’t paying as much attention” to the debate on the immigration bill because of the investigations, “but long-term it’s a big problem,” Bonjean said. “The president’s political capital diminishes as these crises continue, and eventually he’s going to have to cash in that capital to get people to cast tough votes and push this thing through.”

#### Lifting the embargo will be a massive fight – strong groups will rally against it.

Spadoni & Sagebien 13 a. assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Augusta State b. associate professor at the School of Business Administration and an adjunct professor in the International Development Studies program in the College of Sustainability at Dalhousie University, Canada [Paolo Spadoni & Julia Sagebien, Will They Still Love Us Tomorrow? Canada-Cuba Business Relations and the End of the US Embargo, Thunderbird International Business Review, Volume 55, Issue 1, pages 77–93, January/February 2013, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/tie.21524/full]

Although Fidel Castro's definitive exit from the scene, and a Cuban government led by someone other than Raúl Castro, would speed up a relaxation of the embargo, such process will mostly depend on US domestic dynamics. The embargo has survived the end of the Cold War primarily as a domestic electoral issue linked to the role the US-based Cuban exile community has played in helping determine the electoral outcome of important swing states such as Florida and New Jersey. Cuban-American lobbying and hefty campaign contributions were additional key factors (Eckstein, 2009, pp. 127–132; Haney & Vanderbush, 2005, p. 72; Rich Kaplowitz, 1998, p. 134). What Cuban-Americans think and feel matters. They were relatively receptive or at least not outright hostile to Obama's early remarks on Cuba and welcomed the lifting of restrictions on their travel and money transfers to the island. The Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) fully supported the president's decision to increase this kind of people-to-people exchange (CANF, 2009). Moreover, US opinion polls show considerable backing for a further easing of sanctions that are considered anachronistic and ineffective, even by many Cuban-Americans.4 Washington's Cuba policy has recently been going through a strident debate in Congress, where a series of bipartisan legislative proposals aimed to chip away at various aspects of the embargo are under consideration. Yet, pro-embargo forces, among them Cuban-American legislators and other members of the congressional group Cuba Democracy Caucus, will not go down without a fight, as demonstrated by their strenuous opposition to the aforementioned bills and their attempts to set rules for travel and remittances to Cuba back to what they were under former President George W. Bush.5

#### Immigration is key to maintaining economic growth

Center for American Progress 10 [How Immigration Reform Would Help the Economy, p. <http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2010/01/14/7130/how-immigration-reform-would-help-the-economy/>]

A new report, “Raising the Floor for American Workers: The Economic Benefits of Comprehensive Immigration Reform,” by Dr. Raúl Hinojosa-Ojeda, finds that comprehensive immigration reform that includes a legalization program for unauthorized immigrants and enables a future flow of legal workers would result in a large economic benefit—a cumulative $1.5 trillion in added U.S. gross domestic product over 10 years. In stark contrast, a deportation- only policy would result in a loss of $2.6 trillion in GDP over 10 years. Hinojosa uses a computable general equilibrium model based on the historical experience of the 1986 legalization program, and finds that: Comprehensive immigration reform that includes a legalization program for unauthorized immigrants would stimulate the U.S. economy. Immigration reform would increase U.S. GDP by at least 0.84 percent. This would translate into at least a $1.5 trillion cumulative increase in GDP over 10 years, which includes approximately $1.2 trillion in consumption and $256 billion in investment. The benefits of additional GDP growth would be spread broadly throughout the U.S. economy, but immigrant-heavy sectors such as textiles, electronic equipment, and construction would see particularly large increases. The higher earning power of newly legalized workers would mean increased tax revenues of $4.5 billion to $5.4 billion in the first three years. Higher personal income would also generate increased consumer spending—enough to support 750,000 to 900,000 jobs in the United States. Experience shows that legalized workers open bank accounts, buy homes, and start businesses, further stimulating the U.S. economy. Comprehensive immigration reform increases all workers’ wages. The real wages of less-skilled newly legalized workers would increase by roughly $4,405 per year, while higher-skilled workers would see their income increase $6,185 per year. The wages of native-born high-skill and low-skill U.S. workers also increase modestly under comprehensive immigration reform because the “wage floor” rises for all workers. Legalized workers invest more in their human capital, including education, job training, and English-language skills, making them even more productive workers and higher earners. Mass deportation is costly, lowers wages, and harms the U.S. economy. Mass deportation would reduce U.S. GDP by 1.46 percent, amounting to a cumulative $2.6 trillion loss in GDP over 10 years, not including the actual costs of deportation. The Center for American Progress has estimated that mass deportation would cost $206 billion to $230 billion over five years. Wages would rise for less-skilled native-born workers under a mass deportation scenario, but higher-skilled natives’ wages would decrease, and there would be widespread job loss. Studies from various researchers with divergent political perspectives confirm these findings. A report by the libertarian CATO Institute using a similar CGE model came to startlingly similar conclusions. CATO found that legalization would yield significant income gains for American workers and households. Legalization would boost the incomes of U.S. households by $180 billion in 2019. CATO also concluded that tighter restrictions and a reduction in less-skilled immigration would impose large costs on native-born Americans by shrinking the overall economy and lowering worker productivity.

#### Economic decline risks multiple global nuclear wars

O’Hanlon 12 Kenneth G. Lieberthal, Director of the John L. Thornton China Center and Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development at the Brookings Institution, former Professor at the University of Michigan [“The Real National Security Threat: America's Debt,” Los Angeles Times, July 10th, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/07/10-economy-foreign-policy-lieberthal-ohanlon>]

Alas, globalization and automation trends of the last generation have increasingly called the American dream into question for the working classes. Another decade of underinvestment in what is required to remedy this situation will make an isolationist or populist president far more likely because much of the country will question whether an internationalist role makes sense for America — especially if it costs us well over half a trillion dollars in defense spending annually yet seems correlated with more job losses. Lastly, American economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad. Other countries sense our weakness and wonder about our purport 7ed decline. If this perception becomes more widespread, and the case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive, countries will begin to take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future. Allies and friendswill doubt our commitment and may pursue nuclear weapons for their own security, for example; adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrainedin throwing around their weight in their own neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become less stable. Major war will become more likely. When running for president last time, Obama eloquently articulated big foreign policy visions: healing America's breach with the Muslim world, controlling global climate change, dramatically curbing globalpoverty through development aid, **moving toward a world free of** nuclear weapons. These were, and remain, worthy if elusive goals. However, for Obama or his successor, there is now amuchmore urgent big-pictureissue:restoring U.S. economic strength.Nothing else isreallypossibleif thatfundamentalprerequisite toeffectiveforeign policyis not reestablished.

## 2AC

#### 1. Won’t pass – Obama’s scandal & GOP opposition

Bloomberg 5 – 23 – 13 [Obama Probes Create Immigration Magic as Bill Advances, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-23/obama-probes-create-immigration-magic-as-bill-advances.html]

2007 Defeat

The immigration bill stands at the same juncture a similar measure reached in June 2007, before heading for the Senate floor and collapsing after an at-times bitter floor fight, with a handful of Democrats joining Republicans to defeat it.

That could still be the current legislation’s fate. The potential damage from the scandal to Obama’s influence and the partisan fissures they could create may diminish momentum.

Also, some Democrats regard the bill’s provisions to bolster border security and enforcement as too punitive and object that it creates an arduous and costly process for undocumented immigrants to eventually gain citizenship.

And while most Republican leaders have embraced an immigration revision as a political imperative after the 2012 elections demonstrated their weakness with Hispanic voters, some parts of the party’s base remain opposed to what they regard as “amnesty.”

Some of the immigration bill’s top Republican supporters, who are risking their support from those party activists, have been the loudest voices criticizing Obama over the scandals.

#### 2. Intrinsicness—you can pass immigration and the plan—the disad is not an opportunity cost to the plan to a logical policy maker.

#### 3. Obama losing capital on scandals

Morrissey 6 – 12 – 13 [Ed Morrissey, editor at Politico, [Politico: “Trust me” not really working for Obama, huh?, politico.com]

A couple of months ago, political analysts discussed Barack Obama’s increased political capital after winning re-election and increasing Democratic seats on Capitol Hill. These days, pundits like Glenn Thrush and Jennifer Epstein at Politico are openly wondering whether Obama and the avalanche of scandals have turned him into a liability. The scandals have eroded Obama’s greatest political asset — trust:

“Trust me” is President Barack Obama’s preferred mode of action in times of crisis — and his go-to comment to nervous staffers has always been some version of “Relax, I got this.”

But that message is an increasingly hard sell for Obama in his second term, following revelations that the man who once railed against the Bush administration over civil liberties abuses has himself surreptitiously quarterbacked the greatest expansion of electronic surveillance in U.S. history.

Obama’s call for trust, patience and near blanket secrecy is increasingly falling on deaf ears in his own party, spurring a backlash among Democrats who say it’s time for the “most transparent president in history” to provide the American people with a comprehensive explanation of a secret program that dragnets most phone records and much of the Internet.

It’s not just the scandals, either, but the administration’s response to them. When did Obama find out about the IRS targeting conservatives? When he picked up the newspaper — even though his chief of staff and White House counsel had briefed the West Wing on the scandal weeks earlier. He didn’t know that his close friend Eric Holder had named a Fox News reporter as a co-conspirator in espionage until that hit the newsstands, too. What did Obama do during the terrorist attack on Benghazi? He was “fully briefed,” but the White House refuses to say where he was and what specifically he did after the initial briefing. The administration managed to offer pictures of the Commander in Chief on the job during the Osama bin Laden raid, but all we get is a shrug when things went wrong in Benghazi.

#### 4. Lifting the embargo politically popular

Bandow 12 senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a former special assistant to former US president Ronald Reagan. [Doug Bandow, Time to End the Cuba Embargo, <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/time-end-cuba-embargo?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+CatoRecentOpeds+(Cato+Recent+Op-eds)>]

The embargo survives largely because of Florida’s political importance. Every presidential candidate wants to win the Sunshine State’s electoral votes, and the Cuban American community is a significant voting bloc.

