# 1AC

## Plan/Solvency

### Plan

The United States Federal Government should offer to the Government of Venezuela to remove sanctions against Petroleos de Venezuela if the Government of Venezuela agrees to implement economic reforms designed to increase economic freedom.

### Solvency

#### Plan solves – Now is the key time to use leverage to change internal Venezuelan policy, only more economic freedom can address the problems in Venezuela

Roberts 13 (James Roberts, master’s degree in international and development economics from Yale University and also holds a master of business administration from the University of Pittsburgh, Research Fellow For Economic Freedom and Growth, Center for International Trade and Economics (CITE), and Sergio Daga, Visiting Senior Policy Analyst, Center for International Trade and Economics (CITE) “Venezuela: U.S. Should Push President Maduro Toward Economic Freedom,” Issue Brief #3911, 4-15-13)

Hugo Chavez’s hand-picked successor, former trade union boss Nicolás Maduro, appears to have defeated Governor Henrique Capriles by a narrow margin in a contentious and hard-fought special election on April 14. Venezuela is in such shambles after 14 years of seat-of-the-pants mismanagement that Maduro—assuming his victory is confirmed—may ultimately be forced to pursue more moderate policies and seek help from the U.S. to restore stability. The Obama Administration and Congress should exploit this opening by using U.S. leverage to push Venezuela to turn from Chavez’s failed experiment in oil-cursed[1] “21st-century socialism” toward economic freedom. An Economy in Ruins The foundations of economic freedom in Venezuela have crumbled. When Chavez took office in 1999, Venezuela scored 54 out of 100 possible points in The Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal’s annual Index of Economic Freedom. Today, however, after 14 years of Chavez’s soft authoritarian populism, Venezuela merits a score of just 36 points. This nearly 20-point plunge is among the most severe ever recorded by a country in the history of the Index. Its 2013 rank—174th out of 179 countries—places Venezuela among the most repressed nations in the world.[2] Venezuela’s dismal economic freedom score is reflected in statistics that translate into real-time hardship for Venezuelans, who must spend more of their incomes on higher prices for necessities—if they can find them on empty store shelves. There are scarcities of nearly all staple food and fuel products. In fact, according to the Banco Central of Venezuela’s (BCV) shortages index, Venezuela faces the most severe food shortages in four years.[3] And what food is available comes at a price: Mary O’Grady reports in The Wall Street Journal that “over the past 10 years inflation in food and nonalcoholic beverages is 1,284%.”[4] Financial disequilibrium in Venezuela is the result of a sharply widening fiscal deficit that reached almost 15 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) last year.[5] Government control of the formerly independent BCV also contributed to a massive expansion of the money supply. There are anecdotal reports in Caracas of people paying as much as 23 bolívars for one U.S. dollar in the black market as of early April. The official rate is just 6.3 bolívars per dollar—and that is after a significant 32 percent devaluation in February.[6] These problems were aggravated by Chavez’s foreign adventurism—which drained billions of petrodollars from the economy to keep afloat the failed economy in Fidel Castro’s Cuba—as well as generous subsidies to his Chavista cronies in the region through such schemes as ALBA and PetroCaribe. Corruption and Weak Rule of Law As reported in the Index, political interference in Venezuela’s judicial system has become routine, and corruption is rampant. The landscape in Caracas and elsewhere in the country is littered with half-finished, publicly funded infrastructure and housing projects. The government funds needed to complete them often disappear. As government expanded under Chavez, corruption became institutionalized. Chavez doubled the size of the public sector, many of whose 2.4 million[7] employees have no real job other than to work to keep the regime in power. A World Economic Forum (WEF) survey found little trust among businesses, politicians, the judicial system, and the police in Venezuela.[8] The tragic result is that Venezuela is now one of the most dangerous countries of the world. According to the Venezuelan Violence Observatory, in 2012 nearly 22,000 people were murdered.[9] An inefficient and non-transparent regulatory environment that is hostile to private foreign direct investment obstructs long-term development and hampers entrepreneurial growth. The investment regime is tightly controlled by the state and favors investors from China, Russia, Iran, and other democracy-challenged countries.[10] Investor protection in Venezuela is ranked at 140 out of 144 countries, according to the WEF report.[11] In 1998, before Chavez took power, there were more than 14,000 private industrial companies in Venezuela; in 2011, after 13 years of extensive nationalizations and expropriations, only about 9,000 remained.[12] The Chavez government did make one product very inexpensive for Venezuelans: Generous energy subsidies mean a car can be filled up with 15 gallons of gasoline for less than one U.S. dollar.[13] Although that might buy short-term political advantage for the Chavista government, in the long term these energy subsidies are very destructive to future economic growth, since Venezuelan companies have a distorted cost base and thus cannot compete globally. Operations of the state oil company, PDVSA, have also deteriorated significantly under Chavez. When he took office, PDVSA was producing 3.5 million barrels per day (bbl/d); today, it is down to 2.5 bbl/d.[14] Social Programs and Inequality Ironically, Chavez’s years in power did not result in much reduction of poverty and inequality. Although some measures of income inequality (such as the Gini coefficient) did improve under Chavez,[15] according to a recently published research paper by Darryl McLeod and Nora Lustig[16] that used data for 18 Latin American countries, market democracies such as Chile and Brazil were far more successful at reducing inequality and poverty than the populist Chavista regimes. Despite its vast oil wealth, Venezuela’s economic growth performance has also been poor. Between 1999 and 2012, average annual per capita growth was just 1.1 percent, while in the top four Latin American countries (Panama, Peru, the Dominican Republic, and Chile) the rate was 3.6 percent.[17] Not surprisingly, the rate of private investment in Venezuela—under 5 percent—is also one of the lowest in the region. In Peru and Chile, it is almost 20 percent.[18] U.S. Policy Toward the New Maduro Government Washington should insist on strict conditionality before sending a new U.S. ambassador to Caracas or assenting to any new lending to Venezuela by international financial institutions until the new government: Produces a comprehensive plan for reform that reduces the size of the public sector, reverses nationalizations and expropriations of land and enterprises with just compensation to owners, restores the independence of the central bank and judicial institutions, reforms the electoral system, and submits to an internationally supervised audit of the government’s books during the Chavez years; Takes steps to privatize PDVSA to bring in international equity partners with the expertise and financial capacity to restore PDVSA to the high level of professional operational and managerial expertise for which it was widely respected prior to 1999; Immediately stops all subsidies to Cuba and terminates wasteful and economically destabilizing subsidy programs such as PetroCaribe and ALBA; Ceases cooperation with international state sponsors of terrorism (such as Iran) and joins the international community’s cooperative efforts in the fight against transnational crime, narco-trafficking, and terrorism; and Restores freedom of the press and access to information for all Venezuelans. Use U.S. Leverage The foundations of economic freedom in Venezuela were severely weakened during the 14-year misrule by Chavez. Although Chavez’s death may aggravate instability and further polarize Venezuela, it need not be that way. Venezuela is in need of immediate and sweeping reforms, but these changes will take time, effort, determination, and, above all, dedicated reformers in Venezuela. The Obama Administration should step into the breach with active and forward-looking policies to bring Venezuela back into the globalized economic system.

## Relations

### 1AC: Relations

#### Advantage: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Relations

#### US has no diplomatic ties with Venezuela – relations are at a cross-roads

RT News 13 (“Venezuela threatens oil, trade in continuing election spat with US,” 4-23-13,

http://rt.com/news/venezuela-threatens-us-oil-238/

In response to remarks from US Assistant Secretary of State Roberta Jacobson, Venezuelan Foreign Minister Elias Jaua warned that any sanctions imposed by the US for its April 14 presidential ballot would be met with punitive oil and trade measures. Over the weekend Jacobson commented on CNN en Espanol, stating that the Venezuelan state moved too quickly in proclaiming Nicolás Maduro its new president in light of tight electoral results, and that half of the country’s public rejected the results. When Jacobson was asked whether the US would go so far as to impose sanctions if Venezuela refused to recount poll results, she could not confirm or deny the possibility. In response to Jacobson’s remarks, Foreign Minister Jaua said that his country held the US responsible for the violence that followed the election and has so far left eight people dead. He added that Venezuela would respond in kind to any US sanctions. Maduro was sworn in as president last Friday at a ceremony widely attended by South American leaders, including Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff and the presidents of Argentina and Cuba. No US diplomat attended the ceremony. Since the election results were tallied the US State Department has supported the idea of a recount, which has been a demand of opposition candidate Henrique Capriles and his Justice First party. The notion of a full or partial recount has been the subject of much back-and-forth debate, though last Thursday the country’s electoral board (Consejo Nacional Electoral) indicated that it would support an audit. Since then, however, the electoral body seems to have retracted its support for an audit. The board’s president, Tibisay Lucena, criticized as an ally of the incumbent party, told domestic media that no one should have “false expectations” regarding the results of a potential audit, and reiterated that as far as the board was concerned the vote’s results were final and irreversible. Officially, the US has yet to accept the results of Venezuela’s presidential election, where Maduro was reported to hold 51 per cent of the vote to Capriles’ 49 per cent.

#### Venezuela is willing to work with the United States, High-Level diplomatic exchanges are crucial to overall cooperation

AFP 13 (Agence France Presse, “Venezuela’s new government ‘open’ to resuming U.S. diplomatic relations,” 5-19-13, <http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2013/05/19/venezuelas-new-government-open-to-resuming-u-s-diplomatic-relations/>)

Venezuela on Sunday made a rare diplomatic overture to the United States, suggesting it could be time for better ties. “We are going to remain open to normalizing relations with the United States,” Foreign Minister Elias Jaua said on Televen television Sunday. “The first thing would be to resume diplomatic representation at the highest level,” he said. The country’s late socialist president Hugo Chavez was a staunch critic of the United States, and his successor Nicolas Maduro is still feeling out its footing with Washington. Chavez for more than 14 years unleashed verbal broadsides on US leaders before his death in March. The United States and Venezuela since 2010 have not even had ambassadors in their embassies in their respective capitals. Maduro, who earlier said his government would like to increase dialogue with the United States, has selected lawmaker Calixto Ortega as its potential US envoy. US President Barack Obama however has not congratulated Maduro for his controversial, razor-thin April 14 election, as Maduro’s opposition rival Henrique Capriles presses claims that the Venezuelan presidential election was marred by irregularities. Maduro meanwhile slammed Obama “the top leader of devils” after he commented on post-election unrest in Venezuela.

#### Plan will boost U.S. standing in important Latin American energy forums

Delahunt 12 --- chairman of the Venezuela-US Friendship Group and retired U.S. Representative (10/30/2012, William, “A new role for the US and Venezuela,” <http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2012/10/30/podium-venezuela/EJ6Jd2yRKfaJ76HYrXb4WJ/story.html>)

The recent election in Venezuela offers an opportunity to improve the US-Venezuela bilateral relationship. On Oc. 7th, President Hugo Chavez was reelected to a new six-year term by a nine point margin. I — along with hundreds of other international witnesses — was duly impressed with the transparency of the electoral process and the enthusiasm of Venezuelans for democracy. Eighty-one percent percent of registered voters went to the polls! This turnout was remarkable when compared to the United States and other “mature” democracies. Whether or not one agrees with Chávez’s policies, there can be no doubt that he won these elections fairly. There are so many checks and balances in the electoral system in Venezuela that there is virtually no room for fraud. The voter registry, the voting machines, the electronic ballot and the data transmission system are all fully audited by representatives of all the different political parties and independent observers. Former President Jimmy Carter recently called the Venezuelan voting system “the best in the world.” He noted that the voting machines print out a paper receipt that voters can look at to verify that their selection was recorded correctly, and poll workers check those receipts against the electronic tally. I was particularly struck by the atmosphere of peacefulness and mutual respect in the voting centers, where monitors from both pro-government and opposition groups were present. In contrast with elections past, the two main candidates manifested a similar attitude. Once the election authorities announced the results, opposition candidate Henrique Capriles rapidly conceded defeat, and he quickly scolded “radical” opposition supporters who insisted on alleging that fraud had taken place, despite no evidence to support their claims. Chávez also behaved gracefully, calling Capriles the following day to express his willingness to work together to mitigate the polarization that divided Venezuelans. Most of Venezuela’s political leadership — following a tumultuous power struggle, during which a coup d’Etat and violent protests occurred — appear to have accepted to follow the democratic rulebook and be more tolerant of one another. This is an important step forward, and the United States should encourage Venezuelans to continue seeking common ground, rather than support one group over another, as has at times been the case in recent years. Most importantly, over 55 percent of Venezuelan voters cast their vote in favor of Chávez. The United States should respect this outcome and seek to improve relations in areas where we can agree. Commercial relations between our two countries have generally been excellent, despite political differences, and both countries would greatly benefit from their expansion. Venezuela will no doubt continue to play a central role in the region’s new multilateral cooperation and consultation mechanisms, such as the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the Community of Central American and Caribbean States (CELAC). The United States, which has increasingly found itself isolated in regional forums, would do well to find ways to work with these new groups on important issues such as drug trafficking and energy cooperation. Improved relations with Venezuela would greatly facilitate this task. Our government will certainly have important differences with Venezuela, particularly in the area of international relations. But we can agree to disagree, as we do with many other partners throughout the world. I am convinced that the Venezuelan government is prepared to respond favorably to such an initiative.

#### US-Latin American Energy policy dialogue is key to stop Amazon Deforestation

Zedillo et al 08 Commission Co-Chair for the Brookings Institute Report on the Partnership for the Americas and former President of Mexico [Ernesto Zedillo, Thomas R. Pickering, etc, Rethinking U.S.–Latin American Relations A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World. Report of the Partnership for the Americas Commission, The Brookings Institution, November 2008, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2008/11/24%20latin%20america%20partnership/1124_latin_america_partnership.PDF>]

To expand the hemisphere’s energy capacity, massive infrastructure investments will be required. Major investments in oil production (especially deep offshore), refining, and distribution will be needed to achieve the region’s potential. Developing the Tupi project in Brazil alone will cost $70–240 billion. Liquefied natural gas will become an important source of energy, but not before major investments are made in infrastructure to support liquefaction, regasification, transport, and security. U.S. and Canadian electricity networks, which are already highly integrated, can be further integrated with Mexico’s. Mexico also plans to connect its grid to those of Guatemala and Belize, eventually creating an integrated power market in Central America. Power integration in South America will demand even larger investments in generation, transmission, and distribution. Finally, reliance on nuclear power may grow because it is carbon free and does not require fossil fuel imports. However, efforts to expand energy capacity and integrate hemispheric energy markets face a variety of obstacles. Energy nationalism has led to disruptive disputes over pricing and ownership. Tensions and mistrust in South America have hindered regional cooperation and investment, particularly on natural gas. The security of the energy infrastructure, especially pipelines, remains a concern in Mexico and parts of South America. Gas, oil, and electricity subsidies distort patterns of production and consumption, and they are triggering protectionist behavior elsewhere. Technology on renewables remains underdeveloped, and research in this area can be better centralized and disseminated. Overcoming these obstacles will require high levels of cooperation among hemispheric partners. In addition to developing carbon-neutral sources of energy, the Western Hemisphere has other roles to play in combating climate change. The LAC region currently accounts for about 5 percent of annual global carbon emissions, and emissions per capita are still relatively low compared with other regions. However, minimizing the LAC region’s future carbon footprint will require new policies. Also, deforestation globally accounts for 20 percent of greenhouse gas emissions. The Amazon River Basin contains one of the world’s three most important rainforests, whose protection can therefore very significantly contribute to combating climate change. Brazil is pioneering the use of information technology to lessen deforestation in the Amazon.

#### Extinction

**O’Neal 97** (Martin, “Rain Forest Depletion,” 5-5, http://www.northern.wvnet.edu/~tdanford/bio1/RAINFO.htm)

There are some really amazing facts about the Amazon rain forest. The Amazon alone covers 54% of all the world’s rain forests, thus **making it literally the lungs of the Earth**. We can say this because trees produce oxygen while they use carbon dioxide to maintain their respiration. Rain forests cover about 7% of the Earth’s surface, but host about 50-90% of the plant and animal population of the entire world. The Amazon River has more species of fish than the entire Atlantic Ocean does. In less than 25 acres of rain forest there are more species of trees than the entire continent of North America. A tree found in Peru was found to be the host to 43 different species of ants. There are more species of birds on a Peru reserve than the entire United States has. A fact that is very highly regarded about the Amazon rain forest is that of the 3000 species of plants that have been discovered there, 70% of these plants have anti-cancerous properties. Also, 25% of these plants are now used to combat cancer. So as humankind continues to harvest the Amazon rain forest which covers 1.2 million acres and 9 countries, they should also try to consider the devastating effects that it is having on our race along with all the biological effects that it also carries. Although 1.2 million acres seems like a very large number, in the past four decades that number was reduced in half to the current figure, so we see that this can not keep happening with out some type of governing on what is occurring. If it does **we may become an endangered species**.

Offering to negotiate sanctions is crucial to establish diplomatic ties and provide official recognitionof the Maduro government, key to solve counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism and FARC

Metzker 13 (Jared, “Analysts Say Oil Could Help Mend U.S.-Venezuela Relations,” 6/18/13, <http://www.international.to/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8681:analysts-say-oil-could-help-mend-us-venezuela-relations&catid=268:inter-press-serv%E2%80%A6>)

Over half of Venezuela's federal budget revenues come from its oil industry, which also accounts for 95 percent of the country's exports. Estimated at 77 billion barrels, its proven reserves of black gold are the largest of any nation in the world. Despite a troubled political relationship, its principal customer is the United States, which imports nearly a million barrels a day from Venezuela. Venezuela's oil industry has been officially nationalised since the 1970s, and, as president, Chavez further tightened government control over its production. His government took a greater chunk of revenues and imposed quotas that ensured a certain percentage would always go directly towards aiding Venezuelans via social spending and fuel subsidies. While these measures may be popular with Venezuelans, who pay the lowest price for gasoline in the world, critics argue such policies hampered growth and led to mismanagement of Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), the main state-run oil company. The same critics also point to increasing debt levels, slowdowns in productions and accidents stemming from faulty infrastructure. In order to boost production, PdVSA agreed in May to accept a number of major loans. This includes one from Chevron, one of the largest U.S. oil companies, which will work with Venezuelans to develop new extraction sites.[related\_articles] "The oil sector is in deep trouble in Venezuela – production is down and the economic situation is deteriorating," explained Shifter. "They know they need foreign investment to increase production, and this is in part what has motivated Maduro to reach out." If its economy continues to falter, Venezuela may be further tempted to embrace the United States, which has the largest, most sophisticated fossil fuel industry in the world. Kerry's recent words suggest that the administration of President Barack Obama would be waiting with open arms. "Venezuela cannot confront its economic crisis and the United States at the same time," Diana Villiers Negroponte, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, a Washington think tank, told IPS, "and we are a pragmatic country which will deal with Maduro if it is in our interests." Indeed, Negroponte said she was "optimistic" about the possibility of rapprochement between the two countries within the next six months. She notes a "troika" of issues on which the United States is looking¶ for Venezuelan cooperation: counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and assistance in ridding Colombia of its FARC rebels. Nonetheless, major actions remain to be taken if normalisation is to even begin, such as the exchange of ambassadors and official U.S. recognition of the Maduro government. Shifter (who regards the Kerry-Jaua meeting as "a small step") was not optimistic that these larger requirements will be completed in the short term. "I don't think Washington is going to push hard to send an ambassador to Caracas," he said. "It will probably take more time to observe the new government and see where it is going."

#### Narco-Terrorism fueled by FARC causes WMD use in the Americas

**NTA 8** (National Terror Alert, “U.S. Officials Worry Terrorists Could Align With Drug Cartels,” 10-9, http://www.nationalterroralert.com/2008/10/09/us-officials-worry-terrorists-could-align-with-drug-cartels/)

There is real danger that Islamic extremist groups such as al-Qaeda and Hezbollah could form alliances with wealthy and powerful Latin American drug lords to launch new terrorist attacks, U.S. officials said Wednesday. Extremist group operatives have already been identified in several Latin American countries, mostly involved in fundraising and finding logistical support. But Charles Allen, chief of intelligence analysis at the Homeland Security Department, said they could use well-established smuggling routes and drug profits to bring people or even weapons of mass destruction to the U.S. “The presence of these people in the region leaves open the possibility that they will attempt to attack the United States,” said Allen, a veteran CIA analyst. “The threats in this hemisphere are real. We cannot ignore them.” Much as the Taliban tapped Afghanistan’s heroin for money, U.S. officials say the vast profits available from Latin American cocaine could provide al-Qaida and others with a ready source of income. The rebel group known as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, has long used drug money to pay for weapons, supplies and operations — and is also designated as a terrorist organization by the U.S. “We’ve got a hybrid that has developed right before our eyes,” Braun said. Latin America’s drug kingpins already have well-established methods of smuggling, laundering money, obtaining false documents, providing safe havens and obtaining illicit weapons, all of which would be attractive to terrorists who are facing new pressures in the Middle East and elsewhere.

#### Sanctions whip up nationalistic fervor in Venezuela – undermining US credibility, increasing oil prices and derailing the economic recovery, offering to negotiate is crucial to a sustainable solution

Economides 11 (Dr. Michael Economides, Contributor for Forbes, Editor-in-Chief of Energy Tribune, PhD petroleum engineer, professor at the Cullen College of Engineering, at the University of Houston, “Silly Sanctions Against Venezuela Boost Hugo Chavez,” 6-13-11, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2011/06/13/silly-sanctions-against-venezuela-boost-hugo-chavez/>

The U.S. government has finally decided to take on Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, but probably in the worst possible way: toothless sanctions that barely scathe the caudillo. Instead, these sanctions give him a treasure trove of ammunition to undermine U.S. policies and consolidate his own power. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton included Petróleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA), parent company of large American refiner and gasoline retailer CITGO, in a list of seven companies sanctioned last month for supporting Iran’s energy sector. PDVSA “delivered at least two cargoes of reformate to Iran between December 2010 and March 2011, worth approximately $50 million,” the statement says. Reformate is blended with gasoline to improve its quality. The sanctions bar PDVSA from access to U.S. government contracts, financing through the U.S. Export-Import Bank and export licenses. But the sanctions don’t apply to PDVSA subsidiaries (e.g. CITGO) and don’t “prohibit the export of crude oil to the United States.” Chávez could not hide his glee on Twitter on May 24: “Sanctions … imposed by the imperialist gringo government? Welcome Mr. Obama! The real impact of the new gringo aggression is potentiating the patriotic and nationalist morale of Venezuela.” Chávez is right to thank Obama. Ahead of Venezuela’s presidential elections next year – perhaps the best chance for a democratic transition of power – the administration has handed its biggest antagonist in the hemisphere an ideological missile to rally support against the U.S. A case in point: “The revolutionary government calls on all the Venezuelan people, laborers and especially the oil workers, to stay alert and mobilized in defence of our PDVSA and the sacred sovereignty of the homeland,” says a statement from the Venezuelan Foreign Affairs Ministry. Yet the list of accusations runs deep. For example, the U.S. State Department has repeatedly accused Venezuelan officials of aiding FARC in Colombia; a Spanish court is investigating Venezuelan government support of the Basque terrorist group ETA and U.S. authorities are investigating reports that Chávez’s friendly ties to Iran are translating into support for Hezbollah and Hamas. Ever since Washington’s pressure on Caracas backfired at the beginning of George W. Bush’s first administration, both the Bush and Obama administrations have stuck to ignoring Latin tongue-lashing. Official reactions to Chávez’s provocations are simply useless and, in fact, to his benefit. Sadly, this is the best strategy the U.S. has come up with thus far. Also of concern, PDVSA is one of the world’s largest energy companies. It is and will remain an influential player in global energy matters. For instance, the U.S. imports between 9 and 10 percent of its oil from Venezuela. Full sanctions would require replacing heavy oil supplies, for which much of the U.S. oil refining infrastructure on the Gulf Coast is geared. Additionally, oil prices could rise as a result, an unwelcome scenario in a still wobbly recovery. There would also be geopolitical consequences, as Venezuela hosts numerous influential investors (including many Americans). Considering all of these points, it is all the more baffling that the administration is imposing these sanctions. A senior administration official quoted in a press briefing that followed the unexpected announcement said, “These sanctions send a strong signal to companies around the world about the risks of dealing with Iran. So it serves as a signal, a deterrent, as much as it does as having a near-term, practical impact.” Except they don’t. Iran will continue to provision itself with gasoline and additives, Chávez will be emboldened without actually enduring any significant sanctions and both governments will benefit economically when oil prices increase if the standoff escalates. Now it could be that the decision to include PDVSA on the list is a policy decision for other headaches. There is no doubt that the U.S. wants to target Iran’s lack of refining supply, one of its weaknesses. But $50 million worth of gasoline additive supply is not a game changer for Iran, and Venezuela’s efforts to supply Iran with refined products are inconsequential. Therefore, President Obama might have fallen into a trap. Or it could be that the administration is trying to quell criticism of its policies toward Venezuela. Whatever the case, these sanctions are unwise. They don’t dent Iran’s refined product supply. They are not “a strong signal” to Venezuela, nor do they weaken Chávez ahead of elections. And they could ultimately result in higher oil prices, threatening U.S. economic recovery.

#### Economic decline causes global war

Royal 10 (Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction – U.S. Department of Defense, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises”, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215)

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases**,** as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularlyduring periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate externalmilitary conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in theuse of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflictat systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

#### High Oil Prices devastate China’s export potential

Gangnes 11 (Byron S. Gangnes Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA and Yokohama National University, Yokohama, Japan Alyson C. Ma School of Business Administration, University of San Diego, San Diego, California, USA, and Ari Van Assche Department of International Business, HEC Montre´al, Montre´al, Canada and LICOS Centre of Institutions and Economic Performance, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Leuven, Belgium, “China’s exports in a world of increasing oil prices,” Multinational Business Review19.2, 2011, 133-151)

In the six years leading up to the global recession of 2009-2010, oil prices rose dramatically, from an annual average of roughly US$26 a barrel in 2002 to nearly US$100 a barrel in 2008. In the summer of 2008, prices brieﬂy spiked to nearly US$150 per barrel before receding as the recession deepened. As oil prices surged upward in 2008, business analysts became increasingly worried about the impact of rising oil prices on trade. Rubin and Tal (2008) of CIBC World Markets wrote a thought-provoking article that rising oil prices will lead to signiﬁcant hikes in international transportation costs and therefore to a major slowdown in the growth of world trade – reversing globalization. They reported that hand in hand with the oil price hikes, the cost to ship a standard 40-foot container from Shanghai to the US Eastern seaboard rose from US$3,000 in 2000 to US$8,000 in 2008. At such transport prices, they argued, companies have started to rethink the establishment of far-ﬂung global supply networks, by seeking supplies from domestic and regional markets closer to home. Following on the heels of Rubin and Tal (2008), Jen and Bindelli (2008) of Morgan Stanley Research predicted that East Asia’s and especially China’s export model would be particularly affected by rising oil prices. This is because trade within East Asia is much more vertically specialized than for other regions. Many of the ﬁnished goods that China exports to America and Europe are made from components imported from Taiwan, Japan and South Korea. Since these regional production networks require components to be shipped multiple times, affordable transport costs are an essential ingredient for their maintenance.