But the political environment is changing. A younger, more liberal generation of Cuban Americans with no memory of life in Cuba is coming to the fore. Said Wayne Smith, a diplomat who served in Havana: “for the first time in years, maybe there is some chance for a change in policy.” And there are now many more new young Cuban Americans who support a more sensible approach to Cuba.

Support for the Republican Party also is falling. According to some exit polls Barack Obama narrowly carried the Cuban American community in November, after receiving little more than a third of the vote four years ago. He received 60 percent of the votes of Cuban Americans born in the United States.

Barack Obama increased his votes among Cuban Americans after liberalizing contacts with the island. He also would have won the presidency without Florida, demonstrating that the state may not be essential politically.

Today even the GOP is no longer reliable. For instance, though Republican vice-presidential nominee Paul Ryan has defended the embargo in recent years, that appears to reflect ambition rather than conviction. Over the years he voted at least three times to lift the embargo, explaining: “The embargo doesnt work. It is a failed policy. It was probably justified when the Soviet Union existed and posed a threat through Cuba. I think its become more of a crutch for Castro to use to repress his people. All the problems he has, he blames the American embargo.”

#### 5. Winners-win – gets moderates on board

RCP 3 – 11 – 13 [Caitlin Huey-Burns, Is the GOP Finally Winning?, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2013/03/11/is\_the\_gop\_finally\_winning\_117363.html]

The president is going around House Republicans and courting their colleagues in the Senate. Over the past week, Obama has phoned and dined with several GOP senators, hoping to strike a deal.

“The White House is trying anything they can to win right now,” said South Dakota Sen. John Thune, a member of the GOP leadership. “I think the president sort of got on the wrong side of this whole issue with the sequester by going out and using the scare tactics, and I think that’s kind of bit him.”

The president’s shift in tone rests better with the public, which is holding him accountable, a top Democratic aide said. “It is better when he looks like he’s getting stuff done,” the aide explained. “He’s reaching out and working with Republicans and trying to get something done rather than just trying to talk about the bad things that are going to happen.”

Many rank and file Republicans in the Senate welcome the president’s outreach and are open to a grand bargain on deficit reduction. But they are also working to impel the president on entitlements.

6. No internal link—obama isn’t key. Their uniqueness argument says that Boehner is essential to sway Republicans that are on the fence

#### 7. Political Capital makes no sense – useless concept – unforeseen events are just as likely. The consequences of losing capital are just as likely to be positive.

HIRSH 2 – 7 – 13 chief correspondent for National Journal, previously served as the senior editor and national economics correspondent for Newsweek. Overseas Press Club award for best magazine reporting from abroad in 2001 and for Newsweek’s coverage of the war on terror, which also won a National Magazine Award [Michael Hirsh, There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital, http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207]

On Tuesday, in his State of the Union address, President Obama will do what every president does this time of year. For about 60 minutes, he will lay out a sprawling and ambitious wish list highlighted by gun control and immigration reform, climate change and debt reduction. In response, the pundits will do what they always do this time of year: They will talk about how unrealistic most of the proposals are, discussions often informed by sagacious reckonings of how much “political capital” Obama possesses to push his program through.

Most of this talk will have no bearing on what actually happens over the next four years.

Consider this: Three months ago, just before the November election, if someone had talked seriously about Obama having enough political capital to oversee passage of both immigration reform and gun-control legislation at the beginning of his second term—even after winning the election by 4 percentage points and 5 million votes (the actual final tally)—this person would have been called crazy and stripped of his pundit’s license. (It doesn’t exist, but it ought to.) In his first term, in a starkly polarized country, the president had been so frustrated by GOP resistance that he finally issued a limited executive order last August permitting immigrants who entered the country illegally as children to work without fear of deportation for at least two years. Obama didn’t dare to even bring up gun control, a Democratic “third rail” that has cost the party elections and that actually might have been even less popular on the right than the president’s health care law. And yet, for reasons that have very little to do with Obama’s personal prestige or popularity—variously put in terms of a “mandate” or “political capital”—chances are fair that both will now happen.

What changed? In the case of gun control, of course, it wasn’t the election. It was the horror of the 20 first-graders who were slaughtered in Newtown, Conn., in mid-December. The sickening reality of little girls and boys riddled with bullets from a high-capacity assault weapon seemed to precipitate a sudden tipping point in the national conscience. One thing changed after another. Wayne LaPierre of the National Rifle Association marginalized himself with poorly chosen comments soon after the massacre. The pro-gun lobby, once a phalanx of opposition, began to fissure into reasonables and crazies. Former Rep. Gabrielle Giffords, D-Ariz., who was shot in the head two years ago and is still struggling to speak and walk, started a PAC with her husband to appeal to the moderate middle of gun owners. Then she gave riveting and poignant testimony to the Senate, challenging lawmakers: “Be bold.”

As a result, momentum has appeared to build around some kind of a plan to curtail sales of the most dangerous weapons and ammunition and the way people are permitted to buy them. It’s impossible to say now whether such a bill will pass and, if it does, whether it will make anything more than cosmetic changes to gun laws. But one thing is clear: The political tectonics have shifted dramatically in very little time. Whole new possibilities exist now that didn’t a few weeks ago.

Meanwhile, the Republican members of the Senate’s so-called Gang of Eight are pushing hard for a new spirit of compromise on immigration reform, a sharp change after an election year in which the GOP standard-bearer declared he would make life so miserable for the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. that they would “self-deport.” But this turnaround has very little to do with Obama’s personal influence—his political mandate, as it were. It has almost entirely to do with just two numbers: 71 and 27. That’s 71 percent for Obama, 27 percent for Mitt Romney, the breakdown of the Hispanic vote in the 2012 presidential election. Obama drove home his advantage by giving a speech on immigration reform on Jan. 29 at a Hispanic-dominated high school in Nevada, a swing state he won by a surprising 8 percentage points in November. But the movement on immigration has mainly come out of the Republican Party’s recent introspection, and the realization by its more thoughtful members, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, that without such a shift the party may be facing demographic death in a country where the 2010 census showed, for the first time, that white births have fallen into the minority. It’s got nothing to do with Obama’s political capital or, indeed, Obama at all.

The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term. Often it is a synonym for “mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful concept,” says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of political capital. But the fact is, it’s a concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.”

The real problem is that the idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong. “Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind of political capital—some sense of an electoral mandate to do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason, political capital is a concept that misleads far more than it enlightens. It is distortionary. It conveys the idea that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusive concept of political power, and it discounts the way unforeseen events can suddenly change everything. Instead, it suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest, just as someone might have real investment capital—that a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history.

Naturally, any president has practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress and a cohesive coalition behind him? Obama has neither at present. And unless a surge in the economy—at the moment, still stuck—or some other great victory gives him more momentum, it is inevitable that the closer Obama gets to the 2014 election, the less he will be able to get done. Going into the midterms, Republicans will increasingly avoid any concessions that make him (and the Democrats) stronger.

8. No internal link—Republicans want immigration to pass to get Hispanic votes—the plan doesn't change that

9. No impact—the current immigration bill doesn't solve the impact card. Their evidence assumes a much more comprehensive bill.

#### 10. Impossible to predict the economic benefits

**Khimm, 13** (Suzy, “How much will immigration reform cost?,” February 1st, 2013, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/02/01/how-much-will-immigration-reform-cost/>)

There’s a lot of evidence pointing to the economic benefits of adding more legal immigrants to the economy. What’s less clear is how much a comprehensive immigration overhaul would affect the federal budget.¶ While more legal immigrants could cost taxpayers more in health care, education, and other social services, they would also contribute more tax revenues. Ultimately, there will be a lot of political pressure to produce a reform that costs as little as possible, possibly even reducing the deficit in the long term.¶ In 2007, the Congressional Budget Office concluded that the Senate’s proposed bipartisan immigration reform would increase the deficit by about $18 billion over 10 years, but would have “a relatively small net effect” on the deficit over 20 years.¶ Here’s how that number breaks down: Direct federal spending on immigrants would cost $23 billion over 10 years, mostly because of Medicaid and refundable tax credits. At the same time, the overhaul would generate $48 billion in new revenue, mostly through increased Social Security taxes.¶ So under the 2007 overhaul, newly legal immigrants would have generated far more revenue than they take in from the government. It’s partly because most undocumented immigrants are working age and wouldn’t immediately incur major Social Security and Medicare costs. It’s also because the 2007 bill required immigrants to pay back taxes and forced them to wait for years before receiving federal benefits.¶ However, the process of implementing reform itself — setting up a legalization process, new enforcement measures, and so forth — carries its own price tag, of $43 billion over 10 years. So ultimately, CBO estimated that the total cost of the 2007 immigration overhaul was $18 billion.¶ How would the math work out now? Since neither Congress nor the White House has actually put out a bill, it’s not clear. But there are a few things that we do know: Obamacare expanded federal health insurance, and an estimated 7 million undocumented immigrants might theoretically qualify for coverage under its provisions, as my colleague Sarah Kliff explains.¶ That could add to the cost of immigration reform, depending on how many ultimately became legal citizens and how long they would have to wait to receive benefits. (Both the White House and the Senate gang agree that undocumented immigrants with provisional legal status wouldn’t qualify for benefits.) At the same time, it could also introduce a large number of younger, healthier people into insurance pools, which could potentially reduce overall insurance costs, says Michael Fix, senior vice-president of the Migration Policy Institute. ”The jury is still really out.”¶ It’s also unclear what the cost of implementation will be: As I’ve reported earlier, we’ve already hit most of the 2007 targets for border security, at the cost of hundreds of millions of dollars. And the Senate Gang of Eight’s plan is vague about what “securing our border” will really mean this time around. Most of the security reforms involve more use of technology, rather than personnel, but the government already has a track record of investing into tech-driven boondoggles in the name of border security.¶ So the price tag of immigration reform will really depend on legislative debate that Congress has begun to wade into. There will be a lot of pressure on Congress to produce a bill that’s either revenue-neutral or will actually reduce the deficit, both by restricting any federal spending on immigrants and limiting the upfront appropriations on implementation.