#### Chinese exports key to their economy

Prasad 08- Tolani Senior Professor of Trade Policy, Cornell University, United States (Eswar S. PRASAD, May 28th 2008, Is the Chinese growth miracle built to last?, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1043951X08000321#)

Since the early 1990s, China has integrated into world trade at an astounding pace. Chinese exports more than quintupled between 1992 and 2007, growing faster than the national economy. The functioning of China's economy has been radically transformed, moving from an isolated position with exports of less than 10% of GDP in 1980 to a highly-integrated economy, with an export ratio of more than 37% in 2007. This process has been accompanied by a no less impressive diversiﬁcation of China's trade, as its manufactured exports pervaded all sectors of world trade, from low-technology textiles to high-tech electronics and computers. A number of aspects of this trade integration have however puzzled economists. One is the rapid upgrading of China's exports: economists (and world consumers) have noticed the impressively broad range of China's export products since the mid-nineties, and in particular, the ability of Chinese producers to export capital- and skill-intensive products, high-technology products, and in general products that are usually considered as belonging to the area of specialization of more developed countries. Rodrik (2006) notes that China is an outlier regarding the overall sophistication of its exports: according to the sophistication index of Hausmann et al. (2007), which estimates the average “income level of a country's exports”, China's export bundle is similar to that of a country with a level of income per-capita three times larger than China. Using an alternative indicator, Schott (2008) also ﬁnds that China's export bundle is increasingly overlapping with that of the world's most-developed economies, and that this overlap cannot be entirely explained by factor endowments.

#### Impact is CCP Collapse and Great Power War

**Kane 01** [Thomas Kane, PhD in Security Studies from the University of Hull & Lawrence Serewicz, Autumn, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/01autumn/Kane.htm>]

Despite China's problems with its food supply, the Chinese do not appear to be in danger of widespread starvation. Nevertheless, one cannot rule out the prospect entirely, especially if the earth's climate actually is getting warmer. The consequences of general famine in a country with over a billion people clearly would be catastrophic. The effects of oil shortages and industrial stagnation would be less lurid, but economic collapse would endanger China's political stability whether that collapse came with a bang or a whimper. PRC society has become dangerously fractured. As the coastal cities grow richer and more cosmopolitan while the rural inland provinces grow poorer, the political interests of the two regions become ever less compatible. Increasing the prospects for division yet further, Deng Xiaoping's administrative reforms have strengthened regional potentates at the expense of central authority. As Kent Calder observes, In part, this change [erosion of power at the center] is a conscious devolution, initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1991 to outflank conservative opponents of economic reforms in Beijing nomenclature. But devolution has fed on itself, spurred by the natural desire of local authorities in the affluent and increasingly powerful coastal provinces to appropriate more and more of the fruits of growth to themselves alone.[ 49] Other social and economic developments deepen the rifts in Chinese society. The one-child policy, for instance, is disrupting traditional family life, with unknowable consequences for Chinese mores and social cohesion.[ 50] As families resort to abortion or infanticide to ensure that their one child is a son, the population may come to include an unprecedented preponderance of young, single men. If common gender prejudices have any basis in fact, these males are unlikely to be a source of social stability. Under these circumstances, China is vulnerable to unrest of many kinds. Unemployment or severe hardship, not to mention actual starvation, could easily trigger popular uprisings. Provincial leaders might be tempted to secede, perhaps openly or perhaps by quietly ceasing to obey Beijing's directives. China's leaders, in turn, might adopt drastic measures to forestall such developments. If faced with internal strife, supporters of China's existing regime may return to a more overt form of communist dictatorship. The PRC has, after all, oscillated between experimentation and orthodoxy continually throughout its existence. Spectacular examples include Mao's Hundred Flowers campaign and the return to conventional Marxism-Leninism after the leftist experiments of the Cultural Revolution, but the process continued throughout the 1980s, when the Chinese referred to it as the "fang-shou cycle." (Fang means to loosen one's grip; shou means to tighten it.)[ 51] If order broke down, the Chinese would not be the only people to suffer. Civil unrest in the PRC would disrupt trade relationships, send refugees flowing across borders, and force outside powers to consider intervention. If different countries chose to intervene on different sides, China's struggle could lead to major war. In a less apocalyptic but still grim scenario, China's government might try to ward off its demise by attacking adjacent countries.

## Economic Reforms

### 1AC: Economic Reforms

#### Advantage \_\_\_\_\_: Economic Reforms

#### Now Key - Offering to remove oil sanctions provides the political cover necessary for Maduro to implement economic reforms, key to stabilize Venezuela and Latin America, and consolidate hemispheric trade

Pagano 13 (James, contributing writer to the Truman Doctrine, “Moving Venezuela to the Center,” 3-18-13, <http://trumanproject.org/doctrine-blog/moving-venezuela-to-the-center/>)

After over a decade in power, Hugo Chavez is now dead, providing U.S. policy makers an opening to mend fences and steer Venezuela’s next president towards the center. With smart policy and a light touch, the United States can help Venezuela’s next president lead his country out of the mess that Chavez built. Chavez won the presidency in 1999 on a promise to “sow” the oil wealth of Venezuela into its social program. Bolstered by record high oil prices, Chavez spent billions on such programs. While millions of Venezuelans were able to obtain healthcare and an education, the poorly designed programs left little money to reinvest in oil exploration; output in Venezuela declined threatening the longevity of all Chavez’s initiatives. Meanwhile, Chavez became an increasingly authoritarian leader, consolidating power in the executive. He blacklisted opposition figures, altered the constitution and unevenly enforced laws for personal benefit. By creating a steeply slanted playing field, Chavez was able to retain power. Venezuela’s next president will have to decide whether to reverse these trends, or continue the slide to outright authoritarianism. The United States can and should influence this decision. The United States must support the democratic process and engage the likely winner of April’s election, Chavez’s chosen successor, Nicolás Maduro. He will have a real opportunity to put Venezuela back on the path to a free-market democracy. The next president will face an extremely politicized Supreme Court and military and reforms are likely more palatable if made by Maduro. Changes to apportionment, food subsidies or tax rates coming from Enrique Capriles (the opposition candidate) could spark a legal challenge from the supreme court; or worse, opposition from the military. What should the U.S. role be? It must work with its Latin American allies in the region, Chile, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico to gently pressure Maduro into making the types of institutional and economic changes necessary for Venezuela to prosper. Failure to do so could lead to the reemergence of authoritarianism in Latin America, instability in world oil markets and serious regional security repercussions. Chavez was infamous for his anti-American tirades. George W. Bush’s poor global standing gave Chavez an easy target. With a more positive global image, the most important step President Obama can take is to normalize relations with Cuba. As Venezuela’s closest ally, Cuba has remained a persistent problem in U.S.-Latin American relations. By normalizing relations, Obama would take a huge step in reducing anti-Americanism in Venezuela. Simultaneously, Obama would ingratiate himself to the rest of the region by ending the dated embargo. Perhaps most importantly, eliminating this issue would give Venezuela’s next president the political cover necessary to mend relations with the United States. The U.S. should push for economic reform with the help of Brazil which seeks a greater role in international and regional politics. Former Brazilian President Lula da Silva has close ties to Venezuela, and touting the recent successes of his center-left government in Brazil could help persuade Maduro to moderate his government. Brazil has made huge societal gains without suffering the kind of economic setbacks seen in Venezuela. Friendly cajoling, along with the promise of closer economic ties could help lead Maduro onto a path of economic reform necessary to extend certain “Chavista” social programs. Colombia, Brazil and the U.S. also have a shared interest in improving Venezuelan security. Under Chavez, Venezuela became on the most violent countries in Latin America, as drug related crimes skyrocketed. Violence is the number one concern of Venezuelans, and significant reductions would be a major political victory for whoever is in power. Brazil and Colombia together should pressure Venezuela to accept sorely needed D.E.A assistance with the tacit acceptance of modest political reforms, most importantly freer press. The death of Chavez is a critical juncture in U.S.-Latin American relations and it is important the United States not miss this opportunity. Having a stable trustworthy Venezuela would allow the United States to continue to draw down operations in the ever-volatile Middle East, fight narcotrafficking and expand trade. Careful, well thought-out overtures and policy changes will help quell lingering anti-Americanism while also improving regional stability. Ending the Cuban embargo would provide absolute economic gain for all parties, while providing cover for Maduro to thaw relations with the United States and receive aid to stop uncontrollable violence. Strategic engagement with regional allies could help spur the economic and institutional reforms necessary for Venezuela to prosper moving forward. The situation in Venezuela could be potentially destabilizing to the region. The United must act deliberately to make Hugo Chavez’s passing an unmitigated positive development.

#### Venezuelan instability spills over causing global problems

**Manwaring 05** (Max G., Retired U.S. Army colonel and an Adjunct Professor of International Politics at Dickinson College, VENEZUELA’S HUGO CHÁVEZ, BOLIVARIAN SOCIALISM, AND ASYMMETRIC WARFARE, October 2005, pg. PUB628.pdf)

The Issue of State Failure. - President Chávez also understands that the process leading to state failure is the most dangerous long-term security challenge facing the global community today. The argument in general is that failing and failed state status is the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism. These conditions breed massive humanitarian disasters and major refugee flows. They can host “evil” networks of all kinds, whether they involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form of ideological crusade such as Bolivarianismo. More specifically, these conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of infrastructure. These means of coercion and persuasion can spawn further human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, genocide, ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and criminal anarchy. At the same time, these actions are usually unconfined and spill over into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict.62 Peru’s Sendero Luminoso calls violent and destructive activities that facilitate the processes of state failure “armed propaganda.” Drug cartels operating throughout the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere call these activities “business incentives.” Chávez considers these actions to be steps that must be taken to bring about the political conditions necessary to establish Latin American socialism for the 21st century.63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate actors’ strategic efforts are aimed at progressively lessening a targeted regime’s credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and society. Chávez’s intent is to focus his primary attack politically and psychologically on selected Latin American governments’ ability and right to govern. In that context, he understands that popular perceptions of corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct the business of the state. Until a given populace generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and other basic issues of political, economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, instability and the threat of subverting or destroying such a government are real.64 But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually anyone can take advantage of such an unstable situation. The tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability. As a consequence, failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states, or new people’s democracies. In connection with the creation of new people’s democracies, one can rest assured that Chávez and his Bolivarian populist allies will be available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity. And, of course, the longer dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and people’s democracies persist, the more they and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity.65

#### Latin American conflict goes global

**Rochlin 94** (James Francis, Prof. Pol. Sci. @ Okanagan University College, “Discovering the Americas: the evolution of Canadian foreign policy towards Latin America”, p. 130-131)

While there were economic motivations for Canadian policy in Central America, security considerations were perhaps more important. Canada possessed an interest in promoting stability in the face of a potential decline of U.S. hegemony in the Americas. Perceptions of declining U.S. influence in the region – which had some credibility in 1979-1984 due to the wildly inequitable divisions of wealth in some U.S. client states in Latin America, in addition to political repression, under-development, mounting external debt, anti-American sentiment produced by decades of subjugation to U.S. strategic and economic interests, and so on – were linked to the prospect of explosive events occurring in the hemisphere. Hence, the Central American imbroglio was viewed as a fuse which could ignite a cataclysmic process throughout the region. Analysts at the time worried that in a worst-case scenario, instability created by a regional war, beginning in Central America and spreading elsewhere in Latin America, might preoccupy Washington to the extent that the United States would be unable to perform adequately its important hegemonic role in the international arena – a concern expressed by the director of research for Canada’s Standing Committee Report on Central America. It was feared that such a predicament could generate increased global instability and perhaps even a hegemonic war. This is one of the motivations which led Canada to become involved in efforts at regional conflict resolution, such as Contadora, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

#### US-Venezuela trade ties are key combat exclusionary trade agreements, and to pave the way for Hemispheric trade integration, necessary for full WTO realization

**Hornbeck 11** (J. F. Hornbeck, Specialist in International Trade and Finance, “U.S.-Latin America Trade: Recent Trends and Policy Issues,” 2-8-11, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/98-840.pdf)

The United States and Latin America have pursued trade liberalization through multilateral, regional, and bilateral negotiations, with mixed results. In part this reflects divergent priorities that have been difficult to fully reconcile. For many Latin American countries, reducing barriers to agricultural trade is top of the list for a successful agreement. This goal includes reducing market access barriers (peak tariffs and tariff rate quotas—TRQs), domestic U.S. subsidies, and nontariff barriers (administrative rules, antidumping provisions). Although there are many other issues, agriculture policy has played a big part in slowing progress in the World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Development Round and halting the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).7 The United States has made clear its unwillingness to address most agricultural and antidumping issues in a regional agreement like the FTAA to preserve its bargaining leverage in the WTO against other subsidizing countries such as the European Union and Japan. Latin American counties have their own sensitive issues and a particular concern in some countries for easing its subsistence agricultural sectors slowly toward trade liberalization. In addition to market access, the United States has focused its trade negotiating goals on areas where it is most competitive such as services trade (e.g., financial, tourism, technology, professional); intellectual property rights (IPR); government procurement; and investment. Not surprisingly, these are areas where many Latin American countries are more reluctant to negotiate. Hence, there is a near reversal of priorities that has slowed the progress of comprehensive agreements at the multilateral and regional levels, reflecting inherent differences between many developed and developing countries. The result in the Western Hemisphere has been the proliferation of reciprocal bilateral and plurilateral agreements. The United States has implemented FTAs with Mexico, Central America, the Dominican Republic, Chile, and Peru, but Congress has not acted on the proposed FTAs with Panama or Colombia, despite changes agreed to even after the formal negotiations concluded. Currently, congressional reticence awaits further commitments in areas that fall outside the negotiated text of the FTAs, such as tax law in Panama and human rights improvements in Colombia, raising questions for some over the ability of the United States to consummate trade negotiations.8 The prospects are limited at best for exploring reciprocal FTAs with Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela. Brazil, as the major regional economy not in a unilateral preferential arrangement with the United States, has abandoned the FTAA model and moved ahead separately by adding associate members to Mercosur, supporting Venezuela’s accession to Mercosur as a full member, and leading in the formation of broader economic and political integration pacts in South America. Venezuela’s President Hugo Chávez has taken a decidedly more confrontational approach in establishing the Bolivarian Alternative to the Americas (ALBA), enticing Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Dominica, and Honduras to join with subsidized oil trade.9 Although these are neither deep nor comprehensive trade arrangements, they do signal a political will to consolidate regional bargaining interests in juxtaposition to the U.S.-designed FTAA. Three clear challenges emerge from this picture. First, Brazil and the United States have demonstrated a prolonged reluctance to move off their respective positions, which bodes poorly for resurrecting the FTAA.10 The addition of Venezuela and possibly other countries with less than sympathetic attitudes toward the United States as full Mercosur members could solidify this standoff. Nationalizations of key industries and other efforts to increase the role of the state in managing the economies of Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador also do not augur well for broadening support for market-based trade solutions.

#### WTO prevents resource constraints and crises

Carbonnier 13 – Professor of Development Economics @ Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies [[Gilles Carbonnier](http://www.cepweb.org/author/gilles-carbonnier/) (Editor-in-chief of International Development Policy, President of the board of directors of CERAH, the Centre for Education and Research in Humanitarian Action, and founding member of CEP), “Resource Scarcity, Export Restrictions and the Multilateral Trading System,” | Council on Economic Policies, April 10, 2013, pg. http://www.cepweb.org/resource-scarcity-export-restrictions-and-the-multilateral-trading-system/

A Greater Role for the WTO? How pivotal should the WTO be in improving the global governance of food, energy and minerals? Each commodity market presents its own characteristics with different key players and specific regional and global organisations pursuing different, potentially conflicting, objectives. Enhancing transparency by providing reliable information on stocks and flows is critical to enable importing and exporting countries as well as investors to take early action and avoid panic moves. The WTO could provide greater transparency on export restrictions with tighter rules on early notifications and consultations involving all interested parties. Member states could also clarify the interpretation of relevant WTO disciplines, in particular with regard to the temporary application of export restrictions for the sake of preventing or relieving critical shortages of primary commodities deemed essential to exporting countries. It has further been suggested to seek a deal under which importing countries would commit to reduce tariff escalation on processed goods against binding commitment from exporting countries not to impose trade restrictions on primary commodity exports.[[4]](http://www.cepweb.org/resource-scarcity-export-restrictions-and-the-multilateral-trading-system/#_ftn4) Concluding Remarks The Doha Round stalemate does not bode well for rapid advances on the options highlighted above. This should, however, not prevent progress on greater transparency and effective early consultations. For obvious reasons, previous multilateral trade negotiations focused on import protectionism. Today, the WTO should address export restrictions as a matter of priority. An effective multilateral trading system is expected to contribute to avoiding harmful panic moves when not justified by market fundamentals, as exemplified by the 2008 rice crisis. On the other hand, the WTO does and can further take into account the legitimate concerns of producer countries, allowing for restrictions deemed essential for national security or environmental protection. This should be part of a broader attempt to strengthen the global institutional architecture dealing with food and energy security. It requires considering a myriad of bilateral, regional and global arrangements ranging from informal, voluntary initiatives to systematic data exchange and oversight via the building and sharing of emergency stocks and the clarification of binding rules related to export restrictions. There is no one-size-fits-all solution: each commodity market has its own characteristics with different players and specific risks and vulnerabilities. Yet, the growing nexus between water, food and energy requires factoring the complex interactions between various commodity markets into the analysis with a view to identifying critical bottlenecks and devising early risk management strategies. Pragmatic multilateralism must contain the tendency to address resource scarcity through bilateral and exclusive deals.

#### Extinction

Aguilar-Millan 10 – Director of research @ European Fu22tures Observatory [Stephen Aguilar-Millan (Member of the Global Advisory Council of the World Future Society and the Board of the Association of Professional Futurists), Ann Feeney (Member of the Association of Professional Futurists and its board and is a Certified Association Executive), Amy Oberg (Managing partner at Future-In-Sight, LLC. 25 years of experience), and Elizabeth Rudd (Risk assessment consultant), “The Post-Scarcity World of 2050-2075,” The Futurist, Jan/Feb 2010, pg. <http://www.eufo.org/psw1.pdf>]

Historically, there have been periods when large numbers of the global population have been reduced due to war, disease, natural disasters or famine. In the next 75 years, such an episode is likely to occur. The world has **several military hot spots**, and weapons able to **eliminate large portions of the population** are more prevalent than in the past. Rogue states or non-state actors such as terrorist organizations may develop these capabilities over the coming decades. **Resource shortages** may lead to heightened tensions, isolationism by countries, and increasing incidents of violence. In order to reduce the possibility of such incidents, we may see the rise of supranational governance and regulation and continued efforts to resolve conflicts through diplomacy and negotiation. The outbreak of disease is also a threat. A **global pandemic**, which, due to global travel, may spread more rapidly than any outbreak in history, could eliminate large numbers of the population. How widespread, and how great the population loss, will be dependent on the ability to curtail the global outbreak and find a cure or vaccination quickly. Inequities in access to health care mean pre-modern nations are likely to sustain a greater proportion of population loss than more-developed nations. **Famine** has the greater impact in pre-modern nations. Post-modern nations may be able to rely on their supranational relationships to assist them through the tough times. Modern nations may have better resources to manage or avoid food scarcity, but pre-modern nations are heavily dependent on aid from other nations. If globalization and access to finance becomes more difficult, coupled with resource shortages within their own countries, aid may decrease to the pre-modern nations, which will increase the duration and severity of famines. Weather patterns are cyclical. As well, there is a growing body of evidence in the early decades of the century indicating global warming. The severity and occurrence of natural disasters is increasing. If this continues, we are likely to have larger numbers of people displaced, and the death toll is likely to increase. In the early decades of the century, birthrates are much higher in modern and pre-modern countries. Economic development—especially in terms of the advancement of women through access to education, to micro-finance, and to birth control—contributes to reductions in birthrates in pre-modern countries. If pre-modern countries can successfully advance economically, this is likely to contribute to reduced population growth. Population will also impact where and how we live. People have lived in some type of dwelling for most of time, usually with family members. People will continue to live together in dwellings, but what will be the location, form, and ownership of those dwellings? The percentage of the global population living in urban areas is expected to increase from 48% in 2003 to 61% by 2030. The UN estimates that most of these urban dwellers will be in developing countries, living in cities in low-lying coastal areas at high risk from flooding due to global warming, making them vulnerable to natural disasters. As resources become scarce, housing prices are likely to rise, making home ownership less affordable; this may impact living arrangements, meaning more people living together in smaller spaces. This in turn could lead to increased crime rates for theft and violence. This may give rise to the countertrend of a return to villages. Villages afford more space and the ability to attain greater self-sufficiency for essentials like food, water, and power. Individual home ownership is common in many countries. Apartments or condominiums are also often individually owned, or sometimes the whole building is owned by a corporation. As global finance and credit markets become tighter, and resource shortages drive up the cost of housing, we may see more people leasing for longer periods of time and more housing owned by larger corporation and retirement funds. Rents are also likely to increase, so more people will likely share a household, thus reversing the growing trend of oneto two-person households. The materials we use to build and the sources of energy we use to heat and power our homes will likely change. Material shortages may drive innovation in recycled building materials and longer-lasting materials. Wind and solar may become more common sources of power. Rooftop, hydroponic, and vertical gardening could enable residential space to be used for food production, as a shortage of soil and arable land make it harder to feed the world’s growing population. It is difficult to conceive of a society without some form of individual ownership. A world in which all goods, services, and accommodation are provided by the government or by corporations seems unlikely. However, it is possible to conceive of one in which what individuals own, and how goods are consumed, changes due to both the availability of resources and also the materials used. Cradle-to-cradle manufacturing, a closed-cycle manufacturing process where nothing is wasted, may become more commonplace. Planned obsolescence in manufactured goods may become a thing of the past. Leasing of goods, where the manufacturer is responsible for repair and/or replacement and recycling of the item, may become more common. Innovation efforts are likely to focus on these types of efforts as resource availability begins to peak, yet demand continues to increase. While many fantasize about reduced workweeks and more leisure time, for the foreseeable future people will continue to work outside the home to earn an income. Where changes may occur is in the nature and quantity of the work. Statistics indicate that, as many countries develop economically, working hours increase. Resource shortages may mean this will eventually begin to show more balance. As the focus turns to efficiency and resource reuse, people are likely to buy less, which means less is produced, although it may be at a higher cost. Population growth means more adults available to work. This may lead to the elimination of child labor. Access to education for women as well as children may also assist in reducing the number of children working outside the home. Advances in health care and improvements in life span and the quality of life may assist people to remain in the workforce longer; this will be especially beneficial for post-modern countries, where the birthrate typically declines as the country advances economically. Greater numbers of people may enter or remain in the workforce. Reduced working hours may be mandated, in order to create more jobs. More people might work part time. Greater self-reliance may mean more need for time outside of work to spend growing food and tending to other essential activities. The time and activities performed at work are likely to change. Leisure activities are also likely to shift, with more physical activities being more local and distance interactions done virtually through the use of technology. The cost and resources available to enable global leisure travel are likely to experience shortages in the age of scarcity. By 2075, perhaps new technologies to enable low-cost, low impact travel may be developed. The desire to do so, however, is more a question of geopolitics, an issue to which we shall now turn. Post-Scarcity Geopolitics The most-plausible scenario of the development of a post-scarcity society would be driven by advances in nanotechnology or other extensions of materials sciences. So, based on the current infrastructure, the breakthrough developments would most likely take place in Western Europe, the United States, Japan, or South Korea, although China or India, or even one of the oil-wealthy Gulf nations, cannot entirely be ruled out. It would be tempting to follow all these possible scenarios, but for the scope of this paper, we will focus on the assumption that the post-scarcity future begins in the developed, Westernized world. By the time we build a post-scarcity capacity enough to build a post-scarcity economy, there will still be **widespread poverty** in many nations, particularly those that were still developing at the time of “peak everything” and many that reverted to developing-nation status under the hardships of climate change, scarcity of potable water, wars, and environmental degradation. Whether led by a spirit of philanthropy, capitalism, or enlightened self-interest, it seems likely that the originating nations would ensure that other nations would receive at least some of the benefits fairly soon. Much geopolitical conflict derives from scarcity or perceived scarcity of land, water, energy sources, mineral wealth, or other physical objects, ones which would be greatly alleviated by a post-scarcity economy. Eliminating or reducing these causes for conflict would be a great step toward international peace. However, it would not create total peace, largely because the capacity to mount deadly attacks would increase at the same time that some reasons for conflict will remain or might even worsen. Some scholars posit that **all historical conflict has been driven by competition over resources**, and that even wars ostensibly over ideologies were truly about scarcity. Political or ideological dominance were ways to an end, rather than the end itself. Certainly for many wars, such as the Crusades and World War II, their arguments are at least plausible. However, conflicts that might have started over scarcity may still capture hearts, minds, and resources by the enticing trappings of politics, religion, or even simply historical grudges. If, as other scholars believe, humans are **inherently a warlike species**, a postscarcity economy will enhance leaders’ ability to create war over causes that might have seemed trivial during a time when there was scarcity to worry about. The status of the natural world is another area that could create conflict. Many arguments for environmental protection are based on the direct and indirect human benefit of natural land and species conservation. The world’s forests act to sequester carbon, clean the air, regulate the temperature, and house animals and plants of current or potential benefit to humankind. In a post-scarcity society where technology can replace all of those functions, there could well be conflict over the appropriate use of whatever wild areas are left between those who see such areas as having intrinsic value, or possible future extrinsic value, and those who wish to use such land for other purposes. So far, we have just looked at the questions in terms of today’s nations and assumed that today’s nation-states are more or less intact by the time of the post-scarcity society. However, the post-scarcity society may well make both today’s states and the idea of a nationstate obsolete. On the other hand, the twentieth- and twenty-firstcentury creation of international groups and agencies from mutual interests rather than shared borders could replace today’s states in a different way. For example, the European Union formed, as an economic union, the European Economic Community, which itself arose from the European Coal and Steel Community. It has broadened its objectives beyond the purely economic or closely related (e.g., free movement of labor) to include social justice (e.g., its powers to legislate against discrimination), environmental policy, foreign policy, and security issues. If it were to change its charter to be one of shared values and common history, such an organization might not only include Turkey, thus adding part of Asia to its scope, but also traditional allies such as the United States. It might even transcend geography and history to become an alliance of democracies, bringing all of North America and large parts of South America, Asia, Africa, and even parts of the Middle East. Of course, the shadows of colonialism may create too great a barrier for some time, and continental alliances, rather than intercontinental, may come first. Some alliances would be unlikely to continue. OPEC, based on commodity production, would likely disappear. The existing NonAligned Movement, originally formed as a response to NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations, has struggled to define itself and its purpose since the collapse of the Cold War, and even now, its membership has little in common. One remaining unifying theme has been fair and sustainable development, but in a mature post-scarcity world, development would be moot for virtually all nations. On the other hand, a post-scarcity society in which the means of living could be created at a micro level, or even at a household level, could make it possible for small, self-selected communities to exist either as parts of a nation-state but largely independent or as entirely autonomous of a nation-state, even as their own nation-state. History suggests that most of these would be beneficial to their members and at worst harmless to others, but also gives us darker warnings of cults and militant groups that attacked other groups or destroyed themselves and took innocents with them. The ability of these organizations to operate with all the capacities of an autonomous nation in a post-scarcity society is a sobering thought. On the other hand, if the pursuit of these groups is control over themselves and their members and no control from an outside world, or if they can at least settle for this, we might find that post-scarcity geopolitics are in fact the road to a lasting peace. Ultimately, the geopolitics of a post-scarcity world depends upon the interactions of humans and groups. While human nature is a constant, human ethics are not, and most of the world’s history, viewed over a long time span, is what most of us would consider the growth of human ethics. For example, things once considered tolerable by the majority of society, such as slavery and indiscriminate slaughter during war, are now mostly condemned, at least in principle if not always in practice, and are greatly reduced. Perhaps this is what has **enabled us to survive** so far—that, while our technical capacities always run ahead of our ethical development, our ethics do keep up just enough. In order for a post-scarcity society to develop in such a way that it adds to net human freedom, justice, and well-being, we need more than ever to reinforce the principles of equality, generosity, tolerance, compassion, and mutual interdependence in what we teach and in what we model before those who will build the post-scarcity world. These values (or **their lack**) will shape whether the post-scarcity world fulfills its promise or **creates the seeds of the destruction of civilization**. Nowhere will this be felt greater than in the post-scarcity financial system. Pg. 289-297