11. No impact—**no evidence that not passing immigration reform would plunge the economy into economic collapse. There is no evidence that the economy is collapsing now.**

#### 12. Economic decline doesn’t cause war

Tir 10 Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and is an Associate Professor in the Department of International Affairs at the University of Georgia [Jaroslav Tir, “Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict”, The Journal of Politics, 2010, Volume 72: 413-425)]

Empirical support for the economic growth rate is much weaker. The finding that poor economic performance is associated with a higher likelihood of territorial conflict initiation is significant only in Models 3–4.14 The weak results are not altogether surprising given the findings from prior literature. In accordance with the insignificant relationships of Models 1–2 and 5–6, Ostrom and Job (1986), for example, note that the likelihood that a U.S. President will use force is uncertain, as the bad economy might create incentives both to divert the public’s attention with a foreign adventure and to focus on solving the economic problem, thus reducing the inclination to act abroad. Similarly, Fordham (1998a, 1998b), DeRouen (1995), and Gowa (1998) find no relation between a poor economy and U.S. use of force. Furthermore, Leeds and Davis (1997) conclude that the conflict-initiating behavior of 18 industrialized democracies is unrelated to economic conditions as do Pickering and Kisangani (2005) and Russett and Oneal (2001) in global studies. In contrast and more in line with my findings of a significant relationship (in Models 3–4), Hess and Orphanides (1995), for example, argue that economic recessions are linked with forceful action by an incumbent U.S. president. Furthermore, Fordham’s (2002) revision of Gowa’s (1998) analysis shows some effect of a bad economy and DeRouen and Peake (2002) report that U.S. use of force diverts the public’s attention from a poor economy. Among cross-national studies, Oneal and Russett (1997) report that slow growth increases the incidence of militarized disputes, as does Russett (1990)—but only for the United States; slow growth does not affect the behavior of other countries. Kisangani and Pickering (2007) report some significant associations, but they are sensitive to model specification, while Tir and Jasinski (2008) find a clearer link between economic underperformance and increased attacks on domestic ethnic minorities. While none of these works has focused on territorial diversions, my own inconsistent findings for economic growth fit well with the mixed results reported in the literature.15 Hypothesis 1 thus receives strong support via the unpopularity variable but only weak support via the economic growth variable. These results suggest that embattled leaders are much more likely to respond with territorial diversions to direct signs of their unpopularity (e.g., strikes, protests, riots) than to general background conditions such as economic malaise. Presumably, protesters can be distracted via territorial diversions while fixing the economy would take a more concerted and prolonged policy effort. Bad economic conditions seem to motivate only the most serious, fatal territorial confrontations. This implies that leaders may be reserving the most high-profile and risky diversions for the times when they are the most desperate, that is when their power is threatened both by signs of discontent with their rule and by more systemic problems plaguing the country (i.e., an underperforming economy).

## 2NC/1NR

### Turns Relations

#### Immigration reform is critical to US-Latin American relations

Barshefsky and Hill April 12 (Charlene and James T., Chairs Council on Foreign Relations, US-Latin America Relations: A New Direction For a New Reality”)

Some enduring problems stand squarely in the way of partnership and effective cooperation . The inability of Washington to reform its broken immigration system is a constant source of friction between the United States and nearly every other country in the Americas . Yet US officials rarely refer to immigration as a foreign policy issue . Domestic policy debates on this issue disregard the United States’ hemispheric agenda as well as the interests of other nations.

### Uniqueness

#### Immigration will pass – Rubio will get on board

Washington Post 6 – 6 – 13 [Why Marco Rubio is against his own immigration bill — and what it means, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/06/06/why-marco-rubio-is-against-his-own-immigration-bill-and-what-it-means/]

After months of defending immigration reform to conservatives, Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) said earlier this week that, as the bill stands, he won’t vote for it. So, is Rubio’s pronouncement a death knell for the legislation’s chances?

Nope. Rubio’s been saying for weeks that he can’t support the bill in its current form. But that doesn’t mean he’s giving up (as one conservative radio host urged him just yesterday to do). What is worrisome for reformers is that Rubio might embrace a bill that’s too conservative for them.

During the bill markup in the Senate Judiciary Committee, Rubio pushed for an amendment that would require the implementation of a biometric tracking system, among other border-security measures. After the bill passed out of committee without those measures, he put out a statement saying that “work still remains to be done” to “earn the confidence of the American people that we are solving our immigration problems once and for all.”

It was also a few weeks ago that he circulated a memo around the Senate that listed 21 concerns with the bill.

When asked if he would support the legislation as is, Rubio told conservative talk radio host Hugh Hewitt: “If those amendments don’t pass, then I think we’ve got a bill that isn’t going to become law and I think we’re wasting our time. So the answer is no.” But, he added: “If they don’t pass, then we have to keep working to ensure that we get to a bill that can become a law.” (Rubio’s office declined to comment on the Hewitt interview. )

“Gang of Eight” members on both sides of the aisle who are pushing the legislation aren’t panicking — Sens. Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.) and Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) told the Tampa Bay Times that they welcomed Rubio’s efforts to bridge the gap between reformers and conservatives.

That doesn’t mean reform advocates aren’t worried. Rubio’s comments to Hewitt are his most public push yet to move the bill to the ideological right, and some reform advocates whisper that soon the legislation will be so compromised it won’t be worth passing.

They are concerned that Rubio has been supportive of Sen. John Cornyn (R-Tex.), who has introduced an amendment that would trigger a path to citizenship only after 90 percent of illegal-border crossers are caught.

“His public forays drive me a little batty, but I’m less interested in what he says and more interested in what he does,” said Frank Sharry, the executive director of the pro-reform America’s Voice. “It’s really kind of a moment of truth for Rubio: is he gonna let John Cornyn push him into a corner in a way that destabilizes the ‘Gang of Eight?’”

Others are annoyed but still confident.

“Rubio is trying to have it both ways — be seen as a leader on behalf of both immigrants and people who are uncomfortable with immigration,” said AFL-CIO spokesman Jeff Hauser. “At some point, he’ll have to choose, and ultimately we are convinced he will recognize that choosing citizenship for the 11 million is the right political move.”

If the legislation succeeds, Rubio’s efforts will make him look doubly good. With Hispanic voters, he can say he was a key player in the reform’s passage. With conservatives he can say he ensured the bill was heavily girded with enforcement measures.

But Rubio has already expended huge amounts of political capital on immigration reform. To walk away from it now – after risking his standing with conservatives by going on record, repeatedly, in support of a path to citizenship — would make no sense. Nope. Rubio’s been saying for weeks that he can’t support the bill in its current form. But that doesn’t mean he’s giving up (as one conservative radio host urged him just yesterday to do). What is worrisome for reformers is that Rubio might embrace a bill that’s too conservative for them.

#### Will pass – smaller house bills good

Klein 6 – 5 – 13 Washington Post political insider [Ezra Klein, The House won’t have a bipartisan immigration bill. That’s (maybe) okay., http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/06/05/the-house-wont-have-a-bipartisan-immigration-bill-thats-maybe-okay/]

The bipartisan House group that’s been working for years on an immigration bill is about to break up without anything to show for it. ABC News reports that the negotiations crashed on the shoals of whether immigrants would have access to government-subsidized health care during their 15-year path to citizenship. So what comes next? “The House is likely to pass several smaller bills that address immigration reform, but would not include a pathway to citizenship.”

Disaster? Maybe not. There’s a theory going around that that’s actually better for the final bill. The premise is that the purpose of the House process is to get a bill through the House. It could be a good bill. It could be a bad bill. It just has to be a bill. Because once something makes it through the House it will go to conference with the Senate. Once it goes to conference with the Senate, the Senate can force a product that’s more like its bill than the House bill. And once the process is that near to completion, House Republicans will be afraid to kill it. Speaker John Boehner will waive the Hastert rule, it’ll be passed with a bunch of Democratic votes, and President Obama will have something to sign.

Under this theory, anything that keeps the process moving in the House is a good thing. That means the break-up of the bipartisan House group might be a good thing. Whatever came out of the bipartisan group was likely to fail in the broader House. Either it would be too liberal for the Republicans or too conservative for the Democrats. And once it failed, there’d be no replacement. Everyone’s political capital would already be used up.

Letting Republicans break the bill into pieces makes it likelier that some of those pieces will pass. It also makes it easier for Republicans to vent their anger against certain parts of immigration reform — like the path to citizenship — without imperiling the whole bill. It makes it likelier that something, anything, passes the House.

#### Will pass - momentum

Bloomberg 5 – 23 – 13 [Obama Probes Create Immigration Magic as Bill Advances, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-23/obama-probes-create-immigration-magic-as-bill-advances.html]

Interesting Timing

“The timing of all of this is kind of interesting in that it probably took a bit of heat off the markup in the committee - - that doesn’t mean the bill’s not going to face intense scrutiny on the Senate floor,” Democratic strategist Jim Manley said.

“Regardless of all the so-called scandals whirling around, the fact is the immigration bill is about the only thing that’s going to get done this year,” he said.

Republican Senator Jeff Flake of Arizona, a member of the group of eight that wrote the compromise bill as well as the Judiciary Committee that signed off on it, said the scandal fever that has broken out in Washington has “been good” for the legislation, lowering the emotional temperature that has surrounded past failed efforts to make immigration changes.

‘Open Process’

“To be able to go through this markup where nobody can claim that we’ve short-circuited the process -- it’s been an open process, we’ve adopted some substantive amendments -- to be able to do that without people calling press conferences outside and without groups calling members, it’s been a good process,” Flake said in an interview, referring to the Judiciary panel’s actions. “I’d have to say it probably helped.”