#### Offering to end oil sanctions provides Maduro the cover to make quick adjustments, necessary for stability and undercutting Russian Arctic Oil Development, paving the way for US Middle East Oil Independence and the US Economic Recovery

Weafer 13 (Chris Weafer is chief strategist at Sberbank Investment Research, BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union – Political, “No business as usual for Russia in Venezuela – paper,” 3-12-13, Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring)

Despite assurances from government officials in Caracas that it will be business as usual after the death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez last week, his passing will almost certainly lead to the start of political and social changes in that country. The only question is the time frame. Chavez's death and the emergence of a new presidential administration will surely have a significant impact on the global oil industry and price of oil, although perhaps on an even longer timeline. According to the BP Energy Review, Venezuela sits on the world's largest exploitable reserves of oil. Chavez's policies have led not only to no significant exploitation of those reserves but have actually directly led to a cut in the country's average daily oil output by one-third in the 14 years he served as president. In 1999, the country produced an average of 3.5 million barrels per day, while the current average output has dropped to 2.5 million barrels. With the right investments, the country may easily support average daily oil output of 5 million barrels and probably higher, according to industry estimates. There can be little doubt that as of last week, Venezuela has become the most important target location for foreign oil majors, especially US companies. Russian oil majors still have a small advantage, and senior executives from state-owned Rosneft and Gazprom will be eager to ensure good relations with the next administration. But they must know that there is now a limited window to convert promised cooperation with the Venezuelan state-owned oil company, PDVSA, into actual projects. Oil executives from Houston will soon be descending on Venezuela with lucrative alternatives, and PDVSA, in dire need of capital investment, will surely be listening to their offers. For Russia, that means three risks. First, Gazprom and Rosneft will have more competition for joint-venture deals in that country. Second, Venezuela is an easier alternative to the hostile and unpredictable Russian Arctic for US oil companies, which may make it harder for Moscow to attract joint-venture deals. Finally, the prospect of more oil coming out of Venezuela adds to the growth projections for shale oil as a significant longer-term threat to the price of oil, and therefore, to the Russian economy. None of this will be lost on the Kremlin. It means that there will have to be greater urgency to convert promised deals into real projects in Venezuela. At the same time, the Kremlin will want to conclude more joint ventures to exploit the Arctic. It also means that the clock counting down to lower oil revenues is now ticking, increasing the need for more urgent progress in economic reforms. The Venezuelan constitution mandates that a new election must take place within 30 days. As it stands today, the current vice president, Nicolas Maduro, is expected to be elected to replace Chavez. Maduro said he intends to stick with the economic and political policies and ideologies of his former boss, but since Maduro is no Chavez, this will be virtually impossible to achieve. Chavez was a hugely charismatic, larger-than-life leader who managed to maintain unity of purpose among the many vested interests in the country. At the same time, he stayed popular with the people even as the economy slid further into trouble. With oil averaging over 110 dollars per barrel last year, the Venezuelan state budget ran a deficit of close to 20 per cent of gross domestic product. Now that Chavez is gone, the soon-to-be-elected president Maduro will come under increasing pressure to take actions to start improving the economy. No different from President Vladimir Putin's situation when he took over an ailing economy in Russia in 2000, the only place that the new Venezuelan president can get revenue is from the oil sector. But after Chavez practically destroyed PDVSA when he fired 20,000 skilled engineers and other workers in 2002, PDVSA will need a huge boost to capital spending and joint-venture partnerships. Although politically risky, Maduro may have no other choice than to ask ExxonMobil and Chevron, two of the US majors that had their local projects nationalized by Chavez, to come back. Venezuela is certainly an attractive option for the world's big oil majors. Recoverable reserves are now put at just under 300 billion barrels, compared to about 265 billion in Saudi Arabia and less than 100 billion in Russia. Most of Venezuelan oil is heavy and more expensive to refine, but it lies only a few hundred meters below the Orinoco Belt. That makes it a lot more attractive than, for example, speculatively drilling in the hostile Russian Arctic while dodging icebergs. The Orinoco Belt is an extremely important natural environment, and the inevitable objections from domestic, regional and international environmentalists will slow any development. But as has happened in similar situations elsewhere, the quest for the prize will almost certainly prevail. Venezuela needs the money. Venezuela has also very likely moved to near the top of the US government's list of geopolitical priorities. The US is set on a course to become energy independent, and the International Energy Agency calculates this may take two to three decades based on current trends and with optimistic assumptions for US shale oil production. Such assumptions have always been speculative when it comes to the oil industry. But a more achievable target for the US is to become regionally oil independent -that is, to only source its oil requirements domestically and from Canada, Mexico and now perhaps from Venezuela. That would allow the US to become completely independent of Middle East oil within 10 years or so. A change in Venezuela's political and economic priorities would also weaken the Cuban economy since Chavez supplied Cuba with almost free oil. That would hasten the inevitable regime change there as well, an extra bonus for Washington. But while such an outcome would be very favourable for the US economy, it would accelerate the game change already started in the global oil industry with the rapid growth in shale oil volumes. No matter how you work the assumptions, the world is heading for a lot more oil supply over the balance of this decade. New major oil production will come from North America, Iraq and the Caspian Sea, where Kazakhstan's giant Kashagan field starts to produce from this year, almost certainly from Venezuela if a new administration takes concrete steps to increase foreign investment and production in the oil sector. This may be the real reason Russian officials shed a few tears at Chavez's funeral on Friday.

#### Russian energy development in the Arctic causes escalating military competition

Talmadge 12 (Eric – AP, Huffington Post, “Arctic Climate Change Opening Region To New Military Activity’, 4/16, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/16/arctic-climate-change-military-activity\_n\_1427565.html)

To the world's military leaders, the debate over climate change is long over. **They are preparing for a new kind of Cold War in the Arctic**, anticipating that rising temperatures there will open up a treasure trove of resources, long-dreamed-of sea lanes and a slew of potential conflicts. By Arctic standards, the region is already buzzing with military activity, and experts believe that will increase significantly in the years ahead. Last month, Norway wrapped up one of the largest Arctic maneuvers ever — Exercise Cold Response — with 16,300 troops from 14 countries training on the ice for everything from high intensity warfare to terror threats. Attesting to the harsh conditions, five Norwegian troops were killed when their C-130 Hercules aircraft crashed near the summit of Kebnekaise, Sweden's highest mountain. The U.S., Canada and Denmark held major exercises two months ago, and in an unprecedented move, the military chiefs of the eight main Arctic powers — Canada, the U.S., Russia, Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland — gathered at a Canadian military base last week to specifically discuss regional security issues. None of this means a shooting war is likely at the North Pole any time soon. But as the number of workers and ships increases in the High North to exploit oil and gas reserves, **so will the need for policing, border patrols and** — if push comes to shove — **military muscle to enforce rival claims**. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that 13 percent of the world's undiscovered oil and 30 percent of its untapped natural gas is in the Arctic. Shipping lanes could be regularly open across the Arctic by 2030 as rising temperatures continue to melt the sea ice, according to a National Research Council analysis commissioned by the U.S. Navy last year. What countries should do about climate change remains a heated political debate. But that has not stopped north-looking militaries from moving ahead with strategies that assume current trends will continue. Russia, Canada and the United States have the biggest stakes in the Arctic. With its military budget stretched thin by Iraq, Afghanistan and more pressing issues elsewhere, the United States has been something of a reluctant northern power, though its nuclear-powered submarine fleet, which can navigate for months underwater and below the ice cap, remains second to none. Russia — one-third of which lies within the Arctic Circle — **has been the most aggressive in establishing itself as the emerging region's superpower**. Rob Huebert, an associate political science professor at the University of Calgary in Canada, said Russia has recovered enough from its economic troubles of the 1990s to significantly rebuild its Arctic military capabilities, which were a key to the overall Cold War strategy of the Soviet Union, and has increased its bomber patrols and submarine activity. He said that has in turn led other Arctic countries — Norway, Denmark and Canada — to resume regional military exercises that they had abandoned or cut back on after the Soviet collapse. Even non-Arctic nations such as France have expressed interest in deploying their militaries to the Arctic. "We have an entire ocean region that had previously been closed to the world now opening up," Huebert said. "There are numerous factors now coming together that are mutually reinforcing themselves, causing a buildup of military capabilities in the region. **This is only going to increase as time goes on**." Noting that the Arctic is warming twice as fast as the rest of the globe, the U.S. Navy in 2009 announced a beefed-up Arctic Roadmap by its own task force on climate change that called for a three-stage strategy to increase readiness, build cooperative relations with Arctic nations and identify areas of potential conflict. "We want to maintain our edge up there," said Cmdr. Ian Johnson, the captain of the USS Connecticut, which is one of the U.S. Navy's most Arctic-capable nuclear submarines and was deployed to the North Pole last year. "Our interest in **the Arctic** has never really waned. It remains very important." **But the U.S. remains ill-equipped for large-scale Arctic missions**, according to a simulation conducted by the U.S. Naval War College. A summary released last month found the Navy is "inadequately prepared to conduct sustained maritime operations in the Arctic" because it **lacks ships** able to operate in or near Arctic ice, **support facilities and adequate communications**. "The findings indicate the Navy is entering a new realm in the Arctic," said Walter Berbrick, a War College professor who participated in the simulation. "Instead of other nations relying on the U.S. Navy for capabilities and resources, sustained operations in the Arctic region will require the Navy to rely on other nations for capabilities and resources." He added that although the U.S. nuclear submarine fleet is a major asset, the Navy has severe gaps elsewhere — it doesn't have any icebreakers, for example. The only one in operation belongs to the Coast Guard. **The U.S. is currently mulling whether to add more icebreakers**.

#### De-escalation is key to prevent Arctic conflicts from going nuclear – draws in major powers

Wallace and Staples 10 (Michael Wallace and Steven Staples. \*Professor Emeritus at the University of British Columbia and President of the Rideau Institute in Ottawa “Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue,”http://www.arcticsecurity.org/docs/arctic-nuclear-report-web.pdf)

The fact is, the Arctic is becoming a zone of increased military competition. Russian President Medvedev has announced the creation of a special military force to defend Arctic claims. Last year Russian General Vladimir Shamanov declared that Russian troops would step up training for Arctic combat, and that Russia’s submarine fleet would increase its “operational radius.” 55 Recently, two Russian attack submarines were spotted off the U.S. east coast for the first time in 15 years. 56 In January 2009, on the eve of Obama’s inauguration, President Bush issued a National Security Presidential Directive on Arctic Regional Policy. It affirmed as a priority the preservation of U.S. military vessel and aircraft mobility and transit throughout the Arctic, including the Northwest Passage, **and foresaw greater capabilities to protect U.S. borders in the Arctic**. 57 The Bush administration’s disastrous eight years in office, particularly its decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty and deploy missile defence interceptors and a radar station in Eastern Europe, have greatly contributed to the instability we are seeing today, even though the Obama administration has scaled back the planned deployments. The Arctic has figured in this renewed interest in Cold War weapons systems, particularly the upgrading of the Thule Ballistic Missile Early Warning System radar in Northern Greenland for ballistic missile defence. The Canadian government, as well, has put forward new military capabilities to protect Canadian sovereignty claims in the Arctic, including proposed ice-capable ships, a northern military training base and a deep-water port. Earlier this year Denmark released an all-party defence position paper that suggests the country should create a dedicated Arctic military contingent that draws on army, navy and air force assets with shipbased helicopters able to drop troops anywhere. 58 Danish fighter planes would be tasked to patrol Greenlandic airspace. Last year Norway chose to buy 48 Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter jets, partly because of their suitability for Arctic patrols. In March, that country held a major Arctic military practice involving 7,000 soldiers from 13 countries in which a fictional country called Northland seized offshore oil rigs. 59 The manoeuvres prompted a protest from Russia – which objected again in June after Sweden held its largest northern military exercise since the end of the Second World War. About 12,000 troops, 50 aircraft and several warships were involved. 609 Ridding the Arctic of Nuclear Weapons: A Task Long Overdue Jayantha Dhanapala, President of Pugwash and former UN under-secretary for disarmament affairs, summarized the situation bluntly: “From those in the international peace and security sector, **deep concerns are being expressed over the fact that two nuclear weapon states** – the United States and the Russian Federation, which together own 95 per cent of the nuclear weapons in the world **– converge on the Arctic and have competing claims**. These claims, together with those of other allied NATO countries – Canada, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway – could, if unresolved, **lead to conflict escalating into the threat or use of nuclear weapons**.” 61 Many will no doubt argue that this is excessively alarmist, but **no circumstance in which nuclear powers find themselves in military confrontation can be taken lightly**. The current geo-political threat level is nebulous and low – for now, according to Rob Huebert of the University of Calgary, “[the] issue is the uncertainty as Arctic states and non-Arctic states begin to recognize the geo-political/economic significance of the Arctic because of climate change.” 62

#### Extinction – it’s categorically different from all other impacts

Bostrom 2 (Nick, PhD Philosophy – Oxford University, “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios”, Journal of Evolution and Technology, Vol. 9, March, http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html)

The unique challenge of existential risks Risks in this sixth category are a recent phenomenon. This is part of the reason why **it is useful to distinguish them from other risks**. We have not evolved mechanisms, either biologically or culturally, for managing such risks. Our intuitions and coping strategies have been shaped by our long experience with risks such as dangerous animals, hostile individuals or tribes, poisonous foods, automobile accidents, Chernobyl, Bhopal, volcano eruptions, earthquakes, draughts, World War I, World War II, epidemics of influenza, smallpox, black plague, and AIDS. These types of disasters have occurred many times and our cultural attitudes towards risk have been shaped by trial-and-error in managing such hazards. But tragic as such events are to the people immediately affected, in the big picture of things – from the perspective of humankind as a **whole – even the worst of these catastrophes are** mere ripples **on the surface of the great sea of life**. They haven’t significantly affected the total amount of human suffering or happiness or determined the long-term fate of our species. With the exception of a species-destroying comet or asteroid impact (an extremely rare occurrence), there were probably no significant existential risks in human history until the mid-twentieth century, and certainly none that it was within our power to do something about. The first manmade existential risk was the inaugural detonation of an atomic bomb. At the time, there was some concern that the explosion might start a runaway chain-reaction by “igniting” the atmosphere. Although we now know that such an outcome was physically impossible, it qualifies as an existential risk that was present at the time. For there to be a risk, given the knowledge and understanding available, it suffices that there is some subjective probability of an adverse outcome, even if it later turns out that objectively there was no chance of something bad happening. If we don’t know whether something is objectively risky or not, then it is risky in the subjective sense. The subjective sense is of course what we must base our decisions on.[[2]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html#_ftn2) At any given time we must use our best current subjective estimate of what the objective risk factors are.[[3]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html#_ftn3) A much greater existential risk **emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and** the **USSR**. **An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might** have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[[4]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html#_ftn4)  Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, **is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy** or thwart **humankind’s potential permanently**. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

#### Middle East oil dependence erodes US Hegemony

Miller 12[Paul, assistant professor of international-security studies at the National Defense University, “Fading Arab Oil Empire”, 6/28/12, <http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-fading-arab-oil-empire-7072?page=1>]

SINCE 1945, the United States has rightly sought to prevent any single power from dominating the Middle East’s oil supplies. An oil hegemon, whether Soviet, Baathist, Nasserite, Iranian or Islamist, would have had the capacity to blackmail the United States and the world with economic warfare. To that end, the United States supported anticommunist monarchies and autocracies in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain, among others, during the Cold War. It has armed Saudi Arabia with a staggering $81.6 billion of arms sales since 1950, almost a fifth of all U.S. weapons shipments. It supported Iraq against Iran in the 1980s before fighting Iraq to defend Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in 1990–1991. After the 2001 terrorist attacks, it further bolstered ties in the region, adding Kuwait, Bahrain and Morocco to its collection of major non-NATO allies, which includes Egypt, Israel and Jordan. In 2003, it invaded and occupied Iraq over fears, later proven overblown, that Iraq’s WMD proliferation might give Saddam Hussein or allied terrorists unacceptable leverage in the region. The U.S. military’s Central Command, formed in 1983, has a forward headquarters in Qatar, and the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet is based in Bahrain. This military infrastructure guarantees a long-term U.S. military presence in the region. Those policies were largely sensible efforts to maintain the security of world energy supplies. However, they make less sense in light of the brewing realities in the world oil market. These developments—the world’s increasing energy efficiency and the Middle East’s loss of its comparative advantage in oil production—will take time to play out fully. But they have been under way for several decades already. In two decades or so, the global oil market and the Middle East’s geopolitical influence will be dramatically different from what they are today. The Middle East will remain an important player, but it will no longer be able to act as the “central bank of oil,” as the princes of Saudi Arabia style their kingdom. Moreover, it will forever lose the ability to credibly threaten to wield oil as a weapon. The sword of Damocles that has implicitly hovered over the West since the 1970s will be gone. That means the central goal of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East will essentially be achieved: no power will be able to threaten the United States with unacceptable leverage over the American economy. That is because oil itself will be less important, and the world oil market will be more diffuse and diverse. The importance of this development cannot be overstated. It is a tectonic shift in the geopolitical balance of power, a strategically pivotal development only slightly less momentous than the fall of the Soviet Union. It is the slow-motion collapse of the Middle Eastern oil empire. In turn, the United States can and should begin to adapt its foreign policy to reflect these realities. It can look with more complacency on the rise and fall of particular regimes across the Middle East and North Africa. The Arab Spring, even if it brings to power moderate Islamist governments, is unlikely to threaten American interests. Washington also can play a less active part in conflicts between states, reverting to a role more like its indirect support for Iraq against Iran and less like its direct involvement in the 1991 and 2003 Iraq wars. Further, it can speak out more freely against tyranny and human-rights abuses, especially in Saudi Arabia, one of the most oppressive countries on earth. It can reclaim its position as the advocate of global liberalism, undoing the damage to the U.S. brand done by its close association with Middle Eastern dictators. THE UNITED States has additional interests in the Middle East, but they are outweighed by those in other parts of the world. For example, the region is a hotbed of terrorism and may become a major locus of WMD proliferation. But South Asia hosts terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda, that threaten the United States more directly. Further, South Asia is home to two declared nuclear powers. Thus, South Asia—not the Middle East—should be the focus of U.S. counterterrorism and counterproliferation efforts in coming decades. Additionally, the Middle East has two of the world’s most important choke points for ocean-going trade: the Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz. But governments in the region, heavily reliant on exports, have strong interests in keeping trade routes open. Despite Iranian leaders’ recent threats, no government is likely to cut off its own economic lifeline voluntarily. Meanwhile, the Malacca Strait in East Asia will remain important for a diverse array of ocean-going trade for the foreseeable future. Finally, the United States rightly is committed to Israel’s security. If Iran succeeds in building a nuclear weapon, Israel could face a potential existential threat—the same threat fellow U.S. allies in East Asia, including South Korea, Taiwan and Japan, have been facing from North Korea since 2006. Once again, U.S. interests in the Middle East are no more, and probably less, important than U.S. interests in other regions. The changing realities of the world energy market do not mean the United States can or should ignore the Middle East. Certainly, Israel’s security and Iran’s behavior will keep the region a focus for policy makers’ attention. But, placed in a global perspective, the United States has more or deeper interests at stake in other regions of the world—especially Europe and Asia—than in the Middle East. Budget cuts are concentrating minds inside the Beltway with newfound discipline. And a new presidential term begins next January, either with President Obama or Mitt Romney taking over. This confluence of events gives American policy makers a powerful opportunity to reassess U.S. grand strategy, along with its attendant military-deployment and force structure. As they do so, they should recognize the emerging realities in the Middle East. Our rationale for guaranteeing the region’s stability in exchange for cheap oil is fading, and that mission quickly is becoming more trouble than it is worth.

#### US Hegemony prevents global nuclear conflicts

Kagan 07 Senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace [Robert Kagan (Senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund), “End of Dreams, Return of History,” Policy Review, August & September 2007, pg. http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html]

The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying — its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic. It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War I and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe’s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war. People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that’s not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War II, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe. The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world’s great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States. Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China ’s neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan. In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene — even if it remained the world’s most powerful nation — could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe — if it adopted what some call a strategy of “offshore balancing” — this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances. It is also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of a more passive, “offshore” role would lead to greater stability there. The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more “even-handed” policy toward Israel, which some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to come to Israel ’s aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and on the ground. The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn’t change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. The alternative to American predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by both China and Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasn ’t changed that much. An American withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to “normal” or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again. The alternative to American regional predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one should imagine that a reduction of American power or a retraction of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path.

# Relations

## Uniqueness

### A2 U.S.-Venezuela Relations Will Improve

#### Improvement in relations unlikely in the squo

Weisbrot, 13 --- co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research (5/3/2013, Mark, “What Does the Future Hold for U.S.-Venezuela Relations?” <http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3297>)

A: Mark Weisbrot, co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research: "According to a New York Times report on April 15, Maduro reached out to the Obama administration through Bill Richardson just before the election. The administration gave its answer within 48 hours, and it was a lot worse than 'no, thank you.' By refusing to recognize Venezuela's election results, and saying that a '100 percent audit' of the vote count was 'necessary,' the Obama administration was saying, 'we hate you, and we are going to do everything we can to undermine your ability to govern.' It was really an escalation of Washington's involvement in Venezuelan politics not seen since its support for the military coup of 2002. It was also disingenuous: given the results of the election-day audit of votes from 53 percent of the voting machines, a further audit could not possibly change the result. A statistical analysis we did shows that the probability of getting the April 14 audit result if the true winner were Capriles is far less than one in 1 quadrillion. The Obama administration's attempt to delegitimize Venezuela's election, although it was completely isolated in the world, indicates that there is no inclination from Washington to significantly improve relations with Venezuela in the foreseeable future. This is regardless of what Maduro does. As for businesses' political risk, I don't see any reason these would increase. The risk of expropriation has always been very small compared to normal investment risks such as prices of outputs or inputs."

## Solvency

### Plan Solves Relations: 2AC

#### Negotiations over oil sanctions are key to the future of relations

Clarke 13 --- Associate Editor of America The National Catholic Review and MA in International Studies from DePaul University (3/25/2013, Kevin, “Chavez Death Brings New Chance For U.S.-Venezuela Engagement,” <http://americamagazine.org/issue/chavez-death-brings-new-chance-us-venezuela-engagement>)

The passing of President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela unleashed an epic outpouring of grief among his supporters in Venezuela, the likes of which may only be eventually paralleled with the passing of another larger-than-life figure in Latin American socialism, Cuba’s Fidel Castro. Matthew Carnes, S.J., assistant professor of government at Georgetown University, said Chávez will be remembered as a leader who had an “outsized impact in Venezuelan politics.” Father Carnes said Chávez’s passing offers an opportunity for the United States, politically and economically, to revive its relationship with Venezuela. Occasionally “capricious and doctrinaire,” Chávez was “someone the United States had a hard time negotiating with,” according to Father Carnes. Whether his designated political heir, Vice President Nicholas Maduro, or an opposition candidate, most likely Henrique Capriles Radonski, governor of the Venezuelan state of Miranda, is elected to replace Chávez, Father Carnes expects a more pragmatic and less confrontational leadership to emerge. That could mean improved ties not just with Venezuela but throughout the region, he said, and a possible opening for renewed U.S. investment and partnership with the Venezuelan state oil industry. Despite Chávez’s notorious distaste for U.S. political leaders, under his leadership Venezuela remained one of the largest suppliers of oil to the United States. This is likely to continue.

## Amazon

### Impact 2AC

#### Amazon destruction sparks nuclear extinction

**Takacs 96** (David, Institute for Earth Systems Science and Policy – California State University, Monterey Bay, The Idea Of Diversity: Philosophies Of Paradise, p. 200-201)

So biodiversity keeps the world running. It has value and of itself, as well as for us. Raven, Erwin, and Wilson oblige us to think about the value of biodiversity for our own lives. The Ehrlichs’ rivet-popper trope makes this same point; by eliminating rivets, we play Russian roulette with global ecology and human futures: “It is likely that destruction of the rich complex of species in the Amazon basin could trigger rapid changes in global climate patterns. Agriculture remains heavily dependent on stable climate, and human beings remain heavily dependent on food. By the end of the century the extinction of perhaps a million species in the Amazon basin could have entrained famines in which a billion human beings perished. And if our species is very unlucky, the famines could **lead to a thermonuclear war, which could extinguish civilization.”** Elsewhere Ehrlich uses different particulars with no less drama: What then will happen if the current decimation of organic diversity continues? Crop yields will be more difficult to maintain in the face of climatic change, soil erosion, loss of dependable water supplies, decline of pollinators, and ever more serious assaults by pests. Conversion of productive land to wasteland will accelerate; deserts will continue their seemingly inexorable expansion. Air pollution will increase, and local climates will become harsher. Humanity will have to forgo many of the direct economic benefits it might have withdrawn from Earth's well­stocked genetic library. It might, for example, miss out on a cure for cancer; but that will make little difference. As ecosystem services falter, mortality from respiratory and epidemic disease, natural disasters, and especially famine will lower life expectancies to the point where can­cer (largely a disease of the elderly) will be unimportant. Humanity will bring upon itself consequences depressingly similar to those expected from a nuclear winter. Barring a nuclear conflict, it appears that civilization will disappear some time before the end of the next century - not with a bang but a whimper.

#### Amazon destruction causes disease spread and global economic collapse

**Chase 96** (Robert S., PhD Candidate – Economics Yale U., Et Al., Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb, Lexis)

The array of plants and trees in the Amazon is an important source of natural pharmaceuticals; deforestation may also spread diseases as the natural hosts of viruses and bacteria are displaced to other regions. A social and political collapse would **directly affect** significant U.S. economic interests and American investors. Brazil's fate is **inextricably linked** to that of the entire South American region, a region that before its debt and inflation crises in the 1970s bought large amounts of U.S. goods and is now potentially the fastest-growing market for American business over the decades to come. In sum, were Brazil to succeed in stabilizing over the long term, reducing the massive gap between its rich and poor, further opening its markets, and privatizing often inefficient state-run industries, it could be a powerful engine for the regional economy and a stimulus to U.S. prosperity. Were it to fail, Americans would feel the consequences.

#### Second, disease spread causes extinction

**Scotsman, 95** (9-11, “The Mega Death”, p. 13, Lexis)

Bullets and bombs may be the weapons of the present, but plagues, viruses and killer microbes are the arsenal of the future. Together with the sarin gas which it released on the Tokyo underground in April, the Japanese Ohm cult had stockpiled a lethal bacterium which it chose not to unleash. Crippling continents by using killer infectious diseases is no far- fetched idea of sci-fi novels. But the scientists’ inability to distinguish between naturally emerging and synthetic disease outbreaks means whole areas could be laid waste before anyone realised what was happening, warns Laurie Garrett, author of a ground-breaking book on the burgeoning of infectious disease. All this on top of the fact that new diseases are emerging naturally at an alarming rate - representing a real threat to the survival of the human species - says The Coming Plague. Meticulously researched over the past decade, Garrett’s book charts the history of our age-old battle against the microbes, and concludes that we are beginning to cede the advantage to the disease-carriers. The optimism born out of defeating smallpox in the Sixties was dangerously premature. Everything from overuse of antibiotics to increased promiscuity have helped smooth the path for the microbes ever since. “The survival of the human species is not a pre- ordained evolutionary programme,” warns Nobel Laureate Joshua Lederberg in The Coming Plague. When Garrett’s book was released in the United States, it caused such widespread alarm that Vice President Al Gore set up a special task force to review American preparedness to tackle newly-emerging epidemics. In July, the evaluation concluded that the microbial threat was not just a domestic problem, but a national security question. It is no longer just governments which had the capability to engage in biological warfare.

### A2 Collapse Inevitable: 2AC

#### Amazon improving now – deforestation slowed 50%

**Maguder, 10** (Natasha, “Can Brazil continue to slow deforestation in the Amazon?”, November 24, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/americas/11/23/brazil.rainforest/index.html)

Brazil has worked hard to manage the forest. New data is expected to confirm that this last year has seen a drop of almost 50 percent in the rate at which deforestation is happening. In fact, Brazil is the best country in the world when it comes to fighting the problem of deforestation. Senator-elect Eduardo Braga represents Amazonas state. He says the people in his state don't deforest because they're stupid, or even because they're smart. He says they do it to survive. Braga attributes the positive data to better relationships with the forest people, as well as improved satellite technology. Regular scans of the forest show changes to groundcover, and highlight where new damage is happening. This allows the authorities to clamp down on illegal activity sooner. Paulo Adario has other ideas about the recent slow down. Food is big business and it is the recent dip in the profitability of food production has slowed the rate of deforestation, says Adario, not only the improved environment policing. Adario showed me the charred trunk of a Brazil nut tree, an icon of the Amazon. Growing at its base was a corn stalk. A tree like this takes 400 years to grow, he says. And it's being forcibly removed, for the sake of corn, which takes just four months to grow. Brazil is one of the key countries in favor of the UN's Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation scheme (REDD), which pays people to look after the rainforest, and teaches the economic importance, says Eduardo Braga. The COP16 UN Climate Change Conference takes place in Mexico next month, but the wranglings of global governments felt a long way away from Boca do Acre. Brazilian NGOs and the government are united in their desire to protect the trees. They are pushing for zero deforestation; the rate at which trees are disappearing to slow to a complete stop.

## Terrorism

### Nuke Terror Impact: 2AC

#### Nuclear terror would cause super power nuclear war

Ayson 10 (Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies & Director, Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33: 571-93)

But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important . . . some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension inWashington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.

### High Probability: 2AC

#### Risk of nuke terror high now

Washington Post 07 (Nuclear Terrorism FAQ, Sept. 26, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/24/AR2007092401154.html?sid=ST2007092501877)

Is it really plausible that terrorists could get and use a nuclear bomb? Yes. Unfortunately, terrorist use of a nuclear bomb is a very real danger. During the 2004 presidential campaign, President George W. Bush and Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.) agreed that nuclear terrorism was the single greatest threat to U.S. national security. Published estimates of the chance that terrorists will detonate a nuclear bomb in a U.S. city over the next ten years range from 1 percent to 50 percent. In a 2005 poll of international security experts taken by Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), the median estimate of the chance of a nuclear attack in the next ten years was 29 percent -- and a strong majority believed that it was more likely that terrorists would launch a nuclear attack than that a state would. Given the horrifying consequences of such an attack, even a 1 percent chance would be enough to call for rapid action to reduce the risk.

#### High probability now

Allison 07 (Graham Allison is the director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government and the faculty chair of the Dubai Initiative at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, The Three 'Nos' Knows, November 12, 2007, <http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=16004>)

Richard Garwin, a designer of the hydrogen bomb who Enrico Fermi once called “the only true genius I had ever met”, told Congress in March that he estimated a “20 percent per year probability [of a nuclear explosion—not just a contaminated, dirty bomb—a nuclear explosion]with American cities and European cities included.” My Harvard colleague Matthew Bunn has created a model in the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* that estimates the probability of a nuclear terrorist attack over a ten-year period to be 29 percent—identical to the average estimate from a poll of security experts commissioned by Senator Richard Lugar in 2005. My book, *Nuclear Terrorism*, states my own best judgment that, on the current trend line, the chances of a nuclear terrorist attack in the next decade are greater than 50 percent. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has expressed his own view that my work may even underestimate the risk. Warren Buffet, the world’s most successful investor and legendary odds-maker in pricing insurance policies for unlikely but catastrophic events, concluded that nuclear terrorism is “inevitable.” He stated, “I don’t see any way that it won’t happen.”

### Fast Time Frame: 2AC

#### Fast time frame

Allison 06 (GRAHAM ALLISON is the founding dean of Harvard's JFK School of Government and Director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. He was Assistant secretary of Defense in the first Clinton Administration, Harvard International Review, Fall 2006, The Will To Prevent, LN)

When could terrorists launch an attack? If terrorists bought or stole a nuclear weapon in good working condition, they could detonate it today. If the weapon had a lock, the date of detonation would be delayed for several days. If terrorists acquired the 100 pounds of HEU needed for an elementary nuclear bomb, they could have a working bomb in less than a year.

### A2 No Motivation: 2AC

#### Motivation high

Goodin 06 (Robert E. Goodin is Distinguished Professor of Social and Political Theory at the Australian National University, What’s Wrong with Terrorism?, pg. 138-9)

It was once thought that larger strategic considerations would inhibit terrorists from using weapons of mass destruction. It would simply not be prudent for terrorists who are in pursuit of specific objectives that required broad public sympathy to engage in the radically indiscriminate destruction, such as that entailed by the use of nuclear weapons or the uncontrolled spreading of an epidemic. 74 Recent decades, however, have seen the emergence of ‘new terrorism’ of a sort that is more Messianically motivated or millenarian-oriented. Being less concerned with external support among non-believers, such groups might be less reluctant to employ indiscriminately weapons of mass destruction. 75 On the contrary, ‘inflicting a scourge on the heretics or infidels may be seen as performing a sacramental act, manifesting divine retribution that morally justifies mass murder.’ 76 Once upon a time it was further thought ‘that a biological attack is unlikely precisely because the devastation from such an attack cannot be limited’, and would spread to the attackers’ own people as well as among those they meant to attack. But again, that may no longer be such a compelling argument, insofar as contemporary terrorists are infused with a spirit of martyrdom that extends that exalted status even to unknowing or unwilling victims of the epidemics that they initiate.

## Econ

### Oil Prices Kill Econ

#### High Oil Prices massively increase the US Trade Deficit – kills the economy

Morici 11 (Peter, The Street, Professor Peter Morici, of the Robert H. Smith School of Business at the University of Maryland, is a recognized expert on economic policy and international economics, director of the Office of Economics at the U.S. International Trade Commission, “U.S. Trade Deficit Rises With Increasing Oil Prices And China Imports,” 4-11-11, http://www.businessinsider.com/trade-deficit-is-sign-of-economys-problems-2011-4)

NEW YORK (TheStreet) -- On Tuesday, the Commerce Department plans to report the international trade deficit in goods and services for February, and analysts expect the number to come in at $44.0 billion. That would be up from $27 billion in mid-2009, when the economic recovery began. The trade deficit subtracts from demand for U.S.-made goods and services, just as a large federal budget deficit adds to it. Consequently, a rising trade deficit slows economic recovery and jobs creation and limits how much Congress and the President may cut the deficit without sinking the economic recovery. Rising oil prices and imports from China are driving the trade deficit up, and these are major barriers to creating enough jobs to pull unemployment to acceptable levels over the next several years. If the Obama Administration and Republican leadership in Congress addressed the trade deficit, economic growth, jobs creation and tax revenue would increase dramatically, and the federal deficit could be cut to manageable levels without fear of killing jobs creation. Jobs Creation The economy added 216,000 jobs March, but 360,000 jobs must be added per month to bring unemployment down to 6% over the next 36 months. With federal and state governments trimming civil servants, private sector jobs growth must exceed 360,000 per month to accomplish this goal. Americans have returned to the malls and new car showrooms but too many dollars go abroad to purchase Middle Eastern oil and Chinese consumer goods that do not return to buy U.S. exports. This leaves too many Americans jobless and wages stagnant, and state and municipal governments with chronic budget woes. Now, the increase of gasoline prices to $4.00 a gallon threatens to further reduce spending on homes and discretionary items made in the U.S. -- leaving many U.S. businesses again scrambling for customers and pressured to layoff workers. Simply, policies regarding energy and trade with China are not creating conditions for the 5% GDP growth that is needed and easily could be achieved to bring unemployment down to acceptable levels. In March, the private sector added 230,000 jobs, but many were in government-subsidized health care and social services, and temporary business services. Netting those out, core private sector jobs have increased only 157,000 in March. That comes to 50 permanent, non-government-subsidized jobs per county for more than 5,000 job seekers per county. Early in a recovery, temporary jobs appear first, but 21 months into the expansion, permanent, non-government-subsidized jobs creation should be much stronger.

## China

### High Prices Kill Chinese Growth

#### High Oil Prices kill Chinese economy – leads to T-Bill Sell-off

**Rubin 12** [Jeff Rubin, Former Chief Economist, CIBC World Market, “The End of Growth”, 5/2/12, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeffrey-rubin/the-end-of-growth_b_1471216.html>]

Just as people require food, economies require energy. The relationship is straightforward: economic growth is a function of energy consumption. With national economies around the world once again forced to pay more than $100 for every barrel of oil consumed, a critical question must be asked -- what happens when the world's most important source of energy becomes unaffordable? A glance at the latest GDP numbers is already telling us the answer. Economic growth has downshifted into a much lower gear nearly everywhere you look. Europe is struggling to keep its head above water, North America is stagnating and even the hard-charging economies of the BRIC nations are starting to groan under the weight of high energy prices. When the price of oil goes up, something has to give. Right now, the European Monetary Union looks to be the most imminent casualty. How much longer will Greece slavishly heed the demands of its creditors and impose punishing austerity measures with the only result being the continuing implosion of its economy? Will Spain be able to tighten its belt any further when a quarter of its labor force is already unemployed? The answers seem obvious. Without economic growth, neither country can service its debt. And growth just isn't in the cards. The ground beneath the European Monetary Union has never been shakier. And as the Euro trembles, the stage is being set for a return of the drachma, escudo, peseta, Irish pound, and lira. When we look across the Pacific we see that even China and India, the global economy's principal engines of growth, can't escape the toll exacted by high energy prices. When policy makers in Beijing tried to sustain double-digit economic growth, food and energy inflation quickly slammed on the brakes. The economies of China and India will soon struggle to grow at half the torrid pace of recent years. When that happens, the rest of the world will need to pay attention. In a world where distance costs money, China will increasingly look to its own 1.3 billion consumers to drive economic growth. If China decides to focus on tapping the potential of its huge domestic market, rather than supplying cheap goods to faraway Walmarts, the economic balance of power will tilt decidedly eastward. What happens if the People's Bank of China then decides that buying U.S. treasuries is no longer a necessity? U.S. taxpayers, for one, don't want to find out. They'll be left footing the bill for Washington's budget deficit -- currently at $1.25 trillion.

### Econ Collapse = War

#### Chinese economic collapse causes World War III

**Plate 3** (Tom, Professor of Communications – UCLA, Straights Times, 6-28, Lexis)

But imagine a China disintegrating - on its own, without neo-conservative or Central Intelligence Agency prompting, much less outright military invasion - because the economy (against all predictions) suddenly collapses. That would knock Asia into chaos. A massive flood of refugees would head for Indonesia and other places with poor border controls, which don't want them and can't handle them; some in Japan might lick their lips at the prospect of World War II Revisited and look to annex a slice of China. That would send Singapore and Malaysia - once occupied by Japan - into nervous breakdowns. Meanwhile, India might make a grab for Tibet, and Pakistan for Kashmir. Then **you can say hello to World War III, Asia-style**. That's why wise policy encourages Chinese stability, security and economic growth - the very direction the White House now seems to prefer.

**Kaminski 7** (Antoni Z., Professor – Institute of Political Studies, “World Order: The Mechanics of Threats (Central European Perspective)”, Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, 1, p. 58)

As already argued, the economic advance of China has taken place with relatively few corresponding changes in the political system, although the operation of political and economic institutions has seen some major changes. Still, tools are missing that would allow the establishment of political and legal foundations for the modem economy, or they are too weak. The tools are efficient public administration, the rule of law, clearly defined ownership rights, efficient banking system, etc. For these reasons, many experts fear an economic crisis in China. Considering the importance of the state for the development of the global economy, the crisis would have serious global repercussions. Its political ramifications could be no less dramatic owing to the special position the military occupies in the Chinese political system, and the existence of many potential vexed issues in East Asia (disputes over islands in the China Sea and the Pacific). A potential hotbed of conflict is also Taiwan's status. Economic recession and the related destabilization of internal policies could lead to a political, or even military crisis. The likelihood of the global escalation of the conflict is high, as the interests of Russia, China, Japan, Australia and, first and foremost, the US clash in the region.

## A2 Russia Disad

**Oil Not Key**

**Oil prices not key to economy— inflation and prevents oil from driving growth**

**Kelly 11** — writer for Reuters (Lidia, May 19, 2011, “Russia's economy struggles for sustainable growth” http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/05/18/idINIndia-57105920110518)

Russia's economy is struggling to attain sustainable growth despite the surge in prices for its oil exports, data showed on Wednesday, pointing to another tough decision on official interest rates later this month. Industry output grew at its slowest rate in 18 months in April, while producer prices rose more than forecast and weekly consumer inflation, stuck at 0.1 percent, underlines the conflicting pressures on the central bank. Pledging to keep full-year inflation below 7.5 percent ahead of presidential elections in March 2012, the central bank is expected to continue tightening monetary policy -- but a sluggish economy will complicate its decision-making on how to control prices and manage rouble appreciation driven by high oil prices. Investors have been scrutinising data for clues on the central bank's move after the regulator unexpectedly raised all key rates last month, including the benchmark refinancing rate. The latest data, including Monday's figures showing gross domestic product growing a weaker than expected 4.1 percent year-on-year despite surging oil prices, suggests that emerging Europe's largest economy is struggling. "**We would have expected that given the high oil prices something of this would transfer to the real economy**, but the big story is inflation, which is eating into the real income of consumers," said David Oxley, an emerging markets economist at Capital Economics in London.

**Econ high now despite low prices**

**Adomanis 12**

[Mark Adomanis, Forbes Contributor, 7/18/12, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2012/07/18/russias-economy-in-2012-a-strong-start-and-an-uncertain-future/>]

The IMF recently cut its forecast for Russia’s 2013 GDP growth from 4 percent to 3.9 percent, and repeated its forecast that 2012 economic growth would come in right at 4 percent. The Russian Ministry of Economic Development is slightly less optimistic, predicting that 2012 GDP growth will be in the 3.4-3.7% range (though it reserves the right to revise this upward if necessary). Well the results of the first half of 2012 are now available from Rosstat and, at first glance, they would appear to be ground for significant optimism: GDP grew at a 4.9% rate, fixed capital formation grew at 4.7%, and retail turnover galloped ahead at a rapid 6.9% annual rate. Also on the positive side of the ledger was a 3% growth in disposable incomes and a strikingly large 10% decline in unemployment to a post-Soviet low. Russia has now officially surpassed its pre-crisis GDP peak and is doing so with oil prices that are roughly $30 a barrel less than they were in 2008, when the world energy market was at the height of its decade-long run up in prices, and with notably lower levels of both unemployment and inflation. So while the Russian economy isn’t exactly a world-conquering colossus, it’s arguably in better shape than its ever been: prices are more stable, more workers are active, and investment and consumption are increasing.

**Manufacturing and construction key – oil prices don’t translate into increased growth**

**Kelly 11** — writer for Reuters (Lidia, May 19, 2011, “Russia's economy struggles for sustainable growth” http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/05/18/idINIndia-57105920110518)

Crude has held above $100 per barrel for a third month in a row -- more than $30 above what had been initially assumed in the 2011 budget -- ensuring fresh cash inflows into the economy and propping up Russia's trade and current account surplus. The Economy Ministry said late last month that it was relying **on industry** to put the economy onto a sustainable path to 4.2 percent gross domestic product growth this year. "Manufacturing sectors of the industry will be the drivers of economic growth in 2011, with growth dynamics of 7.5 percent," the ministry said in a document describing economic scenarios. But while manufacturing grew 5.3 percent year-on-year in April, it was down 3.6 percent on the month, Wednesday's data from the Federal Statistics Service showed. Extraction of raw materials, including oil and gas, was also down on the month, after a period when rising crude prices encouraged production. "Industry in Russia strongly reacts to changes in external demand, but **high oil prices are not enough any more** and from the point of view of internal growth, expectations about growth in the second quarter come, first of all, **from construction**," said Natalya Orlova, an economist at Alfa-Bank. Construction was one of main drivers of Russia's stellar performance in the second half of the last decade, before the 2008 crisis brought a halt to virtually all projects. Oxley at Capital Economics said the upshot is that growth will likely pick up in the second half, with pre-election spending taking hold and the spike in inflation fading to take some of the pressure off the central bank.

**Diversification Turn 2AC**

**Low prices have no impact- leads to diversification which prevents collapse**

**Kommersant 06**

[Russia’s Daily Online New Source, “Low Oil Prices May Push Up Russia’s Economy,” 7/16/2006, [http://www.kommersant.com/p705040/r\_500/Low\_Oil\_Prices\_May\_Push\_Up\_Russia’s\_Economy/](http://www.kommersant.com/p705040/r_500/Low_Oil_Prices_May_Push_Up_Russia's_Economy/)]

The OPEC Reference Basket has fallen below $60 per barrel, for the first time over the last five months, closing at $59.08 at the New York exchange yesterday. However, futures for Light Sweet grew. Analysts explain it, saying that stags decided to buy more contracts at attractive low prices. Experts note that a new drop is the start of a long-term trend of a decline in oil prices. Russian authorities have already given their predictions of how Russia’s economy will be affected by lower oil prices. The Central Bank’s head Sergey Ignatyev said that Russia would not suffer even if oil falls below $25-30 per barrel. Independent experts are of a different opinion, though. With a Urals barrel at $80 a Russian oil company has after-tax net profit of $36.3 billion annually. If Urals decline to $30, the net profit will plummet to $7.8 billion. Yet, a fall in natural resources prices may give a positive impulse to the Russian economy. “Certainly, if the natural resources industry slows down, other sectors may speed up as the Central Bank will no longer have to strengthen the ruble to trend down inflation,” Evgeny Nadoshin at the Trast bank said. “This is what Russian business has long been asking for.” A sharp drop in oil prices may force the Russian government to reinvigorate reforms and diversify economy, which will boost Russia’s economy. Even if authorities prefer a passive stance and keep on increasing budget expenses ahead of presidential election, Russia’s gold reserves and stabilization fund will help the economy to slow down as smoothly as possible.