The final day of Judiciary’s markup of the bill was a case in point. While former IRS officials testified before the Senate Finance Committee, the panel convened in the building next door for its fifth day of deliberations. Senator Orrin Hatch, a Utah Republican, quietly reached agreement with Democrats on changes to a high-skilled visa program, clearing an impediment to his party’s support for the bill.

“While the discussion on TV continues, the immigration bill marches on, and that’s because of that independent, strong support for the bill -- labor, business, farm groups, it’s incredible,” said Senator Amy Klobuchar of Minnesota, a Democratic member of the committee. “It’s been actually a nice oasis to actually do some legislating during all of the somewhat radioactive news.”

### A2 No PC

#### Obama’s loss of influence hasn’t effected immigration yet

Guardian 5 – 17 – 13 [Beleaguered Obama looks to fight back as critics ask: is he a lame duck already?, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/may/17/barack-obama-beleagured-lame-duck>]

However, there are some who warn that the tides of Obama's political fortunes could turn again. He still wields a lot of power in the White House, including the ability to push an agenda using presidential executive orders.

He is also likely to still be able to pursue his ambitious aim of securing immigration reform as a landmark achievement of his second term to match his healthcare law during his first period in office.

Mindful of demographic changes and the fast-growing power of Hispanic voters, many Republicans are aware that signing up with immigration reform is good politics for their party. They are unlikely to let a desire to win political points over a weakened Obama get in the way of the broader aim of improving their image with Hispanic communities.

"The politics of immigration changed dramatically after the presidential election. That continues to be the case. Both parties want to do it," said Haas.

### Link

#### Plan requires capital and domestic political backlash dooms engagement – sends signal of failure & can undo efforts. Means the link turns the aff.

HAASS & O’SULLIVAN 00 a. VP & Director of Foreign Policy Studies at Brookings, b. Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at Brookings [Richard N. Haass and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies 113, Survival, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 113–35]

Building support at home

Engagement strategies often fail not simply because of disagreements between the US and the country it is engaging, but because American domestic political considerations warp the strategy or make it untenable. Détente between the US and the Soviet Union is the best case in point. Kissinger and Nixon carefully crafted their ‘linkage’ strategy, where the Soviet Union would be offered political and economic incentives in return for restrained behaviour in the strategic arena. This trade-off did encourage Brezhnev to negotiate and sign significant arms-control agreements, and certainly, some of the agreements and the summits at which they were signed accorded the Soviet Union a muchdesired increase in political status. However, Kissinger’s capacity to pursue détente was damaged by the inability of the Nixon administration to deliver pledged trade concessions. While Kissinger and Nixon had promised the Soviet Union MFN trading status in return for its cooperation in other global arenas, they failed to convince Congress of the importance of this deal. As a result, Congress passed the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which linked MFN status to the internal behaviour of the Soviet regime. This move tied the hands of Kissinger and helped undermine the strategy of détente.

Although the strong backing of domestic public opinion will always be valuable to those implementing an engagement strategy, the support of Congress and representatives of key constituencies and businesses is critical to success. Securing support for engagement among these key actors in democratic societies requires intense coordination between various branches of government. As the case of North Korea aptly illustrates, engagement strategies are too often hindered by executive efforts to evade congressional involvement and congressional attempts to thwart executive endeavours. From the perspective of the executive branch, a strength of the Agreed Framework was that it was not a treaty with North Korea. While this technicality spared the agreement from the necessity of Senate ratification, Congress later asserted itself through its reluctance to finance commitments made under the accord. For several reasons, the executive branch should take the lead in implementing engagement strategies. Not only is the articulation of the rationale behind the chosen foreign-policy strategy best handled by the President and his principals, but also the executive branch is uniquely positioned to negotiate with foreign countries and their leaders. However, rather than regarding Congress as an impediment to the smooth implementation of engagement, the president and his advisers need to consider Congress as another partner in a multi-faceted consultation. Ideally, these efforts would go beyond simply briefing Congress about the state of relations with candidates for engagement, to include the appointment of joint executive/congressional delegations and fact-finding missions. In return for such efforts, Congress should recognise that the executive branch needs discretion in order to negotiate with target countries, in the reasonable expectation that it can deliver the incentives it extends.

### A2 Winners Win

#### Winners don’t win – Needs to build trust not alienate

DICKERSON 3 – 21 – 13 CBS Political Director [John Dickerson, How Not to Woo Republicans, <http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2013/03/if_barack_obama_wants_a_grand_bargain_with_republicans_he_needs_to_build.single.html>]

To woo your enemy, do not drop an ox in his soup. That isn’t an ancient maxim, but the idea behind it is so self-evident, I don't need to find Sun Tzu’s version to know it’s true. When you are trying to build trust with someone who does not trust you, don't give them new reasons not to trust you.

President Obama needs to be reminded of this basic truth. When Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu asked him if he was planning to relax after he landed in Israel on Wednesday, Obama replied, "It's good to get away from Congress." House Speaker John Boehner told Jake Tapper in an interview, "So much for the charm offensive."

Oh come on, you're saying. (And if you're not, you should be.) How sensitive a spring flower is John Boehner if he bruises this easily? Is this how inconsequential our politics have become that this overheard line requires comment? Yes, this is exactly what we've been reduced to and we can all meet for a symposium on how small things have become later this summer. (I'll bring the microscope!) But if the president wants to get that big deal he's been talking about, he's going to have to hold his tongue.

The premise of the president's recent outreach to Republicans is that he might be able to build connections that would lead to a grand budget bargain. This relationship relies on trust. Republicans must trust that if they take a political risk to support changes in the tax code that would bring in revenue for deficit reduction—which will hurt them with their supporters—the president won't undermine them further with their voters by making them look like chumps.

This relationship needs to do more than just win their agreement. It needs to be flexible and durable enough to help Republicans build support on their own side. The president’s Republican partners have to make the case for this bargain (still a near-fantasy long shot) to their voters and colleagues who don't trust the president and who only form their opinions about him by watching television.

#### Obama needs allies – influence lower than it was

WSJ 3 - 6 - 13 President Woos GOP to Seek Broad Dealhttp://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323628804578344083964807590.html

Even some Democrats are doubtful that Mr. Obama's latest efforts will bear fruit. Senate Democrats believe the White House had far more leverage at the end of 2012, when Republicans were eager to avoid across-the-board tax increases under what was called the fiscal cliff.

Mr. Obama hosted several gatherings with chief executives to seek input as he tried to reach a budget deal at the end of the year. After he gave a speech last week to CEOs at a Washington hotel, he lingered for nearly an hour for private discussions with the corporate leaders, moving table to table, said someone who was at the gathering.

Senior Obama aides also have held conference calls with the chiefs of several dozen top companies, including Xerox Corp., XRX +0.71% Caterpillar Inc. CAT +0.01% and Boeing Co., BA +2.49% according to participants on the calls.

"The president and his aides realize they need as many allies as they can get for the four years ahead," said one executive who has been in the thick of the recent White House outreach campaign.

### A2 No Internal Link

#### Obama’s capital is critical to overcome those differences to negotiate a deal

Washington Post 5-2 [“Why is immigration going so much better for Obama than the budget”, May 2nd, 2013, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/05/02/why-is-immigration-going-so-much-better-for-obama-than-the-budget/>]

In his news conference on Tuesday, Obama expressed confidence that Congress would overhaul immigration laws – what he said would be an “historic achievement” – while he was less optimistic about whether he could achieve a grand bargain on the debt. Somehow, the election and public opinion more generally have produced two different outcomes. On immigration, Senate Republicans – led by 2016 presidential contender Sen. Marco Rubio (Fla.) – are eager to strike and sell a deal. But they seem content to stand their ground on the budget. Why? The question has prompted much discussion about the structural forces shaping Congress – and Obama’s limited power to overcome them. The conventional thinking is that on immigration, Republicans are in survival mode: They recognize they need Hispanics to win national elections. On the other hand, Republicans do not see much to lose in a budget fight with Obama, and they see much more to lose if they make themselves vulnerable to primary challenges from the right. This argument is elegant in that it looks at the incentives facing Republicans, and to a large degree it is fair. But it’s also an oversimplification. Obama’s role has been more important than it may seem in shaping the political forces in Washington, but the underlying dynamics favoring an immigration deal and auguring against a budget agreement are even stronger than many recognize. In asking why Republicans seem responsive to public opinion on immigration but impervious on the budget, consider the following chart: It’s extremely unlikely that Republicans would be considering an immigration deal in the absence of Obama’s aggressive pursuit of an overhaul. In words and action, Obama forced Republicans to take a position on the issue. He also created space for more voters to support a pathway to citizenship by being quite tough on illegal immigrants facing deportation – often to the displeasure of the Hispanic community. Republicans, including presidential candidate Mitt Romney, staked out a far different position, opposing any pathway to citizenship. Republicans were savaged on Election Day: exit polling showed Obama winning Hispanics by 44 percentage points.

#### Obama spending capital on immigration – fighting to secure votes

Hindustan Times 6 – 11 – 13 [Obama back in fray on immigration reform, <http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/Americas/Obama-back-in-fray-on-immigration-reform/Article1-1074774.aspx>]

US President Barack Obama made an outspoken pitch for a Senate bill on comprehensive immigration reform on Tuesday, branding those opposed to it insincere about fixing a badly broken system.

Obama has gently pushed the bill from behind the scenes for months, fearing his open support would swell the ranks of conservatives who see the bill as offering amnesty to illegal immigrants and who are determined to kill it.

But as the legislation faced a crucial test vote in the Senate, Obama waded into the fray, leveraging the political capital on the issue he won during last year's election campaign, particularly among Hispanic voters.

"This week, the Senate will consider a common-sense, bipartisan bill that is the best chance we've had in years to fix our broken immigration system," Obama said at an event at the White House.

The president also sought to disarm conservative Republicans -- even some who support immigration reform -- who argue that the bill should not be passed without tough new border security measures.

"I know there's a lot of talk right now about border security so let me repeat: today illegal crossings are near their lowest level in decades.

"If passed, the Senate bill, as currently written and as hitting the floor, would put in place the toughest border enforcement plan that America has ever seen. So nobody's taking border enforcement lightly."

Obama also took direct aim at the motives of lawmakers who are opposed to the bill, which was drawn up in the Senate by a bipartisan group of lawmakers known as the "Gang of Eight."

"There's no reason Congress can't get this done by the end of the summer," Obama said, but cast doubt on the motives of those wanting to block the bill.

### A2 Hirsh

#### 1. Hirsh is an indict of the meme of capital – we have warrants specific to the immigration bill.

#### 2. Obama’s working behind the scenes – that’s the 1nc link – here’s academic support

BECKMANN & KUMAR 11 Professor of Political Science, UC, Irvine [Matthew N. Beckmann and Vimal Kumar, How presidents push, when presidents win: A model of positive presidential power in US lawmaking, Journal of Theoretical Politics 2011 23: 3

Fortunately for those inside the West Wing, some researchers paint a more optimistic picture regarding presidents’ potential for passing important planks of their legislative agenda. Covington et al. (1995), Barrett and Eshbaugh-Soha (2007), Edwards III and Barrett (2000), Kellerman (1984), Light (1982), Peterson (1990), and Rudalevige (2002) all observe that presidents secure greater support for their ‘priority’ items, and when they exert ‘effort’ pushing them. In addition, Covington (1987) concludes that White House officials can occasionally win greater support among legislators by working behind the scenes, while Canes-Wrone (2001, 2005) shows that presidents can induce support from a recalcitrant Congress by strategically ‘going public’ when advocating popular proposals (see also Kernell (1993)). Sullivan (1987, 1988) finds that presidents can amass winning congressional coalitions by changing members’ positions as a bill moves through the legislative process.

However, even among these relative optimists, the prescription for presidents appears to be an ephemeral combination of luck and effort, not a systematic strategy. In discussing the challenge for a president looking to push legislation on Capitol Hill, Samuel Kernell offers a comparable assessment. He writes, The number and variety of choices place great demands upon [presidents’] strategic calculation, so much so that pluralist leadership must be understood as an art…an ability to sense ‘right choices’. (Kernell, 1993: 36) Furthermore, the seemingly paradoxical findings noted above, that is, a general (if modest) pattern of president-supported legislative success on passage and policy content, but not on ‘key’ roll-call votes, remain unexplained.

This paper aims to demystify the White House’s legislative strategies, both their logic and their effects. Developing a non-cooperative game in which the president allocates scarce ‘political capital’ to induce changes in legislators’ behavior, we deduce two lobbying strategies White House officials may execute and, in turn, investigate their impact on the laws that result. Interestingly, we theorize that presidents’ foremost influence comes from bargaining with congressional leaders over policy alternatives before bills reach the floor, not bargaining with pivotal voters for their support once they do. Precisely because so much of the presidents’ influence comes in the legislative earlygame (rather than the endgame), we theorize that typical roll-call-based tests of presidents’ legislative influence have missed most of it.

#### 3. Hirsh admits the agenda sometimes works that way

HIRSH 12 – 14 – 12 [Michael Hirsh, Obama Gets a Solution to His Susan Rice Problem, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/whitehouse/obama-gets-a-solution-to-his-susan-rice-problem-20121213>]

It was a classic Washington exit: stealthy and swift, with few fingerprints. President Obama didn’t want to be seen as backing down. So Susan Rice — one of his most devoted aides since 2007 — gave him the way out, seemingly all on her own.

“If nominated, I am now convinced that the confirmation process would be lengthy, disruptive, and costly — to you and to our most pressing national and international priorities,” Rice wrote on Thursday in a letter withdrawing her name from consideration as secretary of State.

In a statement in response, Obama said that “while I deeply regret the unfair and misleading attacks on Susan Rice in recent weeks,” he “accepted her decision.” He added that Rice will continue as his U.N. ambassador for the time being.

This was all the part intended for public consumption. The underlying reality is this: The president is almost certainly furious about this turn of events — which represents the first major defeat he’s suffered since his reelection — but he’s a savvy enough politician to know how to back off without seeming to back down. While floating Rice’s name for secretary of State in the media was always something of a trial balloon — she was never formally nominated or even publicly declared by the administration to be the leading candidate to replace Hillary Rodham Clinton — Obama appeared to really want to appoint her, calling her “extraordinary” and excoriating GOP attacks on her with unusual (for him) personal pique.

But as the weeks passed, it became clearer that Rice’s biggest political problem was no longer just the klatch of Republican senators, led by John McCain, who were fiercely criticizing her for allegedly misleading statements on the attack at the U.S. consulate that killed U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other Americans in Benghazi, Libya on Sept. 11.

After a series of strikingly unsuccessful meetings on Capitol Hill in which she failed to impress even moderate Republicans such as Susan Collins of Maine, Rice also found herself facing resistance from foreign-policy elites who questioned her temperament and her record. In addition, human-rights critics were up in arms over her behavior toward African dictators, particularly her role in allegedly holding up publication of a U.N. report that concluded the government of Rwandan President Paul Kagame, with whom she has a long and close relationship, was supplying and financing a brutal Congolese rebel force known as the M23 Movement.

That may have been the tipping point, though an official on Rice's team declined to say so. As she put it herself in her letter to Obama, the president had some other “pressing national international priorities.… It is far more important that we devote precious legislative hours and energy to enacting your core goals, including comprehensive immigration reform, balanced deficit reduction, job creation, and maintaining a robust national defense and effective U.S. global leadership.”

In other words, the Obama team was quickly coming to realize that, even though it appeared he had considerable leverage over the Republicans following a more-robust-than-thought reelection victory, a Rice nomination was simply going to cost him too much political capital, especially when it came to a long-term budget deal.

### A2 Not Key to Econ

#### Immigration reforms key to the economy

Beadle 12 [Amanda Peterson Beadle, Think Progress, Dec 10, 2012, “Top 10 Reasons Why The U.S. Needs Comprehensive Immigration Reform” <http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2012/12/10/1307561/top-10-reasons-why-the-us-needs-comprehensive-immigration-reform-that-includes-a-path-to-citizenship/>]

1. Legalizing the 11 million undocumented immigrants in the United States would boost the nation’s economy. It would add a cumulative $1.5 trillion to the U.S. gross domestic product—the largest measure of economic growth—over 10 years. That’s because immigration reform that puts all workers on a level playing field would create a virtuous cycle in which legal status and labor rights exert upward pressure on the wages of both American and immigrant workers. Higher wages and even better jobs would translate into increased consumer purchasing power, which would benefit the U.S. economy as a whole. 2. Tax revenues would increase. The federal government would accrue $4.5 billion to $5.4 billion in additional net tax revenue over just three years if the 11 million undocumented immigrants were legalized. And states would benefit. Texas, for example, would see a $4.1 billion gain in tax revenue and the creation of 193,000 new jobs if its approximately 1.6 million undocumented immigrants were legalized. 3. Harmful state immigration laws are damaging state economies. States that have passed stringent immigration measures in an effort to curb the number of undocumented immigrants living in the state have hurt some of their key industries, which are held back due to inadequate access to qualified workers. A farmer in Alabama, where the state legislature passed the anti-immigration law HB 56 in 2011, for example, estimated that he lost up to $300,000 in produce in 2011 because the undocumented farmworkers who had skillfully picked tomatoes from his vines in years prior had been forced to flee the state. 4. A path to citizenship would help families access health care. About a quarter of families where at least one parent is an undocumented immigrant are uninsured, but undocumented immigrants do not qualify for coverage under the Affordable Care Act, leaving them dependent on so-called safety net hospitals that will see their funding reduced as health care reforms are implemented. Without being able to apply for legal status and gain health care coverage, the health care options for undocumented immigrants and their families will shrink. 5. U.S. employers need a legalized workforce. Nearly half of agricultural workers, 17 percent of construction workers, and 12 percent of food preparation workers nationwide lacking legal immigration status. But business owners—from farmers to hotel chain owners—benefit from reliable and skilled laborers, and a legalization program would ensure that they have them. 6. In 2011, immigrant entrepreneurs were responsible for more than one in four new U.S. businesses. Additionally, immigrant businesses employ one in every 10 people working for private companies. Immigrants and their children founded 40 percent of Fortune 500 companies, which collectively generated $4.2 trillion in revenue in 2010—more than the GDP of every country in the world except the United States, China, and Japan. Reforms that enhance legal immigration channels for high-skilled immigrants and entrepreneurs while protecting American workers and placing all high-skilled workers on a level playing field will promote economic growth, innovation, and workforce stability in the United States. 7. Letting undocumented immigrants gain legal status would keep families together. More than 5,100 children whose parents are undocumented immigrants are in the U.S. foster care system, according to a 2011 report, because their parents have either been detained by immigration officials or deported and unable to reunite with their children. If undocumented immigrants continue to be deported without a path to citizenship enabling them to remain in the U.S. with their families, up to 15,000 children could be in the foster care system by 2016 because their parents were deported, and most child welfare departments do not have the resources to handle this increase. 8. Young undocumented immigrants would add billions to the economy if they gained legal status. Passing the DREAM Act—legislation that proposes to create a roadmap to citizenship for immigrants who came to the United States as children—would put 2.1 million young people on a pathway to legal status, adding $329 billion to the American economy over the next two decades. 9. And DREAMers would boost employment and wages. Legal status and the pursuit of higher education would create an aggregate 19 percent increase in earnings for young undocumented immigrants who would benefit from the DREAM Act by 2030. The ripple effects of these increased wages would create $181 billion in induced economic impact, 1.4 million new jobs, and $10 billion in increased federal revenue. 10. Significant reform of the high-skilled immigration system would benefit certain industries that require high-skilled workers. Immigrants make up 23 percent of the labor force in high-tech manufacturing and information technology industries, and immigrants more highly educated, on average, than the native-born Americans working in these industries. For every immigrant who earns an advanced degree in one of these fields at a U.S. university, 2.62 American jobs are created.