**Diversification Turn 1AR**

**High oil profits allow Russia to avoid diversification—this will crush the economy**

**Tempera 11** (Michele, “Is Russia Diversifying Its Economy or Once More Strengthening Its Already Strong Sectors?” PECOB, March)//mat

From the Soviet period the Russian Federation inherited a rigid industrial structure on which it has built its present-day productive system with substantial continuity. The strict configuration of the Soviet planned economy has left Russia with few big industrial complexes which were for the most part less efficient and productive than the western European ones. The main and driving economic sectors were at the time, and remain today: energy, weapons manufacturing and steel and aluminium production. The peculiar soviet economic policies prevented any significant diversification until the early nineties, when a general economic collapse and the loss of the satellite states economies support led to an arrest in any possible productive development. The far-reaching privatization wave that occurred after the fall of communism has partly reshaped these traditional economic divisions, leaving a good slice of the biggest factories in the hands of the public sector through its state-owned or state controlled enterprises and the holding companies. This change happened, especially under the Eltsin government tenure, without any effect on the whole productive structure except for the ownership of some of the more profitable state enterprises. The internal political and financial scenery emerged in this way and and brought Russia to the new millennium with a roughly tripartite economic structure. The first segment is composed by a number of small enterprises and activities which suffered huge technological backwardness and isolation from the rest of the country’s economy. The second segment is made up of an extended public sector which stretches to cover the majority of strategic financial and productive enterprises once owned by the soviet regime. The control over these strategic economic strong points is exerted through public holding companies or by the federal government directly. The third economic part, which came to light at the beginning of the new millennium, is constituted by the state enterprises or some of their branches that the so called “oligarchs” were able to gather at the time of the vast, non-transparent and suspect post-soviet privatizations. This situation led to an almost motionless economic structure, where a small number of primary sectors have been advantaged at the expenses of dynamic, widespread and balanced economic development. At the same time the majority of Russian human and monetary resources have been devoted to those sectors, leaving only a minor role to all other activities. From Putin’s rise to power in 1999 onwards, this unbalanced trend has been going on without any interruption and is still evident today. Nevertheless the last eleven years have seen the rising need to cope with the lack of economic alternatives outside of the above mentioned pillars, that historically have been the backbone of Russia’s productive system. The necessity to enlarge the economic options has been felt by Moscow as a priority on paper, but it hasn’t been already addressed successfully. Throughout the ten years of Putin’s hold on power, there have been some efforts to solve the problem of imbalance between overdeveloped and underdeveloped economic sectors. However, the various attempts to diversify Russian economy have been, it seems, in vain. It is also possible to affirm that in the same period of time, what could have been considered as a temporary weakness, caused by the understandable postsoviet financial and institutional difficulties, has become Russia’s permanent structural feature, keeping the national economy from being helpful to the bulk of the population. In this context the last ten years have seen the funding of the three key Russian productive sectors (defence, energy and steel) rise until the great majority of the total state investment spending. If we take into consideration 2010 and the beginning of 2011, we can easily observe that the tendency described above hasn’t changed considerably. On the contrary, in October 2010, Prime Minister Putin and Energy Minister Shmatko announced at a conference held in gas-rich Siberia that investments in the gas sector will escalate until 2030 to an amount of approximately 450 billion dollars. The plan hinges on the national gas monopoly of Gazprom, the state company which is the strategic point on which Russian economic and political powers rely. Moreover the nuclear energy and oil production output will be augmented through large supplementary investments made by public and private Russian agencies. The defence sector will have an even larger share of the investments at hand for the future, confirming the past trend. By 2020 the military spending will reach almost 2% of Russian GDP, with a extensive army and renewal of heavy weapons worth 650 billions dollars up to the same year. The steel industry is following the same path, mostly for two reasons: the unquenchable Asian demand that keeps alive the profitability of the production, and the home consumption stirred (directly or indirectly) by state economic activities. These huge investment plans, focused on the few already-developed economic sectors, will absorb most of the public financial resources in the approaching decades. It’s a situation that reveals the misleading nature of the declarations and actions taken by the Russian political authorities ahead of an urgent and widely recognized need to diversify the Russian economy. In fact the necessity and the will to work effectively for the diversification of the economic structure has been a central issue in the official statements made by Moscow, more than once in the last years. For what concerns the policies oriented towards this goal, the agreements with the European Union in the spring 2010 whose content went from know how and technology transfer to bilateral cooperation in research must be underlined. Furthermore a national plan to modernize and upgrade the productive activities in Russia has been lunched in the fall 2010 with a massive commitment by the government, but which remained largely on paper. Even though something has been done, the endeavours made by the public authorities have so far fallen apart, generating activities separated and isolated from the general (and frail) economic net. This outcome has tragically resembled the national outlook depicted by the three main national sectors inside a weak economy. In addition, it must be noted that technological research and the productive activities which have flourished in the last years as a consequence of the efforts made by Moscow to encourage innovation and diversification of the economy, have kept a strong association with the three main national economical sectors. In this way the possible benefits of an enlargement to the whole economy of dynamic and new activities have remained limited to little circle of industries linked to the main ones. The Special Economic Zones (SEZs), established in the last decade as a tool to attract investments and start new enterprises on the Russian territory, are to be considered as another example of failed attempt to enlarge the economic participation of a wider segment of the population. They didn’t generate the expected effect on the country’s wellness as a whole, only improving artificial arithmetical indexes, sacrificing labour rights and environmental laws without a real positive outcome for the majority of the people. The same goes for the Foreign Direct Investments in Russia. They have been mainly directed to the three driving sectors of the national economy, almost without touching other parts of the national economical structure that are in need of support. While in terms of foreign investments draw the gas and oil industry kept on gaining ground in the last few years, the rest of economy, especially the small and medium enterprises, lagged behind almost to a standstill. The poor judicial and institutional accountability, holds investors from risking something in other activities than the ones already developed whose attachment to state interests assures a sufficient degree of certainty in the mid-term repayment. The strong pledge of Moscow in attracting foreign investments, emerging in the last decade, has risen simultaneously to a lack of internal autonomous economic action, apart from the three main sectors and a few others. This circumstance is still present and yet the ineffectiveness of this strategy has not been fully understood and overturned by political authorities. In fact it prevents the economy from acting autonomously and the political actors from taking the proper role in shaping a complete, modern and balanced industrial policy. The concentration of the foreign investments in a small number of productive sectors has caused a mounting vulnerability of the three sectors themselves. As the weight of foreign capitals grew in these segments of national economy, so did the potential risks involved in a sudden downturn or retirement of investments. It happened in the last three years with the effects of the international financial crisis. In 2009 foreign direct investments in Russia fell by 13% against 2008, while the 2010 figure was even worse. This sharp and harmful drop was generated by the concentration of foreign capitals in the primary and narrow part of the national economy. Another problem connected to the missed diversification of Russian economy and thus its polarized and imbalanced nature, is its exposure to the oscillations of world market trends. This is especially true for the energy sector, which is mainly export oriented and makes up for the majority of the state monetary resources and reserves. In fact the fluctuation of oil and gas prices is dangerous for Russia, given the lack of flexibility in its economy, and the prominence of this sector inside the national economic setting. A proof of the difficulties explained above has been given recently by the 15% fall in gas and oil sales to EU during 2009 and 2010. At the same time the economic growth is diminished by 8% in 2009. This explains briefly but clearly the damaging effect caused by the low range of productive options present in the Russian economic structure, especially in times of financial turbulence or market prices variations. Another example is given by the very high unemployment rate observed in some of the biggest Russian cities which are dominated by an almost single sector industry. The so called “mono-industrial” cities represent the tip of the iceberg and the most apparent icon of the neglected productive diversification in the country. The awful, direct and immediate result on the population of those cities, in terms of job losses and consequent distress, is a mirror in which Russia can reflect its larger but similar structural economic problems on a national level. The existence of the three mentioned sectors in a privileged position inside the Russian economy has favoured the creation of economic, financial and political centres of power. As receivers of the highest amount of monetary resources and investments from abroad as well as from the government, those industries have developed a big influence ahead of the other economical players in the country. Being the backbone of the Russian productive economy, they have precedence over other issues and are now able to direct reforms so as to avoid any structural reform of the Russian economic system. The stronger this influence is, the more difficult will be to change the present unfair and polarized economical pattern. This in turn strengthens the influence held by the three sectors themselves. This condition, as it is easily understandable, holds very negative implication for the rest of the economy as well as for the economic structure as a whole, and in the end for the Russian population. At the moment, the most visible of the detrimental effects is the absence of the relocation of wealth produced among the society and the harsh inequality which is a trademark of post soviet Russia. In this context, it is almost impossible for medium and small ventures to prosper and to broaden the economic options for citizens and government, which is a result of the shortage in public support, political strategic vision and allocation of resources to more receivers than the accustomed ones. The energy sector surely plays the biggest role in offering the successive Russian governments an enormous monetary (also political and electoral) revenue which has discouraged (and still does) the productive diversification of the economy. The three pillars of Russian economy (energy, weapons and steel) have created the image of the state abroad as a and have shaped the post-soviet country’s structure both politically and economically. It seems that this trend it’s not turning around and that the envisaged change towards diversification has a long way to go yet. Apart from the consequences already exposed, there are two more reflections to be made. The development of these three sectors is harming the environment producing goods in an unsustainable way for unsustainable purposes. Hydrocarbons, vast quantities of steel and heavy weapons are old fashioned products belonging to the “old economy” of the twentieth century, whose usage will be less and less frequent in the upcoming years (unfortunately apart from the weapons). What’s more, the production, on an extremely large scale, of heavy weapons has a double moral repercussion. On one side the export of weapons and war technology in general produces violence in other parts of the world; on the other side the huge defence spending at home is removing (and will even more so in the near future, given the plan outlined above) essential resources otherwise vital to face many social and economic problems which badly affect Russia. The three sectors are still gaining ground inside the crisis hit Russian economy, developing rapidly but in a quantitative way (more steell, more weapons, more gas, more aluminium etc.). Rather than taking into account the need to raise significantly the quality standards and, most of all, consider other goals for the future of its economy and society, Russia is still chasing after an economic model both unsustainable and already out of time.

**Failure to diversify from oil exposes Russia to international economic fluctuations**

**Tempera 11** (Michele, “Is Russia Diversifying Its Economy or Once More Strengthening Its Already Strong Sectors?” PECOB, March)//mat

The Special Economic Zones (SEZs), established in the last decade as a tool to attract investments and start new enterprises on the Russian territory, are to be considered as another example of failed attempt to enlarge the economic participation of a wider segment of the population. They didn’t generate the expected effect on the country’s wellness as a whole, only improving artificial arithmetical indexes, sacrificing labour rights and environmental laws without a real positive outcome for the majority of the people. The same goes for the Foreign Direct Investments in Russia. They have been mainly directed to the three driving sectors of the national economy, almost without touching other parts of the national economical structure that are in need of support. While in terms of foreign investments draw the gas and oil industry kept on gaining ground in the last few years, the rest of economy, especially the small and medium enterprises, lagged behind almost to a standstill. The poor judicial and institutional accountability, holds investors from risking something in other activities than the ones already developed whose attachment to state interests assures a sufficient degree of certainty in the mid-term repayment. The strong pledge of Moscow in attracting foreign investments, emerging in the last decade, has risen simultaneously to a lack of internal autonomous economic action, apart from the three main sectors and a few others. This circumstance is still present and yet the ineffectiveness of this strategy has not been fully understood and overturned by political authorities. In fact it prevents the economy from acting autonomously and the political actors from taking the proper role in shaping a complete, modern and balanced industrial policy. The concentration of the foreign investments in a small number of productive sectors has caused a mounting vulnerability of the three sectors themselves. As the weight of foreign capitals grew in these segments of national economy, so did the potential risks involved in a sudden downturn or retirement of investments. It happened in the last three years with the effects of the international financial crisis. In 2009 foreign direct investments in Russia fell by 13% against 2008, while the 2010 figure was even worse. This sharp and harmful drop was generated by the concentration of foreign capitals in the primary and narrow part of the national economy. Another problem connected to the missed diversification of Russian economy and thus its polarized and imbalanced nature, is its exposure to the oscillations of world market trends. This is especially true for the energy sector, which is mainly export oriented and makes up for the majority of the state monetary resources and reserves. In fact the fluctuation of oil and gas prices is dangerous for Russia, given the lack of flexibility in its economy, and the prominence of this sector inside the national economic setting. A proof of the difficulties explained above has been given recently by the 15% fall in gas and oil sales to EU during 2009 and 2010. At the same time the economic growth is diminished by 8% in 2009. This explains briefly but clearly the damaging effect caused by the low range of productive options present in the Russian economic structure, especially in times of financial turbulence or market prices variations.

**Russia Aggression Turn**

**Russia’s oil economy kills US-Russia Relations - Aggression**

**Shlapentokh 06** Professor of Sociology at MSU (11/6/06, Vladimir, Oil and Gas Journal, “Intoxicated by high oil prices: Political Dutch disease afflicting the Kremlin”, Vol. 104, Iss. 41; pg. 18, Proquest SW)

As suggested by many economists, Dutch disease-a country's excessive dependence on the export of raw materials-can have serious economic consequences as a country becomes increasingly dependent on that raw materials sector. Other branches of the economy, such as manufacturing, often decline because of the concentration of such resources as oil or gold, as happened in 16th century Spain. A sudden fall in the price of the raw materials could bring an economic collapse. Seemingly, the Russian leaders, like their colleagues in Venezuela and Iran, see the world through the prism of oil revenues. It goes without saying that one of the first victims of the political Dutch disease is democracy. However, an even more dangerous consequence of the political Dutch disease is the leader's loss of a sober assessment of reality. Under the impact of their technological achievements, both Stalin and Khrushchev, with thenskewed visions of reality, moved the country closer to a major war. **Putin's** euphoria over oil prices may not be as great as his predecessors' enthusiasm, but his **aggressiveness in foreign policy in general, and toward the US** and Russia's neighbors in particular, **has** clearly **increased** since 2005.The shift occurred in late 2005 when Moscow brandished its gas weapon against Ukraine and indirectly against Europe. Russia's foreign policy has hardened (despite some cooperative gestures toward the West) and influenced several international conflicts, including issues surrounding North Korea, Iran, and the Middle East. The conspicuous demonstrations in July of friendship with Venezuela's Chavez, another political leader inebriated by oil revenues, and the readiness to sell him weapons despite American protests were **clear signals of unfriendliness toward the US.** Russian media treated Moscow's attitudes toward Chavez as **an obvious demonstration of disregard toward American concerns.** Drnitry Medvedev's proposal to make the ruble fully convertible in an attempt to renew the currency's international status was another result of the country's oil fever. Medvedev talked contemptuously about "the financial irresponsibility of the United States," citing the country's growing national deficit. He also denounced the International Monetary Fund's attempt to promote market reforms, forgetting that only a few years ago Russia had scrounged for credits from this bank.

**Extinction**

**Allison & Blackwill 11**

[Graham, director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School, former assistant secretary of defense in the Clinton administration, Robert D., Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy -- Council on Foreign Relations, served as U.S. ambassador to India and as deputy national security adviser for strategic planning in the Bush administration, both co-chairmen of the Task Force on Russia and U.S. National Interests, co-sponsored by the Belfer Center and the Center for the National Interest, 10-30-11 Politico, “10 reasons why Russia still matters,” http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=161EF282-72F9-4D48-8B9C-C5B3396CA0E6]

That central point is that Russia matters a great deal to a U.S. government seeking to defend and advance its national interests. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s decision to return next year as president makes it all the more critical for Washington to manage its relationship with Russia through coherent, realistic policies. No one denies that Russia is a dangerous, difficult, often disappointing state to do business with. We should not overlook its many human rights and legal failures. Nonetheless, Russia is a player whose choices affect our vital interests in nuclear security and energy. It is key to supplying 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Ten realities require U.S. policymakers to advance our nation’s interests by engaging and working with Moscow. First, Russia remains the only nation that can erase the United States from the map in 30 minutes. As every president since John F. Kennedy has recognized, **Russia’s cooperation is critical to averting nuclear war.** Second, Russia is our most consequential partner in preventing nuclear terrorism. Through a combination of more than $11 billion in U.S. aid, provided through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and impressive Russian professionalism, two decades after the collapse of the “evil empire,” not one nuclear weapon has been found loose. Third, **Russia plays an essential role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons** and missile-delivery systems. As Washington seeks to stop Iran’s drive toward nuclear weapons, Russian choices to sell or withhold sensitive technologies are the difference between failure and the possibility of success. Fourth, Russian support in sharing intelligence and cooperating in operations **remains essential to the U.S. war to destroy Al Qaeda and combat other transnational terrorist groups.**

**U.S. Econ Turns Russia**

**Economic downturn collapse Russian restraint, unleashing a winner-take-all war**

**Nyquist 8**

[J.R., a WorldNetDaily contributing editor and author of 'Origins of the Fourth World War.', “Financial Collapse and Destructive War”, September 19, http://www.financialsense.com/stormwatch/geo/pastanalysis/2008/0919.html]

If the United States went bankrupt the following sequence would occur: The U.S. government would lose its credibility, the country’s currency would fail and imports could not be maintained – especially oil imports. There would be shortages. But the sequence doesn’t end with shortages. It doesn’t end with mere economic loss. When the financial structure collapses, the national security structure collapses. Then nothing will restrain the military power of Russia and China. A few days ago Russia’s representative to NATO, Dimitry Rogozin, made a striking statement. He warned that the Europeans risk war if Georgia joins the alliance. “We will terminate all contact with NATO because we cannot cooperate with an organization which supports an aggressor against us. If NATO makes another mistake in its relations with the East, we will be unable to continue our relations. Our people will not understand. For us, it is a ‘red line.’” He then characterized Mikhail Saakashvili as a war criminal and “puppet of the United States.” Rogozin warned that Europe should stay out of the “somebody else’s war, which is a war against Russia.” What did Rogozin mean by this? If the Europeans know what is good for them, they will leave the Americans to fend for themselves. In other words – Europe must break with the United States. The real conflict is between Russia and America. Europe need not get involved. The Kremlin’s position was clarified recently by Prime Minister Putin. He said that George Bush was a good man, but that George Bush was no longer in charge of the U.S. government. Evil advisors have taken over in Washington, and these must be dealt with. If you follow Russia closely, and listen to the words of Russian leaders, then you know that there is a low-level war being fought between Russia and America. In fact, it is a war of national survival and Russia is determined to prevail. This has not been stated directly, but was indirectly alluded to by Vladimir Putin when he spoke to the Russian people after the Beslan massacre in 2004. “Despite all the difficulties,” said Putin in a televised speech, “we have managed to preserve the core of the colossus that was the Soviet Union.” And that core has come under attack. “Someone” wants to destroy what remains of the USSR. The Russian leadership is consistent in its policy. Talk of Russia’s “partnership” with America has always been a smokescreen. The Kremlin seeks to justify future military action against the United States and has long been building a case. The Kremlin wants America cut off from its allies, and has patiently waited for the advent of financial collapse as the signal to push hard for Europe’s neutrality. As explained in previous columns, this is the basis of Russia’s recent turn of policy. “Some want to cut a juicy morsel from us,” said Putin in 2004, referring to the oil-rich Caucasus region. “Others are helping them. They are helping because they believe that, as one of the world’s major nuclear powers, Russia still poses a threat to them, and therefore this threat must be removed. And terrorism, of course, is only a tool for achieving these goals.” They want to break the back of the Russian state. They want to deprive Russia of its nuclear arsenal because it “still” threatens them. “This is a challenge to the whole of Russia,” Putin explained, “to the whole of our people. This is an attack on our country.” The plan is to “intimidate” Russia with “inhuman cruelty,” to “paralyze our will and demoralize our society.” The Russian president added: “It would appear that we have a choice of resisting them or agreeing to their claims, surrendering or allowing them to destroy and split Russia….” It is a case of kill or be killed, split or be split. Russia is therefore at war with America. “One cannot fail to see the obvious,” said Putin. “We are not just dealing with separate actions aimed at frightening us, or separate terrorist sorties. We are dealing with direct intervention by way of terrorism against Russia, with total, cruel and full-scale war in which our compatriots die again and again.” Putin is lying, of course. He knows that the wars of the Caucasus were contrived by the Russian General Staff and the KGB. The Kremlin has long operated on the basis of a secret policy. This policy includes the retreat from ideology, the abdication of the Communist Party and false liberalization. KGB defector Anatoliy Golitsyn described this secret policy five years before the Berlin Wall came down, warning that a long-range strategy had been jointly agreed upon by Russia and China in 1960. He outlined the details of the planned collapse of Communism: including the unification of Germany, the elimination of the Warsaw Pact and the push for European neutrality at the outset of a renewed Cold War. To be sure, no policy works exactly as the planners envisioned. There were setbacks and delays. But the objective of the conspiracy remains. It is global revolution. This was Lenin’s conception. This was also the rationale of the Soviet state and the mission of the KGB. The collapse of the Soviet Union was conceived as a strategic maneuver in the late 1950s. It was discussed by KGB Chairman Alexander Shelepin at a secret meeting in 1959. The KGB infiltrated and financed various dissident movements inside the Soviet Bloc. The future role of these movements was clear. A period of fake democracy would be initiated and the West would be “put to sleep.” The Communists in the East denied their faith publicly. They repeated Lenin’s New Economic Policy with a straight face and their hands out. When Communism lost its official standing in Russia, the Communists discovered the feebleness of their revolutionary order. They discovered that fraud is a two-way street. The party bosses weren’t the only ones who could steal, cheat and lie. The reality of the Soviet economy was, in part, expressed in a simple formula: “We pretend to work and they pretend to pay us.” A fraudulent system engenders a fraudulent citizenry and a hollow center. The Soviet public suspected the official ideology was rotten with lies; so once the bankruptcy of the system was publicly admitted the people were confirmed in their cynicism. Besides this, they never really cared about class struggle. The ruling ideology was not theirs. They did not choose it willingly, or embrace it enthusiastically. It was imposed on them by Lenin and Stalin. Only a sub-faction within the aspiring cadre of the Communist Party Soviet Union appreciated Marxist concepts. For such people, Communist ideas signified foreknowledge and power. It was the science and method, pure and rigorous, of global revolutionary conquest. It was a method of seizing power, winning wars and crushing enemies. That is why Mao Zedong scoffed at the atomic bomb. Weapons don’t decide everything, he said. Man decides what happens, and men are guided by ideas, and the ideas of Marx and Lenin are “more powerful than a machine gun,” and more destructive than the atomic bomb. To understand the power of Communist ideas we must come to terms with the emergence of the modern nihilistic misfit and his special brand of narcissistic megalomania. Lenin once wrote that there is no such thing as Communist dogma. This statement may confuse the party idiots, but it clarifies the real situation for the politically perceptive. The apparent abdication of the Communists during the period 1989-91 was a subterfuge long in the making. It was conceivable by the strategists in Moscow because the framework of their ideology involved the integration of sociology, economics and psychology with politics and war. It represented the science of “divide and conquer” carried to perfection. Today the name of Hitler has become a caricature. In our mind’s eye we see the carpet-chewing megalomaniac foaming at the mouth, screaming hate before demented crowds, parading around with goose-stepping soldiers. We call Hitler a “madman” and dismiss him as an aberration. We fool ourselves by thinking there is nobody like him today. But the leaders in Moscow and Beijing are more cunning and better equipped for mass extermination than Hitler ever was. The leaders of the totalitarian countries, behind the façade of liberal reform, are serial killers imprinted with an impulse to butchery. They want more victims, and they want the victims piled ever higher. These are the blood-proofs of their power, and the ultimate assurance of longed-for preeminence. If the ancient Romans destroyed Carthage without nuclear weapons, without modern instruments of war, what will Moscow and Beijing do to the United States when America is paralyzed by financial collapse? Again and again I am asked the question: Why would the leaders of Russia or China want to destroy the United States? One might as well ask why Hitler sought the destruction of the Jews. Why did Genghis Khan exterminate entire cities and depopulate entire regions of the earth? You say that these are the acts of “madmen.” But history is populated with madmen. Everyone can see that Lenin’s successors have refused to bury him. They buried Stalin. They buried Khrushchev. They buried everyone in the country. But they refuse to bury Lenin. He lays in state, in his mausoleum, the great symbol of Communism’s persistence and the KGB’s ongoing mission. The cadre stays the course. The dynamos continue to propel the great engine of destruction. They are there, wearing their masks – in league with their comrades around the globe (in Cuba, in Venezuela, in Bolivia, in South Africa, in Congo, in the American universities). Only when they bury Lenin, only when the Red Tsar is laid to rest, should we accept the death of Communism as an authentic happening in Russia. You see, it doesn’t matter if one percent of a country actually adheres to something. If that one percent is driven to dominate, if that one percent guides the machine, if that one percent makes policy and follows the same old strategy, then the rest are fodder. They are grist for a terrible mill. Ideas are decisive in every system, even if those ideas are a rationale for mass murder, even if those ideas only appeal to thieves and murderers. The killer has an impulse to kill, the tyrant to tyrannize and the warmonger to make war. Vladimir Putin has referred to himself as a “Soviet person.” He has publicly decried the fall of the Soviet Union. He has overseen the return of Soviet symbols to the Russian military, the rebuilding and modernization of key elements of the old Soviet war machine. Whether he is a true tsar or the public face of a secret ruling group, the spirit of Lenin bleeds through his cold Napoleonic façade. America’s financial collapse threatens to uncork the totalitarian genie from its bottle. I believe it is too late to stop the worst from happening. The sequence has begun. The Kremlin knew that a financial crash was about to take place. They’ve been waiting on it. They are prepared to exploit it. And the Americans are completely oblivious. They are utterly unprepared.

### Russia Econ Defense

#### -- Russian economy resilient – and impact is empirically denied

Post Magazine 8 (3-31, Lexis)

In late 1998 Russia's economy suffered a major downturn that saw its financial markets collapse. As a result of world commodity prices sinking, Russia's slick black oil and gas-driven economy turned into a red sea of disasters - and the insurance market followed suit in a crash of its own. But, slowly, Russia began to rebuild itself. And like any country depending on exports, the win-lose battle suddenly started to improve. With oil prices skyrocketing to a new all-time high of close to $105 (£52.6) per barrel this month, it seems likely the country will stay in the black. "It is impossible to think of any event that might cause a similar fall in country's insurance market," says Nikolay Galushin, deputy chief executive officer for corporate development of Ingosstrakh, one of the country's largest domestic insurance companies.

#### -- Empirics disprove Russian collapse

WPJ 3 (World Policy Journal, 12-22)

Using extensive interviews with participants in all three administrations, and memoirs by former officials, they paint a compelling picture of officials often over-whelmed by the challenge of an entirely new reality. The unexpected collapse of communism and of the Soviet Union, coming just after the GulfWar, left them with no road map to understand how Russia and other post-Soviet states might develop. Nightmare scenarios suggested themselves: nuclear war between Russia and Ukraine; weapons proliferation on a terrifying scale; Yugoslav-type ethnically based civil war on the territory of the former Soviet Union; mass starvation; economic collapse--the ominous possibilities were endless. That these "dogs did not bark" is testimony to the unwillingness of people in the post-Soviet space to engage in armed conflict and to Western assistance that staved off famine and economic collapse. The failure of catastrophic scenarios to come about is one indicator of success--but if one were to measure America's contribution to transforming Russia in more positive ways, the evidence is more mixed. If a minimalist definition of success was the absence of catastrophe, the maximalist definition was the creation of a fully functioning democracy in Russia with a transparent market economy and the rule of law. That has not happened yet, and it is unclear when it will. So far, there is no consensus about what would constitute a realistic timetable for Russia's democratic development.