### A2 No Impact

#### Decline cause miscalculation and conflict – prefer statistically significant evidence

Royal 10 (Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction – U.S. Department of Defense, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises”, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213–215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre–eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre–eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases**,** as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularlyduring periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self–reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate externalmilitary conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in theuse of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflictat systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic–security debate and deserves more attention.

# Worms DA

## 1NC

#### Ending the trade embargo undermines Cuba’s worm tech exports. Their expertise exist because of financial constraints – not choice

**Ewing 08** [[Ed Ewing](http://www.guardian.co.uk/profile/edewing), “Cuba's organic revolution,” [guardian.co.uk](http://www.guardian.co.uk/), Thursday 3 April 2008 20.02 EDT, pg. http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/apr/04/organics.food

But when the USSR collapsed in 1990/91, Cuba's ability to feed itself collapsed with it. "Within a year the country had lost 80% of its trade," explains the Cuba Organic Support Group (COSG). Over 1.3m tonnes of chemical fertilisers a year were lost. Fuel for transporting produce from the fields to the towns dried up. People started to go hungry. The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (UNFAO) estimated that calorie intake plunged from 2,600 a head in the late 1980s to between 1,000 and 1,500 by 1993.

Radical action was needed, and quickly. "Cuba had to produce twice as much food, with less than half the chemical inputs," according to the COSG. Land was switched from export crops to food production, and tractors were switched for oxen. People were encouraged to move from the city to the land and organic farming methods were introduced.

"Integrated pest management, crop rotation, composting and soil conservation were implemented," says the COSG. The country had to become expert in techniques like worm composting and biopesticides. "Worms and worm farm technology is now a Cuban export," says Dr Stephen Wilkinson, assistant director of the International Institute for the Study of Cuba.

Thus, the unique system of organoponicos, or urban organic farming, was started. "Organoponicos are really gardens," explains Wilkinson, "they use organic methods and meet local needs."  
"Almost overnight," says the COSG, the ministry of agriculture established an urban gardening culture. By 1995 Havana had 25,000 huertos – allotments, farmed by families or small groups – and dozens of larger-scale organoponicos, or market gardens. The immediate crisis of hunger was over.  
Now, gardens for food take up 3.4% of urban land countrywide, and 8% of land in Havana. Cuba produced 3.2m tonnes of organic food in urban farms in 2002 and, UNFAO says, food intake is back at 2,600 calories a day.

Organoponico plaza

A visit to Havana's largest organoponico, the three-hectare Organoponico Plaza, which lies a stone's throw from the city's Plaza de la Revolución and the desk of Raul Castro, confirms that the scheme is doing well. Rows of strikingly neat irrigated raised beds are home to seasonal crops of lettuces, spring onions, chives, garlic and parsley.

Guava and noni fruit trees provide shade around the perimeter, while on the far side compost piles sit next to plastic tunnels used to raise seedlings. Outside in the shop, signs extol the virtues of eating your greens.

The shop is open only on Mondays. Produce is sold by the people who work the garden (they keep 50% of sales, so are motivated to produce a lot) to the people who live nearby. In this case, the organoponico serves an estate that wouldn't look out of place in Tower Hamlets or Easterhouse. Yet inside, butterflies flit and the head gardener, Toni, turns sod like he is digging at Prince Charles's Highgrove estate.

A success then? "In terms of improving the diet of the population it has had a beneficial effect," says Wilkinson.

"And it has been a success in terms of meeting some of the food security needs," he says, "but it has not resolved the problem since the island still imports a great deal of food."

And change is on the horizon, which might be good for living standards, but not be so good for Cuba's commitment to pesticide-free food.  
The US trade embargo is losing its "symbolic meaning", says Julie M Bunck, assistant professor of political science at the University of Louisville and author of Fidel Castro and the Quest for a Revolutionary Culture in Cuba, and as that happens, "Cuba will evolve, embrace the market in some way, begin to produce and buy and sell normally."  
General farming will "most likely" move away from organic methods says Wilkinson. Farming on a large scale after all, he says, has seen a reduction in pesticide and fertiliser use mainly due to "financial constraints, not choice".

#### Worms are key to our planetary survival. Vermicomposting expertise is limited

**Blakemore 10** - Studied ‘VermEcology’ for 30 years and holds qualifications in ecology, computing and permaculture. [Dr. Rob Blakemore, “Wonder Worm to the rescue,” Our World 2.0, July 2, 2010, pg. http://ourworld.unu.edu/en/wonder-worm-to-the-rescue/

Can worms help save the planet? I think so and, before arguing my case, please let me state my position from the start: I am an ecologist. Not just the type of trendy person who faithfully recycles — although I am fashionably green and a semi-vegetarian who tries to recycle as many beer bottles as possible. No, I am also the other, scientific kind.

The science of ecology is generally defined as a study of organisms and their environment, i.e., everything! However, I would be somewhat more categorical and say that it is “The study of organisms, their products whether alive or dead, and their environment” — i.e., even more of everything, including fossil fuels and human endeavour!

An ecologist then, is someone who considers holistic workings of a natural ecosystem in all its complexity and diversity throughout its time-cycle while breaking it down into its component parts and honing in on its few key, controlling entities. Simultaneously practicing as a generalist and as a multi-faceted specialist.   
Deeds of the dirt

The experience of growing up in rural England alongside my grandfather, the village farrier who was also a bee keeper and gardener, as well as my weekend work with farmers and gamekeepers, immersed me in general natural history. This education was formalized by academic degrees in terrestrial and aquatic biology and, for me the key to life, soil ecology. The main movers and shakers in the soil are the living organisms, paramount amongst which is the humble, hidden earthworm.

Here I must air my strong objections to marine biologists such as Sylvia Earle who pointed out after winning the TED 2009 Prize that the oceans make up 70% of the surface of the Earth and the rest is just “dirt”.

Approximately 99.4% of our food and fibre is produced on land and only 0.6% comes from oceans and other aquatic ecosystems combined, [according to FAO](http://www.fao.org/ag/AGL/agll/soilbiod/consetxt.stm). The calorific value obtained from ocean catches, freshwater fishing and aquaculture adds up to just about 10-16% of the current human total. (These figures are slightly skewed for maritime countries like Japan and Iceland but still, more than 80% of our nutrition is terrestrial in origin).

Furthermore, I am sure Dr. Earle accepts that the oceanic ecosystem is wholly dependent upon dissolved nutrients washed down or blown from the soil and is similarly affected by pollution mainly from activity on the land. Her survival depends as much as anyone’s on the “just dirt” part.

Thus it is abysmal that scientific knowledge of the oceans is infinitely deeper than for terrestrial ecosystems. Moreover, Leonardo da Vinci’s observed 500 years ago that “We know more about the movement of celestial bodies than about the soil underfoot” and this still rings true today. The journal Science, realizing that our knowledge is so scant, produced a special 2004 issue entitled [Soils — The Final Frontier](http://www.sciencemag.org/content/vol304/issue5677/#special-issue).

Why waste precious funds and brain resources on the vain discovery of useless planets overhead or new deep-sea species that will still be there tomorrow, while vital unrecognized organisms literally beneath our feet disappear at an increasingly alarming rate and to our peril?

Why are we not concentrating our efforts and valuable resources on protecting and preserving the tangible deeds of our earthly home patch for current and future generations of Earthlings? Where on earth is our Soil Ecology Institute?

Global worming

We talk of greenhouse gasses and global warming yet it is the [lithosphere](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lithosphere), not the oceans nor trees, that acts as the major global carbon sink. This is especially so following the discovery just over a decade ago of [glomalin](http://www.ars.usda.gov/is/ar/archive/sep02/soil0902.htm), a tightly bound organic molecule accounting for an extra 30% of stored soil carbon. (The energy crisis too can be cured by simply tapping freely into subterranean geothermal energy, as recounted in an Our World 2.0 article on this ‘ [red hot power](http://ourworld.unu.edu/en/geothermal-energy/" \t "_self)’.)

Proper management of our arable, pastoral and forest soils is the most practically feasible mechanism to sequester atmospheric carbon without any adverse effects. Atmospheric carbon is entirely recycled via the soil from plants in around 12-20 years — all of this being processed through the intestines of worms.

Vermicomposting of organics and encouraging soil biodiversity by rebuilding humus provides a natural closed-system remedy with neither waste nor loss of productivity.

Down-to-Earth soil species

All manner of dirt and disease always ends up in the sod and consequentially its ecology is naturally robust. Yet, the soil suffers the most profound and significant effects from over-exploitation and faces the greatest threat from erosion, destruction and pollution with artificial chemicals and/or transgenes.

Despite its importance, soil biodiversity is so poorly known that even obvious organisms like the relatively large worms are mostly unclassified. On each field trip I find new species and, of the 10,000 that have been given scientific names thus far (perhaps less than a third of the total), we know something of the ecology about a dozen species.

But what we do know doesn’t look good. Unprecedented loss of species abundance and diversity combined with high extinction rates are bringing Earth into new and uncharted territory. We urgently need triage.

Laboratories crammed with scores of ecologists could study just worms for their whole careers and still we would only progress slightly from our current poor state of knowledge, but our gain would be justifiable and have tangible effects on resolving pressing environmental issues. But this is not the current situation.

Fundamentally we can justify study of soil ecology because it affects all our lives and is a crucially important issue for immediate survival of humans and all other terrestrial organisms. Whereas earthworm specialists are an endangered and rapidly declining breed, some scientists attempt to defend their studies that look at a single crop or pest. In contrast, I would argue that without earthworms there would be no healthy soil in which any healthy crop could develop in the first place.