**Econ Impact Defense**

**Russian economic collapse is inevitable**

**Aslund 2008** (Anders, Peterson Institute, Moscow Times, Sept 3, http://www.iie.com/publications/opeds/oped.cfm?ResearchID=997)

August 8 stands out as a fateful day for Russia. It marks Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's greatest strategic blunder. In one blow, he wiped out half a trillion dollars of stock market value, stalled all domestic reforms, and isolated Russia from the outside world. Russia's attack on Georgia, its small democratic neighbor, was bad enough, but its recognition of two conquered protectorates as independent states has been supported only by Hamas, Belarus, Venezuela, and Cuba. Putin is turning Russia into a rogue state. Russia has gone through a grand economic recovery, but its strength must not be exaggerated. In current dollars, its gross domestic product has increased almost ninefold in nine years, but even so, it accounts for only 2.8 percent of global GDP. At present, its per capita GDP of $12,000 is a quarter of the US level. While this is impressive, much of its catch-up potential has been exhausted. The official government target is to reach half the US per capita GDP by 2020. It is possible to achieve that goal, but it would require carrying out extensive economic reforms during the next 12 years. The problem, however, is that Russia's foreign aggression has strengthened the authoritarian regime, and this has ended all hopes for substantial reforms at a time when they are needed the most. To understand Russia's economic dilemma, we need to consider the causes of the country's growth over the last decade and the current challenges. The dominant cause of growth has been European or capitalist convergence, which Russia has enjoyed thanks to Boris Yeltsin's hard-fought introduction of a market economy, privatization, and international integration. The country's short economic history can be summed up as: All good comes from private enterprise. The government's contribution has been to keep the budget in surplus and reduce taxation. A second cause of the high growth has been the huge free capacity in production, infrastructure, and human capital after the collapse of communism. The recovery was also coupled with remonetization, as Russia has enjoyed one of the greatest credit booms of all time. With the rise of the new capitalist service sector, a huge structural change has spurred growth. Together, the systemic and structural changes amount to a gigantic catch-up effect that all postcommunist reform countries have experienced. The average annual real growth in former Soviet states from 2000 to 2007 was 9 percent, but it reached only 7 percent in Russia.The third factor behind Russia's growth is the most spurious—namely the oil price windfall since 2004. While it has boosted the country's budget surplus, current account balance, and currency reserves, it is likely to have damaged its policy badly, as the elite focused on the distribution of oil rents rather than on the improvement of policy. As a consequence, Russia has seen no economic or social reforms worth mentioning for the past six years. Moscow's current economic dilemma is that the old sources of growth will soon be exhausted. Undoubtedly, some capitalist convergence will continue, but it is bound to slow down. Unfortunately, it is easy to compile 10 reasons why Russia is likely to have lower growth in the near future than it has had for the last nine years. 1. Internationally, one of the greatest booms of all times is finally coming to an end. Demand is falling throughout the world, and soon Russia will also be hit. This factor alone has brought the Western world to stagnation. 2. Russia's main problem is its enormous corruption. According to Transparency International, only Equatorial Guinea is richer than Russia and more corrupt. Since the main culprit behind Russia's aggravated corruption is Putin, no improvement is likely as long as he persists. 3. Infrastructure, especially roads, has become an extraordinary bottleneck, and the sad fact is that Russia is unable to carry out major infrastructure projects. When Putin came to power in 2000, Russia had 754,000 kilometers of paved road. Incredibly, by 2006 this figure had increased by only 0.1 percent, and the little that is built costs at least three times as much as in the West. Public administration is simply too incompetent and corrupt to develop major projects. 4. Renationalization is continuing and leading to a decline in economic efficiency. When Putin publicly attacked Mechel, investors presumed that he had decided to nationalize the company. Thus they rushed to dump their stock in Mechel, having seen what happened to Yukos, Russneft, United Heavy Machineries, and VSMP-Avisma, to name a few. In a note to investors, UBS explained diplomatically that an old paradigm of higher political risk has returned to Russia, so it has reduced its price targets by an average of 20 percent, or a market value of $300 billion. Unpredictable economic crime is bad for growth. 5. The most successful transition countries have investment ratios exceeding 30 percent of GDP, as is also the case in East Asia. But in Russia, it is only 20 percent of GDP, and it is likely to fall in the current business environment. That means that bottlenecks will grow worse. 6. An immediate consequence of Russia's transformation into a rogue state is that membership in the World Trade Organization is out of reach. World Bank and Economic Development Ministry assessments have put the value of WTO membership at 0.5 to 1 percentage points of additional growth per year for the next five years. Now, a similar deterioration is likely because of increased protectionism, especially in agriculture and finance. 7. Minimal reforms in law enforcement, education, and health care have been undertaken, and no new attempt is likely. The malfunctioning public services will become an even greater drag on economic growth. 8. Oil and commodity prices can only go down, and energy production is stagnant, which means that Russia's external accounts are bound to deteriorate quickly. 9. Because Russia's banking system is dominated by five state banks, it is inefficient and unreliable, and the national cost of a poor banking system rises over time. 10. Inflation is now 15 percent because of a poor exchange rate and monetary policies, though the current capital outflow may ease that problem.In short, Russia is set for a sudden and sharp fall in its economic growth. It is difficult to assess the impact of each of these 10 factors, but they are all potent and negative. A sudden, zero growth would not be surprising, and leaders like Putin are not prepared to face reality. Russia's economic situation looks ugly. For how long can Russia afford such an expensive prime minister?

# Economic Reforms

## Uniqueness

### No Reforms Now: 2AC

#### **Maduro popularity low now – US diplomatic recognition of his government gives him the capital to get reforms**

Baverstock 13 (Alasdair CSM Contributor, “Venezuela's Maduro still waiting on Washington's recognition,” 5-17-13, The Christian Science Monitor)

More than a month after Venezuela's contested presidential election, President Nicolás Maduro's narrow victory has yet to be recognized by the United States. Refusing to legitimize the new premier while a partial recount of the vote is underway, the US position has led to further political tensions in a relationship historically stressed under the leadership of former President Hugo Chávez. A handful of countries, including Chile, Peru, and the US, have expressed concern over the democratic standards of the election, which Maduro won by a little more than 1 percent of the vote. Venezuela's opposition party is calling for the results to be annulled, citing over 3,000 instances of election fraud, ranging from alleged multiple-voting in chavista-strongholds to polling booth intimidation. "Obviously, if there are huge irregularities we are going to have serious questions about the viability of that government," said Secretary of State John Kerry during a hearing of the US Foreign Affairs Committee following the announcement of President Maduro's victory in April. While the US has pledged not to interfere with Venezuelan politics, the refusal to recognize Maduro's presidency has left many to question what message the US is trying to send, and how - if at all - it will impact Venezuela post-Chávez. "[The US isn't] recognizing or failing to recognize," says David Smilde, professor of sociology at the University of Georgia. "They're just waiting. But here in Venezuela that's seen as an act of belligerence." 'Symbolic' The US's reluctance to accept the new leader affects little in economic terms; the heavy crude is still flowing steadily from the Venezuelan oil fields into US refineries, a trading relationship upon which Venezuela relies heavily, particularly following the recent slump in global oil prices. In fact, many believe the US's reluctance to legitimize Maduro amounts to little more than a message to other regional observers. "Maduro is certainly now the president of Venezuela," says Mark Jones, professor of political science at Rice University in Texas. "The US's refusal to recognize him is more symbolic than anything else. Ignoring Maduro's win sends a signal to other Latin American countries that these elections didn't meet minimum democratic standards." Other observers cite the socialist leader's continued belligerence toward Washington - Maduro blames the US government's "dark forces" for the death of Mr. Chávez and has pursued the provocative rhetoric of his predecessor - as a factor in the US's reluctance to recognize Maduro as president. "You can't blame the US for not extending their hand," says Mr. Smilde. "Maduro has been denouncing US conspiracies since the day Chávez died." Maduro reacted publicly to President Obama's announcement that the US was withholding recognition of his victory by describing the US president as the "Grand chief of devils" and threatening to cut off oil exports to the country."That's an entirely hollow threat," says Professor Jones, "96 percent of Venezuela's export revenues come from oil, so Maduro is not going to do anything to upset that." Regional recognition Meanwhile, other countries in the region were quick to congratulate Maduro on his victory. In fact, the new leader spent last week on a whistle-stop tour of friendly regional governments including Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil in an attempt to secure his leadership status. "Things haven't been going well for Maduro since the election," says Smilde. "his recent touring of the continent has been a very obvious attempt to demonstrate his legitimacy." Following the hotly contested election, which many Venezuelans believe was stolen by a socialist government fearing the loss of power, country-wide protests erupted. Riot police fought protesters with tear gas and nightly "cacerolazo" sound protests filled the capital with a cacophony of noise. Although officially victorious, Maduro's slim win compared to the eleven percent by which Chávez defeated the same opponent last October left the new premier with little mandate to govern. "A lot of Venezuelans seem to think that a close election is not a valid election, so this leaves room for Maduro's critics to question it," says Mark Weisbrot of the Center for Economic and Policy research, an independent think-tank in Washington. Mr. Weisbrot says he thinks the US is trying to take advantage of this situation. Far from putting a dent in Maduro's credibility, other observers believe that continued tensions between Venezuela and the US serve as a positive for a president whose supporters have come to expect belligerence towards "las imperialistas." "In many ways John Kerry is doing Maduro a favor by not recognizing him," says Jones. "The US's refusal to cooperate plays into the socialists' broader narrative that the US is conspiring to defeat Venezuela's revolution." Others are less convinced by Maduro's bluster, seeing a politician weakened by his lack of mandate at home. "He'd definitely like the US to recognize him," says Gerardo Munck, a professor of international relations at the University of Southern California. "There's nothing he can do to pressure the US, but to be seen as having been duly elected would put him in a far stronger position both at home and internationally." With neither side showing any inclination toward compromise, the standoff between the two countries also shows no sign of ending. But Maduro's long-term challenges are looming. Inflation in the socialist country is nearing 30 percent, there is public anger over the chronic shortages of basic goods, and the ballooning murder rate exceeds Europe and the United States's combined. "Maduro is going to have to tackle these problems if he's going to last as president," says Mr. Munck. "[U]nless there's some change in the way he handles the situation, the US isn't going to budge."

## Solvency

### Plan Solves Economic Reforms: 2AC

#### Plan is key to facilitate Maduro’s economic reform policy, opposition movement prevents action now

Mander 13 (Benedict, Financial Times London, “Fears of hyperinflation grip Venezuela,” 5-10-13)

Hyperinflation is looming in Venezuela , with prices suffering their highest monthly rise on record in May, while the economy slides into recession and the popularity of Nicolas Maduro , the new president, wanes. Prices rose 6.1 per cent in May, compared with 1.6 per cent in the same period last year, bringing accumulated inflation for the first five months of 2013 to 19.4 per cent, almost as high as the annual figure for 2012 of 20.1 per cent. The sudden jump in prices, with the 4.3 per cent rise in April already sounding alarms, has triggered fears at Goldman Sachs that Venezuela could be on the brink of hyperinflation, which the US bank defines as seasonally adjusted annualised rates of more than 40 per cent. There is no fixed definition of hyperinflation. The International Accounting Standards Board puts it at a cumulative rate of 100 per cent over three years. At present, the annualised rate of inflation in Venezuela is 35.2 per cent. At the same time, the economy is losing steam, with 0.7 per cent growth registered in the first quarter of 2013, compared with 5.9 per cent growth in the same period last year. Analysts at London-based consultancy Capital Economics suspect Venezuela may already be in recession and forecast that gross domestic product will contract by 1 per cent this year. At the root of the Opec country's economic woes is a tangled web of price and currency controls which, together with problems in the oil industry that supplies 96 per cent of export revenues, have generated a shortage of foreign currency, on which the import-dependent economy relies. That has caused shortages of basic goods including food, aggravating inflation further. Zulia, Venezuela's most populous state, had considered rationing of 20 basic food products but Mr Maduro dismissed the plan as "insane". With stagflation now entrenched, political instability has also racked the country since Mr Maduro's victory by less than 2 percentage points in the mid-April election, a result which an emboldened opposition refuses to recognise. Infighting within the ruling socialist party is also damaging Mr Maduro's popularity. A recent poll by Caracas-based IVAD showed that opposition leader Henrique Capriles would win if the election were held again today. Russ Dallen, managing partner at Caracas Capital Markets, says the problem is that the value of the dollar on the currency black market, the result of a decade of strict controls, has more than tripled in the past three years, making imports more expensive. "If Maduro can find dollars and speed them into the markets, he could turn that situation around. Sadly, the Cubans seem to be running things in the meantime and you end up with Cuban-type solutions like the rationing model in Zulia," he said.

## WTO

### Impact 2AC

#### -- Free trade through the WTO solves nuclear war.

**Copley News Service. 1999** [Lexis]

For decades, many children in America and other countries went to bed fearing annihilation by nuclear war. The specter of nuclear winter freezing the life out of planet Earth seemed very real. Activists protesting the World Trade Organization's meeting in Seattle apparently have forgotten that threat. The truth is that nations join together in groups like the WTO not just to further their own prosperity, but also to forestall conflict with other nations. In a way, our planet has traded in the threat of a worldwide nuclear war for the benefit of cooperative global economics. Some Seattle protesters clearly fancy themselves to be in the mold of nuclear disarmament or anti-Vietnam War protesters of decades past. But they're not. They're special-interest activists, whether the cause is environmental, labor or paranoia about global government. Actually, most of the demonstrators in Seattle are very much unlike yesterday's peace activists, such as Beatle John Lennon or philosopher Bertrand Russell, the father of the nuclear disarmament movement, both of whom urged people and nations to work together rather than strive against each other. These and other war protesters would probably approve of 135 WTO nations sitting down peacefully to discuss economic issues that in the past might have been settled by bullets and bombs. As long as nations are trading peacefully, and their economies are built on exports to other countries, they have a major disincentive to wage war. That's why bringing China, a budding superpower, into the WTO is so important .As exports to the United States and the rest of the world feed Chinese prosperity, and that prosperity increases demand for the goods we produce, the threat of hostility diminishes. Many anti-trade protesters in Seattle claim that only multinational corporations benefit from global trade, and that it's the everyday wage earners who get hurt. That's just plain wrong. First of all, it's not the military-industrial complex benefiting. It's U.S. companies that make high-tech goods. And those companies provide a growing number of jobs for Americans. In San Diego, many people have good jobs at Qualcomm, Solar Turbines and other companies for whom overseas markets are essential. In Seattle, many of the 100,000 people who work at Boeing would lose their livelihoods without world trade. Foreign trade today accounts for 30 percent of our gross domestic product. That's a lot of jobs for everyday workers. Growing global prosperity has helped counter the specter of nuclear winter. Nations of the world are learning to live and work together, like the singers of anti-war songs once imagined. Those who care about world peace shouldn't be protesting world trade. They should be celebrating it.

### Econ

#### WTO boosts the US economy.

Daniel **Griswold. 2000**. “WTO Membership Good for California, U.S. Economy” [Director of the Center for Trade and Policy Studies @ CATO] <http://www.freetrade.org/node/197>

The WTO benefits the American economy by encouraging its 135 member nations to lower their trade barriers and keep them down. Trade liberalization at home brings the dynamic blessings of competition to the U.S. economy. It spurs innovation, controls costs, and keeps downward pressure on prices. For consumers, trade means lower prices, better quality, and wider variety, raising the real value of their wages. For domestic producers, trade allows access to lower-cost inputs and more sophisticated machinery. And for exporters, trade expands markets abroad, making possible larger production runs and cost savings through economies of scale.

### A2 WTO Defense

#### WTO massively expands free trade.

Daniel **Griswold. 2000**. “WTO Membership Good for California, U.S. Economy” [Director of the Center for Trade and Policy Studies @ CATO] <http://www.freetrade.org/node/197>

The WTO has also played an important role in facilitating trade liberalization in the rest of the world. Since the late 1940s, barriers against the free flow of goods and capital have been falling, with average global tariffs on manufactured goods down among industrialized countries from an average of more than 40 percent to under 4 percent today. The volume of world merchandise trade today is 16 times the volume in 1950, a rate of growth three times faster than the growth of global output

#### Collapse of the WTO means abusive trading practices – captures all their offense.

Kevin **Watkins. 2006**. Prospect Magazine. http://www.socialistpartyaustralia.org/archives/2003/08/23/cancun-and-world-trade-debate/

Some anti-globalisers will view any proposal to reform the WTO as ill-conceived. But what are the alternatives? If you want a glimpse into the future of a world with a weakened multilateral system take a look at the content of regional and bilateral trade pacts. Robert Zoellick, the US trade representative, now arrives at international meetings waving the US-Singapore free trade agreement and holding it up as a model for all countries. Its provisions include duty-free market access for US exports, a legal provision prohibiting future import taxes, unrestricted rights of entry and profit repatriation for US investors, and intellectual property rules that make the TRIPS agreement look tame. The US would probably be happy to see the end of the WTO and is busy building a trade empire that projects the realities of its unrivalled power. Witness the creation of a Middle East free-trade zone - and the decision not to allow Egypt entry as punishment for its refusal to support the US case against the EU over genetically modified food. The WTO’s rules are rigged in favour of the strong. Yet abolition is not an option. Apart from removing a source of pressure on the US and the EU to open markets, cut farm subsidies and halt protectionist abuses, it would risk a ruinous spiral of conflict. **Rich countries would bulldoze poor ones into deeply unequal trade treaties**. The multilateralism of convenience and bilateral power politics that the Bush administration is promoting in other international institutions would prevail. Ultimately, that is in nobody’s interest - Cancun is the place to draw a line in the Mexican sand.

#### The WTO promotes domestic and global free trade.

William **Lash and** Daniel **Griswold. 2000**. “WTO Report Card II: An Exercise or Surrender of US Sovereignty?”[Prof of Law @ George Mason +Assoc. Director for Trade and Policy Studies @ CATO] http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/briefs/tbp-009.pdf

Membership in the WTO is not a surrender of U.S. sovereignty but its wise exercise. The WTO encourages the United States to keep its own markets open for the benefit of U.S. consumers and import using industries. WTO membership also promotes trade liberalization abroad, which opens markets and keeps them open for U.S. exporters.

#### WTO diffuses trade conflict – prevents outbreak of WW3.

**World Trade Organization. 2003**. “10 Benefits of the World Trade Organization” <http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/whatis_e/10ben_e/10b01_e.htm>

Peace is partly an outcome of two of the most fundamental principles of the trading system: helping trade to flow smoothly, and providing countries with a constructive and fair outlet for dealing with disputes over trade issues. It is also an outcome of the international confidence and cooperation that the system creates and reinforces. History is littered with examples of trade disputes turning into war. One of the most vivid is the trade war of the 1930s when countries competed to raise trade barriers in order to protect domestic producers and retaliate against each others’ barriers. This worsened the Great Depression and eventually played a part in the outbreak of World War 2. Two developments immediately after the Second World War helped to avoid a repeat of the pre-war trade tensions. In Europe, international cooperation developed in coal, and in iron and steel. Globally, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was created. Both have proved successful, so much so that they are now considerably expanded — one has become the European Union, the other the World Trade Organization (WTO)

### Resource Scarcity Impacts

#### Resource shortages cause extinction

**Morgan 9** (Dennis Ray, Professor of Current Affairs – Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, South Korea, “World on Fire: Two Scenarios of the Destruction of Human Civilization and Possible Extinction of the Human Race”, Futures, 41(1), p. 684)

Could it be that humans are a sort of ‘‘biological error,’’ Chomsky ponders, ‘‘using their allotted 100,000 years to destroy themselves and in the process much else . . . with an assault on the environment that sustains life . . . and with a cold and calculated savagery, on each other as well?’’ [2]. Thus does Chomsky point to the two human-engineered, global ‘‘fires’’ that threaten the life of our planet: the burning of fossil fuels, spurring exponential global warming, and the threat of nuclear war ‘‘fires’’ as a result of militarization, wars of aggression, and the escalation of global conflicts. Both fires can be linked to the competition for ever-shrinking natural resources, and the escalation of such competition through global conflict threatens to create runaway conditions that could bring about global collapse or crash. The consequences of these two ‘‘runaway’’ fires are grave enough to consider the possibility of the complete destruction of human civilization or perhaps the extinction of the human species (as well as all else in the process) within the next 100 years.

#### Resource scarcity causes nuclear war and extinction

**Coombs 90** (H.C., Economist – Australian Nation University, Return of Scarcity: Strategies for an Economic Future, p. 42)

Furthermore, our occupancy of the environment is or threatens to be so complete, our effect on its resources and character so destructive, the possibilities of genetic damage to our own species so real, that the extinction of the human race – perhaps all forms of life – cannot be discounted, especially if the conflicts of interest provoked by competition for critical resources lead to the lunacy of **atomic war**.

### Resource Wars Impacts

#### Resource wars cause nuclear war and extinction

**Woolridge 9** (Frosty, Former Officer – US Army Medical Service Corps, “America Galloping Toward Its Greatest Crisis in the 21st Century”, The Examiner, 5-22, http://www.examiner.com/examiner/x-3515-Denver-Political-Issues-Examiner~y2009m5d22-America-galloping-toward-its-greatest-crisis-in-the-21st-century)

“It is clear that most politicians and most citizens do not recognize that returning to “more of the same” is a recipe for promoting the first **collapse of** a **global civilization**. The required changes in energy technology, which would benefit not only the environment but also national security, public health, and the economy, would demand a World War II type mobilization -- and even that might not prevent a global climate disaster. Without transitioning away from use of fossil fuels, humanity will move further into an era of resource wars (remember, Africom has been added to the Pentagon’s structure -- and China has noticed), clearly with intent to protect US “interests” in petroleum reserves. The consequences of more resource wars, many likely triggered over water supplies stressed by climate disruption, are likely to include **increased unrest** in poor nations, a **proliferation of** **w**eapons of **m**ass **d**estruction, **widening inequity** within and between nations, **and** in the worst (and not unlikely) case, **a nuclear war ending civilization**.

#### Resource wars go global and nuclear

**Klare 8** (Michael, Professor of Peace and World Security Studies – Hampshire College, “The Coming Resource Wars”, 3-10, <http://www.alternet.org/environment/33243>)  
  
It's official: the era of resource wars is upon us. In a major London address, British Defense Secretary John Reid warned that global climate change and dwindling natural resources are combining to increase the likelihood of violent conflict over land, water and energy. Climate change, he indicated, "will make scarce resources, clean water, viable agricultural land even scarcer" -- and this will "make the emergence of violent conflict more rather than less likely." Although not unprecedented, Reid's prediction of an upsurge in resource conflict is significant both because of his senior rank and the vehemence of his remarks. "The blunt truth is that the lack of water and agricultural land is a significant contributory factor to the tragic conflict we see unfolding in Darfur," he declared. "We should see this as a warning sign." Resource conflicts of this type are most likely to arise in the developing world, Reid indicated, but the more advanced and affluent countries are not likely to be spared the damaging and destabilizing effects of global climate change. With sea levels rising, water and energy becoming increasingly scarce and prime agricultural lands turning into deserts, internecine warfare over access to vital resources will become a global phenomenon. Reid's speech, delivered at the prestigious Chatham House in London (Britain's equivalent of the Council on Foreign Relations), is but the most recent expression of a growing trend in strategic circles to view environmental and resource effects -- rather than political orientation and ideology -- as the most potent source of armed conflict in the decades to come. With the world population rising, global consumption rates soaring, energy supplies rapidly disappearing and climate change eradicating valuable farmland, the stage is being set for persistent and worldwide struggles over vital resources. Religious and political strife will not disappear in this scenario, but rather will be channeled into contests over valuable sources of water, food and energy. Prior to Reid's address, the most significant expression of this outlook was a report prepared for the U.S. Department of Defense by a California-based consulting firm in October 2003. Entitled "An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for United States National Security," the report warned that global climate change is more likely to result in sudden, cataclysmic environmental events than a gradual (and therefore manageable) rise in average temperatures. Such events could include a substantial increase in global sea levels, intense storms and hurricanes and continent-wide "dust bowl" effects. This would trigger pitched battles between the survivors of these effects for access to food, water, habitable land and energy supplies. "Violence and disruption stemming from the stresses created by abrupt changes in the climate pose a different type of threat to national security than we are accustomed to today," the 2003 report noted. "Military confrontation may be triggered by a desperate need for natural resources such as energy, food and water rather than by conflicts over ideology, religion or national honor." Until now, this mode of analysis has failed to command the attention of top American and British policymakers. For the most part, they insist that ideological and religious differences -- notably, the clash between values of tolerance and democracy on one hand and extremist forms of Islam on the other -- remain the main drivers of international conflict. But Reid's speech at Chatham House suggests that a major shift in strategic thinking may be under way. Environmental perils may soon dominate the world security agenda. This shift is due in part to the growing weight of evidence pointing to a significant human role in altering the planet's basic climate systems. Recent studies showing the rapid shrinkage of the polar ice caps, the accelerated melting of North American glaciers, the increased frequency of severe hurricanes and a number of other such effects all suggest that dramatic and potentially harmful changes to the global climate have begun to occur. More importantly, they conclude that human behavior -- most importantly, the burning of fossil fuels in factories, power plants, and motor vehicles -- is the most likely cause of these changes. This assessment may not have yet penetrated the White House and other bastions of head-in-the-sand thinking, but it is clearly gaining ground among scientists and thoughtful analysts around the world.For the most part, public discussion of global climate change has tended to describe its effects as an environmental problem -- as a threat to safe water, arable soil, temperate forests, certain species and so on. And, of course, climate change is a potent threat to the environment; in fact, the greatest threat imaginable. But viewing climate change as an environmental problem fails to do justice to the magnitude of the peril it poses. As Reid's speech and the 2003 Pentagon study make clear, the greatest danger posed by global climate change is not the degradation of ecosystems per se, but rather the disintegration of entire human societies, producing wholesale starvation, mass migrations and recurring conflict over resources. "As famine, disease, and weather-related disasters strike due to abrupt climate change," the Pentagon report notes, "many countries' needs will exceed their carrying capacity" -- that is, their ability to provide the minimum requirements for human survival. This "will create a sense of desperation, which is likely to lead to offensive aggression" against countries with a greater stock of vital resources. "Imagine eastern European countries, struggling to feed their populations with a falling supply of food, water, and energy, eyeing Russia, whose population is already in decline, for access to its grain, minerals, and energy supply." Similar scenarios will be replicated all across the planet, as those without the means to survival invade or migrate to those with greater abundance -- producing endless struggles between resource "haves" and "have-nots." It is this prospect, more than anything, that worries John Reid. In particular, he expressed concern over the inadequate capacity of poor and unstable countries to cope with the effects of climate change, and the resulting risk of state collapse, civil war and mass migration. "More than 300 million people in Africa currently lack access to safe water," he observed, and "climate change will worsen this dire situation" -- provoking more wars like Darfur. And even if these social disasters will occur primarily in the developing world, the wealthier countries will also be caught up in them, whether by participating in peacekeeping and humanitarian aid operations, by fending off unwanted migrants or by fighting for access to overseas supplies of food, oil, and minerals.When reading of these nightmarish scenarios, it is easy to conjure up images of desperate, starving people killing one another with knives, staves and clubs -- as was certainly often the case in the past, and could easily prove to be so again. But these scenarios also envision the use of more deadly weapons. "In this world of warring states," the 2003 Pentagon report predicted, "nuclear arms proliferation is inevitable." As oil and natural gas disappears, more and more countries will rely on nuclear power to meet their energy needs -- and this "will accelerate nuclear proliferation as countries develop enrichment and reprocessing capabilities to ensure their national security." Although speculative, these reports make one thing clear: when thinking about the calamitous effects of global climate change, we must emphasize its social and political consequences as much as its purely environmental effects. Drought, flooding and storms can kill us, and surely will -- but so will wars among the survivors of these catastrophes over what remains of food, water and shelter. As Reid's comments indicate, **no society**, however affluent, **will escape involvement in** these forms of **conflict**.