If we ask “Which group of organisms would cause the most disruption to life support systems on the Earth if lost?” My answer would be that — rather than fish, birds and bees, or humans — it is  the earthworms. They are key links in food chains (not just for fish and fowl), they act as hosts and vectors for diverse symbionts and parasites, and they are the major detritus feeders responsible for soil mineralization and recycling of organic matter. Can other scientists, outside of medicine, claim such importance for their study subject?   
Looking forward to the past

One of the main predictions, highly optimistic, in the revolutionary move into our post-industrial era (see [Alvin Toffler’s The Third Wave](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Third_Wave_%28book%29) for details) was that genetic engineering would provide new production methods and have profound effects on future development. In many ways this has been borne out in medical use and microbial ‘manufacture’ with genetically modified organisms (GMOs) that provide some potential benefit and serve some purpose, albeit at huge cost.

But there are equally large risks. Rather obviously, the main characteristic of life is to reproduce and disperse. The architects of the modified corn, cotton, soy, wheat, rice and spuds are often of exactly the same companies (or at least profit-driven mind-sets) that produced the toxic chemicals that they are now telling us their new GMO technology will replace — just as chemical engineers promised solutions to all our problems previously.

In 1962 Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring first alerted us to risks of agricultural chemical pollution, exacerbated by bioaccumulation in body tissue (especially of invertebrates such as earthworms) and bioconcentration further up the food-chain. But whatever the problem, these chemicals will eventually disperse and decline once production halts.

With biology the reverse is true. Design a plant to be herbicide or insect resistant and it will increase and spread by its own means, by cross-pollination or genetic drift. Case in point is the [illegitimate escape in Japan](http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16827549) of feral oilseed rape ( Brassica napus) genetically modified to resist herbicide that, as with any similar calamity, will continue in an uncontrollable fashion.

Rather than addressing immediate environmental issues per se, much of scientific resources are diverted into molecular studies, mostly for industrial agricultural production, that are inordinately expensive, or into agronomic trials of effective toxic biocide applications. Mostly this is not requested by informed consumers nor by farmers who must rely on the advice of often industry-funded ‘experts’ and extension officers (hopefully not advertisers).

Surprisingly and shamefully, almost zero funding is available for research on organic production ‘alternatives’ that are dismissed as impractical fads. Yet it is their implementation, since the start of the agricultural revolution 10,000 years ago, that has brought us this far.

Let’s not let topsoil slip through our fingers

Topsoil is the most valuable resource upon which civilizations depend. Its rapid loss combined with soil fertility and soil health decline are of greatest immediate concern.

How important is loss of topsoil? Basically without fertile topsoil there is no plant growth and no life on land. How big an issue is loss of topsoil? The 1991 UN funded [Global Survey of Human-Induced Soil Degradation Report](http://www.isric.org/UK/About+ISRIC/Projects/Track+Record/GLASOD.htm) showed significant problems in virtually all parts of the world. Just 11% of the Earth’s terrestrial surface is cultivated and of the total available, approximately 40% of agricultural land is seriously degraded, according to the UN’S 2005 [Millennium Ecosystem Assessment](http://www.millenniumassessment.org/documents/document.300.aspx.pdf) (MEA).

Loss of topsoil has been due to the combined effects of desertification, salinization, erosion, pollution and urban/road or other development activities. In the United States alone it is estimated to cost about $125 billion per year. The MEA, which despite its scope did not consider ‘Soil Systems’ separately, nevertheless ranked land degradation among the world’s greatest environmental challenges, claiming it risked destabilizing societies, endangering food security and increasing poverty. Among the worst affected regions are Central America, where 75% of land is infertile, Africa, where a fifth of soil is degraded, and Asia, where 11% is now unsuitable for farming.

In addition to those pollutants commonly recognized as originating from biocides and fertilizers, there are many other sources — such as antibiotics associated with intensive animal production, plus a ‘cocktail’ of human-processed pollutants like drugs, solvents and synthetic hormones from birth control pills — that all make their way into the environment in an infinite variety of unforeseeable combinations.

Suggested remediation to soil decline and agricultural production are to use GMO crops and other high-tech applications, because there is an assumption that topsoil formation is a centuries-old process that is essentially non-renewable and thus is gone forever. This view is false and there are several examples of methods that can be applied to restore fertile topsoils to farms, and in a time frame as short as a matter of a few years.

Feed the worm

“When the question is asked, ‘Can I build top-soil?’ the answer is ‘Yes’, and when the first question is followed by a second question, ‘How?’ the answer is ‘Feed earthworms’,” so wrote Eve Balfour in the introduction to Thomas J. Barrett’s book, Harnessing the Earthworm.

Indeed there are many instances of organic farms around the world preserving or restoring healthy soils. Organic farming has many approaches, with Rudolph Steiner’s biodynamics being one manifestation. All these solutions comfortably find a home under the wide umbrella of permaculture, as defined by Bill Mollison. This philosophy and approach to designing our natural environment for efficient and effective production and for comfortable living under prevailing conditions is well known and widely adopted by national and local communities and individuals worldwide.

William Blake urged us “[t]o see a world in a grain of sand and a heaven in a wildflower”. Soil survey of  the abundance and diversity of earthworms in a soil will provide a good measure of natural fertility, as these are the monitors and mediators of soil health.  That some of our honourable predecessors appreciated the worm’s role is manifest by one translation of the Chinese characters for ‘earthworms’ being ‘angels of the earth’.

Seeing a worm turned up by the plough and eaten by a bird started Prince Siddhartha (Gautama Buddah) on his contemplative path to understanding the Cycle-of-Life. In the Classical world, the ‘father of biology’, Aristotle, called earthworms the “soil’s entrails” and it is reported that Cleopatra decreed them sacred.

Charles Darwin, British naturalist and father of evolution, also had an interest in earthworms. In 1881, the year before he died, his 40 year study culminated in publication The Formation of Vegetable Mould through the Action of Worms. As a founder of soil ecology, he was one of the first scientists to give credence to conventional wisdom from earlier civilizations about the beneficial effects of earthworms on soils and plant growth, and thus on human survival.

Believing his worm work one of his most crucial contributions, Darwin   
stated:

“It may be doubted whether there are many other animals which have played so important a part in the history of the world, as have these lowly organized creatures…

“The vegetable mould [humus] which covers, as with a mantle, the surface of the land, has all passed many times through their bodies.”

Hopefully it will continue thus.

In 1981, as a centennial tribute to Darwin’s seminal work, I completed a survey on Lady Eve Balfour’s [Haughley experimental farm](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haughley_Experiment) that showed organic methods encourage healthy soil and an earthworm abundance. Significantly higher maintenance of temperature, moisture and organic matter in the soil equated with double the carbon content. In this way we could readily fix runaway CO2 in the atmosphere. Moreover, crop production was equable between organic and non-organic management regimes, even without factoring in the cost savings in chemicals and environmental degradation. (Details are [presented here](http://bio-eco.eis.ynu.ac.jp/eng/database/earthworm/Haughley%5CHaughley.pdf).)

Look up to the worm

My thesis is that each of the three major interlinked influences on our world – mass extinction of species due mainly to human activity, global warming from excessive anthropogenic generated carbon, and risk of social and political dysfunction from impending resource and food shortages caused by population pressure — can all be redressed by educating people (and politicians!) about restoring soil health and fertility. One way to start is to re-process organic ‘wastes’ via worms, for a natural compost fertilizer.

## 2AC

1. **No link – No shift back to petrochemicals**

**Van Cleef 00** [Lisa Van Cleef, “The Big Green Experiment: Cuba's Organic Revolution,” [San Francisco Chronicle](http://www.sfgate.com), “Wednesday, March 15, 2000, pg. http://yeoldeconsciousnessshoppe.com/art9.html

Cuba's advanced organic farming techniques have led to major cultural shifts as many city-dwellers have become farmers. But what happens when the Cuban economy shifts and the embargo is lifted? Now that they are such capable organic growers, will they revert to chemical farming? Rieux says no.

"Yes, there are people who believe some of the gardeners will revert to the old practices, but many people will still farm organically. Even when the embargo lifts, the small farmer will make more money organically because he spends so little. He's not going to start buying chemicals. He won't have to. He has the knowledge now.

#### No Internal link – Worms will survive whether or not the Cubans use them for vermicomposting, their impact evidence says that the only thing that could possibly threaten global worm extinction is runaway warming.

1. **India will lead – Cuban expertise not needed**

**Rajendran et al. 08** – Professor of Zoology @Vivekananda College [P. Rajendran, E. Jayakumar, Sripathi Kandula & P. Gunasekaran “Vermiculture and Vermicomposting Biotechnology for Organic Farming and Rural Economic Development,” Eco Web, February 2008, pg. http://www.eco-web.com/edi/080211.html

Vermiculture and vermicomposting technology is easy to practice, ecologically safe, economically sound and can create more employment opportunities for the rural people to upgrade their standard of living. At present Vermiculture technology is all set to emerge as a big business of the next century. The organic manure obtained from different waste materials using this versatile technique will avoid pollution problems to a greater extent. India being agriculture based country, it could easily produce millions of tones of Vermicompost, and considerably reduce the use of chemical fertilizers.

1. **The environment is resilient --- has withstood massive destruction.**

Gregg **Easterbrook**, **1995**. Distinguished Fellow, Fullbright Foundation. A Moment on Earth pg 25.

IN THE AFTERMATH OF EVENTS SUCH AS LOVE CANAL OR THE Exxon Valdez oil spill, every reference to the environment is prefaced with the adjective "fragile." "Fragile environment" has become a welded phrase of the modern lexicon, like "aging hippie" or "fugitive financier." But the notion of a fragile environment is profoundly wrong. Individual animals, plants, and people are distressingly fragile. **The environment** that contains them **is close to indestructible.** The living environment of Earth has survived ice ages; bombardments of cosmic radiation more deadly than atomic fallout; solar radiation more powerful than the worst-case projection for ozone depletion; thousand-year periods of intense volcanism releasing global air pollution far worse than that made by any factory; reversals of the planet's magnetic poles; the rearrangement of continents; transformation of plains into mountain ranges and of seas into plains; fluctuations of ocean currents and the jet stream; 300-foot vacillations in sea levels; shortening and lengthening of the seasons caused by shifts in the planetary axis; collisions of asteroids and comets bearing far more force than man's nuclear arsenals; and the years without summer that followed these impacts. Yet hearts beat on, and petals unfold still. Were the environment fragile it would have expired many eons before the advent of the industrial affronts of the dreaming ape. Human assaults on the environment, though mischievous, are pinpricks compared to forces of the magnitude nature is accustomed to resisting.

## 2NC/1NR

### A2 No Shift Back

#### Concessions on the embargo places Cuban organics at risk

**Barclay 03** [Eliza Barclay, “Cuba's security in fresh produce,” Food First, September 12th, 2003, pg. http://www.foodfirst.org/node/1208

Faced with the possibility of widespread starvation, the Cuban government foresaw that a full-scale mobilization of domestic resources, both human and natural, would be required in order to increase production to meet the demands of a hungry populace. And with few options to import food given the stringency of the U.S. embargo, Cuba turned over a new leaf by converting almost entirely to an organic production system within 10 years.

Cuba's nationwide commitment to food self-sufficiency without reliance on chemical or mechanical technologies has borne some startlingly successful results, not only in terms of food production but also in the development of a more personalized food culture, woven deeply into patterns of food consumption, nutrition, and community.

These trends, which many sustainable agriculture experts enthusiastically champion, also appear to be on the brink of a major confrontation with the powerful forces of the global market, from which Cuba was virtually exempt until 2001, when U.S. policy toward agricultural exports to Cuba began to shift slightly. The strength of Cuba’s food security, with all its growing bureaucratic and market support, will inevitably be put to the test as small but increasing concessions are made to expand trade between Cuba and its closest potential trading partner, the United States.

### A2 Cuba Not Needed (India)

#### Cuba is the model for vermicomposting. Their transition is driven by the embargo

**Project Censored 10** [“Cuba Leads the World in Organic Farming,” Apr 30, 2010, pg. http://www.projectcensored.org/top-stories/articles/12-cuba-leads-the-world-in-organic-farming/

Cuba has developed one of the most efficient organic agriculture systems in the world, and organic farmers from other countries are visiting the island to learn the methods.

Due to the U.S. embargo, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuba was unable to import chemicals or modern farming machines to uphold a high-tech corporate farming culture. Cuba needed to find another way to feed its people. The lost buying power for agricultural imports led to a general diversification within farming on the island. Organic agriculture has become key to feeding the nation’s growing urban populations.

Cuba’s new revolution is founded upon the development of an organic agricultural system. Peter Rosset of the Institute for Food and Development Policy states that this is “the largest conversion from conventional agriculture to organic or semi-organic farming that the world has ever known.” Not only has organic farming been prosperous, but the migration of small farms and gardens into densely populated urban areas has also played a crucial role in feeding citizens. State food rations were not enough for Cuban families, so farms began to spring up all over the country. Havana, home to nearly 20 percent of Cuba’s population, is now also home to more than 8,000 officially recognized gardens, which are in turn cultivated by more than 30,000 people and cover nearly 30 percent of the available land. The growing number of gardens might seem to bring up the problem of space and price of land. However, “the local governments allocate land, which is handed over at no cost as long as it is used for cultivation,” says S. Chaplowe in the Newsletter of the World Sustainable Agriculture Association.

The removal of the “chemical crutch” has been the most important factor to come out of the Soviet collapse, trade embargo, and subsequent organic revolution. Though Cuba is organic by default because it has no means of acquiring pesticides and herbicides, the quality and quantity of crop yields have increased. This increase is occurring at a lower cost and with fewer health and environmental side effects than ever. There are 173 established ‘vermicompost’ centers across Cuba, which produce 93,000 tons of natural compost a year. The agricultural abundance that Cuba is beginning to experience is disproving the myth that organic farming on a grand scale is inefficient or impractical.

So far Cuba has been successful with its “transformation from conventional, high input, mono-crop intensive agriculture” to a more diverse and localized farming system that continues to grow. The country is rapidly moving away from a monoculture of tobacco and sugar. It now needs much more diversity of food crops as well as regular crop rotation and soil conservation efforts to continue to properly nourish millions of Cuban citizens.

In June 2000, a group of Iowa farmers, professors, and students traveled to Cuba to view that country’s approach to sustainable agriculture. Rather than relying on chemical fertilizers, Cuba relies on organic farming, using compost and worms to fertilize soil. There are many differences between farming in the United States and Cuba, but “in many ways they’re ahead of us,” say Richard Wrage, of Boone County Iowa Extension Office. Lorna Michael Butler, Chair of Iowa State University’s sustainable agriculture department said, “more students should study Cuba’s growing system.” (AP 6/5/00)

### A2 No Impact

#### Vermicomposting will preserve the ecological balance

**Rajendran et al. 08** – Professor of Zoology @Vivekananda College [P. Rajendran, E. Jayakumar, Sripathi Kandula & P. Gunasekaran “Vermiculture and Vermicomposting Biotechnology for Organic Farming and Rural Economic Development,” Eco Web, February 2008, pg. http://www.eco-web.com/edi/080211.html

Sujatha *et al.* (2003) reported earthworm castings in the home garden often contains 5 to 11 times more Nitrogen, Phosphorous and Potassium than the surrounding soil. Castings of earthworm also contain abundant sources vitamins, antibiotics and enzymes such as proteases, amylases, lipases, cellulases and chitinases. Vermicompost technology can provide employment to millions of youth, can eliminate dependence on chemicals; can convert wastes into fertilizer; can bring waste land under cultivation, can feed hungry citizen and can make a country green and prosperous in a span of just a few years (Shewta *et al.,* 2004). This technique also helps to conserve the biodiversity, which is the need of the hour. Apart from providing self-employment opportunities for the weaker section and profitable agricultural waste utilization it will also help in maintaining the environmental/ecological balance.

**Global collapse triggers wars, spreads epidemics and destroys trade**

**Ehrlich & Ehrlich 13** – Professor of Biology & Senior Research Scientist in Biology @ Stanford University [Paul R. Ehrlich (President of the Center for Conservation Biology @ Stanford University) & Anne H. Ehrlich, “Can a collapse of global civilization be avoided?,” Proceedings of the Royal Society Biological Sciences, Proc. R. Soc. B 2013 280, published online 9 January 2013

Virtually every past civilization has eventually **undergone collapse**, a loss of socio-political-economic complexity usually accompanied by a **dramatic decline in population size** [1]. Some, such as those of Egypt and China, have recovered from collapses at various stages; others, such as that of Easter Island or the Classic Maya, were apparently permanent [1,2]. All those previous collapses were local or regional; elsewhere, other societies and civilizations persisted unaffected. Sometimes, as in the Tigris and Euphrates valleys, new civilizations rose in succession. In many, if not most, cases, overexploitation of the environment was one proximate or an **ultimate cause** [3].

But today, for the first time, humanity’s global civilization—the worldwide, increasingly interconnected, highly technological society in which we all are to one degree or another, embedded—is threatened with collapse by an array of environmental problems. Humankind finds itself engaged in what Prince Charles described as ‘an act of suicide on a grand scale’ [4], facing what the UK’s Chief Scientific Advisor John Beddington called a ‘**perfect storm**’ of environmental problems [5]. The most serious of these problems show signs of rapidly escalating severity, especially climate disruption. But other elements could potentially also contribute to a collapse: an accelerating extinction of animal and plant populations and species, which could lead to a loss of ecosystem services essential for human survival; land degradation and land-use change; a pole-to-pole spread of toxic compounds; ocean acidification and eutrophication (dead zones); worsening of some aspects of the epidemiological environment (factors that make human populations susceptible to infectious diseases); depletion of increasingly scarce resources [6,7], including especially groundwater, which is being overexploited in many key agricultural areas [8]; and resource wars [9]. These are not separate problems; rather they interact in two gigantic complex adaptive systems: the biosphere system and the human socio-economic system. The negative manifestations of these interactions are often referred to as ‘the human predicament’ [10], and determining how to prevent it from generating a global collapse is perhaps the foremost challenge confronting humanity.

The human predicament is driven by overpopulation, overconsumption of natural resources and the use of unnecessarily environmentally damaging technologies and socio-economic-political arrangements to service Homo sapiens’ aggregate consumption [11–17]. How far the human population size now is above the planet’s long-term carrying capacity is suggested (conservatively) by ecological footprint analysis [18–20]. It shows that to support today’s population of seven billion sustainably (i.e. with business as usual, including current technologies and standards of living) would require roughly half an additional planet; to do so, if all citizens of Earth consumed resources at the US level would take four to five more Earths. Adding the projected 2.5 billion more people by 2050 would make the human assault on civilization’s life-support systems disproportionately worse, because almost everywhere people face systems with **nonlinear responses** [11,21–23], in which environmental damage increases at a rate that becomes faster with each additional person. Of course, the claim is often made that humanity will expand Earth’s carrying capacity dramatically with technological innovation [24], but it is widely recognized that technologies can both add and subtract from carrying capacity. The plough evidently first expanded it and now appears to be reducing it [3]. Overall, careful analysis of the prospects does not provide much confidence that technology will save us [25] or that gross domestic product can be disengaged from resource use [26]

2. Do current trends portend a collapse?

What is the likelihood of this set of interconnected predicaments [27] leading to a global collapse in this century? There have been many definitions and much discussion of past ‘collapses’ [1,3,28–31], but a future global collapse does not require a careful definition. It could be triggered by anything from a ‘small’ nuclear war, whose ecological effects could quickly end civilization [32], to a more gradual breakdown because **famines, epidemics and resource shortages** cause a disintegration of central control within nations, in concert with **disruptions of trade and conflicts** over increasingly scarce necessities. In either case, regardless of survivors or replacement societies, the world familiar to anyone reading this study and the well-being of the vast majority of people would disappear. pg. 1-2