## Arctic

**Uniqueness: Artic War Coming**

**Russian military aggression is high now – conflicts will occur in the future**

**Weitz 11/21** (Richard – Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at Hudson Institute, “The Focus of Russian Military Means”, 2012, http://www.sldinfo.com/the-focus-of-russian-military-means/)

Despite the reformers’ goal of redirecting Russian strategic thought away from fighting the West to winning localized conflicts, Russia’s military doctrine **and recent military exercises** **still identify** resisting NATO **aggression as a major task** of the Russian armed forces. The 2010 Military Doctrine describes NATO’s growing military infrastructure near Russia’s border as well as the alliance’s alleged efforts to acquire “global functions in contravention of international law” as potentially threatening Russia’s military security. An important consideration affecting how Russians approach military reform is their expectations of **the nature of future wars**—especially the questions of the main sources of military threats and how they might manifest themselves. The most basic consideration is that Russian leaders still see themselves as threatened from hostile forces that must be dealt with through military means. Although individuals differ on what they see as the main threats, there is a pervasive sense that, under certain conditions, Russia could **come into conflict** with certain foreign countries if it fails to have an effective military. Mostly these possible adversaries are seen as Western states, but some Russian strategists, thinking ahead, consider China and possibly Iran as emerging threats.

**Arctic on the brink of great-power conflict – diplomacy is no longer an option**

**Tassinari 9/7** (Fabrizio Tassinari is a non-resident Senior Fellow at the German Marshall Fund and the Head of Foreign Policy and EU Studies at the Danish Institute for International Studies, September 7, 2012, “Avoiding a Scramble for the High North”, http://blog.gmfus.org/2012/09/07/avoiding-a-scramble-for-the-high-north/)

**The geopolitics of the Arctic are stuck in a paradox**: The more regional players restate the importance of international cooperation, the more some pundits and policymakers seem to conclude that the Arctic **risks descending into competition and even conflict.** The world is awakening to the growing strategic importance of the High North. As the Arctic ice melts due to global warming, it opens up new opportunities, from shorter shipping lanes to newly accessible oil and **gas reserves**; respectively, about 13 percent and 30 percent of the world’s undiscovered resources are in the Arctic, according to the U.S. Geological Survey. These discoveries are usually followed by declarations of the littoral nations to the effect that any potential disagreements over them will be resolved peacefully. However, beneath expressions of goodwill, the Arctic debate is often characterized **by a sense of urgency**, and even forms of alarmism. In recent years, instances of growing securitization of the Arctic have abounded. Back in 2008, a paper by Javier Solana, then the EU’s foreign policy’s chief, and the European Commission warned about “potential conflict over resources in Polar regions” as they become exploitable due to melting ice. In 2010, NATO’s supreme allied commander in Europe, Adm. James Stavridis, argued that “for now, the disputes in the North have been dealt with peacefully, but climate change could alter the equilibrium.” Then there are actions that speak louder than prepared speeches — from the famous August 2007 expedition that planted a Russian flag on the North Pole’s seabed to the annual summer military exercises carried out by Canada to assert its sovereignty in the North. Although the Russian stunt was most likely aimed at nationalist domestic audiences, some observers view these exercises as the expressions of competing national interests. As the scholar Scott Borgerson ominously put it: “The Arctic powers **are fast approaching diplomatic gridlock**, and **that could eventually lead to the sort of armed brinkmanship** that plagues other territories.” The geopolitical constellation in and around the region provides a ready justification for such an assessment. While no-one really imagines the United States, Canada, Norway, and Denmark fighting over the Arctic, some of their politicians have occasionally framed rhetoric in more peppered terms than one might expect. **Russia**, the fifth Arctic littoral nation, typically treads a fine line between declarations of cooperation and **an innate instinct for great-power competition**. Add to that the EU, which is seeking to carve its own role, and Asia’s giants, above all China, for which the opening of the Northeast passage may reduce sailing distance with Europe by some 40 percent, **and it is not hard to conjure up the prospect of an Arctic race building up.**

### Russian Drilling = Conflict

#### Russian drilling in the arctic causes resource conflict

**Cohen and Altman 11** (Ariel Cohen, Ph.D. is a Senior Research Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy at the Heritage Foundation, Anton Altman is a research volunteer at The Heritage Foundation, August 16, 2011, “Russia’s Arctic Claims: Neither LOST nor Forgotten”, http://blog.heritage.org/2011/08/16/russias-arctic-claims-neither-lost-nor-forgotten/)

Moscow has an unquestionable head start on the rest of the world, and it is not shy about investing in its ambitions. At least six new icebreakers and Sabetta, a new year-round port on the arctic shores—costing $33 billion—are on the agenda, but Prime Minister Putin has said the Kremlin is “open for a dialogue with our foreign partners and with all our neighbors in the Arctic region, but of course we **will defend our own geopolitical interests firmly** and consistently.” Or as they said in Soviet times, “What is mine is mine, and what is yours is negotiable.” The Arctic is of vital geopolitical importance not just to Russia, but to the entire world. **It has enormous quantities of hydrocarbon energy and other natural resources**, and as the Arctic is no longer completely icebound, in summertime it may become an important transportation route vital to U.S. national security. Despite this, at present the U.S. has made virtually no effort **to strengthen its position** in the frozen final frontier. The chief concern is America’s lack of icebreakers—even Canada and Finland have more than the United States. Icebreakers are vital to exploring the Arctic and enforcing one’s sovereignty there. As of 2010, Russia had 29 icebreakers in total and was building more. The United States had two (including one that is obsolete), with no plans to expand. The Heritage Foundation has exposed this problem extensively: The United States **has significant geopolitical and geo-economic interests in the High North**, but the lack of policy attention and insufficient funding have placed the U.S. on track **to abdicate its national interests in this critical region**. The United States **must strengthen its position in the Arctic** and make its interests clear to friend and foe alike. Washington should reach out to the Arctic Council members to block Russia’s expansion plans at the U.N. Meanwhile, the U.S. should fund and build its icebreaking squadron and deploy it in Alaska. Russia’s Arctic aspirations are a serious geopolitical challenge for U.S. and allied interests. America’s security and economic prosperity in the 21st century will depend on U.S. ability to access polar waters and the Arctic Ocean bed.

### Spills Add-On: 2AC

#### Spill happens in the arctic – kills biodiversity

Kollewe and Macalister 12

[Julia and Terry, The Guardian, 4/11/12, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/apr/12/lloyds-london-warns-risks-arctic-oil-drilling>]

Lloyd's of London, the world's biggest insurance market, has become the first major business organisation to raise its voice about huge potential environmental damage from oil drilling in the Arctic. The City institution estimates that $100bn (£63bn) of new investment is heading for the far north over the next decade, but believes cleaning up any oil spill in the Arctic, particularly in ice-covered areas, would present "multiple obstacles, which together constitute a unique and hard-to-manage risk". Richard Ward, Lloyd's chief executive, urged companies not to "rush in [but instead to] step back and think carefully about the consequences of that action" before research was carried out and the right safety measures put in place. The main concerns, outlined in a report drawn up with the help of the Chatham House thinktank, come as the future of the Arctic is reviewed by a House of Commons select committee and just two years after the devastating BP blowout in the Gulf of Mexico. The far north has become a centre of commercial attention as global temperatures rise, causing ice to melt in a region that could hold up to a quarter of the world's remaining hydrocarbon reserves. Cairn Energy and Shell are among the oil companies that have either started or are planning new wells off the coasts of places such as Greenland and Canada, while Total – currently at the centre of a North Sea gas leak – wants to develop the Shtokman field off Russia. Shtokman is the largest single potential offshore Arctic project, 350 miles into the Russian-controlled part of the Barents Sea, where investment could reach $50bn. A BP joint venture is planning to spend up to $10bn on developing onshore oilfields in the Yamal-Nenets autonomous area of Russia, despite its experiences with the Macondo oil spill in the relatively benign waters of the Gulf. A series of onshore mining schemes are also planned, with Lakshmi Mittal, Britain's richest man, wanting to develop a new opencast mine 300 miles inside the Arctic circle in a bid to extract up to £14bn of iron ore. But the new report from Lloyd's, written by Charles Emmerson and Glada Lahn of Chatham House, says it is "highly likely" that future economic activity in the Arctic will further disturb ecosystems already stressed by the consequences of climate change. "Migration patterns of caribou and whales in offshore areas may be affected. Other than the direct release of pollutants into the Arctic environment, there are multiple ways in which ecosystems could be disturbed, such as the construction of pipelines and roads, noise pollution from offshore drilling, seismic survey activity or additional maritime traffic as well as through the break-up of sea ice." The authors point out that the Arctic is not one but several ecosystems, and is "highly sensitive to damage" that would have a long-term impact. They are calling for "baseline knowledge about the natural environment and consistent environmental monitoring". Pollution sources include mines, oil and gas installations, industrial sites and, in the Russian Arctic, nuclear waste from civilian and military installations, and from nuclear weapons testing on Novaya Zemlya. The report singles out a potential oil spill as the "greatest risk in terms of environmental damage, potential cost and insurance" – but says there are significant knowledge gaps in this area. Rates of natural biodegradation of oil in the Arctic could be expected to be lower than in more temperate environments such as the Gulf of Mexico, although there is currently insufficient understanding of how oil will degrade over the long term in the Arctic. Sea ice could assist in some oil-spill response techniques, such as in-situ burning and chemical dispersant application, but this could lead to air pollution and the release of chemicals into the marine environment without knowing where moving ice will eventually carry them. Unclear legal boundaries posed by a mosaic of regulations and governments in the Arctic are an additional challenge. The Lloyd's report notes that there is no international liability and compensation regime for oil spills. An EU proposal under discussion would apply to offshore oil projects in the Arctic territories of Norway and Denmark, and possibly to all EU companies anywhere they operate. Meanwhile, a taskforce is drawing up recommendations for the intergovernmental Arctic Council on an international instrument on marine oil pollution designed to speed up the process for clean-up and compensation payments, due for release next year. This may include an international liability and compensation instrument. Greenland has argued that "different national systems may lead to ambiguities and unnecessary delays in oil pollution responses and compensation payments" and that any regime must adapt as understanding of the worst-case scenario in the Arctic changes. The Lloyd's report says the "inadequacies" of both company and government in the event of a disaster were demonstrated after the Macondo blowout. A smaller company than BP, faced with estimated $40bn clean-up and compensation costs, might have gone bankrupt, leaving the state to foot the bill, it notes. Lloyd's says it is essential that there is more investment in science and research to "close knowledge gaps, reduce uncertainties and manage risks". It calls for sizeable investment in infrastructure and surveillance to enable "safe economic activity" and argues that "full-scale exercises based on worst-case scenarios of environmental disaster should be run by companies". The Arctic's vulnerable environment, unpredictable climate and lack of a precedent on which to base cost assessments have led some environmental NGOs to argue that no compensation would be worth the risk of allowing drilling to take place in pristine offshore areas. Others are campaigning for more stringent regulations and the removal of the liability cap for investors.

**Extinction**

**Ford 3** (Violet, Vice President – Inuit Circumpolar Conference, “Global Environmental Change: An Inuit Reality”, 10-15, http://www.mcgill.ca/files/cine/Ford.pdf)

The Arctic ecosystem is a fundamental contributor to **global processes** and the balance of **life on earth**. Both the unique physical and biological characteristics of the Arctic ecosystem play key roles in maintaining the integrity of the global environment. Massive ice sheets and ice cover regulate the global temperatures by reflecting much of the solar radiation back into space, the Arctic ocean influences global ocean currents which are responsible for a variety of weather conditions and events, to name but two. The Arctic is also the recipient of the by-products of southern-based industry and agricultural practices. In February 2003, UNEP’s Governing Council passed a resolution effectively recognizes the Arctic as a **“barometer”** or indicator region **of the globe’s environmental health**. This is important and is further reason why Arctic indigenous peoples should work together at the international level. Late last year ICC and RAIPON participated in the Global Environment Facility (GEF) Council meeting in Beijing, China with the aim of sensitizing this organization to the Arctic dimension of global environmental issues. I understand that the GEF is now willing to consider indigenous peoples and their organizations to be distinct and separate from environmental and other NGO’s.

### Drilling = Spills Ext.

**Arctic conditions cause accidents**

**Cunningham 12**

[Nicholas, Policy Analyst at the American Security Project, August 2012, <http://americansecurityproject.org/ASP%20Reports/Ref%200076%20-%20Offshore%20Oil%20Drilling%20in%20the%20Arctic.pdf>]

Offshore oil drilling is a highly complex and technologically advanced industrial activity. The Deepwater Horizon blowout demonstrated that despite innovative technology, drilling is inherently a risky operation and safety is not absolutely certain. The problems with drilling safety are compounded in the Arctic. Shorter days, harsh weather, presence of ice and lack of infrastructure are just some of the additional problems in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas that do not exist in the Gulf of Mexico. Aware of these risks, Shell has only been given legal permission to drill during the warmer months of July to October. 52 Additionally, lessons learned from the Deepwater Horizon blowout have not translated into increased safety for offshore oil and gas drilling, as accidents around the world continue. In the spring of 2012, French oil and gas firm Total finally plugged a well in the North Sea that spewed natural gas for nearly two months. 53 Chevron Corp. faces up to $22 billion in environmental damages in Brazil, for allowing 3,000 barrels of crude oil to leak into the ocean off the coast of Rio de Janeiro in November 2011. 54 Executives are potentially facing time in prison. Shell is also facing litigation in Nigeria for its accident at its Bonga offshore oil facility in December 2011. Fifty-five local communities in Nigeria impacted by the oil spill are filing a case against Shell for spilling 40,000 barrels of oil into the ocean. 55 While the industry would claim that drilling operations have grown much safer since the Deepwater Horizon and that these are isolated incidents, they merely demonstrate that offshore oil drilling remains an inherently risky activity

### Arctic Fragile: Ext

#### Arctic uniquely vulnerable to bioaccumulation of toxins

Hamilton 4 (Sarah R. Hamilton is a class of 2004 candidate for the Juris Doctor degree at the University of Colorado School of Law in Boulder, Colorado. She received a B.A. in History from Duke University, “Toxic Contamination of the Arctic: Thinking Globally and Acting Locally to Protect Arctic Ecosystems and People,” Winter, 2004, 15 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 71)

The unique characteristics of Arctic flora and fauna, which render them perfectly suited to the harsh climate of the far north, also tend to make them peculiarly vulnerable to toxic contamination. n116 Plants in the nutrient-poor climate conserve energy by holding their leaves year-round, which allows sediments from air pollution to build up for years before passing on to grazers. n117 In addition, the short Arctic growing season occurs in the spring, when the snow cover melts and light returns, [\*86] so contaminants trapped in the snow are released at exactly the time plants are taking in nutrients. n118 This accelerated intake is especially pronounced in food chains involving shorebound water plants and plankton, as contaminants trapped at river mouths are released close to shore and taken in by the fauna that is most accessible to land mammals and coastal water animals, and thus most likely to join the food chain. n119 These characteristics therefore tend to magnify the contamination of ambient air, land, and water beginning at the most fundamental unit of Arctic food webs. n120 At each step of the food chain, POPs and heavy metals bioaccumulate and concentrations rise. Marine pollution poses particular dangers because marine food chains tend to be the longest, n121 so pollution levels in the ocean are magnified many times over in top-level marine predators. n122 Some high-level predators can accumulate 70,000 times the contaminant concentration of the ambient water, n123 and since northern seas are more heavily polluted than those in other regions the concentrations can reach unprecedented levels. n124 Both marine and terrestrial animals in the Arctic have certain characteristics that facilitate their survival in the harsh environment, but also, incidentally serve to maximize contaminant concentrations. Because of the dearth of nutrients in their diets, animals take longer to store enough energy to reproduce and therefore have low birth rates and are older - and therefore more contaminated - when they do reproduce and pass their contaminant burdens on to their young in utero. n125 In addition, substantial fat reserves are necessary to stay warm and survive the long winters, but also provide the perfect vehicle for lipid-soluble POPs. n126 Arctic people and carnivorous animals preferentially eat fat and fatty tissues for their high energy content, which augments the concentration of contaminants at higher levels of predation. n127

#### Extinction

Montague 91(Peter, editor, Rachel’s Health and Envt. Weekly, “Real Hope For The Great Lakes: Local Groups Form 'Zero Discharge Alliance,” Rachel’s Health and Environment Weekly, March 20th 1991, #225)

Bioaccumulative toxins are dangerous because amounts that seem harmless are multiplied as they pass through the food chain; often the result is environmental destruction. The adverse consequences of bioaccumulative toxins may become understood only after it is too late. For example, human breast milk is now contaminated with hundreds of persistent, bioaccumulative toxins (see RHWN #193), but the effects of these poisons upon breast-fed infants is not known except in rare cases. Such dousing of infant children with persistent, bioaccumulative toxins is a massive experiment; the full results may become known in the future, but one thing is known beyond any doubt today: it cannot help the human species to expose it from birth onward to a constant bath of industrial toxins. (People who are tempted to think that the human species might be improved by random meddling with our genetic structure should remind themselves that a human is something like a TV set [though of course much more complex] and the hope of improving a human by randomly introducing poisons into its diet at an early age is like splashing hot solder into a TV set's electronic circuits hoping to improve the picture.) It is important to note that many of the most toxic, persistent, and bioaccumulative chemicals are formed by the use of the element chlorine. DDT, PCBs, dioxins, CFCs, and many pesticides are chlorine compounds. Most people know of chlorine because it disinfects their drinking water, kills germs in the local swimming pool, or bleaches their clothes in the washing machine. Unfortunately, when it is used by industry, chlorine produces a broad spectrum of toxins that persist in the environment and bioaccumulate. In a very real sense, chlorine lies at the heart of the toxics problem, world-wide. For two decades, government has tried to control toxic pollutants one at a time, by establishing the exact amount that could be safely released into the environment, issuing "permits" giving industry permission to discharge toxics into air and water, then trying to police the polluters to force compliance with the permitted limits. The entire effort was foolish from the start: there are over 40,000 chemicals in use today and 1000 to 2000 new ones enter commercial channels each year. Meanwhile during its 20-year effort, government has managed to establish "safe" limits for fewer than 100 chemicals. Meanwhile, government has gone ahead and issued permits that ignored most chemicals entirely (because there was no basis for saying how much was safe). Finally, government never showed any real interest (or ability) in enforcing these silly per-mits. A classic house of cards. This wrong-headed effort at pollution control (instead of pollution prevention) has led to massive damage to wildlife throughout the Great Lakes (see RHWN #146) and, worldwide, a dangerous accumulation of toxics in creatures that eat at the top of the food chain, like large birds, large fish, bears, and humans. It is now crystal clear that the old way has been a complete failure, which, if it is continued, can only lead to the extinction of humans.

## Oil Dependence

### Middle East Dependence Kills Heg

**Oil Dependence Keeps the U.S. bogged down in the Middle East- this trades off with preventing terror, prolif and sustaining Heg**

**Miller 12**

[Paul, assistant professor of international-security studies at the National Defense University, “Fading Arab Oil Empire”, 6/28/12, <http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-fading-arab-oil-empire-7072?page=1>]

SINCE 1945, the United States has rightly sought to prevent any single power from dominating the Middle East’s oil supplies. An oil hegemon, whether Soviet, Baathist, Nasserite, Iranian or Islamist, would have had the capacity to blackmail the United States and the world with economic warfare. To that end, the United States supported anticommunist monarchies and autocracies in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain, among others, during the Cold War. It has armed Saudi Arabia with a staggering $81.6 billion of arms sales since 1950, almost a fifth of all U.S. weapons shipments. It supported Iraq against Iran in the 1980s before fighting Iraq to defend Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in 1990–1991. After the 2001 terrorist attacks, it further bolstered ties in the region, adding Kuwait, Bahrain and Morocco to its collection of major non-NATO allies, which includes Egypt, Israel and Jordan. In 2003, it invaded and occupied Iraq over fears, later proven overblown, that Iraq’s WMD proliferation might give Saddam Hussein or allied terrorists unacceptable leverage in the region. The U.S. military’s Central Command, formed in 1983, has a forward headquarters in Qatar, and the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet is based in Bahrain. This military infrastructure guarantees a long-term U.S. military presence in the region. Those policies were largely sensible efforts to maintain the security of world energy supplies. However, they make less sense in light of the brewing realities in the world oil market. These developments—the world’s increasing energy efficiency and the Middle East’s loss of its comparative advantage in oil production—will take time to play out fully. But they have been under way for several decades already. In two decades or so, the global oil market and the Middle East’s geopolitical influence will be dramatically different from what they are today. The Middle East will remain an important player, but it will no longer be able to act as the “central bank of oil,” as the princes of Saudi Arabia style their kingdom. Moreover, it will forever lose the ability to credibly threaten to wield oil as a weapon. The sword of Damocles that has implicitly hovered over the West since the 1970s will be gone. That means the central goal of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East will essentially be achieved: no power will be able to threaten the United States with unacceptable leverage over the American economy. That is because oil itself will be less important, and the world oil market will be more diffuse and diverse. The importance of this development cannot be overstated. It is a tectonic shift in the geopolitical balance of power, a strategically pivotal development **only slightly less momentous than the fall of the Soviet Union**. It is the slow-motion collapse of the Middle Eastern oil empire. In turn, the United States can and should begin to adapt its foreign policy to reflect these realities. It can look with more complacency on the rise and fall of particular regimes across the Middle East and North Africa. The Arab Spring, even if it brings to power moderate Islamist governments, is unlikely to threaten American interests. Washington also can play a less active part in conflicts between states, reverting to a role more like its indirect support for Iraq against Iran and less like its direct involvement in the 1991 and 2003 Iraq wars. Further, it can speak out more freely against tyranny and human-rights abuses, especially in Saudi Arabia, one of the most oppressive countries on earth. It can reclaim its position as the advocate of global liberalism, undoing the damage to the U.S. brand done by its close association with Middle Eastern dictators. THE UNITED States has additional interests in the Middle East, but they are outweighed by those in other parts of the world. For example, the region is a hotbed of terrorism and may become a major locus of WMD proliferation. But South Asia hosts terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda, that threaten the United States more directly. Further, South Asia is home to two declared nuclear powers. Thus, South Asia—not the Middle East—should be the focus of U.S. counterterrorism and counterproliferation efforts in coming decades. Additionally, the Middle East has two of the world’s most important choke points for ocean-going trade: the Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz. But governments in the region, heavily reliant on exports, have strong interests in keeping trade routes open. Despite Iranian leaders’ recent threats, no government is likely to cut off its own economic lifeline voluntarily. Meanwhile, the Malacca Strait in East Asia will remain important for a diverse array of ocean-going trade for the foreseeable future. Finally, the United States rightly is committed to Israel’s security. If Iran succeeds in building a nuclear weapon, Israel could face a potential existential threat—the same threat fellow U.S. allies in East Asia, including South Korea, Taiwan and Japan, have been facing from North Korea since 2006. Once again, U.S. interests in the Middle East are no more, and probably less, important than U.S. interests in other regions. The changing realities of the world energy market do not mean the United States can or should ignore the Middle East. Certainly, Israel’s security and Iran’s behavior will keep the region a focus for policy makers’ attention. But, placed in a global perspective, the United States has more or deeper interests at stake in other regions of the world—especially Europe and Asia—than in the Middle East. Budget cuts are concentrating minds inside the Beltway with newfound discipline. And a new presidential term begins next January, either with President Obama or Mitt Romney taking over. This confluence of events gives American policy makers a powerful opportunity to reassess U.S. grand strategy, along with its attendant military-deployment and force structure. As they do so, they should recognize the emerging realities in the Middle East. Our rationale for guaranteeing the region’s stability in exchange for cheap oil is fading, and that mission quickly is becoming more trouble than it is worth.

### Mid-East Oil Dependence = Terrorism

#### Dependence on Middle Eastern oil fuels Terrorism

**Surveyor 10** [American Surveyor, expert researchers on hydrocarbon depletion, August 8th, 2010, “Seven Dangerous Side Effects of US Dependence on Foreign Oil” http://peakoil.com/production/seven-dangerous-side-effects-of-the-u-s-dependency-on-foreign-oil/]

It makes us vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Terrorism is a reality of the modern world. Terrorism is not the product of Islam; rather it is the manifestation of a particular political agenda. All terrorist groups in the Middle East share a hatred for Israel, but seldom have major attacks impacting the United States had much to do with our support of Israel. Instead, most of these groups’ grievances relate to the effects of oil policies. Take, for example, the story of the nation’s most wanted terrorist—Osama bin Laden. As an insurgent against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Bin Laden was a de facto U.S. ally, and few dispute the claim that he received support from the CIA. Things changed in 1990 when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia came under threat. The Saudi royal family turned to the U.S. for assistance. Bin Laden offered to defend the country himself with his mujahedeen fighters but was turned down. After Saddam was expelled from Kuwait, the U.S. stationed as many as 20,000 troops in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other nations surrounding Iraq to contain any future threat. The U.S. response and the ability to assemble a broad international coalition had nothing to do with sympathy for Kuwait or feigned outrage at Saddam Hussein’s audacity to invade a sovereign neighbor. The U.S. and the rest of the world were understandably frightened of the prospect of Saddam controlling over 38 percent of the world’s oil and all of the world’s swing capacity. If he were allowed to control Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, Saddam would have had nearly absolute control over world oil prices. The presence of troops began to breed resentment, especially in Saudi Arabia, where Islamic extremists were particularly insulted by the American presence so close to Islam’s holiest sites. It was the decision to keep U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia that many believe was the critical catalyst that would lead to the September 11 attacks. With U.S. troops set to be in the region seemingly indefinitely, hatred for America and the terrorist attacks that stem from that hatred are not likely to cease.

#### Reducing Middle East Oil Dependence is key to solve Terrorism

**Parmley 6** (Julia Parmley-writes for University of Delaware newspaper, April 6 2006, "U.S must end dependency on oil, experts say," http://www.udel.edu/PR/UDaily/2006/apr/global040606.html).

Depending on volatile countries in the Middle East for oil poses a threat to national security, Gal Luft, co-director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, said Wednesday evening, April 5, during a Global Agenda series lecture at UD. “The reality is most of the world's oil is concentrated in areas and countries that are unstable, corrupt, dictatorial and, in some cases, deeply resentful of the United States,” he said. “Seventy-one percent of the world's oil reserves are in the hands of Muslim countries at a time in which our relationship with the Muslim world is at an all-time low.” In his lecture, Luft said lack of oil in the U.S. increases its dependency on other countries. Although the U.S. possesses only 3 percent of the world's oil, it consumes 25 percent. Luft, co-chairperson of the Set America Free Coalition, said the U.S. is supporting terrorism by paying Middle Eastern countries for their oil. “We are funding those countries that are the richest proliferators of radical Islam,” he said. “We are fighting the war on terrorism, and we are paying for both sides of the war. On one hand, we are sending our troops and daughters all over the world to fight for freedom and democracy. At the same time, every time we arrive into a gas station, we end up sending dollars and cents to those who don't like us.” Luft: “Sixty percent of our oil is coming from abroad, and this figure is growing by the day.” Luft said the U.S. cannot win the war on terror while relying so heavily on the Middle East. “I do not think we can meet these goals as long as we are dependent on oil, to the degree that we are today,” he said. “Sixty percent of our oil is coming from abroad, and this figure is growing by the day.” Luft said terrorists are targeting the U.S. through oil pipeline sabotage. More than 1.5 billion barrels of oil have been lost as a result of sabotage. Luft also said the U.S. could be exhausting the reserve of cheap oil and that oil prices could rise in the next five years. The U.S. needs to find alternatives to oil, Luft said. Instead of gasoline, flexible fuels--such as ethanol, methane and electricity--can be used to power cars, he said. Noting that it could take 20 years to replace an oil-dependent economy, Luft said that it is critical to the country's safety and prosperity to begin the transformation now. “Everyday we delay the beginning of the process is one more day, in the future, we will have to be under severe adversity,” he said. Luft said the U.S. should take the lead in lessening its dependence on oil and that other countries will follow.

### Middle East Terror Impact

#### Middle East terrorism goes global

Byman 05 (Daniel, Dir – Center for Peace and Security Studies – Georgetown U., FDCH, 9-8, Lexis)

The September 11, 2001 attacks demonstrated the danger that terrorism emanating from the Middle East can pose to the United States. Almost 3,000 people died on that day because of the hatred and machinations of the people of the region, not their governments. Today, much of this danger goes beyond the Middle East as traditionally defined and includes South Asia, Southeast Asia, parts of Africa, and Europe. The Middle East, however, remains the heart of much of the problem and this is likely to remain an issue in the future. The jihadists have proven skilled in blaming the region's many problems on the United States. Bin Ladin's message -- that the United States, as opposed to regional regimes, was responsible for the economic and political problems of the region -- had at best limited penetration in the Middle East, even as late as September 2001. But the Iraq war and the plunging popularity of the United States have made Bin Ladin's arguments credible to increasing numbers of people in the Middle East. The numbers of recruits and supporters of terrorist movements have grown since September 11. It is possible that several Middle Eastern terrorist groups may shift their focus from local regimes to the United States in the coming years. In Iraq, such a mix of antiregime and anti-U.S. terrorism has already demonstrated its lethality. Thus far, groups like the Palestinian HAMAS or the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria have concentrated on local regimes, not on killing Americans. Should these fighters embrace Bin Ladin's call for striking at the United States, it would greatly add to the cadre and network of the anti-U.S. jihadists. Parts of the Algerian Islamist militant community have already moved toward embracing a broader, more global agenda. Regimes in the Middle East have so far kept a lid on terrorism and dissent primarily through repression. As long as the regimes remain relatively strong, this remains a viable if brutal approach. Should the legitimacy crisis grow more extreme in countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, violent radicals will have far more opportunities to recruit and carry out operations.

### Middle East Bioterror Impact

#### Middle Eastern terror will be biological

Roberts 04 (Brad Roberts, 04, Research Fellow in International Security Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and former editor of The Washington Quarterly, "The Prospects for Biological War in the Middle East,”)  
Transnational terrorists have exhibited a strong interest in mass casualty techniques.  This has most recently been demonstrated by the Al Qaeda hijacking of four U.S. airliners on 11 September 2001, and ramming them into the Pentagon and two towers of the World Trade Center.  Such terrorists are not constrained in the way that traditional terrorist actors have been by the need to calibrate their use of violence.  Osama bin Laden has deemed the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction to be a "holy duty."   The collateral effects their use would produce could have been seen by bin Laden not as alienating or de-legitimizing, but as useful, demonstrating that the U.S. regime in power cannot protect its people.  There may also be a particular appeal to biological weapons derived from the special abhorrence they generate; within the region there is a tradition of combating foreign invaders with weapons and tactics that are especially offensive to those invaders.  The purpose of choosing such especially offensive techniques is to communicate social rage against that invader.  It is also to generate fear, as the invader must contemplate the barbarity of those faced by overwhelming conventional military power.  Osama bin Laden also reflects the revolutionary's desire to use violence to raise the stakes in a game that he wants to see accelerate and intensify.   In his case, he might also have been attempting to get the U.S. to strike back in such a way as to alienate and further radicalize the Muslim world, triggering an even wider holy war.

#### Extinction

Ochs 02 (Richard, June 9, pg. <http://www.freefromterror.net/other_articles/abolish.html>)

Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a known cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on earth. Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control. Biological weapons, on the other hand, can get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination is over, it is over. With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever. Potentially worse than that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE.

### Bioterror = Extinction Ext

#### A bioterror attack is the most likely risk for extinction- its effects cannot be predicted making response impossible and spread immediate

Steinbruner 97 (John, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and Sydney Stein, Jr. chair in international security and vice chair of the committee on international security and arms control of the National Academy of Sciences, "Biological weapons: a plague upon all houses." Foreign Policy)

Although human pathogens are often lumped with nuclear explosives and lethal chemicals as potential weapons of mass destruction, there is an obvious, fundamentally important difference: Pathogens are alive, weapons are not. Nuclear and chemical weapons do not reproduce themselves and do not independently engage in adaptive behavior; pathogens do both of these things. That deceptively simple observation has immense implications. The use of a manufactured weapon is a singular event. Most of the damage occurs immediately. The aftereffects, whatever they may be, decay rapidly over time and distance in a reasonably predictable manner. Even before a nuclear warhead is detonated, for instance, it is possible to estimate the extent of the subsequent damage and the likely level of radioactive fallout. Such predictability is an essential component for tactical military planning. The use of a pathogen, by contrast, is an extended process whose scope and timing cannot be precisely controlled. For most potential biological agents, the predominant drawback is that they would not act swiftly or decisively enough to be an effective weapon. But for a few pathogens - ones most likely to have a decisive effect and therefore the ones most likely to be contemplated for deliberately hostile use - the risk runs in the other direction. A lethal pathogen that could efficiently spread from one victim to another would be capable of initiating an intensifying cascade of disease that might ultimately threaten the entire world population. The 1918 influenza epidemic demonstrated the potential for a global contagion of this sort but not necessarily its outer limit.

**Most likely type of terror- 6 reasons and this answers their defense**

**Caldwell and Williams 06** (Daniel Caldwell is a distinguished Professor of Political Science at Pepperdine University and Robert E. Williams, Jr. is Associate Professor of Political Science at Pepperdine University, Seeking Security in an Insecure World, 2006, pg. )

Biological weapons pose a particularly significant threat due to certain characteris-tics, some of which are unique and some of which are shared with other weapons of mass destruction. First, unlike nuclear weapons, for example, biological weapons can be produced without a large supporting industrial infrastructure. A typical college or even high school laboratory could be used to produce biological weapons. This leads to a second characteristic, low production cost. Third, biological weapons are accessi-ble to rogue states and terrorist groups, a characteristic related to ease of manufacture, low production cost, and the relative ease with which clandestine manufacture and shipment can occur. While sophisticated systems like missiles or bombs can be used to deliver biological weapons, they are not required. Thus, ease of delivery is a fourth threat-enhancing characteristic of biological weapons. Fifth, the extraordinary lethal-ity of many types of biological weapons makes them especially worrisome. Sixth, these weapons are very small; an anthrax spore may be just one to five microns in diameter, which is one fiftieth the width of a human hair.

### Bio-Terror: A2 Too Hard

#### Easy for terrorists to create bioweapons

Wagner 06 (Abraham R. Wagner, JD, PhD, Adjunct Professor in the School of International and Public Affairs at Colombia, Countering Terrorism and WMD: Creating a Global Counter-Terrorism Network, Ed. Peter Kotana, Michael Intriligator, and John P. Sullivan, 2006, pg. 124)

The first major question here is therefore how difficult is it for a terrorist group to obtain or manufacture significant quantities of bioagents? Certainly it would be much easier for a terrorist group to accomplish this than manu-facture an operational nuclear weapon. Indeed, the skills, materials and other resources necessary to manufacture biological agents are nowhere near as difficult as the nuclear weapons case. The various bio-toxins themselves, such as the three illustrated in Table 7.2, are well known. Anthrax, for example, has been around for centuries and is no state secret. 26 The bio-technology by which anthrax spores can be reproduced into the quantities needed for a bio-weapon is neither secret nor exceedingly difficult. In short, it would be possible for a dedicated terrorist group to manufacture several kilograms of anthrax spores for a weapon, either outside the target nation or at a covert facility inside the target nation. The specific laboratory technolo-gies needed are common to the pharmaceutical industry and the dairy indus-try, and are not the subject of international controls and are in fact readily available on the world market. Common laboratory supplies can be easily obtained from commercial suppliers or from the internet, and are largely uncontrolled, unregulated and unknown. A terrorist group could easily con-struct a substantial laboratory with equipment and supplies purchased anonymously.

### A2 No Motivation: 2AC

#### Motivation high

Goodin 06 (Robert E. Goodin is Distinguished Professor of Social and Political Theory at the Australian National University, What’s Wrong with Terrorism?, pg. 138-9)

It was once thought that larger strategic considerations would inhibit terrorists from using weapons of mass destruction. It would simply not be prudent for terrorists who are in pursuit of specific objectives that required broad public sympathy to engage in the radically indiscriminate destruction, such as that entailed by the use of nuclear weapons or the uncontrolled spreading of an epidemic. 74 Recent decades, however, have seen the emergence of ‘new terrorism’ of a sort that is more Messianically motivated or millenarian-oriented. Being less concerned with external support among non-believers, such groups might be less reluctant to employ indiscriminately weapons of mass destruction. 75 On the contrary, ‘inflicting a scourge on the heretics or infidels may be seen as performing a sacramental act, manifesting divine retribution that morally justifies mass murder.’ 76 Once upon a time it was further thought ‘that a biological attack is unlikely precisely because the devastation from such an attack cannot be limited’, and would spread to the attackers’ own people as well as among those they meant to attack. But again, that may no longer be such a compelling argument, insofar as contemporary terrorists are infused with a spirit of martyrdom that extends that exalted status even to unknowing or unwilling victims of the epidemics that they initiate.

## A2 Saudi Disad

**Oil Not Key to Relations**

#### Oil isn’t key to the US-Saudi relationship

**Alterman** 5/22/**08** (Jon, Director of Middle East Program @ CSIS, "Understanding Saudi-US Relations: A Conversation with Jon Alterman," http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/articles/2008/interviews/080521-alterman-interview.html)

Alterman: There are two issues. First I don’t think people appreciate how much we do with Saudi Arabia. It’s just not understanding the importance of Saudi Arabia to the U.S. in a myriad of ways. **It’s not just energy**. It’s not just security. It comes to economic issues, counterterrorism issues, regional diplomacy issues. There’s a centrality and importance to Saudi Arabia that I think most Americans don’t have an appreciation for.

#### Energy doesn’t control the US-Saudi relationship AND there are considerable differences on both sides

**Alterman** 5/22/**08** (Jon, Director of Middle East Program @ CSIS, "Understanding Saudi-US Relations: A Conversation with Jon Alterman," http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/articles/2008/interviews/080521-alterman-interview.html)

Jon B. Alterman: What’s striking is just how rich the US-Saudi relationship is. **It’s not just an energy relationship**. It’s not just a security relationship. It has to do with virtually everything the U.S. does in the Middle East. The relationship has gone from being a comfortable relationship **to one with considerable sensitivities on both sides,** and many more sensitivities in public than officials have in private.

**Oil Not Key to Econ**

**Non oil sectors key**

**AME 07**

[Middle East Business Resources, Mark 2007, <http://www.ameinfo.com/113150.html>]

Non-oil private sector growth is expected to grow by around 6 per cent this year and be the Kingdom's **main engine** of economic expansion along with government spending. Since joining the World Trade Organisation Saudi non-oil exports, mainly petrochemicals, have risen 13 per cent to a value of $20 billion. Significantly foreign direct investment in the Kingdom has more than doubled to $5.6 billion There have been no sudden dramatic adverse effects on agency agreements and the trading sector as a result of membership of the World Trade Organisation. This is helping to underpin Saudi Arabia's economic reform programme.

**High Prices Kill Econ**

**High prices Hurt Saudi and global Econ- They want low prices**

**Naimi 12**

[Ali Naimi, Financial Times, 3/28/12, [http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9e1ccb48-781c-11e1-b237-00144feab49a.html#axzz1z1Z5piSN](http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9e1ccb48-781c-11e1-b237-00144feab49a.html" \l "axzz1z1Z5piSN)]

High international oil prices are bad news. Bad for Europe, bad for the US, bad for emerging economies and bad for the world’s poorest nations. A period of **prolonged high prices is bad for all oil producing nations, including Saudi Arabia**, and they are bad news for the energy industry more widely. It is clear that sustained high prices are starting to take their toll on European economic growth targets. They are contributing to trade balance deficits and feeding inflationary pressures. It is an unsatisfactory situation and one Saudi Arabia is keen to help address. In an interconnected world, European economic growth is in our national interest. No one benefits from a stagnating European economy and we want to do what we can to help encourage growth. Needless to say, Saudi Arabia does not control the price; it sells its crude oil according to international prices. But it remains the world’s largest producer, and the country with the greatest proven reserves, so it has a responsibility to do what it can to mitigate prices. The bottom line is that **Saudi Arabia would like to see a lower price**. It would like to see a fair and reasonable **price that will not hurt the global economic recovery**, especially in emerging and developing countries, that will generate a good return for producing nations, and that will attract greater investment in the oil industry.

**No Saudi Prolif**

**No Saudi prolif**

**Lippman 11—**Thomas W., senior adjunct scholar at the Council on Foreign Relations, August 5th, "Saudi Arabia's Nuclear Policy", Saudi-US Relations Information Service, 2011, <http://www.susris.com/2011/08/05/saudi-arabia%E2%80%99s-nuclear-policy-lippman/>

It is highly unlikely, however, that Saudi Arabia would wish to acquire its own nuclear arsenal or that it is capable of doing so. King Abdullah’s comments should not be taken as a dispositive statement of considered policy. There are compelling reasons why Saudi Arabia would not undertake an effort to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, even in the unlikely event that Iran achieves a stockpile and uses this arsenal to threaten the Kingdom. Money is not an issue — if destitute North Korea can develop nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia surely has the resources to pursue such a program. With oil prices above $90 a barrel, Riyadh is flush with cash. But the acquisition or development of nuclear weapons would be provocative, destabilizing, controversial and extremely difficult for Saudi Arabia, and ultimately would be more likely to weaken the kingdom than strengthen it. The kingdom has committed itself to an industrialization and economic development program that depends on open access to global markets and materials; becoming a nuclear outlaw would be fatal to those plans. Pursuing nuclear weapons would be a flagrant violation of Saudi Arabia’s commitments under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and would surely cause a serious breach with the United States. Saudi Arabia lacks the industrial and technological base to develop such weapons on its own. An attempt to acquire nuclear weapons by purchasing them, perhaps from Pakistan, would launch Saudi Arabia on a dangerously inflammatory trajectory that could destabilize the entire region, which Saudi Arabia’s leaders know would not be in their country’s best interests. The Saudis always prefer stability to turmoil. Their often-stated official position is that the entire Middle East should become an internationally supervised region free of all weapons of mass destruction.

**Saudi Arabia won’t proliferate – science and technological barriers and strong US security guarantees.**

**Posen 2006**

[12/2/6, Barry, Professor of Political Science at MIT, Century Foundation Report, “A

Nuclear-Armed Iran: A Difficult but Not Impossible Policy Problem”, http://www.tcf.org/publications/internationalaffairs/posen\_nuclear-armed.pdf]

Saudi Arabia does not, however, have a developed nuclear science and technology effort. And it does not have the other industrial capabilities needed to support a nuclear weapons program and associated delivery systems. Saudi Arabia would thus take quite a long time to develop its own nuclear forces, and like Egypt, would be vulnerable in the interval. They would have to rely on an external guarantee, and the guarantor probably would not want to be a party to any nuclear program. With its wealth, however, it cannot be ruled out that the Saudis would simply try to buy nuclear weapons. They would need more than a few to compete with an Iranian program, and they would need delivery systems. Pakistan seems the only possible source, but it is under a great deal of scrutiny. Pakistan would face enormous pressure not to transfer complete weapons to another party. Finally, Saudi Arabia does have good reason to believe that outsiders are committed to its security. The United States and other great powers have extensive economic and military interests in maintaining Saudi security. The United States has demonstrated its commitment in many ways, including war. The Saudis are accustomed to security cooperation with the United States. A U.S. guarantee likely would prove the most attractive option for Saudi Arabia.

**A2 Turns Heg**

**Saudi Arabia isn’t key to power projection**

**Duros and Williams 07** (SGM Paul Duros United States Army Sergeant Major Academy Class 58 CSM (R) Diane Williams, “ Saudi Arabia's Vast Oil Reserves and Location are not Critical to the United States Militarily” <http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p15040coll2/id/3161>, 11/27/07)

So you can see that although the continuing presence of foreign troops was a source of tension between the royal family and its citizens. Saudi Arabia's vast oil reserves and location are not critical to the United States militarily for two main reasons. First, the U.S. imports the majority of its oil from Non-OPEC countries. Saudi Arabia only provides the U.S. with a small portion of the monthly oil purchases. Finally, The Kingdom’s national makeup strives to maintain a conservative Islamic view. The Kingdom’s royal family does not wish to lose face within the Arab world by allowing a western super power, the United States, to remain on its soil.

## Cuba Add-On

### 2AC

#### Venezuelan economic strength key to Cuban Stability

Arlidge 13 (John, The Sunday Times, London, “Viva la revolucion: Cuba turns capitalist; Raul Castro, Fidel's brother, hopes that a liberalised private sector will prevent economic collapse,” 5-13-13)

Cuba is changing. Raul Castro, 81, who took over as president from his ailing brother Fidel, 86, in 2008, has introduced laws enabling Cubans to set up small businesses, hire staff and pay what they want. Previously, everyone worked for the state and salaries were limited to a meagre $20 ((EURO)15) a month. This being Cuba, Raul cannot bring himself to utter the "c" word - capitalismo. Instead, he insists he is "welcoming socialist entrepreneurs into the broader nonstate sector". In the sunscorched streets around the Capitolio in central Havana, meanwhile, Marie-Helena Barrios hawks glittery bras, nail polish and guayabera, traditional linen shirts. On the tree-lined Prado, Jorge Martorell, a budding estate agent, offers homes for sale at (EURO)10,000 to (EURO)300,000. It's not hard to explain Cubans' new-found passion for the once-reviled art of making money. The economy has collapsed. Wages are less than half their 1989 level in real terms. Unemployment is officially a record 3.8% but judging by the number of people on the streets in Havana, the real figure is much higher. Food production has withered. Fifty years ago, the largest, most fertile country in the Caribbean grew one-third of the world's sugar. Today, Cuba imports more than half of its food, including sugar, at a cost of almost $2bn a year, forcing its balance of payments into the red. The country only functions at all thanks to a sweetheart deal with Venezuela. Havana supplies about 50,000 doctors and intelligence and security experts to Caracas. In return, Caracas provides cheap oil - 115,000 barrels a day, about two-thirds of Cuba's consumption, worth some $3.5bn a year. Additional investment takes Venezuela's overall support for Cuba to about $5bn a year. The deal was agreed by Fidel Castro and former Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez, who died in March. If Venezuela's new president, Nicolas Maduro, renegotiates the agreement - and many analysts say that with Venezula's economy slumping he has no choice - Cuba will grind to a halt.

# Topicality

## 2AC

### A2 Topicality: 2AC

#### Counter-interpretation – Economic engagement includes a government-to-government quid pro quo offer of the removal of trade restrictions

Haass 2K (Richard N. Haass formerly a senior aide to President George Bush, is Vice President and

Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Fellow with the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution “Terms of Engagement: Alternatives to Punitive Policies,” *Survival*, vol. 42, no. 2, Summer 2000, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2000/6/summer%20haass/2000survival.pdf>)

Many different types of engagement strategies exist, depending on who is engaged, the kind of incentives employed and the sorts of objectives pursued. Engagement may be conditional when it entails a negotiated series of exchanges, such as where the US extends positive inducements for changes undertaken by the target country. Or engagement may be unconditional if it offers modifications in US policy towards a country without the explicit expectation that a reciprocal act will follow. Generally, conditional engagement is geared towards a government; unconditional engagement works with a country’s civil society or private sector in the hopes of promoting forces that will eventually facilitate cooperation. Architects of engagement strategies can choose from a wide variety of incentives. Economic engagement might offer tangible incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology, loans and economic aid.3 Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties such as trade embargoes, investment bans or high tariffs, which have impeded economic relations between the United States and the target country. Facilitated entry into the economic global arena and the institutions that govern it rank among the most potent incentives in today’s global market. Similarly, political engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic recognition, access to regional or international institutions, the scheduling of summits between leaders – or the termination of these benefits. Military engagement could involve the extension of international military educational training in order both to strengthen respect for civilian authority and human rights among a country’s armed forces and, more feasibly, to establish relationships between Americans and young foreign military officers. While these areas of engagement are likely to involve working with state institutions, cultural or civil-society engagement entails building people-to-people contacts. Funding nongovernmental organisations, facilitating the flow of remittances and promoting the exchange of students, tourists and other non-governmental people between countries are just some of the possible incentives used in the form of engagement.

### Topicality: 1AR

#### Solves Limits – Economic Engagement can be conditional

Kahler and Kastner, 2006 [¶ Miles Kahler Scott L. Kastner¶ Department of Government and Politics¶ University of Maryland¶ Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies¶ University of California, San Diego “STRATEGIC USES OF ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE:¶ ENGAGEMENT POLICIES IN SOUTH KOREA, SINGAPORE, AND TAIWAN¶ “ Journal of peace reseach vol 43 number 5]

ECONOMIC ENGAGMENT: STRATEGIES AND EXPECTATIONS

Scholars have usefully distinguished between two types of economic engagement: conditional policies that require an explicit quid-pro-quo on the part of the target country, and policies that are unconditional.[[1]](#endnote-1) Conditional policies, sometimes called “linkage” or economic “carrots,” are the inverse of economic sanctions. Instead of threatening a target country with a sanction absent a change in policy, conditional engagement policies promise increased economic flows in exchange for policy change. Drezner’s (1999/2000) analysis of conditional economic inducements yields a set of highly plausible expectations concerning when conditional strategies are likely to be employed, and when they are likely to succeed. Specifically, he suggests that reasons exist to believe, a priori, that policies of conditional engagement will be less prevalent than economic sanctions. First, economic coercion is costly if it fails (sanctions are only carried out if the target country fails to change policy), while conditional engagement is costly if it succeeds (economic payoffs are delivered only if the target country does change policy). Second, states may be reluctant to offer economic inducements with adversaries with whom they expect long-term conflict, as this may undermine their resolve in the eyes of their opponent while also making the opponent stronger. Third, the potential for market failure in an anarchic international setting looms large: both the initiating and the target states must be capable of making a credible commitment to uphold their end of the bargain. These factors lead Drezner to hypothesize that the use of economic carrots is most likely to occur and succeed between democracies (because democracies are better able to make credible commitments than non-democracies), within the context of international regimes (because such regimes reduce the transactions costs of market exchange), and, among adversaries, only after coercive threats are first used.

# Politics

## Link Ans.

### Dems Link Turn

#### Democrats support engaging Venezuela

DNC 12 (Democratic National Committee, “2012 Democratic National Platform: Moving America Forward” 2012, <http://www.democrats.org/democratic-national-platform>)

In Africa, the administration engaged to ensure a legitimate transfer of power in Cote d'Ivoire, supported the independence of South Sudan, and remains actively involved in resolving the issues between Sudan and South Sudan. In the Americas, we see vibrant democracies in countries from Mexico to Brazil and Costa Rica to Chile. We have also seen historic peaceful transfers of power in places like El Salvador and Uruguay. Yet despite the region's democratic progress, stark inequalities in political and economic power endure. We will continue to press for more transparent and accountable governance. And we will promote greater freedom in Cuba and Venezuela until all their citizens enjoy the universal rights they deserve. Under President Obama, we have undertaken the most significant efforts in decades to engage the Cuban people. We have focused on the importance of the family ties between Cuban Americans and their relatives still living under oppression. Because of steps the President has taken, it is now possible for Cuban Americans to visit and support their families in Cuba, and to send remittances that reduce the Cuban people's dependence on the Cuban state. We have taken additional steps to bolster Cuban civil society, expanding purposeful exchanges that bolster independent religious groups on the island and enhancing the free flow of information to, from, and among the Cuban people. Going forward we will continue to support the Cuban people's desire to freely determine their own future.

#### Democrats are positively disposed towards Venezuela

Carroll 7 (Joseph, “Republicans' and Democrats' Ratings of Nations,” 2-27-07, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/26659/republicans-democrats-ratings-nations.aspx>)

PRINCETON, NJ -- Gallup's Feb. 1-4 World Affairs poll finds Republicans and Democrats differ in their overall views of many nations around the world. Republicans are much more likely than Democrats to favorably rate Israel, Afghanistan, and Iraq, while Democrats are much more positive about France, Venezuela, and Mexico. Republicans' ratings of Iraq and Afghanistan have declined over the past year, and their ratings of Mexico have been lower over the past two years than at any other point since 2001. Ratings of France among Democrats are at their highest point since the Iraq war began, but are lower and have been relatively steady among Republicans in recent years. Republicans and Democrats show only modest variation in their views of North Korea and Iran.

1. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)